

CHRISTOPHE ERISMANN

**Immanent realism.  
A reconstruction of an early medieval  
solution to the problem of universals\***

« There is no separation of particulars and universals »  
DAVID M. ARMSTRONG, *Nominalism and Realism*, Cambridge 1978, p. 113.

During the early Latin Middle Ages, three possibilities were open to a philosopher who wished to defend the existence of universal entities : first, he could rely on the Platonist-Augustinian line of thought<sup>1</sup>, also transmitted by way of Priscian<sup>2</sup>, and uphold the early medieval view of separated, transcendent universals (*ante rem*<sup>3</sup>), that is to say, the doctrine of divine ideas. Secondly,

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<sup>1</sup> A strictly Platonic theory of separate forms was never defended during the early Middle Ages. But Augustine transmitted the theory of Platonic universals as divine ideas ; he says that these ideas are in God's mind, *in ipsa mente Creatoris*, and nowhere else, thus giving confirmation to the Middle- and Neo-Platonist understanding of ideas as the Demiurge's thoughts. The classical text on this point is AUGUSTINE, *De ideis. De diversis quaestionibus*, Edition Bénédictine, Paris 1952 (Bibliothèque Augustinienne 10), 46, p. 124 : « Ideas igitur latine possumus vel formas vel species dicere, ut verbum e verbo transferre videamur. Si autem rationes eas vocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus ; rationes enim graece λόγοι appellantur, non ideae : sed tamen quisquis hoc vocabulo uti voluerit, a re ipsa non aberrabit. Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriuntur, neque intereant ; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit ».

<sup>2</sup> According to the author of the *Institutiones grammaticae*, genera and species exist in the divine mind (*in mente divina*) before appearing in bodies (*antequam prodirent in corpora*) (PRISCIAN, *Institutiones Grammaticae*, XVII, 44, ed. M. HERTZ in *Grammatici Latini*, Lipsiae 1857-1880 (repr. Hildesheim 1961), vol. III, p. 135, ll. 1-10).

<sup>3</sup> Even if it was not known to early medieval Latin philosophers, the Neoplatonic distinction of three 'states' of universals is a useful conceptual tool for defining the types of entities in discussion. On this theory, see P. HOFFMANN, *Résumé*, in *Annuaire. Résumé des conférences et travaux, Ecole pratique des hautes études, Ve section*, 101, 1992-1993, pp. 241-245 ; see also A. DE LIBERA, *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Seuil, Paris 1996, pp. 103-105.

he could defend the position sometimes called conceptualism, known today as abstractionism, which advocates *post rem* universals, that is to say, universals which only exist in the mind and are the products of abstraction. Thirdly, he could defend immanent universals which exist in the individuals, *in re*. The first answer is theological in nature, the second logical and epistemological, and the third ontological. These answers do not exclude each other: they can be combined<sup>4</sup>. Nevertheless, the decision to emphasise one over the others reveals a fundamental orientation of thought and a genuine theory of universals.

During the early Middle Ages, the second solution, that is, the abstract Aristotelian universal, was defended by Boethius, in his second commentary to Porphyry, and, in a different way, by Peter Abelard<sup>5</sup>. The theory of divine ideas was generally accepted by all the thinkers of the early Middle Ages, even by such an anti-realist as Abelard<sup>6</sup>. It seems to have been considered as a theological doctrine and not as a philosophical position in need of being defended or justified. The third solution, the defence of immanent universals, that is, of entities which exist, as opposed to being only concepts, and which exist *in* individuals, and have the same degree of reality as the individuals, is what I will call ontological realism. It is on the existence of such entities that the early medieval and twelfth-century debate on universals was centred. The existence of divine ideas was indisputable, being part of Christian dogma; neither was there any attempt to deny the existence of universal concepts.

The doctrine of immanent universals, which relies for its textual sources upon Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*, was defended mainly by

<sup>4</sup> A systematic presentation of all the possible combinations of the different doctrines was not given during the early Middle Ages. But it can be found in Neoplatonic Scholasticism and, later, in the work of Albertus Magnus, following the Latin reception of Avicenna: see A. DE LIBERA, *Albert le Grand et le platonisme. De la doctrine des idées à la théorie des trois états de l'universel*, in E. P. BOS, P. A. MEIJER eds., *On Proclus and his Influence on Medieval Philosophy*, Brill, Leiden-New York 1992, pp. 89-119; ID., *Théorie des universaux et réalisme logique chez Albert le Grand*, « Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques », 65, 1981, pp. 55-74; ID., *Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand*, Vrin, Paris 2005, pp. 211-264. See also E.-H. WEBER, *Le thème avicennien du triple universel chez quelques maîtres du XIIIe siècle latin*, in A. DE LIBERA, A. ELAMRANI-JAMAL, A. GALONNIER eds., *Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet*, Vrin, Paris 1997, pp. 257-280.

<sup>5</sup> An excellent study of the history of this solution has been given by A. DE LIBERA, *L'art des généralités. Théories de l'abstraction*, Aubier, Paris 1999. See also J. MARENBNON, *Boethius*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003 pp. 23-32.

<sup>6</sup> See J. JOLIVET, *Non-réalisme et platonisme chez Abélard*, in AA. VV., *Abélard et son temps*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1981, pp. 175-195; and, for a criticism of Jolivet's views, J. MARENBNON, *The Platonisms of Peter Abelard*, in L. BENAKIS ed., *Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale*, Brepols, Turnhout 1997, pp. 109-129.

four authors: John Scottus Eriugena<sup>7</sup>, Anselm of Canterbury<sup>8</sup>, Odo of Cambrai<sup>9</sup> and William of Champeaux<sup>10</sup>. I have given elsewhere a detailed analysis of the sources, the history and the coherence of this doctrine<sup>11</sup>. In this paper, I wish to examine the philosophical implications underlying the notion of immanence on which this version of realism rests. In order to do this, I will consider two very close versions of ontological realism, those of Anselm of Canterbury and Odo of Cambrai. Ontological realism is common to all four authors. My decision to consider only two of them is not based on any significant doctrinal difference in their defence of realism. Ontological realism

<sup>7</sup> On Eriugena's realism, see J. MARENBNON, *From the circle of Alcuin to the school of Auxerre*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981, pp. 78-83; K. ESWEIN, *Die Wesenheit bei Johannes Scottus Eriugena. Begriff, Bedeutung und Charakter der "essentia" oder "οὐσία" bei demselben*, « Philosophisches Jahrbuch », 43, 1930, pp. 189-206; C. ERISMANN, *Generalis essentia. La théorie érigénienne de l'ousia et le problème des universaux*, « Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen âge », 69, 2002, pp. 7-37 and Id., *Processio id est multiplicatio. L'influence latine de l'ontologie de Porphyre: le cas de Jean Scot Erigène*, « Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques », 88, 2004, pp. 401-460. See also B. MAIOLI, *Gli Universali. Storia antologica del problema da Socrate al XII Secolo*, Bulzoni, Roma 1974, pp. 147-162 (« Scoto Eriugena. La dialettica reale »); C. ALBANESE, *Il pensiero di Giovanni Eriugena*, Principato, Messina 1929, pp. 125-155.

