

THE PERSISTENT PUZZLE OF THE MINORITY DEMOCRAT

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I
ROUSSEAU writes,

Aside from [the] primitive contract, the vote of the majority always obligates all the others But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. How can the opponents be both free and be placed in subjection to laws to which they have not consented?¹

His answer is that by consenting to or willing the procedure that leads to an outcome, one consents to or wills the outcome and so remains free. A democrat, let us say, is one who wills or desires whatever gets a majority of votes (it is beside the point that few are fully democrats, or whether it is a morally defensible stance).² Democrats are then subject to their own wills even when they are in the minority.

The usual view of voting is that it involves favoring one of the alternatives over the others. If the social choice is between *A* and *B*, to vote for *A* is to favor, or will, *A* over *B* (or, more strictly, *A* and not-*B* over *B* and not-*A*). In the case where one votes for *A* but *B* wins, it appears that the winning alternative is something the minority voter wills not to be enacted. However, if this voter is a democrat, Rousseau's argument suggests that he or she wills *B* by willing whatever gets a majority. This seems to put the voter in the incomprehensible position of willing *A* and not-*A*; *A* is willed in the agent's vote, and not-*A* is willed in the agent's being a democrat.

- (1) I will that what a majority wills is enacted (even if this is *B*).³
- (2) I will that *A* be enacted.

This would appear to attribute two inconsistent attitudes to minority democrats: willing *A*, and also not-*A*.⁴

Commentators have generally concluded that the puzzle can be solved without upsetting the received understanding of democracy to any significant extent. I wish to argue that the puzzle cannot be solved as long as voting for a policy is conceived as favoring it, though I do not suppose that this undoes the possibility of democratic theory altogether. Still, since it is a central part of contemporary thought about democracy that voting is a kind of favoring, what follows is, in an important way, a defense of the puzzle's reality and importance.

Perhaps the minority voter's attitudes are not, after all, inconsistent. Consider a similar situation, but in another context—that of a losing sprinter. Supposing I am the sprinter, it is reasonable to assume that I begin the race with two desires:

- (A1) I want the first runner past the line to get the prize, even if that is not me.
- (A2) I want it to be the case that I am first past the line.

If I have these two desires, we can fairly say that I want the prize to go to me. Still, if I am beaten in the race I want the prize to go to another. There is no reason to consider these as incompatible desires, since the desire that the prize go to me is, in a way, conditional on my being fastest, which I also desire.

Once the race is over and I have lost, I needn't be thought to give up my original desire (to get the prize as a result of being first). It involves a state of affairs which I still prefer to the one that has actually come about. It has not disappeared but has been rendered moot. The two desires peacefully coexist; I haven't changed my mind on anything.⁵

Consider the minority voter's attitudes as they parallel those of the losing sprinter:

- (B1) I desire that the policy with majority support be enacted.
- (B2) I desire that *A* is the policy with majority support.

As with the sprinter, the minority democrat's attitudes are not, after all, inconsistent, even when *B* rather than *A* gets majority support.⁶ However, this account of the consistency of these two attitudes raises a further and equally important difficulty.

The term "support" is vague in (B1) and (B2). Let us distinguish two proposals. First, suppose that "to support" is taken to mean "to vote for":

- (C1) I desire that the policy with a majority of votes be enacted.
 (C2) I desire that a majority vote for *A*.

These attitudes are consistent as we have seen. Presumably, (1) represents the voter's being a democrat, while (2) represents the content of this individual's vote. However, this is an interpretation of voting which employs the concept of voting. This is illegitimate for the following reasons. The puzzle has presented us with two questions of interpretation. First, "What is it to be a democrat?" and second, "What is it to vote for something?" These questions are raised by the fact that certain answers that would be natural to give ((1) and (2)) conflict with each other in the way we've discussed. There is a need, then, to try to adjust these interpretations so that they do not conflict in that way. The proposal in question does remove the conflict, but by interpreting voting for something as expressing a desire for a majority to vote for it. This is no answer to the question "What is it to vote for something?" The interpretation of voting uses the concept of voting as though it were independently interpreted. This is viciously circular and illegitimate.

