NON-SUBSTANTIAL INDIVIDUALS
IN ARISTOTLE’S CATEGORIES

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Aristotle’s Categories\(^1\) classifies entities by using two predication relations, being ‘said of’ a subject and being ‘in’ a subject.\(^2\) Four kinds of entity emerge from this classification: (i) things that are neither ‘said of’ nor ‘in’ a subject; (ii) things that are ‘said of’ a subject but not ‘in’ a subject; (iii) things that are both ‘said of’ a subject and ‘in’ a subject; and (iv) things that are ‘in’ a subject but not ‘said of’ a subject.\(^3\)

It is clear what sorts of entities belong in the first three of these classes: Socrates, man (the species), and colour (the species), respectively. But the nature of entities in the fourth class—that of non-substantial individuals—has been a matter of intense debate over the past few decades. The traditionally accepted view, which I shall call the ‘traditional view’, is that a non-substantial individual is a property that cannot be shared by (be ‘in’) more than one individual substance; thus, on this view, the individual white ‘in’ Socrates

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\(^1\) In this paper I mostly rely on, but occasionally differ from, J. L. Ackrill’s translation in Aristotle: Categories and De interpretatione [Categories], translation and notes (Oxford, 1963).

\(^2\) I shall use the terms ‘said of’ and ‘in’ in quotation marks when they are meant in Aristotle’s technical sense. Likewise, it is the technical sense of ‘in’ that is meant when I refer to the ‘x is in y’ relation.

\(^3\) Aristotle’s classification of entities into four kinds based on the two predication relations was the first formulation of a theory which has largely dominated the history of metaphysics; the four classes have been traditionally known as: (a) individual substances, (b) universal substances, (c) universal accidents, and (d) individual accidents, corresponding to (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) above, respectively. See I. Angelelli, ‘Accidents, III: The Ontological Square’, in H. Burkhardt and B. Smith (eds.), Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology (Philadelphia, 1991), 12–13, and id., Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1967), 9–36.
cannot also be ‘in’ Plato (or anyone else). This interpretation of the Categories was challenged by Owen, setting off the modern debate. Owen and Frede⁴ have argued that non-substantial individuals are maximally determinate properties, which can be shared by more than one individual substance; on this view, an individual white would be a particular shade of white, which could be ‘in’ both Socrates and Plato. One way of putting the difference is that the latter view does, whereas the former view does not, allow the recurrence of non-substantial individuals.

In this paper I shall defend a version of the latter view, arguing that the non-substantial individuals of the Categories may be ‘in’ several individual substances. I shall proceed by first discussing, and offering an interpretation of, 1²⁴–⁵, the critical passage that the traditional view originates from. After defending an interpretation of 1²⁴–⁵ that allows recurrence, I shall argue, in Section 2, that the interpretation commonly held by proponents of the traditional view is inconsistent with various passages in the Categories. In my third section I shall challenge attempts to find other passages that support the traditional view, and I shall show that the traditional view does not enjoy the purported textual support.

I

The traditional view originates from a single sentence in the second chapter of the Categories:

ἐν ὑποκειµένω δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι µὴ ὡς µέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν µοι ἐστίν.

(1²⁴–⁵)

By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.

Advocates of the traditional view have generally taken this sentence to mean the following:

(T) x is ‘in’ y iff

⁶ I adopt the usual abbreviation ‘iff’ for ‘if and only if’. 
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(i) \( x \) is in \( y \),
(ii) \( x \) is not part of \( y \),
(iii) \( x \) cannot exist independently of \( y \).\(^8\)

Now \( x \) could not be dependent on \( y \) if it were also ‘in’ \( z \), where \( x \) is a non-substantial individual, and \( y \) and \( z \) are individual substances.\(^7\)

\(^7\) There has been some debate about whether to take the ‘in’s occurring in the \textit{definiens} (or \textit{explanans}, depending on one’s view) at 1A24–5 in the technical sense. Defenders of the traditional view such as Ackrill, D. T. Devereux (‘Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle’s Categories’ [‘Primary Substance’], \textit{Ancient Philosophy}, 12 (1992), 113–31), and M. V. Wedin (‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, \textit{Phronesis}, 38 (1993), 157–65) have argued that they could not be the same, as that would lead to a vicious circularity. Ackrill (who takes 1A24–5 to provide a definition) maintains that these two ‘in’s must be understood in the ordinary-language sense, such that being ‘in’ a subject (in the technical sense) is defined in terms of being in a subject in the ordinary sense. The difficulty here is that this makes being in something in the ordinary sense a requirement of being ‘in’ something. Yet many things that are ‘in’ something are clearly not in those things in the ordinary sense: neither five-foot nor double is ordinarily said to be ‘in’ anything. Seeing that ‘Not all non-substances are naturally described in ordinary language as [in] substances’, Ackrill proposes to help Aristotle by bringing in other ordinary locutions such as something being of another thing, belonging to it, etc. (Ackrill, \textit{Categories}, 74). But as Allen points out, many non-substantial entities cannot be captured by such locutions: neither English nor Greek allows us to say that ‘yesterday’, or ‘five-foot’, or ‘larger than’ is in, of, or belongs to, Socrates. Ackrill’s definition thus sets up a requirement that is not met by many non-substantial entities.

In defence of taking the two ‘in’s in the technical sense, R. E. Allen has argued that rejecting circular definitions of this sort (i.e. where the \textit{definiendum} recurs in the \textit{definiens}) ‘appeals to an over-narrow notion of definition’ and that such definitions can be informative: ‘they are informative when they mark off the sense intended from other senses with which it may be confused’ (‘Substance and Predication in Aristotle’s \textit{Categories}’, in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (eds.), \textit{Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos} (Assen, 1973), 362–73 at 364). Here too the intended sense of ‘in’ is marked off by distinguishing the sense in which something is in another as separate. Though I am sympathetic towards Allen’s view, I believe that a convincing case can be made for it only if we suppose, as I do, that 1A24–5 does not offer a formal definition but is, instead, an explanatory remark for which it is reasonable to lower our standards of precision. But once the sentence is understood in this relatively loose way, the trouble facing Ackrill’s interpretation may be excused as well. In the final analysis, I find it difficult to determine which of these two views provides a more plausible account of the text. Luckily, I do not need to make that choice: my interpretation of 1A24–5 works under either scenario, since I do not take 1A24–5 to be offering a formal definition, as I explain below.

\(^8\) I shall be referring to this clause also as the inseparability condition. Though Aristotle speaks of existing separately (\( \chiωρίς εἶναι \)), it is uncontroversial that this can be rendered in terms of dependence. Whether in terms of dependence or inseparability, the clause has generally been understood as saying that ‘if \( y \) does not exist \( x \) cannot exist’. The traditional reading of 1A24–5 relies on this understanding of the clause.

\(^9\) The significance of this qualification about \( x \), \( y \), and \( z \) will be clarified shortly.
In other words, the individual white ‘in’ Socrates cannot also be ‘in’ Plato, since it would then be capable of existing independently of Socrates. Thus it is claimed that all non-substantial individuals in the Categories can be ‘in’ a single individual substance only. But as Owen and Frede have argued, the sentence need not be understood in this way. On Frede’s reading, 1A24–5 is not about the ‘x is in y’ relation at all, but rather about the class of things that are ‘in’ something (i.e. properties). Frede’s reading can be formulated thus:

(F) x is ‘in’ a subject iff there is a subject y such that
   (i) x is in y,
   (ii) x is not a part of y,
   (iii) x cannot exist independently of y.

As can be seen, the three clauses (i–iii) are identical to those of T, and the difference is only in the introductory clause—’x is “in” a subject iff there is a subject y such that’ as opposed to ‘x is “in” y iff’. The critical and intended consequence is that, on this reading, ‘x is “in” z’ does not entail ‘x cannot exist independently of z’, unless it so happens that z = y. Hence, the fact that a non-substantial individual is ‘in’ an individual substance does not prevent it from also being ‘in’ another individual substance—non-substantial individuals can recur.

