Names as Predicates

Delia Graff Fara
Princeton university
Draft 1.02 (the last), 27 January 2011

THIS MANUSCRIPT WILL FOREVER REMAIN UNPUBLISHED. IT WILL BE SUPERSEDED BY A WORK THAT'S CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS CALLED "NAMES ARE PREDICATES."

In the more or less recent history of analytic philosophy, the view that names are predicates has had at least two prominent developers. One of these is Willard Van Orman Quine (1960). Another is Tyler Burge (1973). I will follow in their footsteps and propose an analysis of names as predicates which will afford an explanation of the asymmetry reflected in (1) and (2) below.

(1) I want to be Marlene Dietrich;

(2) I want Marlene Dietrich to to be me.

While some components of the explanation may be left mysterious, we will see that the analysis can also extend to the famous difference between the contingency of (3) and the necessity of (4).

(3) Martha believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus;

(4) Hesperus is Phosphorus.

1. Quine on Names

Quine's progression toward his own view of names as predicates was slow and did not clearly emerge until *Word and Object* (1960). Briefly tracing his steps toward the view will provide aid as I set out the view of names as predicates that I advocate.

In his earliest treatment of names (1939), Quine proposed that they were 'abbreviations' for definite descriptions with substantive descriptive content. For example, he analysed the name 'Pegasus' as short for the description, 'The winged horse that captured Bellerophon' (703, 706). This description was in turn to be analysed according to Bertrand Russell's (1905) Theory of Descriptions.

Shortly after that (1940, 1948, 1950), Quine gave up this substantive-description theory of names but still represented names logically as definite descriptions. The predicates

occurring within these definite descriptions were so closely related to the name being analyzed that it wouldn't be misleading to represent their difference only with an asterisk. The name 'Pegasus' would get associated with the definite description 'the *Pegasus**', the name 'Europe' with the description 'the *Europe**', the name 'God' with 'the *God**' (Quine 1940, 149–152), 'John' with 'the *John**' (Quine 1950, 219–223).

What were effectively the names themselves ('*Pegasus**'), rather than some complex and descriptively substantial noun phrase ('winged horse that captured Bellerophon') now occurred as general terms within the definite description. In this phase, Quine would write these predicates in 'Logicians' English' using the 'is' of predication, for example: 'Pegasus' would be represented (using the orthography I suggest) as 'the x such that x is-*Pegasus**' (Quine 1948, 27).

Given his Russellian analysis of definite descriptions in existence claims, the treatment in this middle period would yield the following succession of logical representations:

(5) Nothing is Pegasus;

(5′) $\neg \exists x (x = \text{ the } y \text{ such that } Pegasus^* \, y)$.

(5′) $\neg \exists x (\forall y (Pegasus^* \, y \leftrightarrow x = y))$.

(6) Something is Socrates;

(6′) $\exists x (x = \text{the } y \text{ such that } Socrates^* \, y)$.

(6′) $\exists x (\forall y (Socrates^* \, y \leftrightarrow x = y))$.

Quine's mature view, in *Word and Object* (1960), was that names should not be thought of as abbreviating definite descriptions. Rather, names were to be left by themselves as general terms when they occurred in predicate position, as the complement of a copula. Now (5) and (6) would be logically represented as:

(5″) $\neg \exists x (\text{Pegasus} \, x)$;

(6″) $\exists x (\text{Socrates} \, x)$.

When names occurred in argument position (as opposed to predicate position), the sentences containing them would be logically represented as existential quantifications with names occurring only as general terms (1960, 178–179).

(7) John is happy

would be logically represented like this:

(7′) $\exists x(\text{John } x \wedge \text{happy } x)$.

In all cases, Quine took names to be predicates that were true of things that bore that name, false of everything else. But doesn't (7), then, have truth conditions that are altogether too weak? There are so many people with the name 'John'; surely *at least one of them* is happy.

Quine had already acknowledged in early work that general terms are often used with an understood contextual completion. He writes,

> Everyday use of descriptions is indeed often elliptical, essential parts of the [descriptive] condition being left understood; thus we may say simply 'the yellow house' ... when what is to be understood is rather 'the yellow house in the third block of Lee Street, Tulsa'. (1940, 146)

This sort of contextual completion allows Quine to assign appropriately strong truth conditions to sentences with names in argument position. For (7) to be true, it needn't be merely that someone or other with the name 'John' is happy. Rather it must be that some particular person with the name 'John'—a contextually picked out one—is happy in order for the sentence to be true.

2. Burge on Names

Tyler Burge later picked up where Quine left off. Burge was concerned in particular to account for occurrences of names in positions usually reserved for common nouns. Here are two of Burge's examples (1973, 429):

(8) There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton.

(9) Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.

Like Quine, Burge took it that names could occur as general terms, and that when they did, they were true of the bearers of the name (1973). But since Burge was interested in cases where names had to be true of more than one thing, he did not regard them as always being contextually narrowed to such an extent that they applied to only one thing.

Also like Quine, Burge recognized that when names occurred by themselves in argument position, as in 'John is happy', they did typically require unique denotation. Where

Quine handled these cases as existential quantifications ('Some John is happy') with a contextually restricted name, Burge used a complex demonstrative ('That John is happy').[1]

I will pick up where Burge left off. I will defend a view that combines elements of all of the views just discussed, but with some amendments. Here are some points of agreement. (A) I will agree with Burge that names must often be interpreted as predicates with multiple application, since (8) and (9) are both true. In these cases, the names are predicates that are true of their bearers. (B) I agree with Quine's interim as well as mature views that names as predicates may be contextually restricted like other nouns, and often so completely restricted as to have only single application. (C) More surprisingly, probably, I will endorse Quine's interim view that unadorned names in argument position are complements of an unpronounced definite article 'the' rather than Burge's view that they are complements of an unpronounced demonstrative 'this' or 'that'. (D) I will agree with Quine's mature view that when names occur as complements to the verb 'is', they serve as general terms (predicates) complementing the 'is' of predication. 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is not an *identity* statement (although in context it does entail one); it attributes the property of *being Phosphorus* to Hesperus.[2] (E) Finally, I will allow for uses of names that jibe better with Quine's earliest view, according to which names may have substantial descriptive content.

3. Parasitic Syntax and Semantics

Neither Quine nor Burge was especially interested in the syntax of natural language. I will depart from both of them in that respect. On my view, the syntactic form of sentences containing names will be special cases of sentences containing other descriptions, numerical phrases, quantified noun phrases, complex demonstratives, or bare plurals. Whatever syntactic form the (a) sentences below have, the (b) sentences have that form as well. Unpronounced elements are enclosed in square brackets.

(10)   A.. The table is tall;

       B.. [The] Maria is tall.

(11)   A.. The table in my room is tall;

       B.. The Maria in my room is tall.

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[1] Burge gives an incredibly brief argument for preferring the demonstrative 'that' to the definite article 'the' as the unpronounced determiner (431–432). I am not sure how to assess his argument.

[2] Clearly, I intend the 'being' in my articulation of this property not to be expressing the relation that 'being identical to' expresses.

(12) A.. The lady was buying one desk while seated at another;

       B.. [The] Jacquie was reading one Aristotle while married to another

(13) A.. Some people read history, others make it;

       B.. Some Williams read history, others make it.

(14) A.. That man sure does hate to ski.

       B.. That Jeff sure does love to swim.

(15) A.. Bears from the north are usually scary;

       B.. Sarahs from [the] Alaska are usually scary.

In each case, I take it that the semantic types of the expressions in the (b) sentences will be the same as those of the corresponding expressions in the (a) sentences. Since the common nouns in the (a) sentences all have predicate-type semantic values, the names in the (b) sentences all do as well. The truth values, and the propositions expressed, of the (b) sentences will therefore be determined in the same compositional way as those of the (a) sentences.