<sup>8</sup> On Anselm, cf. Y. IWAKUMA, *The Realism of Anselm and his Contemporaries*, in D. E. LUSCOMBE, G. R. EVANS eds., *Anselm. Aosta, Bec and Canterbury*, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield 1996, pp. 120-135. See also C. ERISMANN, *Collectio proprietatum. Anselme de Canterbury et le problème de l'individuation*, « Mediaevalia. Textos e estudos », 22, 2003, pp. 55-71.

<sup>9</sup> Odo is maybe the least known of the early medieval realists; but he is one of the most interesting thinkers of this group, given his clear formulation of the realist doctrines. Born in Orléans in 1060, he was master at Tournai, and restored the community of St. Martin of Tournai (1092-1105). In 1105, he became bishop of Cambrai and died in 1113. See J. J. LABIS, *Le bienheureux Odon, évêque de Cambrai, son école à Tournai, son réalisme et l'application qu'il en fait au dogme du péché originel*, « Revue catholique », 14, 1856, pp. 445-460, 519-526, 574-585; and more recently, T. GREGORY, *La dottrina del peccato originale e il realismo platonico: Oddone di Tournai*, « Studi Storici », Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 26-27, 1958, pp. 31-51; E. BERTOLA, *Oddone di Tournai (o di Cambrai) ed il problema degli universali*, « Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica », 69, 1977, pp. 20-35; A. THOMPSON, *The Debate on Universals before Peter Abelard*, « Journal of the History of Philosophy », 33, 1995, pp. 409-430; I. M. RESNICK, *Odo of Tournai, the Phoenix, and the Problem of Universals*, « Journal of the History of Philosophy », 35, 1997, pp. 355-374.

<sup>10</sup> Some useful remarks can be found on the realism of William of Champeaux in J. E. BROWER, K. GUILFOY eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Abelard*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004; J. MARENBNON, *Life, milieu and intellectual contexts*, pp. 13-44, at pp. 27-34; P. KING, *Metaphysics*, pp. 65-125, at pp. 66-67; and Y. IWAKUMA, *Influence*, pp. 305-335.

<sup>11</sup> See C. ERISMANN, *La genèse du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen âge. Etude doctrinale des théories réalistes de la substance dans le cadre de la réception latine des Catégories d'Aristote et de l'Isagoge de Porphyre (850-1110)*, Doctoral thesis of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes - Université de Lausanne, to be published by Vrin, *Sic et Non* series, Paris. This study contains an analysis of Anselm's and Odo's realist ontology, a consideration of the relevant passages and a discussion of secondary literature.

was used as a tool in some very different philosophical projects — in the case of Eriugena for a general metaphysical system, for Anselm and Odo in a problem essentially theological in nature<sup>12</sup>; in the case of William for the teaching of dialectic. So my criterion of selection is not taken from the realist doctrine itself, but rather from the chronological period and intellectual project in which it was used. On these two points, Anselm and Odo are very close<sup>13</sup>. The two texts which will be at the centre of my analysis — the *De conceptu virginali et originali peccato* of Anselm and the *De peccato originali* of Odo — were both written at the end of the eleventh century and are doctrinally very homogeneous. I shall not discuss problems of dating; what I can say, though, is that the order in which these two texts were written is not known with certainty, and that there are good reasons to doubt the generally accepted idea that Anselm's was written first. The subject matter of the two texts is also very close: they both deal with the question of original sin<sup>14</sup>. In

<sup>12</sup> My analysis on this point follows that of A. Thompson: « Between 1080 and 1120, a realist understanding of universals did enjoy the support of the most influential writers and teachers of Western Christendom. These included St. Anselm of Canterbury, who treated universals in his *Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi*, and Odo of Cambrai, whose analysis appeared in his *De Peccato Originali*. Both men wrote as theologians, and both believed that some version of realism was necessary for theological orthodoxy » (*The Debate on universals* cit., pp. 413-414).

<sup>13</sup> G. Evans highlights the community of knowledge and the intellectual proximity between Anselm and Odo in *Anselm and a New Generation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1980, p. 141: « He [i.e. Odo of Cambrai] and Anselm worked in much the same climate of thought as theologians, and it is clear that Odo had access to a range of sources and a knowledge of what was topical which was very like that of Anselm ».

<sup>14</sup> The answer to the question of original sin and its transmission, which was defended by Odo and Anselm, is based on a realist, immanent theory of universals. The argument is basically the following: when the individual (or person) Adam sinned, man (the specific universal) also sinned (« cum Adam peccavit, homo peccavit » according to Anselm in the *De conceptu virginali*, 23, p. 165, ll. 12-13). This transition from the individual to the universal, the fact that a nature can be affected by the action of one or several individuals that belong to it, is made possible by the strict immanence which Anselm and Odo defend. Such a theory presupposes the existence of the common nature (realism) and the existence of the universal in its instantiations (immanence). It is upon this that Anselm and Odo rely when they say that, at a time when the only humans were Adam and Eve, the entire human nature existed in them. Both Adam and Eve sinned, which means that all the individuals sinned, thus the nature itself sinned, since it only exists in its instantiations. — The problem of the transmission of sin is consequently easy to answer: if the nature has been corrupted by Adam's sin, any individual to receive human nature (without which it could *not* be a man) will receive a corrupted nature. See for example ODO OF CAMBRAI, *De peccato originali*, 1088 CD: « Et si peccavit Adam, peccavit homo; quia si peccavit ipse homo, peccavit humana natura, quae est homo. Sed humana natura tota tunc erat in ipso, nec usquam erat alibi specialis homo. Cum ergo peccavit persona, scilicet ipse homo, peccavit tota natura, scilicet communis homo. Et in peccato personae, culpabilis factus est homo communis naturae. Et qualem Adam fecit humanam naturam in se, talem posteris eam tradidit

both cases, a discussion of the ontological status of the first man sets the framework in which the authors advance their realist theses. The argument of my paper has three stages: 1) I shall give a brief outline of the context in which the problem of universals presented itself during the early Middle Ages; 2) I shall examine the central tenet of immanent realism: the ontological interdependence of universals and particulars (the rejection of uninstantiated universals on the one hand and the rejection of the possibility of individuals not belonging to any genus or species on the other hand); 3) I will conclude with some remarks concerning the philosophical implications that derive from choosing the solution based on immanence.