I agree with Frede that 1A24–5 is not about the ‘x is in y’ relation but rather about the class of things that are ‘in’ something. Aristotle has just introduced a class of entities that are ‘in’ a subject (τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειµένω µέν ἐστι ...) and he is now telling us something about what kinds of things he has in mind, how these things actually relate to their subjects. (ἐν ὑποκειµένω δὲ λέγω δ ... ) But Frede’s view is that the sentence offers a definition of things that are ‘in’ something, and this I have a disagreement with.

11 Frede actually argues that ‘The “in” in the definiens does not do any work’ and that we can formulate 1A24–5 without the first clause—’x is in y’ (‘Individuals’, 62). I have formulated his view without removing the first clause so as not to distract from its critical difference from T. Frede’s motivation to drop the first clause seems to be to avoid the problem of circularity I mention above. But this approach too depends on reading 1A24–5 without the sort of precision that we expect from formal definitions, since Aristotle does mention that the property has to be in the subject from which it is inseparable. I do not think that we are at liberty to excuse this requirement if we understand the sentence, with Frede, as setting the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a property.
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He takes the definition to be this: ‘What is characteristic of the members of [the class of entities that are in something] is that, for each of them, we can specify at least one subject of which it is true that it could not exist without that subject.’\(^{12}\) This is not, however, true of secondary substances, things that are ‘said of’ something but not ‘in’ anything; of all the things they are ‘said of’, there is no particular one without which they cannot exist. The species man could not exist if there were no men at all, but there is no single man without which the species could not exist;\(^ {13}\) the same is true of animal—it could not exist if there were no animals at all, but there is no individual animal, nor any one species (man, dog, cat, etc.) without which it could not exist. Hence, species and genera of substances are excluded by Frede’s definition. But differentiae are not: differentiae (of substances) are things that are ‘said of’, but not ‘in’, other things (3\(^2\)1–8). ‘Rational’ is ‘said of’ man—it is what sets these animals apart as a particular species. However, in chapter 3 Aristotle maintains that a differentia that occurs in one genus cannot occur in any other genera. As Frede writes, ‘If “rational” were the differentia specifica that constitutes the species man, “rational” could not also, at least not in the sense relevant to the species man, appear in another genus.’\(^ {14}\) This implies that, for differentiae, there is a subject without which they cannot exist, namely the species that they constitute; rational is ‘said of’ man, and without man, rational cannot exist. Frede tries to overcome this difficulty in the following way:

Now it seems as if Aristotle wishes to rule out precisely this case by requiring, in 1\(^{a}\)24–25, not only that there must be a subject, without which the thing in question could not exist, but also that this thing must not be a part of its subject. The differentia specifica, however, is a part of the species, since it constitutes it. This interpretation presupposes that Aristotle is thinking of conceptual parts, when he is speaking of parts in 1\(^{a}\)24–25.\(^ {15}\)

To support this presupposition, Frede appeals to the passage 3\(^{2}\)29–32. There Aristotle argues that the claim that parts of substances are substances is compatible with the claim that what is ‘in’ a subject cannot be a substance; for parts of substances are not ‘in’ substances (in the technical sense of ‘in’). Here Aristotle is clearly

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\(^{12}\) Frede, ‘Individuals’, 59. As we have seen, for colour the relevant subject is body, and for knowledge it is soul.

\(^{13}\) And, of course, man is only ‘said of’ individual men.


\(^{15}\) Ibid.
referring back to 1\textsuperscript{24–5}, where parts of things were excluded from the class of things that are ‘in’ something.\textsuperscript{16} Frede argues that, at 3\textsuperscript{29–32}, Aristotle must be speaking not of physical parts of substances but of conceptual parts, since otherwise this passage would make little sense in the context in which it occurs. — ‘For both the preceding as well as the following lines deal with genera, species, and differentiae.’\textsuperscript{17} He then reasons that if the parts at 3\textsuperscript{29–32} are conceptual parts, then so are those at 1\textsuperscript{24–5}, to which this passage refers. Hence, Frede concludes, the reason why Aristotle mentions parts at 1\textsuperscript{24–5} is precisely to avoid the problem with differentiae and exclude them from the class in question.

This argument strikes me as altogether unconvincing. First, it is clear that 3\textsuperscript{29–32} is concerned with parts of substances which are themselves substances—the whole point of the passage is to assure the reader that the status of these parts as substances is not threatened. And it is also clear from 3\textsuperscript{21–8} that differentiae are not substances: there Aristotle argues that although differentiae are not substances, they, like substances, are not ‘in’ anything. Hence, the parts discussed at 3\textsuperscript{29–32} cannot include differentiae, and this contradicts the premiss that is key to Frede’s argument.\textsuperscript{18} Second, it makes perfect sense to discuss physical parts in the context of 3\textsuperscript{29–32}. Aristotle has claimed at 3\textsuperscript{20} that no substance can be ‘in’ a subject. A concern may naturally arise as to whether physical parts of substances, being in them (in the colloquial sense), cannot be substances; 3\textsuperscript{29–32} is addressing this worry. What is more, the passages that precede and follow 3\textsuperscript{29–32} deal at least as much with substances as they do with genera, species, and differentiae. Therefore, there appears to be absolutely no reason why discussing physical parts of substances would not fit well within the context.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} The reference is clear, not merely because the same point is being invoked but also because of the particular language Aristotle uses: ‘For when we spoke of things in a subject we did not mean things belonging in something as parts.’

\textsuperscript{17} Frede, ‘Individuals’, 62.

\textsuperscript{18} Devereux (‘Primary Substance’) makes this objection against Frede also.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. R. Heinaman, ‘Non-Substantial Individuals in the Categories’, \textit{Phronesis}, 26 (1981), 295–307 at 301–2. There is yet another point which casts doubt upon Frede’s view that 1\textsuperscript{24–5} means to exclude differentiae from the class of things that are ‘in’ something: at 3\textsuperscript{21–8} Aristotle discusses the question of whether differentiae are ‘in’ something and gives reasons why they are not; here, if anywhere, one would expect Aristotle to refer to 1\textsuperscript{24–5} if that passage indeed played the role that Frede claims it does. However, Aristotle makes no mention of that passage, either at 3\textsuperscript{21–8}, or in any other passage where differentiae are discussed.
For the reasons given above, Frede fails in his attempt to overcome the problem with differentiae, which discredits his interpretation of \(1^24-5\) as a definition of the class of things that are ‘in’ something.\(^*\)

Another weakness of Frede’s view is his interpretation of the inseparability condition stipulated by the sentence. If the sentence does not say that ‘if \(x\) is “in” \(y\), \(x\) cannot exist independently of \(y\)’, what does it say \(x\) is dependent on? On Frede’s view, the answer comes in the following sentence, at \(1^28\), where Aristotle claims that an individual white is ‘in’ body since all colour is ‘in’ body. All colour is, necessarily, in body (i.e. the genus body) and hence, body is the thing without which no colour can exist. Similarly, Frede argues, every property occurs within a particular range of objects, and the corresponding species or genus will be the universal that the property is inseparable from.\(^\text{21}\)

While it seems right that there is such a universal for every property, Frede is mistaken in thinking that this is what Aristotle claims at \(1^24-5\). Identifying universals as the things that properties are dependent on seems inconsistent with the ontological priority given to individual substances (which Aristotle appropriately calls ‘primary substances’)—“if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist” (\(2^B6\)). And as Frede is aware, Aristotle thinks that a property is ‘in’ a secondary (general) substance if and only if it is ‘in’ a primary substance of which the

\(^*\) This difficulty with differentiae disappears if we do not read the sentence as offering a definition: if the sentence provides only necessary conditions for being ‘in’ a subject, that the conditions are satisfied by differentiae would not place them in the class of things that are ‘said of’ a subject and things that are ‘in’ a subject: Aristotle never appeals to \(1^24-5\) in order to determine whether something is ‘said of’ or ‘in’ a subject; a distinction between being ‘said of’ and being ‘in’ a subject is given at \(2^19-34\), and it is this distinction he appeals to when he argues that secondary substances are not ‘in’ species but are not ‘said of’ species (\(3A15-21\); cf. \(3A25-28\)) (Devereux, ‘Primary Substances’, 125). Also in favour of this view of \(1^24-5\) are the following considerations. (i) The sentence occurs as a parenthetical remark, and hence it does not seem that Aristotle took it to be a critical claim which establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for his technical term, being ‘in’ a subject. (ii) If, in this critical paragraph (\(1^20-1^210\)), Aristotle were in fact giving a definition of one of his technical terms, it would be reasonable to expect a definition of the other, i.e. being ‘said of’ a subject. Yet, Aristotle does not do this and so I think we have less reason to look for a definition in \(1^24-5\). (Owen avoids problems on this point merely by remaining silent about the exact significance of \(1^24-5\).)

secondary substance is the species or genus ($A^3_{34–5} B^{5}$). Therefore, to read $A^{24–5}$ as giving the ontological pride of place to secondary substances puts an unnecessary strain on the text.

