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Mailed in June 2005.

Alain Badiou
Handbook of Inaesthetics.
Trans. Alberto Toscano.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2005.
Pp. xi + 148.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4408-4);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4409-2).

In this book, Badiou argues for an 'inaesthetic' relation of philosophy to art. Philosophy, he contends, should make no claim to turn art into an object for philosophy — a peculiar thing to propose in a book that does little else but philosophize about art. But this contradiction, recommending one thing and doing just the opposite, is more than made up for by Badiou's interesting takes on the works of Milosz, Pessoa, and Mallarmé, on theatre and cinema. The book is well worth reading for this reason alone, and the reader should be glad that Badiou did not follow his own advice. The major problem with this book is that it fails to live up to its billing. Badiou identifies three ways that philosophy has tried to make a truce with art, and then proposes what he takes to be an entirely new way. What's so new — or even better — about this 'inaesthetic' approach is hard to say. A brief look at this argument takes us to the heart of what this book sets out to achieve.

The *first* way Badiou calls 'didactic', whose representative is Plato. The heart of this polemic against art is not that it is an imitation of things but rather an imitation of the effect of truth. Art's ability to fake this effect is what makes us prisoners of the 'immediate image of truth'. Thus, Plato takes the 'immediacy' of art seriously (as do the prisoners in the cave), but also contends that the truth of art comes from outside art. Hence, art has to be either condemned or regulated by a truth extrinsic to it, placed in the service of education. The *second* way is 'classical', whose founder was Aristotle. On this view art is incapable of truth and mimetic. Plato would agree with this much. But, contrary to Plato, this incapability doesn't pose a problem after all, simply because art never claimed to have been capable of truth to begin with. What art imitates is not a truth but an action; its function is not cognitive but therapeutic. Watching the protagonist act badly doesn't make the audience want to act badly too; cathartically, it does just the opposite. The cost of this truce between art and philosophy is that it renders art innocent, but only because it is innocent of all truth. According to the *third* way, called 'romantic', 'art alone is capable of truth,' and it manages to '[accomplish] what philosophy itself can only point toward' (3).

This much seems uncontroversial. The problem is with what comes next. Badiou correlates these three ways with the 'massive tendencies of thought in the twentieth century': 'as regards the thinking of art, Marxism is didactic, psychoanalysis is classical, and Heideggerian hermeneutics is romantic' (5). Leave aside this massive oversimplification of the twentieth century. What stands out is the last part of this remark, which is also key to a critique of Badiou's argument. After all, doesn't 'romantic' belong to the likes of Blake

and Coleridge? And doesn't the phrase 'romantic hermeneutics' refer to something about getting back to the original intentions of the author? To call Heidegger's philosophy of art 'romantic' sounds like a provocation. How can we make sense of this?

Maybe Badiou would place what we normally think of as the 'romantics' somewhere in the company of either the didactic Plato or the classical Aristotle. I doubt he would want to do this. The other possibility is that he thinks that Heidegger's ideas about art are essentially romantic. The first possibility is highly questionable, and so is the second. In any event, unless Badiou justifies this romantic reading of Heidegger, there seems to be not three but four schemata: the didactic, the classical, the romantic, and the *Heideggerian*.

But for argument's sake, let's agree that up until now there have been just these three ways: the didactic, the classical, and the romantic, best represented by Heidegger. This still leaves us with the problem of determining what's so novel about Badiou's inaesthetics. He contends that each of the three schemata shares a pair of categories, immanence and singularity. *Immanence* refers to the question of whether truth is internal or extrinsic to the artwork. *Singularity* refers to whether the truth testified by art belongs to it absolutely. For Badiou, the relation of truth to art in the Platonic schema is singular but not immanent; the relation in the classical schema is neither immanent nor singular; and the relation in the Heideggerian schema is immanent but not singular. It is in the fourth way — the only combination that is left — that the relation between artwork and truth will be one of both immanence and singularity. The question is what is so novel about this fourth way.

Truth, according to Badiou, is a founding event. The plays of Aeschylus constitute a founding event for theatrical tragedy. Galileo's mathematizing of nature, the French Revolution of 1792, an amorous encounter that changes a whole life — these are other founding events. Much of this sounds a lot like Heidegger, according to whom art 'lets truth originate': the artwork constitutes a founding, truth-event; the work discloses a truth precisely in founding a truth. For Heidegger, the work has 'immanence'. Second, for Heidegger art *also* has something like what Badiou calls 'singularity'. For Badiou the truths that artworks 'activate are irreducible to other truths — be they scientific, political, or amorous. This also means that art, as a singular regime of thought, is irreducible to philosophy' (9). But Heidegger wouldn't disagree with this. For him, as for Badiou, these are different, irreducible ways that truth goes to work.

In a word what is essentially new in Badiou is difficult to say. I stress 'essentially'. For example, Plato's view of what to do with art and Brecht's view are obviously different in the details. But essentially, as far as truth goes — as far as *Badiou* is concerned — art has for both of them a didactic function. So with Badiou and Heidegger. Their views are obviously different in the details. But if we subtract from Badiou's writings things not to be found in Heidegger — a bit of topology here, a terminological novelty there —

Badiou comes off sounding a lot like the older master when he talks about art.

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Peter Baumann and **Monika Betzler, eds.**
Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. 333.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81271-2);
US$27.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-01210-4).

The problem with reviewing a book that is a collection of papers when you are confined to a brief word limit is that you can find yourself conflicted between attempting to provide an adequate description of all the contributions and providing a fruitful discussion of the ideas and arguments contained in the contributions. I have good reason to do both, but cannot achieve both in a way that is fully satisfying or complete. In short, I seem to be faced with a practical conflict.

Practical conflicts pervade our lives and we often find ourselves in situations where we have a number of good normative reasons for action that we cannot act on. The most interesting of these conflicts, and the ones that are most deserving of philosophical focus, are practical conflicts in which, at least in principle, it does not seem possible for an agent to find a solution between a reason to do A and a reason to do B, where she cannot act on both. Indeed, we find that there are many different reasons for action that can come into conflict. By focusing on whether these kinds of practical conflicts are genuine and their affect in our practical deliberation, the collection of papers in this book analyzes practical conflicts in various forms and domains as a means of approaching questions about the scope of practical reason, in particular whether or not the existence of practical conflicts potentially restricts the scope of practical reason.

Different theories of practical reason, e.g., Humeanism and Kantianism, have argued that the existence of practical conflicts in areas of morality, well-being, and autonomy are resolvable conflicts that it is the function of practical reason to either preclude or guide clearly to their resolution. Other theories of practical reason dismiss this overly optimistic view, instead opting to articulate accounts of practical reason as having a restricting scope, in an attempt to avoid what they perceive as theories of practical reason that

underdetermine or overdetermine the rational resolution of practical conflicts, at least in a number of situations. The papers within this collection outline the various positions held by these two camps in the philosophy of practical reason through an examination of conflicts between moral and non-moral reasons (David Velleman, Christine Korsgaard, Ruth Chang), moral conflicts (Nicholas White, Peter Schaber, Jon Elster), conflicts of desires (Henry Richardson, Issac Levi, Peter Baumann), conflicts between values and desires and the connection of conflicts to free will and self-control (Alfred Mele, Barbara Guckes), and conflicts of reasons more generally (Joseph Raz, Monika Betzler).

While I cannot adequately discuss all of the contributions, I want to single out the contributions of Ruth Chang and Joseph Raz, as being particularly interesting and worthwhile. Chang examines the conflict between moral and prudential value, in particular how the conflict between morality and well-being presents a challenge for the scope of practical reason and the normativity moral reasons are generally taken to have. Chang argues that if there is no common point of view, upon which we can assess the demands of morality and well-being, it is difficult to see why an agent should see reasons that are not related to making her life go best as having normative authority. Instead, she proposes that we can put together morality and well-being, such that there exists a more comprehensive value in which morality and well-being are component parts. Chang puts forth two original arguments for why we can understand conflicts between morality and well-being to be resolvable in light of this proposed comprehensive value, such that the conflicting values no longer arise from distinct points of view, but are parts of the same value.

Raz examines the question of whether there is something unfortunate about the existence of practical conflicts. He claims that we should only see conflicts as unfortunate if they present situations in which a blameless agent doing her best is not deemed to have acted good enough in virtue of not being able to act on the unsatisfied reason(s). What makes these practical conflicts distinctly normative is that it is impossible to completely conform to all the reasons that count in favour of acting. In not being able to conform to considerations we have reason to follow, we can recognize the normative significance of such reasons and why they provide us with reasons for regret, apologizing to those we have harmed, and compensating those we have wronged.

All of the contributions to this wonderful collection are unpublished originals, with the exception of Christine Korsgaard's 'The Myth of Egoism' (from her 1999 Lindley Lectures). A great many of the contributions to this collection are innovative and thought-provoking, and provide a detailed and varied examination of many important questions within the philosophy of practical reason that have received insufficient attention. Having said that, given the immense breadth of the questions and topics covered all under the auspices of practical reason, there are pros and cons associated with the unity of the contributions to this collection. In that it covers so much, this collection will be of interest to many scholars and students. In that practical conflicts

permeate so many areas of our lives and raise so many different questions, various aspects of the papers in this collection will appeal more to certain disciplines and research areas. All the same, this is certainly a very valuable collection full of exceptional and stimulating papers.

Adrian M. Viens
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J.M. Bernstein, ed.
Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. 363.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80639-9);
US$22.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00111-0).

Rodolphe Gasché
The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant's Aesthetics.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2003.
Pp. 272.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4613-3);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4621.4).

Kai Hammermeister
The German Aesthetic Tradition.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.
Pp. 278.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-78065-9);
US$22.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-78554-5).

In the preface to *The German Aesthetic Tradition* Kai Hammermeister claims that 'philosophical aesthetics was not only born in Germany; the development of this discipline is also predominantly a Germanic affair' (x). While some may view this as contentious it is by no means an outrageous claim. Indeed, taken together these three books could go some way to advancing this position. Hammermeister reminds us that the term 'aesthetics' was coined by Alexander Baumgarten in 1735 for a new philosophical discipline. J.M. Bernstein elucidates how certain classic and Romantic German aesthetic texts have proved so influential on this discipline and continue to be of contemporary interest and significance. Rodolphe Gasché reinterprets what is arguably *the* classic German text of philosophical aesthetics, Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, in ways that reveal much more then just its influence or relevance, but also its depth.

These are three very different books in terms of style, intensity of engagement with the subject matter and philosophical originality. Hammermeister's *The German Aesthetic Tradition* is a fairly straightforward history that provides a clear and concise overview and summary of the positions of major figures within that tradition. Bernstein's collection of *Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics* also does what it says on the cover, but apart from a very helpful introduction leaves us to interpret some extremely rich (and difficult) texts ourselves. Gasché's *The Idea of Form*, on the other hand could be summarised as an extended close reading of Kant.

Hammermeister's is the most accessible of the books. As such it would be very useful to undergraduate students who have no familiarity at all with either German philosophy or aesthetics. The book is described on the flyleaf as a 'systematic critical overview of German aesthetics from 1750 to the present'. It is certainly an overview, which is more critical in some parts than others. Its claims to systematicity derive from Hammermeister's attempt to construct a narrative of the development of German aesthetics and his concentration on the ontological, epistemic and practical aspects of each of the theories explored. Hammermeister is aware of the dangers of leaving out some important thinkers and themes in creating a story of the (dialectical) development of Germanic aesthetics. Indeed he gives his own reasons for excluding Marx, Freud and Goethe amongst others, arguing that they 'would not have changed the historical pattern significantly'. He tries to persuade us that they also excluded themselves by not situating 'themselves within the tradition of German philosophical aesthetics' and failing to 'advance a position that answers to the basic questions and concerns of the aesthetic tradition' (xiv). All of these claims can, of course, be challenged and refuted, but they can also be respected as signalling Hammermeister's own philosophical position on what counts in and as aesthetics.

There are strengths and dangers in attempting to frame an historical overview in such a prescriptive way. Its honesty should be admired as well as the focus it provides. The other extreme could result in a blurred and uncritical text that pretended to an impossible 'view from nowhere'. However, while Hammermeister can be praised on his knowledge and conviction about what aesthetics is we also need to be aware that an introductory text such as this is also likely be influential on the formation of such convictions in others. What is perhaps more telling about the conception of aesthetics at work here are those thinkers who are not dealt with at all, or only mentioned in passing. For example Hölderlin, Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis are reduced to a supporting role in the chapter on Schelling. German Romanticism has had such a lasting and still contemporary influence on philosophy and aesthetics that it does seem to be a glaring omission not to have a chapter at least on the movement as a whole.

There are other confusing aspects about which thinkers have been included, how much space has been given to each, and what influence this will have on the naïve reader. The chapter on Schopenhauer is particularly curious. Hammermeister opens with a long list of artists who have been

influenced by Schopenhauer's thought. He then immediately proceeds to tell us that 'his effect ... on philosophical aesthetics in particular is negligible' (111). Schopenhauer is relentlessly described as contradictory, vague, and inconsistent throughout the chapter. The trouble with such negative criticism is that, although it is a perfectly justifiable interpretation, it begs the question of why Schopenhauer would merit a whole chapter to himself in the first place. My fear is that an undergraduate student reading this chapter would be tempted never to look at Schopenhauer or anything remotely Schopenhauerian again.

On the other hand, the book succeeds very well as an overview and summary of many contributions to an often difficult tradition. The book works in (at least) two ways. First, it will be useful to students as a kind of reference work. The chapters are both short enough and comprehensive enough to either introduce or remind the reader of the major features of a specific thinker's aesthetic theory. Second, read as a whole, it does succeed in showing how many of the thinkers relate to, borrow from and re-interpret each other (even if the developmental story feels slightly contrived).

For example, the chapter on Kant explains the historical and philosophical importance of the *Critique of Judgement* and proceeds to explicate the analytic of the beautiful and the sublime as well as the discussions of genius, fine art and the relationship between beauty and morality. Hammermeister treats Kant's subtle and difficult distinctions and definitions very deftly. His clear exposition takes us through the various moments step by step so that the reader should be able to understand how the argument works. There are of course discrepancies of reading and interpretations that would not be shared by many Kant commentators. The jump from the treatment of beauty to sublimity leaves the reader wondering what possible link there could be between the two concepts and the bold assertion that 'they are opposed to each other' (34) cannot be so easily derived form Kant's text.

Hammermeister's insistence on evaluating the ontological, epistemological and practical elements or consequences of each thinker's theory is another useful strategy. It helps in comparing different views and emphasises differences between say Hegel's commitment to truth-content in art and Nietzsche's aestheticisation and perspectivism of philosophy. However it occasionally feels rather forced, as in Hammermeister's dissatisfaction with Kant's failure to answer the ontological question about art. Surely part of the significance of Kant's contribution lies in thinking about why he didn't feel the need to ask the ontological question.

Bernstein's *Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics* is certainly a book that will go some way to filling the gaps in Hammermeister's survey. However, as a collection of translations of original texts rather than commentaries on those texts, it requires a great deal more work on behalf of the reader. Although this is a new collection, the translations are not all new. It is not immediately clear who has translated which text and when, but a close examination of the suggestions for further reading and the note on texts

reveals that the Moritz, Schiller and Hölderlin texts are new for this volume (although they have all been translated elsewhere previously).

Again, this is a book that can be used in a number of different ways. It can and certainly should be used as a source book for some of the greatest writings in German aesthetics. It can also be read to trace the links, comparisons and developments between the different texts and thinkers. Bernstein's introduction is extremely useful in this regard. In a similar spirit to Hammermeister, Bernstein wishes to 'provide as theoretical framework that would characterize the main philosophical stakes running through' these works. He too tells a kind of a story and traces 'the path that runs from Lessing to Jena Romanticism' (viii). It is easy to assume that any such attempt will be too general or violent to some of the complexities and nuances of such sophisticated theories. However, Bernstein is a subtle and sensitive reader and manages to present a five-part argument that directs attention to undoubtedly significant aspects of the texts.

His first claim is an historical one about the role and position of aesthetics. He considers all of these thinkers to be responding in some way to a crisis in reason that results from the ever-widening gap between the subject and nature within modernity. Although Bernstein doesn't use this example, it is probably best exemplified by Kant's awe at the conundrum of 'the starry heavens above and the moral law within' (*Critique of Practical Reason* A289). Turning to Lessing's struggle with the problem of freedom and nature, as spelled out in *Laocöon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry*, Bernstein concentrates on the notion of artistic mediums. This is an illuminating reading of Lessing's essay and certainly conveys its influence on the tradition in general and on Schlegel in particular. The whole of the essay is included as the second translation in the collection, taking up almost exactly one third of the whole book.

Bernstein continues with the theme of freedom as having replaced the mimetic as the fundamental idea of art. He briefly refers to Moritz as having stretched the notion of imitation to breaking, but primarily concentrates on Schiller's conception of beauty as 'freedom in appearance'. Bernstein considers Schiller's most significant contribution to be the explanation of appearance in terms of 'autonomy as opposed to heteronomy' (xxi). The next episode of the narrative is given over to Hölderlin's 'tragic or elegiac modernism' (xxiii), which is interpreted as no longer attempting to overcome the divergence of nature and freedom through art. Instead Hölderlin is taken to construct a different aporia, that of the 'duality of judgement and being', and to consider tragedy to be a manifestation of 'our separation from an origin to which we remain bound' (xxv). The theme of freedom is carried through to the fifth and final element of Bernstein's narrative of philosophical development. It is with the Jena Romantics, especially Friedrich Schlegel, that poetry is considered as 'the exemplary instance of human freedom' (xxvii). At the same time the connection between freedom and nature is finally severed allowing literature to become the philosophical 'self-consciousness of modernity' (xxx).

This is indeed a very astute summary of the main positions of most of the texts reproduced in the book. Bernstein can only be praised for his ability to get to the heart of the matter of such different, difficult and endlessly interpretable texts. As such it is a more successful synthesis that Hammermeister's. However, Bernstein does make some grand and intriguing claims that are never fully cashed out. In particular, he states that 'the path that runs from Lessing to Jena romanticism looks uncannily like the path that runs from artistic modernism to the postmodern art scene of the present' (viii). According to Bernstein's own summary of the path, this would position modernism as an aesthetic response to a crisis of reason and leave postmodern art as the self-consciousness of modernity. This would be a relatively unproblematic description of modernism, but a great deal more would need to be argued in order to understand postmodernism's self-consciousness. This is not a book about postmodern art, so the claim can be taken merely to show how these classic texts are of much more than historical importance. By making such claims, which are by no means unjustified, Bernstein is giving us a further spur to thought.

In one sense such spurs are redundant, because the writings offered in this book are all intensely thoughtful. That many, if not all of them, are also classics of German literature should not go unnoticed or be taken merely as a coincidence. For example Hölderlin's genius takes the philosophical and poetic enterprise to ever new ground. There are barely two pages of the *Oldest Programme for a System of German Idealism*, which is thought to be a collaboration between Hegel. Hölderlin and Schelling, but it provides an infinite amount of food for thought.

It is a pity though, that the reader is not given more help with some of the more esoteric pieces. The first, and by far the strangest work is J.G. Hamann's *Aesthetica in nuce*. Bernstein does provide some explanatory footnotes, but these only inform us about the various references in the work. While it is easy to recognise a profound sense of the enlightenment divorce of nature and reason in this text, Bernstein makes no reference to the work in his introduction in order to situate it within the tradition. I am sure many readers would also find some clues to how best to read Cabbalistic prose very helpful.

The other thinker who is not discussed in the introduction is Novalis. However, as a representative of Jena romanticism he can be assimilated into that part of the narrative. Bernstein has given us a focus and a starting point to read these delightful and frustrating works, but the book is primarily a collection rather than a commentary. It is for the reader then to untangle Novalis' *Monologue* in which he informs us that he has 'delineated the nature and office of poetry as clearly as I can, all the same I know that no one can understand it ... ' (215).

Gasché certainly has an understanding of Kant's Critique of Judgement; whether this is a 'correct' understanding or not is a more debatable point. In *The Idea of Form* Gasché attempts to return to Kant's Third Critique with fresh eyes — to read it again and to understand what it is 'really' about. It is

as if Gasché is trying not to be influenced by the whole tradition of commentary and influence while at the same time remaining aware of that tradition. In Gasché's own words, he has 'endeavoured to think with Kant' (11). This admirable strategy does indeed produce novel, intriguing, and sometimes confusing interpretations of Kant's theory. From a combination of the protean nature of Kant's work and the intelligence of Gasché's commentary all of the conclusions can certainly be derived through reference to the *Critique of Judgement*.

For example, Gasché forcefully reminds us that, despite the invaluable influence on a tradition of aesthetics of fine art, Kant's aesthetics is primarily an aesthetics of nature. The question that arises from this timely retrieval is how this will affect the larger picture. He too seems to think that it will enhance our understanding of modern and post-modern fine arts. The importance of nature for Kant's model is that it is only nature that really evades proper conceptual cognition, and as such provides the possibility for 'radical disinterestedness' (3).

Although it is set out as a monograph, the text sometimes feels more like a collection of essays, all of which concentrate on an aspects of the third *Critique*. The benefits of this are that it is probably more interesting and original than a 'straight' commentary on Kant's text. However, it also means that the links between chapters are not always immediately obvious. The order that the papers are presented is also quite strange if we are expecting them to follow the development of Kant's argument in the *Critique*. Gasché is aware of the organisational oddities of his work and suggests that Chapter 4 (of 8) is 'both a concluding chapter and the center of the book' (12). The problem with this is that we are in danger of treating the following chapters as appendices and therefore miss out on some of the more interesting moves that Gasché makes in relation to the sublime.