### I. COMMON ENTITIES

The problem of universals as it was understood during the early Middle Ages was not the problem of the nature of properties and relations as it is today, but the problem of natural kinds<sup>15</sup>. It was a question defined by two texts, Aristotle's *Categories* and Porphyry's *Isagoge*, about the nature of Aristotelian secondary substances, that is genera and species. It is important to note that in neither of these fundamental texts can the word 'universal' (καθόλου, *universale*) be found. Following Boethius, the problem centres on the notion of community or, more precisely, of common natures. So the early medieval version of the problem of universals can be expressed by the following question: Should we admit the existence of entities common to

post se ». — The idea of natural sin which is so important both to Odo and Anselm can only be accepted if accompanied by a realist, immanent theory of common natures, such as the one analysed in this article. We have here a paradigmatic case of integrating philosophical theses in the solution to what is both a theological and dogmatic problem and a scriptural challenge (the exegesis of *Romans*, V, 12). For a detailed discussion of the use of ontological realism in Odo's and Anselm's thought on sin, see C. ERISMANN, *Problème théologique, solution philosophique. Réalisme ontologique et péché originel*, in G. D'ONOFRIO ed., *Il paradigma medievale. Pensiero religioso e filosofia*, Brepols, Turnhout, to be published. — For historical and theological remarks on Anselm's and Odo's doctrine of original sin, see O. LOTTIN, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 6 vols., Abbaye du Mont César, Louvain 1954, vol. IV; H. RONDET, *Le péché originel dans la tradition patristique et théologique*, Fayard, Paris 1967, pp. 174-189 ('Saint Anselme et ses disciples'); J. GROSS, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Erbsündendogmas im Zeitalter der Scholastik (12.-15. Jahrhundert)*, E. Reinhardt, München-Basel 1960, pp. 14-45 ('Anselm von Canterbury und sein Kreis'); J. N. ESPENBERGER, *Die Elemente der Erbsünde nach Augustin und der Frühscholastik*, Mainz, 1905, pp. 59-85 ('Die anselmische Gruppe'); R. MARTIN, *La question du péché originel dans s. Anselme*, « Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques », 5, 1911, pp. 735-749.

<sup>15</sup> The problem is that of *kinds*, that is, of entities that individuals instantiate by belonging to them, and not properties that things exemplify by possessing them.

several individuals? Let us for example consider Anselm's notion of secondary substance. In the course of discussing the problem of substance in *Monologion* 27, Anselm defines the universal in terms of community:

« To be sure, every substance is classified either as a universal, which is essentially common to many substances (as to-be-a-man is common to individual men), or else as a particular (*individua*), which has a universal essence in common with other [particulars] (as individual men have in common the fact that they are men). So how would anyone understand the Supreme Nature to be contained in the [same] classification as other substances? For neither is it common to many substances, nor does it have anything essentially in common with any other [substance]»<sup>16</sup>.

This text shows how the debate on substance takes place in the tradition of the *Categories*, and illustrates the acceptance of the Aristotelian distinction between primary substances (individuals) and secondary substances (genera and species)<sup>17</sup>. It also shows an understanding of the universal as κοινόν and not καθόλου, that is, as something which is common to different individuals, and not as that which is predicated of many. Anselm, who in this respect is representative of the early medieval realist tradition, does not understand the universal in terms of predication (as a logical universal, *dici de multis*), but of a common nature (as a metaphysical universal, *esse in multis*). The universal is understood, in a realist interpretation, as an entity which can be multiply instantiated, which remains one because it is common to many, and can exist at the same time in several numerically different individuals. The universal essence is common to many individuals. The community of the universal — its capacity of being multiply instantiated — is also emphasised by Odo of Cambrai: *homo [est] species quia potest esse multorum communis individuorum (De peccato originali, 1079B)*<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> ANSELM, *Monologion*, XXVII, p. 45, ll. 6-12: « Nemp̄e cum omnis substantia tractetur aut esse universalis, quae pluribus substantiis essentialiter communis est, ut hominem esse commune est singulis hominibus; aut esse individua, quae universalem essentiam communem habet cum aliis, quemadmodum singuli homines commune habent cum singulis, ut homines sint: quomodo aliquis summam naturam in aliarum substantiarum tractatu contineri intelligit, quae nec in plures substantias se dividit, nec cum alia aliqua per essentialem communionem se colligit? ». The Latin text of Anselm's works is quoted from F. S. SCHMITT, *S. Anselmi Opera omnia*, Seckau-Roma-Edinburgh 1938-1961. The English translations are by J. Hopkins and H. Richardson, *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, A. J. Banning Press, Minneapolis, 2000.

<sup>17</sup> See also Boethius' *Contra Eutychem*, where he states that, among substances, some are universal, others particular: « Rursus substantiarum aliae sunt uniuersales, aliae particulares » (II.15, ed. MORESCHINI, Saur, München-Leipzig 2000, p. 214, ll. 153-154).

<sup>18</sup> Odo's Latin text is quoted from the *Patrologia Latina*, vol. CLX, coll. 1071-1102. The English translation is by I. M. RESNICK, *On Original Sin and A disputation with the Jew, Leo, concerning the Advent of the Son of God. Two Theological Treatises of Odo of Tournai*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1994.

Realism maintains the existence of entities which are common to several spatio-temporally different individuals. In doing so, it rejects particularism, the doctrine according to which there is no thing which is not particular. So, for a realist, there are (at least) two different types of substantial entities in the world : particular individuals and universals, common to several individuals.

The realist doctrine of the universal as a common entity relies on immanence. Strict immanence implies ontological interdependence between universals and particulars. So 1) universals depend on individuals, in that they must be instantiated in them in order to exist (this is the immanent side of the theory) and 2) individuals depend on universals because, for an individual to be something, it must instantiate a specific universal (this is the essentialist side of the theory) : Socrates cannot exist if he is not a man (or, more generally, a *something*, the instantiation of a specific universal). And, according to the realists, for Socrates to be a man, he must instantiate completely the universal man. We can maybe summarise this thesis by borrowing an expression from the contemporary philosopher D. M. Armstrong: « Universals are nothing without particulars. Particulars are nothing without universals »<sup>19</sup>.

