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Fred Feldman

TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT PLEASURE

1.

In this paper, I present my solutions to two closely related questions about pleasure. One of these questions is fairly well known. Quite a few philosophers have discussed it, and the literature contains many proposed answers. The second question seems to me to be at least as interesting as the first, but it apparently hasn't interested quite so many philosophers. I know of only a few proposed answers.

Before the questions can be presented, it will be necessary to draw a distinction. This is the distinction between what I call 'sensory pleasure' and what I call 'propositional pleasure'. Let's first consider sensory pleasure.

2.

We use a variety of ordinary language expressions to ascribe sensory pleasure. For example, we may say that a person is 'feeling pleasure', 'experiencing pleasurable sensations', 'having pleasurable feelings', etc. These expressions are true of a person if and only if he is experiencing sensory pleasure.

Certain rather fundamental biological processes are ordinarily accompanied by pleasurable feelings. These include nutritive, reproductive, and other such processes. Imagine that you are on sunny tropical island. Imagine that the sky is clear and the sun bright. Imagine that the beach is clean and warm. Imagine that you are lying on the sand, delighting in the fresh air, sunshine, peacefulness, and warmth. You are experiencing many pleasurable sensations. These would include the pleasures associated with the feelings of warmth, the smell of the fresh salty air, and the tingling feeling produced by the caress of the gentle breeze. Each of these sensations is pleasurable or 'pleasure-giving'. Each is, in my terminology, a sensory pleasure.

Propositional pleasure is another matter. We ascribe propositional pleasure to a person when we say that he is pleased that something or other is the case; when we say that he takes pleasure in something or other's being the case; when we say that he is pleased about something or other's

being the case, etc. Consider a man with smart children. Suppose he 
learns that his children have gotten report cards filled with 'A's. This is a 
source of pride and satisfaction for him. He is pleased that his children 
have gotten good report cards. In this case, the man's pleasure has an 
'object', and the object is a proposition (the proposition that his children 
have gotten good report cards). Thus, he is experiencing propositional 
pleasure.

Much more could be said about the distinction between sensory and 
propositional pleasure. However, my present purpose is not to clarify or 
explain this distinction. It is merely to draw attention to the fact that the 
distinction exists. Furthermore, I fear that if I were to discuss the distinc-
tion much further at this point, I would enter controversial territory. For 
now, it will be sufficient to take note of the fact that some hedonic phe-
nomena seem to be primarily sensory phenomena. Others seem to involve 
a propositional attitude. Later, I will attempt to sharpen the distinction.

3.

One thing to notice about sensory pleasure is its apparent heterogeneity. 
The man on the beach enjoys some pleasurable smells as well as some 
pleasurable feelings of warmth. Each of these sensations is pleasant, plea-
surable, 'pleasure-giving'. Some would find nothing odd in saying that 
each of these sensations 'is a pleasure'. Nevertheless, from the strictly 
phenomenological perspective, they seem to have very little in common. 
One is an olfactory sensation -- it is the smell of fresh, salty air. The other 
is an all-over bodily feeling of warmth. Aside from the fact that they are 
experienced simultaneously and by the same person in the example, they 
seem to be utterly unlike.

In order to see the heterogeneity of sensory pleasures even more 
clearly, consider the pleasurable sensations you get when you eat delicious, 
salty peanuts and drink sparkling, cold beer. The taste of the peanuts is a 
pleasure. The taste of the beer is a pleasure. Yet, unless your taste sensa-
tions are profoundly unlike mine, the taste of the peanuts has little in com-
mon with the taste of the beer. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that we 
who love to eat peanuts while we drink beer love this, at least in part, be-
cause of the remarkable contrast between the two leading sensations in-
volved. (The phenomenological contrast between the taste of cold beer and 
the feelings of warmth enjoyed while sunbathing is even more striking -- 
yet each of these may be a sensory pleasure.)

Sensory pleasures, then, are a heterogeneous collection of sensa-
tions. Yet each member of the set is a pleasure. Why is this so? Is there 
some interesting feature common to all sensory pleasures? If so, what is 
it? These questions serve to identify the first question about pleasure. We 
can call it 'the heterogeneity question'. It is a question about sensory plea-
sures, and it can be stated succinctly: Is there some feature common to all sensory pleasures, in virtue of which they are pleasures? If so, what is it? The same question could be asked, perhaps in a more old-fashioned way, by asking 'what is the nature of sensory pleasure?'

4.

The second question concerns certain relations between the concept of sensory pleasure and the concept of propositional pleasure.

We use the word 'pleasure' and various cognates to indicate what seems to be a fundamentally sensory phenomenon -- sensory pleasure. We also use these words to indicate what seems to be a propositional attitude -- propositional pleasure. This leads me to wonder whether there is some interesting semantical connection between the two uses, and whether there is some interesting necessary connection between the two phenomena. There are several main possibilities here.

It might turn out that the two styles of talk are directly intertranslatable. Perhaps each is a mere stylistic variant of the other. In this case, it would be misleading to say that sensory pleasure and propositional pleasure are two different hedonic phenomena. It would be more appropriate to say that there is a certain hedonic phenomenon that can be expressed either in the sensory mode or in the propositional mode. The choice of linguistic mode would be determined on stylistic, rather than ontological, grounds.

A second possibility is that the fundamental hedonic phenomenon is sensory pleasure. It might be the case that there is a certain phenomenological feature present in all and only cases of sensory pleasure, and that when we say that someone is experiencing sensory pleasure, we are just saying that he is having a sensory experience with this feature. The concept of propositional pleasure, on the other hand, might be definable by appeal to the concept of sensory pleasure. For example, it might turn out that when we say that someone takes propositional pleasure in some state of affairs, we just mean that that state of affairs causes him to experience sensory pleasure. In this case, I would be inclined to say that sensory pleasure has a sort of conceptual primacy over propositional pleasure. The concept of sensory pleasure would, in this case, be the more fundamental of the two, and the concept of propositional pleasure would be definable in terms of it. A number of distinguished philosophers have defended various versions of this view.