Because names are syntactic and semantic parasites, I do not need to provide detailed investigation or elaboration of their syntax and semantics in order to present my view. I entitle myself to say here just that the syntax and semantics of names piggybacks on those of common nouns. But let me clarify two points.

First, in saying that the syntax of names piggybacks on that of common nouns, I do not mean to say that there is no syntactic difference between proper names and common nouns. There must be *some* syntactic difference between them. Otherwise we wouldn't have 'the' being permitted to occur before the noun in 'the woman is on the road' but prohibited from occurring before the name in 'Ludmilla is on the road'. I mean rather to be making claims like the following: if the bare plural construction in 'bears are scary' contains a syntactically real but unpronounced generic operator, then so it does in 'Sarahs are scary'.

Second, in saying that the semantics of names piggybacks on that of common nouns, I mean only to say that names and common nouns have the same semantic type, not that they have the same sort of conditions of application. For example, if common nouns are best treated as having an extensional semantic value—such as a function from entities to truth values—then so are names. Alternatively, if common nouns are best treated as having

an intensional semantic value—such as a function from possible worlds to extensions—then so are names. In contrast, the view that the name 'Michael' applies to a thing just in case it is called Michael does not entail that the noun 'tiger' applies to a thing just in case it is called a tiger. Here's a perfectly analogous claim. The view that the predicate 'man' applies to a thing just in case it is an adult male human does not entail the view that 'tiger' applies to a thing just in case it is an adult male human.

4. Names are Multiply Applicable Predicates that are True of Their Bearers

There's no controverting Burge's view that names at least sometimes are predicates with multiple application. In these cases they are predicates that are true of their bearers. The predicate 'Tyler' is true of both Tyler Burge and Tyler Doggett; this is partly why (16) is true.

(16) There are at least two Tylers with philosophy degrees from Princeton.

'Tylers' in 'at least two Tylers' can only be a predicate, given its syntactic position as the complement of the numerical determiner 'at least two'. Further, this predicate 'Tyler' has multiple application, since there can be at least two Tylers from Princeton only if the predicate 'Tyler' applies to at least two things. Finally, and no less obviously, this predicate 'Tyler' applies to all the things called Tyler, and to them only; if there weren't two people *called* Tyler with degrees from Princeton, the sentence would not be true. Let me strengthen this last claim by saying that names in these positions have the *being-called condition* as their condition of application as a matter of meaning. It's best to represent this condition as a schema.

(*BCC*) A proper name '*N*' is a predicate that is true of a thing just in case it is called
   N.

Here are some instances of the schema:

(17) 'Socrates' is a predicate that is true of a thing just in case it is called Socrates;

(18) 'Tyler' is a predicate that is true of a thing just in case it is called Tyler;

(19) 'Jeff' is a predicate that is true of a thing just in case it is called Jeff.

   I claim that in *every* case where a name occurs in a position that's obviously occupiable by a common noun, it is a predicate with (potentially) multiple application. The condition

of its application is given by (*BCC*), the *being-called condition*. This includes cases where the name follows a demonstrative. Recall our earlier example:

(14) b. That Jeff sure does love to swim.

I imagine someone objecting that the name 'Jeff' in (14b) is not being used in the clearly predicative way that names in Burge examples are. The objector says that the name 'Jeff' here is just being used in its ordinary, referential way. What's out of the ordinary here is the use of the demonstrative 'that' in front of it. The objector says that this is a special demonstrative construction, since demonstratives don't ordinarily occur before referring expressions. This special construction, he says, is used only to emphasize just how much Jeff loves to swim.

In defense of our claim that the name 'Jeff' here is a Burge-type predicate, I'll make two points.

First, demonstratives with common nouns may be used in just this same way. If we have been talking about some particular man, we can utter (14a) to emphasize just how much *that* man hates to ski.

(14) a. That man sure does hate to ski.

I'll call these 'non-restrictive uses of 'that' '. The non-restrictive use of 'that' is appropriate when we're already talking about a particular person—a particular man, say, or a particular Jeff—and we are making an emphatic claim about that person.

Second, and by contrast, demonstratives with proper names or with common nouns can be used in a *restrictive* way. When the demonstrative 'that' in (14a,b) is focused—by lengthening its vowel and raising its pitch and perhaps its volume—we now use it to pick out one man among many, or one Jeff among many. We then make no commitments about the preferred activities of *other* men, or *other* Jeffs.

In addition to a difference in focus, there are other ways in which sentences with restrictive 'that' are distinguished prosodically from those with non-restrictive 'that'. In the restrictive case, there is a sudden dropping off of pitch and volume. In the non-restrictive case, the pitch and volume of the sentence rise gradually, culminating with a 'rise-fall-' tone.

With both the non-restrictive and the restrictive uses of the demonstrative, there is no difference in behavior between proper names and common nouns. In both cases, the name

behaves like a Burge-type predicate. And in both cases, the name applies to a thing just in case that thing is called by that name.

5. Names may be Contextually Restricted

Names may have multiple application when they occur as complements to quantifier words. Burge did not remark on the fact that even in such cases, names as predicates could be still be subject to the phenomenon known as *quantifier-domain restriction*. The phenomenon of quantifier-domain restriction involving common nouns is illustrated by the pair of sentences in (20). The phenomenon of quantifier-domain restriction involving names is illustrated by the pair in (21)

(20)   A.. Every adult is having a good time;

      B.. Every adult *at the party* is having a good time.

(21)   A.. Only a few Davids are having a good time;

      B.. Only a few Davids *at the party* are having a good time.

An utterance of (20a) will typically take place at a time when there are some adults in the world who are not having a good time. That typically does not suffice to make the utterance false. An utterance of (20a) may have the truth conditions represented in (20b). Similarly, an utterance of (21a) will typically take place at a time when there are more than a few Davids in the world who are having a good time. That typically does not suffice to make the utterance false. An utterance of (21a) may have the truth conditions represented in (21b). Quantified noun phrases can have restricted domains when they have proper names in their nominal component just as they can when they have common nouns in their nominal component.

6. Proper Names in Argument Position are Denuded Definite Descriptions

In order to account for Burge's examples, we've granted that many occurrences of names have the syntactic and semantic type of predicates. As a matter of meaning, they apply to those things that are called by that name. In order to account for their being subject to quantifier-domain restriction—as in example (21)—we have also granted that proper names even in the Burge-type examples may be implicitly restricted by predicate modifiers.

But what now are we to say of names when they occur in argument positions? Names may occur as subjects of predicates (7), or as direct or indirect objects of relations (22–23).

(7) John is happy;

(22) That man loves John;

(23) That man gave John a cookie.

Can we maintain that the names in these positions are predicates? I say, we should try to.

A well-known philosopher of language once said to me ('p.c.') that names in the Burge-type examples clearly had different meaning from names in their normal, referential, occurrences; in the Burge cases, they were meta-linguistic uses that were to be set aside as deviant. I deny that this is clear. I say, don't just set them aside. We should try as much as possible to uphold a unified theory of the semantics of proper names. Simplicity is a virtue, not least of all in semantic theory.

According to the theory I'll try to maintain, names in argument position—when they occur bare and in the singular—are parts of 'denuded definite descriptions'. They form the nominal part of a definite description with an unpronounced definite article.

Names are Denuded Definite Descriptions: When names occur bare and in the singular in argument positions, the are predicates that occupy the nominal part of a definite description with an unpronounced definite article.