As the title suggests the focus of the work is on the concept of form; more accurately, what Kant refers to as 'mere form'. However it is from Kant's first critique, not the third, that Gasché derives his account of form. It is a strangely epistemological conception of form that emerges; one that is concerned more with the mind's capacities to gather intuitions together in the constitution of the objects of experience.

Gasché identifies two extreme positions of interpretation of the *Critique of Judgement*. The first is the strictly formalist position, which he rejects because it fails to appreciate this quasi-epistemological definition of form and is unable to adequately explain Kant's concern with nature and therefore the objective. At the other end of interpretative response he sees an attempt to make the aesthetic relevant to discussions of truth and morality. Gasché also refuses to attribute this position as his own while at the same time denying that he is either providing a middle ground or mediation between the two ends of the continuum. Again this hinges on a perceived faulty definition of what form is for Kant.

Gasché's rejection of the formalist theory is more forceful and convincing while his own position is nearer to the one linking the aesthetic with truth

and morality than he cares to admit. Because he is committed to what he calls a 'para-epistemological' reading that foregrounds the participation of reason in judgements of the beautiful as well as the sublime, he is also committed to a serious concern with issues very close to truth and morality.

Gasché also returns to the question of whether the *Critique of Judgement* was Kant's attempt to marry together the critiques of pure and practical reason. His concentration on the possibility of reflective aesthetic judgement bridging the gap between the cognitive and the moral rests on the assumption that the faculty of reason is at work in judgements of taste. This is the most controversial view expounded in this book and is one that contradicts what is explicit in Kant's analytic of the beautiful; namely that the pleasure of the beautiful is derived from the free play of the imagination and the understanding. It is clear on any reading that reason is essential to judgements of sublimity, but Gasché wants to smuggle it back into the discussion of the beautiful as well. It is in a discussion of one of the strangest paragraphs of the third critique (17) that Gasché bases his return of reason to judgements of beauty. The paragraph attributes the ideal of beauty to the human form, but Gasché discovers a subtle, and far from explicit shift from 'ideal' to a 'determined idea' (105). The way in which Gasché interprets the status of the latter certainly opens up a novel and challenging reading of Kant's work. However because it rests on this very subtle move, I suspect only a few will be completely convinced.

For those unfamiliar with the *Critique of Judgement*, Gasché's book would likely produce a very unorthodox view of what is of aesthetic significance in Kant's book. For example, when the final chapter endeavours to show how 'the very scope and thrust of the *Critique of Judgement* depends on an elemental and constructive takeover ... of ... rhetoric' (202), the reader might be left thinking that Kant's was a work of and/or about rhetoric. This is not to suggest that Gasché is being wilfully heterodox; rather it is a reflection on both the richness of Kant's text and the rigour, depth and closeness of Gasché's reading. While only time will tell how orthodox Gasché's reading becomes, it is certainly a rewarding book, which encourages the reader to continually return to the rich resource of Kant's text.

Ewan Porter

Paolo C. Biondi
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II.19: Introduction, Greek Text, Translation and Commentary Accompanied by a Critical Analysis.
Sainte-Foy, QC: Les Presses de L'Université Laval 2004.
Pp. xii + 309.
Cdn$35.00. ISBN 2-7637-8081-4.

This is a valuable study of one of the most important texts in the history of western philosophy: Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* II 19. In just under sixty lines of dense, at times tortuous, Greek text Aristotle accomplishes two crucial tasks. First, he secures the foundations of demonstrative science by showing that there is a state of knowledge in which we grasp the first indemonstrable principles of science — namely 'intellect' (*nous*). Second, he shows that we acquire this state of knowledge by moving from the sense-perception of particulars, through memory and experience, to the intellectual or 'noetic' grasp of a universal, a process he calls 'induction' (*epagôgê*). Biondi's aim is to defend the traditional interpretation of the chapter (found in the Greek and Latin commentators, on whom he draws extensively) according to which intellect plays a significant role in the inductive process. His method is to supplement his exegesis of II 19 and defend his main thesis through close analyses of other relevant Aristotelian texts — notably, *De Anima* and the logical works.

The text and translation of II 19 are followed by a line-by-line commentary and a series of interpretative essays — what Biondi calls a 'critical analysis'. This consists of four chapters and one appendix dealing with the main philosophical issues that arise in II 19: Aristotle's conception of logic and science (Chapter 1), the nature of sense-perception, memory, imagination and experience (Chapter 2), induction (Chapter 3), and intellect (Chapter 4 and appendix).

The commentary serves as a very convenient guide to II 19. Here Biondi defends his translation of widely disputed parts of the text, explains the text's principal exegetical problems, and sets out a range of possible solutions. He also raises objections to the solutions he does not favour and briefly sketches his own interpretation. This allows the reader to compare Biondi's views to other interpretations without having to go to the literature herself.

In the critical analysis Biondi defends his interpretation in much greater detail. Here he takes a strong stance in the debate of recent decades about the principal problem of II 19, the relationship between induction and intellect. Aristotle characterizes induction as the road from particulars to universals and as the means by which intellectual knowledge of first principles is developed in us from sense-perception. On the empiricist interpretation, which Biondi rejects, Aristotle's account is problematic, for it leaves an unbridgeable gap between sense-perception and intellect — that is, between

the empirical process of induction and the intellectual knowledge of first principles that is said to be its result. Biondi argues that the traditional view that intellect is involved in induction avoids this problem altogether (217). On this interpretation, intellect is not the passive result of induction but its active guide (225). This is the book's central theme, and Biondi develops it in several interesting ways, most notably in his discussions of the relationship between sense-perception and intellect and the nature of induction.

Biondi argues that in human beings the power of sense-perception is identical with the 'first potentiality' of intellect — the innate human capacity to achieve the developed intellectual state in which first principles are known (119, 224). On this view, sense-perception is the means by which the intellect begins to habituate itself to grasp the universal latent in sensible particulars. Thus there is neither an unbridgeable gap between, nor a magical leap from, sense-perception of particulars to knowledge of a universal such as we find in the empiricist interpretation of induction (224). This is because intellect influences and acts in concert with sense-perception nearly from the start (214, 219).

Biondi's interpretation of the nature of induction is the most interesting part of the book. He argues that induction is a process of intellectual habituation in which the intellect slowly develops the capacity to apprehend first principles or universals (58, 234, 257). A key moment in this development occurs in the early stages of induction when the intellect, through an act of 'intellectual perception', first makes contact with sensible particulars and thereby acquires a 'vague and confused' grasp of a universal (251-2, 257-9). In the subsequent stages of induction the intellect deepens its understanding of this universal (254). Thus induction ends with a purely intellectual grasp of a universal that transcends its perceptual origins. But this final act is a development, perfection and progressive deepening of the knowledge first gained in an imperfect form in the intellect's initial contact with sensible reality. Biondi does not go quite this far, but if he is right, it follows that the process of induction is best understood not as a series of separate stages (sense-perception, memory, experience, knowledge), but as a continuous and progressive unfolding and bringing to actuality of a single activity, sc. intellect.

This points to the main advantage of Biondi's interpretation. His account of the intellect's role in induction is not the *deus ex machina* solution to the problem of II 19 that one often finds. Intellect is not some mysterious faculty that intervenes from nowhere, as it were, to aid us in our search for knowledge. Rather, intellect is a power that develops in us over time through a process of habituation in which the mind is brought to a progressively deeper understanding of intelligible reality (250).

An interesting analogy follows from Biondi's account (one that he does not explicitly draw out): induction is to intellect what moral habituation is to moral virtue. This points to an important parallel between moral and intellectual development. It also suggests that Aristotle's account of moral

development in the *Nicomachean Ethics* may be of more value for our understanding of his epistemology than we might have otherwise thought.

In sum, this book makes a significant contribution to scholarship on Aristotle's psychology and epistemology. I highly recommend it to anyone with interests in those areas.

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Ronald Bogue
Deleuze's Wake: Tributes and Tributaries.
Albany: State University of New York Press 2004. Pp. xiii + 190. US$62.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-6017-7); US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-6018-5).

Ronald Bogue is well suited (up) to tribute Gilles Deleuze's philosophy. Bogue's first book, *Deleuze and Guattari*, came out in 1989, the year I was transitioning from arborescent science studies to motherhood and graduate work in philosophy, a bit of a rhizome year. That book was, as Todd May has noted, an 'intellectual event: the first book on Deleuze in English ... an important step in conferring intellectual legitimacy on the study of Deleuze.' Since then, Bogue has kept us in good supply of Deleuze, having written a three-volume collection on cinema, music, painting and the arts; in addition to three other works (*Violence and Mediation in Contemporary Culture*, *Play of the Self, Mimesis, Semiosis and Power: Mimesis in Contemporary Theory*).

In *Deleuze's Wake: Tributes and Tributaries*, Bogue offers eight eclectic essays, tributaries of Deleuzian thought, written before and after Deleuze's defenestrations of 1995. They address topics of interest to a wide range of readers — Deleuze on style, semiotics, strata, sinister sound (death metal!) and, possibly the best writing in the collection, scape-goatism. Like all of Bogue's work, they are blessedly readable yet not dumbed down. The book as a whole manages to reveal both the singular minute 'flashes' that spark off the pages of *A Thousand Plateaus* or *Difference and Repetition*, (to name just two sparky works), and the power chord force of Deleuze's Big Thought, a kind of thumping bass making the walls warp and dance, making one's heart beat differently.

Deleuze drew blood in *What is Philosophy?* (co-written with Félix Guattari), suggesting that philosophy is not the pleasant self-positing use-*less* activity it likes to imagine as its special distinguishing feature. *It does not contemplate, reflect or communicate*. What does it do, then? By his own showing and telling, Deleuze instructed that philosophy ought to be and to

feel more like learning to swim, rather than to drown, having been tossed head-first into a difficult and eddying problem. To quote the poet Margaret Avison: 'For everyone/ The swimmer's moment at the whirlpool comes,/ But many at that moment will not say/ "This is the whirlpool, then" ' (*Winter Sun* [Toronto 1962], 36). The philosopher's champion stroke at the perilous whirlpool is the making of concepts. 'Philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts' (*What is Philosophy?* 2). To make concepts is to skillfully and artfully re-jig, reanimate, re-articulate philosophy's stock tools — freedom, beauty, power, cogito, telos, duration — in order to, to take a thought from Foucault, 'seek a moment of discontinuity in the history of an intolerable situation; defamiliarize existing practices and make it possible to imagine alternatives to them.' This whirlpool, then, is the fluxy press of novel urgencies — unforeseen ways of the world demanding from us modes of thought, concepts ever *closer to our time*. Just two of those famous 'urgencies' for Deleuze, were Francis Bacon's assaultive paintings, and Samuel Beckett's scraping the shit off the soles of the English language, his razoring of its territory so that *saying* did the work ever and ever more precisely, approaching exhaustion.

'The philosopher, then, is the expert in concepts *and in the lack of them*' (*What is Philosophy?*, 3). To philosophize well is to see when there is something lacking, a thought that still needs doing. Bogue manages this task admirably, especially in the first three essays, the 'Tributes' section. This section is probably best explored by those with a basic familiarity with Deleuze, and/or steady nerves. In 'Deleuze's Style', Bogue explores Deleuze's inflections about 'style' in his reading of Spinoza's *Ethics*, revealing for the reader Deleuze's own signature lines of writing and reasoning — volcanic, ethereal and systematic. In the second essay, 'Is Deleuze a Postmodern Philosopher?', Bogue draws some evidence for this moniker from Deleuze, in 'that he abandons, and occasionally challenges the *grands récits* of the Enlightenment ... but with no nostalgia for a missing whole and no claims to possess a privileged methodology ... ' (40). Deleuze himself did not claim to be, nor theorize about, such temporal filing systems, as in: 'Modernism' goes before 'Postmodernism'. He thought, *the untimely*, against the times. To ask which historical phase of thinking Deleuze belongs to is to simply ask the wrong question, and not just of Deleuze. The question, Bogue's essay ultimately points to, is not which phase Deleuze fits in, but why the filing question? What does just such a question effect or shut down? In the third 'tribute', 'Deleuze, Foucault, and the Playful Fold of the Self', Bogue is doing spectacular work with the Foucauldian concepts of exteriority, circuits of forces, power, regimes of truth and light, *déraison*, visibilities and statements, and freedom. He shows himself to have possibly the sharpest acuity with Foucauldian thought of those writing today. Drawing from Deleuze's notoriously beautiful and yet terrifying book on Foucault, and from Blanchot and Heidegger, Bogue sketches force-bearing maps at the intersections of concepts — the four aspects of self-formation that Foucault identifies with the Deleuzian four folds of the self — maps which revealed to me the territory

of power and force in entirely new ways. Anyone wanting to know what Foucault and Deleuze were up to should tackle this essay.

I have always been grateful for Deleuzian openness, though it makes philosophers a bit nervous. He was careful to commend them for their special talents and role, but still invited so others many in! The five accessible essays in the second section of *Deleuze's Wake*, entitled 'Tributaries', will be of interest to semioticians, cultural theories, literary theorists, painters and film-makers, theologians and heavy-metal rock musicians with a secret passion for textuality. Bogue includes here: the sonic potentials of Fender bass guitars and Typhoon synthesizers, the plasticity of contemporary cinematic aural and visual images, and the Japanese Noh drama form. He shows in each case where Deleuze's concepts both are useful tools and yet need further adaptation, further folds. In 'Deleuze and the Invention of Images', for instance, Bogue presses the Deleuzian notion of 'pure image' into the shape he has made from the infolding of Yeats, Beckett and Noh drama. In 'The Betrayal of God', Bogue re-examines the pathos of Jonah, the mutual and continual turning away from God of Jonah and Jonah from God, as a map of potential escape for the scapegoat, the one who is, under the signifying regime of signs, never able to leave by any gate and ever made to bear the marks of negated meaning (156). By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari describe how the betrayal orchestrated in the Jonah tale, enables, within the regime of signification they call the 'passional asignifying', a reconstitution whereby the scape-goat can 'enter into asubjective relations, apersonal and anindividual, 'strange combinations as sources of time ... ' (159), an opening toward a future formerly denied it. Anyone currently intrigued by the Lévinasian project of responsibility for the Other, or the Derridean-induced projects of *timely* and *respons*ible mourning, will not be untutored here.

Deleuze viewed thinking and making as complementary activities that produce, must produce, always. Just as he argued that 'narration is only a consequence of visible images themselves and of their direct combinations, never a given' (114 in *Deleuze's Wake*, quoting from *Cinema 2: Image Temps*), so too, resonant life stories produced in the writer and in the reader, in the text and in the problematics themselves, through creating, and encountering concepts — through those new ways of thinking, perceiving, and feeling — are never a given. *The philosopher is the concept's friend; he is the potentiality of the concept (What is Philosophy?* 5). In other words, the vocational work of philosophy is the making of concepts and the releasing of their potential in or toward problems, at the whirlpools. The reader will return to *Deleuze's Wake* repeatedly, not having exhausted their potency in one pass.

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Stefan Braun
Democracy Off Balance.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2004.
Pp. i + 384.
Cdn$/US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-8959-3);
Cdn$/US$35.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-8636-5).

Stefan Braun's *Democracy Off Balance* is a passionate, at times polemical, defense of the right to freedom of expression against what he takes to be the anti-democratic attempts at limiting that constitutional right in cases of hate speech. This is of course a timely, and deeply felt, issue for many people in Canada and the United States, but it is also an issue that has been the source of a great amount of theorizing since J.S. Mill's *On Liberty*. Given the rich history of thought on the subject, it is difficult to see how Braun can hope to advance any novel arguments. Nevertheless, he certainly does, though only at the expense, it seems, of caricaturing the nature of both law and politics. While this diminution of both fields would seem to be prohibitive for a book with a theme that seems so vitally to concern each, Braun nevertheless offers an insightful analysis of the alternatives to outright restrictions on hate propaganda which is independent of his flawed criticisms of the relationship between law and politics.

The central conceit of the book is that restriction on hate propaganda is self-undermining, in that it effectively undercuts the very goals of the restriction — promotion of equality and tolerance. In making this case, Braun is forced to subscribe to a view of the nature and role of law that seems implausible. He views the law as a crude, static, and final pronouncement, and as such, inadequate to the task of regulating such a fluid and nuanced phenomenon as hate speech. The frequent refrain of the book is that 'progressive censors would substitute found truths, fixed public meanings, and final political triumphs for the political process' (19). There are at least two problems with such a formulation. First, and most importantly, it rests on the straightforwardly false premise that the law is static. One need only to look at the history of jurisprudence, say even over the last handful of years (same-sex marriage, for just one), to realize that law is anything but static. Braun is right to note that hate speech, like any other product of culture, is constantly changing, and thus a static law is inadequate to the task of regulating it. But that is precisely why the law is forced to, and indeed does, change in response to the times. Second, even if we grant Braun's argument that the law is inadequate to remedy the contours of freedom of expression in all of its varied manifestations, we are left with some quite unsavoury conclusions from such a view.

How, then, is the law to be adequate to the task of interpretation *at all*, for any changing cultural phenomenon? It seems that this is a problem with the nature of law per se, at least until Braun can show us how hate propaganda differs from any other social ill that we seek to regulate. Second, even if we grant the idea that since law is too crude to be up to the task of

regulating morphing offenses, that offers an embarrassingly weak justification for freedom of expression: freedom of expression must be a blanket right because if it isn't, we would have an imperfect regulatory apparatus. It seems hardly obvious that *because* a regulatory tool is so deeply flawed that we ought to use it only at its maximum strength.

The book is guilty of equally facile analysis in its discussion of the leading cases in Canadian hate speech jurisprudence. In discussing *Keegstra*, which upheld the criminal prohibition on hate speech, Braun suggests that: 'the public hurt of hate is visible, dramatic, and newsworthy. The public hurt of denial of freedom to express hate is not ...The intuitive response ... is to balance in favour of the tangible harm and against the unquantifiable right. Courts are not immune to such response ... They are not particularly well equipped either in terms of institutional structure or historical mandate to articulate general or abstract rights' (28-9). It is of course highly dubious that the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada is as unsophisticated as that, and Braun fails to offer any evidence from the text of the judgment to support his claim. More glaringly, the assertion that the Court is not equipped to deal with 'abstract rights' seems absurd on its face.

We can see more clearly what might be tempting Braun to make such radical claims when we examine the flawed central premise underlying the argument of the book. He believes that hate speech is fundamentally a political issue (even though the argument above claims that it is an issue of abstract right), and as such it should not be dealt with through law. He sees the two fields of law and politics as separate, opposed, and irreconcilable, which leads him to advance the strange claim that law is inadequate to the task of adjudicating political issues. However, it seems that this separation is by no means obvious, and instead of seeing the two spheres as talking past each other, it makes much more sense to see them as meaningfully and richly intertwined. Indeed, the entire point of Section 1 of the Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, which limits all of the enumerated constitutional rights insofar as the values underlying democratic culture necessitate such limitation, is to enshrine and embrace the connection between law and life, and it is the distinctive mark of Canadian jurisprudence to do so. Braun seems to some degree unaware that his argument for the irreconcilability between law and politics leads not only to the mistakes already canvassed, but also to the radical claim that there ought not to be a Section 1 of the *Charter*. If his argument is to be compelling, Braun must not only acknowledge this consequence but further demonstrate that it is desirable.

These criticisms notwithstanding, the merits of *Democracy Off Balance* come in the later chapters, where Braun devotes considerable effort to quite a robust examination of a number of less radical alternatives to criminal prohibition of hate speech. It is here that the book distinguishes itself from most of the strictly theoretical works on this topic. Braun weighs various levels of suppression of hate speech in different circumstances and, not surprisingly, argues that 'temporary suppression of expressions of hatred in extraordinary circumstances of grave and irreparable harm' is permissible,

albeit grudgingly. Instead of suppression, however temporary, Braun argues in the final chapter that 'discursive alternatives', such as activism on behalf of multiculturalism and equality, are far preferable. While this approach of combating harmful speech with counter-speech has been around since Mill, Braun nevertheless gives it a fresh spin through his references to contemporary activist strategies and tactics. *Democracy Off Balance* certainly offers a provocative, if ultimately unconvincing, spin on a topic at the intersection of philosophy, law, and politics.

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William Dembski and **Michael Ruse, eds.**
Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xiii + 405.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-521-82949-6.

This collection of essays is intended to present in one volume, 'arguments from both sides', of the debate over the Intelligent Design movement, 'in which each side puts forth its strongest case' (4). The editors offer this volume as a resource from which, 'the reader then can quickly and readily start to grasp the fundamental claims and counterclaims being made' (4). The editors have certainly met their goal. More interesting than just discussing the Intelligent Design movement itself, this volume locates Intelligent Design (ID) within the broader, quite fascinating, context of contemporary approaches to the biological sciences — the origin, development and persistence of biological complexity in particular. In the second of three introductory essays, Ruse offers an even-handed overview of the history of the design argument in which he makes a number of distinctions that are very useful for navigating the subsequent essays. After the introductory section, the book is divided into four sections, each devoted to presenting the case for a particular approach to explaining biological complexity. In Part One Francisco Ayala, Elliott Sober and others present and defend the neo-Darwinian account of evolution by natural selection. Part Two contains essays by Stuart Kauffman, Paul Davies and others devoted to, 'complex self-organization'. In Part Three John Polkinghorne, Richard Swinburne, and others focus on theistic evolution. Lastly, in Part Four Dembski, Michael Behe and others present and argue for their ID approach.