It may seem that the circularity can be removed by first offering (C1) and (C2) as an account of certain pertinent attitudes of a voter, and then interpreting voting itself in another way.⁷ However, this strategy proceeds by ignoring the original puzzle and the way in which it forced the move to (C1) and (C2). The original difficulty centered around the fact that voting cannot be interpreted as simply a kind of favoring because this is inconsistent with the possibility of being a democrat even where one is on the losing side. This same problem must still be faced if (C1) and (C2) are taken as motives rather than as an interpretation of voting. The fact that (C1) and (C2) are unproblematic when they're not considered as interpretations of voting is no comfort

in the search for an *interpretation* that avoids the puzzle. Relegating (C1) and (C2) to the background of reasons or motives, and then simply trying again with the remaining issue of the interpretation of voting is a pointless maneuver.

To avoid the circularity the term "support" might be taken to mean "desire" rather than "vote for":

- (D1) I desire that the policy *desired* by a majority is enacted.
 (D2) I desire that a majority *desire* *A*.

Since (D2) does not refer to voting in any way, the circularity of the previous account is absent. This is puzzling as a proposed interpretation of voting, since it would leave it a mystery what any voter desires with regard to the social choice between *A* and *B*. The thought behind the proposal seems to be that what the majority desires should be revealed through voting, and the majority's desire's should prevail. Since the interpretation of voting cannot itself refer to voting (as in C1 and C2), the idea is to make it refer to desires instead—the desires of the other voters. The result, however, is that *nobody's* desires are revealed through voting, contrary to the intention of the proposal. (D2) is not a circular interpretation of voting, but is, in a way that is decisive against it, empty.

Is there an interpretation that is neither empty in this way, nor circular in the way (C2) is? Of course there are many candidates for interpretations of voting that take the following form:

- (I desire, I will, I prefer it, It ought to be the case, etc.)
 that *A* is enacted.

Under these interpretations no vicious circle is formed by any reference to the votes of others, nor are they empty like the previous proposal. However, a candidate of this sort is either an incomplete statement of the more complex sort of attitude reflected in (C2) or (D2) in which case it is no help, or it is a simple favoring of *A*, in which case we simply face the original puzzle—the voter's desire (preference, and so on) for *A*, and, as a minority democrat, for not-*A*. Suppose, for example, we correct the emptiness of the previous proposal in the simplest possible way. Add the desire for *A* on to the interpretation of voting as follows:

- (E1) I desire that the policy desired by a majority is enacted.
 (E2) I desire that a majority desire A.
 (E3) I desire A.

The only addition is (E3); (E1) and (E2) are just (D1) and (D2). Here we suppose that (E1), (E2) and (E3) are together an interpretation of voting. Voting no longer leaves it mysterious what the voters desire, and so the emptiness of (D1), (D2) is filled. However, (E3) is a kind of straightforward favoring, and is pernicious in just the way that it was in the naive understanding of voting that gives rise to the puzzle in the first place, namely (1) and (2). After all, (E1) is just (1) ("I will that what a majority wills is enacted"), and desire (E3) is relevantly like (2) ("I will that A be enacted") in that it will conflict with the voter's simple desire ((1) or (E1)) in minority voters. In short, the original puzzle is simply present here as well.

However, it might be thought that this proposal can be saved. (E3) may be held to be a complex desire, such that it is, in its very nature, to be *revised* should policy B get a majority of votes. The voter would come to desire B rather than A in that case. The suggestion is that (E3) is not meant to be an undemocratic desire that A be enacted no matter what. It is more complicated than that. It is, presumably then,

- (E3') I desire that A get a majority and that it be enacted for that reason.

This is indeed a perfectly democratic attitude. However, it fails in its purported capacity as part of an interpretation of voting. (E3'), as stated, is ambiguous. A is desired to get a majority of *what*? (E3') must mean either the conjunction of (C1) and (C2), or the conjunction of (D1) and (D2). In either case it falls victim to the arguments I have advanced against those accounts above.