The heading of this thesis may be a misleading way of putting the thesis I'm concerned to defend. I put it the way I do for brevity and convenience. I don't actually think that names themselves *are* these denuded definite descriptions. Rather, I think that when a name occurs bare and in the singular, it *occupies* the common-noun position of a definite description with an unpronounced 'the'. The name is not itself the denuded definite description. The name 'Sarah' when it occurs bare and in the singular is preceded by an unpronounced 'the' with which it forms a syntactic constituent—specifically, a determiner phrase.[3]

To say that an occurrence of a name is bare is to say that it does not occur with any explicit and pronounced quantifier word ('every Sarah'), number-word ('two Sarahs'), or definite or indefinite article. We take interpretation of these occurrences of names to be straightforward. They are predicates with multiple applicability to their bearers.

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[3]The view, in its essential form, has been advocated by (among others) Quine (see above), Kneale (1962), Sloat (1969), Geurts (1997), Bach (2002), Elbourne (2005), and Matushansky (2006). The view that names are predicates has also been advocated by Elugardo (2002).

To see why the theory applies only to *singular* occurrences of names, reconsider (15).

(15) Sarahs from Alaska are scary.

In (15), the state-name 'Alaska' occurs in argument position in the singular, and thus will be subject to the theory and objections under discussion here. The personal name 'Sarah', however, while it does occur *bare* here in argument position, it occurs as a bare *plural*. We do not want to say that plural occurrences of names in argument position are preceded by an unpronounced definite article. This would yield a plural definite description. But plural definite descriptions are used to say something about all of the members of some contextually or explicitly picked-out group. But that is not what 'Sarahs' in (15) is being used to do. (15) is not like:

(24) The Sarahs from Alaska are scary.

Rather, the bare plural occurrence of the proper name in (15) has whatever generic force other bare plurals have. It is like the bare plural 'bears' in (25).

(25) Bears from Alaska are scary.

It would be foolish to infer (25) from there being just one scary bear from Alaska. It would be equally foolish to infer (15) from there being just one scary Sarah from Alaska. It is hard to say just how many bears, or what sorts of bears, or what proportion of bears from Alaska have to be scary in order for (25) to be true. But I take it that the same kind of story will have to be told about the bare plural in (15).[4]

The denuded-description theory of names is in essence the theory that Quine proposed in what I was calling his interim period. In that period he would analyze the name 'Pegasus' as the definite description 'the x such that *Pegasus* x. In *Mathematical Logic*, he wrote this as '$(\iota x)(\text{peg}\, x)$' (1940, 150). In 'On What There Is' he wrote it as 'the thing that is-Pegasus' or—to his mind, equivalently—as 'the thing that Pegasizes' (1948, 27). We might as well attribute to Quine the view that the 'peg' in 'peg x' and the predicate 'Pegasus' in 'is-Pegasus' just *are* the proper names being analyzed. If we do this, we attribute to Quine the denuded-description theory of names.

'Denuded definite descriptions' is my term, but the view that names are denuded definite descriptions was already advocated by the linguist Clarence Sloat just nine years after the publication of Quine's *Word and Object* (Sloat 1969). Ora Matushansky has more

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[4]For a recent and promising story, see Sarah-Jane Leslie (2008).

recently been elaborating and defending a denuded-description theory of proper names (Matushansky 2006). I find her case very convincing, and here I simply take her lead.

I will defend the theory by showing that it can accommodate a variety of phenomena and by showing how it provides nice explanations of more or less well-known phenomena. I will also defend the theory by showing that it survives various objections. In some cases I do this directly; in other cases I proceed by analogy—by showing that common nouns also behave in the supposedly problematic ways, or by showing that alternative views provide no better an explanation. We will discuss the best-known of these in the final section: co-extensive names can not always be exchanged *salva veritate*, in particular when they are embedded in propositional attitude reports.

7. Definite Descriptions Require Uniqueness

According to Russell (1905), a sentence of the form 'The F is G' is true just in case (i) there is at least one F, (ii) there is a most one F, and (iii) whatever is F is G; false otherwise. Critics of Russell's theory have pointed out that few utterances of definite descriptions involve a descriptive component that really does correctly apply to exactly one object. Many such utterances are true, however.[5] When I said last night that the table is covered with books, I spoke truly. I was talking about my dining-room table, and I said that *that* table was covered with books. So what I said was true even though there are many tables in the world.

Defenders of Russell's theory have provided a counterpoint. The successful use of incomplete definite descriptions can be subsumed under the more general phenomenon of quantifier-domain restriction. Just as some utterance of 'every table is covered with books' can be true at a time even if there are tables in Nova Scotia that are not covered with books at that time, an utterance of 'the table is covered with books' can be true at a time even if there is more than one table in the world. The first utterance is true just in case a simultaneous utterance of 'every table in the yellow house in the third block of Lee Street, Tulsa is covered with books' would have been true. Similarly, the second utterance is true just in case a simultaneous utterance of '*the* table in the kitchen of the yellow house in the third block of Lee Street, Tulsa is covered with books' would have been true. (Recall Quine (1940).) In the definite-description case, we can save Russell's theory by allowing that the common noun 'table' can be contextually restricted.[6]

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[5]See, for example, Peter Strawson (1950) and Keith Donnellan (1966)
[6]See for example Stephen Neale (1990).

I believe that the defenders of Russell's theory have the upper hand here. I do not agree with every aspect of Russell's view, and I think that at the very least it must be expanded in order to account for mass and plural definite descriptions.[7] However, I agree with enough of Russell's theory to be willing to adopt it here for the sake of concreteness and familiarity.

When we say, 'the Saul who wrote *Naming and Necessity* is a philosopher', the (dressed) definite description we use is a complete one because, even though there are many Sauls, only one of them wrote *Naming and Necessity*. But when we say, 'Saul is a philosopher', the denuded definite description '[the] Saul' is an incomplete one, since there are many people called Saul. If we were talking about the Saul who wrote *Humboldt's Gift* when we said 'Saul is a philosopher', we would have spoken falsely (perhaps metaphorically) since that Saul was not a philosopher. If we weren't talking about any Saul in particular, then we wouldn't have expressed anything that could be true or false. We wouldn't have said anything about anyone at all.

Names in argument position (when they are singular) are used in order to say something about a single individual. Although there are many Sauls, there will typically be some particular Saul whose happiness is relevant for the truth of an utterance of 'Saul is happy'. If *that* Saul is happy, then the utterance is true; if not, it's false. But since there are many Sauls, the proper name 'Saul'—if it's the predicate that we're saying it is—has many things in its extension. So if the name 'Saul' in 'Saul is happy' were part of a denuded definite description '[the] Saul', with an unpronounced 'the', then that description would be an incomplete one.

This does not by itself present a problem, however. The phenomenon of incomplete definite descriptions applies equally to descriptions containing common nouns, so the fact that it would have to apply to names if the denuded-description theory were correct does not show that the denuded-description theory is incorrect.

According to one syntactic and semantic account of quantifier-domain restriction, restrictions on the domain of quantification result from a contextually provided modifier attaching to the *noun* of a quantifier phrase rather than to the quantifier itself (Stanley & Szabó 2000), (Stanley 2002).[8] Let's use parentheses to demarcate syntactic and semantic compositional structure. As before, we'll use square brackets to represent unpronounced material. Then, suppressing some important details of Stanley and Szabó's theory as well

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[7]On this, see Richard Sharvy (1980), who I agree with almost entirely.

[8]I just left out an important detail: these 'contextually provided' modifiers are contextually provided assignments to hidden variables which are syntactically real and which can therefore be bound by explicitly pronounced variable-binding operators like 'every'.

as some irrelevant syntactic details, we can represent the nominal-restriction theory as proposing the following logical forms:

20′ (Every (adult [*at the party*])) is having a good time;

21′ (Only a few (Alfreds [*at the party*])) are having a good time.

The extension of '(adult [at the party])' is determined by an intersection rule for predicate modification. The extension of '(adult [at the party])' is the set of things that are both an adult and at the party. The extension of '(Alfred [at the party])' is the set of things that are an Alfred and also at the party. To be an Alfred is to be *called* Alfred, so this is the same as the set of things that are both called Alfred and also at the party. Given other standard composition rules, this all yields the correct truth conditions for the envisaged utterances of (20) and (21).