I think that Owen is on the right track here: what Aristotle means to say is that if $x$ is a property, it cannot exist without something to contain it. That is to say, what Aristotle gives us here is a foretaste of the view he puts forward later in the *Categories*, that all other things—including properties—depend on primary substances for their existence. As Owen points out, there is evidence that taking ‘cannot exist separately from what it is in’ in this general way ‘is matched by the familiar phrasing of Aristotle’s other complaints at Plato’s separation of the universal’.

As stated earlier, I believe that Frede is right in taking $A^{24–5}$ to be about properties, but wrong in taking it to provide a definition. The sentence provides only necessary conditions for being a property, and this serves Aristotle’s purposes sufficiently. This reading of $A^{24–5}$ can be formulated as follows:

(N) $x$ is ‘in’ a subject only if there is (at least) a subject $y$ such that
(i) $x$ is in $y$,
(ii) $x$ is not a part of $y$,
(iii) $x$ cannot exist independently of $y$.

As with F, N allows recurrence and cuts off the lifeblood of the traditional view. But more needs to be said to explain why Aristotle is asserting N at $A^{24–5}$.

What I suggest is this: Aristotle’s aim at $A^{24–5}$ is to distinguish between the things that are ‘in’ something in the colloquial sense, and the things that are ‘in’ something, in the technical sense. At this early point of the *Categories*, where he is introducing us to the four classes of entities, Aristotle wants to warn us: ‘when I speak of things that are “in” something, do not think that I mean things that we usually say are “in” something. For many things that we usually say are “in” something are not “in” anything in the sense that I mean.’ Parts of things, such as hands and feet, are ordinarily said

\[^{22}\text{Ibid. 59–60.}\]
\[^{23}\text{For example, “[w]hen Aristotle argues that the universal cannot exist separately from the particulars of which it is predicated”. See Alex. Aphr. *Peri Ideîn* (In Metaph. 84. 22–3 Hayduck), and Metaph. 909b17–21, 1033b19–21, 1040b25–30. (Owen, ‘Inherence’, 257.)}\]
to be in the substances of which they are parts, but they are not ‘in’ them. Aristotle wants to make this distinction between properties and parts clear, and uses the clause about parts to do so.\textsuperscript{24} But then there are also substances that are in something without being a part, such as flowers in a vase. Aristotle rules these out through the inseparability condition: while flowers can exist without the vase, properties cannot exist without something to contain them. Whatever is not ruled out by the clause eliminating parts is ruled out by the inseparability condition, since substances that are in things are either parts of those things or else capable of existing without what they are in.\textsuperscript{25}

It can be seen that the first clause of N (‘\(x\) is in \(y\)’) does no work on this reading.\textsuperscript{26} What is more, the clause should not be considered as one of the necessary conditions for being a property: if we take the ‘in’ there in the ordinary sense, many properties will fail to

\textsuperscript{24} I have argued that the ‘part’ that occurs in \(\tau 24–5\) refers, most likely, to physical parts of substances, and that \(\tau 29–32\) is making the point that such parts are not ‘in’ the substances of which they are parts. Given also that \(\tau 29–32\) appears to be alluding to \(\tau 24–5\), it is reasonable to hold that when Aristotle says ‘I mean what is in something, not as a part . . .’ in the earlier passage, he is establishing the same point that the later passage invokes. An important point here is that parts of substances are themselves substances (and hence not properties); Aristotle is clear about this at \(\tau 29–32\).

\textsuperscript{25} Devereux denies that these two conditions are distinct, arguing that the inseparability condition is a gloss on the claim that properties are not in things as parts (‘Primary Substance’, 124). He argues that, since parts of primary substances are themselves primary substances, they can exist independently from what they are in. Hence, being incapable of independent existence sets properties apart from parts as well. This assumes that primary substances are capable of independent existence, but there is no evidence that the ontological priority of primary substance needs to be understood this way. And it would be puzzling, as Ackrill points out (\textit{Categories}, 83), for Aristotle to claim to primary substance can exist without secondary substances. In addition, the conclusion that parts of substances can exist on their own contradicts the claim in the \textit{Metaphysics} that a severed hand is not a hand except homonymously (\(1035 \beta 23–5\)). I agree with Devereux that this doctrine of the \textit{Metaphysics} need not be taken as relevant to the \textit{Categories}, for when Aristotle wrote the \textit{Categories}, he had not yet formulated the network of ideas that underlie his denial that the parts of living organisms are substances (‘Primary Substance’, 123). But to establish that doctrine’s absence from the \textit{Categories}, Devereux needs, and does not have, evidence that primary substances are capable of independent existence. In a later paper, Devereux reverses his view and claims that the ontological priority of primary substance should be understood as the capacity to exist without depending on an underlying subject, i.e. without being ‘said of’ or ‘in’ anything (‘Separation and Immanence in Plato’s Theory of Forms’ [‘Separation and Immanence’], \textit{Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy}, 12 (1994), 63–90 at 81 n. 38). I thank David Sedley for alerting me to these difficulties concerning the ontological priority of primary substances.

\textsuperscript{26} Cf. n. 11 above.
satisfy this necessary condition. If, on the other hand, we take the ‘in’ in the technical sense, the clause will introduce a vicious circularity. This is not surprising or worrisome if I am right that 1\textsuperscript{A}24–5 is a somewhat imprecise parenthetical remark meant only to distinguish properties from substances that are in other substances; the sentence performs the particular task expected of it, but its lack of precision and refinement creates some mess that we need to clean up for Aristotle. A modified formulation better captures the point of 1\textsuperscript{A}24–5:

\[(N') x \text{ is ‘in’ a subject only if there is (at least) a subject } y \text{ such that}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \(x\) is not in\textsuperscript{14} \(y\) as a part,
\item \(x\) cannot exist independently of \(y\).
\end{enumerate}\]

This interpretation of 1\textsuperscript{A}24–5 avoids the problems facing Frede’s reading, and is consistent with the recurrence of non-substantial individuals, cutting off the traditional view from what has been its life source. To be sure, this interpretation is not inconsistent with non-recurrence either, but it will be up to those defending the traditional view to give us other reasons for endorsing non-recurrence, which I believe they fail to do.

II

So far, I have offered an alternative interpretation of 1\textsuperscript{A}24–5 that is textually supported, but I have not given any reasons to reject T. In this section I shall show that T has entailments that contradict other passages in the Categories. It has been a matter of intense debate whether these entailments indeed constitute reasons for rejecting the traditional view. The entailments are:

\[(E1) \text{ No general property can be ‘in’ an individual substance.}\]
\[(E2) \text{ No individual property can be ‘in’ a general substance.}\]

\textsuperscript{27} As I point out above (n. 7), many Aristotelian properties, such as five-foot, double, and has-shoes-on, are not in anything in the ordinary sense.