One fruitful approach to the book may be in considering the relationship between methodological and metaphysical naturalism. These concepts are

clearly distinct: methodological naturalism is the claim that a scientific explanation should invoke only material entities, while metaphysical naturalism is the view that there exist only material entities. Robert Pennock stresses this distinction in his essay arguing against ID. However, methodological naturalism is one of a cluster of widely accepted views that together entail metaphysical naturalism. Accepting all four views — methodological naturalism, evolutionary theory extrapolated to a cosmic scale, scientific realism, and what could be called explanatory exclusivism — requires that one accept metaphysical naturalism. These are complex theories: however, looking at some of the claims and counterclaims represented in this collection of essays can help in understanding their interaction.

Scientific realism can be understood as the view that scientific reasons for accepted a theory as empirically adequate are also reasons for accepting the existence of the entities the theory postulates. One could argue for scientific anti-realism in general, or for a local anti-realism claiming that scientific theories in natural history fail to 'cut the world at its joints'. One could argue that evolutionary theory 'saves the phenomena' but should not be taken as true in any substantive sense. None of the authors in this volume argue against a realist approach.

Kaufman and the other writers arguing for complex self-organization accept natural selection as a relevant, and possibly important or even very important, law for sustaining and promoting biological complexity but not for the introduction of such complexity. They argue neo-Darwinism, our best theory of biological evolution, cannot be extrapolated to explain complexity on a cosmic scale. Other laws must be invoked to explain the development of complex physical structures such as stars and galaxies — laws of self-organization. Such physical laws of self-organization would also, it is argued, account for the rise of biological complexity. While this view questions the explanatory scope of neo-Darwinism, it is neutral regarding the move from methodological to metaphysical naturalism — what one holds regarding the other theories in our cluster would inform that relationship.

An explanatory exclusivism would involve the idea that if a reasonable scientific explanation can be given for a phenomenon, that explanation should be accepted as the only explanation required. Any other explanation should be rejected as superfluous. Such a view would amount to a soft scientism. The theistic evolutionist writers in this volume argue against explanatory exclusivism. John Haught argues that the existence of God has explanatory value beyond the sciences and he explicitly rejects the notion that a reasonable scientific explanation should force out all others. Polkinghorne seems to hold some version of self-organization but rejects the idea that such a law would render theistic explanation superfluous. Swinburne argues whatever laws science discovers, there will always be a need to explain how and why those laws are in force. Such an explanation must go beyond the sciences since scientific explanations of phenomena necessarily involve invoking laws. A circularity of laws explaining laws, or the claim that particular laws have always existed, simply would not do.

Furthermore, Swinburne argues the laws that have been discovered lead us to posit the existence of God. As he argues, the simplicity, elegance, and orderliness of our universe is far more probable on a theistic explanation than it is on a non-theistic explanation. Sober, arguing against the cogency of design arguments in general, claims the observation that the universe is highly conducive to the formation of life does not confirm theism over non-theism. He claims that an observation selection effect (OSE) renders such an observation useless for the comparative evaluation of the two theories. An OSE occurs when the method by which an observation is obtained leads one to reasonably believe that the observed phenomenon is not representative of the possible observations relevant to the theories being tested. Sober argues the very fact that we are making an observation entails that in our universe the 'constants are right' for life. This being the case, any theory meant to explain this phenomenon will entail the observation and so confer on it a probability of unity.

It is not clear that making such an observation involves a method of observation that needs to be incorporated into the theories under consideration; however, this objection may be relevant to some design arguments. Yet, Swinburne's observation is not simply that the constants of our universe are right for life to occur, but that the universe is conducive to our flourishing. Our making such an observation does not entail such a characteristic. This he argues can be much better explained by theism than by non-theism. This interaction is quite interesting and should continue.

ID theorists, as Haught argues, seem to accept explanatory exclusivism. Theism must succeed as a scientific claim if it is to be accepted at all. They also accept scientific realism. So, by sheer logic, to reject metaphysical naturalism they must reject either evolutionary theory or methodological naturalism. However, ID theorists rightly see that given their other commitments they must reject these theories in tandem. A proponent of complex self-organization could reject evolutionary theory and still hold to metaphysical naturalism. The ID theorist's rejection of neo-Darwinism is also a rejection of methodological naturalism. ID theorists claim neo-Darwinism fails because it is impossible for any naturalistic theory to explain the origin, persistence and increase of biological complexity. If this is correct, either biological complexity must go without scientific explanation or methodological naturalism must also be rejected to make conceptual room for non-material explanations.

ID theory focuses on Behe's notion of irreducible complexity and Dembski's formulation of complex specified information. Dembski describes irreducibly complex biological systems as examples of complex specified information. Behe argues that there are a variety of irreducibly complex systems in the biological world, the most famous being the bacterial flagellum. Kenneth Miller rejects Behe's assessment. The debate represented in this volume deserves note.

Behe has claimed that the bacterial flagellum is an irreducibly complex system. By this he means that any simplification of the system, either in the

alteration or removal of a component, would result in loss of function. Miller claims that another functional bacterial system, a type III secretory system, consists of a set of proteins that are homologous to a subset of flagellum proteins. This, Miller argues, falsifies Behe's claim. In effect, a subset of the protein components of the flagellar motive system functions as a secretory system. Therefore, the bacterial flagellum is not irreducible. Behe argues Miller has committed an equivocation. Behe claims the flagellum is an irreducibly complex *system* — any change to the system will result in the loss of function of the system. On the other hand, Miller's example, Behe argues, focuses on the functionality of the individual proteins in the system.

Behe questions how components of one functional system could be made to operate within a different system with a different function. He argues that while two systems may both be functional, there is only nonfunctional configuration space between them. In order for one functional system to evolve into another this nonfunctional space would need to be crossed. This would involve the move from functionality to nonfunctionality, which by definition would be deleterious to the organism.

Arguing similarly for ID, Stephen Meyer suggests an analogy to language use. Between any two meaningful sentences there is a space of possible alterations that would produce a meaningless string of symbols. Moving stepwise from one meaningful sentence to another would require traversing this space of meaninglessness. However, this analogy is problematic. Language use does evolve. The uses of particular words and phrases do change over time. Dialects arise. Whole new languages develop from previously existing ones. Synchronically, in a given language there will be meaningless space between meaningful sentences, yet this does not entail the impossibility of diachronic meaning change. As changes in meaning arise language evolves. This does not require the move from meaningfulness to meaninglessness. Meaning moves with the language. Likewise, the stepwise evolution of one functional multi-protein system from another need not require a diachronic loss of function even though non-functional space may exist between the two systems examined synchronically.

Yet there is an important point to be made from Meyer's analogy. A synchronic analysis of language need not give any clear indication as to how one meaningful string of symbols arose from another. If between two sentences there is only a space of meaningless strings, there will be no way to decipher the stepwise move from one to the other. The claim to identify a transitional form between the two sentences must presuppose a process that cannot be supported by the two sentences under consideration. This seems to be a problem for the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. This interaction too should continue.

There are several other interesting issues running through the essays in this collection but restrictions of time and space do not allow for discussion of them all. This collection should be considered an introduction to the debate over design and as such is a valuable addition to the fast-growing literature. As is inevitable in such a book, the various authors often refer back to their

own prior writing and the tendency to offer references instead of arguments is at times quite frustrating. Still, even this has its virtue — the volume does feed the desire to do further reading on this subject. The book is highly recommended.

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Richard M. Gale
The Philosophy of William James: An Introduction.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. x + 246.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-84028-7);
US$23.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-54955-8).

James was 'out to have it all' according to Gale, who sees James' 'Promethean Pragmatism' as an exciting yet ultimately unsatisfying philosophy. This introduction, a slimmed-down version of his reference-laden *The Divided Self of William James* (Cambridge UP 1999), leaves out nothing of intellectual value. Even labeling this work as an introduction is somewhat misleading, since its high technical skill and complexity will exercise graduate students and have durable utility for professors.

Gale's method of interpretation proceeds by relying on what he calls James' Master Syllogism, which guides the Promethean Pragmatism that according to Gale animates most of James' philosophy. The syllogism is as follows: (1) We are always morally obligated to act so as to maximize desire-satisfactions over desire-dissatisfaction. (2) Belief is a (free) action. Therefore, (3) We are always morally obligated to believe in a manner that maximizes desire-satisfaction over desire-dissatisfaction (15). By locating this drive for 'desire-satisfaction' at the heart of James' philosophy, Gale has a justification for always preferring that interpretation which is most closely compatible with the notion that, as Gale re-words the principle, 'A proposition is true when believing it maximizes desire-satisfaction' (130). While this is an expeditious mode of interpretation, it appears that Gale's way of describing the essence of James' pragmatism leaves James mostly defenseless against the typical objections made against this sort of theory of truth. Gale does appreciate that it is often better to understand James as viewing the criteria of maximization as a long-term rule for people in general, like rule-utilitarianism, rather than a short-term act of judging truth for a lone thinker. The 'rule' version of truth as 'what is best for all people in the long

run' cannot answer all difficulties, however, and James himself wavers between a social or personal view of judging truth, as Gale points out.

Even though Gale's consistent application of his method of interpretation renders James unable to hold a coherent philosophical system, and indeed forces James into positions that almost always turn out to suffer from severe problems, Gale is undeterred. For example, at a crucial point where the very consistency of James' view of truth is at stake (128-32), Gale is satisfied with charging grave inconsistency, on the grounds that 'this account makes James' theory of truth a bold and original contribution to the history of philosophy' (131). In Gale's hands, this business of philosophical interpretation is hence far easier that one might believe if one had been misguided by demands for murky textual hermeneutics or stodgy historical or philosophical context (although Gale does occasionally bring in G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell for comparison). Gale apparently is relying on what could be called 'Gale's Master Syllogism for Interesting Interpretation': (1) An interpreter of a philosopher should always emphasize the most interesting and original doctrines that can be read out of a philosopher's work. (2) Interesting and original doctrines need not be coherent with each other or with other important themes in that philosopher's work, or even philosophically supportable. Therefore, (3) an interpreter should organize an interpretation of a philosopher's work around its most interesting and original doctrines regardless of whether they cohere with other important themes in that philosopher's work, and regardless of whether they turn out to be philosophically supportable.

It should be said that most chapters of Gale's book do provide close and useful exegesis of select passages of James with no Master Syllogism hovering to lend aid; chapters on the 'The Will-to-believe' and 'The Self' are good examples. I also agree with Gale's opinion that James' pluralistic and humanistic understanding of science should be preferred over his occasional lapse towards a Peircean 'ideal limit' notion of truth (110-11). However, in conformity with Gale's Master Syllogism for Interesting Interpretation, we can build an interpretation of Gale's own book as an interesting and original rejection of the old principle of 'charitable' interpretation in favor of the principle of 'interesting' interpretation. And viewed from this angle, what an interesting interpretation we get from Gale! Far too many incisive and persuasive discussions of points of James' philosophy are delivered in rapid-fire fashion by Gale to possibly cover in a brief review. Some will find Gale's conclusions that most of James' major views are seriously flawed, or outright false, less interesting as each chapter passes. However, Gale does forewarn the reader, dismissing 'sympathetic interpreters [who] attempt to protect a great philosopher against his hostile critics' (ix). Now, I've yet to see a clear case of mere 'protection' in the better scholarship on James; trying to build a coherent system out of the better-supported doctrines carefully extracted from a thinker's entire work is also a philosophically worthy enterprise. But there's room in philosophy (or at least there *should* be room) for both kinds of endeavors, and James scholars should be appreciative of Gale's efforts.

Whether there actually is ultimately a coherent system in James is of course another matter. Gale constructs an extended argument that the Mystical James, explored in Part II of the book, goes in a quite different direction that the internally inconsistent Promethean James of Part I. There's little hope of reconciling the two Jameses, according to Gale, especially due to what Gale calls James' 'Humpty Dumpty intuition' (208) that relational complexes cannot be philosophically built from numerically distinct substances. Gale does not long explore whether James' intuition is justifiable, which is curious because it is not a mere 'intuition' but rather a carefully considered tactic to forestall post-Kantian idealistic rationalism, so emphasized by other James scholars. Gale's suggested remedy for James' philosophical schizophrenia is that James could simply admit 'special exceptions to the law of noncontradiction' so that he can keep his 'many selves' (236). Regardless of whether that may be the best interpretative option, anyone intrigued by William James must carefully consider Gale's interesting version.

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Joshua Gert
Brute Rationality:
Normativity and Human Action.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xiii + 230.
US$75.00. ISBN 0-521-83318-3.

This new contribution to the Cambridge Studies in Philosophy series is a monograph about rationality and practical action by Joshua Gert. *Brute Rationality* is Joshua Gert's first book, although philosophers working on rationality might be familiar with some of the ideas presented in the book through Gert's articles previously published in various prominent journals. This book is of interest to those who work on decision theory and those who are interested in moral theory and meta-ethics. It is also of particular interest to philosophers interested in understanding the connection between morality and rationality.

The monograph, which comprises nine chapters, is devoted to understanding the status of practical reasons and how they may contribute to the rationality of action. It defends a distinction between the 'requiring' and the 'justifying' roles of practical reasons. The justifying role is the role for making it rationally permissible to do a given action that would otherwise be irrational. The requiring role is the role of making it rationally impermissible

to fail to do an action (56). For example, giving up two hundred dollars in order to rescue forty children from famine counts as rationally permissible, but not required. By contrast, a rationally required action, as defined by Gert, is to be understood as required on pain of irrationality; it would be irrational to fail to do the action. An action that would harm the agent without bringing any benefit to anyone counts as clearly irrational on this account. Someone who refuses to take medicine that will make her healthy is a recurrent example in the book (although this example may not appear uncontroversial to everyone). Seen this way, it is rationally required to avoid this kind of action.

The distinction between justifying and requiring is offered in response to a position held by a significant number of philosophers. It is often assumed that normative practical reasons count in favour of, or against, doing something (19). And it is also assumed that if a reason justifies an action, it also requires it and that the requiring force of a reason is a matter of its strength. In other words, sufficient justifying reason to ø is also a requirement to ø. This view, which we may call 'the received view', does not assume a fundamental distinction between justifying and requiring.

The book offers a carefully formulated rejection of the received view. Chapters Two and Three provide the groundwork where the received view is explained and the cogency of the distinction between justifying and requiring roles is established. Chapter Two introduces the concept of 'purely justificatory reason'. Chapter Three gives reasons to reject 'the requirement view', the view that all practical reasons are prima facie rational requirements (43). If some reasons are not prima facie requirements, then the requirement view will be false. The chapter then agues that there may be such things as purely justificatory reasons and the requirement view may indeed the false.

The aim of Chapters 4-7 is to reject the received view and replace it with a competing position based on the distinction between justifying and requiring. Chapter Four articulates the distinction between two roles for practical reasons. It is argued that reasons do not count in favour or against reasons, but have either a 'justifying' or 'requiring' role. On this view, the rationality of a given action is not determined by the relative strength of the reasons in favour of it, but rather by its 'wholesale rational status' (63). It is the rational status, viewed as more basic than reasons, that has either justifying or requiring role. This view allows Gert to refine his position. In Chapter Five, he rejects the single-value view of reasons, the view that reasons can be ranked according to their strength and that the strongest reason relevant to a choice is to be picked. The distinction between the justifying and the requiring roles, which operates with two categories of reasons, rules out the single-value view. Chapter Six situates Gert's thesis within the contemporary debate practical rationality. Chapter Seven sheds new light on the distinction between objective and subjective conceptions of rationality by tying objective rationality with the requiring role and subjective rationality with the justifying role of reasons. The last two chapters discuss the implications of Gert's thesis.

An interesting feature of the book is the distinction it draws between rational and moral justifications. Gert argues that the class of rationally permissible actions contains, but is not limited to, all morally required actions. What this means is that all morally required actions have to be at least rationally permissible, but not all rationally permissible actions are morally permissible. Some actions that count as 'selfish' or 'immoral', on Gert's description, may turn out to be rationally permissible. Although the distinction between justifying and requiring roles of practical reason is persuasive, the views about moral requirements and permissions remain less satisfactory. Gert does not sufficiently examine cooperative situations, in which reasons would be considered in light of others' reasons and dispositions to cooperate. Instead, he briefly discusses and dismisses contractualism in the introductory chapter. However, on a thorough consideration of the issues in cooperative situations the gap between rational and moral permissions is likely to diminish. This makes the book open to objections that may come from contractarians.

Overall, this is a strong book, but it is not for beginners. It is highly technical and assumes familiarity with the thematic background. It will appeal to an audience of specialized philosophers who have an interest in rationality and some areas of moral philosophy and meta-ethics. It could be used as a textbook only in upper level philosophy courses, for example as the main reading in a graduate or honours seminar. Although it does not appeal to a wide audience, *Brute Rationality* promises to give full satisfaction to connoisseurs who look for rigour and precision and who are not afraid of following the arguments to their conclusions. It is a great contribution to contemporary philosophical debate and is likely to make an impact.

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Carol C. Gould
Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. 288.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-83354-X);
US$24.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-54127-1).

Carol C. Gould's *Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights* continues her systematic re-examination of the normative foundations of democracy. Gould argues that progress in realizing democracy demands a robust account of the universal interests that define human beings. It is this account of universal human interests that allows *Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights* to

shed new light on the normative foundations of democracy and human rights, provide a cogent account of how to resolve the tensions between them, explain the need for new global democratic institutions, and justify group rights. It is a lucid intervention into the defining debates of contemporary social and political philosophy.

The key to understanding Gould's political argument is her social ontology. Social ontology is a concretely universal account of the 'substantive features of human practice or of human existence' (32) that form the basis of normative judgements. Gould does not deny that distinct societies express and repress distinct interests and capabilities. Unless, however, there is a universal feature of human practice or existence that is present, at least as potential, in *any* social formation then universally valid normative judgements would be impossible.

Gould argues that this universal feature of human practice is freedom. Individuals are not inert matter programmed by social and cultural institutions but potentially self-active and free beings. In order to fully understand a society the social philosopher must judge its institutions by reference to the degree to which they enable the citizens' capacity for freedom. Social relations neither create nor negate in any absolute sense this capacity. As she argues, 'individual agents are ontologically prior to the groups that they constitute, [but] they stand in internal relationships to each other such that they become the individuals they are in and through such relations and can, therefore, be described as social individuals' (120). If human beings are potentially free, then they have an interest, Gould argues, in social institutions that satisfy the comprehensive conditions for the realization of that interest. It is by reference to this normative principle that Gould reconstructs the legitimacy of democracy and individual human rights.

The conflict between democracy and human rights is generally explained as a conflict between the power of majorities and the right to individual autonomy. Understood as a doctrine of political power, there is nothing in the idea of democracy to constrain the scope of majority decisions. At the same time, democracy cannot simply be discarded by liberals, since it is the only political system in which individual autonomy can be reconciled with political power. Gould's conception of social individuals mediates this opposition and explains why democracy and individual human rights mutually entail each other.

The basis of her explanation is the universal interest in freedom. She defines freedom in two dimensions, 'a bare capacity for choice' and 'the exercise of this capacity — individually or collectively with others — in the realization of long-term projects or the development of abilities' (33). Considered as the definitive feature of human being, freedom is expressed by the fact that humans do not simply *behave*, they are capable of consciously *acting*. This fact means that everyone has an individual interest in the conditions for the development of this capacity. Hence individual human rights are legitimate because they are necessary limits on the exercise of political power. At the same time, since human beings are necessarily social, the

realization of the capacity for freedom entails public institutions where citizens with different life plans can meet to collectively decide matters of public concern. Thus the freedom-protecting essence of individual human rights cannot be realized outside of democratic institutions. The legitimacy of both democracy and human rights thus follows from the universal human interest in 'equal rights to the conditions of self-determination' (36-7). At present, Gould argues, no society fully satisfies these comprehensive conditions of individual freedom.

The real strength of Gould's reconstruction lies in the fact that she goes beneath the language of rights to disclose their normative ground in a universal interest in the comprehensive conditions of freedom. Too much contemporary political philosophy is bewitched by the word 'rights', tending to confuse that which is valuable about rights with the mere possession of legal entitlements. Freedom, however, is not identical to a charter of rights; it is an activity. That which is valuable about a right is that it protects a space in which capacities can be exercised. The right to free speech, for example, is valuable because people have something unique to say. If humans lacked that capacity the right would be meaningless. At the same time, possessing a right in the absence of the material conditions presupposed for the expression of the capacity that it protects is tantamount to having no right at all.

It is in that light that one should understand Gould's argument in support of the need to extend democracy to global institutions. Globalization has compromised the ability of national governments to chart public policy in the interests of satisfying the conditions of self-determination for their citizens. At the same time, however, growing interconnection has created new opportunities for inter-cultural political dialogue. Gould thus agrees with seminal theorists of globalization like David Held that deepening democracy today demands its globalization. Gould wisely avoids trying to theorize institutional reform from the top down and instead builds a compelling case for a more organic development of new global institutions. Once again her conception of a fundamental interest in the conditions for the realization of human freedom is intelligently used to generate a criterion of membership in these institutions. Where it can be proven that international or global dynamics are responsible for limiting access to the rights and resources necessary for freedom, there is revealed a need for new institutions. Such institutions as are necessary ought to grow up from the ground of shared interest.

Gould employs a related argument to make progress on the vexed issue of justifying group rights. Too often the debate is still polarized between liberals, who insist that individual rights alone are justifiable, and so-called 'communitarians', who maintain that since individual identity is always culturally concrete, group rights are necessary. Gould again mediates the opposition through her conception of social individuality. She concludes that the necessity for group rights is limited to cases of historically oppressed minorities. Hence group rights are legitimate in just those cases where they are required to establish 'cultural justice', (123) but they can never be legitimately employed to justify assymmetries of power within groups.