I find the nominal-restriction theory of 'quantifier-domain restriction' to be attractive, and I will adopt some version of it as a working hypothesis, re-molding it as needs be. If we apply the theory to definite descriptions involving names, we can equate the members of the following groups of sentences:

(26) A.. Only the strange Saul is having a good time;

B.. Only the strange Saul [*at this party*] is having a good time;

C.. Only the strange (Saul [*at this party*]) is having a good time.

(27) A.. Only Saul is having a good time;

B.. Only [the] Saul [*at this party*] is having a good time.

C.. Only [the] (Saul [*at this party*]) is having a good time.

Many people are named Saul. When we use the name 'Saul', we typically mean to be talking about just one of them—and we succeed in doing so, at that. Assume briefly, for the sake of argument, that the referential view of names is correct—that names are referring expressions that have individuals rather than sets of individuals as their semantic values. Briefly assume also, for the sake of argument, that names are directly referential: which thing a given name refers to is not determined by any descriptive condition that enters into the content of utterances containing it; Toni Morrison and Chloe Wofford are the same person, so 'Toni Morrison wrote *Sula*' expresses the same proposition as 'Chloe Wofford wrote *Sula*'.

Even given these assumptions, *some* descriptive condition must be involved in determining which thing a name refers to in any meaningful utterance containing it. If nothing determined which Saul we were talking about when we uttered the sentence 'Saul is a philosopher', then we would not have said anything about any Saul. We would not have said anything at all. The direct referentialist does not deny this. He merely says that whatever condition is involved in determining the referent of a given use of a name, it does not automatically enter into the propositions we express when we use the name.

Nevertheless, we all must agree that when a speaker uses a name, her audience might not know what the referent of the name was when she used it. Rewind twenty years. I say, 'Saul is writing a new book.' You think it far more likely that Saul Bellow would be writing a new book than that Saul Kripke would be. But you also think that I would be far more likely to talk about Saul Kripke than about Saul Bellow, so you ask me, 'Which Saul are you talking about?' I could helpfully answer by saying, 'the Saul who wrote *Naming and Necessity*'. This, though, doesn't mean that *that* is the descriptive condition that determined the referent of 'Saul' when I first used it. I like the idea that the determinant condition may well have been this one: *the Saul I was talking about*.

There is obviously an interesting further question: in virtue of *what* was I talking about the one Saul as opposed to the other. But that there is such a further question to be asked does not mean that our answer—*the Saul I was talking about*—is incorrect. Here's an exactly analogous point: the predicate 'man' applies to a thing just in case it is an adult male human. There is obviously an interesting further question: in virtue of what is something adult, male, and human. That there is such a further question does not mean that the initial claim was incorrect.

Let me adapt this idea to the denuded-description view of names: when a name '*N*' occurs in argument position, as part of a denuded incomplete definite description, the extension of '*N*' as used by a speaker *S* might well be the singleton set determined by the condition *the N that S is talking about*.[9] I say 'might well be' because I allow that this singleton set won't always be determined by such a condition. 'Saul' in 'Saul is having a good time' might well be part of a contextually completed denuded description with its its singleton extension determined by the condition *is a Saul at this party* or *the Saul that my mother talks about*.

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[9]Let me stave off confusion by stressing that this is a *schema*. One instance of it is this: the extension of 'Noam' as used by Sarah might well be the singleton set determined by the condition *the Noam that Sarah is talking about*.

8. Incomplete Definite Descriptions are Rigid Designators

In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke argued that proper names (in argument positions) could not be synonymous with the definite descriptions that speakers ordinarily associate with them. One of these arguments is called 'the modal argument'. Here's roughly how it goes. The descriptions that speakers associate with names are typically not rigid designators; the names themselves are rigid designators, though; so names are not synonymous with the descriptions that people associate with them. Recall one of Kripke's famous examples. One might associate the name 'Gödel' only with the definite description 'the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. But the sentence 'Gödel was German' would have been false if *Gödel*, that person who is in fact the referent of the name 'Gödel', had not been German. In contrast, the sentence 'the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic was German' could only have been false (given that one person did indeed prove incompleteness) if the theorem had been proved by someone who was not German. If Gödel had still been German while someone other than him, someone who was Italian, say, had proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, then it would have been true that Gödel was German but false that the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic was German.

Perhaps we should worry that the modal argument shows that names cannot be the general-term parts of denuded definite descriptions. After all, if they were then (28) could have either of (28′) or (28″) as its interpretations in some context. Or so the worry goes.

(28) Saul is having a good time;

(28′) The Saul at this party is having a good time;

(28″) The Saul that I'm talking about is having a good time.

The objection we're facing is an instance of the modal argument. 'Saul' occurs as a rigid designator in (28). A designator is rigid if it designates the same individual in every possible world. The objector says that the definite descriptions in (28′) and (28′) are not rigid designators; they designate different individuals in different possible worlds.

I take it that where p is the party in question, p itself can occur in other possible worlds. After all, this party might have started earlier, and fewer people might have come to it. So there are possible worlds in which this very party occurs but starts earlier than it in fact starts, and ones in which it has fewer people at it than it in fact has. I also take it that as uttered in the envisaged context, the predicate 'is having a good time' is incomplete insofar

as it does not specify where the good time is being had. I think that this predicate, as used in the context we're describing, applies to a thing in a possible world just in case that thing is having a good time *at p* in that world.

So why think that the descriptions in (28′) and (28″)—'the Saul at this party' and 'the Saul that I'm talking about'—are not rigid designators? According to one school of thought, the description 'the Saul at this party' is not rigid since the Saul who is in fact at this party might not have been here; there are possible worlds in which some different Saul is here instead. In those worlds, the claim we in fact made ('the Saul at this party is having a good time') is true just in case in that world, there is exactly one Saul at this party and in *that* world, *that* Saul is having a good time, no matter what the Saul who is in fact here is doing in this other possible world.

This thought might be taken to work against the denuded incomplete descriptions view. It would work against it if the following semantic principle for incomplete descriptions were correct:

SID. If a definite description 'the F' is incomplete as uttered in a given context but has been completed in that context by a predicate-modifier G, then 'the F is Φ', as uttered in that context, is true in a possible world w just in case in that world, there is exactly one thing x that is an F that is G and x is Φ.

The idea is that when an incomplete description 'the F' is completed by 'G' in a context—we'll write this as 'the F_G'—then the proposition expressed by 'the F_G is Φ' is the same as that expressed by 'the (F-and-G) is Φ. If the conjunctive description 'the F-and-G' is non-rigid, then so is the description 'the F_G', as used in that context. The contextually determined description 'the F-and-G' necessarily has the same denotation as the description 'the F_G'

Let's see what happens if we apply this principle to the denuded descriptions view of the case at hand. Suppose that the name 'Saul' as used in the envisaged context is the denuded incomplete description 'the Saul', contextually completed by the predicate-modifier *at this party*. Then what was said by the sentence 'Saul is having a good time', as uttered in the envisaged context, is true in a possible world just in case there is exactly one thing x in that world that is a Saul at p, and in that world, x is having a good time at p. But of course, some different Saul might have been at p having a wonderful time, while the Saul who is in fact at p never went to p at all. Given the semantic principle *SID*, it wouldn't be that there is some particular Saul s, the one in fact being talked about, such

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that the utterance 'Saul is having a good time' would be true at a possible world just in case s were having a good time at p in that world. But this then flies in the face of the following rigid-designation thesis for the name 'Saul', which formed the basis of Kripke's modal argument.

RN. 'Saul is having a good time', as uttered in the envisioned context, is true at a possible world w just in case s is having a good time at p in w.