It might have been expected that the original puzzle depended on the presence of *inconsistent* attitudes on the part of the minority voter, and that it would dissolve if we could find attitudes which plausibly represented both the voter's being a democrat and the voter's favoring one alternative over the other, without these committing the voter to wanting or willing inconsistent states of affairs.

However, there is an additional requirement, that the solution retain a tenable interpretation of voting. This is not just an artificially imported requirement; it is an obvious and absolutely minimal requirement.

The puzzle is persistent against suggestions that democrats favor, in some simple way, the policies they vote for. And accounts which recognize the more complicated kind of support that *is* present in a democrat nonetheless fail if they suggest that voting is to be interpreted as involving support of this more complex kind. Democrats do not favor policies simply, and even the complex democratic kind of favoring is not a part of voting. Thus, the puzzle raises the question whether voting is to be theorized as any kind of favoring at all, and to this extent it raises fundamental questions about the nature of democracy.⁸

II

According to Rousseau, to vote for a policy or law is not to *favor* it, as is usually thought, but rather to state that it conforms to the General Will.⁹ The situation of a minority democrat on this view involves the following two facts:

- (F1) I will that the policy with a majority of votes be enacted.
 (F2) I state that policy A conforms to the general will.

First, there are no inconsistent attitudes involved here, even in the minority voter. Second, the sort of circular interpretation of voting just criticized is not present here, because (F2), which represents the agent's vote for a policy, does not make any reference to the votes of others. We get a simple answer if we ask what it is to vote for something; it is to state that it is in conformity with the General Will.

It might appear that this account suffers a circularity related to the kind already discussed. Suppose that the General Will is *constituted* by the majority's votes. Then, to vote for something is to state that (if conditions are proper) a majority will vote for it. Recall that the earlier proposal, that to vote for something is partly to *desire* that a majority vote for it, failed as an interpretation of voting because it employs the interpreted concept in the interpretation. The present proposal clearly suffers the same fate.

Here to vote for something is to *state* (rather than to desire) that a majority will vote for it. But, again, what *is* it for them to vote for it? This answer begs the question.

Even if there were not *this* sort of circularity, if conformity to the General Will were just having been voted for by a majority under the right conditions then there would still be the difficulty of a *circular voter's task*. The act of voting one way rather than another would itself affect the way it is reasonable to vote, since all that would matter in one's attempt to answer the question at hand is how oneself and others will vote. Of course, one cannot base one's vote on the nature of that very vote. The only basis for voting which remains is the nature of *other* people's likely votes. However, if every voter is taken to base his or her vote on how others are expected to vote, then those other voters must be assumed to do the same. The result is that there is no basis for anyone's vote. If everyone's vote depends on someone else's, the chain of dependence is infinite even if there are a finite number of voters, since eventually the voters to which one voter looks will be looking back at that voter (at least indirectly), who must again turn to the others. The problem is, at root, one of circularity, though here is is not the interpretation itself, but the task involved, that is circular. My earlier argument, that the *interpretation* is circular, alleges that the *concept* of voting is there interpreted in terms of itself. The claim here, however, is that, apart from this conceptual self-dependence, the proposed interpretation involves an act which depends on itself. My vote depends on yours, and yours on mine, and so mine depends on itself. Whereas the puzzle with which this article began, the puzzle of the minority democrat, is a form of incoherence in the individual voter, this circular voter's task is a kind of incoherence at the collective level.

For these reasons Rousseau's account would be inadequate if the General Will were *constituted* by a majority of votes. However, to say that ". . . the declaration of the General Will is drawn from the counting of votes" could instead mean that the General Will is *discovered*, though not in any way constituted by a majority of votes, and then the interpretation of voting as opinions on the General Will would not be circular.

