Introduction

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1 Justice, Respect for Autonomy, and Love

Questions concerning love and its role in morality (and vice versa) have been with us since antiquity. They have given rise to a long and complex debate about the nature of love, the lovers’ emotional and attitudinal characteristics, and about how love shapes and is in turn shaped by the lovers’ self-understanding and their autonomy. In this context, important questions arise concerning the relation between love and justice, be it

1) within relationships of (romantic) love,
2) about love’s alleged incompatibility with morality’s demand for general impartiality, or
3) regarding the implications of both of the aforementioned tensions for the political realm.

Arguably, acts of love may come into conflict with considerations of justice when rather than considering the claims of everyone involved equally and impartially, one favors a loved one over others. Moreover, lovers may be prone to interfere with the freedom or autonomy of their beloved out of concern for their well-being, which apparently goes against the moral demand of respecting everyone’s autonomy, including the beloved’s. Given that both love and morality are undoubtedly of central concern in our lives, how can these apparent tensions between love, justice, and respect for autonomy be addressed or resolved? And which implications would need to be incorporated in a broader, political perspective on the matter? In order to address these questions, the central notions of love, justice, and autonomy obviously need to be clarified. The following introductory sketch is intended to provide some conceptual background on the topic.

First of all, equality, fairness, and impartiality are all essential aspects of justice (for an overview concerning the notion of justice, see Miller 2017). Justice has often been construed in relation to equality and fairness, where the latter includes the claim that persons are to receive their due. This seminal idea can be found in Plato’s Republic (Plato 2013a; 2013b) and has been famously enshrined in the formula suum cuique (to each his own) by Ulpian in the 3rd century and later by emperor Justinian in the early 6th century.
Aristotle classically conceived of justice in terms of equitable distributions of benefits and burdens in society as well as rectifying unjust distributions (cp. Aristotle EN, Book V).\textsuperscript{1} The basic underlying and still prevalent idea is that equality functions as the default position against which possible inequalities need to be justified. Equal cases need to be treated equally. The burden of proof, thus, lies with inequality (cp. Tugendhat 1997, 70). Of course, unequal treatment can be shown successfully as just by pointing to morally relevant and differing characteristics, e.g. desert or need. Yet what may count as morally relevant characteristic is, in turn, in need of (moral) justification. Moreover, equality needs to be specified, i.e. whether something is considered an equal basis of moral judgment or which kind of equality is supposed to be the aim of moral action. Unsurprisingly, both aspects are a matter of contention and the question “equality of what?” has spawned an intense debate (see Gosepath 2011, section 3).

Still, one of the undisputed core elements of modern morality is the idea that all persons are moral equals. This idea is most forcefully advocated by Immanuel Kant, when he contends that persons do not have a price, which characterizes weighable and replaceable items, but dignity, which makes persons irreplaceable and of unweighable value (cp. Kant 2011, 97–99). Likewise, the idea of persons as moral equals can be found in John Stuart Mill’s appropriation of Jeremy Bentham’s dictum of classical utilitarianism: “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one” (cp. Mill 1861, 257f.), viz. when Mill discusses justice and morality’s impartiality (for an overview of the notion of impartiality, see Jollimore 2020). Being impartial, then, means treating all persons as equals and judging a situation irrespective of the particular persons involved, only based on morally relevant characteristics.

More recently, John Rawls famously defined justice as fairness, where persons are regarded as free (autonomous) and equal, rational citizens, who share the burdens in a fair society, grounded in two principles of justice: “First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all” (as he first stated them in Rawls 1971, 60). Rawls’s lexical ordering of both principles, according to which possible further advantages are prohibited if they come at the cost of infringing on people’s equal liberties as stated in the first principle, once again
shows the importance of equality and fairness when it comes to how people should be regarded, namely as having equal value, no matter their position in society. While Rawls recognizes that persons are born into unequal societal positions, these undeserved inequalities should be compensated for in order to ensure that all enjoy fair opportunities (cp. Rawls 1971, 100). Accordingly, the principles of justice form the bedrock of society and are the essential element of Rawls’s social contract theory. This theory also exemplifies the role of impartiality, since the so-called “original position,” which includes the “veil of ignorance,” is defined in a way that avoids any possible partiality (cp. Rawls 1971, 118–22, 130–42). The original position is the hypothetic starting point where citizens determine the just principles of their society. In this position, they need to decide under a veil of ignorance, stripping them of any knowledge about their personal values, preferences, and place in society. Hence, it is ensured that their point of view is impartial. Ultimately, the equal respect for persons thus grows out of this conception of fairness and an impartial perspective, which are both in turn grounded in a fundamental assumption of equality.