It is probably in the *Categories* that the early medieval realists found the conceptual tool that allowed them to make ontological interdependence into a full-blown theory ; this tool is the notion of simultaneity. Aristotle says in *Categories*, 15a7-8 : « thus we call simultaneous by nature those things which reciprocate as to implication of existence » (ἅμα οὖν τῇ φύσει λέγεται ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν). For a realist, universals and particulars are characterised by such a relation.

So, from the combination of immanence, universalism and essentialism<sup>20</sup>, we obtain the two main theses of early medieval immanent realism as it is defended by Anselm and Odo.

## II. NEITHER UNINSTANTIATED UNIVERSALS NOR BARE PARTICULARS

As opposed to Platonic realism, immanent realism requires that a universal exists in its individuals, and neither outside them, nor independently of

<sup>19</sup> D. M. ARMSTRONG, *Universals and Scientific Realism, I : Nominalism and Realism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1978, p. 113.

<sup>20</sup> By 'essentialism', I mean the thesis according to which in an individual, there are essential properties and accidental properties. The essential properties cannot be taken away without entailing the destruction of the individual, see C. WITT, *Substance and Essence in Aristotle*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-London 1989, p. 1 : « Essentialists believe that some constituents or properties of objects are essential to those objects, while other constituents or properties are not essential to them. There is an inner 'core' or essence that constitutes the object and that cannot change so long as that object exists ; the object might differ with respect to many of its features, but not with respect to its 'core' or essence ».

them: universals must be instantiated. Immanence and instantiation are closely related: a universal can only be immanent if it is instantiated. This instantiation can be multiple: several individuals can instantiate the same universal, since it is a *repeatable* entity<sup>21</sup>.

Early medieval realists understood instantiation as a perfect and complete realisation. This is a consequence of Aristotle's thesis in the *Categories* that substances do not admit of a more and a less (3b33-4a9<sup>22</sup>). The only way for an

<sup>21</sup> Cf. B. Aune, who gives the following definition of a universal: « A universal is an absolutely determinate feature that may exist at many different places at the same time; it is a 'repeatable' entity » (B. AUNE, *Universals and Predication*, in R. M. GALE ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics*, Blackwell, Oxford 2002, pp. 131-150, at p. 131). Notice that early medieval realism also admits of determinable universals, the genera.

<sup>22</sup> ARISTOTLE, *Categories*, 3b33-4a9: « Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance than another (we have said that it is), but that any given substance is not called more, or less, than which it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man. For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. Again, a thing is called more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is called more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot. Substance, however, is not spoken of thus. For a man is not called more a man now than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. Thus substance does not admit of a more and a less » (translation in ARISTOTLE, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, translated with notes by J. L. ACKRILL, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963). In Boethius' Latin translation (ARISTOTELES, *Categoriae vel Predicamenta. Translatio Boethii*, ed. L. MINIO-PALUELLO, Desclée de Brouwer, Bruges-Paris 1961 (AL I, 1), pp. 11, l. 21-12, l. 3): « Videtur autem substantia non suscipere magis et minus; dico autem non quoniam substantia non est a substantia magis substantia (hoc enim dictum est quoniam est) sed quoniam unaquaeque substantia hoc ipsum quod est non dicitur magis et minus; ut, si est ipsa substantia homo, non erit magis et minus homo, nec ipse a se ipso nec ab altero. Neque enim est alter altero magis homo, quemadmodum album est alterum altero magis album, et bonum alterum altero magis bonum; et ipsum se ipso magis et minus dicitur, ut corpus, album cum sit, magis dicitur nunc quam primo, et calidum magis et minus dicitur; substantia vero non dicitur (neque homo magis dicitur nunc homo quam antea dicitur, nec ceterorum aliquid quae sunt substantia); quare non suscipiet substantia magis et minus ». — Porphyry upholds the same thesis in *Isagoge* (ed. A. BUSSE, Berlin 1887 (CAG, IV, 1); p. 9, ll. 16-23) which gives, in Boethius' translation (*Categoriarum supplementa. Porphyrii Isagoge, translatio Boethii*, ed. L. MINIO-PALUELLO, Brill, Leiden 1966 (AL I, 6), p. 16, ll. 4-12): « Et illae quidem quae per se sunt non suscipiunt magis et minus, illae vero quae per accidens (vel si inseparabiles sint) intentionem recipiunt et remissionem; nam neque genus magis et minus praedicatur cuius fuerit genus, neque generis differentiae secundum quas dividitur; ipsae enim sunt quae uniuscuiusque rationem complement, esse autem unicuique unum et idem neque intentionem neque remissionem suscipiens est, aquilum autem esse vel simum vel coloratum aliquo modo et intenditur et remittitur ». — This thesis from the *Categories* was also known through the summary Martianus Capella gave of it in the passage of the *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* on secondary substances: « Substantia nec intendi nec remitti potest, id est recipere magis et minus. Et si quidem nemo homine alio magis homo est, et nec ipse unus homo magis cras erit homo quam hodie fuit, et in diuersis non magis equus equus est quam homo homo » (ed. A. DICK, Teubner, Stuttgart 1978, § 365, p. 169, ll. 9-13).



individual to instantiate a specific or generic universal or a definitional property is by realising it completely<sup>23</sup>. Socrates is not more or less man than Plato. John Scottus Eriugena, the first early medieval thinker to set out the realist doctrine, sums up this point in a concise formula: *nullus homo alio homine humanior est* (*Periphyseon* 943A)<sup>24</sup>. Humanity is totally present in each man, which is why no man is more human than another. Eriugena insists on the complete immanent realisation of the universal in each of its members: « *humanitas in omnes homines diffunditur, et tota in omnibus est, tota in singulis, siue boni sint, siue mali [...], pura in omnibus [...], aequalis in omnibus* » (942 C).

The idea of instantiation is very important in early medieval realism. Instantiation understood as the complete realisation of the universal in each of its individuals is in strong opposition to the other two traditional ways of understanding the relation between universals and particulars — on the one hand, the universal as being mereologically composed of the particulars and on the other hand, the universal as being present in the particular to a greater or lesser degree, which is the theory Augustine seems to defend. The theory of the mereological division of the universal — today known as mereological nominalism — considers a universal as being the sum of its individuals: each individual is a small part of the universal<sup>25</sup>. If there exist one hundred

<sup>23</sup> The thesis according to which the universal is wholly present in its subdivisions was clearly formulated by Boethius. We can consider the realist position as an attempt to uphold the existence of common, non-numerically multiplied entities, which answer three criteria given by Boethius, in his second commentary to Porphyry, when describing what a genus should be — even if Boethius denies the existence of such entities: « *Genus uero secundum nullum horum modum commune esse speciebatur potest; nam ita commune esse debet, ut et totum sit in singulis et uno tempore et eorum quorum commune est, constituere ualeat et formare substantiam* » (BOETHIUS, *In Isagogen Porphyrii*, G. SCHEPPS, S. BRANDT eds., Wien 1906 (CSEL 48), pp. 162, l. 23-163, l. 3). Here we have the three conditions a genus is supposed to meet: it should be wholly present, immanent in the individuals, and constitutive of the metaphysical being of the individuals. The early medieval realists advocate universal entities which meet all three criteria.