\textsuperscript{28} This ‘in’ is, clearly, in the ordinary sense.

\textsuperscript{29} We need not worry whether differentiae or secondary substances satisfy these two conditions (which they do), since \(N\) is not supposed to exclude them.

\textsuperscript{30} Devereux (‘Primary Substance’) too gives a reading of 1\textsuperscript{A}24–5 that is consistent with both recurrence and non-recurrence, maintaining that the traditional view is supported by the passages I discuss (and dismiss) in sect. 3.
(a) **The first entailment, \(E_1\)**

\(E_1\) is entailed by \(T\) because general properties can exist separately from any specific individual substance, thus failing the clause (iii) of \(T\); since white or colour could exist separately from Socrates, e.g. in Plato, they do not qualify to be ‘in’ him. It has been pointed out by Owen and Frede that this entailment creates a problem for \(T\) because it contradicts various passages. At 2\(a\)34–35 Aristotle writes:

> All the other things are either said of primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects . . . For example, animal is predicated of man and therefore it must also be predicated of the individual man; for if it were not predicated of any individual man it would not be predicated of man at all. Again, colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for if it were not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. \(^{31}\)

It is quite clear from the passage that Aristotle allows general non-substantials such as colour to be ‘in’ an individual substance such as an individual body. There is no doubt that when Aristotle says ‘colour’ he means colour in general, for he uses the expression ‘the individual \(x\)’ (\(τὸ \ τὶ \ \tau_{i} \ x\)) whenever he wishes to indicate an individual. \(^{32}\) And it will not do to claim, as Ackrill does, that Aristotle is being careless and using a relaxed sense of ‘in’ when he says that general properties are ‘in’ individual substances. \(^{33}\) There is no indication whatsoever that Aristotle ever relaxes the sense of the ‘in’ relation, a technical term he introduces. What is more, in the passage quoted above, Aristotle is drawing a parallel between the ‘said of’ and the ‘in’ relations, pointing out that the same sort of transitivity holds for both relations: for any general item \(x\) (substance or non-substance), if \(x\) is ‘said of’ (or ‘in’) \(y\) and \(y\) is ‘said of’ \(z\), then \(x\) is ‘said of’ (or ‘in’) \(z\). \(^{34}\) As Owen points out, ‘it is mere despair’ to dismiss this carefully constructed parallel between the two relations and

\(^{31}\) I follow the convention in translating \(κατηγορεῖται\) as ‘predicated of’ while translating \(λέγεται\) as ‘said of’, and in taking ‘said of’ to be a more restrictive relation than ‘predicated of’, such that \(x\) is ‘said of’ \(y\) only if \(x\) and \(y\) belong in the same category. As we shall see, Aristotle can be very loose about his use of \(κατηγορεῖται\), meaning different things by it on different occasions.

\(^{32}\) See Frede, ‘Individuals’, 60.

\(^{33}\) Ackrill, *Categories*, 83.

\(^{34}\) Here Aristotle uses ‘predicated of’ for the case illustrating the principle for the ‘said of’ relation; he is entitled to this looseness at this point because he has already made it clear that animal is ‘said of’ man and man is ‘said of’ an individual man, i.e. that ‘said of’ is the predication relation in these two cases.
to argue that Aristotle does not really mean to say that a general property can be in an individual substance.\textsuperscript{35}

Second, at 2\textsuperscript{a}34–5 and 2\textsuperscript{b}3–5 Aristotle claims that anything other than primary substances (individual substances) is either ‘said of’ or ‘in’ primary substances. Then, at 2\textsuperscript{a}15–17 and 2\textsuperscript{b}37–3\textsuperscript{a}3 he confirms this, writing that primary substances are subjects for all the other things. Since general non-substantial items cannot be ‘said of’ individual substances, it has to be the case that they can be ‘in’ individual substances, and this contradicts (E1), defeating T.

Among the recent defenders of the traditional view, Heinaman and Wedin have confronted this problem, offering two different kinds of solutions. Wedin concedes that (E1) makes T untenable, and he gives up T, defending the view that non-substantial individuals are non-recurrent on a different reading of 1\textsuperscript{a}24–5 that does not entail (E1).\textsuperscript{36} Heinaman, on the other hand, sticks with T, maintaining that it does not in fact entail (E1).\textsuperscript{37} As both positions are also related to (E2), I proceed to discuss that entailment before giving the details of these positions and evaluating them.

\textbf{(b) The second entailment, (E2): is it really entailed?}

(E2) says that no individual property can be ‘in’ a general substance, or, in other words, individual properties can only be ‘in’ individual substances. The case of (E2) is, I think, significantly more complicated than that of (E1), as I am not convinced that (E2) is in fact entailed by T. And unfortunately, scholars have typically given little or no justification for their positions on this question.\textsuperscript{38} Even though (E2) bears a certain symmetry to (E1) (‘only individual properties can be “in” individual substances’ vs. ‘individual properties can only be “in” individual substances’), and there may be an aesthetic appeal in considering the two together, as a pair, it is far from clear that (E2) is actually entailed by T. Wedin simply assumes that it is, while Heinaman justifies it as follows: ‘For on this account [i.e. T] the particular substance in which an individual is present individuates it. But if Socrates’ health and Plato’s health are both present in the universal “body”, they are present in a subject which

\textsuperscript{35} Owen, ‘Inherence’, 255.
\textsuperscript{36} Wedin, ‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 140–1.
\textsuperscript{37} Heinaman, ‘Non-Substantial Individuals in the Categories’, 393.
\textsuperscript{38} Of the authors included in my bibliography, only Heinaman and Devereux have offered comments on this point.
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does not individuate them.\textsuperscript{39} Although it may be the case that the traditional view requires the individual property to be individuated by the individual substance ‘in’ which it is, I do not see how T sets the rule that whenever \( x \) is ‘in’ \( y \)—whether \( x \) and \( y \) are individual or general—\( y \) individuates \( x \), as Heinaman seems to think it does. Let us see what T does in fact tell us about individual properties being ‘in’ general substances. Take the example of an individual white being ‘in’ animal: T tells us that (i) the individual white is in animal, (ii) the individual white is not a part of animal, and (iii) the individual white is inseparable from animal. Now it is this third item that ought to draw our attention. Can it be true that the individual white is inseparable from animal? And given that all non-substantial individuals are ‘in’ an individual substance,\textsuperscript{40} say Socrates for our individual white, could this individual white be inseparable from both Socrates and animal (at the same time)? Strange as it may seem at first, I believe the answer to both of those questions is affirmative. The key idea here is what Aristotle expresses at 3\textsuperscript{a}4–6: ‘if you will call the individual man grammatical it follows that you will call both man [\( ἄνθρωπον \)] and animal [\( ζ/Alphasubiotaῶον \)] grammatical’. This follows his comment that, just as everything else is predicated of (‘said of’ or ‘in’) individual substances, everything else (i.e. other than themselves and individual substances) is predicated of general substances (3\textsuperscript{a}1–4). That is to say, whether general or individual, whenever a property is ‘in’ an individual substance, it is also ‘in’ whatever is ‘said of’ that individual substance. So, if an individual white is ‘in’ Socrates, it is also ‘in’ man, animal, and body.