Furthermore, Rawls at first followed Kant’s conception of persons, who are considered to be morally autonomous, equal, and rational (Rawls 1980).² Persons possess equal worth and deserve equal respect, specifically because of and for their autonomous rational will. These notions are captured in Kant’s three formulations of the categorical imperative (see Kant 2011). The first states to act only on that maxim which at the same time can be willed as universal law. This formulation exemplifies impartiality, since principles are applied to all persons equally and no one can receive special treatment. In other words, one ought to view the application of justice from an objective perspective. The second formulation requires that we respect all persons, including our own, equally and never treat persons merely as a means, which specifically consists in respecting a person’s autonomous, rational will. Persons are, in turn, autonomous because they can set laws for themselves, more specifically the moral law as expressed in the categorical imperative. The third formulation states that as autonomous, rational agents, we ought to act such that we could legislate universal law in an imagined kingdom of ends. This formulation reveals the source of our dignity, i.e. our value as human beings, in our autonomous rational will that can legislate universal law and not merely act in accordance with it. So for Kant, our equality is grounded in our autonomous rational will, where autonomy consists of our
ability to set the moral law for ourselves from an impartial perspective. And as we are all equal, everyone’s autonomous will ought to be respected.

Respect for a person’s autonomy is thus not only an important part of considerations of justice in particular but a fundamental part of modern morality in general (for an overview, see Christman 2015). It is the centerpiece of Kantian ethics, and while utilitarianism does not put autonomy front and center as Kantianism does, it is traditionally considered to contribute crucially to people’s well-being, which is why strong moral reasons are needed for overriding it by other aspects of the situation in question (cp. Mill 1859; 1861). In sum, equality, fairness, impartiality, and respect for autonomy are mutually supporting notions.

In contrast, partiality, i.e. treating someone differently just because the person has a special connection to oneself, is considered unjust or unfair in modern morality (see Jollimore 2020). At the very least, partiality is in need of moral justification. The question is therefore whether there are some special circumstances that set aside moral impartiality or that can, in fact, morally justify treating certain persons more favorably than others because of some personal connection. Arguably, family bonds, relationships of love, or friendships might qualify as morally relevant characteristics, thereby making a corresponding partiality morally justified. If so, it could also be concluded that everyone is being treated fairly.

However, even if this were granted, it only holds for differentiating between loved ones and other persons. Yet, what about questions of how to treat one’s beloveds and the temptation to interfere with their freedom or autonomy, even if only out of concern for their well-being or flourishing? When following Kant or Rawls, such interfering would apparently mean disrespecting their autonomy and not treating them as equals. Granted, in the case of family relations, parents are certainly morally justified when they engage in paternalistic behavior toward their, especially smaller, children—which neither Kant, Mill, nor Rawls deny. However, relationships of romantic love present a different challenge, and it is far from clear that lovers are justified in interfering with their beloved’s freedom or autonomy, even if it might be for their own sake. No wonder, therefore, that references to autonomy play such an important part also in the discussion on love’s relation to morality. However, it is important to note that these references typically do not
have the narrow Kantian definition of autonomy (as the ability to set the moral law for oneself) in mind. So, what is autonomy?

In partially explicit opposition to Kant’s narrow definition, recent debate on autonomy has taken a broader approach and understands *personal autonomy* as a general capacity of self-governance (for an overview, see Buss and Westlund 2018). Accordingly, personal autonomy is meant to describe a person’s capacity of deciding and acting, i.e. in general leading her life, based on her own convictions, consisting especially of her desires, preferences, values, or principles. Being autonomous, thus, also means to be (sufficiently) independent of undue influences, be these external influences by other people, like coercion or manipulation, or internal influences, like addictions or other mental influences experienced as alien to oneself.

The debate on personal autonomy has been largely shaped by individualist accounts and corresponding criticisms (see, for example, Christman 1989; Taylor 2005). Individualist accounts analyze personal autonomy solely in relation to a person’s internal traits and capabilities. Most notably, Harry G. Frankfurt has argued that autonomy consists in a specific hierarchical structure of a person’s will, which basically consists in our capacity of (metaphorically) stepping back from our desires and considering whether we identify ourselves with them (cp. Frankfurt 1971; 1988). The details of Frankfurt’s approach and the corresponding criticism are not important for the purpose at hand. What matters, rather, is this: on individualist approaches, love may be considered either as an influence that endangers the lover’s autonomy—e.g. when we speak of being “madly” in love or being no longer able to see things clearly because of being in love—or, on the contrary, as an authentic source of the lover’s autonomy. The latter position is notably defended by, again, Frankfurt, when he identifies love, or what we care about, as the source of our identity or self (cp. Frankfurt 1994; 1999; 2004). Assuming that we decide and act based on what (or whom) we love and, thus, based on who we essentially are, Frankfurt claims that this may be regarded as an authentic and, therefore, autonomous expression of our self.

However, while both of these individualist considerations discuss love in relation to the *source* of authenticity and autonomy, either endangering autonomy or being constitutive of it, love may very well also be analyzed in terms of being the *result* of personal autonomy. These kinds of individualist approaches reject an essentialist idea of the self.
as something to be merely discovered, including what or whom one loves, and instead opt for a—likely even existentialist—perspective, according to which we are able to—or even unavoidably must radically—choose who we want to be, including what and whom we want to love (cp. Fromm 1956; Lehrer 1997; Kühler 2014). Admittedly, this would imply giving up the influential understanding of love as something over which we have no control, especially when love is considered to be, at least primarily, a specific emotion.