Here, s is the Saul that's being talked about in the context. (There are many Sauls in the world. Only of them is being talked about.)

I want to accept the rigid-designation thesis *RN*. What I reject is the semantic principle, *SID*, about incomplete definite descriptions. I replace it with the following principle, according to which incomplete definite descriptions, if completed in a context, are rigid designators, as used in that context:

RID. If a definite description 'the F' is incomplete as uttered in a context but has been completed in that context by a predicate-modifier G, then 'the F_G is Φ', as uttered in that context, is true in a possible world just in case there is exactly one thing x that is an F that is G and x is Φ in that world.

According to *SID*, the first semantic principle about incomplete definite descriptions, the contextually completed description 'the F_G' non-rigidly denotes, in each world, the one thing which in that world is both F and G if there is one. According to *RID*, in contrast, the contextually completed description 'the F_G' rigidly denotes, in each world, the one thing that is in fact both F and G if there is one.

Let's rephrase the principles in a way that perspicuously reflects their difference, using double brackets with subscripts to represent extensions in a world, and w_c to denote the world of of the context in which the utterance takes place .

(SID) $[\![F_G]\!]_w = [\![F]\!]_w \cup [\![G]\!]_w.$

(RID $[\![F_G]\!]_w = [\![F]\!]_{w_c} \cup [\![G]\!]_{w_c}.$

There is only one Saul at the party in the context c that we're envisioning. Again, call this Saul s. Given that, and given the second principle, *RID*, 'Saul is having a good time', as uttered in our context c, is true at a possible world w, on the denuded-description view, just in case in w, there is exactly one x in $\{s\}$ and x is having a good time (at p). This is

the same truth condition as that given by the rigid-designation thesis *RN* (p 17, above).[10] So Kripke's modal argument does not refute the denuded-descriptions theory of proper names. Denuded incomplete definite descriptions, when completed in a context, are rigid in that context.

9. This is not *Ad Hoc*

According to *RID*, *all* incomplete definite descriptions that are completed in a context are rigid designators as used in that context. This was not an *ad hoc* principle meant to apply only to denuded incomplete descriptions containing proper names. Consider a classic instance of a sentence with incomplete definite descriptions:

(29) The book is on the table.

This sentence can be truly uttered even if there are many tables in the world that don't have books on them, and even it there are many books in the world that are not on tables. It can be truly uttered when a particular table and book are being talked about as long as that book is on that table. According to the principle *RID*, the principle stating the rigidity of incomplete definite descriptions—when they are contextually completed—the definite descriptions I use here are rigid designators. Is this defensible?

I think it is. Suppose I utter (29) in an appropriate context, that is, in a context in which the incomplete descriptions I use are completed enough to have a denotation. We won't care what the completing restriction *G* is, but to be concrete let's just suppose that it is the restriction *in the dining room of 95 Horatio St, apartment 107*. Let *b* and *t* be the book and the table that are being denoted. Then the proposition I express is one that is true in a possible world just in case *b* is on *t* in that world. What I said was in fact true, let's suppose. What would it have taken for it to be false? It would have to have been that *b*, that very book, was not on *t*, that very table.

Or look at things this way. Suppose the following claims are made in the same context as the one just described.

(30) The book might not have been on the table.

(31) The book would have been on the table if you had straightened up like you were supposed to have done.

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[10]The have the same truth conditions but for a commitment to singleton sets. This is a worry which I'll ignore.

The first claim doesn't get to be true just because there are possible worlds in which there's some different book and some different table in the dining room of 95 Horatio St, apartment 107, and *that* book is not on *that* table.

Similarly, the second claim doesn't get to be true just because the most similar possible world in which you straightened up is one in which some different book and table are the ones in the dining room in question, and in that world *that* book is on *that* table.[11] Suppose that when I say 'the book is on the table' I'm talking about a particular book b and a particular table t, so that what I say is true just in case b is on t. Subsequent utterances of (30) and (31) have truth conditions that depend on whether b—the book I'm in fact talking about—is on t in certain other possible worlds.

We have in fact already discussed examples involving a rigid incomplete description— 'the party'. When my daughter comes home from a birthday party, and says that she had a good time at the party, what she says is true even though there are many parties that took place at the same time as the one she cam from. The description 'the party' is incomplete, but completed in the context by the restriction *the party she came from*. Let r be this party, the one she came from. What she says is true just in case she had a good time at r. What she says is true in a possible world just in case she had a good time at r in that world. The reason that it's true that she might have had a bad time at the party is not that there's some possible world in which she came home from some *other* party and had a bad time at *that* party. The reason is rather that there is a possible world in which she had a bad time at r. Similarly, it's true that the party might have started earlier than it in fact did because there is a possible world in which r, the party she in fact came from, started earlier. The incomplete but contextually completed description 'the party' is a rigid designator.

Parties are like sports teams; it can be difficult to say just what their identity conditions are—just which of there properties are essential to them. Very few of their obvious properties are essential to them. The roster of a sports team is not an essential property of it. Teams change their members all the time. And so with parties. Which guests had a good time at a given party is not an essential property of that party. Start-times of parties are not essential to them. So, in case there was a worry, it is perfectly legitimate to say that r, the party my daughter in fact went to, and had a good time at, can itself exist in worlds where she didn't go to it or have a good time at it.

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[11]Here I assume the semantics for subjunctive conditionals described by Robert Stalnaker (Stalnaker 1975, for example) and David Lewis (Lewis 1973, for example).

The conclusion to draw from this section is that if names are denuded *incomplete* descriptions, then we expect them to be rigid in exactly the way that names are according to the 'direct-reference' view of Kripke and his followers. The incomplete descriptions of which I'm claiming that names are a part pass every test for rigidity that there is.

10. Why 'The'?

Remember that strictly speaking, the thesis I want to defend is not that names *are* denuded definite descriptions. Rather it is that they are predicates that occupy the common-noun positions of denuded definite description—ones with an unpronounced 'the'. This thesis was restricted to bare names occurring in argument position in the singular. On part, this was to preserve a uniform analysis of names that could account for occurrences of them that are not bare or not in the singular, where they clearly do occur as predicates.

So why think that the missing and unpronounced determiner that names occur with is the definite article? Burge, recall, thought that it was a demonstrative. 'Saul is having a good time' would be '[That] Saul is having a good time. Let me rehearse some reasons that linguists have had for choosing 'the'. Sloat (1969) wrote up the following table:

'Sm' is the unstressed 'some' that occurs with plurals and mass terms. 'Sóme' is the stressed 'some' that is well represented by the existential quantifier from first-order logic. The asterisks mark the defective sentences.

A man stopped by.	A Smith stopped by.
* Sm man stopped by.	* Sm Smith stopped by.
Sóme man stopped by.	Sóme Smith stopped by.
Sm men stopped by.	Sm Smiths stopped by.
Sóme men stopped by.	Sóme Smiths stopped by.
Men must breathe.	Smiths must breathe.
The clever man stopped by.	The clever Smith stopped by.
The man who is clever stopped by.	The Smith who is clever stopped by.
A clever man stopped by.	A clever Smith stopped by.
The men stopped by.	The Smiths stopped by.'
The man stopped by.	* The Smith stopped by.
* Man stopped by.	Smith stopped by.

Sloat then writes:

> As can be seen, the only significant difference between combinations of determiner plus proper noun and determiner plus countable common noun is that *the* does not appear before the singular proper noun, and the null determiner does not appear before the singular countable common noun.

Sloat proposes that the simplest explanation is that the 'null determiner' is in fact an unpronounced definite article. His idea is that proper names and common count nouns have the same distribution but that in English, when a singular proper name is the complement of the definite article, the article can only get pronounced in certain situations.