Judged as a whole Gould's *Globalizaing Democracy and Human Rights* is a unique intervention into the central problems of contemporary political philosophy and practice. In reflecting on the social implications of her understanding of freedom, in particular when it is read through the lens of her idea of mutuality ('an active concern with enabling [others'] well-being') (42), a value which she derives from the feminist ethics of care, I felt that she does not always go far enough to emphasize just how far our world is from that ideal. Whatever critical conclusions might follow from that feeling, however, would be immanent criticisms, urging a fuller development, rather than an abandonment, of her premises.

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Wendy C. Hamblet
The Sacred Monstrous: a reflection on violence in human communities.
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2004.
Pp. 136.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7391-0651-5);
US$22.00 (paper: ISBN 0-7391-0743-7).

In *The Sacred Monstrous: a reflection on violence in human communities*, Wendy Hamblet offers an anthropological and philosophical analysis of the fundamental role violence has played, and continues to play, in both identity formation and human relationships. Rather than viewing violence as a form of aberrant behavior, Hamblet argues that we ought to recognize violence for what it is, namely, a constitutive element of individual and social interactions.

In the first four chapters of her book, Hamblet discusses the anthropological evidence for her claim of the primacy of violence in human interactions — violence that is transmitted through a groups rituals and myths. Chapter One notes the relationship between violent rituals and the myths that eventually develop to both justify and perpetuate the violence contained in the ritual. Chapter Two develops this line of thought by providing an anthropological account of how ritual violence is transmitted (often unconsciously) from generation to generation. Chapter Three traces some of the ways in which ritual violence continues to influences our current worldview, particularly the religious worldview. Finally, Chapter Four discusses how rituals survive social and historical upheavals, and continue to transmit the violence that seems fundamental in human relationships.

Chapters Five through Eight examine the influence violent rituals and myths have had on philosophy, particularly in the area of identity formation. Chapters Five and Six examine the ways in which violence has insinuated itself into the views on identity formation of philosophers such as Nietzsche, Plato, Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas, along with the shortcomings of these views. In Chapter Seven, Hamblet extends her treatment of the effects of violence on identity by noting the role violence plays in the first sphere of identity formation, namely, the home. Extending this analysis in Chapter Eight, Hamblet considers the role of violence as it operates outside of the homespace, that is, as it functions in the 'superstructures' of identity formation. These superstructures help insure the perpetuation and legitimacy of violence on a societal level.

In the concluding chapter, Hamblet holds out the hope that the recognition of the role violence plays in our identity formation, and the ways in which it permeates our relationship and treatment of others, may allow us to avoid instilling these violent rituals in our children. That being said, Hamblet does not believe that a radical reformation of our oppressive and violent systems is likely. As she writes (105), 'I believe the chances of positive change are slim. The value of the happiness of the relieved sufferer will always be weighed against the benefits to the donor. And, since around the globe the scales of justice are owned and operated exclusively by the donors, and never the sufferers, the necessity to change the gross inequalities that underpin "ordered" systems will always be gauged by a rational calculation made by those who have something to lose, for the sake of those who have nothing to offer.'

At a scant 109 pages, *The Sacred Monstrous* is a densely packed work that only scratches the surface of the often ignored subject of violence in human interactions. While not an extensive treatment of the subject, Hamblet has provided an interesting point of departure for further research and discussion on this important area philosophy.

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Dale Jacquette, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Brentano.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xxii + 322.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80980-0);
US$27.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00765-8).

Including the introduction by the editor Dale Jacquette, the *Cambridge Companion* to Franz Brentano (1838-1917) consists of thirteen commissioned essays written by a qualified team of scholars, who successfully switch between descriptive paraphrase and critical evaluation in a readable manner. The fact that Brentano was chosen for the *Cambridge Companions to Philosophy* series mirrors his growing recognition both inside and outside the German-speaking world.

Born in Germany in 1838, Brentano studied philosophy and theology. Following the defense of his *Habilitationsschrift* (according to the legendary fourth thesis, the correct method of philosophy is the method of natural science), he briefly lectured in Würzburg before going on to teach at the University of Vienna, where he spent most of his career. He counted Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong, and Christian von Ehrenfels among his students. As with Bernard Bolzano, Brentano is not only crucial in the history of philosophy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but also as a representative of typically 'Austrian' philosophy, which is commonly characterized by its 'German' counterpart. Moreover, with respect to the (genuinely flawed) distinction between analytic and continental philosophy, Brentano served as a bridge between both traditions. In the English-speaking world, his concept of intentionality — which he recovered from medieval philosophy and which he used to characterize mental acts as being directed upon intended objects — received early attention through the efforts of Roderick R. Chisholm. Brentano's influence extended to Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Gilbert Ryle. And — to name at least one member from the continental side — Martin Heidegger reported that Brentano's dissertation *On the Manifold Senses of Being in Aristotle* (orig. 1862) was the first philosophical work he studied intensively. In tracing such influences, the collection advances an understanding of Brentano's manifold impacts on philosophy and other disciplines. As a result of the critical assessments in this collection, several of Brentano's contributions appear to still be relevant, e.g., in philosophy of mind or phenomenology. Yet despite his insightful argumentation, Brentano remains underappreciated. Thus, it was a good idea to design the collection around the concept for which Brentano is most famous, intentionality.

By making Brentano's concept of intentionality the focus of almost every essay, repetitions about this topic are unavoidable. Nevertheless, repetition becomes advantageous, as is also the case with the following recurring topics: Brentano's insistence on the rational-scientific character of his philosophy; his empiricist methodology (as suggested by the title of his major work from 1874, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*); his neo-Aristotelian frame-

work; the ontic status of intended objects; and, finally, his three-fold classification of mental phenomena, which is unconventional insofar as he divides thought into two classes (presentation and judgment) while putting emotion and will together into a single class.

In the opening essay, Dale Jacquette introduces Brentano as a leader of an intellectual revolution, who sought to revitalize German(-language) philosophy as opposed to its post-Kantian and idealist direction as characterized by Hegel's dialectics. Instead, Brentano endeavored to institute a scientific form of philosophy with Aristotle's and John Stuart Mill's empiricism as a foundation. Jacquette's introduction is informative and stimulating, though it is a pity then that he does not speak more about the historical contexts of Brentano's philosophy, such as the late nineteenth-century political and ideological tension between liberalism and Catholicism in Vienna. Rolf George and Glen Koehn present Brentano's neo-Aristotelian framework by recounting his early study of Aristotle and medieval interpreters such as Thomas Aquinas. By seeing in Aristotle a precursor of a philosophy modeled on the natural sciences, Brentano succeeded in ascribing to himself a similarly positive and instigating role in the history of Western philosophy. Peter Simons, who reminds us that Brentano's logic emerges as a by-product of his other interests, analyzes Brentano's efforts to improve Aristotelian syllogistic logic. Taking his analysis one step further, Simons goes on to reflect upon Brentano's reform of elementary deductive logic on the basis of his theory of correct judgment. According to his psychology of reasoning, the fundamental logical form of judgment is not the predicative combination of a property term with an object term, but the assertion or denial of an existential claim. Brentano's philosophical psychology is subsequently discussed by Kevin Mulligan as the most detailed description of mental phenomena ever provided before the twentieth century. Nevertheless, Mulligan ascribes Brentano a secondary role as a philosopher of mind.

In his essay on the central theme of this book — Brentano's concept of intentionality — Dale Jacquette traces Brentano's changing views of the issue, beginning with his immanent intentionality (or in-existence) thesis, which has been accused of implicit psychologism and of having introduced ontological problems concerning intended objects. Before criticizing Roderick M. Chisholm's account of Brentano's concept of intentionality, Joseph Margolis, too, addresses the ontic status of intended objects. Especially thought-provoking is Margolis' broadening of the notion of intentionality; in order to situate mental acts in the socio-cultural world, he makes psychological intentionality the paradigm form of the 'Intentional' as 'the "cultural" (or culturally significant or significative)' (145). Incidentally, when Margolis speaks of 'semiotic attributes', one may take this as a lead to inquire upon the relationship between Brentano and Ferdinand de Saussure, whose description of the speech circuit belongs to the tradition of act psychology shaped by Brentano.

The concept of intentionality provides the starting point for the next two articles on Brentano's epistemology. Linda L. McAlister outlines his empiri-

cist epistemology and draws connections between his theory of knowledge and the ontology of intended objects. Charles Parsons then focuses on Brentano's judgment theory. Whereas the early Brentano accepted a version of the correspondence theory of truth, he abandoned it later in favor of an evidence theory that defines truth as correct judgment in light of evidence; the notion of evidence is thus stronger and more fundamental than the notion of truth. While ontological issues emerge in several essays as looming problems, Brentano's ontology as such is well recounted by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Barry Smith. They pursue the development of his ontology from early conceptualism to reism as a somewhat austere ontology, according to which only individual things and particular properties exist as real entities. Reism also opens the discussion of Brentano's objectivist value theory in the article by Wilhelm Baumgartner and Lynn Pasquerella. They describe Brentano's aesthetics and ethics as theories of intrinsic value grounded in the fact that aesthetic and ethical evaluations are either correct or incorrect. Predominantly, his aesthetics is still a neglected field, and hopefully this article marks a step towards further interest not only in Brentano's views on beauty but also the significant influence he exercised on the Vienna cultural scene through both his socializing and lecturing; the Austrian poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal, for instance, attended one of his lectures in 1895.

Susan F. Krantz Gabriel's analysis of Brentano's ideas on religion — including arguments for God's existence and the immortality of the soul (both human and animal) — concludes the discussion of major aspects of his philosophy and serves as a reminder that Brentano considered natural theology to be the pinnacle of philosophy. And while even Sigmund Freud was impressed (though not convinced) by the theological approach of this traditional theist, his arguments had no impressive afterlife. Remarks about Brentano's influence appear repeatedly throughout the collection, but only the two final essays focus exclusively on this issue. Robert D. Rollinger outlines the relation between Brentano and Husserl, given that the former is sometimes best known as the latter's teacher. This narrow perspective is then complemented by the broader outlook of Karl Schuhmann, who samples Brentano's impact on twentieth-century philosophy, particularly on phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind.

This final essay harks back to the introduction with respect to what can be called Brentano's invisibility, which is partly understandable by the work-in-progress character of his philosophizing and also by the dispersion of ideas through his lecture courses in Vienna. The fact that most of these courses remain unpublished is as unfortunate as is the unreliability of some of his posthumously published works. In view of the companion-character of this collection, the current state of editorial affairs could have been clarified at one point. While this volume succeeds in being comprehensive, up-to-date and critical in an informed and non-polemical manner, there are, of course, always some topics that could have been treated more extensively. Amid the frequent references to Descartes, for instance, one might have expected more

details about Brentano's Cartesian aspects, but perhaps they were placed in the background in favor of his empiricist methodology with its stress on empirical facts and probabilities. The index, too, could well have accommodated more references and entries; but as with the few typos, such points are only small reservations that do not diminish the overall excellence of this collection. The book is also highly recommendable because it is suited for both new and advanced readers who take interest in Brentano and his lasting contributions to contemporary philosophy.

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Timothy Macklem
Beyond Comparison: Sex and Discrimination.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xi + 212.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-82682-9);
US$25.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-53415-1).

Must we settle the question of the nature of women in order to remedy their disadvantage? In this unusual book, a male law lecturer at King's College, London, answers, Yes, plunging into a book-long exploration of what it means to be a woman. Macklem begins with the argument that discrimination on the basis of sex is a moral wrong to the extent that it prevents women from leading successful lives. Hence, there is nothing wrong with treating women and men differently if it enables their respective flourishing. Macklem draws on the perfectionism of Joseph Raz, perceptively developing the idea that our fundamental concern should be to remove obstacles that stand in the way of a life of value. A life of value can take many, doubtless incommensurable, forms, but it is nonetheless an objective matter, realized better by some pursuits rather than others. Macklem contends, however, that a valuable life is quite properly relative to one's sex, and indeed, we cannot properly make sense of a successful life, and the obstacles posed by discrimination on the basis of sex, unless we understand the specificity of being female. 'In short, to establish the existence of genuine disadvantage in the lives of women it is in all cases necessary to establish the true meaning of sexual identity, and in many if not all cases that will require us to establish what women are and not merely what they are not' (147).

To this end, Macklem considers some feminist orthodoxy on the question of male and female differences. It is commonly thought that whilst biological

sex is a given, gender, that is femininity and masculinity, are cultural creations. Macklem studies two models on the question of sexual identity that take the feminine to be artificial — the radical feminism of Catharine MacKinnon, which insists that feminism abolish gender difference in order to end the hierarchy of men over women; and the poststructuralist feminism of Drucilla Cornell which, drawing on the psychoanalytical approach of Lacan, calls for the deconstruction of gender difference in order to enable a diversity of sexual possibilities.

Macklem examines these radical approaches with sensitivity and care, but he gives the impression that they exhaustively cover feminist responses to the question of female identity. Given his sympathetic attention to feminist argument, one wonders why he fixed on two straw women, as it were, and didn't take account of the much broader diversity of views among feminists. In particular, feminists who identify a specific feminine moral identity would seem to merit attention, but Macklem only makes passing reference to one of their number, Carol Gilligan. Further, one would have thought that Martha Nussbaum, with her Aristotelian argument for enabling the development of capacities to lead flourishing lives, would also merit some focus (she is mentioned only briefly in a footnote).

On the other hand, perhaps the last thing this book needs is a more thorough-going inquiry into the nature of gender. Macklem's insistence that society must understand what it is to be a woman in order to get a handle on the problem of discrimination seems to impose an extraordinarily burdensome condition on the pursuit of a straightforward demand of justice. Moreover, What is woman?, repeatedly asked by feminists and anti-feminists alike, is something of a non-question. Even if we could conjure up laboratory conditions that isolate human beings from a human environment in order to determine their 'essential nature' (an impossibility), it's unclear how that would be relevant. After all, men can differ from other men as much as they differ from women, and it would seem improper to treat men differently on the basis of such differences.

Macklem is right to insist that feminists often overstate the extent to which sexual identity is nurtured, rather than the product of nature. And the preoccupation with liberating women from the feminine harms women and men, undermining the important human interest in the historically feminine tasks of childbearing and rearing. Macklem is also right to underscore the specificity of childbearing for women, and the obligation of society to provide accommodation. But this sex-specific activity does not license a wholesale approach based on the premise of 'truly different people' (159). Such a position risks closing down the possibility that, for policy purposes at least, being female is hardly relevant in most circumstances. This is not to invite Macklem's target: a uniform conception of value. Rather, it is to suggest that value pluralism can cut across, rather than replicate, gender differences.

In fact, for all Macklem's hostility to agnosticism about the origins of gender, it remains unclear why we can't remain on the fence when it comes to the question of the nature of women. What matters, after all, is that we

enable human beings, men and women, to pursue their diverse interests, in the productive and reproductive domains. This means fair conditions in work and public life and support for the demands of care in private life, not because women specifically require it, but because human beings do. Whether the uptake in different domains tends to be represented by one sex more than another need not concern us, particularly if we have ensured that the obstacles to the successful pursuit of such human activities have been removed. Obstacles in fact remain, among them the ways in which conditions of work inhibit commitment to family. Macklem devotes a scant six pages at the end of the book to the matter of discrimination itself, which not surprisingly, he does not take to be objectionable per se. Too bad he does not consider ways in which the public domain of work and citizenship might be recast to ensure that the human task of caring for others is not unfairly discriminated against.

This is an interesting book that offers some salutary insights about human flourishing and femininity. However, Macklem's preoccupation with rejecting the androgyny view of gender identity makes for an unsatisfying contribution. Having recklessly opted to go around and around the question of what is woman, Macklem is bound to be blamed for failing to give a satisfactory answer. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the book is that it has almost nothing to say about legal institutions. It is a paradox that a philosopher of law, who might have illuminated the legal matters of sex discrimination, foregoes the opportunity in order to pursue instead a question which is both inherently elusive and, ultimately, beside the point.

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Barry Maund
Perception.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press 2003.
Pp. x + 227.
Cdn$/US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-2465-7);
Cdn$/US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7735-2466-5).

At times, among philosophers, discussion of perception is introduced, and motivated as philosophically interesting, on the basis of the role it plays in epistemology — in particular whether it can justify beliefs about the external world and satisfy the skeptic. However, there are a host of metaphysical and mind-related issues about perception that are interesting in their own right. In many cases introductions to the philosophy of perception focus in one way

or another on just the epistemological role of perception, at the cost of saying little of substance about the metaphysical and mind-related issues.

Maund's introduction is excitingly different in this regard. The book clearly presents and rigorously engages various historical accounts of perception such as Price, Broad, and Austin, as well as contemporary accounts such as Evans, Dretske, McDowell, Robinson, Millikan, and Tye. The metaphysical and mind aspects of perception discussed by these authors are well employed by Maund to give a thorough introductory treatment of perceptual experience while at the same time pointing toward a specific view.

In addition to its clear presentation of the literature in the field, the book offers a defense of a representationalist version of natural realism. In presenting this view, Maund analyzes the debate between indirect and direct realist accounts of perception, and articulates a hybrid view that mixes aspects of indirect and direct realism.

The hybrid view of perception accepts, along with the direct realist view, that perception of objects is direct and immediate, but also acknowledges, along with the indirect realist view, that the directness relation to the object is done by way of an awareness of intermediaries. In conscious attentive perception one perceives physical objects and their qualities by becoming aware of sensory representations that are a natural sign of the object in question.

Maund's account of perceptual experience holds that perceptual experiences are complex thoughts that have a non-conceptual sensuous component and a conceptual non-sensuous component. Conscious perceptual experience is presented as an intentional activity. It is an act of double awareness. The activity consist of the perceiver taking the sensuous component to be a natural sign of the presence of something of a certain kind, such as, a physical object before him or her.

One particularly interesting and penetrating discussion in the book is Maund's analysis of the argument from illusion — a central component of his representationalist version of natural realism. The premise that becomes of main importance in defending the argument from illusion is the phenomenal principle (PP): whenever something appears to a subject to possess a sensible quality, there is something of which the subject is aware and which does possess that quality. On an interpretation defended by Robinson, Maund claims that (PP) is false.

Consequently, in Chapter 7 Maund sets out to articulate a phenomenal-descriptive sense of 'looks' (and other 'appears' terms) on which the phenomenal principle is plausible. The phenomenological-descriptive sense of 'looks' is contrasted with the comparative and epistemic senses of 'looks'. On the epistemic sense, for example, 'looks' indicates that a subject holds a guarded belief. 'It looks to x as if p' is translated into 'it seems to x as if p'. In this case x is withholding from fully endorsing a belief. On the phenomenal descriptive sense — the sense relevant to (PP) being plausible — 'a looks F to x' is a descriptive and phenomenal sense of 'looks' that does not require that x possess the concept of F.

Additional and useful aspects to the text are the chapters on types of perceptual content, and the representationlist-intentionalist thesis. In the former case, the recent debate over whether perception has non-conceptual or conceptual content (key figures involved being Evans, McDowell, Peacocke, Millikan, Dretske, Kelly, and Stalnaker) is often hard to understand. Maund's presentation is exceptionally clear. He illustrates the key arguments and key issues between the authors, especially the importance of demonstrative reference. And in defense of his own view he articulates two conceptions of 'non-conceptual content' based on two understandings of how thoughts have content. In one case thoughts have content in virtue having satisfaction conditions. In the other case thoughts have content in virtue of the fact that thoughts involve the exercise of concepts. The second sense is important because it allows for Maund to put substance to the notion idea of non-conceptual representational content.

In the latter case, Maund provides an analysis of several of the arguments in favor of the representationalist thesis — that in normal perception we are not aware of the intrinsic qualities of experience; instead we are aware of those objects and their qualities that are specified in the content of our experience. Of key importance are Millikan's and Evans' claim that opponents of the thesis often conflate the content of experience with the vehicle of experience. Maund attacks the Millikan charge of committing a fallacy, by claiming that she commits the 'fallacy fallacy', which is the fallacy of thinking a theory commits a fallacy only when it might commit the fallacy. His main contribution to defending the opposing view is that the fallacy of conflating content with vehicle may not be fallacious if the perceptual process has the fallacy built into it in order to enable the perceiver to succeed in certain perceptual acts. If the perceptual system has the fallacy built into it, then an account of naïve or natural perception could not be faulted for presenting that fallacy as part of perceptual experience.

Overall, *Perception* is a great contribution to the literature on perception. It is an exceptionally good guide to those interested in getting a foot hold on the metaphysical and mind aspects of perception. And Maund's defense of the representationalist version of natural realism is challenging and plausible.

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Arthur Melnick
Themes in Kant's Metaphysics and Ethics.
Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press 2004.
Pp. x + 275.
US$64.95. ISBN 0-8132-1371-1.

Melnick's book collects ten essays on metaphysics, three on ethics. Five are published elsewhere. Most pages are devoted (implicitly or explicitly) to the 'naturalization' of Kant's *Erkenntnistheorie*, while the 'ethically themed' essays argue that the 'open-ended' nature of practical reasoning itself provides an adequate ground for ethical principles.

As Melnick himself admits, there is 'a good deal of repetition' across the selections (ix) — for instance, the same passage (B154-5) is marshaled and interpreted in support of a constructivist interpretation of Kantian space-time in each of the first nine essays; in six of these, the same metaphor — happening upon an unfinished cake-baking — is used to elucidate the schema of 'permanence'. Yet despite such repetition, I suspect that many will find central interpretive claims underdeveloped and inadequately supported. Perhaps most problematic will be Melnick's contention that Kant holds an 'output account of cognition' (92), with surprisingly little to say about the 'input'-relation, i.e., the (first-personal) reception of phenomenal contents in empirical intuition.