In any case, these all too brief remarks already show the variety of options of how love’s relation to personal autonomy may be discussed against individualist accounts of the latter. However, things get even more complicated once one also adds relational accounts of personal autonomy to the mix (see Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Oshana 2006). In recent decades, these accounts have gained substantial popularity, not the least due to a number of corresponding criticisms of individualist accounts. For individualist accounts are taken to fall short of addressing precisely enough autonomy endangering as well as autonomy enabling social conditions. While individualist accounts simply take a person’s reflective capabilities for granted, relational accounts emphasize that we need to grow up in a suitable social environment in order to be capable of developing into an autonomous person in the first place. If we are not treated with respect and recognized as a person with dignity, so that we can develop corresponding attitudes towards ourselves, notably self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem (cp. Anderson and Honneth 2005, 130f.), we would arguably not be able to become autonomous persons—although we may be able to remain autonomous even in a hostile social environment once we have developed our capacity for personal autonomy. Stronger relational accounts, on the other hand, go a step further and claim that these social conditions are constitutive of personal autonomy, i.e. we cannot be or remain autonomous unless they are met.

Since loving relationships are obviously a tremendously important part of a person’s social environment, on relational accounts, love may influence personal autonomy even more. Being loved may be considered as contributing substantially to enabling or promoting one’s autonomy. However, this claim obviously only holds if love comprises an attitude toward the beloved that fosters their autonomy enabling or promoting self-attitudes, i.e. that supports the beloved in developing and maintaining attitudes such as self-respect or self-esteem. Accordingly, this idea explains well how love may not only
be considered compatible with the lovers’ respective individual autonomy but even enabling and promoting it (cp. notably Velleman 1999).

However, relational accounts have also put much emphasis on identifying and criticizing social conditions that endanger personal autonomy, including close personal relationships (see Oshana 2014). For especially loving relationships may also include interpersonal dynamics that diminish a person’s flourishing as an autonomous individual—although it might be a matter of contention if such relationships should still be considered relationships of love. Most notably, feminist authors have shown how more or less subtle manipulations up to straightforward ‘gaslighting’ or treating the beloved based on restrictive gender stereotypes diminishes and endangers the beloved’s—i.e. for the most part women’s—autonomy.

In sum, while personal autonomy broadens the view in comparison to Kant’s narrow notion and is of central importance to modern ethics, it is far from clear how it should be analyzed exactly. Moreover, the variety of theoretical approaches creates a multitude of possibilities how personal autonomy may relate to love, i.e. in what sense love may be supportive of or even required for our capacity of being autonomous and, on the contrary, in which sense it may endanger autonomy.

What complicates the matter even further is the fact that the notion of love is, of course, far from clear as well. Traditionally, three different notions of love have been distinguished: love as *eros*, love as *philia*, and love as *agape* (for an extensive historical and critical discussion, see Singer 2009a; 2009b; 2009c). As per the account epitomized in Plato’s *Symposion* (Sheffield and Howatson 2008), *eros* is associated with passionate and romantic love. Though typically (but not necessarily) carnal in its initial stages, erotic love can be purified, as it were, into love of beauty itself, perhaps even further. *Philia*, on the other hand, is meant to characterize the relation of mutual well-wishing and support in the dimension of the good. According to Aristotle, *philia* refers to the loving relationship that relates true friends and, in its lesser forms, people who share certain goals or pleasures (cp. Aristotle EN, books VIII & IX). *Agape*, finally, is said to refer to a kind of selfless and unconditional love. In the Christian tradition, the term is associated with love’s highest form, charity, and is said to be properly attributed to the bond between man and the divine, but is also used as a label for the love the religious person is to feel for her neighbor (see Soble 1989).
In highlighting the lover’s desire, *eros* is arguably a more self-centered love, including a specific partiality toward the beloved. Accordingly, it seems rather natural to assume that such loving partiality is in tension with morality’s required impartiality. *Philia* and *agape*, on the other hand, do not seem to present quite the same pressing challenge. Following Aristotle’s seminal discussion, *philia* usually requires the lovers or friends to be virtuous persons, which also includes the virtue of justice. *Agape* in the sense of neighborly love is even the explicit manifestation of equality and impartiality in love.

In addition to this traditional distinction between *eros, philia*, and *agape*, another possible grouping of theoretical approaches to analyze love may be helpful for the topic at hand (cp. Kühler 2020, where the following overview is mostly borrowed from; cp. also Klonschinski and Kühler 2020):

1) **individualist accounts**, according to which love is analyzed in terms of a purely individual stance which takes the beloved as its object,

2) **interpersonal accounts**, according to which love is conceived as a dialogical relation between the lovers who are thus both considered subjects of their loving relationship, and

3) **union accounts**, according to which the lovers ‘merge’ into a *we*, i.e. abandon their individual identities and together form a new *we*-identity.