Joshua Cohen discusses a possible Rousseauian view which has the following hybrid structure:

The General Will is characterized in terms of an ideal procedure of deliberation or collective choice, while democratic decision making is construed as an imperfect procedure which, when suitably organized, has the property of providing evidence about how best to achieve the object of the General Will.¹⁰

On this view the actual procedure helps to *discover* rather than constitute the General Will, and so is immune to my criticisms. However, the view seems to be that the General Will is still procedurally interpreted; it is constituted by the outcome of an "ideal procedure of deliberation or collective choice." The procedure in question is imaginary (like Rawls' "original position"). We may suppose that some question is put to some imaginary (and in certain ways, ideal) voters. The collective answer will (by some aggregation rule) constitute the General Will. Perhaps the question is, "What is the General Will?" That is, the General Will might be thought to be constituted by some ideal deliberations *about the General Will*. If so, the account has not escaped the difficulty of the circular voter's task. Since each of the ideal voters' opinions would "go into" the correct answer, there's no basis for an opinion prior to the aggregation of votes. But then there are no votes to aggregate. This is a problem even at this ideal level. We can make no sense of the ideal voter's deliberations on this account. If, on the other hand, the imaginary votes are not understood as opinions on the General Will, but are instead given a "desire interpretation" (desire, preference, etc.), the original puzzle of the minority democrat applies.

Now, neither problem applies if, say, these ideal voters are asked what is in their own interest, and the General Will is constituted by unanimity on any alternative. Here we assume the voters are so ideal that no one is wrong about his or her own interests. so the General Will is just the common interest. I think this is roughly the right interpretation of the General Will, but it is a distortion to explicate it procedurally. We might just as well say the average weight of American males is the result of an ideal procedure of asking each of them their own weight, assuming each is correct since

ideal, and then aggregating the answers by averaging. But of course there is nothing essentially procedural about the average weight of American males, nor is there about the General Will on the view that it is the common interest. Moving the constitutivism of the account from an actual procedure to an ideal procedure in Cohen's fashion does not redeem the general constitutivist strategy I have criticized. Instead, the Rousseauian view quoted at the beginning of this section must be understood to involve a procedure of discovering the General Will by asking the citizens which policies conform to it. This "discovery" model is free of the discussed problems of "constitutivist" models. The promising Rousseauian strategy is to emphasize discovery rather than constitution of the common good through voting.

III

The puzzle of the minority democrat may seem to reappear in a slightly different form for this Rousseauian view. Participants in such a system as this may be taken ideally to believe that the majority (under proper circumstances) will be correct about the General Will. This belief may or may not be part of what it is to be a democrat in these circumstances, but either way it threatens to conflict with the minority voter's belief about the General Will. The following two attitudes would apparently be present:

- (G1) I believe that the majority General Will-belief is correct.
- (G2) I believe that A is in the General Will.

Where the voter is in the minority, the majority General Will-belief will be that *A* is *not* in the General Will (let $p =$ "A is in the general will," and so $\text{not-}p =$ "A is not in the General Will"). A puzzle is generated by attributing to the minority voter a belief that $\text{not-}p$ based on (G1), since this would conflict with (G2), a belief that p . The Rousseauian view would then be stuck attributing to every minority democrat a belief that p and a belief that $\text{not-}p$; the puzzle resembles that in Section 1, except that the apparently conflicting attitudes are beliefs instead of desires.

The problem would disappear if minority voters

never held both beliefs at once, but changed their mind—corrected their beliefs—in light of the outcome of a vote. However, we might expect this move, the "Correction Solution," to be either open to both the Rousseauian and the earlier ("desire") views, or else closed to both. If it is open to both, then the puzzle could have been resolved within the desire views, and there would be no need to introduce the Rousseauian view at all. I shall argue that, oddly enough, this Correction Solution move is open to the Rousseauian view but not to the earlier views owing to an interesting difference between beliefs and desires.

The difference is that desires can be deferential in a way that beliefs apparently cannot. I can have a desire that takes as its object whatever the object of someone else's desire is, as in, "I want whatever Mary wants." I cannot, however, with as much sense, say, "I believe whatever Mary believes." I can be *willing* to believe whatever Mary believes, once I know what it is. That is, *I* can be deferential, but the belief itself cannot. Desires *themselves* can be deferential (or so we might describe the case). Not all desires are like this, but there is this kind of desire.