Matushansky (2006) has proposed that there is a syntactic operation that allows 'the' to become an 'affix' on proper names. As such, it can 'take on a special morphological form'. In English, this special form is lack of pronunciation. In other languages, there are other special forms. Her proposal, in layman's terms, is that the 'the' and the proper name get smushed together in all but some predictable constructions. When they're smushed together, 'the' by default doesn't get pronounced. So what are the predictable constructions?

When adjectival modifiers, whether restrictive or not, get between the 'the' and the proper name, 'the' has to get pronounced.

(32) Interveners

    A.. The taller Michael is teaching metaphysics this year.

    B.. The implacable Peter can't even enjoy his vacation.

When other sorts of modifiers are pronounced after the proper name, the 'the' gets pronounced if the modifier is restrictive, but not if it isn't.

(33) Restrictive versus non-restrictive modifiers

    A.. The Ivan who is on the roof is howling.

    B.. * The Ivan, who is on the roof, is howling.

One explanation of this last fact is that restrictive modifiers occur between 'the' and a proper name at some stage of syntactic transformation. At some relevant stage, 'The Ivan on the roof is howling' is 'The on-the-roof Ivan is howling'. An alternative proposal is that the definite article can only smush together with a name when the name is not a part of some more complex constituent *within* the definite description. On this proposal, the constituent structure of the sentences in (33) are:

(33′)   A.. ((The (Ivan who is on the roof)) is howling).

        B.. ((The Ivan) (who is on the roof) is howling).

In the first case, 'the' must get pronounced because it is conjoined with a name that's conjoined with something else. In the second case 'the' cannot get pronounced because it is conjoined with a name that is not conjoined with anything else.

    Sloat also notices that when the definite article receives stress, it does get pronounced. You can't stress a word without pronouncing it at all.

(34) Stressed versus unstressed 'the'   (Sloat 1969, 28)

        A.. Is that Fabian?

        B.. Is that THE Fabian?

11. Machiavelli and Marlene

So far we've argued (i) that names are predicates that are true of the things that are called by that name; (ii) that names have the syntactic distribution of common count nouns; (iii) that when names occur bare and in the singular in argument positions, they are 'denuded definite descriptions'—they occupy the nominal position of an incomplete definite description with an unpronounced 'the'; (iv) that these denuded definite descriptions are incomplete, though typically completed contextually; (v) that incomplete descriptions— when they are used successfully, to denote something—are rigid designators; and (vi) that utterances of sentences containing names in argument positions therefore have the same modal profile on the denuded-descriptions view as they do on direct-reference views.

    There's at least one interesting use we make of names, though, that is not accounted for by our theory. (No theory I know of does account for it.) Some people call this a metaphoric use of names.

(35) He's a real Machiavelli;

(36) My mother thinks she's some kind of Martha Stewart.

The proper names in these sentences are not in argument positions; the positions they're in are equally well occupiable by common count nouns. This syntactic position requires that the proper names in these sentences have the semantic type of a predicate. But what is the condition of application of these names as predicates? Clearly they are not names

that are true of things called by that name. That is so even if these are metaphorical claims. When we say that he's a real Machiavelli, we don't say, even metaphorically, that he is *called* Machiavelli. My mother does not, even metaphorically, think that she's some kind of thing *called* Martha Stewart.

The person who wants to set Burge-type occurrences of names aside, saying that they have a special, predicative, meta-linguistic use that needn't be accounted for by a general theory of names as referring expressions, now has another special predicative use of names to set aside and avoid accounting for. We are in a somewhat better position. We can allow that these uses of names do not have a special *type* of semantic value. They are predicates that are true or false *of* objects. But we cannot say that in these admittedly special cases, the names are true of things that are called by that name, even metaphorically. Rather, we should say that they are true of things that have certain important characteristics of a particular person called by that name.

I can only say at this point that names (as predicates) do have these special uses; I have no explanation for why they have them, or exactly what are the circumstances in which they have them. That said, it does seem that the hedging indicators 'a real' and 'some kind of' are required to get these non-standard readings. I want to propose, though, that this special use—let me call it the Machiavellian use—is more common than might be supposed. I noted at the outset that there is an asymmetry between (1) and (2): it would be wonderful if I were Marlene Dietrich but boring and unfortunate if she were me.

(1)   I want to be Marlene Dietrich;   (TRUE)

(2)   I want Marlene Dietrich to be me.   (FALSE)

It seems to me that there are two different desires I could be expressing when I say that I want to be Marlene Dietrich. I could be expressing the impossible desire to be one and the same person as Marlene. Or I could be expressing a possible desire to be *like* Marlene in important and well-known respects. I might want to be an actress-singer with a low and sultry voice like hers, million-dollar legs like hers, smoldering eyes like hers, *et cetera*. We account for the latter case by letting the 'to be' verb here be the 'is' of predication and treating 'Marlene Dietrich' as a Machiavellian predicate—true of things that are like Marlene in salient respects. One reason it's false that I want Marlene to be *me* is that I do not want her to have many (if any) of my salient qualities.

12. Marlene and the Morning Star

But what of the readings of (1) and (2) that have me expressing, apparently, desires for the impossibility that Marlene and I be the very same person. Even on these readings, the desire reports have different truth values. I want to be the very same person as her, but I do not want her to be the very same person as me. How could that be? After all, isn't this a symmetrical relation that I want to hold between us? We can bring the problem into further relief by noting that on the names as predicates view, a partial unpacking of the truth clauses for the two claims yields something close enough to being equivalent to the following:

(1′) I want the person in the singleton set containing me to be a member of the singleton set containing the Marlene Dietrich [*that starred in 'Der Blaue Engel'*]

(2′) I want the person in the singleton set containing the Marlene Dietrich [*that starred in 'Der Blaue Engel'*] to be a member of the singleton set containing me.

The 'is' of predication does not stand for a symmetric relation because it does not stand for any relation at all. That went some way to explaining the asymmetry of (1) and (2) on their coherent readings, but the relation expressed in (1′) and (2′) is a symmetric relation: If A is a singleton set and its one member is a member of a singleton set B, then the converse holds: B is a singleton set and its one member is a member of singleton set A. But there is no less of an asymmetry between (1′) and (2′) than there is between (1) and (2) . How is that possible?

The answer, I think, is to be found in the futurity of wants. If I want to meet Barack Obama, then I have a desire about the future.[12] This is made clear by changing the aspect of the infinitival clause in the desire report. I want to meet Obama (in the future), but I don't want to *be meeting* him (now). If I were to meet him, I would want to be far more prepared with questions than I am right now. That's why I don't want to *be meeting* him even though I do want to meet him. If we make this futurity semantically explicit by positing a syntactically real future-tense operator in the embedded clauses of desire reports, then we have an operator that can take wider or narrower scope within its clause. The asymmetry between (1) and (2) on its 'identity' reading, is then represented as follows:

(1*) I want: [the x: Delia x] FUT: x is Marlene;

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[12]See Fara (2003) for discussion of desires, scope, and tense.

(2*) I want: [the *x*: Marlene *x*] FUT: *x* is : Delia.[13]

In the first case, what I want is that the element of the singleton set containing me in the future be an element of the singleton set containing Marlene. Impossible, yes, but different nonetheless from the desire, which I don't have, that the element of the singleton set containing Marlene in the future be an element of the singleton set containing me. This analysis of the asymmetry of (1) and (2) —on its 'identity' reading'—is available to *us* because we think that the expressions taking scope here are denuded definite descriptions containing names. This scope-taking analysis is not available to one who thinks that proper names are referring expressions. Referring expressions (if any but variables remain) can occur *within* the scope of operators or other scope-taking expressions, but they cannot take wide scope with respect to them.[14]

There are attitudes, however, that do not involve an element of futurity and, correspondingly, attitude verbs that do not embed a future-tense operator for scope-taking expressions to scope outside of. Belief is one such attitude. When I say that Nastenka believes that Ivan is mad, there is no room for interpreting me as saying that Nastenka believes that Ivan is *going* to be mad.