Ad 1) Individualist accounts of love come in different flavors. They might analyze love in terms of a specific emotion, volition, or a more general stance. They might argue that love is rational in that there are reasons *for* love. Alternatively, they might argue that, on the contrary, love is arational and is, conversely, the source of reasons, namely reasons *of* love (for an overview, see Helm 2017). What all of these individualist accounts have in common is that they take love to be something attributable exclusively to the lover, with the beloved merely being the *object* of this love. What it means to love someone then often includes the idea of *caring about* the beloved, i.e. wanting the beloved to flourish and being actively engaged in promoting the beloved’s well-being and flourishing, as it has traditionally been attributed to *philia*. As Frankfurt puts it in his influential account of love as caring, “[l]ove is, most centrally, a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for it.” (Frankfurt 2004, 42; see also 1999). Moreover, as mentioned above, what a person loves or cares about is, in turn, a source of the lover’s
own identity and autonomy (Frankfurt 1994, 138; 1999; 2004). Yet the point of individualist accounts is to locate this source in the loving person herself. The beloved person, therefore, does not necessarily have any impact on the lover’s identity. Loving another person does not imply any changes to the lover’s identity because of this love—and if such changes occurred, these would be conceived as accidental. Accordingly, individualist accounts of love allow for each lover’s identity to remain basically unchanged. Mutual love can, thus, only be explained in terms of each lover’s individual and independent stance of love that just so happens to have the respective other person as its object.

Ad 2) In contrast, interpersonal accounts of love take mutual love as their starting point and claim that love should be analyzed in terms of a shared relationship. Notably, Angelika Krebs defends such an account (cp. Krebs 2014; 2015, cp. also her chapter in this volume). She argues that love’s nature is dialogical. Mutual lovers are not only both subjects of their shared love, but each lover also has an intrinsic interest in the sharing of their lives. “Partners share what is important in their emotional and practical lives. […] [L]ove is the intertwining of two lives” (Krebs 2014, 22). Moreover, the sharing of lives includes that the lovers are open to changes in their individual identities because of their love (cp. Rorty 1987). Hence, interpersonal accounts of love include the claim that each lover’s individual identity will unavoidably—and willingly—be affected by their dialogical love. “In sharing emotions and actions, the partners engage in a mutual building of selves. How they view and respond to each other shapes their characters” (Krebs 2014, 22).

Ad 3) The locus classicus for union accounts, finally, is Plato’s Symposium. According to the myth conveyed by Aristophanes (cp. Sheffield and Howatson 2008, 189e–93), humans were once “double-creatures” with four legs, four arms, and two heads. Because of their strength and hubris, they even posed a threat to the gods themselves, so Zeus split them in halves, yielding our current appearance. Ever since each of these halves desperately looks for its other half and yearns for being reunited with it. Love is, therefore, nothing but the desire for unity and, if fulfilled, the union itself. Now, obviously, the idea of lovers being (re-)united or merging must not be taken literally. Recent union accounts usually do not rest on ontological claims about the creation of a new entity. Instead, union accounts’ central claim is that lovers merge in the sense of sharing a we-identity and we-autonomy (cp. Fisher 1990, 26–35; Nozick 1990; for a discussion of how to understand
the lovers’ union, see Merino 2004). The main idea is that lovers no longer see themselves as independent individuals but as fundamentally belonging together. Union accounts, thus, go one step further than interpersonal accounts. While interpersonal accounts claim that the lovers keep their individual identities and autonomy—although their identities are affected by their dialogical love—union accounts often readily admit that love as union is incompatible especially with individual autonomy (cp. Fisher 1990, 28; Nozick 1990, 71; for intricate discussions of the matter, see Soble 1997; Friedman 1998, see also Kühler’s chapter in this volume). However, it should be noted that union accounts may include a stronger or weaker claim when it comes to the lovers’ we-identity. Stronger versions of union accounts comprise the claim that the new we-identity completely redefines or replaces the lovers’ prior individual identities. Weaker versions, on the other hand, leave some room for each lover to retain their respective individual identity and consider the new we-identity merely as a supplement to or a partial modification of the lovers’ individual identities.

The intriguing point of this threefold distinction of theories of love for the topic at hand is that each of these approaches implies a specific framing of possible conflicts between love and justice as well as autonomy on all three levels mentioned at the beginning, i.e. within loving relationships, concerning the conflict between love’s partiality and morality’s impartiality, and regarding the political dimension. First, following individualist accounts, all of these possible conflicts allow for a traditional individualist analysis and discussion, according to which individual interests, preferences, and autonomy can be pitted and weighed against each other. Accordingly, justice within loving relationships would amount to a discussion about whether benefits and burdens are distributed fairly among the individual lovers in their relationship. Love’s partiality would manifest itself in a lover’s preference for the beloved in comparison to everyone else. Finally, at least the liberal, likewise individualist, political tradition would not face fundamental problems when it comes to incorporating love as an individual personal stance—although this obviously does not mean that all ensuing problems of loving partiality vs. now political impartiality may easily be fixed; it merely means that they may easily enough be analyzed and discussed against a shared individualist background.