The third possibility is the reverse of the second. Perhaps the concept of propositional pleasure is the more fundamental, and the concept of sensory pleasure is to be analyzed by appeal to it. If we took this approach, we might say that the fundamental hedonic phenomenon is not a feeling, or a sensation. Rather, we would say that the fundamental hedonic
phenomenon is a propositional attitude we can take toward a state of affairs -- something in this respect like hope, or fear, or belief. If we adopted this approach we might go on to say that statements about sensory pleasure are analyzable by appeal to statements about propositional pleasure. For example, we might maintain that a statement to the effect that someone feels sensory pleasure just means that there are some feelings such that he takes propositional pleasure in the fact that he has them. In this case, we could say that propositional pleasure has conceptual primacy over sensory pleasure.

A final possibility should be mentioned. It might turn out that the concepts of sensory and propositional pleasure are independent -- perhaps statements about sensory pleasure neither entail nor are entailed by statements about propositional pleasure. Perhaps it is just an accident that we use such similar forms of speech to indicate the two phenomena. Perhaps there are at best some analogies between the case in which a person feels sensory pleasure and the case in which someone takes propositional pleasure in some state of affairs.³

So we have our second question about pleasure. Are there any conceptual links between sensory and propositional pleasure? Is either concept definable by appeal to the other? Is either conceptually prior to the other? What is the nature of the conceptual linkage, if any, between sensory and propositional pleasure? We can call this 'the linkage question'.

In order to sharpen the questions, as well as to demonstrate their legitimacy, it may be worthwhile to consider some of the most attractive answers that have been proposed. I start with the heterogeneity question.

5.

We sometimes say that pleasurable sensations 'give us pleasure', or that we 'get' or 'derive' pleasure from them. If we take such locutions very seriously, we may arrive at one of the simplest proposed answers to the heterogeneity question.

We might say that the pleasurable feeling of warmth and the pleasurable smell of the fresh salty air in fact do have something in common. However, the common feature is not something that could be discovered by direct phenomenological scrutiny of these sensations. Rather, to discover what they have in common, we would have to reflect upon their causal consequences. It could be claimed that these pleasurable sensations are pleasurable in virtue of the fact that each of them causes a special feeling we might call 'the feeling of pleasure itself'.

When he wrote Principia Ethica, G.E. Moore apparently believed in some version of this view. He there suggested that a person feels sensory pleasure iff
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...his mind, a certain definite mind, distinguished by certain definite marks from all others, has at this moment a certain definite feeling called pleasure.... It is enough for us to know that 'pleased' does mean 'having the sensation of pleasure,' and though pleasure is absolutely indefinable, though pleasure is pleasure and nothing else whatever, yet we feel no difficulty in saying that we are pleased.4

This first, or Moorean, view seems to be based on the idea that there are really two different sorts of sensory pleasure. Some sensory experiences are sensory pleasures because they are feelings of this 'certain definite feeling called pleasure,' or 'pleasure itself'. These would be the most fundamental hedonic phenomena. Other sensory experiences are sensory pleasures of a derived sort. They are said to be pleasures because they are feelings that immediately cause feelings of the first sort.5 Whenever a person experiences pleasure itself, his experience has some determinate intensity. In other words, he feels some particular amount of pleasure itself. When a person has a derived sensory pleasure, his pleasure has two intensities. One is the intensity of the sensation that immediately causes the pleasure, and the other is the intensity of the pleasure it causes. When we say that one derived sensory pleasure is 'greater' than another, we mean that the one causes a more intense feeling of pleasure itself than the other. Pretty obviously, the two intensities may vary independently.

It must be admitted that the Moorean view is suggested by a number of ordinary language expressions, and that it would serve as a basis for a relatively straightforward hedonic calculus. In spite of the fact that it has these attractive features, the Moorean view is not popular. The central difficulty is straightforwardly phenomenological. The alleged sensation of pleasure itself has proven extremely elusive. No matter how carefully they scrutinize their feelings, phenomenological researchers fail to locate the indefinable feeling Moore attempted to indicate.

Another difficulty is epistemic. Suppose I am drinking beer and eating peanuts more or less simultaneously. Suppose each of the tastes is pleasurable. Suppose, however, that the taste of the peanuts is more pleasurable than the taste of the beer. According to the Moorean view, here's what's happening. I am experiencing the taste of beer and the taste of peanuts. Each taste sensation is causing the feeling of pleasure itself. However, the taste of the peanuts is causing a more intense feeling of pleasure itself than is the taste of the beer.

If the Moorean view were true, I would face a certain slight difficulty when I tried to determine which taste is the greater pleasure. For, according to this view, I would be having four simultaneous relevant sensory experiences: the taste of the peanuts, the taste of the beer, and two feelings of pleasure itself, one more intense than the other. While it would be rea-
sonable for me to assume that the feelings of pleasure were being caused by the tastes, I might have to engage in some causal experimentation in order to determine which taste was causing which feeling of pleasure itself. Perhaps I would put aside the beer and munch on peanuts alone for a while. I could then check to see which feeling of pleasure persists. Then I might put aside the peanuts for a while, and take my beer straight. Once again, I could check to see which feeling of pleasure persists. With luck, I might be able to determine which taste sensation was the greater sensory pleasure.

In fact, however, it seems to me that I never have to engage in this sort of causal experimentation in order to determine which of two simultaneous sensations is the more pleasurable. In a case such as the one imagined, I would be able to tell immediately that the taste of the peanuts was more pleasurable than the taste of the beer. Hence, there is something wrong with the epistemology generated by the Moorean view.6

6.