Belief reports are, however, subject to asymmetries in much the way that desire reports are. The planet Mars is not the planet Venus. But I wouldn't be surprised to learn that there was someone who thought that Mars was Venus. And I wouldn't be surprised either to learn that there was someone who thought that Venus was Mars. But these, it seems to me, are not all the same belief. The following sentences need not stand or fall together:

(37) Martha thinks that Mars is Venus;

(38) Martha thinks that Venus is Mars;

If we say that Martha thinks that Mars is Venus, then we mean, more or less, that whenever Martha sees Mars, she thinks that she is seeing Venus. But if we say that Martha thinks

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[13]We have not talked about the semantic type of definite descriptions. I have argued (2001) that they have predicate-type semantic values. I think that definite descriptions are like names in that when the occur in argument positions, they occupy the nominal part of a determiner phrase. As such, they can take wide or narrow scope with respect to operators or other scope-taking phrases when they occur in argument positions. When they occur as complement to 'is' they are just the predicative complement of the 'is' of predication. As such, they do not take wide scope with respect to other operators. This view is confirmed by the fact that the names-qua-descriptions in (1) and (2) cannot take wide scope with respect to the future-tense operator or the attitude verb.

[14]The descriptivist who follows Russell here is for that reason in a better position than the descriptivist who follows Frege. Russell thought that ordinary names were (short for) definite descriptions, and that *that* was why they could take wide scope with respect to operators or other scope-taking expressions. Frege thought that proper names were referring expressions. He was therefore not entitled to the Russellian view that names are scope-taking expressions, despite his thinking that they have descriptive senses

that Venus is Mars, then we mean more or less that whenever she sees *Venus*, she thinks that she is seeing *Mars*. These are clearly not equivalent.[15] When I see Hume, I could think that I'm seeing Heimson without thinking, when I see Heimson, that I'm seeing Hume—and without, for that matter, thinking that I'm seeing Heimson when I am in fact seeing Heimson.

I'll take this asymmetry of (37) and (38) to be an incontrovertible datum. This datum is explained on the denuded-descriptions view as a case of a denuded definite description taking wide scope with respect to an attitude verb. The difference is that between the following:

(37′) [the x: Mars x](Martha thinks that x is Venus)

(38′) [the x: Venus x](Martha thinks that x is Mars)

In the first case there's a particular x, namely Mars, and she thinks, *of x*, that it is Venus. In the second case there's a different x, namely Venus, and she thinks, *of this x*, that it is Mars.

Our view has opened up the possibility of there being different scopes for the names occurring in argument position here. Given that Hesperus is, necessarily, Phosphorus, the following pair of logical forms necessarily have the same truth value. Below these logical forms, I put the sentences of which they could be the logical forms.

(39) Wide-scope readings

A.. [the x : Hesperus x](Martha thinks that x is Phosphorus);
Martha thinks that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

B.. [the x : Phosphorus x](Martha thinks that x is Phosphorus);
Martha thinks that Phosphorus is Phosphorus.

The equivalence of these wide-scope readings does explain the feeling, which some philosophers have, that if you believe that Phosphorus is Phosphorus then you really *do* believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus. How could you not? Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical, so anything you believe of the one, you believe of the other. I accept this way of thinking. The 'believes-of' talk is a reflection of the wide-scope readings we have given to the denuded descriptions here. Unlike the descriptivist target of Scott Soames's (1998) attack on wide-scope defenses of descriptivism, we do not say that denuded definite descriptions with names cannot take scope outside of attitude verbs.

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[15]Samuel Cumming (2008) has made the same point.

But the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus does not obviously require, of course, that everyone who thinks that Phosphorus is Phosphorus must also believe that Hesperus is phosphorus. I claim only that there are disambiguations—the wide-scope ones—of these sentences that do stand or fall together. So how, then, do we account for the problem that so puzzled Frege—the apparent possibility of a *difference* in the truth values of 'Martha believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus' (FALSE) and 'Martha believes that Phosphorus is Phosphorus' (TRUE).

We have said that these are equivalent on their wide-scope readings. So if we are to accommodate a difference in truth value, it must involve the narrow-scope readings of (at least one of) these sentences.

(40) Narrow-scope readings

    A.. Martha thinks that [the x: Hesperus x](x is Phosphorus);

       Martha thinks that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

    B.. Martha thinks that [the x: Phosphorus x](x is Phosphorus);

       Martha thinks that Phosphorus is Phosphorus.

I am not entirely prepared to side unequivocally with Frege in thinking that these sentences (on their narrow-scope readings) can differ in truth value. Whether they can is a question I could see myself answering either way. The main point I wish to make is *whatever* the difference is between these sentences, the view that names are denuded incomplete descriptions predicts that there will be that difference.

Return to the sentence 'the book is on the table'. Suppose that the completing restrictions on these incomplete descriptions are given as follows:

(41) The book *that I lent you* is on the table *that I work at*.

The complete descriptions 'the book that I lent you' and 'the table that I work at' are non-rigid designators. I base that claim on the the truth of the following:

(42) If I worked at a table other than the one that I in fact work at, then the book
    that I lent you would not have been on the table that I work at.

In contrast, the incomplete-description correlates of these complete descriptions *are* rigid designators. I base that claim on there being no false reading of the following:

(43) Even if I worked at a different table, the book would still have been on the table.[16]

Here is the crucial point for us: despite the rigidity of the incomplete description 'the table'—as witnessed by there being no false reading of (43)—the completing predicate-restriction *that I lent you* still, in some sense that I do not want to provide a theory of, figures into what I believe when I believe that the book is on the table.

The analogy with Frege's puzzling pairs is this. The description associated with 'Phosphorus', namely 'the brightest body in the morning sky' is a non-rigid designator. I base that claim on the truth of the following:

(44) If the brightest body in the morning sky had been other than the one that in fact is the brightest body in the morning sky, then Hesperus would not have been the brightest body in the morning sky.

In contrast, the name 'Phosphorus' is a rigid designator. I base that claim on there being no false reading of the following:

(45) Even if the brightest body in the morning sky had been other than Phosphorus, Hesperus would still have been identical to Phosphorus.

In some sense (we know not yet what) I cannot believe, in the context we described, that the book is on the table without believing that something I lent you is on a table that I work at. This is so despite the fact that the book would still have been on the table even if I had worked at a different table with no book at it. In just the same sense, Martha cannot believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus without believing that Scott talks about something that she sees in the morning sky—assuming that her denuded incomplete descriptions are completed like this: [the] Hesperus [*that Scott talks about*] is [the] Phosphorus [*that Martha sees in the morning sky*]. This is so despite the fact that Hesperus would still have been Phosphorus even if Scott never talked about it, and even if she never saw Phosphorus in the morning sky.

I said that I do not want to give a theory of what is going on with these rigid incomplete descriptions. I do not want to give a theory of how they can be rigid even though there is a sense in which the contextually provided predicate-restrictions that complete them do get

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[16]In saying that there is no false reading of this sentence, I am taking certain counterfactuals facts as fixed. In particular I am taking it as fixed that it's not the case that if I worked at a different table then the book would have been on a different table from the one it is in fact on.

into what we believe when we believe what we say using these descriptions. I also do not want to give a theory of what it is for these predicate restrictions to 'get into' what is believed. There are a number of theory-laden two-way distinctions in the literature that we could glom onto the distinction we've made between a description's not getting into the modal profile of a an utterance while nonetheless getting the beliefs we express when we make that utterance. Some examples are the distinctions between 'assertoric content' and 'ingredient sense' (Dummett 1973); 'necessity' and 'a priority' (Kripke 1972); 'metaphysical necessity' and 'epistemic necessity' (Dummett 1973); 'superficial necessity' and 'deep necessity' (*EVANS*) 'horizontal propositions' and 'diagonal propositions' (Stalnaker 1981); and others still.