Interpersonal accounts of love, on the other hand, yield a different framework and are arguably more challenging for an otherwise individualist moral and political point of
view. Although interpersonal accounts stress that lovers remain individually autonomous, their identities get affected and may undergo significant changes. Consequently, if a person’s identity is considered to be the source of authenticity for making autonomous choices, a lover’s individual autonomy is affected, after all. Yet, this is usually not considered as negatively interfering or even impeding the lover’s autonomy, for the underlying changes in identity because of love are taken to be welcomed, even pursued intrinsically. Moreover, interpersonal accounts of love stress that loving someone includes valuing and promoting the beloved’s individual autonomy. If so, it would seem that interpersonal accounts are well equipped to address and even ensure justice within loving relationships. However, given that the lovers value their relationship intrinsically, it appears to be quite possible that this may result once again in a tension between love’s partiality and morality’s impartiality, now understood in terms of the lovers being partial toward their relationship in comparison to other people. The latter would, in turn, present a challenge for acknowledging loving relationships as special from a political point of view, although it might be argued that the traditional concept of marriage precisely serves as the corresponding instrument in political thought and practice.

Finally, love as union likely yields the most challenging framework when it comes to taking justice and the political realm into account. Especially with stronger versions of union accounts, the idea of the lovers sharing a we-identity and abandoning their respective individual identity and autonomy seems to make it impossible even to address the question of justice within love, at least in the usual sense. However, it is perfectly conceivable to raise the question of how exactly the shared we-identity came about and to what degree the (previously) individual lovers are represented in it. Hence, questions about justice within loving relationships can still be raised but require a substantial reformulation in terms of their content, including questions about how autonomous the individual lovers’ initial or continued identification with their shared we-identity actually is. While weaker versions of union accounts readily allow for such questions to make sense, stronger versions of union accounts arguably exclude any individual stance toward the shared we-identity to begin with. If so, the question would be to what degree the lovers’ shared we-identity may be considered an acceptable source of authenticity for the lovers’ autonomy, be it in terms of their individual autonomy or their shared we-autonomy—assuming that the redefinition of each lover’s identity in terms of the shared we-identity
may still be considered as individual autonomy to begin with. Furthermore, union accounts of love in any version seem to present an even more pressing tension between love’s partiality and morality’s impartiality. For how could the lovers not favor their *we* in comparison to everyone else? Yet in principle, it seems to be perfectly conceivable that the lovers actually value morality’s impartiality, especially if they consider themselves as no longer being separate individuals. Just like individuals are capable of valuing impartiality, so is the lovers’ *we*, or so it could be argued. Although love as union certainly allows for an *egotism à deux*, it does not imply it. In any case, love as union certainly presents an even greater challenge for modern political thought than interpersonal accounts due to the apparent abandonment of the lovers’ respective individual identity and autonomy.

2 Overview of Contributions

Following the above sketch of possible tensions between love, justice, and autonomy, the contributions to this volume engage in the critical discussion of these tensions from three perspectives, which mark the volume’s three sections:

1. Justice Within Relationships of Love
2. Loving Partiality and Moral Impartiality
3. The Political Dimension of Love and Justice

2.1 Section 1: Justice Within Relationships of Love

Contributions in this first section aim at shedding light on conceptual and practical issues concerning the (in-)compatibility of love and justice within relationships of love, with the notion of justice construed primarily in terms of respect for autonomy between the lovers. In this respect, *Arina Pismenny* takes the tension head-on and argues in her contribution “The Amorality of Romantic Love” that romantic love does not include a moral dimension. She starts from the opposing view that romantic love is, according to a number of authors, an intrinsically moral phenomenon. The alleged connection between love and morality is elucidated in terms of reasons *for* and reasons *of* love. Romantic love, on such views, is a response to moral reasons—the moral qualities of the beloved. Similarly, the reasons love produces are also taken to be moral in nature. Since romantic love is a response to moral qualities and a source of moral motivation, it is itself moral. Pismenny’s
contribution aims to cast doubt on both these claims. By employing the model of emotional rationality, she contends that a moralistic fallacy is committed when reasons for love are construed as moral. Reasons of love are also not essentially moral, as she goes on to argue, but rather of both moral and nonmoral kinds, and they are in part determined by cultural narratives and norms pertaining to love. Romantic love, she concludes, is not moral in nature; morality is extrinsic to love.

In his contribution “Autonomy, Love, and Receptivity,” Carter Johnson focuses on respect for autonomy within loving relationships. Being in a loving relationship apparently includes the risk either to give up one’s own autonomy or to abridge the autonomy of the beloved. Moreover, since loving relationships can produce dispositions, one risks developing a long-term disposition to do so. In order to protect against this risk, Johnson argues, a person can develop a contrary disposition, one that will nurture autonomy, and claims that receptivity is such a disposition. He defines receptivity as the ability to be with someone without having to impose careless or compulsive expectations. This definition is bolstered by using research from psychology and neuroscience about biases, defense mechanisms, and other cognitive and motivational features common to most people. Since receptivity involves sufficient control of or independence from these cognitive and motivational features, and since such features are often what causes breaches in autonomy, Johnson concludes that receptivity enables one to have loving relationships without damaging the autonomy of oneself or the other.