<sup>24</sup> The whole passage is worth quoting, *Periphyseon* V, 943 AB (ed. E. JEAUNEAU, Brepols, Turnhout 2003 [CCCM 165], p. 116, ll. 3725-3733): « *Et ut cognoscas aequalitatem humanitatis in omnibus hominibus, intueri communem speciem humanorum corporum. Nullus enim homo alio homine humanior est. Nam si aliqua deformitas contigerit uel formarum differentia, non ex natura euenit, sed uel ex corruptione corporeae integritatis uel quibusdam accidentibus, quae extrinsecus adueniunt quasdamque singulis hominibus differentias addunt, dum sit una species et generalis omnibus ex natura uniformiter impressa* ».

<sup>25</sup> Although this theory is not the one Boethius supports, some passages from the *De divisione* seem to incline towards mereological nominalism and could serve as textual authorities for its partisans, for example: « *the parts of man are Cato, Virgil, Cicero and the single men who, although being particulars, nevertheless combine to make up the sum of man. [...] they are rather the parts out of which the whole of man is composed* »; « *Cumque hominis dicimus partes esse Catonem, Virgilium, Ciceronem et singulos qui, cum particulares sint, vim tamen totius hominis iungunt atque componunt; neque enim homo genus, nec singuli homines species, sed partes quibus totus homo coiungitur* » (ed. and transl. J. MAGEE, Brill, Leiden 1998, p. 8, ll. 9-14).

individual cats, each cat is one hundredth of the universal cat. This theory is rejected by early medieval realists; they insist on the complete and simultaneous realisation of the universal in each of its instances. Let us consider Odo of Cambrai's very accurate way of expressing this point — beside the condition of complete realisation, he mentions the immanence of the universal in the individual:

« The individual of the universal has the universal itself whole and perfect in it »  
 (« individuum universalis, ipsum universale, totum et perfectum habet in se »,  
 1080 B).

The other theory rejected by early medieval realists is Augustine's idea of degrees of instantiation. According to this theory, an individual can instantiate its specific universal more or less<sup>26</sup>. Following Aristotle in the *Categories*, the early medieval realists reject the possibility of partially instantiated universals and that of a difference of degree in the instantiation of a universal in two individuals of the same species. Peter cannot be more human than Paul.

Cody S. Gilmore has recently given a definition of the immanence of universals which corresponds perfectly to the early medieval notion of complete instantiation: « To say that universals are immanent is to say that they exist *in* their instances, when this is taken to mean that each universal is wholly present at each location at which it is instantiated »<sup>27</sup>. In the Aristotelian tradition of the *Categories*, immanence is understood as a complete presence, an entire realisation. This notion of complete instantiation allows the unity and identity

<sup>26</sup> AUGUSTINE, *De immortalitate animae*, VIII, 13, Ed. Bénédictine, [BA V/2], p. 194: « Quod si non id quod est in mole corporis, sed id quod in specie facit corpus esse, quae sententia invictiore ratione approbatur: tanto enim magis est corpus, quanto speciosius est atque pulchrius; tantoque minus est, quanto foedius ac deformius; quae defectio non praecisione molis, de qua jam satis actum est, sed speciei putatione contingit ». Christopher Stead gives a clear summary of Augustine's anti-Aristotelian position on the possibility of the more or less perfect realisation of a form: « Certainly Augustine speaks of greater and less being, and of supreme being (*magis esse, minus esse, summe esse*); but does this apply to all aspects of being? With regard to the third of these, permanence, the answer is clear; obviously things can be more and less permanent. But to say that one can possess a specific form more and less completely sounds improbable, and is certainly a direct contradiction of Aristotle; while common sense insists that either a creature is a horse, or it is not. But Augustine clearly did believe that a specific form, for instance humanity, can be more and less perfectly realized; and this belief is linked with his theory of evil as defect of being », G. C. STEAD, *Augustine's Philosophy of Being*, in G. VESEY ed., *The Philosophy in Christianity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 71-84, at p. 82.

<sup>27</sup> C. S. GILMORE, *In defence of spatially related universals*, « Australasian Journal of Philosophy », 81, 2003, pp. 420-428, at p. 420.

of the common nature man to be maintained. For the realists, the unity of the species depends on the presence of the same universal in each member of the species, and on its presence in the same degree, that is, its complete presence.

Since immanent realism holds that a universal exists only in its individuals, non-instantiated universals do not exist. For a realist who advocates immanent universals, it is therefore necessary to postulate a *principle of instantiation*, defined here in a way inspired from David Armstrong<sup>28</sup> :

For each universal U, there exists at least one particular such that it is U.

Admitting or refusing such a principle, that is, refusing or admitting non-instantiated universals, is the dividing line between two sorts of realism : on the one hand, Platonic or transcendental realism, which defends separated universals, outside and beyond individuals, and on the other hand, Aristotelian realism, which defends immanent universals.

In order better to understand the difference between these two types of realism and to highlight the doctrinal orientation of early medieval ontological realism, it may be useful to explore further the position on uninstantiated universals in these two doctrines<sup>29</sup>. During the early Middle Ages, the problem does not arise in the general framework of a theory of properties such as that of Armstrong, but only in that of the relation between a species (i.e. a natural kind) and its individuals. The problem is thus of deciding whether a species can exist without any individuals. A supporter of Platonic or transcendent realism believes that an individual can exist only if the universal that it instantiates exists ; but the universal can exist without being instantiated by any individual. An upholder of immanent realism, on the other hand, would accept the following rule :

If S is a specific universal and  $x^1, x^2, x^3 \dots x^n$  are the individuals belonging to the species S, then, necessarily, S exists if at least one x exists.

This means that, for any existing specific or generic universal, there is at least one individual that instantiates wholly this universal. This principle

<sup>28</sup> ARMSTRONG, *Universals and Scientific Realism*, I cit., p. 137.