Recent writers on the topic generally maintain that what makes a feeling a sensory pleasure is not how it feels.7 Rather, what makes it a sensory pleasure is the fact that the person who experiences that feeling has a certain attitude toward his having of it. A not-very-plausible version of the view is suggested by Derek Parfit:

> What pains and pleasures have in common are their relations to our desires....all pains are when experienced unwanted, and a pain is worse the more it is unwanted. Similarly, all pleasures are when experienced wanted, and they are better or greater the more they are wanted....one of two experiences is more pleasant if it is preferred.8

Parfit seems to be maintaining that a sensation of any phenomenological sort is a sensory pleasure iff at the time he has it, the person who has that sensation wants to be having it. Taken at face value, the view seems pretty obviously false. Suppose I am doing research for an introspective psychological study of the feeling of dizziness. I want to experience dizziness. I decide that I will spin around until I am dizzy, and then focus on the feeling. Suppose I spin and become dizzy. I might then feel dizzy while wanting to feel dizzy. In spite of all this, my feeling of dizziness would not be a pleasurable feeling. It would not be a sensory pleasure.

One thing to note about this example concerns a distinction between what we might call 'intrinsic desire' and what we might call 'extrinsic desire'. Let's say that a person has an intrinsic desire for a thing iff he desires that thing for itself, *per se*, independently of its consequences and ac-
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companiments. Let's say that a person has an extrinsic desire for a thing iff he desires that thing for something else, such as its anticipated consequences or accompaniments. A miser might desire money intrinsically. The rest of us desire it only extrinsically. In the dizziness example, it is most plausible to suppose that my desire to feel dizzy is purely extrinsic. I want to feel dizzy because I want to understand dizziness, and I think that I have to experience it in order to understand it. Were it not for my research interest in dizziness, I probably would not want to experience that feeling. This suggests a slight modification of Parfit's proposal. Perhaps a feeling is a sensory pleasure iff, at the time he has it, the person who has that feeling intrinsically desires to have it.

This proposal is more plausible than its predecessor, but is still not right. Further consideration of misers reveals the problem. I suppose that misers start out desiring money purely extrinsically. As time goes by, their desire for money gradually becomes at least partially intrinsic. The same phenomenon might occur in connection with some sensation. Suppose I have been doing research on dizziness for many years. In connection with my research, I have developed a strong extrinsic desire to feel dizzy. As time goes by, I begin to lose interest in my research, and I become more interested in the dizziness for its own sake. On some occasions I spin around to make myself dizzy even though I've long since given up my research project. Dizziness, which I formerly desired only extrinsically, is now something I desire at least partially intrinsically. Nevertheless, the feeling of dizziness, when I get it, may fail to be a sensory pleasure.

A thoroughly indoctrinated ascetic provides a counterexample in the other direction. He may be utterly convinced that pleasure is worthless. As a result of this conviction, he may lose all extrinsic desire for pleasure. Eventually, however, he may find that he has no desire for pleasure. When some sensory pleasure occurs, he has neither intrinsic nor extrinsic desire to be having that sensation. Thus, we cannot say that sensory pleasures are feelings that are intrinsically desired.

A final version of the propositional attitude view was suggested by Sidgwick. Sidgwick defines sensory pleasure as:

...feeling which the sentient individual at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be desirable; desirable, that is, when considered merely as feeling, and not in respect of its objective conditions or consequences...

Sidgwick's view is structurally quite like the views we have just considered. According to it, a feeling is a sensory pleasure in virtue of the fact that the person who experiences that feeling has a certain attitude toward it. The distinctive feature of Sidgwick's approach concerns the nature of the attitude. Whereas others appealed to such attitudes as preference, desire,
and intrinsic desire, Sidgwick appeals to 'apprehension as intrinsically desirable'. This seems pretty implausible.

Any antitheodist who sincerely maintains that some sensory pleasures are intrinsically worthless or evil would apparently serve to refute Sidgwick's view. For any such person could experience a sensory pleasure without believing that feeling to be intrinsically good. I assume that such a person experiences sensory pleasure but does not 'apprehend it to be intrinsically desirable as feeling'.

It also seems to me that a person might apprehend some nonpleasurable sensory experience to be intrinsically desirable. For example, a person might observe a child suffering undeserved pain. The observation of this unjustified evil might produce a painful feeling of anger. G.E. Moore and others would say that this painful feeling of anger is intrinsically good. While it is not entirely clear to me that this would count as a case of 'apprehending a feeling to be intrinsically desirable, it certainly seems close. If it is, then it shows that it is possible for someone to apprehend a feeling to be intrinsically desirable, even though that feeling is not a sensory pleasure.

There are other proposed answers to the heterogeneity question, but I prefer not to canvass them here. I hope this relatively brief survey suffices to show that there is a genuine question about the nature of sensory pleasure; that a number of distinguished and insightful philosophers have proposed or suggested answers; and that many of these answers are in one way or another unsatisfactory. Let us turn now to the second question about pleasure -- what is the linkage (if any) between sensory and propositional pleasure?

So far as I know, only a few philosophers have attempted to answer the linkage question. While they have given a few different answers, their answers are alike in several important respects. These philosophers seem to agree (a) that sensory pleasure is the more fundamental hedonic phenomenon, that (b) propositional pleasure is to be analyzed by appeal to sensory, and that (c) when we say that a person takes propositional pleasure in some state of affairs, we are saying something to the effect that there is some causal connection somehow involving that state of affairs and some experience of sensory pleasure.

One version of this approach has been suggested by a few philosophers. It's not clear to me that any of these philosophers would defend it in this simple form. We might say that a person is pleased that p iff p causes him to feel sensory pleasure. In other words, a person takes propositional pleasure in a state of affairs iff that state of affairs 'makes him pleased' -- or causes him to experience sensory pleasure.
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This view seems to me to be confused. Clearly, there is a difference between the case in which someone is pleased as a result of some state of affairs, and the case in which he is pleased that that state of affairs is occurring. As I see it, the proposed analysis runs these things together. To highlight the difference, consider a case in which a sensory pleasure is being caused by factors of which the subject is unaware. For example, suppose that suitable electrodes have been implanted in a man's brain, but he is unaware of their presence. When a slight current is passed through the electrodes, the man experiences a sensory pleasure -- it feels like the pleasurable sensations one normally has while lying on a warm tropical beach. The cause of the man's sensory pleasure is the passage of current through the electrodes. In this case it would be correct to say that the man is pleased as a result of the passage of current through the electrodes in his brain, but it would be wrong to say that the subject of the experiment is pleased that a slight current has been passed through the electrodes in his brain.