In his contribution “A Minimalist Conception of Love,” Getty Lustila, too, addresses the prima facie conflict between the values of love and autonomy. How can we bind ourselves to a person and still enjoy the fruits of self-determination? He argues that the solution to this conflict lies in recognizing that love is the basis of autonomy: one must love a person in order to truly appreciate their autonomy. To make this case, Lustila defends a minimal account of love, according to which love is an agreeable sensation that is experienced when considering the existence of another person. On this view, the lover does not desire anything from the beloved but works to attend to their presence. Love, then, puts us in a position to appreciate the beloved in their particular way of being. By accepting the presence of the beloved we gain a sense of their autonomy. The roots of this account of love are found in the writings of Damaris Cudworth Masham, but Lustila
also draws on the work of Kieran Setyia, David Velleman, and Kyla Ebels-Duggan to elaborate on and defend Masham’s views.

Troy Jollimore takes on a more skeptical view again. In his contribution “‘The Power and the Freedom’: Love, Constriction, and Justice in Rear Window and Vertigo,” he looks at two films by Alfred Hitchcock, Rear Window (1954) and Vertigo (1958). Both films showcase our anxieties about romantic love, connecting them with the view that such love is transformative: i.e. tends to open lovers to radical changes, including alterations of their very identities. Moreover, these changes are to a large degree unpredictable and uncontrollable. This suggests, Jollimore argues, that love, at least in some cases, can pose a deep threat both to our continued well-being and, perhaps more profoundly still, to our autonomy. If this is right, then some of the most powerful reasons for avoiding love might arise from love itself: both love of ourselves, and the love we direct toward others. In light of these considerations, the anxiety felt about love by the protagonists of these films is, as Jollimore concludes, entirely understandable.

Like Lustila and Johnson, Raja Rosenhagen, in his contribution “Murdochian Presentationalism, Autonomy, and the Just Lovers’ Pledge,” examines the relation between love and autonomy aiming to make it intelligible why and how just love fosters autonomy. He draws on two sources: presentationalism, a position in the debate on experience’s rational role, and Iris Murdoch’s account of love as just attention. Presentationalism and Murdoch’s view, he argues, are natural bedfellows and yield Murdochian presentationalism. On it, just love requires just attention and the continuous acknowledgment that the beloved, their concepts and their ends are different from us and that both lovers’ concepts, views, and experiences may be muddled, selfish, and murky. Since different responses to identical circumstances can be equally rational, just lovers are both humbly willing to learn from their beloved and ever-ready to compassionately respond to them. Rosenhagen thus couches ideal loving relationships in terms of the joint project of cleansing the lovers’ respective outlooks by removing selfish fantasies and excising—through action and explication—heteronomous factors, so as to ultimately increase the lovers’ ability to treat each other justly, do well by each other, to increase their freedom and autonomy, and to orient them, gradually, towards what is real and good.
In her contribution “On the Internal Normative Fabric of Dialogical Love,” Angélique Krebs engages in a further clarification and defense of her recently developed dialogical conception of romantic love (Krebs 2015). According to this view, romantic lovers share what is important in their lives and are internally, that is, by virtue of their love, committed to contribute to and respect the other’s autonomy. In order to understand romantic love, she argues that we need to understand how two people can truly share feelings and actions and what kind of obligations go along with this. Max Scheler and Edith Stein offer some valuable insights on this issue. First, Krebs introduces three major models of romantic love: the fusion model, the care model, and the dialogue model. She then argues in support of the third model, which views romantic love essentially as a form of sharing, and reconstructs the thoughts of Max Scheler and Edith Stein about sharing. Krebs goes on to argue that Edith Stein’s perceptions, which in turn are extensions of Max Scheler’s work, constitute a convincing account of collective feeling and acting and thus of what lies at the heart of romantic love. In closing, she updates this account on the basis of current philosophical understanding.

In his contribution “Tolerance, Love and Justice,” Christian Maurer discusses the relation between love and tolerance and its implications for justice within loving relationships, which has been surprisingly underrepresented in recent debate. He proposes a conception of love as a robust-yet-fragile phenomenon experienced by weak human agents and goes on to discuss some differences between tolerance and forbearance. The latter is conceived as a form of patient endurance of deeply objectionable difference in values, which is often associated with love and hope. On the other hand, tolerance—a more distant reaction—is often thought to be incompatible with love. However, Maurer argues that not only forbearance but also tolerance is psychologically and morally compatible with love. To some extent, he follows John Bowlin’s discussion of forbearance and tolerance, but bases his own discussion on the specific conception of love as a robust-yet-fragile phenomenon. Within such love, and within certain limits, Maurer argues, at least some deeply objectionable differences may be tolerated, yet this may render difficult the wholehearted acceptance of the other because it involves some degree of alienation. The motive for tolerance in such love may be a concern for justice combined with a concern for the loving relationship.
In the final contribution to the first section, “Abandonment and the Egalitarianism of Love,” Tony Milligan broadens the view further. While focusing on love as an emotion, he assumes that it is central to various forms of religious commitment, particularly so in the case of the Christian tradition which appeals to an egalitarian worthiness of love’s recipients. However, Milligan suggests, and to some extent argues, that appeals to love’s unconditionality and to constancy which are prevalent in Christian discourse work better in some domains than in others. More specifically, an unconditional constancy in the context of intimate sexualized love can be problematic by reinforcing submissive gender roles, conflicting with a concern for equality, and clashing with a reasonable concern for agent well-being. There are loves, Milligan contends, which we ought to end insofar as we are able to do so.