<sup>29</sup> Thanks to Boethius, medieval thinkers had a clear formulation of the alternative between Platonism and Aristotelianism : « sed Plato genera et species caeteraque non modo intelligi universalia, verum etiam esse atque propter corpora subsistere putat ; Aristoteles vero intelligi quidem corporalia atque universalia, sed subsistere in sensibilibus putat » (BOETHIUS, *In Isagogen Porphyrii* ed. cit., p. 167, ll. 12-15).

underlies early medieval realist thought. This is particularly visible in the discussion on the creation of the first man, Adam. Let us consider a moment *t* at which there existed only one man, Adam. A Platonic realist will consider that there were at that moment two entities : the separated universal man and Adam, who participates in this universal. An immanent realist will consider that there is just the individual who instantiates wholly the universal man. The universal is there, but only in the individual. Anselm is particularly clear on this point : the whole of human nature was *in* Adam when he was the only man, and in Eve and Adam once God created woman :

« Since human nature which as a whole was so present in Adam that none of it was present outside of him [...] ».

*Quamobrem quoniam humana natura quae sic erat in ADAM tota, ut nihil de illa extra illum esset [...] (De conceptu virginali, X, p. 152, ll. 22-24).*

« And because the whole of human nature was in Adam and Eve, none of it being outside of them, human nature as a whole was weakened and corrupted ».

*Et quia tota humana natura in illis erat et extra ipsos de illa nihil erat, tota infirmata et corrupta est (De conceptu virginali, II, p. 141, ll. 15-16).*

The universal man exists only in particular men. So before the creation of Adam, the universal man did not exist. When God created man, he created at the same time the universal man and a given individual, Adam. And while Adam was the only man, the universal man existed only in Adam<sup>30</sup>. When there were two human beings, Adam and Eve, the universal was completely realised in each of them, but nowhere else. Outside the individuals (*extra ipsos*) mankind did not exist (*de illa nihil erat*). Odo upholds exactly the same thesis :

<sup>30</sup> This point is important because it highlights the fact that the immanent universal of the realists can be instantiated by several individuals, but must be instantiated by at least one. Thus there can be monadic species such as the phoenix. The number of individuals is accidental to the species. The possibility of multiple realisation — the possibility that the universal can have several instantiations — is enough for it to be universal. So even if there is never more than one phoenix, phoenix is a species because there could be several of them. See ODO OF CAMBRAI, *De peccato originali* 1079 B: « Nam phoenix avis, quamvis individuum non habeat nisi unum, species est, quia communis potest esse multorum, aliud enim est phoenix, aliud haec phoenix. Phoenix est specialis natura, quae potest esse communis: haec phoenix vero natura, quae tantum est individua, nec aliud esse potest quam singularis; phoenix genere, differentiisque terminatur, haec phoenix accidentium proprietate discernitur. Individuum non nisi de uno dici potest. Species etiamsi de uno solo dicitur, de pluribus dici potest. Species etiamsi de uno solo dicatur, universalis est; individuum vero nonnisi singulare est ».

« In fact, at the time the whole human nature was in him [i.e. Adam], and nowhere else was there human species ».

*Sed humana natura tota tunc erat in ipso, nec usquam erat alibi specialis homo (De peccato originali, 1088 C).*

The immanence of the universal appears clearly from these texts; the nature, which will become common, thus universal, when several men come to exist, is at that moment *in Adam*. This important point is set out by Anselm :

« Accordingly, since nature exists in persons and since persons do not exist without a nature, the nature makes the persons of infants sinful ».

*Hac ratione quoniam natura subsistit in personis et personae non sunt sine natura, facit natura personas infantum peccatrices (De conceptu virginali, XXIII, p. 165, ll. 19-21).*

Leaving aside the problem of sin, this brief passage contains two ontological theses that express the relation of interdependence between universals and particulars for an immanent realist.

First, a nature subsists in persons: *natura subsistit in personis*. Since 'nature' is the name Anselm gives to the essence common to several individuals of the same species<sup>31</sup>, we have confirmation that Anselm is defending here a theory of universals: he believes in the existence of common natures, i.e., *in re* universals. Universals are immanent and subsist in particulars which instantiate them. Anselm is speaking here of real non-separated universals; they are neither divine ideas, nor concepts, but real entities, immanent in sensible things. The universal man — a nature which is common and capable of multiple instantiations — exists only in individual men, here called 'persons' for theological reasons derived from the *De trinitate* of Boethius, because of their rationality<sup>32</sup>. Odo defends exactly the same idea, asserting that « *substantia non est nisi in persona* » (1085 BC) — since *substantia* always refers to the generic or specific universal in his text.

Secondly, a person cannot exist without a nature: *personae non sunt sine natura*. In other words, an individual cannot exist without its specific universal; a universal causes the being of its subdivisions. The universal is the metaphysical constituent of the individuals. The 'suppression argument' underlies this position: if the nature is suppressed, the individual is

<sup>31</sup> The equivalent meaning of 'natura' and 'essentia' is clearly stated in the *Monologion*: « *Idem namque naturam hic intellego quod essentiam* » (*Monologion*, IV, ed. cit., p. 17, ll. 17-18).

<sup>32</sup> Following Boethius, Anselm uses the word 'persona' to refer to an individual of the species man; cf. *Epistola de incarnatione verbi*, I, ed. cit., p. 10, ll. 11: « *omnis individuus homo est persona* ».

suppressed<sup>33</sup>. The nature is ontologically prior. This text from the *De conceptu virginali* emphasises the dependence of individuals on their specific universal, but it also upholds a more general thesis: an individual cannot exist without a nature, that is, without instantiating a specific universal. For an early medieval realist, an individual which is an individual without being *a something*, an instance of a natural kind, cannot exist. Individuals always instantiate some specific universal; in contemporary terms, there are no bare particulars<sup>34</sup>. The notions of individual and universal are closely related in early medieval ontology, particularly in realist thought. Individuals are necessarily individuals of a kind, and kinds are necessarily kinds of individuals. It is impossible for an individual not to belong to a given species; we can express this idea in the following way:

For each individual, x, there exists one specific universal, U, such that x is U.

Thus every individual turns out to be an instance of *a* universal. To be is to be a such-and-such; to be is to take place in Porphyry's Tree, to belong to a given species. The Tree is the ontological structure of the world. Realists believe that the world is a 'realisation' of the division of *ousia* as it was codified by Porphyry. Outside the division of *ousia*, no substance, therefore no existence, is possible.

Odo<sup>35</sup> and Anselm express this idea in the same way: *persona non est sine natura*. There can be no persons, that is, no human individuals, without a nature, in this case the specific universal man. This ontological thesis can be found originally in Aristotle. Daniel Graham calls it 'secondary substantialism' and characterises it as follows: « Every primary substance falls under a

<sup>33</sup> The textual authority for the anteriority and ontological priority of specific and generic universals over individuals is Porphyry's *Isagoge*, ed. cit., p. 17, ll. 9-10: « genera and species are prior (πρότερα) by nature (φύσει) to individual substances » (« genera vero et species naturaliter priora sunt individuis substantiis »).

