Debate? To do this, it is necessary to doubt oneself and to listen to the other. This is what Kant called "judgment" (see the Critique of Judgment [1]): to be able to put oneself in the position of the other. For if we do not make the effort to imagine what the other is saying, if we are not able to put ourselves in the speaker’s place in order to understand exactly the basis of what he is saying and how he is saying it, how are we to consider and reason about the truth or falsity of this argument?

Then debate carries with it the "risk" or incentive of understanding that we are not right. Or perhaps we will find new arguments that have the truth we seek.

If we do not do this, if we simply repeat what we think, considering what the other says only as a place to find the error, then we fall into monologue and the discussion becomes a rally. Nothing happens, but listening to it from the outside is boring. Then what Cervantes wrote in Don Quixote happens: “vino a perder el juicio (He came to lose his mind)” (Chapter One [2]).

Social networks and political positions are full of quick, undeniable truths, but do we not ask ourselves on what foundations they stand? And the more we are shaken by indignation, that emotion so doubtful of thinking according to the Kantian principle of sapere aude (3), the more difficult it becomes for us to understand the other, whom we see riding on the back of falsehood.

There is something wonderful about debating, so much so that it is hard to stop, and sometimes even too sharp and hurtful. There is also something wonderful about watching and listening to the debaters as they engage in an imaginary dialectical boxing match, revealing more and more depth, refining and searching, exchanging rhetorical blows but adapted to the content? It is a gift to the spectator and to themselves. And there is something disgusting in discussions based on monologues, the ad hominem arguments of the personal attack type (see Aristotle [4], Book VIII, 161a; [5], 174b; Chichi [6]), and the ad populum fallacies (see Locke [7]), understood as an argument of authority, of the type "as everyone knows..." (when in fact it is the speaker who affirms).

Why is it that in many parliaments and public and academic tribunes, well expressed and well constructed rational arguments are met with indifference, while arguments without construction and value, but full of arrogance, are loudly applauded?

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In these times of so many speeches and personal attacks, of so few debates, it would be appropriate to have a law that kindly, with the laughter that moved us the possible lost second book of Aristotle's Poetics, would not force people, but would suggest to them: "Debate, take the risk of not being right! Perhaps you might enjoy it..."

References