Here we need to recognize that though we could afford to be casual about the precise meaning of inseparability with respect to (E1), (E2) requires us to think harder about the sort of inseparability T is operating with. Is there a problem with the claim that Socrates’ individual white is inseparable from—i.e. cannot exist without—animal, and that it is, at the same time, inseparable from Socrates (as well as man and body) also? I do not think there is, simply because Socrates’ individual white is ‘in’ animal only in so far as it is ‘in’ Socrates.\textsuperscript{41} To illustrate this, I would like to draw an

\textsuperscript{39} Heinaman, ‘Non-Substantial Individuals in the Categories’, 295.
\textsuperscript{40} This premiss seems to be agreed on by all sides of the debate.
\textsuperscript{41} Devereux too makes this point to show that (E2) is not entailed by his own interpretation of 1\textsuperscript{a}24–5 (different from T), but he stops at saying this much, not explaining or justifying it, which I think needs to be done.
analogy between Aristotle’s inseparability condition and our belief that physical bodies cannot be in more than one place at the same time: I cannot be in the Empire State Building and in Central Park at the same time, yet I can be in the Empire State Building, in New York, and in the United States all at the same time. This is because the Empire State Building, New York, and the United States constitute a sequence of increasingly larger locations, the larger containing the smaller, and because I am in New York and in the United States only in so far as I am in the Empire State Building (when I am there). There is no inconsistency in the claim that I cannot be in any place other than the Empire State Building and I cannot be in any place other than New York, and so forth. And claiming that I cannot be in any place other than New York does not allow me to be in the Empire State Building and Central Park at the same time because I am in New York only by virtue of being in the Empire State Building, at a given time. Likewise, I think, with the ‘in’ relation and inseparability under T; Socrates’ individual white is ‘in’ Socrates, man, animal, and body, and it is inseparable from all of those, in so far as it is ‘in’ Socrates; and in keeping with the analogy, that individual white’s being inseparable from animal does not allow it to be ‘in’ Plato at the same time, for it is inconsistent to say that an individual white which is inseparable from Socrates is at the same time ‘in’ Plato (and inseparable from him also). I submit, therefore, that (E2) is not in fact entailed by T.

Heinaman, too, thinks that (E2) is not entailed by T, but for a very different reason from the one that I have put forward. He offers a reason as to why neither (E2) nor (E1) is entailed. The underlying idea is a reinterpretation of what T (and so T*A24–5) is...
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about: Heinaman argues that T is meant only for the cases where both \( x \) and \( y \) are individuals, i.e. where an individual property is ‘in’ an individual substance.\(^{45}\) Thus, it is claimed, T says nothing about general properties being ‘in’ individual substances or individual properties being ‘in’ general substances. The only argument for taking 1\(^{a}\)24–5 in this way can be that the sentence occurs in the context of introducing things ‘that are in a subject but not said of a subject’ (1\(^{a}\)23–4), i.e. non-substantial individuals.\(^{46}\) But this, I think, is a very weak argument for such a strained interpretation of the sentence.

First, the sentence lends itself naturally to being understood as a claim about being ‘in’ something or the things that are ‘in’ something in general; strong evidence is necessary to take a sentence of the form ‘by “in a subject” I mean . . . ’ to be only about individual properties ‘in’ individual substances. Second, and more importantly, Aristotle is at 1\(^{a}\)23 using the ‘in’ relation for the first time, introducing a technical term, different from our ordinary-language conception of being in something. And 1\(^{a}\)24–5 illuminates this difference, explaining what exactly is meant by being ‘in’ something. Given that Aristotle does not offer a different definition of, or comment on, being ‘in’ something with respect to general properties and substances, either when he introduces those classes of entity (1\(^{a}\)20–2 and 1\(^{a}\)29–3) or anywhere else in the Categories, it seems very unlikely that he could have meant 1\(^{a}\)24–5 to be only about individuals, unless he was being deliberately misleading. And third, that 1\(^{a}\)24–5 occurs in the context that it does cannot support the conclusion Heinaman would like it to, because the context is one where non-substantial individuals are introduced (as one of the four classes of entity), and not one where non-substantial individuals ‘in’ individual substances are discussed. That is to say, the

\(^{45}\) Heinaman, ‘Non-Substantial Individuals in the Categories’, 303.

\(^{46}\) Heinaman himself offers no argument as to why 1\(^{a}\)24–5 should or can be understood in this way. J. Duerlinger, ‘Predication and Inherence in Aristotle’s Categories’ [‘Predication’], Phronesis, 15 (1970), 179–203, whom Heinaman cites as one of the authors who have already given this answer to the problems caused by (E1) and (E2), makes an only slightly better case; he argues (184–6) that (E1) and (E2) are problematic, and so T (1\(^{a}\)24–5) should be understood in the proposed way to remove the problems. Clearly, however, the more direct conclusion to be drawn is that T is not the right interpretation of 1\(^{a}\)24–5. Given the reasons against taking T in this way (which I express below), one would be justified in taking the Heinaman/Duerlinger line only if there were overwhelming evidence that T is the right way to interpret 1\(^{a}\)24–5, and that is simply not the case.
subject in question is individual properties, whether ‘in’ indivi-
dual substances or ‘in’ general substances, and if that context were
to determine what 1\(^{24–5}\) is about, it would be about individual
properties ‘in’ either kind of substance.\(^{47}\)

Therefore, this reading, if true, could rule out only (E1). By
contrast, (E2), which concerns individual properties ‘in’ general
substances, would still be entailed by 1\(^{24–5}\) as interpreted by T.
Hence, those who may be unconvinced by my own argument as
to why (E2) is not entailed by T will not be saved by Heinaman’s
argument. And if I am right in rejecting Heinaman’s understanding
of T, (E1) is entailed by it, and so it does face that serious problem.

As I have noted, Wedin concedesthat (E1) is entailed by T and
that T is thus untenable. He argues, however, that the traditional
view can be defended on an interpretation of 1\(^{24–5}\) other than T.
His interpretation avoids T’s problem by not entailing (E1), but it
does entail (E2) (or at least he thinks so), and he therefore makes
considerable effort—without success in my judgement—to show
that (E2) is not a problematic entailment.

Before I delve into a discussion of (E2)’s predicament, let me
examine Wedin’s alternative interpretation of 1\(^{24–5}\). Wedin first
puts forward an interpretation that he takes to be Frede’s view,
slightly modified:

\[(F^{**}) \text{ } x \text{ is in something, } z, \text{ as its subject } \text{iff there is a subject } y \text{ such that}
\]
\(\text{(i) } x \text{ is in } y,\)
\(\text{(ii) } x \text{ is not a part of } y,\)
\(\text{(iii) } x \text{ cannot exist independently of } y.\]^\(^{48}\)

This interpretation, of course, does not support the traditional
view of non-recurrence. Wedin conjoins to it a condition that ‘re-
cognizes’ the ‘strong dependence’ of individual properties on indi-
vidual substances—as well as that of general properties on general
substances—which he needs for the traditional view:

\[(F^+) \text{ If } y = z, \text{ then}\]

\(^{47}\) In fact, the examples Aristotle gives in that section, in the sentence immediately
after 1\(^{24–5}\) are, as I understand them, cases of individual properties being ‘in’
general substances. I shall discuss shortly why I think ‘the soul’ and ‘the body’ are
general items and do not mean ‘an individual soul’ and ‘an individual body’.

\(^{48}\) Wedin, ‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 151.
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(iv) $x$ is an individual iff $y$ is an individual or $y$ is an individual or
(v) $x$ is general iff $y$ is general.49

Because $F^+$ says nothing about the case where $y \neq z$, and because general properties being ‘in’ individual substances is such a case, Wedin reasons, (E1) is not entailed by the conjunction of $F^{**}$ and $F^+$. (E2), however, is entailed, as in the case where an individual white is ‘in’ body; since $y = z$ in this case, it falls under the condition (v), and so we are prevented from saying that an individual white is ‘in’ body. Contrary to what Wedin seems to hold, (E2) actually cannot be fully entailed, because $y \neq z$ in those cases in which an individual white is ‘in’ man or animal, and so such relations would be permissible.50 In fact, there is a problem about the way to determine whether $y = z$. In order to hold that the conjunction of $F^{**}$ and $F^+$ entails (E2),51 Wedin must maintain that $y = z$ where $z$ is general.52 But this can be done only by assuming that that general item is what the individual property is inseparable from, which is just what Wedin wishes to deny across the board.53 To make his $F^+$ function as he likes, that is, he must assume what he wants to deny, and I do not quite see how he can do this.