2.2 Section 2: Loving Partiality and Moral Impartiality

Contributions in this section shift the focus from the internal fabric of loving relationships to relations between lovers and others. This raises questions about a possible tension between love’s apparent partiality and the impartiality demanded by morality. Rachel Fedock explicitly addresses this shift in perspective in her contribution “Dissolving the Illusion of the Love and Justice Dichotomy,” while arguing that justice and love are, in fact, interconnected, where one makes little sense in isolation from the other. Love and justice have often been conceived as not only sharply distinct, but divergent in their aims and sometimes, conflicting in their demands. Justice has been perceived as having no place in loving relations, while some have argued that the particularistic and partial nature of loving is inconsistent with impartial, universal morality. Fedock refers to this perceived contrast as the “love and justice dichotomy (LJD).” After briefly examining a few theories of love and care to illustrate the history of the LJD and exploring those theorists whose work challenges the LJD, particularly Velleman’s, she lays out the beginnings of a feminist-focused theory of love, which focuses on empowering and promoting the autonomy of the beloved. This results in a further breaking down of the LJD. Drawing upon these challenging works and her own conception of love, she concludes that the LJD is an illusion.

Nora Kreft shares the idea that love and justice are not only compatible but even more closely related. In her contribution “Love and Our Moral Relations With Others,”
she defends this claim against the background of Philip Pettit’s account of love as robust care. Pettit argues that if A loves B, then A provides care for B not only in all actual scenarios, given certain prompts or triggers, but also over a certain range of hypothetical scenarios. Further, according to Pettit, being so disposed is more than being motivated to provide care, it is also a matter of having reason to do so. There is a sense in which, as a lover, one ought to provide care for one’s beloved, given the right prompts. However, Pettit goes on to say that the reasons of love—the reasons to provide care for the beloved—can be outweighed by other reasons, notably moral reasons, e.g. to help a stranger in dire need instead of consoling one’s beloved on a minor matter. While Kreft agrees with Pettit that the lover should help the stranger and that this does not undermine her status as a genuine lover, she disagrees that the situation is correctly analyzed in terms of reasons of love being outweighed by reasons to help the stranger. Instead, Kreft argues that love itself gives us a reason to help the stranger. In helping the stranger, the lover is in fact (also) acting out of love for her beloved, not in spite of it. More generally, Kreft defends the position that love gives us reasons to respect and care not only for the beloved but also for other human beings, at least to some, further specifiable extent and in certain, further specifiable situations. She thereby invokes a long tradition in philosophy to view love as a morally virtuous attitude—an attitude that has the potential to change our moral relations not just with our beloved, but to a certain degree with everyone.

While the previous two contributions attempt to show how love includes a moral perspective, thus allowing for morality’s impartiality, Shane Gronholz puts the matter on its head. In his contribution “Acting Out: How Personal Relationships Provide Basic Moral Practical Reasons,” he asks whether love’s partiality might not be even called for on moral grounds. He starts from the everyday observation that people at least at times behave partially toward their friends or loved ones. To behave partially is to show favoritism toward certain groups or individuals, to put their interests ahead of the interests of others, to treat them better than one treats everyone else. He then raises the question of whether those kinds of actions are wrong, permissible, or rather morally required. Gronholz argues that we are, in fact, morally permitted, and sometimes morally required, to give preferential treatment to those with whom we have certain kinds of personal relationships. This is because he believes that such relationships provide basic moral practical reasons that apply to our treatment of our friends, but not to others. He explicates the
concept of these reasons in terms of relational reasons and defends the accompanying normative moral claim that we ought to love our friends.

However, such a partial loyalty to one’s beloved or friends might provoke more serious moral challenges. In her contribution “Love for One’s Own or Justice for All?,” Marilyn Friedman discusses how love’s loyalty may present a lover with a painful dilemma in case the beloved engages in serious moral wrongdoing. Many people identify themselves and are identified by others in terms of a social group (race, religion, nationality, gender, etc.) to which they belong and to which they may feel a strong attachment. Although often beneficial for their members, a person’s social identity group may engage in serious moral wrongdoing or injustice toward other groups or their members. In such cases, Friedman contends, a member of the wrongdoing group may face a painful dilemma. A strong attachment, or love, for her own group inclines a member toward continuing to support her identity group under varying circumstances. However, when the group commits injustice, it seems appropriate for members to condemn and oppose their own group in the name of justice. These conflicting options are possibly irreconcilable. Friedman surveys this dilemma, explores five ways of responding to it, and considers whether content-neutral autonomy helps to resolve it.