This difference between beliefs and desires is what allows the Rousseauian belief-based view, but *not* the more usual desire-based view, to suppose that the minority voter changes his or her mind in light of the outcome (thus avoiding the puzzle). Both the desire and the belief views posit a simple attitude (a vote belief, or a vote desire), and a majority-regarding belief or desire. Consider the desire view first. The majority-regarding desire gets its object automatically; the desire is itself deferential. In a minority voter, it will therefore come to conflict with the vote desire unless the vote desire changes. Surely the vote desire could change, but the puzzle persists unless there is some *general* reason to suppose it does change (I will return to this possibility). The case is different on the Rousseauian view. Beliefs, as I have argued, cannot themselves be deferential in the way desires can be. The belief in the majority's correctness does not automatically take the content of the majority's belief. It will normally give rise to such a belief, in certain circumstances, but it is a contingent matter in just the way that a change in the vote belief is.

As I said, the conflict in the desire case could be avoided if there were a general reason to suppose the vote desire will change in light of the outcome. A general account of such a change could apparently only find roots in the sort of desire it is, in the claim that it is not a simple, potentially undemocratic desire, but rather one which contains the conditions under which it is to change its object, namely, a contrary majority outcome. A desire can, I believe, have such a structure, but when it is made explicit the account can be seen to be familiar. The desire to get first prize in a race is inherently revisable in just this way, and my arguments against the voting analogue of the sprinter's desire apply here as well. Therefore, no adequate general reason can be provided for supposing the vote desire will change to accommodate a contrary majority outcome. This would be necessary on the desire view since the majority-regarding desire will automatically take the majority desire's object. It is *not* necessary in the belief account because the majority-regarding belief does *not* automatically take the content of the majority belief. Change in the majority-regarding belief, in light of the outcome, is here only contingent and when it occurs it simply *is* (that is, does not just *cause*) a change in the vote belief.

A Rousseauian theory also purports to justify such a change of mind in light of the outcome, but this justification cannot be explored here.

If not all desires are deferential in this way (as clearly they are not), then why suppose the majority regarding desire which desire interpretations of voting need *are* deferential? First, one possible alternative, the *willingness* to desire what the majority desires, would have voters *choosing their desires*, and this is a problematic notion. Second, it would be inadequate to substitute for the majority-regarding desire the fact that the voter *will come to desire* that which the majority desires, since this leaves out any *dependence* of the desire on the fact that it is the majority's desire. However, suppose the democrat's majority-regarding attitude is this:

(H1) The majority's desiring something makes it desirable to me.

This, if adequate as an account of the democrat's attitude, would save desire interpretations from the puzzle of the minority democrat. Conjoined with,

(H2) I desire that A be enacted,

no conflict results when the voter is in the minority, since the attitude in (H1) kicks in and changes the desire for A to a desire for not-A. This is similar to the way I have argued the Rousseauian view is supposed to work, and, as noted above, the possibility that a similar account is open to desire interpretations must be confronted.

The scheme would work for desire interpretations if being a democrat were limited to (H1). However, the democrat's desires are more aggressive than this mere disposition to desire A once it is known to have gotten a majority. The democrat also desires, in advance, that the alternative that gets a majority, whatever it is, be enacted. This is a desire that, as it were, defers to the majority. The presence of this sort of desire can be admitted by the Rousseauian theory without conflict, since voting is not taken to be the expression of a (potentially conflicting) desire at all. However, those who see voting as expressing a desire must either implausibly deny that democrats have this more aggressive deferential desire, or face the puzzle of the minority democrat. Furthermore, a Rousseauian view (as I am using that description) need not admit any deferential majority-regarding *belief*, since, as I have already suggested (and will defend further below) beliefs cannot be deferential in this way. On the Rousseauian view, then, we can say that where a minority voter's majority-regarding belief inclines that voter to believe as the majority does, this amounts to changing one's mind about the matter at hand, and does not involve any simultaneous contrary beliefs on the minority voter's part. The puzzle of the minority democrat, then, does not plague the Rousseauian view as it does the desire-based views.