The important point is that Wedin’s ‘$F^{**} \& F^+$’ is at best neutral on the question of recurrence of individual properties. As he acknowledges, his interpretation of 1.24–5 is consistent with both views on that question;44 accordingly, to establish non-recurrence he must provide evidence from elsewhere in the Categories—which I argue he fails to do (see below, Section 3). ‘$F^{**} \& F^+$’ is neutral because if we approach it with the premiss (I think shared by Owen and Frede) that all non-substantial items are in fact inseparable only from general substances (i.e. $y \neq z$ when an individual property is ‘in’ an individual substance), the formula allows non-substantial individuals to be shared. Wedin’s acknowledgement of

49 Ibid. 152.
50 An individual white is normally held to be inseparable from either an individual substance or body; no author on either side of the recurrence debate that I know of holds that an individual white is inseparable from intermediate general substances such as man or animal.
52 And to get a partial (E2), he has to maintain that $y = z$ where $z$ is an item such as body, i.e. an item that is on Frede’s view at the high level of generality where the relevant properties cannot exist without it; in that case it would be impermissible for an individual white to be ‘in’ body, but permissible for it to be ‘in’ lower-level general items such as man.
54 Ibid. 153.
this amounts to admitting that \(1^\text{st}24-5\) gives no support to the traditional view at all, and all he has to defend that view with are those other passages.\(^{55}\)

In sum, because \(F^+\) is a conditional, the conjunction is non-committal on all of the three following issues: (a) whether non-substantial individuals are recurrent or not; (b) whether \(1^\text{st}24-5\) entails \((E1)\); and (c) whether \(1^\text{st}24-5\) entails \((E2)\). Wedin thinks that he can establish the non-recurrence thesis from those other passages in the *Categories* and is content to have \(1^\text{st}24-5\) be merely consistent with that view, and free from problematic entailments. He rightly sees that his formulation \((F^{**} \& F^+)\) would not entail \((E1)\), and since he holds that \((E2)\) is not problematic, he believes that his formulation is free of troubling entailments. He apparently (I think erroneously) believes that \((E2)\) is inseparable from non-recurrence,\(^{56}\) and probably reasons that those other passages give him that entailment also. By his own account, then, his interpretation entails \((E2)\) and so is damaged if that entailment turns out to be problematic.

(c) The implausibility of \((E2)\)

Now I return to the difficulties \((E2)\) faces in the text. Various passages indicate that Aristotle thought that individual properties can be ‘in’ general substances, and these passages have already been pointed out by others. However, the value of these passages as counter-examples to \((E2)\) has been questioned by Wedin, so I take

\(^{55}\) A question naturally comes to mind: where did \(F^+\) come from? Clearly, \(F^{**}\) is at least a prima facie acceptable interpretation of \(1^\text{st}24-5\), but how does one add to it this \(F^+\) as the continuation of the interpretation of \(1^\text{st}24-5\)? The answer is that it is the product of Wedin’s imagination, a mere concoction with no textual evidence to back it. Wedin foresees this kind of objection and writes: ‘Now one might object that had Aristotle intended any such thing he would surely have been more explicit on the point. However, this just amounts to holding that \(1^\text{st}24-5\) is not sufficiently fine grained to determine either interpretation [of \(F^{**}\) vs. \(F^{**} \& F^+]\). Formulations notwithstanding, it remains neutral on the nature of non-substantial individuals’ (‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 153). But it is not the case that \(1^\text{st}24-5\) is ambiguous between \(F^{**}\) on the one hand and \(F^{**} \& F^+\) on the other; one is a reasonable interpretation of the sentence while the other is a piece of fiction. Wedin’s reasoning would allow one to interpret \(1^\text{st}24-5\) in whatever way we like, given the assumption that it does not have some other obviously true interpretation.

\(^{56}\) Wedin writes that, though \((E1)\) must be avoided, ‘[(E2)] may turn out to be enough to salvage the nonrecurrent status of [non-substantial individuals]’ (‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 143).
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them up to show that their value is undiminished by Wedin’s arguments.57

One of the most conspicuous counter-examples is this. At \( \textit{1}^\text{25–9} \)
Aristotle gives examples of individual properties:

For example, the individual knowledge of grammar \( [\textit{ἡ τὶς γραµµατική}] \) is
in a subject, the soul \( [\textit{ἐν τ/etasubiotaῆ ψυχ/etasubiotaῆ}] \), but is not said of any subject; and the
individual white \( [\textit{τὸ τὶ λευκόν}] \) is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in
body \( [\textit{ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶµα ἐν σώµατι}] \), but is not said of any subject.

Then, at \( \textit{1}^\text{1–2} \), we get general properties:

For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul \( [\textit{ἐν τ/etasubiotaῆ ψυχ/etasubiotaῆ}] \), and is also
said of a subject, grammatical knowledge.

As Owen points out, the same item, the soul, is being made the
subject of both an individual property (the individual knowledge
of grammar) and a general property (knowledge in general). And,
Owen remarks, ‘Here if anywhere it would seem important to dis-
tinguish the first subject from the second as being not merely in
the soul but in a particular soul; but he does not do so either here
or elsewhere.’58 If the two subjects are the same and that is the soul
in general, \( \textit{1}^\text{25–9} \) contradicts (E2). Strangely, Wedin takes the arg-
ument Owen constructs out of these passages to be against (E1).59
Now that would be the case if Owen took ‘the soul’ to mean ‘an
individual soul’ in both cases—then \( \textit{1}^\text{1–2} \) would contradict (E1)—
but he makes it clear that this is not what he has in mind: ‘Nor is it
open to a dogmatic to read “in the soul” as either meaning or even
implying “in a particular soul”, otherwise the second example is a
mistake.’60

Be that as it may, Wedin claims that the argument is a bad one be-
cause ‘the soul’ need not mean the same thing in the two passages.61
This objection strikes me as very weak for several reasons. First, as
Owen points out, these passages occur in a crucial paragraph where

57 Wedin is the only author referred to in this paper who thinks that (E2) is not a
problematic entailment and that all of those passages can be explained away. I have
already referred to some of those passages, interpreting them in the way that they
contradict (E2). Here I defend my interpretation, shared by many, against criticisms
by Wedin.
59 Wedin, ‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 140.
60 Owen, ‘Inherence’, 254. So Owen apparently thinks that (E2) is entailed by T,
though he does not make this clear.
61 According to Wedin, ‘the soul’ means ‘the individual soul’ in the first passage
and ‘the soul in general’ in the second, so (E2) is not contradicted.
the four kinds of ‘things that are’ are introduced, and it would be extremely careless of Aristotle if he used the same words to mean different things here, without giving any indication that he is doing so. Second, as Frede has argued, in the Categories and especially in the first few chapters, ‘Aristotle—by using a special and rather unusual idiom—takes great pains to indicate when he is speaking of individuals: a particular, individual man is referred to by *ho tis anthrōpos*, a particular, individual white, by *to ti leukon* . . .’62 Thus, it seems very unlikely that Aristotle could mean anything other than the soul in general in either of those passages. Finally, what makes Wedin’s argument more incongruous than weak is that he claims that Frede is right in making the above point about the language Aristotle uses.63 Frede himself applied this point to a different passage from the one at issue here, but the point is general and equally applicable to other cases. I therefore find it odd that someone who agrees with it would argue that Aristotle means ‘an individual soul’ when he says ‘the soul’.