At the heart of Melnick's interpretive project lies the notion of 'construction', a term which straddles both sides of the Sellarsian '-ing/-ed' distinction: space and time are said to *exist in* procedures of construction (4), yet they are also said to *be* those activities or constructions (126n3); somehow, space-time 'is' both what is constructed and the activity of constructing. The ground of construction is 'motion, as an act of the subject' (B154) — something Melnick construes as a 'sweep or flow of attention', as 'something I do (something I produce)' (4). This motion is identified with the synthesis of productive imagination (43), and with pure intuition (70).

But just as, for Melnick's Kant, there 'is' no space-time, without the subject actively making it so, *sensation* too only occurs with such motion. This obscures how sensibility could nevertheless be an essentially receptive (passive) faculty, though Melnick couldn't be clearer: 'In order to be affected by something, I must move and thereby make the object present' (147).

Melnick is pushed to this position because he takes the First Antinomy to demonstrate the unintelligibility of alternate ('transcendental-realist') views — which Melnick sees as upholding Trendelenburg's so-called 'neglected alternative' — which claim that the presented object 'already' exists 'out there to be met with' (171). The transcendental idealist takes 'what arises in the procedures' to be 'all there is' (173), though we have yet to be told what else there 'is' to 'arise' (or 'make present') besides the procedures themselves, nor how this squares with Kant's claim (B125) that we are not responsible for the 'existence' of presented objects.

Melnick's Kant takes the general form of cognition to be: 'it is proper to take *k* steps, be affected, and to perceive so-and-so', which eschews 'realistic' insistence that this form be supplemented by: '...be affected *by the object that is there...*' (171), and so denies the realist's thesis that 'there can be no affection without objects (there and then) to affect us' (182). Though Kant's own texts seem to imply otherwise (cf., B33), and contrary to several of Melnick's own statements — e.g., that space and time are 'mere activities or constructions or motions of the subject by which it is liable to be affected *by things*' (147; my ital.) — Melnick rejects the straightforward identification of the 'so-and-so perceived' with an affecting object 'waiting there' to be perceived (183).

Consequently, the content of perception (appearance) is exhausted by the 'output' of such affection, or what Melnick prefers to call 'reactions' ('responses') (53). Nevertheless, the cognitive 'response' Melnick has in mind is precisely the 'having' of presentations: cognitions are 'nothing other than rules for moving about and getting affected in various ways or obtaining presentations' (148). But what is it to 'obtain a presentation' ('perceive so-and-so'), on a Kantian model, if not to *passively* receive empirical content in intuition? Why take the detour through the language of 'response'?

The detour is required only by Melnick's determined attempt to construct a 'naturalized' Kantianism. On this theory, cognitions as 'states of the subject' have 'content' that is 'not "proposition-like", but rather behavioral' — more specifically, cognitive content 'becomes a state of the organism apt for causing or producing the behavior', and so becomes something Melnick calls a *mechanism* (74). To have a thought, on this model, is to have a mechanism for behavior 'executively in place', a capacity Melnick thinks we share (at least) with animals (75), though he gives no indication just how far he means this account to extend. (Do thermostats 'have thoughts', insofar as their constitution involves executive response-mechanisms?)

Though Melnick admits that the fully 'naturalized' (behaviorist) output-account takes him beyond Kant-exegesis, the output-account itself (and its attendant vocabulary) seems to be unnaturally foisted upon Kant, and the strains caused by this imposition leaves much of Melnick's interpretation at arm's length from, if not at odds with, Kant's own texts, insofar as it ignores the role of first-personal passive confrontation with content in perceptual experience. (Unsurprisingly, this de-personalization of cognition finds its mirror in the practical sphere: compare Melnick's later suggestion that 'quantum-mechanical indeterminism ... gives a model (a concrete realization) of the open-endedness of practical reason' (227).)

This account orients Melnick's readings of the Deduction, the Analogies, and the Refutation of Idealism, readings which, though highly suggestive, are uniformly couched in this alternate 'output'-lexicon, and so tend to obscure which corresponding Kant-claim is actually under discussion. In the details, many will have difficulty with Melnick's thesis that the specific nature of temporality (though *not* the 'self-conscious aspect of thought') plays a fundamental role throughout the Deduction (35). Equally noteworthy is the

fact that Kant ends up with a 'causal theory of time': causation 'constitut[es] the necessary advance of time' (96), and 'time relations are not something over and above causal relations' (102) — even though by Melnick's own lights, 'I can represent succession (temporal order) without thinking of causation' (103), and (worse) 'the concept of cause (production, necessary determination) *derives ... from* the nature of the time series' (108; my italics).

This last statement is particularly troubling, if one wants to secure a distinct form of *practical-rational* causality (221ff). Yet though Melnick agrees with Kant, in taking the 'open-ended' (underdetermined) nature of rational agency to ground all ethical principles (216), Melnick becomes (predictably) un-Kantian once more in his suggestion that rational-causality too can be modeled quantum-mechanically (227-8), and so is not essentially distinct.

Melnick's criticisms of Korsgaard, his innovative 'categorical imperative', and his claims to provide the only possible definitive, rational justification for moral practices (268), can only be mentioned here. To conclude, though: however philosophically successful the positions constructed by Melnick may be, they fail in their stated task — Kant-interpretation.

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Ruth Garrett Millikan
Varieties of Meaning:
The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2004.
Pp. xii + 242.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-262-13444-6.

Millikan's books are deservedly said to be difficult, and at least some potential readers of *Varieties of Meaning* may well be wary. Millikan restates and incrementally refines her 'teleosemantic' view of the relations between language and thought, again comparing her view to and contrasting it with those of previous Nicod lecturers Dretske and Fodor. More ought yet to be said in support of her view.

Millikan's unchanged overarching goal is to 'place meaning and, in general, intentionality (aboutness, of-ness) in nature alongside sentences and the people who utter sentences.' (*Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories* [The MIT Press 1984], 10) Now she considers specifically 'What are the varieties of meaning? And what do they have in common, so as to be treated together under one cover?' (*VM*, ix) Her short answers are, first, that

there is 'meaning in the sense of purposing [and] meaning in the sense of representing or signifying' and, second, 'Nothing', though the two varieties of meaning do 'cross and overlap' and 'intersect' (ix). Her long answers explore crossings, overlappings, and intersectings. Perhaps in the interests of greater accessibility, she encapsulates her view in the slogan that '[explicit human] intentions are represented purposes' (ix). The compactness of this slogan is potentially misleading, for Millikan uses crucial terms with technical and, arguably, largely stipulative senses. Her talk here of purposes, for example, is still to be understood in terms of her notion of a 'proper function', which 'is intended as a technical term' in such a way that a thing's proper function rests at bottom and in a complex way on evolutionary history (*LTOBC*, 18). And her talk here of representation is still to be understood in terms of her notion of 'representations' as 'intentional icons the mapping values of the referents of elements of which are supposed to be identified by the cooperating interpreter' (96). Millikan has attempted before to give more accessible accounts of her technical notions (for example, in *White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice* [The MIT Press 1993]). Nevertheless, in good Sellarsian style, *Varieties of Meaning* contains fewer chapters than footnotes directing readers to various of Millikan's previous books and articles for discussion that is 'more extended', 'full', 'thorough', 'careful', 'expanded', or 'in more detail', or for 'defense' or 'argument'.

Millikan deploys a notion of 'locally recurrent natural signs' in order to have a view of the informativeness of natural signs that is both sufficiently like Dretske's view to share its strengths and sufficiently unlike Dretske's view to avoid 'an insurmountable problem' that arises because Dretske's view apparently forbids what all organisms need, 'information that cannot possibly be acquired without leaning on certain merely statistical frequencies' (*VM*, 32). Her notion is that 'certain *A*s are "locally recurrent signs" of certain *B*s' in a certain domain iff (a) *A*s are correlated with *B*s in the domain; (b) the correlation is 'strong enough to have actually influenced sign use, either through genetic selection or through learning'; (c) 'the correlation of *A*s with *B*s extends from one part of the domain to other parts for a reason'; and (d) the domain is 'a domain that it is possible for an organism to track' (40, 44). Her view (previously presented in *On Clear and Confused Ideas* [Cambridge University Press 2000]) is that we and other organisms lean on merely statistical frequencies by means of locally recurrent signs. Meanwhile, striking at what is 'absolutely central to [Millikan's] position on intentionality', Fodor 'argues against the idea that human cognition is an adaptation' due to natural selection and suggests that 'perhaps the mechanisms [currently accounting for human thought] appeared on the scene quite accidentally' (*WQPOEA*, 32; *VM*, 8n2) Millikan's response here does not go much beyond her insistence that 'the notion that the current human brain was not selected for is patently absurd' (8n2). For a more substantial response, she might well have referred readers to her previous discussion of the issue (in *WQPOEA*). Even with her more substantial response in hand, though, some readers (for example, Bruce Hunter, 'Knowledge and Design', *Philosophy and Pheno-*

menological Research 59 [1999]) might well be troubled by the extent to which Millikan appears willing to rest her view on mere 'speculation about ... evolution' (*VM*, xi).

There are other restatements and incremental refinements too. For example, Millikan argues again 'that understanding language is simply another form of sensory perception *of the world*' (113, original emphasis). She does not refer readers to her previous defense of this claim (in *LTOBC*), which perhaps differs significantly from her present defense. Millikan also considers how her view accommodates the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Unsurprisingly, she argues 'that the line between conventional and nonconventional uses of language is vague in the extreme, so that the semantics-pragmatics distinction is necessarily vague as well' (*VM*, 139). But, perhaps more surprisingly, this vagueness apparently also infects the intensional-nonintensional distinction since, on Millikan's view, 'an intensional context ... is merely a context in which one sign is held up to portray another' but where 'which [similarities] are relevant ... is ... determined pragmatically rather than being grammaticalized' (95, 88). Millikan is coy about extending her account of intensionality to modal contexts. On the one hand, she 'would like to defend the view that modal contexts too are best analyzed as containing representations of representations', but, on the other hand, 'though I think this view is correct, the argument for it will have to wait for another occasion' (99). So a promissory note that is sizeable and long outstanding (since *LTOBC*) remains yet unredeemed.

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Plato
Socrates and Alcibiades: Plato's *Alcibiades I & II, Symposium* (212c-223b), Aeschines *Alcibiades*.
Trans. David M. Johnson with introduction and notes.
Focus Philosophical Library. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing/ R. Pullins Co. 2003.
Pp. 100.
US$10.95. ISBN 1-58510-069-2.

This new *Focus Philosophical Library* volume is a bit of a grab-bag of Greek texts, including some Platonic and pseudo-Platonic, collected around the figure of Alcibiades, the bad boy of fifth-century BCE Greek history, whose amorous relations with Socrates fueled so much speculation in the ancient world. The texts of most obvious philosophic interest are *Alcibiades 1* and the

Alcibiades section that concludes the *Symposium*. The *Alcibiades II* and Aeschines texts have little of intrinsic interest for philosophers. In crafting his translations Johnson does 'not aspire to the eloquence of a literary translation', but succeeds in being 'as literal as I can without reaching the sort of literalism that requires readers to learn a translator's pidgin that lies somewhere between English and Greek' (xxiii). The translation is accurate and should certainly allow those for whom Loeb translations are frustrating easier access and increased opportunities for critical analysis and insight. There are a few typos but, again, none that compromise the text, though it does prompt questions about the copy-editing practices this valuable series is using.

Actually, the volume as a whole has only a little to offer the philosophic reader. *Alcibiades I* does provide a very useful companion piece to the much richer and more substantial *Phaedrus* and, of course, to the *Symposium* as a whole. It provides a helpful example of Socratic dialectic in action. Socrates engages with Alicibiades by trying to induce the all-important confusion that might have opened Alcibiades to accepting the gift from the gods he so badly needs: a faithful, loving, close companionship (*Letter VII* 341cd) that accommodates hard truths. Tragedy hangs over the whole piece, of course, since Alcibiades' end is so well known.

Johnson's introduction is a valuable and lively sketch of the historical and cultural dynamics that frame Plato's Socrates. The introduction is driven by the timeless question: Why did the great teacher Socrates fail with his most promising student? Johnson hints at a number of elements in that question, and tentatively at an answer, but wisely leaves it as it was when the dialogue was first written — a challenging continuing problem as much for educational theorists as for philosophers of all educational technologies.

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Plato
Phaedrus.
Trans. Stephen Scully with introduction, outline, interpretive essay, 5 appendices, and glossary.
Focus Philosophical Library. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing/ R. Pullins Co. 2003.
Pp. 140.
US$10.95. ISBN 0-941051-54-4.

This new *Focus Philosophical Library* translation of Plato's *Phaedrus* certainly meets the series' criteria as a 'clear, faithful' translation that makes the philosophical text 'accessible and inspirational'. The volume might ap-

pear, at first, to best serve the needs of Classics students, or Literature students, more than of those in Philosophy. Its approach and interpretive analysis draw less on the rich supply of contemporary philosophic debates about the dialogue than on philological, historical, and stylistic considerations.

Scully establishes his approach from the opening line of the introduction: 'The *Phaedrus* is Plato's least political dialogue.' This approach may well have something to do with the generally acknowledged confusion about the dialogue's focus, structure, and philosophical intent, frustrations that have marked successive treatments of the dialogue since antiquity. Scully puts it this way (73): 'The *Phaedrus* has many beautiful parts, some of them among the most memorable in all of Plato's writings, but it remains a confusing dialogue, and it is far from simple to describe how, or if, the parts fit together into a coherent whole. The two main themes of the Phaedrus are rhetoric *and* love, and therein lies the difficulty. The problem of unity is all the more surprising since Socrates stresses in the dialogue that all compositions should be arranged like a unified organism ... '. But if we credit what some contemporary philosophical commentators have to say we find a much more overt political agenda emerging. David White, for example, who appears in Scully's bibliography, comments (*Rhetoric and Reality in Plato's Phaedrus* [New York: SUNY Press 1993)], 180) that, 'in respect of the political repercussions of the analyses of speaking and writing ... the *Phaedrus* is no less political than the *Republic* and its metaphysics no less crucial to the overall import of the dialogue than that of (the *Republic*)'. So if Scully had focused on the politics of Plato's *erōs* and of rhetoric / dialectic — and on the politics of art/*technē*, a very hot theme philosophically and one to which Scully pays little direct attention — it is possible his admirable efforts might appeal more immediately to more philosophers. But possibly more philosophers should look again at Scully's approach.

In fact, what emerges from Scully's deliberate and wholly appropriate 'outside the polis' view of the dialogue is a challenge that is fully consistent with the *Phaedrus* itself. We are forced into a confusion that prompts us to rethink what we construe as 'political', and to reconsider our implication in its life via the various kinds of discourse that constitute the *polis*. Is it the orators or the dialecticians who teach the truly profitable civic and private arts of love, and thus deserve the beloved's favors? Plato himself seems to have constructed the dialogue so as to induce a healthy confusion about different kinds of discourse and intercourse, and in particular to destabilize our misplaced reliance on those disciplinary 'techniques' (*technēmata* 269a) in which we continue to invest such faith.

Healthy confusion is the initial objective of the dialectic as Plato sees it. We can see that from so many of the other dialogues. Without the carefully constructed experience of what Plato calls the 'weakness of language' (Letter VII, 342d8 ; cf. *Cratylus* 435d-436e & *Republic* 372e) its practitioners will never learn how the dialectic works to implicate them in the kind of knowing that takes effective account of the natural dynamics (or 'joints' *Phaedrus*

265e) of the world. It is perhaps unfortunate that Scully does not devote more attention to Plato's other writings beyond the *Republic*. For instance, I found only one reference to the *Seventh Letter* (on page 88, note 28, in the Interpretive Essay) where Plato explicitly and directly addresses many of the confusions induced by the *Phaedrus*. But the translation is, nonetheless, acutely sensitive to the dialogue's philosophical project, and draws out its philosophical lessons very faithfully with a sympathetic joy in the dangerous beauty of Plato's artistry.

There are some typos, but none that compromise the text, which is written in a crisply lucid, engaging and accessible style. Scully is faithful both to Plato and to our own contemporary needs. His considerable attention to scholarly detail is helpful because it is made to serve the needs of translating Plato, not just Plato's text.

Philosophers are, therefore, among those very well served by this fresh, thought provoking rendition of a dialogue that may have more urgent political and philosophical relevance today than ever before, if only because it keeps open the vital epistemic and discursive confusions we have yet fully to explore, and learn from, if political life is to survive.

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Plato
Republic.
Trans. C. D. C. Reeve.
Indianapolis/Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company 2004.
Pp. xxxiv + 358.
US$37.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-737-4);
US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-736-6).

C. D. C. Reeve's translation of the *Republic,* unlike others, features 'direct speech'. Many philosophers might therefore find it a preferable translation to use in their research.

Presenting the dialogue as direct speech means that the speeches of Socrates, Thrasymachus, Glaucon, et al., are not *reported* as parts of Socrates' narrative (as they are in the Greek), but are instead merely presented. So, the discussion between Socrates and his interlocutors appears this way: 'SOCRATES: Therefore, a just person is happy and an unjust one wretched. THRASYMACHUS: Let's say so. SOCRATES: But surely ...', and so on. What is then de-emphasized is Socrates' narration of events. The outset of Book II,

for example, begins with Socrates narrating, 'When I said this, I thought I had done with the discussion. ... ' In typical translations of the dialogue, the text of this narrative is not set off from the speeches of the interlocutors. In Reeve's translation, though, it is italicized and indented, while the central font is used only for speeches.

One immediate benefit for some philosophers is that identifying and studying the arguments is more efficient. One can locate more immediately what the premises are in the argument, and who's offering them — just by glancing, almost — rather than first having to weed through Socrates' narrative remarks to find the premises, or having to review first several lines to see who the speaker is. If, on the fly, one wants to find that spot in Book I, say, where Socrates mentions the example of returning a weapon to a friend who's gone mad, the finding is somewhat easier. Also, isolating unusually long speeches is made easier (such as those of Glaucon and Adiemantus in Book II).

Another advantage to the direct speech presentation for many philosophers is that it 'frees up' the margins at the top of the page for Reeve to identify the topic(s) being discussed on that page, providing additional signposts to the reader. For instance, one will find 'Examination of Thrasymachus', 'Guardian Education', 'Justice in the Soul', 'The Line Analogy', 'Mathematics', and so on, in the top, right-hand margin. Thus, one may quickly thumb through the pages to locate certain topics. In Reeve's 1992 revision of G. M. A. Grube's 1974 *reported*-speech translation, the top margins are reserved instead for indicating which interlocutors are involved in the page's discussion. (One of the hallmarks of some editions of Jowett is their inclusion of side-margin summaries. These are more informative than are Jowett's top-margin notes, such as the vague 'Difficulty of the Subject'. Notably, Reeve's top-margin notes are far more informative.)

Also unique and, I predict, broadly welcomed, is that every fifth Stephanus line is indicated, e.g., 527a, 5, b, 5, 10, c. But because there is sometimes lots of space between each mark — owing to the direct speech presentation — the numbering would better appear as '527a5, 527b', etc. so that readers don't need to hunt down the page number. Why the inefficiency in the midst of all the wonderful conveniences?

What about the translation itself? Reeve is here using the New Standard Greek Text of S. R. Sling, rather than John Burnet's Oxford edition upon which Reeve mostly relied for his revision of Grube. So scholars working off of this new translation will have the benefit of also working off of this more recent Greek text.

The philosophical advantages that the Grube/Reeve translation has had over others has been retained. These advantages concern the treatment of specific philosophical concept words. Consider for example the word 'bad', as in 'What an enemy owes an enemy is — something bad (*kakon*)' (332b8). Rendering *'kakon'* in some cases as 'evil' (as do Jowett's 1892 and Shorey's 1930 translations, for instance), may unnecessarily, and, perhaps incorrectly, suggest an Augustinian or Kantian *moral* good — or even something more

'demonic'. But this begs certain questions against those readings of Socrates and Plato that interpret them as endorsing more or less intellectualist accounts of the good. It is also misleading to students. Translating *kakon* as 'bad', as Reeve does may be more 'neutral' insofar as it closes off neither account of *kakon*.

Students are likely to find this translation more accessible than others, even than the Grube/Reeve. Accessibility is accomplished by Reeve sometimes merely by breaking up a claim into readily discernible parts. The principle through which Plato introduces parts of the soul (436b7-c1) is an example: 'It is clear that the same thing cannot do or undergo opposite things; not, at any rate, in the same respect, in relation to the same things, at the same time.' Both Shorey and Jowett do not separate the qualification from the main principle in this way, and the Grube/Reeve reads not quite as smoothly, I think. Another example is his rendering of 479b9-10, which concludes Plato's account of being versus becoming, knowledge versus belief: 'Then is each of the many things any more what one says it is than it is not what one says it is?' (Compare Shorey: 'Then *is* each of these multiples rather than it *is not* that which one affirms it to be?')

Another point of accessibility is Reeve's choice of 'belief' for '*doxa*', rather than the customary 'opinion' (used also by Grube/Reeve) in the knowledge/belief discussion of Book V. This choice resolves for some students the unnecessary difficulty posed by the almost exotic cognates, 'to opine' and 'opines'.

Reeve includes a substantial introduction, featuring brief discussions of Socrates and Plato as well as a concise, 2-page, account of the dialogue's argument. He also includes thorough discussions of the theory of the Forms, the structure of the kallipolis, and freedom and autonomy, to name only some. This is followed by a 24-item *Select Bibliography*, mentioning works from the 1970's to the present. There is then a careful synopsis of each book of the *Republic*, a 2-page *Glossary of Terms* (from *Being* [*ousia*] to *What it is* [*ho estin*], as well as a *Glossary and Index of Names* (*Abdera* to *Zeus*). Finally, of course, is the *General Index* (*Account* to *Wretched*).