This example suggests a slight alteration of the proposal. Perhaps we should say that a person takes propositional pleasure in a state of affairs, p, iff he is aware that p is the case, and p causes him to experience sensory pleasure.

Further reflection on the example shows, however, that this modification doesn't constitute any improvement. Suppose we tell the electrode-man that there are some electrodes in his brain, and that the passage of current in them is causing him to feel sensory pleasure. Now he's aware of the cause of his sensory pleasure. Still, he might not be at all pleased that there are electrodes in his brain, and he might not be pleased that current is being passed through them. He might be an unwilling and unhappy participant in what seems to him to be a thoroughly ghoulish experiment.

A slightly different thesis about the linkage between sensory and propositional pleasure was apparently maintained by Brentano. He held that love and hate are two utterly fundamental, unanalyzable attitudes. To love a state of affairs is to have some sort of 'pro-attitude' toward it. It is to favor it, to like it, to be 'for' it. Brentano maintained that a person's love of some state of affairs may cause him to experience sensory pleasure. When this happens, the sensory pleasure is said to 'redound from' the love of the state of affairs. In a remarkable passage, Brentano cites two alleged historical instances of this phenomenon:
When Newton read that his astronomical hypotheses had been confirmed by new measurements, his joy became more and more intense and he was finally so overcome that he could no longer continue reading. He succumbed to the intensive sensuous pleasure which had rebounded from his higher feelings. The same was true of Archimedes when he called out "Eureka!" as though intoxicated. Even those pleasures one may take in the awareness of virtue or vice may give rise to violent sensuous passions.\textsuperscript{19}

Chisholm interprets Brentano as having held that a person takes propositional pleasure in a proposition just in case his love of that proposition causes him to experience some sensory pleasure.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, in the example concerning Newton, this is what happened: Let 'C' indicate the proposition that Newton's hypotheses had been confirmed by new measurements. Newton loved C. His love of C caused Newton to experience some sensory pleasure. When we say that Newton took propositional pleasure in C, what we mean is that his love of C caused him to experience sensory pleasure. In general, we can say that when sensory pleasure rebounds from someone's love of a state of affairs, he then takes propositional pleasure in that state of affairs. Let us formulate the Brentano-Chisholm version of the view in question as follows:

\begin{align*}
PP: & \quad s \text{ takes propositional pleasure in } p \text{ at } t \rightleftharpoons s\text{'s love of } p\text{ at } t \text{ causes } s \text{ to experience sensory pleasure at } t.
\end{align*}

I assume that the intensity of a person's propositional pleasure in a state of affairs is equal to the intensity of the sensory pleasure he feels as a result of his love of that state of affairs.

In order to see how the Brentano-Chisholm proposal is supposed to work, consider again the man with smart children. Suppose the children come home from school, and present their report cards to their father. He sees that they have gotten good grades. He loves the fact that they have gotten good grades. His love of this fact causes him to experience some pleasurable sensations. Perhaps the pleasurable sensations are internal, bodily feelings. Maybe he feels a pleasurable 'glow of pride'. The precise nature of the sensory pleasure does not matter. So long as his love of the fact that they got good grades causes him to feel some sensory pleasure, it is correct to say that he is pleased that they got good grades.

The Brentano-Chisholm view does not generate incorrect results in the case of the electrode-man. Let E be the state of affairs of current being passed in the electrodes in the man's brain. E causes the man to feel sensory pleasure. On the Brentano-Chisholm view, this fact is irrelevant. The question here is whether the man's love of E causes him to feel sensory pleasure. If the electrode-man were like me, he wouldn't love E at all, and so his love of E wouldn't cause anything. Thus, we don't have to say that
the electrode-man is pleased that current is being passed in the electrodes in his brain.

The Brentano-Chisholm view seems to me to face a number of difficulties. One problem is straightforwardly phenomenological. Sometimes when I take pleasure in some state of affairs, I do not experience any sensory pleasure. For example, there have been cases in which I was introduced to someone, and in which I was genuinely pleased that I was meeting that person, but in which I did not experience anything I would naturally call sensory pleasure. In one case that I recall pretty clearly, I was being introduced to a distinguished, elderly philosopher. There was nothing aesthetically pleasing about him, and so my visual experiences on that occasion were not sensory pleasures. His hand was somewhat limp and clammy, and so the tactual sensations associated with shaking his hand were not sensory pleasures. In spite of all this, I am certain that I was very pleased to be meeting him. It is therefore impossible to explain my propositional pleasure by claiming that my love of the fact that I was meeting this man caused me to feel some sensory pleasure. In the case described, I didn't feel any sensory pleasure, and so my love of the state of affairs of my meeting him evidently did not cause any sensory pleasure.

Another difficulty for any such view is this: we can surely imagine a person who has been so anesthetized that he temporarily cannot experience any sensory pleasure. For example, consider a man who has been in a motorcycle accident, and who has been shot full of a powerful anesthetic. Suppose this man can feel neither sensory pleasures nor sensory pains. He may nevertheless be pleased to find that he's still alive. Clearly, then, we cannot maintain that his propositional pleasure is to be explained by saying that his love of the fact that he is alive causes him to feel sensory pleasure.

A final difficulty is epistemic. Suppose a man is pleased about two different things at once. For example, suppose he's pleased that his son got good grades (S) and he's also pleased that his daughter got good grades (D). Suppose, finally, that he's more pleased about D than he is about S. If the Brentano-Chisholm causal view were true, the man would be loving two states of affairs simultaneously, and each love would be causing a sensory pleasure. The sensory pleasure caused by the love of D would be greater than the sensory pleasure caused by S.

It seems to me that, if this were an accurate account of the man's circumstance, then the man would face a certain difficulty if he tried to figure out whether he was more pleased about S or D. For he would have to determine which love was the cause of which sensory pleasure. However, it seems to me that we generally don't face this sort of difficulty when we reflect on our propositional pleasures. I think that if I were in this man's situation, and I reflected on the question whether I was more pleased about S or D, I would not have to engage in any causal experimentation in order to reach a decision. Hence, it seems to me that the Brentano-Chisholm view generates the wrong epistemology for propositional pleasure.
So it seems to me that the linkage question is legitimate, too. It is reasonable to suppose that there is some connection between the concept of sensory pleasure and the concept of propositional pleasure, but none of the suggestions considered here is fully adequate.