I do not want to try to fit what I am saying about incomplete definite descriptions into one or the other of these molds. There is, however, at least one theoretical dichotomy I find it helpful to think in terms of. It is the distinction between 'content' and 'character' (Kaplan 1979, Kaplan 1989). The pronoun 'I' and the operator 'Actually' are rigid indexical expressions. When I use the pronoun 'I' it refers to me; when you use it it refers to *you*. The pronoun has a non-constant character. When I say 'I might have been a man', however, what I say is true only if there are possible worlds in which *I*, the referent of my pronoun when I used it, am a man. It's irrelevant to the truth of what I say that there are possible worlds in which *you* are man, even if you are using the pronoun 'I' in those worlds while speaking the same language (English) that I'm actually speaking. The pronoun has a 'stable content' once that content is fixed in a context. Same goes for the indexical 'here'. When I say 'it might not have been raining here' what I say is true only if there are possible worlds in which it is not raining where I actually am (New York). The fact that there are possible worlds in which it is not raining in Los Angeles is irrelevant to the truth of what I say even if in those worlds I am in Los Angeles, using the word 'here' *there*.

Nonetheless the rules for determining the designations of these indexical words do in some sense (I don't want to say in *what* sense) 'get into' what I believe when I believe what I say using them. The rule for determining the designation of an utterance of the indexical word 'here' is that it designates the location of the utterance. That rule gets into what I believe when I say that it's raining here, insofar as I couldn't believe what I say without believing that the location that I'm in is a raining location.

On my view incomplete definite descriptions—and, consequently, names in argument position—are rigid indexicals. Let 'the F' be an incomplete description that in some context becomes the completed description 'the F_G'. The completed description 'the F_G' rigidly

denotes the one thing that is both *F* and *G* in the context in question. The fact that this thing is both *F* and *G* gets into what's believed by the person who uses the description in just the same way that the table's being a table I work at gets into what's believed by me when I use the incomplete description 'the table'. And it's in just this same way that my being in a rainy place is part of what I believe when I say 'it's raining here'.

There is, however, one significant difference between rigid incomplete descriptions and standard rigid indexicals on my view. The difference is this. The rule for determining the designation of 'here' in a context does not vary from context to context. It is always the rule that picks out the location of an utterance. The rule that determines the designation of an incomplete description, in contrast, is something that does vary from context to context. In one context the designation of an incomplete description 'the *F*' is determined by intersecting *F* with *G*; in another context it is determined by intersecting *F* with *H*.

13. Conclusion

Let me sum up by outlining my main line of argument. Because of their occurrence in Burge-type examples, we had to acknowledge that names at least sometimes are predicates with multiple applicability to the things that are called by that name. (Recall 'There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton'.) In order to provide a uniform account of the syntax and semantics of names, we decided to treat them as always having the syntax and semantics of common count nouns.

Like Burge, we proposed that names in argument position occur as the nominal parts of a determiner phrase with an unpronounced determiner. He chose the demonstrative 'that'. Following Sloat, we chose the definite article. Burge took names to be the nominal parts of denuded complex demonstratives. We took names to be the nominal parts of denuded *definite* descriptions.

Sloat had a good empirical reason for thinking that this was the right account of names. His main reason was that the only syntactic difference between names and common count nouns was their distribution with the definite article. When we adopted Matushansky's proposal that the definite article merges with a name that occurs alone in its complement position, and then becomes an unpronounced affix to it (unpronounced in English anyway), we had a good explanation of the distributional facts noted by Sloat. Matushansky's proposal explained why the definite article cannot always be dropped when it occurs with a name in argument position. In 'the taller Maria' and 'the Ivan on the roof', the definite

article cannot be dropped because it cannot merge with the name because the name is part of a complex constituent *within* the definite description.

Having adopted the view that names in argument position occur as parts of denuded definite descriptions, we had to accept that these denuded definite descriptions were *incomplete* definite descriptions—*had to*, this is, if we were to uphold the uniform view that names are predicates that apply to the things called by that name. We then noted that incomplete definite descriptions *in general* are rigid designators. From this it followed that the truth conditions of sentences with bare, singular names in argument position have exactly the rigid modal profile that Kripke and his followers claim that they have.

On the denuded-descriptions view, names have the ability to take wide or narrow scope with respect to operators or other scope-taking expressions. This fact afforded an explanation of an interesting asymmetry within desire reports.

(1)   I want to be Marlene Dietrich;   (TRUE)

(1*) I want: [the x: Delia x] FUT x is [the y: Marlene y];

(2)   I want Marlene Dietrich to be me.   (FALSE)

(2*) I want: [the x: Marlene x] FUT x is [the y: Delia y].

The reason for the asymmetry is that when a desire report has an embedded clause with no marked aspect it contains a future-tense operator with respect to which denuded definite descriptions can take wide scope.

We also noticed that there's a similar asymmetry with belief reports.

(37) Martha thinks that Mars is Venus;

(38) Martha thinks that Venus is Mars;

These belief reports do not have the same truth conditions as each other. The truth of the first requires, more or less, that when Martha sees Mars, she thinks that she is seeing Venus. The truth of the second, in contrast requires more or less that when Martha sees *Venus*, she thinks that she is seeing *Mars*. The denuded-descriptions view also afforded an explanation of this asymmetry in terms of scope differences. It is the difference between

(37′) [the x: Mars x](Martha thinks that x is Venus)

(38′) [the x: Venus x](Martha thinks that x is Mars)

We similarly accounted for the fact that certain pairs of belief reports containing co-extensional names can seem like they must have the same truth value. On their wide-scope readings, 'Martha believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus' and 'Martha believes that Phosphorus is Phosphorus' have to have the same truth value given that Hesperus *is* Phosphorus.

(39) A.. $[\text{the } x : \text{Hesperus } x](\text{Martha thinks that } x \text{ is Phosphorus});$

Martha thinks that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

B.. $[\text{the } x : \text{Phosphorus } x](\text{Martha thinks that } x \text{ is Phosphorus});$

Martha thinks that Phosphorus is Phosphorus.

Finally, on to the puzzle, the famous sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is necessarily true on the denuded-descriptions view, because names are denuded *incomplete* definite descriptions and incomplete descriptions *in general* are rigid designators. Nonetheless, 'Martha believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus' seems false—when it does—because incomplete definite descriptions are like rigid indexicals. The contextually provided material that completes the description somehow gets into what's believed by one who in that context utters a sentence containing the description. I proposed that the following are analogous claims.

- Even though it could have been raining here even if I were not in a rainy location, still I cannot believe what I say when I say 'it's raining here' without believing that I am in a rainy location.

- Even though the book could have been on the table even if I worked at a different table that did not have a book on it, I cannot believe what I say when I say 'The book is on the table' without believing that a book I lent you is on a table that I work at (where these incomplete definite descriptions have been completed in the indicated way).

- Even though Hesperus could still have been Phosphorus—in fact would have been—even if a body other than Phosphorus had been the brightest in the morning sky, Martha cannot believe what she says when she says 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' without believing that something Scott talks about is the brightest body she sees in the morning sky.

The first clauses in each of these three analogous claims are true because the expressions in question are rigid designators. I resisted providing an explanation of why the second

clauses in each of these claims seem true. I also resisted making a commitment one way or the other about whether they are true. I committed only to the weak claim that the denuded-descriptions view of names predicts that the third of these claims is analogous to the second. The question of how to account for Frege's puzzle is thereby subsumed under the more general question of how to account for the strange epistemic character of incomplete descriptions, once we realize that they are rigid. This is progress.

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[17] Thanks to Berit Brogaard, Parma Conference, Reference Seminar, , Stephen Schiffer, Jeff Speaks.

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