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Nancy Nyquist Potter
How Can I Be Trusted?
A Virtue Theory of Trustworthiness.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 2002.
Pp. xviii + 249.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-1150-2);
US$21.00 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-1151-0).

Virtues are often subdivided, after Aristotle, into moral qualities (truthfulness, temperance, courage, etc.) and personal intellectual or epistemic disciplines (attentiveness, fair-mindedness, open-mindedness, intellectual tenacity, etc.). But this taxonomy often misses the important distinction between those virtues that are primarily normative in nature, and those that are largely social. Trustworthiness is a social virtue that forms the foundation for nearly every interpersonal transaction, from traveling by plane or bus, to working a job, to using the telephone. Nancy Nyquist Potter's work offers a fresh and well-organized exploration of trustworthiness.

When Potter developed her theory as part of her doctoral work at the University of Minnesota, she brought a new and innovative inquiry to the idea of trustworthiness. Her project seeks the essence of trustworthiness, inquiring into the parameters of trust (one can be too trusting, or too cynical toward others), the elements of trust, and the cognition, motivation, and emotion required for trust and trustworthiness. Her investigation is both phenomenological and philosophical. A person's expectations of the Other, their own interactions with the Other, and their understandings of justice, are underpinned with notions of trust and trustworthiness. Fidelity, sincerity, wisdom, and respectfulness are empty qualities without trust. Even love itself cannot exist without a precondition of trust. Potter has drawn from feminist sources as well as from traditional virtue theory formulations, in her effort to craft a comprehensive understanding of trustworthiness that could well serve the moralist, the postmodern ethicist, and the neo-pragmatist alike.

Potter follows an Aristotelian method of inquiry. She takes up what look like puzzles in particular cases, and examines them to see what the common beliefs are and how one should reason through them to see what trustworthiness would look like if exhibited in each situation. She pays particular atten- tion to contexts in which power differentials between and among individuals affect trusting relationships. In so doing, Potter draws heavily from the philosophical considerations — and observations about power — provided by Annette Baier, Lorraine Code, and Trudy Govier. Potter's project also emulates Alasdair MacIntyre's emphasis on the relationship between virtue, practices and institutions.

This presentation of Potter's inquiry is divided into six chapters: the first sets out her theory, four chapters provide context for the understanding and application of her theory, and a final chapter is dedicated to her notion of *uptake* as a core virtue that constitutes the heart of trustworthiness. Her explication of her theory is compelling, and invites the reader to enter into a full exploration of her theory in both institutional (health care, crisis counsel-

ing, and education) and personal (intimate relationship) contexts. If her final suggestions about the idea of uptake — generally defined as the willingness to seek out and take on the cares and needs of others — are not as strong as her theory of trustworthiness, the reader will nevertheless discover that the final chapter helps to round out an understanding of her theory as presented in the first. The book leaves the reader with a rich description of the trustworthy person in a variety of contexts, as well as a vision of where and how to direct one's attention and energy in order to become trustworthy.

Trustworthiness, as understood by Potter, takes work. Like all social and moral virtues, trustworthiness starts with an epistemic commitment to the discovery of those qualities that would make trustworthiness operable, especially in favor of the disenfranchised and the oppressed. It requires sensitivity to the particularities of others, particularly in circumstances where broken trust has occurred. In this regard, Potter includes some discussion of relationships characterized by historical abuses of power. Trustworthiness also involves the communication of signs and assurances of loyalty and reliability. Not because such signals are themselves necessarily indicative of trustworthiness, but because some communication of intentionality is usually required before trust can actually be established. The reliable and consistent exhibition of honorable character traits is, for Potter, the starting point for such communication. Authenticity and integrity, finally, cannot be ignored. It is impossible to work at becoming truly trustworthy, while not at the same time cultivating openness and transparency. But that is the point of Potter's work: trustworthiness is not an amalgamation of particular behaviors. Trustworthiness is a holistic expression of genuine care toward others that cannot be falsified.

Potter reminds the reader that in both deontological and consequentialist moral theories, normative rules or principles are offered as central guides to morality. But life's experiences too often prove that it is not enough to arrive at philosophical conclusions about, say, promise keeping or honesty. Without trust, those conclusions are merely theoretical and generally irrelevant. Distrust or betrayal can overshadow — if not negate entirely — any possible consensus regarding moral theories. Virtue ethics puts dispositions, not rules, at the center of moral inquiry, and thus offers a clarity and a richness to our thinking about social, moral, psychological and political interactions and experiences. Virtue ethics lacks the tension that is often associated with theoretical efforts identify and define a moral self — in isolation — as an indepen- dent, impartial and autonomous moral agency. Potter's effort demonstrates how trustworthiness can serve as an Aristotelian lens through which harms and vices in the world can be reexamined without the distractions, drawbacks and clutter of normative theories or rules. A careful consideration of trustworthiness as a social virtue, rather than as composite of behavioral norms, also takes into account the reality of individuals as historical and social selves.

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Jack Reynolds
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity.
Athens: Ohio University Press 2004.
Pp. xix + 233.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-8214-1592-1.

Jack Reynolds has competing motives in writing this, the first book-length treatment of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. One stems from his contention that most existing discussions are partial to one figure over the other. This is overstated, but Reynolds' larger point is well taken, namely, that comparison is strongly predisposed to disanalogy by the way that standard periodizations of twentieth-century philosophy oppose deconstruction to phenomenology. Reynolds wants to destabilize this framework in order to foreground a deeper philosophical consonance between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida and tap their 'combined resources' (26) concerning embodiment and alterity respectively.

Reynolds does not place these themes on an even playing field, however. Judging that the contemporary philosophical Zeitgeist favors Derrida, Reynolds *strategically* privileges the phenomenology of embodiment (218n24). This is Merleau-Ponty's home turf, and nobody would argue that Derrida can outdo him here. What is surprising, though, is Reynolds' claim that on the strength of this, 'Merleau-Ponty's account of the self-and-other relationship is *also* more ontologically and existentially convincing than Derrida's account' (193, emphasis added). Ostensibly to facilitate balanced dialogue, Reynolds' immediate aim is thus to show that the philosophical and normative coherence of deconstruction requires a Merleau-Pontian basis.

Chapters 1-3 lay the groundwork for this effort. Reynolds first reviews Merleau-Ponty's early phenomenology of embodiment, doing so rather narrowly by highlighting the pre-reflective bodily intelligence operative in habitual action. Conceding that Merleau-Ponty is occasionally nostalgic for self-presence, Reynolds argues that the logic of his account — which locates subjectivity in the (temporal) distinction between *le corps habitué* and *le corps actuel* — rejects it for an ambiguous intertwining of immanence and transcendence.

Reynolds then argues that although Derrida gave the body only cursory attention, the mind-body opposition is amenable to deconstructive analysis in a way that is isomorphic to Derrida's treatment of speech and writing. As with Merleau-Ponty, Reynolds is interested in the logic of Derrida's approach — here, however, he expands rather than narrows, inferring the ubiquity of *différance*, the dependence on difference of identity in general. Reynolds thus proposes that Merleau-Ponty's corporeal phenomenology tacitly anticipated deconstruction.

Reynolds tries to substantiate this controversial point by exhibiting the 'surprising similarities' (61) between deconstruction and Merleau-Ponty's later phenomenology with respect to dialectics, temporality, and in/visibility. Although Reynolds' claims are not terribly surprising, his discussion is

commendable for linking these issues. What remains unclear, though, is how well Merleau-Ponty's later work — which Reynolds admits pushes the phenomenological envelope — coheres with his earlier work. Reynolds thus vacillates between claims of close proximity between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, and weaker suggestions that their positions are simply 'not diametrically opposed' (81).

Chapter 4 is pivotal. Here Reynolds launches his critique of Derrida by exposing the abstractness of his notion of 'undecidability'. The idea is that Derrida is preoccupied with the aporetic only because he ignores corporeality. Relying on Merleau-Ponty's account of habit, Reynolds argues that aporetic experience is actually minimized by the propensity of bodily comportment to seek equilibrium. Invoking a Dreyfusian account of 'skilful coping', he contends that by pushing us up the scale of technical proficiency (from 'beginner' to 'master') *and thus allowing us to function less reflectively*, habitual learning smoothes over the aporias that generate undecidability, thereby rendering it 'an increasingly rare state' (94).

Granted we normalize pre-reflective tendencies to master discrete 'areas of expertise'. But how much philosophical work can the model of 'skilful coping' do? Reynolds' critique of Derrida requires that it apply to ethical co-existence. The account of alterity he sketches in the second half of the book, however, questions this move more than it supports it.

Reynolds begins by reviewing Merleau-Ponty's argument against Sartre that being-with-others precedes being-for-others, and that 'agnosticism' concerning the other's being-for-itself — treating it as radically separate — effectively leads to solipsism. Reynolds will retrofit this argument and deploy it against Derrida. The (salutary) idea is to conceive self-other relations interactively such as to generate an ethical imperative to maximize mutually transformative encounters.

Chapters 6 and 7 develop this indirectly via Levinas. Reynolds first dismisses Levinas' criticism of Merleau-Ponty concerning alterity by maintaining the anti-Sartre line that the self-other relation involves irreducible mutual encroachment. He thus bites the bullet — the encounter with alterity inevitably includes some 'imperialism of the same' — but argues that outside the metaphysics of presence this is benign. For Reynolds, this is also the gist of Derrida's early criticism of Levinas. Recognizing that Derrida's later work gravitated toward Levinas, Reynolds revisits that criticism and turns the tables — Derrida is thus put in the same 'agnostic' boat as Sartre and Levinas. Much of this discussion is superfluous and suspiciously circuitous. But it sets up Reynolds' claim that as symptomatic of the incomplete disruption of the self-other opposition, Derrida's agnosticism shows that his approach to deconstruction ultimately fails, thus inviting a Merleau-Pontian renewal.

Merleau-Ponty and Derrida are reconnected in Chapter 8, but by this point the contrast is established: Reynolds merely showcases it in terms of Derrida's possible-impossible aporias (gift, hospitality, forgiveness, mourning). Repeating his analysis of undecidability, he appeals to the progressive erosion of aporeticity through bodies' habitual adjustment to their environments. Mer-

leau-Ponty is thus portrayed as the robust voice of concrete possibility, Derrida as the somatophobic apostle of the impossible. To be sure, this has quotidian salience — yet only by bowdlerizing the institutive moments of ethical co-existence that precondition habitual behaviour. There is an unresolved tension between Reynolds' normative deference toward corporeal *equilibrium* and his 'ethic of mutual *transformation*' (138). Unless sameness is viciously imperious, aren't we perpetual ethical 'beginners' whose responsibility often requires *resisting* habit and choosing *dis*equilibria?

Reynolds' study ranges ambitiously and often insightfully over difficult terrain. It is ultimately polemical, but not by misrepresenting Derrida. Rather, Reynolds simplifies Merleau-Ponty by expurgating from his work the *limits* of possibility and papering over the resulting cracks. He thus implicates Merleau-Ponty in an unfounded optimism whereby habituality spontaneously coincides with ethicality. This is reflected in Reynolds' freely combining Merleau-Ponty's early and late work without critically scrutinizing their compatibility — in effect, his argument against Derrida relies on a Merleau-Pontian tag-team. And it remains unclear whether this really offers the coherence Derrida lacks. Although Reynolds' call for an evenhanded dialogue is judicious, the 'strategic' nature of his contribution compromises its overall conclusiveness. It is unfortunate that he did not risk straightforwardness.

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Aaron Ridley
The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2004.
Pp. viii + 178.
US$89.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7486-1162-2);
US$29.50 (paper: ISBN 0-7486-0902-4).

In this elegantly written and economical monograph Aaron Ridley argues that much recent philosophy of music shares a common and mistaken orientation, which he calls the 'autonomaniac' view. The basic mistake underlying this view is the assumption that music is essentially or ultimately sound structure. In effect, Ridley says, holders of the autonomaniac view treat music as though it were something from Mars rather than an aspect of lived human experience. Ridley's goal in writing is to chip away at the intuitions that make the autonomaniac view even minimally plausible, and so to re-open the possibility of thinking responsibly about musical value. As

Ridley himself puts it, he hopes to put aesthetics back into the philosophy of music. Ridley is perhaps ideally suited to criticize the autonomaniac view as he admits to having been in its grip himself in his earlier *Music, Value, and the Passions* (Cornell University Press 1995).

Ridley claims that no one is an autonomaniac 'all the way down' and allows that the view is not as ubiquitous or evenly distributed as he sometimes implies. The philosophers who come in for criticism most often will be familiar names (usual suspects?) to anyone with even a passing interest in recent philosophical aesthetics: Peter Kivy, Stephen Davies, Roger Scruton, and Jerrold Levinson. Equally familiar to readers with an interest in the philosophy of music are the backward glances to Eduard Hanslick and discussions of his influence. Most of the music discussed is classical or art music, and each chapter is structured around a single canonical work, reflecting Ridley's position that one must set out from particular concrete works if one is to say anything of interest. The work of philosophers who concentrate on popular music and jazz — and who are much less likely to hold the views Ridley decries — is basically unexplored, a forgivable omission in a book of this length and focus.

The book is comprised of five chapters, on understanding, representation, expression, performance, and profundity. Throughout, Ridley's arguments are based upon a distinction he explicates in the first chapter, between internal and external understanding. This distinction is in turn based upon remarks made by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*. Basically, 'external' understanding is understanding of paraphraseable content, and an 'internal' understanding is of non-paraphraseable content. In aesthetic contexts we are usually more interested in the latter, although both types of understanding are required. If I could not offer a paraphrase of a poem you would rightly doubt that I had understood it, even if we agree that the paraphraseable content is not what we are interested in when we read a poem as a poem. Ridley believes that there are parallels with music and that both types of understanding are important here as well. We show external understanding of music when we offer verbal descriptions of works. If we insist that all musical understanding is internal (as is usually assumed on the autonomaniac view), then it is hard to understand things such as background-foreground relations in music and to make sense of the fact that in well-structured compositions some passages are more significant than others.

Ridley's chapter on expression is an especially valuable contribution to philosophical work on music, and one of the best in the book. In opposition to most of the philosophers who have written on the subject, Ridley focuses not on 'pure' music without a text but on song. Rather than seeing song as a hybrid of music and poetry (according to one influential model), Ridley insists that it is more fruitful to see songs as a kind of music that includes words. When a previously existing poem is set to music it is transformed — the melody breaks up the lines and emphasizes certain words — so that the song text is different from the original poem. Hence any talk of an appropriate or

inappropriate 'match' between words and music must be rejected, as it presupposes that we are dealing with two separate things. Ridley instead argues that an appropriate song setting evinces an internal understanding of the poem by transforming it into this rather than that song text. While the text particularizes the expression of the music, it is also the case that the music particularizes the expressiveness of the text.

The chapter on performance is largely taken up with a discussion of musical ontology, and is similarly out of step with much current discussion. Ridley does not distinguish clearly between questions relating to the identity conditions for specific works (what makes this performance a performance of Beethoven's Fifth rather than of some other work?) and questions relating to the ontological status of music as such (what sort of a thing is Beethoven's Fifth, anyway?). Indeed (like some other participants in the discussion) he tends to collapse the latter kind of question into the former. Ridley's main reason for rejecting talk of musical ontology is that evaluative questions can be settled without reference to ontological issues. If we are 'doing aesthetics', that is, chiefly interested in 'our aesthetic experience of renditions of pieces of music' (114), then ontology is at best superfluous, and at worst irrelevant philosophizing. Ridley's traces the current interest in musical ontology to the influence of Nelson Goodman's *Languages of Art* (1976) and to the 'lure' of metaphysics by insecure aestheticians, admitting that the latter remark is ad hominem. The energy Ridley spends decrying ontological discussions of music strikes me as misplaced. The ontological status of artworks has been a topic of philosophical interest since at least Plato's *Republic* and is not likely to cease anytime soon. And it is puzzling for someone who is staunchly anti-essentialist about music to insist on what musical aesthetics essentially is or is not.

Ridley's writing is energetic, free of jargon, and accessible to non-specialists. I found his discussions of particular musical works to be illuminating, both of the philosophical issues at hand and of the works themselves. This book (or sections of it) would work well in undergraduate classes on the philosophy of art or music.

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Jason Scott Robert
Embryology, Epigenesis and Evolution: Taking Development Seriously.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xvi + 158.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-82467-2.

Until recently the philosophy of biology was predominantly the philosophy of evolutionary biology. Jason Scott Robert is one of the new wave of philosophers of science who are changing this emphasis. Many of these authors are represented in the excellent series in which the present volume appears, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology, edited by Michael Ruse. Disciplines that are receiving overdue philosophical attention include ecology, the rapidly growing and diversifying molecular biosciences, and developmental biology, which is the focus of Robert's book. At one end, developmental biology touches the molecular biosciences, since the new techniques that have allowed developmental biology to make such progress in recent decades have emerged from that source. At the other end, however, developmental biology touches evolutionary theory and the reconstruction of evolutionary change. The thriving young discipline of 'evolutionary developmental biology', commonly known as 'evo-devo', holds out the promise of detailed, mechanistic accounts of evolutionary transitions from one form to another. These mechanistic models fill an explanatory lacuna in evolutionary theory, but they also threaten to overthrow some elements of evolutionary orthodoxy, suggesting, for example, that some of the apparent saltational changes in the fossil record may be just what they appear, as Robert explains in Chapter 5.

The topic that Robert aims to place at the centre of the philosophy of biology is the 'problem of development' — how do organisms with many, diverse parts arranged in a functional manner arise from small, relatively undifferentiated eggs? The two ancient theories of epigenesis and preformation cast long shadows over contemporary approaches to this question. Preformationism denies that the egg is less complex and differentiated than the adult, and its modern form would populate the genome with what Kenneth Schaffner has christened 'traitunculi'. Epigenesis supposes that forces acting on the undifferentiated matter of the egg generate complexity *de novo*. Robert rejects the received view, according to which the three-hundred-year debate between epigenesis and preformation was resolved by the discovery of the genetic program: neither the organism nor its traits are preformed in the egg, but all or some of the information that specifies the organism is preformed in the nucleus. Robert argues that, far from representing an attractive compromise, the genetic program idea has the worst features of both traditional theories. Preformation and epigenesis are 'Scylla and Charybdis' and the genetic program concept, their 'chimaeric offspring is even more beastly than its monstrous forebears' (54). Like preformationism, it sidesteps the real task of developmental biology, which is to give a

mechanistic account of development. Like traditional epigenesis, it substitutes a mind-like guiding force for a genuine mechanism (Robert calls this 'genetic animism'). While development *can* be seen as manifesting a certain amount of 'information', a proper explication of what 'information' means in this context reveals that it is not localized in the genome, but resides in the interaction between the many material resources that make a causal contribution to the process connecting egg to adult, a view for which Robert acknowledges his debt to Susan Oyama.

Robert describes his alternative view of development as 'constitutive epigenesis'. He takes the struggle for this view into the heart of enemy territory, arguing that even the primary structure of proteins is nor preformed in DNA ('primary structure' refers to the linear order of amino acids, ignoring (most of) the bonds that form between parts of the polypeptide chain and other factors that produce the three-dimensional 'tertiary structure' on which most of a protein's causal powers depend). Robert endorses the 'process molecular gene concept', due to Eva Neumann-Held, according to which a gene consists not merely of the DNA sequences from which messenger RNA (mRNA) is transcribed, but of all the molecules which help to bring it about that a particular gene product is assembled in the right cells at the right times to make the contribution to development that we recognize as the signature of a particular 'gene'. Robert lays particular emphasis on DNA methylation and on mRNA editing. Methylation is a gene-silencing mechanism with a key role in both cell-line heredity and trans-generational 'epigenetic' heredity. Methylation demonstrates that which genes are expressed in which tissues at which times depends on heritable molecules other than DNA itself. The mRNA editing process inserts additional nucleotides into mRNA or transforms existing nucleotides, so that the DNA is no longer the molecular 'image' of the gene product that results. Recent developments in molecular bioscience could have provided Robert with much additional support for his thesis. Two DNA sequences ('genes'?) that give rise to different products can overlap one another in ways that are not obvious until you see how that sequence is used in different cells at different times. The products of two such 'overlapping genes' may be entirely chemically distinct if the two transcribe their shared DNA in different 'reading frames' (to use the, always problematic, linguistic analogy, this is like reading 'The old man can run' as '(T) heo ldm anc anr un'). In 'co-transcription', two known genes, or a gene and DNA elements that would not otherwise be annotated as a gene, are transcribed along with the DNA between them into a single mRNA that is spliced to produce a new gene product. In 'trans-splicing' mRNAs derived from different parts of the genome are spliced together to make novel products. So contemporary genomics lends considerable support to Robert's view that 'genes' are not preformed in the genome but rather brought into being 'on the fly' as cells require them (which is not to say that genomes do not contain traditional, structural 'genes', but merely that these are only one way to constitute a gene).

Robert has much praise for contemporary evolutionary developmental biology, but urges it to adopt a less gene-centered perspective and to embrace

the insights of research programs such as that of Oyama and other 'developmental systems theorists', and the 'ecological developmental biology' christened by Scott Gilbert and often pursued under the banner of phenotypic plasticity research.