In the final sections of this paper, I will propose my own answer to the linkage question and my own answer to the heterogeneity question. Perhaps surprisingly, I give only one answer. I believe that this single answer suffices for both questions. I turn now to the presentation of that answer.

My answer to the heterogeneity question is, roughly, this: all sensory pleasures are alike in virtue of the fact the individuals who have them take a certain sort of propositional pleasure in the fact that they have them when they have them. My answer to the linkage question is, roughly, this: when we say that a person experiences sensory pleasure, what we mean is that there is a sensation such that he then takes a certain sort of propositional pleasure in the fact that he has that sensation. Thus, both questions are answered by appeal to a special sort of propositional pleasure, which for present purposes I take as an unanalyzed conceptual primitive.

Since I take propositional pleasure as conceptually primary, it is incumbent upon me to attempt to make this concept reasonably clear before going on. I now turn to that project.

Propositional pleasure is a 'pro-attitude'. It belongs in the same family as wanting, and favorably evaluating. It is like these pro-attitudes in several respects. One of these concerns intensity. A person may be pleased that $p$ is true, and pleased that $q$ is true, but he may be more pleased about $p$ than he is about $q$.

Propositional pleasure is different from these other propositional attitudes. I may want something to occur without being pleased that it is occurring. This happens most naturally when I am convinced that it isn't happening. Some have suggested that propositional pleasure can be identified with the conjunction of belief and desire. The idea here is that someone is pleased that $p$ is the case iff he believes that $p$ is the case and wants $p$ to be the case.

While propositional pleasure is quite like belief plus desire, I think there are some subtle differences. One difference concerns what we might call 'non-hedonic sources of desire'. Suppose I think I deserve some punishment. I might be such a fanatic about justice that I actually want to get that punishment. Then, when I am getting the punishment, it might be correct to say that I want to be punished, and I believe that I am being punished, even though it would not be quite right to say that I am pleased that I am being punished. As I see it, to be pleased about a state of affairs,
one must have a slightly different pro-attitude toward it -- one must 'welcome' that state of affairs.

Another difference concerns the case in which I want a certain state of affairs to occur and think it will, but in which the state of affairs is far in the future, and my belief in it is thoroughly unjustified. Suppose for example that I want the weather to be fair next week, and, without good evidence, think it will be. It still seems wrong to say that I am pleased that next week's weather will be fair. Perhaps it would be better to say that I confidently hope that next week's weather will be fair.

It might be suggested that to take pleasure in some state of affairs is just to take that state of affairs to be good. Once again, however, it seems to me that there are some subtle differences. Suppose I love the taste of beer and peanuts and am right now drinking some beer and eating some especially good peanuts. Suppose I am aware of the fact that a certain neighbor is also drinking beer and eating peanuts right now. Let F be the proposition that I am drinking beer and eating peanuts now, and let N be the proposition that my neighbor is doing likewise. I might take more pleasure in F than I do in N, even though I recognize that F is not more valuable than N. My axiological intuitions tell me that F and N are equal in value. If I'm sufficiently fairminded, I might even fail to prefer F to N. For all that, I take more pleasure in F than I do in N. I am more pleased that F is occurring than I am that N is occurring. I believe that this case shows that taking pleasure in a state of affairs is different from believing it to be good.

More extreme examples can be imagined. A thoroughly malicious person might take pleasure in some state of affairs even though he was utterly convinced that it was quite bad. For example, a cruel-hearted and envious person might take pleasure in a rival's suffering without for a moment believing it to be good that his rival suffers.

Some propositional attitudes are 'truth-entailing' -- if a person stands in such an attitude toward some proposition, then that proposition must be true. A good example here is knowledge. Some philosophers have suggested that propositional pleasure is in this way a truth-entailing attitude. According to this view, I cannot be pleased that my children have done well in school unless they have.

My own impression is that propositional pleasure is not truth-entailing. I am convinced by examples such as this: suppose some children are in fact not doing well in school, but have become expert counterfeiters. They produce remarkably realistic counterfeit report cards. The grades on the counterfeits are far superior to those on the genuine articles. They present the counterfeit report cards to their father, who is taken in by the hoax. He thinks they are doing very well in school, and is pleased about this. He says, 'I am pleased that my children are doing so well in school.'

I would say, in a case such as this, that the father's statement might be correct. As I see it, one can take propositional pleasure in a state of af-
fairs even though that state of affairs is not occurring. Some philosophers seem to agree with me.23 Others clearly disagree.24 For present purposes, it may be best to settle for a compromise.

Imagine two fathers, as alike as possible. Each is joyfully studying his children's report cards. Each is noting an unbroken string of 'As', and each is (as I would put it) pleased that his children are doing well in school. Imagine further that one of these fathers is studying a genuine report card that accurately reflects his children's academic successes. The other is studying a carefully contrived counterfeit that reflects his children's growing expertise in counterfeiting. Surely, the two fathers are alike in some important respect. I see nothing wrong with saying that each is pleased that his children are doing well in school. If this seems a violation of ordinary linguistic practice, we may introduce a notational convenience. Let us say that one father is pleased that his children are doing well. (This father is the one whose children are in fact doing well.) We can say that the other father is pleased* that his children are doing well. (This is the father of the counterfeiters.) From here on, when I speak of propositional pleasure, I mean to indicate the attitude expressed by the statement that someone is pleased* that something is the case.

Virtually all writers on the topic agree that propositional pleasure entails belief. If you are pleased that something is the case, then you believe it is the case. Some even go so far as to say that propositional pleasure entails knowledge.25 Since I have stipulated that propositional pleasure is not truth-entailing, I am committed to denying this last thesis.