<sup>34</sup> The thesis according to which an individual is necessarily an instantiation of a specific universal is still defended in the contemporary debate on natural kinds. For example, E. J. Lowe says: « I hold that there are no 'bare' particulars, only individual instances or exemplars of certain sorts of kinds (tokens of certain types in another terminology). [...] I also hold, as a corollary of this thesis, that the notions of an 'individual' and of a 'sort' or 'kind' are opposite sides of a single conceptual coin: each is only understandable in terms of the other. Individuals are necessarily individuals of *a kind* and kinds are necessarily kinds of *individuals*. In consequence I maintain that realism with regard to particulars or individuals — the belief, in my opinion correct, that they may exist independently of the human or indeed any other mind — implies realism with regard to sorts or kinds » (E. J. LOWE, *Kinds of Being. A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms*, Blackwell, Oxford-New York 1989 [Aristotelian Society Series, volume 10], p. 4).

<sup>35</sup> *De peccato originali*, 1085 BC.

secondary substance, which is a species »<sup>36</sup>. So every individual belongs to a natural species and to genera ; so *the individual man belongs in a species, man* (*Cat.* 5, 2a16-17: οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἶδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ). This thesis expresses what was taken by early medieval realists to be a basic and unproblematic fact.

Individuals that belong to no genus and to no species, that is, individuals that instantiate no nature, are impossible. This essentialist idea, taken from Aristotle's *Categories*, is central to realism. For an early medieval realist, substantial being, essence, is given to an individual by the species to which it belongs. Socrates' essence is humanity ; he shares this essence with Plato and Cicero. What differs in Socrates from Plato is not something essential, belonging to the essence, but accidental, that is, a bundle of accidental properties<sup>37</sup>. The

<sup>36</sup> D. GRAHAM, *Aristotle's Two Systems*, Clarendon, Oxford 1987, p. 35. Graham's book offers interesting insights for the scholar in medieval philosophy ; see C. ERISMANN, *Un autre aristotélisme ? La problématique métaphysique durant le haut Moyen âge latin. A propos d'Anselme*, *Monologion* 27, « *Quaestio. Annuario di storia della metafisica* », 5, 2005, pp. 143-160.

<sup>37</sup> The thesis of individuation through accidents upholds that two individuals of the same species are different because they each have a unique bundle of accidental properties. It is in opposition to the idea that particulars are essentially individuated. It admits no essential difference between members of the same species, and thus insists on the unity of the species. This thesis originates in Porphyry (*Isagoge*, ed. cit., p. 7, ll. 19-27), where the individual is said to be *constituted* (συνέστηκεν) by the bundle of accidental properties. — Let us quote this text in Boethius' Latin translation (ed. cit., pp. 13, l. 21-14, l. 6) : « [...] individuum autem de uno solo particulari. Individuum autem dicitur Socrates et hoc album et hic veniens, ut Sophronisci filius, si solus ei sit Socrates filius. Individua ergo dicuntur huiusmodi, quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, quorum collectio numquam in alio eadem erit. Socratis enim proprietates numquam in alio quolibet erunt particularium, hae vero quae sunt hominis, dico autem eius qui est communis, proprietates erunt eadem in pluribus, magis autem in omnibus particularibus hominibus in eo quod homines sunt ». On Porphyry's conception of the individual, see R. CHIARADONNA, *La teoria dell'individuo in Porfirio e l'ΔΙΩΣ ΠΟΙΟΝ stoico*, « *Elenchos* », 21, 2000, pp. 303-331. — Boethius encouraged the Latin diffusion of the model given by Porphyry. The most important text is BOETHIUS, *De trinitate*, I, ed. cit., pp. 167, l. 46-168, l. 63 : « Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est ; praeter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit intelligi potest. Trium namque rerum vel quolibet tum genere tum specie tum numero diversitas constat ; quotiens enim idem dicitur totiens diversum etiam praedicatur. Idem vero dicitur tribus modis : aut genera, ut idem homo quod equus, quia idem genus, ut animal ; vel specie, ut idem Cato quod Cicero, quia eadem species, ut homo ; vel numero, ut Tullius et Cicero, quia unus est numero. Quare diversum etiam vel genere vel specie vel numero dicitur. Sed numero differentiam accidentium varietas facit. Nam tres homines neque genere neque species, sed suis accidentibus distant ; nam vel si animo cuncta ab his accidentia separemus, tamen locus cunctis diversus est, quem unum fingere nullo modo possumus : duo enim corpora unum locum non obtinebunt, qui est accidens. Atque ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt ». On the problem of individuation and the influence of Boethius, see J. GRACIA, *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages*, Philosophia Verlag, München-Wien 1984 ; on the different aspects of the problem of individuation, see P. KING, *The Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages*, « *Theoria* », 66, 2000, pp. 159-184.

individual does not have its own particular essence. Its substance comes from its instantiating a species: it is because Socrates instantiates completely the universal man that he has an essence, i.e. humanity. An individual is thus impossible without its species, since all that would be left would be a bundle of accidental properties lacking substance. Since the universal gives the individual its substance, an individual without universal would totally lack substance. For a realist, an individual has two components: the essence, which is universal and common to all the individuals of the same species<sup>38</sup>, and a bundle of accidental properties, which is unique and particular to each individual<sup>39</sup>. Anselm marks a clear distinction between what belongs to the *persona* (the individual) and what belongs to the *natura* (the specific universal which is common to all the individuals of a species): ‘man’ refers to the species, whereas the first name refers to the person, the individual<sup>40</sup>:

« For the person was what was called Adam; and the nature was what was called man ».

*Persona enim erat quod dicebatur ADAM; natura, quod homo (De conceptu virginali, XXIII, p. 165, ll. 11-12).*

Just as an individual lacking substance cannot exist, an individual lacking its particular component, the bundle of accidents, cannot exist either. Each individual is in part unique (the *collectio proprietatum*), but has also a part which is common to all the individuals of the species. As we have seen, only this common part is substantial.

Odo describes the two ‘parts’ of the individual — the doctrinal foundation of early medieval ontological realism — by using the couple of expressions: *quod est* (that which the individuals of the species have in common: the unique specific substance) and *quod habet* (that by which an individual is different from the others, that is, the bundle of accidents which belongs only to it). So, he says of different individuals of a same species: *per hoc quod habent diversa sunt, per hoc quod sunt, unum sunt (De peccato originali, 1082).*

The individual’s dependence on its species for its substantial being has several consequences. One of them is the ontological devaluation of the

<sup>38</sup> D. M. Armstrong ascribes to the realist a thesis which applies perfectly to the doctrine we are considering here: « I take it that the Realist ought to allow that two ‘numerically diverse’ particulars which have the same property are not wholly diverse. They are partially identical in nature and so are partially identical » (*Universals and Scientific Realism, I cit.*, p. 112).