Robert's book also includes a vigorous defense of the role of the philosopher of biology, drawing on William Wimsatt's account of research heuristics and their biases. 'The devil', Robert assures us, 'is not in the details, but rather in the Gestalt' (130), that is, in correctly identifying the big picture that emerges from science's impressive but still incomplete grasp of biological detail. The philosopher of science should be in a position to draw the big picture in a way that does not mistake the practical exigencies of research for biological necessity, and Robert's strongest criticism is reserved for those philosophers, like Alexander Rosenberg and Michael Ruse, who in Robert's view defend an overly narrow, gene-centered 'big picture' by appealing to the practical simplifications made by scientists to facilitate their work.

This is a thoroughly bioliterate volume that will introduce the philosophical reader to some of the best of modern molecular and developmental biology and its potential implications. It will no doubt provoke vigorous debate amongst philosophers of biology, but it is to be hoped that it will be read by a much wider cross-section of the philosophical community.

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Mark Rowlands
Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press 2003.
Pp. vii + 256.
Cdn$/US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-2649-8);
Cdn$27.95/US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7735-2650-1).

Internalism, according to Rowlands, is roughly the idea that all mental states, events, or properties are located exclusively 'inside the head of the creature or agent that has these things' (2). Externalism, by contrast, is the denial of internalism: it is the idea that *not* all mental states, events, or properties are exclusively inside the head of the creature or agent that has these things. On externalism, then, mental states are essentially hybrid entities that straddle both internal states and processes *and* things occurring in the external world.

Rowlands argues that the concept of internalism — which, he claims in Chapter 2, finds its logical and historical roots in the work of Descartes — is essentially an ontological thesis according to which:

Location Claim (**LC**):

> Mental states are spatially located inside the heads of agents.

Possession Claim (**PC**):

> The possession of mental states by an agent does not depend on any feature that is external to that agent. (13)

If, however, one takes internalism seriously, then, Rowlands asserts, one is immediately faced with *the matching problem*: if the mind really is something that is located exclusively inside the head of the creature that has it, then how does the mind latch onto the world 'in such a way that the creature might know, or even have any reason for believing anything about that world?' (3). Aside from Chapters 9 and 10, in which Rowlands advances his own externalist solution to the matching problem, much of Rowlands' book can be viewed as a critical analysis of the various attempts to solve, or at least respond to, the matching problem.

Rowlands claims in Chapter 3 that one fairly natural response to the matching problem is the broadly Kantian response, according to which the world of our everyday experience is a world that is constructed by the activities of the mind, specifically through the mental activities of what Kant called 'sensibility' and 'understanding' — *thought*, broadly construed (54). On the Kantian view, then, the mind is able to 'latch on to' (4) the world because the world, or at least that portion of the world that we can know and think about, is a world that is essentially constructed *by* the activities of the mind (54). For various interesting reasons, Rowlands finds the Kantian (and neo-Kantian) solution to the matching problem wholly misguided.

In Chapter 4 Rowlands argues that Sartre provides one of the first genuinely externalist solutions to the matching problem, one according to which consciousness is nothing more than a general directedness towards objects where these objects are not mental items, but are 'irredeemably external' (4) and wholly 'transcendent' (74) to consciousness. To the extent that consciousness is not a spatially locatable item in the world (74) but rather a general directedness towards transcendent objects, Sartre, claims Rowlands, rejects (**LC**). Furthermore, to the extent that consciousness is a directedness towards objects that exists outside the head of agents, Sartre also rejects (**PC**).

In Chapter 5, Rowlands claims that Wittgenstein offers an alternative externalist solution to the matching problem. According to this proposal, to mean, intend, or understand something is not to be the subject of some inner state or process. Rather, it is to possess the capacity or disposition to 'adjust one's use of a sign to bring it into line with custom or practice' (5). This, argues Rowlands, connects meaning, intending, and so on, 'with structures that are external to the subject' (5). To the extent that mental phenomena is conceptually connected with structures that are external to the agent, Wittgenstein, argues Rowlands, rejects (**PC**). Moreover, to the extent that mental phenom-

ena do not consist in inner states or processes, Wittgenstein also appears to reject (**LC**).

By way of an extended discussion of the twin-earth thought experiments of Putnam and Burge, and work on indexicals by Kaplan, Rowlands in Chapter 6 examines the various arguments that have been advanced for 'content externalism' — roughly, the claim that the semantic content of mental states is often dependent upon objects, properties, events, that are external to the agent. Here Rowlands argues that, if the arguments of Putnam, Burge, and Kaplan are correct, then content externalism entails at least a rejection of (**PC**) since the semantic content of mental states cannot be instantiated in the absence of those external objects, properties, or events. In Chapter 7, however, Rowlands argues, since content externalism ends up applying only to a 'vanishingly small proportion of what passes for the mental' (138), the scope of this view is severely limited and, as such, cannot be considered a satisfactory response to the matching problem.

After focusing on the epistemological aspects of content externalism in Chapter 8, Rowlands in Chapter 9 attempts to extend the basic idea behind externalism beyond the severely limited scope of content externalism. Rowlands here forwards his own preferred externalist view, what he dubs 'vehicle externalism'. The common thread that runs through vehicle externalism is the idea that the structures and mechanisms that allow an agent to possess mental states and processes are often structures and mechanisms that extend outside of the head of that agent. These *vehicles* of mental processes are extended or distributed out into the world and so too, claims Rowlands, are the mental processes themselves. Rowlands concedes that vehicle externalism is a fairly radical view of the mind (182), since it entails not only that the possession of certain types of mental phenomena is dependent upon structures and mechanisms in the external world, but also that such phenomena are often at least in part out *in* that world. Accordingly, vehicle externalism entails a rejection of both (**PC**) and (**LC**). In Chapter 10, Rowlands applies vehicle externalism to conscious experience, and in Chapter 11 discusses some of the axiological issues surrounding externalism. In Chapter 12 Rowlands summarizes his results.

Externalism is a first-rate book, and makes a significant contribution to the internalism/externalism debate in the philosophy of mind. Although the issues discussed are complex and often technical, the book is so well written that it could serve as a primary text for an advanced undergraduate course in the philosophy of mind. Of course, graduate students and professional philosophers with a general interest in the issues surrounding the internalism/externalism debate will also profit from reading Rowlands' genuinely interesting and insightful book.

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Frederick Schauer
Profiles, Probabilities and Stereotypes.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2003.
Pp. xiii + 359.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-674-01186-4.

Schauer has two projects in this fascinating and timely book, one broad and one narrow. The broad one is to foster appreciation of the (in both descriptive and approbative senses) indispensable role in life of generalization and rule-based decision-making. The narrower project is to display the rational rights and wrongs of reasoning in such hot-button issues as gender discrimination, racial profiling, mandatory sentencing guidelines and the like. Both projects are executed superbly. The former project revisits ground covered in Schauer's earlier *Playing By the Rules* (Oxford University Press 1991). That book, however, was a technical treatise aimed at the professional philosopher and legal theorist. The book under review is altogether more accessible. If you want to go behind *Profiles* to the wealth of carefully argued theoretical views on which it rests, turn to *Playing*.

The Introduction and Chapter 1 develop the broad framework for the analysis of specific cases that follows. Schauer points out that reasoning from non-spurious and non-universal generalization, 'actuarial reasoning', is ubiquitous. We properly say things like 'You get what you pay for' (9) all the time, although there's no doubt that some cheap goods work well and last for years. Misuse of generalization, we think, expresses itself in prejudice. But there are two kinds of 'prejudice' (15-17) — the 'prejudice' of reasoning from one characteristic to another where being in one class is no kind of predictor at all of being in another, and the kind of 'prejudice' that we think is involved in automatically refusing to hire an ex-con, or in stopping every black person driving an expensive car. Some ex-cons do rip off their employers, some blacks have stolen that car. But not all, surely. These two forms of 'prejudice' need to be distinguished; the second form may well not be any kind of faulty reasoning. Schauer also distinguishes between generalization, and decision-making based on generalization, from what he calls 'particularistic' decision-making (there is an extensive analysis of the distinction in *Playing*). Particularistic decision-making seems to be very attractive. What's wrong with the company that won't hire ex-cons is that many of them (most, even) will be excellent employees. Generalizations (and rules) are endemically over- and under-inclusive: they have no respect for persons, as it were. But particularistic decision-making is not therefore superior. Schauer argues this by an interesting discussion (Chapter 1) of Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle well presents equity as a correction of law. Equitable decision-making is valuable as a supplement to law, not as a substitute for law.

With the exception of the final Chapter 11, Schauer now proceeds to discuss in some detail a number of different controversial cases, showing how correct understanding of them depends on appreciating the principles he has outlined. First up are pit-bulls (Chapter 2). Shouldn't we scrap by-laws

banning pit-bulls by breed and just test every individual dog, pit-bull or not, for violent tendencies? No: any prediction that *this* dog will or will not be violent because it behaved thus and so when tested rests on exactly the kind of reasoning by way of generalization that is supposedly being impugned.

Chapter 3 discusses what Schauer presents as an irrational preference in the law for eyewitness or direct testimony over circumstantial evidence, which is after all simply reasoning based on generalization. Chapter 4 turns to mandatory retirement ages for airline pilots and mandatory minimum voting ages. Mandatory retirement at 60 is indeed a very coarse filter based on generalization of the no longer capable: a battery of tests, equally dependent on generalization but individually administered, would of course be a finer filter. But it would differ from the filter by age only in degree. It is not *unjust*, though it may, or may not be, inefficient, to use a coarse filter.

Chapter 5 discusses gender discrimination through an examination of the Virginia Military Institute case. In cases like these, Schauer says, one can regularly find two kinds of irrationality — using empirical information to predict soundly a relevant characteristic, and using it to predict unsoundly an irrelevant characteristic. But the fundamental question is whether we should be using gender as a proxy for underlying characteristics *at all*, even if it is a relevant proxy — i.e., even if the two mistakes just identified are not committed (148). Much depends, Schauer argues, on whether there are other equally relevant proxy features that are not used. In the VMI case and other notorious cases (firefighters and police are mentioned), male applicants are given a whole battery of tests: women applicants are simply given an upper-body-strength test and eliminated. That's unacceptable reasoning, motivated by sexism, even though upper-body strength is a relevant characteristic and one that not many women will possess. Schauer draws attention to the role here played by background moral reasons — the importance of preventing and compensating for the subordination of women, and of guarding against a society divided by gender. These reasons form a plausible case for forbidding the use of gender as a proxy in 'actuarial reasoning', even when it would be a statistically sound proxy.

Chapter 7 is devoted to racial profiling, perhaps the hottest of the hot buttons. The discussion is set up by Chapter 6, which presents examples of 'profiling' to which almost no-one objects and whose success is proven. Both tax authorities, who cannot possibly vet every individual return, and customs officials have elaborate 'profiles' of those most likely to be evading taxes or smuggling drugs (race and gender are not among the features of the profile). In both cases, Schauer emphasizes, use of these profiles is both more accurate and morally more desirable than the exercise of unfettered discretion by the tax office or the customs officer. So clearly there is such a thing as 'good' profiling.

So, then, what goes wrong in 'racial profiling', and can there ever be 'good' 'racial profiling'? As Schauer shows, the most spectacular cases are wrong ultimately because the use of race as a proxy is not statistically justified. Racial profiling is the *mis*use of generalization based on race. He then

comments that, up to a point, the misuse is explicable. Characteristics like race and gender are visually salient to the filterer. Race and ethnicity thus become 'encroachers on the terrain of other predictive factors'; they 'occupy more of the decision-making space than their empirical role would support' (187). Schauer then turns this feature against use of race as a basis for decision-making: 'the strongest argument against using race is ... that race, even if relevant, is so likely to be overused that it is necessary to ... mandate its underuse just to ensure that things come out even in the end' (196). We should refrain from using even statistically justifiable racial factors in the service of avoiding isolation and stigmatization by race (197).

Such a conclusion issues many normative promissory notes, and the remainder of the book goes some way towards paying them off. Chapter 8 defends the Procrustean approach to blind equality. Equality as a goal, when justified, mandates the underuse of differences. Chapter 9 discusses presumptions in the criminal law. It's not news, Schauer says, that legislation classifies imprecisely. The important thing is to give fair notice of what is illegal. This argument itself gives fair notice of the 'rule of law' values that Schauer introduces in Chapter 10, in discussing mandatory sentencing guidelines. These are unpopular because they militate against individualized sentencing. But it's clear to Schauer what a morass a regime of wide judicial discretion on sentencing could become. Moreover, he argues, there is a deep truth to the image of Justice as blindfolded — the equality-based idea that we are all one before the law. Justice *should be* no respecter of persons: its demands fall, and should fall, on all of us equally. There is a fundamental connection between decision-making by generalization and the rule of law.

Thus we come to the remarkable Chapter 11. In this spirited and committed chapter, Schauer defends generality and reasoning from generalization as an instrument of liberal community. Rights are general in character. Rights create community by creating equality across differences. Reasoning from generalization both recognizes us for who we are, and makes us who we are. This is a somewhat romantic 'blue state' vision of the possibilities of the rule of law, especially for one who elsewhere (*Playing*, Chapter 7.6) has underlined the role of rules as neutral devices for the allocation of power. Think Josiah Bartlett, not George W. Bush. But, say I anyway, it's none the worse for that.

Profiles is a clearly and thoroughly argued, witty, passionate and compassionate book — one to be thoroughly recommended.

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Bart Schultz
Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe.
An Intellectual Biography.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xx + 858.
US$64.99. ISBN 0-521-82967-4.

Bart Schultz has spent the last decade and a half researching the many sides of Henry Sidgwick. His efforts have helped make this period fecund for the study and evaluation of Sidgwick's life and works. It is due in part to Schultz that Sidgwick studies are now experiencing something of a renaissance.

Schultz' previous contributions to Sidgwick studies include the anthology *Essays on Henry Sidgwick* (Cambridge University Press 1992) and the CD-ROM *The Complete Works and Selected Scholarly Correspondence of Henry Sidgwick* (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation 1997; 2nd edition 1999). The latter is no small boon to those of us interested in all sides of Sidgwick. Schultz' articles often explore Sidgwick's lesser-known (and occasionally unpalatable) views on race, sexuality, and imperialism, among other things, usefully connecting them with his philosophical views, his historical context and his intimate friendships. They serve as an important corrective for those who study Sidgwick *sans* context. His knowledge of Sidgwick, his (often long-forgotten) peers and their history and culture, is immense in its depth and complexity.

His long-awaited book — nay, tome — *Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe* (*HSE*) is a comprehensive and wide-ranging examination of the connection between Sidgwick's theoretical views, personal relationships, public activities and social milieu. It weighs in at an amazing (and at times exhausting) 858 pages, emerging from a thorough and all-encompassing reading of primary and secondary work on its subject. It will be a work on Sidgwick that all those who study him will have to reckon with for years to come. It is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Sidgwick.

The basic task that Schultz sets for himself is 'to convey some sense ... of how [Sidgwick's] "inner intellectual life" ultimately evolved, how he became what he was' (3). The portrait that Schultz hopes to paint is more favorable than the one that held sway amongst philosophers, e.g., Moore and Russell, at the beginning of the twentieth century, but more robust than the one common amongst recent admirers of Sidgwick, e.g., Rawls and Parfit. Finally, it is supposed to reveal that Sidgwick's utilitarianism is more sophisticated than many have thought.

Sidgwick devoted himself to two distinct but related intellectual issues. He was concerned with 'the deepest problems of human life', for example, the truth of Christianity, the existence of God, the so-called 'dualism of practical reason' (the claim that both utilitarianism and rational egoism are coordinate but conflicting requirements of reason), and the basis of moral obligation. He was also concerned with 'what is to be done here and now'. This forced him into debates regarding the higher education of women, clerical engagements,

the morality of strife, the nature of culture, and the ends of education, among other issues.

Sidgwick began to think seriously about these issues in the years between 1859 and 1869, his decade of 'Storm and Stress'. During this period his worries about the truth of Christianity led him to study biblical criticism, Arabic and Hebrew. Near the end of the decade his worries turned to skepticism, and the skepticism led to an ethical crisis. Sidgwick held a Fellowship at Trinity College, a requirement of which was subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. His skepticism no longer allowed this, however, so in June of 1869 he resigned. Schultz' discussion of this, in Chapters two and three, is nicely organized and illuminating. Of note is his discussion of Sidgwick's early influences, including Edward White Benson, John Fredrick Denison Maurice, John Grote, various discussion groups (clandestine and public) that Sidgwick was involved in (especially the Cambridge Apostles), and his education at Cambridge. Schultz brings out the intimate connection between Sidgwick's intellectual development and his views of inquiry, democracy, and education.

While thinking about whether to resign his Fellowship Sidgwick developed his mature ethical views. He recorded these in *The Methods of Ethics* (*ME*). This work forms the basis of his reputation within philosophical circles. It is his best and most important work. *ME* is analyzed in Chapter Four of *HSE*. Part One of the chapter tackles mainly meta-ethical and axiological matters, while Part Two deals with the dualism of practical reason. The treatment of meta-ethical matters needs further development, especially the discussion of Sidgwick's account of the meaning of the term 'good'. Schultz appears to endorse Tom Hurka's view that Sidgwick's reduction of 'good' to 'ought or rational to desire' is problematic (160); however, instead of pausing to discuss this objection Schultz begins dealing with Sidgwick's axiology. He refrains from philosophically probing Sidgwick's rather interesting views on the meaning of 'ought', and he does not examine the philosophical plausibility of Sidgwick's non-naturalist meta-ethics, and how it might be 'minimal' (i.e., not Platonic) as some suggest.

Sidgwick's moral epistemology in *ME* remains controversial. Schultz claims that much of the previous debate 'seems rather ungenerous and anachronistic in its depiction of Sidgwick, failing to grasp his fallibilistic, multicriterial approach in anything like its true complexity' (197). Schultz favours a now popular view according to which Sidgwick endorses an epistemology that includes elements of both foundationalism and coherentism (200-4). The view is that there are some propositions that are known directly, the epistemic credibility of which can be enhanced by noting coherence with common-sense morality (which possesses merely 'initial credibility'). The appeal to common-sense morality enters the picture in the appeal Sidgwick makes to a set of tests applied to directly known propositions satisfaction of some of which amplify the epistemic status of propositions that are known directly. In endorsing this view Schultz ignores another, more plausible view according to which Sidgwick holds that certain propositions are directly

warranted and that the tests function to help agents avoid error but not to amplify the warrant of the propositions in question. Many of Sidgwick's remarks in *ME* and elsewhere suggest such a view. Moreover, Schultz does not supply an adequate epistemology of common-sense morality, which is required to show that it possesses 'initial credibility' or 'imperfect certitude' (202). Sidgwick doubts that it possesses such credibility (*ME* xx-xxi, 263, 361, 383). Many of Schultz' comments undermine the view that Sidgwick believes that common sense has some built-in credibility, e.g., his claim that Sidgwick has disdain for common-sense morality and that he relies on it for merely strategic reasons (127, 181,187, 249-50, 511-12), and that he treats it as Mill does in *Utilitarianism*, i.e., as no more than beliefs about the effects of various actions on aggregate happiness (185-7).

HSE's fifth chapter deals with Sidgwick's work in parapsychology. The conclusion of *ME*, that both rational egoism and utilitarianism are equally plausible but conflicting requirements of reason, prompted Sidgwick to study paranormal phenomena. He found no philosophical way of reconciling the two requirements. God's existence would apparently make the requirements coincide, but he found no philosophical proof for God and a Kantian-style postulation seemed to him absurd. If he could find empirical proof of an afterlife, he might find proof of a God or moral governor and hence a way of solving his dualism. Alas, he found no such proof in his studies of telepathy, mediums, etc. Schultz does a nice job with this material, suggesting that Sidgwick's psychical and related studies speak to the 'ground of his unshakeable sense of the logical priority of egoism, of egoism as a reflection of the true self that somehow endured' (333).

In Schultz' view, Sidgwick's friendships are crucial to understanding his views. Core to Sidgwick's researches is the idea that truth is best explored through intimate friendships, based on candor, openness and shared hopes. Nowhere is this clearer than in his relationship with the gay poet and writer John Addington Symonds. Schultz' discussion in Chapter Six of Symonds and Sidgwick on the issue of Symonds' homosexuality and the ethics of 'coming out' are both informative and interesting, providing us with some insight into how Sidgwick developed his views regarding veracity, sexuality, and hypocrisy.

Chapter Seven examines Sidgwick's works on politics, political science and political economy. It deals mainly with Sidgwick's *The Principles of Political Economy* and *The Elements of Politics*. Schultz demonstrates how far Sidgwick strayed from early utilitarians, especially Bentham, by embracing semi-socialistic economic and political policies. There is a long discussion of Sidgwick's views on imperialism, race and colonization (605-68). Despite raising the importance of protecting the rights, etc. of those who are colonized and the difficulties associated with doing so, Sidgwick remained committed to the civilizing elements of the imperial project (it would bring 'better religion' and 'truer science', and more plausible political institutions). He often described non-Europeans as 'semi-civilized' or as belonging to 'lower' races or worse (316-17, 622, 631ff, 647). In the eighth and final chapter

Schultz further discusses Sidgwick's views on race, theism, paranormal phenomena, and other matters. Schultz accuses Sidgwick of not objecting strongly enough to the racist views that his friends published (especially James Bryce and Charles Henry Pearson). He calls Sidgwick dishonest for the role he played in helping Symonds' biographer represent his sexual agonizing as religious agonizing. This is unfortunate for those who think of Sidgwick as rather saintly. The second charge does not, however, serve to impugn Sidgwick's character. He had good reasons for lying (of which Schultz is aware): he would protect his friend's reputation, remain loyal to Symonds' wishes, protect his family, Sidgwick's own reputation and free Sidgwick's other endeavors (e.g., the promotion of women's higher education) of guilt by association (709-14). Schulz does not simply want to note Sidgwick's statements about race and his seeming dishonesty, however; he seems to think that Sidgwick's views on these and other matters cast a dark shadow over other parts of his work, threatening their philosophical viability (192, 273-74, 606-07). However, further argument is required to establish this.