Having said these few words in an attempt to clarify the concept of propositional pleasure, I want to turn to the central projects: explaining the nature of sensory pleasure and describing the conceptual linkage between it and propositional pleasure.

8.1

Consider what happens when a happy sunbather enjoys the warmth of the sunshine on a tropical beach. He has a certain sensory property -- the property of feeling warmth in a certain way. Let's call this property 'W'. Suppose a certain sunbather, s, is characterized by W at a time, t. Then a certain state of affairs occurs. It is [Ws,t]. While it involves a certain violation of ordinary English, we can say that this state of affairs is a 'sensation'. In general, we can say that if F is a sensory property, s a potential sensor, and t a time, then the state of affairs of s having F at t (or [Fs,t]) is a potential sensation. If s exemplifies F at t, then it is an actual sensation.

We might propose to explain sensory pleasure by saying that a sensation is a sensory pleasure iff the sensor takes propositional pleasure in it at the time of its occurrence. In other words:
TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT PLEASURE

SP1: [Fs,t] is a sensory pleasure iff [Fs,t] is a sensation, [Fs,t] occurs, and s takes propositional pleasure in [Fs,t] at t.

Unfortunately, this approach is too simple. There are obvious counterexamples. Suppose a man has been in a terrible motorcycle accident. Now he's recuperating in the hospital. He feels numb all over. The doctor tells him that he might be permanently paralyzed -- but then again it might just be temporary. He tells the motorcyclist to concentrate on the feelings in his toes. If he feels an unpleasant stinging sensation in his toes, then he will surely recover completely. The motorcyclist focusses on his toes. Soon he begins to feel a stinging sensation. He is delighted. He takes propositional pleasure in the fact that he feels a stinging sensation in his toes. Contrary to what SP1 says, the sensation is not a sensory pleasure. It is painful.

In order to improve upon SP1, it will be necessary to distinguish intrinsic propositional pleasure from extrinsic propositional pleasure. Sometimes a person takes propositional pleasure in a state of affairs purely for its own sake. For example, consider a person who loves the taste of peanuts. Suppose he is eating some peanuts and is savoring the taste. He may take pleasure in the fact that he is experiencing that taste. It may be that all of the pleasure he takes in this fact is 'intrinsic' -- none of it is derived from anticipations or expectations of other things to which the tasting of the peanuts may lead. He takes pleasure in the tasting entirely 'for its own sake'.

Sometimes a person takes propositional pleasure in one thing because he takes propositional pleasure in another. A common example concerns money. An ordinary, non-miserly person may take pleasure in the fact that he has a lot of money. Of course, if he's non-miserly, he takes pleasure in having the money only because he recognizes that his possession of the money enables him to purchase various items that he wants to purchase. If he discovered that money had become worthless, he might no longer take propositional pleasure in the fact that he has so much of it.

In other cases, a person takes pleasure in one thing not because he thinks that thing will enable him to get another, but because the first thing somehow is an indicator, or sign, of the other thing. For example, consider again the man who takes pleasure in his children's good report cards. He takes pleasure in the fact that they got good grades, not because he thinks it will enable his children to become good students, and surely not because he thinks it will cause them to be good students, but because it serves as good evidence for the belief that they already are good students. He takes pleasure in their being good students.

Whenever a person takes pleasure in any of these ways in one thing because of another we may say that his pleasure in the first is 'extrinsic
propositional pleasure'. The second thing may be said to be the 'source' of
the derived pleasure in the second.

For my purposes here, the central concept is the concept of intrinsic
propositional pleasure. We must recognize that not all intrinsic pleasure is
pure intrinsic pleasure. It is possible for a person to take some intrinsic
pleasure in a state of affairs while also taking some extrinsic pleasure in
that state of affairs. For example, my doctor might tell me that my health
would be improved if I were to enjoy myself more. Then, when I experi-
ence some pleasurable sensation, I might take both intrinsic and extrinsic
propositional pleasure in the fact that I am feeling that sensation.

8.2.

A more plausible account of sensory pleasures is based on the concept of
intrinsic propositional pleasure. According to this view, a sensation is a
sensory pleasure iff its sensor takes intrinsic propositional pleasure in it at
the time of its occurrence. In other words:

SP2: [Fs,t] is a sensory pleasure iff [Fs,t] is a sensation,
[Fs,t] occurs, and s takes intrinsic propositional pleasure in
[Fs,t] at t.

SP2 does not go astray in the case of the injured motorcyclist. Though
he takes pleasure in the stinging sensation in his toes, he does not
take intrinsic pleasure in that stinging. His pleasure is entirely derived.
He takes pleasure in the stinging sensation because he believes that it is a
sign that he will not be paralyzed, and he's pleased that he will not be par-
alyzed.

Nevertheless, SP2 is not quite right. A rather complicated case will
reveal the difficulty. Suppose I am an unhappy old sadist. I am unhappy,
let us suppose, because I have a miserable toothache. On my way to the
dentist's office, I pass a large mirror. I mistake the mirror for a window. I
look into the mirror and see an unhappy-looking old man, obviously suf-
fening from a toothache. I take intrinsic propositional pleasure in the old
man's sensation. Unbeknownst to me, the old man with the toothache is
me.

In this sort of case, SP2 yields the result that the old sadist's
toothache is a sensory pleasure. This seems wrong to me, in spite of the
fact that the old sadist takes intrinsic pleasure in it. Thus, I want to intro-
duce a modification into SP2.

8.3

We must distinguish between the case in which I take pleasure in s's hav-
ing F, and s happens to be me, and the case in which I take pleasure in the
fact that I myself have F. The former sort of case (illustrated by the sadist who sees himself in the mirror) is not relevant to my present purposes. For present purposes, it will be necessary to focus on the second sort of case.

Suppose that \([Ws,t]\) is the state of affairs of \(s\) feeling warmth at \(t\), and suppose that I am \(s\). Even though \([Ws,t]\) is directly about me, I might take pleasure in \([Ws,t]\) without recognizing that it is I myself who is the feeler of the warmth in \([Ws,t]\). This would be a case of 'de re pleasure in a sensation that happens to be mine'. On the other hand, suppose that I take pleasure in the fact that I myself am feeling warmth now. Suppose I have no doubt or confusion about the identity of the person experiencing the warmth. I correctly take him to be me. This would be a straightforward case of 'de se pleasure'.