My argument depends on the claim that desires themselves can be deferential in a way that beliefs cannot. However, by "desire views" I have said that I mean to refer to "favoring views" more generally, and so it is critical whether the point about deferential desire can be generalized to preference, willing, ought-judgements, prescriptions, and so on. No special difficulties seem to attach to preference or willing in this regard, but ought-judgements and prescriptions are less obviously like desire in the necessary way. However, it still seems possible,

(a) to judge that for anything that Mary judges ought to be the case, it ought to be the case, or (b) to prescribe the performance of whatever action Mary prescribes. Ought-judgements and prescriptions do seem to have this same deferential capacity.

The point seems to hinge on the following difference between favoring and believing. It is perhaps best seen by first comparing *desire* with belief. Despite the fact that the contents of beliefs and desires are often similarly expressed (as in "S believes that *p*," and "S desires that *p*") what is believed is different in kind from what is desired:

One *desires a state of affairs* (or an object), not a proposition (though the desired state of affairs may be specified by a proposition).

One *believes a proposition*, not a state of affairs (though the proposition specifies a state of affairs that is believed to obtain).

To see the difference, it is helpful to notice that a belief *can be* related to a proposition in something like the way a desire is related to a state of affairs (roughly, where the proposition is a *thing* which figures in the belief), but then the proposition is not the content of that belief. For example, I can believe that the proposition you are entertaining is true. But

if the proposition you are entertaining is p_1 , then the content of my belief is not (normally) p_1 , but " p_1 is true." And this is a different proposition altogether (call it p_2). That they are different follows from the fact that I can believe p_2 without believing p_1 , if, for example, I don't even know what p_1 is.

Given this difference between beliefs and desires, some desires can get "new" contents automatically when a certain description becomes true of a certain state of affairs—for example, when the description "what the majority wants" becomes true of state of affairs *S*. The case is different with belief; since beliefs are not *about* the propositions that are believed they can't have indirect or deferred contents in this way. "I believe whatever the majority believes" is no belief at all because it makes the mistake of supposing the belief can refer to its content as an object, by description. Desires can sometimes do this, but beliefs cannot. This partially explains the difference I referred to earlier between beliefs and desires. The crucial point here is that what is true of desires in this regard is true generally of the kinds of simple favoring that might be proposed as being involved in voting. One favors states of affairs, but one believes propositions. Therefore, the defense of the Rousseauian view distinguishes it from favoring views generally.

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NOTES

1. J. J. Rousseau, (1983) *On The Social Contract* (Indianapolis: Hackett), Bk. IV, Ch. 2; hereafter, "SC IV.2." I am grateful to the Charlotte Newcombe National Fellowship Foundation for a year's financial support while much of this research was done. For philosophical help I would like to thank Dale Brant, G. A. Cohen, Haskell Fain, Alon Har El, William Nelson, and the Colloquium of the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. A short version was read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Cincinnati, in April 1988, where it received helpful comments from the commentator Edward Langerak and the audience.

2. Barry (1973) thinks that democrats of this stripe are "moral cretins." I criticize his argument in my dissertation, *The Theoretical Interpretation of Voting*, University of Wisconsin, 1986. Riker (1981) also questions this account of a democrat. It is unclear in Riker why democrats approve the holding of elections, if "no sensible person need believe the [outcomes] should be enacted" (p. 120). Doesn't this render idle the popular consent he so values?

3. The parenthetical clause is why it is not a violation of opacity to infer from the majority's willing *B* that I will *B*.

4. This puzzle is most famously presented and discussed in Wollheim (1962), although it is first discussed, without explicit application to democracy, in Little (1952).