The second counter-example, due to Frede, actually comes from one of the passages just dealt with, 1*25–9. Frede fashions a different case out of that passage alone, a case that Wedin finds much more powerful. Frede argues, based on the point cited above, that when Aristotle says ‘the individual white is in a subject, the body, for all colour is in body’, he must mean ‘in’ body in general, for otherwise he would have written τίς τινι σώματι—the individual body.64 Wedin concedes that he cannot dismiss this argument, but he thinks he can ‘blunt the argument sufficiently to allow us to go forth in developing an alternative to his positive view’.65 Aware of the implausibility of taking the two occurrences of ‘body’ as referring to individuals, he tries to accomplish this by arguing that ‘body’ in this sentence occurs in a general, unspecific way, meaning ‘an individual body or body in general’.66 That way, the sentence does not positively claim that an individual body is ‘in’ a general substance, though it does not rule that out either. But given Frede’s view, which I agree with,

63 Wedin, ‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 145.
64 Frede, ‘Individuals’, 60. Notice that ‘body’ occurs twice in the sentence, and on Frede’s reading, which I agree with, both are to be understood as general.
65 Wedin, ‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 146.
66 Wedin maintains that the last part of the passage ‘is to be read in an entirely general way, as asserting that color, whatever it is, is always in body, whatever it is, and that this is the reason that individual color is “in” individual body’ (‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 145, emphasis added).
that Aristotle makes it explicit when he speaks of individuals, and that the idiom he uses for individuals is in contrast to his language for general items, it is highly unlikely that he would employ his language for general items to refer ambiguously to individual and general items. So, the attempt to make ‘body’ ambiguous does not seem to be justified.

In conclusion, I think Wedin does not manage to ‘blunt’ Frede’s argument in any significant way. Even if he did, this is not the only trouble facing (E2), so Wedin is not free to develop an alternative view that entails (E2).

Lastly, I would like to point out another passage that Wedin dismisses:

as the primary substances stand to everything else, so the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are predicated of these. For if you will call the individual man grammatical it follows that you will call both man and animal grammatical; and similarly in other cases.

The point of the passage is, I think, quite clear: out of the four classes of the things there are, items in any other class than that of primary substance are predicated of primary substances. And likewise, in the case of secondary substance, items in the remaining two classes are predicated of secondary substances. This means that individual properties (along with general ones) are ‘in’ secondary substances, so (E2) is contradicted.

Wedin denies that ‘all the rest’ means the remaining two classes and claims that it does not point at individual properties specifically—at the cost, again, of making Aristotle ambiguous. But the ‘everything else’ at the beginning of the passage clearly refers to all items in the other three classes: everything other than primary substances is obviously all of those other items; and the same phrase (τὰ ἄλλα πάντα) is used at 2*34 ff. and 2*15–22, where the context makes it certain that this is what is meant. The ‘all the rest’ in question must, I think, refer to this ‘everything else’, for otherwise the passage is incomprehensible—the sense of the sentence lies unmis-

When Aristotle uses ‘predicated of’ at 3*5–6, for example, he clearly means both ‘said of’ and ‘in’. But Aristotle is not consistent with his use of ‘predicated of’, and he sometimes means predication in the general, ordinary-language sense, as we can see at 2*9–34: he speaks of predication of names and definitions, which are clearly neither ‘said of’ nor ‘in’ anything, since those relations belong exclusively to the entities recognized by the Categories.
takably in the parallel between primary and secondary substances with respect to the other classes. Hence the items predicated of secondary substances must include both classes of properties, i.e. both individual and general. Wedin writes: ‘But when Aristotle says in the final line “similarly in other cases” he cannot mean this. Rather he means that his point will hold for any other accident as well.’ I agree that this is what Aristotle means when he says ‘similarly in other cases’. But I certainly do not understand why Wedin thinks ‘all the rest’ must mean the same thing. In fact, if ‘all the rest’ did mean that, the final comment would be redundant.

The strong impression emerging from each of these cases, and even more strongly from their corroboration, is that (E2) is simply untenable in the Categories. Thus, any interpretation that does entail it, I believe, has to be wrong.

III

Devereux and Wedin have argued, against Owen and Frede, that there is, in the Categories, support for the traditional view in passages besides 1\textsuperscript{a}24–5. In what follows I shall discuss the passages they point out, and I shall try to show that, properly understood, they do not in fact support the traditional view. I begin with the passage taken up by Devereux, which Wedin mentions also. Devereux then defends his interpretation of this passage against a criticism I share with Sharma by bringing up another passage, which Wedin too discusses. I refer only to Devereux in discussing these passages in synecdoche, since what I say applies equally to Wedin’s case on them.

The passage Devereux cites as evidence for the traditional view is this:

Every substance seems to signify a certain ‘this’. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain ‘this’;

68 Wedin, ‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 144.
70 Wedin mentions yet a third passage, which I do not discuss because, as Wedin acknowledges (‘Nonsubstantial Individuals’, 156–7), it supports the traditional view only if his interpretation of the first two passages is assumed. While the specific form Devereux and Wedin’s arguments take differs, the key premises that I attack are in common: in both passages the key interpretative move made by both authors is that of taking Aristotle to mean ‘said of or in’ where he writes only ‘said of’.
for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name—when one speaks of a man or animal—that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain ‘this’, this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification, for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things. (3\textsuperscript{a}10–18)

Here, Aristotle argues that, unlike primary substances, secondary substances are not ‘thises’ because they are not one in number—the condition for being an individual. The reason that Aristotle gives for why they are not one in number is that they are ‘said of’ many things. Devereux argues that although Aristotle uses the term ‘said of’—a technical term he introduces in chapter 2 and refines at 2\textsuperscript{a}19–34—he in fact means to say ‘predicated of’, a term he uses loosely, meaning both ‘said of’ and ‘in’. If this were true, it would follow that an individual property can only be ‘in’ a single individual substance, for no individual could be ‘in’ many things either. However, there does not seem to be sufficient reason to believe that Aristotle is here using his technical term (‘said of’) but meaning something else.\textsuperscript{71}

Yet there is a reason why Aristotle must have meant exactly what he said: the whole paragraph in which the term in question occurs is concerned with things that stand in a ‘said of’ relation. The point made in the quoted passage is that secondary substances, unlike primary ones, are not individuals—and secondary substances are only ‘said of’ primary ones, in the precise sense. And the few sentences that come after this passage offer a better understanding of the things ‘said of’ other things (explaining that secondary sub-

\textsuperscript{71} Devereux can only cite passages from other, later works of Aristotle, which apparently invoke the rule that an individual cannot be ‘in’ a plurality of subjects (‘Primary Substance’, 115 n. 3). Even if we grant Devereux that these passages support the above rule, it does not follow that this should determine, or even influence, our reading of the Categories: it is well known that Aristotle’s views have changed between the Categories and his later works, drastically so in the case of some issues. Anticipating the objection that the passages he cites only ‘reveal a change in Aristotle’s view’, Devereux writes, ‘it seems to me much more plausible to suppose that [Aristotle] holds the same view in the Categories’, but does not tell us why it is much more plausible to suppose this (ibid.). I find it especially odd that Devereux is citing the Metaphysics as evidence when a few pages later he structures one of his arguments on the premiss that doctrines found in the Metaphysics are not necessarily applicable to the Categories, owing to the significant differences between the two works (ibid. 123). It is also odd that Devereux is here willing to attribute to Aristotle careless usage of his technical terms, when he objects, as I have (in sect. 2), to a similar move by Ackrill in another case (ibid. 122). It seems to me that passages from later works just do not constitute adequate reason to attribute such carelessness to Aristotle.
stances signify not merely a qualification but rather substance of a certain qualification). Aristotle shows no sign, either before the term occurs or after, that he means to exclude things that are ‘in’ many things from the class of individuals. The context in which the term occurs is most coherently understood if we take Aristotle to be saying what he means to say—that only things ‘said of’ many things lose their individuality, in which case non-substantial individuals may be ‘in’ more than one individual substance. Sharma argues in a similar vein, pointing out that while it may be possible for Aristotle to have used the expression ‘said of’ here in a general way, encompassing both the ‘said of’ and ‘in’ relations, [such a construal of “said of”] is wholly unparalleled in the *Categories*. Sharma, ‘Tropes’, 312.