Another sort of de se pleasure involves much less self-awareness. Suppose I am enjoying the warmth on the tropical beach. Suppose I am drowsy and non-self-conscious. I am pleased to be feeling this lovely warmth, but I am not giving any thought to the identity of the feeler of the warmth. I am not consciously taking him to be me, and I am not consciously taking him to be anyone else. I'm just not thinking of him.

Some philosophers might hesitate to say, in a case such as this, that I am experiencing de se pleasure.\(^{27}\) The problem, as they see it, is that one cannot have a de se attitude unless one has 'active self-awareness'. My own view is different. On my view, a person can have a de se attitude even though he is not aware of himself. As I see it, when a non-self-conscious person is pleased to be warm, he has a de se attitude. He is pleased that he himself is warm.

The proper analysis of de se attitudes is a matter of controversy. It isn't clear that de se attitudes are genuinely propositional attitudes, and so it is not clear that de se propositional pleasure takes a proposition as its object. It might be that there is no such proposition as the proposition that I myself am feeling warmth. Perhaps it would be better to say that the object of a de se attitude is a property.\(^{28}\) My proposal about pleasure can be stated in the propositional style as follows:

SP3: [Fs,t] is a sensory pleasure iff [Fs,t] is a sensation, [Fs,t] occurs, and s takes intrinsic de se propositional pleasure in [Fs,t] at t.

A variant of SP3 can be stated in a 'non-propositional' form as follows:

SP3*: [Fs,t] is a sensory pleasure iff [Fs,t] is a sensation, [Fs,t] occurs, and s is intrinsically pleased at t that he himself is feeling F at t.
Yet another variant can be stated in a manner that may seem to some to be better suited to the case of non-self-conscious individuals:

SP3": [Fs,t] is a sensory pleasure iff [Fs,t] is a sensation, [Fs,t] occurs, and s is intrinsically pleased at t to be feeling F.

I believe that these three versions of my view are equivalent. Obviously, I will not be able to defend this view here.

According to my account, here's what happens when the happy sunbather experiences sensory pleasure on the beach: there is a certain sensory property, W, which characterizes people if and only if they are feeling warmth in a certain way. The sunbather, s, is characterized by W at t. The state of affairs, [Ws,t] is a sensation. At t, the sunbather is intrinsically pleased to be characterized by W.

In every case of sensory pleasure, there are two relevant 'amounts' or intensities. One is the intensity of the sensation, indicated by 'F' in SP3. The other is the intensity of the propositional pleasure that the sensor takes in F. These amounts vary independently. Thus, a certain feeling of warmth may be a sensory pleasure, and yet, as that feeling of warmth becomes more intense, it may become less of a pleasure. This explains the somewhat paradoxical fact that more intense pleasures are sometimes less pleasurable.

Now we can see how a single answer suffices for both questions. I propose to answer the heterogeneity question by saying this: all sensory pleasures are alike in virtue of the fact that the people who experience them take intrinsic de se propositional pleasure in the fact that they are having them. I propose to answer the linkage question by claiming that the concept of sensory pleasure is analyzable by appeal to the concept of propositional pleasure. More specifically, according to my suggestion, when we say that a person is experiencing sensory pleasure, what we mean is that there is some sensation he is having such that he is intrinsically pleased to be having that sensation. So, on my view, propositional pleasure is the more fundamental concept, and the concept of sensory pleasure can be analyzed by appeal to it.29

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NOTES

1 In the Philebus, Socrates says, 'Pleasure] has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance, -- that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? How foolish would any one
be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!' Plato, *Philebus* 12b.

2 Several versions of this view are discussed below in Section 8.

3 Perhaps there are other possibilities. This should suffice.

4 Moore [1962], p. 12. I have no reason to suppose that Moore continued to hold this view as he matured.

5 Examples such as the following show why it is important to include the 'immediately': suppose a person experiences some painful feeling, F₁. Sadistic by-standers start to laugh. The victim doesn't know what they are laughing about, and begins to laugh, too. He experiences a happy feeling, F₂. F₂ causes a feeling of pleasure itself. We might want to say that F₂ is a sensory pleasure. However, we don't want to say that F₁ was a sensory pleasure, even though it indirectly caused a feeling of pleasure itself. Hence the need for 'immediately'.

6 In Kenny [1963], p. 129, Kenny presents an argument substantially like this one. Commenting on a view relevantly like the one here under consideration, he says, 'It would be possible to make exactly the same mistakes about what was giving one pleasure as it is possible to make about what has given one a stomach-ache. If, say, one had enjoyed listening to the first performance of a new overture, it would be a mere hypothesis that what one had enjoyed was listening to the overture and not, say, sitting in row G of the dress circle. This hypothesis would need to be verified in accordance with Mill's canons: ...' Kenny claims that the argument is a development of one used by Ryle in Ryle [1956]. In Ryle [1949] and [1954], Ryle presented several further arguments against this sort of view. Ryle's arguments have become the focus of much later discussion. See especially Alston [1967], Penelhum [1964], and Penelhum [1957].

7 Another once-popular view is the so-called 'hedonic tone theory' defended by Duncker in Duncker [1940]. According to this view, every sensory experience can be evaluated with respect to its position on the 'pleasure/pain dimension'. If an experience has a phenomenally given positive hedonic tone, then it belongs in the upper part of the pleasure/pain dimension, and is a sensory pleasure. If it has a phenomenally given negative hedonic tone, then it belongs in the lower part of the pleasure/pain dimension, and is a sensory pain. Otherwise, the experience rates a zero in the pleasure/pain dimension, and is neither a sensory pleasure nor a sensory pain. Other notable defenders of the hedonic tone theory include C.D.Broad and Moritz Schlick. See Perry [1967], pp. 193-4 for discussion and references. See Brandt [1959], p. 305 for criticism.