5. For the earliest version of this argument see Barry (1965), pp. 58-65, and 293-94, and a more recent endorsement of the argument in Barry (1973). Graham (1976) objects that on such a view the vote is not a real judgement on the policy at hand, but only on the

hypothetical issue of what to do if that policy gets majority support. However, there is no need to phrase the desire hypothetically, as in "I want to get the prize if I finish first." The sprinter wants to finish first and to get the prize as a result. The minority democrat wants *A* to get a majority and to be enacted as a result. It is true that the voter has the (hypothetical) desire that *A* be enacted if it gets a majority, but the very same is wanted for *B*. These symmetrical desires are admitted; the point is that there is also a non-hypothetical, asymmetrical desire for *A* to get a majority, and to be enacted as a result.

6. I shall speak of the voter's desires, but this is just for convenience. All applies equally well if the relevant attitude is thought to be a preference, a volition (for example, Rousseau speaks of what voters will), a prescription, an ought judgement—in short, any sort of straightforward favoring. Suppose, for example, (1) and (2) are made into ought judgements rather than desires: 1) Whatever gets a majority ought to be enacted, 2) *A* ought to get a majority and be enacted for that reason. According to this voter, *A*'s enactment is one among a set of circumstances which ought to obtain, but under the circumstances which actually obtain *B* ought to be enacted. There is no inconsistency here. "It ought to be the case that *P*" does not always contradict "It ought to be the case that not-*P*," because an ought judgement sometimes specifies only part of what ought to be the case, and this does not contradict the judgement that in an imperfect world, that part of the recommended world ought not to be the case.

7. For more on what an interpretation of voting is and why it is important, see my "Democracy Without Preference," unpublished.

8. Barry (1965) is the first discussion to show the consistency of the two attitudes (as discussed above). Barry's argument is unwittingly repeated by several writers including Goldstick (1973), Honderich (1974), Pennock (1974), and Walzer (1983), all of whose accounts are subject to the present objection. See Estlund, *op. cit.*, 1986, pp. 133-49, where I press this criticism against Goldstick, Honderich, and Pennock.

9. S.C. IV.2.

10. Joshua Cohen, (1986) "An Epistemic Conception of Democracy," *Ethics*, Vol. 97, p. 32.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

The following is a chronological list of discussions of the problem of the minority democrat which have appeared in the philosophical literature. In the case of each discussion, I have noted which other pieces in the list are referred to, if any. All include discussions of Wollheim except the earlier Little. (Rawls clearly discusses Wollheim, but does not mention him by name.) Entries preceded by an asterisk (*) are cited or discussed in the present article.

- *Little, I.M.D. (1952) "Social Choice and Individual Values," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 60, pp. 422-32. Reprinted in Barry and Hardin, *Rational Man, Irrational Society?* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications). (First discussion of the puzzle, even before Wollheim. Not cited in the literature.)
- *Wollheim, Richard (1962) "A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy," in Laslett and Runciman, *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), pp. 71-87. (First application of the puzzle to democracy. Considered to be *locus classicus* of puzzle.)
- Rawls, John (1964) "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play," in *Law and Philosophy*, ed. by S. Hook, (New York: New York University Press), pp. 3-18.
- *Barry, Brian (1965) *Political Argument* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), pp. 58-65 and 293-94.
- Ewin, R. E. (1967) "Wollheim's Paradox of Democracy," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 45, pp. 356-57.
- Schiller, Marvin (1969) "On the Logic of Being a Democrat," *Philosophy*, vol. 44, pp. 46-56. (Discusses Barry (1965).)
- Harrison, R. (1970) "No Paradox in Democracy," *Political Studies*, vol. 18, pp. 514-17. (Discusses Barry (1965), and Schiller.)
- Weiss, D. (1973a) "Wollheim's Paradox: Survey and Solution," *Political Theory*, vol. 1, pp. 154-70. (Discusses Barry (1965), Rawls, Schiller, and Harrison.)
- *Barry, B. (1973) "Wollheim's Paradox: Comment" (Comment on Weiss 1973), *Political Theory*, vol. 1, pp. 317-22.
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