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Michael Smith
Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xii + 388.
US$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80987-8);
US$32.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00773-9).

This is a collection of seventeen previously published papers. Smith's *The Moral Problem* (Blackwell 1994) has been a focus of discussion in meta-ethics and moral psychology for the past decade. In general, the papers reprinted here clarify, refine, and extend the arguments in Smith's earlier book. Some are responses to criticisms of *The Moral Problem* by Russ Schafer-Landau, David Brink, David Copp, and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. A response to Philip Pettit on a topic featured in *The Moral Problem*, but stemming from an article in neither the earlier book nor this one, is also present. Besides its substance, one of the reasons for the centrality of *The Moral Problem* in meta-ethics is the clarity of Smith's writing, which is marked by a concisely presented, carefully articulated web of arguments. The present book exemplifies the same substantive and stylistic virtues. Readers familiar with *The Moral Problem* will find much of interest here. Readers unfamiliar with Smith's earlier work will here find concise presentation of many of the arguments

central to Smith's overall position. Despite being a collection of independent articles, *Ethics and the A Priori* strongly gives the impression of presenting a unified position. However, there is notable repetition of important arguments. Due to the unity of Smith's position, I will concentrate on central arguments, pointing to individual papers only insofar as they are of special interest. This brief presentation of arguments that Smith presents in several different ways cannot help but obscure important subtleties, but the overall shape of the position should be clear.

I shall call Smith's method *rational psychology* — the a priori exploration of the psychology of ideally rational agents. Smith here explores the psychology of such agents in connection with a) the explanation of action, and b) the nature of value. These considerations come together in Smith's important account of the nature of normative reasons. At the heart of this account is Smith's version of the dispositional theory of value. This sort of theory holds that facts about values are facts about idealized desires (e.g., 9), that is, the desires of ideally rational agents. The link between value and ideally rational agents is provided by the notion of *desirability* (e.g., 93): for something to be a value is for it to be desirable, where 'desirable' is to be taken, in the familiar parlance, as worth desiring. What is it for something — some course of action, for example — to be worth desiring for a given person X? The answer that Smith develops is that it is for that thing or course of action to be what an ideally rational version of X would want for X in X's circumstances. As Smith puts it, ' ... there is an analytic connection between the desirability of an agent's acting in a certain way in certain circumstances, and her desiring that she acts in that way in those circumstances if she were fully rational ...' (93) This view delivers, without further amendment, Smith's position on the nature of normative reasons. Normative reasons, in contrast with motivating reasons, are reasons that justify actions. Whereas Smith commits himself to a version of a Humean account of the nature of motivating reasons, and hence to a view of motivating reasons as constituted by belief-desire pairs, normative reasons are instead propositions, the content of which is delivered by the dispositional theory of value: 'normative reasons are propositions concerning the desirability of acting in certain ways, where facts about desirability are in turn simply facts about our idealised desires' (61). So, X has normative reason to do whatever a fully rational version of X would desire X to do in X's circumstances.

To recognize a normative reason is to have a belief. Smith's commitment to a Humean account of motivation entails that for X to act in accordance with normative reasons, X must also have a desire to do so. Smith's account of this turns on another feature of the psychology of the rational agent: coherence. Smith argues that when a rational agent believes that s/he has normative reason to perform a certain course of action, s/he will also form the desire to do so. Consider X again. X's normative reasons for action are determined by the perspective of a fully rational version of X. The importance of this perspective lies in its possession of a fully idealized set of desires. Smith holds that this set is maximally unified and coherent. So, for X to

believe that s/he has a normative reason to do A is for X to believe that s/he would desire that s/he perform A if s/he had a maximally unified and coherent set of desires. Believing this, it is rational to desire that one do A. The reason is that a psychology containing desires that accord with beliefs about what one would desire if one had a maximally coherent set of desires is more coherent than one which lacks such a desire.

Such ideas are put to suggestive use in several articles. In Chapter Five, 'A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility' (building directly on Chapters Three and Four), Smith deploys his version of the dispositional theory of value to give a novel and important account of freedom and responsibility. Smith models an account of freedom and responsibility in the domain of action on an account of such freedom and responsibility in the domain of belief. Another article worth a quick note is Chapter Fifteen, 'Internalism's Wheel'. Since Smith's position posits an analytic connection between judging that one has a normative reason to do something and desiring to do it, it is a form of internalism. Chapter Fifteen charts various meta-ethical positions committed to internalism. Smith does this by mapping the relations of these positions to one another via important objections. He argues that his own version faces certain difficulties, but ones which are not insuperable, and hence that it is the best of this batch of positions.

A priori considerations of the psychological capacities of the rational agent carry a lot of weight in Smith's work. It is well worth wondering whether ordinary humans are rational in this way. If we are not — if, for instance, we are subject to deep forms of irrationality that put insuperable obstacles in the way of some transformations of belief and desire of the sorts examined by Smith — then one would be justified in wondering about the extent to which Smith's psychological and normative theories apply to us. Secondly, Smith is committed, via his rational psychology, to a Humean theory of motivation, and hence to a correlative account of the explanation of action. But given the fact that our action-producing capacities are the product of a long process of natural selection, it is worth wondering whether the psychological entities that explain our action are really the same as those deployed in rational psychology. If they are not, then much of Smith's work just does not apply to us.

On a stylistic note: there is no overall bibliography, and the individual essays have differing citation styles due to their original publication format, presenting a small obstacle to some scholarly purposes.

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Merold Westphal
Transcendence and Self-Transcendence. On God and the Soul.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2004.
Pp. xiv + 235.
US$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-34413-1);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21687-7).

Merold Westphal argues for a philosophical grasp of the divine that is in line with both the recovery of transcendence and the postmodern concern for the decentering of the self. He examines the views of Martin Heidegger, Baruch Spinoza, G.W.F. Hegel, Saint Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas, Karl Barth, Emmanuel Levinas and Søren Kierkegaard on transcendence. In order to accomplish the decentring of the self, divine otherness must stay irreducible. The reign of human subjectivity must be limited and relativized through the encounter with the Other. From the start we can anticipate the volume's culmination in the ethical argument for the transcendence of God. Our ethical choice of action presupposes faith in an otherworldly reality rather than knowledge of God. According to the book's inner logic, the cosmological transcendence (that God is not immanent in this world) dealt with in Part I is the basis of the epistemic transcendence of God (Part II) which in turn is a prerequisite for His ethical transcendence (that we cannot *know* God as a lawgiver) in Part III. Generally, it must be remarked that although all the relevant historical views fall into place where needed to make Westphal's train of thought perspicuous, the leading argument for the threefold transcendence could have been discussed more systematically.

The first part of the book is concerned with 'onto-theology and the need to transcend cosmological transcendence'. It is hard to deny that there is a minimization of cosmological transcendence in both, Spinoza and Hegel. Onto-theology makes God part of the intelligible structure of being as the most general or highest being. Through our grasp of this highest being, creation becomes intelligible. We can speculate why Westphal chooses versions of pantheism as his model of onto-theology. Most likely the decisive point is that God's immanence in the world seems to guarantee that He is epistemically as unproblematic as other objects of our intellect. This abandonment of transcendence is the starting point of this book.

Already for Spinoza, man is completely empowered in relation to God. In denying that there is a reality that exceeds our capacities of comprehension (60) Spinoza is also denying human self-transcendence, i.e., humans are not oriented towards a reality that is not at their disposal. Hegel is onto-theological in programmatically making all being intelligible to the thinking subject. God is nothing but the divine essence of human spirit. Although this is not explicitly discussed, the main thrust of the book is directed against Hegel. His pantheism is the opposite of the ethical transcendence of God

because He remains epistemically accessible whereas ethical transcendence presupposes epistemic mystery.

The second part of the book deals with 'epistemic transcendence: the divine mystery'. The dialectic of concealment and disclosure of God is needed in order to find a way to do theology that does not lapse into onto-theology. With regard to concealment, Westphal sees in Augustine, Aquinas and Barth authors with a very Kantian approach. Recall that for Immanuel Kant, real knowledge of God and of the world is denied to us. This is so because of the limitations of our human intellectual ability which alone we can study. In other words: in seeking knowledge of God, we can only know our human limitations. God remains in complete transcendence. There are, however, ways of making an image of God for human understanding. Rudolf Otto's famous book *The Idea of the Holy* refers to this transcendence rightly as *mysterium tremendum*, which means that the mystery transcends our understanding. God is incomprehensible and therefore awe-inspiring. On this view the epistemic approach is futile. What is known is essentially mystery. Barth says 'God is known as the unknown God' (158).

The last part of this volume deals with 'ethical and religious transcendence'. Levinas criticizes Edmund Husserl's view that the content of consciousness is everything there is. 'What exceeds the limits of consciousness is absolutely nothing for that consciousness' (188). Otherness, according to Levinas, cannot be reduced to the same and opens our horizon from the outside. Intentionality is the grasp of consciousness through which the other is reduced to the same. Based on the encounter with our fellow human beings we suffer the inversion of intentionality and experience human self-transcendence in redirecting our thought towards transcendence.

Westphal perceives clearly that Kierkegaard's God can be well understood in terms of Levinas' ethical otherness. For Kierkegaard, however, intersubjectivity on its own does not constitute meaning. The meaning of the world arises ' ... not from my I nor from my We but from the Thou whose voice disrupts the certainties and the securities of both the I and the We' (211). The ethical relationship with God is faith as listening. Here the concern for the epistemic access to God becomes less important. This ethical relationship allows for the coexistence of spirituality and metaphysics.

In conclusion, we can say that Westphal's very learned approach follows the method of historical contextualization of the argument. Although he is critiquing onto-theology as incompatible with transcendence, at the end of the book it is not yet completely out of the field. Don't we need to know God metaphysically as the Highest Being in order to understand the full meaning of His transcendence? Maybe this question sidetracks Westphal who wants to dethrone and not abolish onto-theology. The 'metaphysical' attributes of God need to be ' ... placed in a context where they are subordinate to the "moral" attributes' (231). I think that this subordination is one way of making contemporary philosophy of religion meaningful again. Hegel and Husserl are wrong because the reign of subjectivity has to be limited. This limitation

of our cognitive control is evident through the ethical dimension of the human awareness of God.

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Gideon Yaffe
Manifest Activity:
Thomas Reid's Theory of Action.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2004.
Pp. x + 167.
Cdn$82.50/US$39.95. ISBN 0-19-926855-X.

Thomas Reid's theory of action is an agent-causation theory. Typically agent-causation theories are propaedeutic, underpinning theories of morality and moral responsibility and the ascription of 'free will' to moral agents. Also, typically agent-causation theorists reject both 'hard' and 'soft' (compatibilist) determinisms, holding that agents are the only causes of human actions.

One of the issues dividing the parties in these many-sided disputes is metaphysical, viz., whether there are two types of causation, substance-causation and event-causation, or only one, or, if two, whether one is reducible to the other. Event-causation is such that if event-A is said to cause event-B, A and B must be subsumable under a 'covering law' that links them in some sense necessarily. Substance-causation is such that a cause is a substance having the power to bring about an action or event as effect. Typically, each party attempts to reduce the other party's type of causation to its own, but some — Roderick Chisholm is an example — accept both types of causation as basic and irreducible.

Reid is a substance-causation theorist, holding that agent-causation is the only type of substance-causation in a 'strict and proper sense'. Because he accepts Hume's analysis of physical causation he rejects the notion that substances in nature have any power to produce the effects they are commonly but mistakenly said to cause. Causes in the 'proper sense' must be efficient causes, i.e., must have the power to cause some change in the world, and the power not to cause it. Only persons, and God and his angels, have the power of efficient causality, in Reid's view. Physical causes have no such powers, and thus fall under the covering law model of causation. But God ordained the laws of physical causation and is their efficient cause, although

he is not the efficient cause of particular physical events falling under such laws, as Malebranche thought.

'The central tenet of Reid's theory of action, then, can be stated very simply: The actions of an agent are all and only those events of which the agent is the efficient cause' (Yaffe, 8). Obviously this rules out as causes of human action such mental traffic as habits, motives, passions, appetites and so on that 'necessitarians' appeal to in their efforts to bring human action under in some sense necessary causal laws. Reid does not doubt that such components of the mind influence or incite our actions, but he denies that such influence is causal. He nowhere gives a satisfactory account of these influences and incitements, but in several places likens them to exhortations and advice.

Yaffe's book is a critical but sympathetic exposition of Reid's basic claim and its many implications and corollaries. It cannot be said to be a good read. His prose is densely packed and his arguments are closely contrived, requiring a constant and intense focus on the text at all times, lest something important slips by.

In Chapter 1, Yaffe examines Reid's view that any substance having the active power to produce changes in the world must be a being having understanding and will, i.e., must be a rational being capable of conceiving ends and then acting to realize those ends. This rules out, in his firm Newtonian way, the ascription of active powers to inanimate beings. In Chapter 2, Yaffe examines Reid's view that active power to produce new events in the world also requires the power not to produce them. 'With power come options' (55). Active power confers 'free will'. ' ... [T]hose who exercise their powers are not at the same time swept along by the exercise of the powers of others' (56). Obviously all this is analytic and definitional of efficient causality and does not establish that there actually exist any such efficient agents.

Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to examining Reid's reasons for thinking that there must exist some efficient causes — God, angels, and human beings. Reid connects efficient causality with final causes, with teleology. Were there no efficient causes at all, the world would be utterly devoid of things and events that are directed towards ends. Ends must be conceived, and the necessary means to ends must be contrived by understanding and will. The manifest natural teleological qualities of many things and events in the world indicate that there are active powers, or, rather, that there is an efficient cause, God, who confers even upon inanimate substances their teleological properties. What Yaffe calls 'end- directedness' in human conduct depends essentially, non-contingently, upon their being a connection between intentionally planned conduct and efficiently caused conduct. It also depends upon our ability to exploit for our own ends the teleological properties of the natural world.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine Reid's truncated analysis of the influence of motives in the initiation of action. Reid's main concern is to rebut arguments that construe the influence of motives as causal in nature. He offers an

impressive array of arguments against the idea that motives are causes, but offers little in the way of a positive account of the influence of motives. Thus, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 collectively ' ... explore the contours of Reid's view of end-directed behavior' (9). The conclusion of the book synthesizes the results of the previous chapters to try to establish in just what sense Reid is an agent-causalist, i.e., how Yaffe's interpretation of Reid differs from that of some other contemporary Reid scholars.

Yaffe is quite aware that all this depends upon the viability of some concept of teleology. Reid, though, offers no explicit account of teleology, but folds it into a design argument; design in a cause may be inferred from signs or marks of it in its effects. This is a very serious lacuna in Reid's thought since in its common conception teleology was the degenerate Medieval Aristotelian teleology of the scholastics, and had by Reid's own time been subjected to apparently fatal criticism, such as, for example, that it is impossible to identify the teleological qualities of things independently of their upshots, thus resulting in such absurdities as 'Opium puts people to sleep because of its dormitive powers.'

Reid, however, is aware of this difficulty and rigorously confines end-directedness to human and divine action in which end-directed intentions, although they cannot be conceptualized independently of the actions they inform, can be known to exist independently of those actions, unlike 'dormitive powers' and the like. Inanimate substances cannot themselves 'intend' their effects; God intends that they should have their effects, and are thus end-directed in their causality.

Reid can scarcely be blamed for having lived and died before Darwin showed beyond any reasonable doubt that design in animate objects, say the eye, requires no Designer, that the processes of natural selection alone are sufficient to produce natural objects having end-directed qualities, or as we should now say, functions. Nor do inanimate objects, designed as they sometimes appear, support an analogy to artifacts sufficient to support an inference to a Designer. But Yaffe certainly can, and ought to be, blamed for not so much as mentioning Darwin and for failing to acknowledge that Reid's views on design/teleology in the non-human natural order are just wrong. Happily, however, this does not subvert Reid's views of human action.

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John W. Yolton
The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke: Man, Person, and Spirits in the 'Essay'.
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Almost fifty years have passed since Yolton's first book on Locke. The intervening half-century saw books by various authors revealing Locke as far more interesting than we used to believe, one who influenced his own time, the Enlightenment, the American and French revolutions, and who continues to shape many of our everyday institutions and practices not the least in politics and religion. However, commentators including Yolton have generally neglected Locke's frequent references to minds or understandings 'higher' than human, Locke's 'separate spirits' or 'other intelligent Beings'. Yolton's most recent book overcomes this neglect. It has all the characteristics of its predecessors — impeccable scholarship, interest and insight, elegance and clarity. It focuses on the 'surprising, somewhat overlooked doctrines' in the *Essay* that locate 'humans ... among the myriads of Beings that inhabit other portions of the universe,' and concludes that 'the soul-spirit that is housed in the body contains the potential for each human to join the ranks of angels and separate spirits ... in the Kingdom of Heaven' (152).

Its first two chapters explore and clarify Locke's use of man, self, person, and the intellectual world. The next three 'bring together the various references to angels and separate spirits, and the ways in which these Beings are related to Locke's man,' while the final chapter concerns the relationship between the intellectual human world and that of other intelligent beings, Locke's 'moral and affective, even aesthetic, attitudes towards the second intellectual world,' and the relation between that second world 'and the Kingdom of God ... in his *Reasonableness [of Christianity]*' (3). Although its subtitle appears to restrict this study to the *Essay*, mention of the *Reasonableness* indicates otherwise; in addition the study draws on, and clarifies arguments in, Locke's works on politics, education, and theology.

Yolton begins with exploring a claim in several of Locke's writings, that 'man is not born a person, but ... can develop into one' (9). It requires recognition that the use of 'person' adds 'rationality' to human corporeality in a way that precludes a reductive explanation of personal identity; 'the properties of a person — intelligence, rationality, consciousness — are not identified with or reduced to neurobiological properties nor to material particles' (14). A 'man ... starts out as an embryo, becomes an infant, an adult, and an old man.' For 'man' to become a 'person' conditions must be met that distinguish between a man's actions like 'dancing or singing' and a person's actions like 'truth-telling, helping others'. Men that lie, cheat or kill are actors who do 'not behave like persons' because they 'violate the law of nature,' so acting against their own (normative) rationality or personhood and becoming like the 'wild savage beasts' of the *Second Treatise* (17). *Person* 'adds, or at

least stresses, the forensic, law-abiding features to the self, creating what Locke calls "moral man", a self concerned for happiness and virtue in this life and ultimately salvation in the next' (24). Thus we 'may have some basis for speaking of a continuum from man in a physical sense, to man as rational (perhaps the self), to moral man (the person)' with the corresponding 'physical powers, powers of thinking and acting, and moral powers.' These powers are found together in 'the mature individual,' the human being 'as agent of thought and action' who is 'both self and person' (25). They present a continuum not of separate entities but 'of different functions of ... man as a conscious cognitive being' such that 'moral man, the rational person emerges from physical man' (37-8). Since it is 'the person, the rational, moral, thinking being that each of us owns' that is 'important for immortality ... [and] accountability' (36-7), what is to be said of the soul? The answer that 'the soul is intimately involved in, as it were, creating the person' (152) is deferred to the fifth chapter while one role of the intervening chapters is to prepare its foundations.

Chapter Two examines Locke's thought about concepts like the material and intellectual worlds, the science of nature and natural philosophy, empirical truth and speculative truth. The second in each of these sets of terms are the important ones for Yolton's theme as he distinguishes an epistemological and an ontological sense of 'intellectual world' — the *Two Intellectual Worlds* of the title. The epistemological sense concerns the nature and extent of our knowledge of the material world, of our understanding, of action, and of signs. The ontological sense concerns 'the domain of God, Angels and other Spirits' (64). This 'non-material domain' is that of speculative truth; it attaches to the main topics of the third and fourth chapters, that of spirits, angels, and God. Locke does not argue for but accepts the existence of the first two primarily on the grounds of revelation. When he considers what might be their specific features or abilities he enters the domain of 'conception' (69, 98, 101), 'supposition' (73), 'conjecture' (74). How does Locke 'decide that something is conceivable, or how does he determine that his account of the domain of God, Angels and Spirits is intelligible?' This says Yolton (105) is a question Locke 'does not address.' The unresolved problems implicit in it make Locke 'cautious in his statements about spirits, speaking often of opinions or of what may be possible' (112). To an extent the same holds for soul; 'there are few attempts made to explain what a human soul is' (114).

Locke does say about soul is that it has a different ontological status from 'mind' (which has no ontological status as 'a real Being') as well as from body (which has ontological status as 'real Being' but of a material rather than spiritual kind. 'Soul' is part of the realm of spirit though different from other spirits because it is related to both man and person — which accounts for Yolton's use of 'soul-spirit' in later chapters. Soul-spirits have a place on the 'chain of being,' a position that may change to lower or higher depending on their attaining greater perfection. As they become 'more perfect ... they acquire more of the person-like characteristics' (121). And since the perfection in question is to be achieved in this life where a human being cannot

function without soul or body, the unit that faces judgment at the resurrection is that of body, man, and (soul)-person.

Since Locke's treatment of the world of spirits is one of conjecture, Yolton's is equally tentative. Both respect the distinction between 'science of nature' and 'speculative truth' and their different limits.

Apart from highlighting this often neglected dimension of Locke's thought, Yolton indicates that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was nothing comparable to Locke's *Essay* in its effective combination of 'an account of the extent and limits of knowledge, the workings of the mind, the physiology of the body, the acquisition of ideas, the experimental science of nature, natural philosophy, moral theory, and a deep religious concern for the future life' (113).

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