8 Parfit [1984], pp. 493-4.

9 I use 'intrinsic desire' and 'extrinsic desire' in such a way as to make it possible for a person to have both sorts of desire for a given thing at a given time. A person who is partially miserly might have this sort of mixed desire for money. I use 'purely intrinsic desire' and 'purely extrinsic desire' to indicate unmixed cases.

10 In Brandt [1959], Brandt discusses this sort of view. At one place, he considers the view that "x is pleasant' simply means, 'x is a part of my experience that I wish to continue on its own account". He offers some modifications, but eventually (307) accepts an analysis according to which pleasures are intrinsically desired parts of experience.

11 Sidgwick [1962], pp. 131.
12 I am here overlooking some complexities in Sidgwick's view. Other passages (111) suggest that he wants to provide a sort of naturalistic analysis of the meaning of 'desirable'.

13 Moore [1962], p. 217 says, 'Yet pity for the undeserved sufferings of others, endurance of pain to ourselves, and a defiant hatred of evil dispositions in ourselves or in others, seem to be undoubtedly admirable in themselves; ...'. Brentano maintained a similar view.

14 In Goldstein [1985], p. 54, Goldstein hints at a few possibilities. One of these is that sensory pleasures are feelings to which we are normally 'attracted'.

15 This view is discussed in Penelhum [1964], p. 228: 'To say that someone took pleasure in something would therefore be to say that it caused him to experience this feeling.' It would also be interesting to compare this simple view to the far more sophisticated one defended by Wayne Davis in Davis [1981b]. There Davis says: 'A is pleased that p iff it makes A happy that p.' (p. 308)

16 Part of the difficulty here may be due to sloppy usage. Some of us use 'I am pleased because p' in such a way as to make it unclear whether we mean to say that p is the cause or whether we mean to say that p is the object of our pleasure. Perhaps this lends credibility to the view that p is the object of our pleasure iff it is the cause. B. A. O. Williams noted this confusion (Williams [1959], p. 57) and presented a neat argument to show that the view is confused. Suppose I erroneously believe that I have just inherited a large sum of money. That I inherited the money may be the object of my pleasure, but, since it hasn't occurred, it cannot be the cause of my pleasure.

17 This critical point probably would not apply to the view defended by Davis. I hope to discuss Davis's view in detail elsewhere.

18 Brentano [1969], p. 155. Brentano goes on to suggest that Aristotle held a view much like his own, and suggests that it can be found in Book X of the Nichomachean Ethics. Brentano's theory is reformulated and defended by Chisholm in [forthcoming a], Chapter 3, pp. 15-22, and [forthcoming b], 11-16.

19 Brentano [1969], 155.


21 In Gordon [1974], Gordon discusses this point in a section entitled 'How to Find Out What You are Angry About: The Hard Way.' My impression is that Gordon thinks that you can find out what you're angry about by subjecting yourself to 'neurological studies'. My hunch is that such studies could at best reveal what is 'making you angry'. If I'm right, Gordon has confused being made angry by p with being angry that p. I formerly thought I understood some of the fundamentals of the epistemology of pleasure. Conversations with Jaegwon Kim convinced me that things are a bit less clear than I took them to be. I hope to return to this topic.

22 Davis [1981a], p. 113. 'Someone is happy that it is going to rain if he is certain that it will and wants it to.' Of course, Davis mentions happiness, not pleasure. However, if, as he suggests elsewhere, these are identical, we get the desired result. See Davis [1981b], pp. 306-7 where Davis says, 'I believe that pleasure can be identified
with occurrent, nonrelational happiness. A person experiences pleasure if, and only if, he experiences happiness."

23 Terence Penelhum seems to be a good example. "We are often pleased by a supposed fact which is not a fact at all; ... Pleasure at any agreeable piece of misinformation will fit into this category, as when I am pleased to hear the false report that the horse I bet on has won the race." Penelhum [1964], p. 84. I understand Penelhum to be saying that it is possible for a person to be pleased that his horse has won, even though in fact his horse has not won.

Chisholm seems to be another example. In Chisholm [forthcoming a], Chapter 3, Section 7, he discusses the case of Charles Evans Hughes, who for a time thought he had been elected President of the United States. Chisholm suggests that as a matter of ordinary language, we would not say that Hughes was pleased that he won. However, Chisholm says, "Surely the object of his pleasure was his winning the election -- not his coming to believe that he had won the election." Chisholm suggests that we should 'violate our ordinary language' and treat 'pleased that' as non-truth-entailing.

Other examples include Irving Thalberg, who discusses (Thalberg [1962], p. 67) the case of a man who is mistakenly delighted that he won the Irish Sweepstakes; and B. A. O. Williams, who discusses (Williams [1959], p. 57) the case of a person who is pleased that he has inherited a fortune, when in fact he has inherited nothing.

24 Examples include Gordon ([1974], p. 34), and almost all of my friends and colleagues.

25 Wayne Davis says that propositional happiness presupposes knowledge. Davis [1981b], pp. 305-6. Robert Gordon says the same thing. [1974], p. 34.

26 The dizziness example discussed above in Section 6 would also serve to refute this thesis. In that example, a person wanted to experience dizziness and then did so. It would be reasonable to suppose that, when he experienced dizziness, he was pleased to be experiencing it. However, the feeling of dizziness was not a sensory pleasure. According to my view, a feeling is a sensory pleasure only if the person who has it takes intrinsic pleasure in the fact that he has it. The man who wants to be dizzy takes only extrinsic pleasure in his dizziness.

27 A particularly clear statement of this position can be found in Peter Markie's [1984].

28 David Lewis seems to prefer to put things in this way. See his [1979]. Chisholm, in [1981], seems to advocate a similar approach.

29 A number of people read earlier drafts of this paper, and made useful suggestions. Among these are Mark Aronszajn, Tom Blackson, Eva Bodanszky, Michael Jubien, Jaegwon Kim, and Gareth Matthews. I have also benefitted enormously from discussions with Roderick Chisholm. I thank Professor Chisholm for permitting me to see prepublication drafts of [forthcoming a] and [forthcoming b].

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