Devereux, in his reply to Sharma, objects that this is not the case, citing another passage where he thinks Aristotle uses ‘said of’ in this way:

It is characteristic of substances and differentiae that all things called from them are so called synonymously. For all the predicates from them are predicated either of the individuals or of the species. (For from a primary substance there is no predicate—since it is not said of any subject— . . .) (3’33–7)

Here, Aristotle mentions that primary substance ‘is not said of any subject’ to back up his claim that there is no predicate from primary substances, i.e. they are not predicated of anything. Devereux reasons that ‘said of’ is being used generally here, covering both the ‘said of’ and ‘in’ relations, ‘for if not, the possibility is left open that a primary substance is predicable of a subject by being “present in” it’. But it is obvious this far into the *Categories* that no substance is ever ‘in’ anything. This is established unequivocally from the outset, at 1\textsuperscript{a}20\textsuperscript{b}–10. And here, in a context where substances (and differentiae) are discussed—items never ‘in’ anything but some of them ‘said of’ other things—it suffices to point out that a primary substance is not ‘said of’ anything (i.e. unlike secondary substances) to prove that it is not predicated of anything. Given also that the sentence in question is a parenthetical remark with no indication of being a critical claim, it is unreasonable to think that Aristotle must be giving there the necessary and sufficient conditions of not being predicated of anything; the passage is about things that can only be ‘said of’ something else, so he indicates that primary substances are not predicated of anything.

\textsuperscript{72} Sharma, ‘Tropes’, 312. \textsuperscript{73} Devereux, ‘Reply’, 348.
Non-Substantial Individuals in Aristotle’s Categories

not ‘said of’ anything, meaning just that and nothing else. Thus, I think, the passage gives no support to Devereux’s case: Aristotle never uses ‘said of’ in the general way Devereux needs to assume he does.\textsuperscript{74}

Moreover, we should question an assumption that we have relied on, namely that, in this passage, Aristotle is setting a criterion of individuality, and that he is stipulating as a condition that an individual not be ‘said of’ many things (leaving aside the question of whether he means to include the ‘in’ relation). Aristotle is not saying here that something is not an individual only if it is ‘said of’ ‘many’ things—he is only claiming that, unlike the primary substance, which is one in number, man and animal are ‘said of’ many things, and this is what deprives them of their individuality. This claim can be understood as stipulating that an individual not be ‘said of’ anything at all. In fact, this is what Aristotle stipulates in the passage where he actually seems to give a straightforward criterion of individuality: ‘Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent them from being in a subject . . .’ (1\textsuperscript{b}6–9). If Aristotle stipulates here that an individual cannot be ‘said of’ anything, we cannot take him to allow at 3\textsuperscript{a}10–18 for things ‘said of’ only one thing to qualify as an individual. Hence, in so far as 3\textsuperscript{a}10–18 is taken as a source of criteria for individuality, the critical sentence can be read as ‘[In the case of man or animal] the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are “said of” something.’ If we insert into the foregoing sentence (before ‘something’), as Devereux wishes to, the phrase ‘or “in”’, the implication of the sentence will be that non-substantial individuals cannot be ‘in’ anything, and, thus, there can be no non-substantial individuals. This result is not only inconsistent with one of the most basic ideas of the \textit{Categories} but also not something that supports Devereux’s view anyway. Hence, once again, we had better leave

\textsuperscript{74} Wedin too thinks that the passage means ‘if \(x\) is not “said of” anything, there is no predicate from it’. He adds to this the premiss (from 1\textsuperscript{b}6–8) that ‘if \(x\) is individual and numerically one, \(x\) is not “said of” any subject’, and concludes that ‘if \(x\) is individual and numerically one, there is no predicate from it’. From this he goes on to argue that Owen’s view (recurrence) is forced to take non-substantial individuals as ‘nonpredicable universals’ and that this notion is ruled out by Aristotle in various works, making recurrence an implausible view. But, as I have argued above, the initial premiss cannot be derived from the passage in question (3\textsuperscript{a}33–7) and so the conclusion cannot be reached.
Aristotle's statements as they are and not allege that although he only says 'said of', he really means 'said of or in'.

But is it true even that if we allow Devereux to modify Aristotle's claim as he wishes, the claim will entail that non-substantial individuals can be 'in' only one individual substance? If Devereux could have it his way, the passage would be setting the rule of individuality that 'no individual can be either “said of” or “in” many things'. Consider the following, however: Aristotle maintains that whenever something is predicated of an individual substance, that thing is also predicated of the species and the genera of that substance.75 It follows, then, that if an individual property is 'in' Socrates, it is also 'in' man and animal. This means that no property can be 'in' only one thing, and therefore, on Devereux's rule given above, there can be no individual properties (or any non-substances). Devereux cannot get around this by invoking that $x$ is 'in' man and animal only in so far as it is 'in' Socrates, because that does not matter here—on the schema of the Categories, a species or genus is as much a 'thing' or 'subject' as are individuals. We can conclude from this that the only way Devereux can cite the passage in question as support for his view is by attributing yet another carelessness to Aristotle; Devereux would have to argue that when Aristotle says 'many things', he in fact means 'many individual substances'. But we have already seen how unreasonable it is to attribute the first misstatement to Aristotle, let alone a second one.76

The above discussion shows, I believe, that the interpretation Devereux gives of 3\textsuperscript{b}10–18 faces a great many difficulties, and that there are very good reasons to reject this interpretation as groundless. This leaves the traditional view with no textual evidence other than the T interpretation of 1\textsuperscript{a}24–5.77 As I argued in the previous

75 See e.g. 3\textsuperscript{a}5: 'For if you will call the individual man grammatical it follows that you will call both a man and an animal grammatical; and similarly in other cases.' I discuss this passage in the previous section. It should be noted that Devereux seems to accept the reading I have advocated, whereby whatever is 'in' an individual substance is also 'in' what is 'said of' that individual substance (Devereux, 'Primary Substance', 126).

76 It takes quite a stretch of imagination to think that, when Aristotle says 'no individual can be said of many things', he means to say 'no individual can be either said of or in many individual substances', but for some reason fails miserably to say what he means.

77 A recent defence of the traditional view draws on purported evidence from outside of the Categories. M. Wheeler argues that Aristotle’s discussion of sameness in the Topics reveals that non-substantial individuals cannot be recurrent (‘The Possibility of Recurrent Individuals in Aristotle’s Organon’, Gregorianum, 80 (1999),
section, however, T cannot be reconciled with the rest of the Categories, and as I explained in Section 1, there is no reason to think that we are stuck with that interpretation of 1\textsuperscript{a}24–5. It turns out that the traditional view is propped up by flimsy evidence, and the many difficulties it faces are insurmountable. I am convinced, therefore, that the persistent traditional view deserves the name ‘dogma’ that Owen gave it.

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Wheeler claims, however, that since non-substantial individuals are one in number (ἕν ἀριθµ/Alphasubiotaῶ)—as Aristotle states clearly in the Categories—they must satisfy this inseparability criterion for sameness. Having pointed out that a recurrent non-substantial individual such as a particular piece of grammatical knowledge can be present in more than one place on Owen’s view, Wheeler writes: ‘Taking sameness in the strict sense according to 151b28, I evaluate whether or not the individual knowledge that the third person plural present of voir is spelled v-o-i-e-n-t can recur given that it is one in number’ (548). Then, observing that this knowledge can continue to exist in my head even when you forget yours, Wheeler concludes that recurrent non-substantial individuals fail to satisfy the criterion. Since recurrent non-substantial individuals cannot be one in number, Aristotle’s non-substantial individuals cannot be Owen’s recurrent ones (549).

This argument rests on a confusion about two different senses in which Aristotle employs the idea of numerical oneness. In the Topics passages at issue, Aristotle is discussing the various senses in which two or more things are the same and the conditions under which two or more things are same in the strictest sense—numerically one. In the Categories, however, numerical oneness occurs as an attribute of a single entity, not as a relational property; the contrast with numerical oneness there is not with multiple things that are not one (with one another) but rather with entities that are not one in number because they are general items. That is to say, the inseparability criterion of the Topics is completely irrelevant to the numerical oneness the Categories attributes to non-substantial individuals.

--- *Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy* (Dordrecht, 1967).