<sup>39</sup> For an analysis of the Anselmian theory of the individual and a detailed discussion of the relevant passages, see ERISMANN, *Collectio proprietatum cit.*

<sup>40</sup> See also ANSELM, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi*, XI, ed. cit., p. 29, ll. 4-9.



individual. Since the individual has no particular substance and cannot exist without the substance it shares with the other individuals of the same species, it does not satisfy the criterion of ontological independence. Thus the tendency of the early medieval realists to abandon the notion of *substantia prima* — Eriugena is the best example of this<sup>41</sup> — in favour of other ways of referring to the individual such as *individua*, *atoma* or *numeri*. The rejection of the particular substantiality of the individual is a clear consequence of the rejection of bare particulars and of the admission of the ontological dependence of individuals on their universal. A new conception of the individual becomes necessary.

### III. TOWARDS A NEW NOTION OF SUBSTANCE AND INDIVIDUAL

One can define the notion of substance according to different criteria. One can consider that, in order to be a substance, something has to be an individual — *this* horse and *that* man are substances; or one can take ontological independence as a criterion for being a substance — a substance is an entity which does not require the existence of any other entity in order to exist<sup>42</sup>. Such a criterion is not acceptable for an early medieval immanent realist: it is probable that he could not have found in his ontology any entities satisfying this criterion. In the Aristotelian framework set out in the *Categories* and endorsed by the early medieval realists, there are primary substances and secondary substances. None of these two types of substances can fulfil the requirement of ontological independence.

The notion of primary substance (the individuals) is redefined by the early medieval realists, to the point of losing nearly all its original meaning: the individual has no proper substance; it is only an instantiation of its species.

<sup>41</sup> Eriugena criticises the notion of primary substance by using the argument that, since all the substantial being of the individual is given by the species, nothing distinguishes substantially an individual from its species. See JOHN SCOTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, I, 470 D-471 A, ed. E. JEAUNEAU, Brepols, Turnhout 1996 (CCCM 161), p. 42, ll. 1224-1235: « Nam iuxta dialecticorum opinionem omne quod est aut subiectum aut de subiecto aut in subiecto aut in subiecto et de subiecto est. Vera tamen ratio consulta respondet subiectum et de subiecto unum esse et in nullo distare. Nam si, ut illi aiunt, Cicero subiectum est et prima substantia, homo uero de subiecto secundaque substantia, quae differentia est iuxta naturam nisi quia unum in numero alterum in specie, cum nil aliud sit species nisi numerorum unitas et nil aliud numerus nisi speciei pluralitas? Si ergo species tota et una est indiuiduaque in numeris et numeri unum indiuiduum sunt in specie, quae quantum ad naturam distantia est inter subiectum et de subiecto non uideo ».

<sup>42</sup> We can mention the formulation of such a thesis by E. J. Lowe: « x is a substance if there is nothing y such that y is not identical with x and, necessarily, x exists only if y exists » (E. J. LOWE, *The Possibility of Metaphysics. Substance, Identity and Time*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998, p. 138).

From the point of view of substance, nothing distinguishes an individual from its species. Since all the substantiality of the individual comes from its species, it is dependent on the species. Since it lacks a proper substance — everything substantial in the individual is common to all the individuals of the species — the individual is reduced to being a way of being of the specific substance instead of being itself an independent substance. It is ontologically dependent on its species in order to be a something.

Odo rejects the possibility of the individual's having something which is substantially more than the species :

« The orthodox respond in the following way to this question, and say that they view the relation of individuals to species as different from that of species to genera, for species have substantially more than genera. The genus does not suffice to constitute the substance of the species, because with respect to substance the species has a difference beyond the genus, and from the standpoint of substance the species is more than the genus. For man is more than animal, because man is rational, and animal is not rational.

Individuals have nothing more than the species from the standpoint of substance (*individua vero nihil habent substantialiter plus quam species*), however, nor with respect to substance are they any different from the species. For with respect to substance, Peter is nothing else but a man. That there are several individuals under one species, however, does not depend on something substantial, but on the accidents. For that reason, a single individual can be under a species, although a single species cannot be under a genus »<sup>43</sup>.

The individual is not, as it was for Aristotle, the paradigm of substance ; it is only that which manifests and instantiates what has now become substance in the first sense of the word, the common essence, i.e. the specific universal. So, from the point of view of substance, the individual is second with regard to the species : the conjunction of realism and essentialism brings about the thesis according to which if man does not exist, Socrates cannot exist.

<sup>43</sup> ODO OF CAMBRAI, *De peccato originali*, 1078 D-1079 B : « Contra hanc quaestionem taliter Orthodoxi respondent, et dicunt quod aliter se habent ad species individua, quam species ad genera ; nam species plus habent substantialiter quam genera, nec sufficit ad speciei substantiam genus, quia substantialiter habet species differentiam praeter genus, et plus est species substantialiter quam genus. Plus enim homo quam animal, quia rationalis est homo, et non est rationale animal ; individua vero nihil habent substantialiter plus quam species, nec aliud sunt substantialiter quam species. Non est enim substantialiter aliud Petrus quam homo. Quod autem sub una specie plura sunt individua, non facit hoc aliquod substantiale, sed accidentia. Ideo solum individuum potest esse sub specie, cum sola species nequeat esse sub genere ». Resnick's translation has been slightly modified.

Secondary substance is the most important type of entity for an early medieval realist. But in this case too, Aristotle's notion is revised. The word 'substantia' is more or less abandoned in favour of, or used in the sense of, 'essentia', which seems to account better for the ontological importance of the universal. But since the realism I am considering is immanent realism, the universal, too, is dependent, not on a given individual, but on the existence of at least one individual which instantiates it (as we have noted in relation to the *principle of instantiation*): as we have seen, the universal needs to be instantiated at least once in order to exist. If the condition of substantiality is ontological independence, it cannot be fulfilled by an immanent universal, since a universal cannot exist independently of at least one individual.

So an early medieval realist's ontology is founded on interdependence, and not on independence, because of the rejection of separated universals and of 'separated' particulars, unsubstantial bundles of accidental properties. Individuals and universals cannot exist without one another. Individuals and universals are two aspects of the same reality. Therefore, the universals are as real as the individuals themselves.