2.3 Section 3: The Political Dimension of Love and Justice

Unsurprisingly, the contributions thus far have shown a great variety and partially opposing positions on the possible tensions between love justice, and autonomy. Whatever stance one takes on any of the issues previously discussed will arguably have broader political implications. Since loving relationships play an important role in society, it is an open question of how to incorporate any position on the relation or tension between love and justice in a more encompassing political framework. The contributions in this final section address such implications for the political realm.

Andrew Lambert’s contribution “Love’s Extension: Confucian Familial Love and the Challenge of Impartiality” ventures beyond the confines of a debate rooted only in Western tradition and explores the political implications of love in the Confucian tradition. The most prominent form of love in the Confucian tradition is familial love, which is also central to ethical conduct and good character. Lambert discusses potential Confucian responses to the demands of impartiality. This is timely, he contends, because the
Confucian family-centric approach to society, and its relevance in contemporary China and beyond, has been questioned by scholars who have identified a conflict between a thoroughgoing commitment to family and ethical impartiality. Various defenses of Confucian thought have been offered, including: impartiality is, in fact, an important value in the classical texts; public institutions from outside the tradition could be introduced to formalize and strengthen impartiality, and are compatible with traditional social values; and the defense of alternative regulative ideals internal to the tradition, which are accorded priority over impartiality. Lambert assesses the merits of these responses before exploring an alternative line of argument: that Confucian familial attachments can sometimes achieve that at which impartiality aims, but without appealing to impartiality as a foundational moral ideal. Such an approach to ethics has its limits, Lambert admits, but shows promise in the regulation of everyday social life in localized communities. More importantly, he argues that the Confucian tradition of familial ethics can engage in a critical dialogue with ethics in the tradition of liberal individualism.

In his contribution “Love as Union and Political Liberalism,” Michael Kühler follows up on liberalism’s individualism and discusses its compatibility with union accounts of romantic love. According to liberal thought, each person is treated as an individual, i.e. as a separate subject independent of any group affiliations. Moreover, everyone is treated as an equal whose individual autonomy and freedom needs to be respected. Union accounts of romantic love, on the other hand, claim that lovers (at least partially) abandon their individual identities and form a shared we-identity. The crucial idea is that lovers no longer regard themselves as separate (autonomous) individuals but as fundamentally belonging together, even including a “pooling” of their autonomy. Taken together, this raises the question of whether or to what degree liberalism is compatible with union accounts of love. Does liberalism leave (sufficient) room for this highly influential and still prevalent understanding of romantic love? In order to answer this question, Kühler discusses core assumptions of liberalism’s individualism, distinguishes between a variety of union accounts of love, and argues that liberalism’s compatibility with love as union is substantially limited. In fact, he concludes that only one rather weak version of love as union, which is distinctly akin to liberalism’s individualism, proves to be compatible.

Aside from its emphasis on individualism, liberalism, of course, focuses on people’s freedom. This topic is taken up by Niklas Forsberg in his contribution “The Freedom
that Comes with Love.” Forsberg engages in a detailed discussion of love’s implications for the political realm in Iris Murdoch’s philosophy, which is well-known for love taking center stage. However, the general tendency has been to think that the relevance of Murdoch’s conception of love concerns romantic relations between two persons. Thus, little attention has been paid to how this conception of love relates to the communal and to more political notions like justice and freedom. Forsberg’s discussion is intended to remedy that by means of elucidating the relations that hold between Murdoch’s conception of love and her concept of freedom. What emerges, he argues, is a call for a recognition of the many layers in which freedom is developed. Beyond a restricted notion of freedom as “freedom to choose,” there is a notion of freedom that comes in degrees.

In the final contribution to the volume, “Love, Activism, and Social Justice,” Barrett Emerick analyzes the relationship between love and social justice activism, focusing in particular on ways in which activists rely on either the union account of love (to argue that when one person is oppressed everyone is oppressed), the sentimentalist account of love (to argue that overcoming injustice is fundamentally about how we feel about one another), or love as fate (to argue that it is in love’s nature to triumph over hatred and injustice). Emerick argues that all three accounts, while intelligible and attractive, are seriously problematic, as they tend either to obscure important differences in the ways that various groups are socially situated or to enable inaction by trusting that justice is inevitable. Therefore Emerick explores alternative, deeper interpretations of each account and their respective relationships to activism.

References


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**Endnotes**

1 However, it should be noted that according to Aristotle, justice is not for everyone, only equals. As citizens and slaves are not equals, they ought not be treated as such, while citizens should be treated equally among each other, and slaves as well, for instance, rejecting impartiality between these groups.

2 Later, Rawls revised his position and claimed to have abandoned Kantian metaphysics. Yet, his new political conception of the person still includes regarding everyone as free and equal, i.e. treating everyone as if they were free and equal (cp. Rawls 2001, 18–24; 2005, 29–35).