# Gene Fendt[[1]](#endnote-1)

# How to play the Platonic flute:

# Mimêsis and Truth in *Republic* 10

This will apply to the maker of tragedy, if he is an imitator: he is naturally, as it were, three removes from a king and the truth, as are all other imitators.

You may venture so [*Kinduneuei*]. (*Republic* 597e)[[2]](#endnote-2)

There are a number of scholarly puzzles about Socrates’s reintroduction of the topic of mimesis at the beginning of *Republic* 10. This paper concentrates on the strangeness that Socrates repeats the “three removes” argument three times. It is not clear why Socrates does this and the re-iterations are not mere repetitions, though many scholars have either not mentioned the re-iterations[[3]](#endnote-3) or melted the second to the first,[[4]](#endnote-4) and no one I have read mentions the queerness of the third example used in Socrates’s dismissal of the mimetic, much less treats it as distinct.[[5]](#endnote-5) Taking note of the patent differences in the three versions of the three removes will both undermine the extremist view Socrates pretends he and his interlocutors have agreed to,[[6]](#endnote-6) and also show how book Ten’s re-introduction of mimesis fits together with the discussion of books two and three.[[7]](#endnote-7)

### The three removes of ‘three removes from the truth’

The first instance sets out three kinds of bed:

one that is in nature, which we would say, I suppose, a god produced…. And then one that the carpenter produced…. And then one that the painter produced (597b).

This story allows the traditional theory of forms traction:[[8]](#endnote-8) the forms are the divine ideas of each thing, which the human maker imitates in many ways, much as the demi-urge made the universe as the moving image of eternity in *Timaeus*. There can be only one form for each thing, since the admission of two produces a third man argument (597c); this limitation makes the god “the real maker of the bed that really is, not a certain bedmaker of a certain bed” (597d). He is the nature maker (*phutourgos*); the carpenter makes *the particular* bed of whatever materials he has available; the painter produces an imitation of the appearance of the particular from a particular vantage point —an imitation of a phantasm (*eidôlon phantasmatos*, 598b). The genitive here grammatically makes it sound as if we might be four removes from the divine bed, since the phantasm (3) is a phantasm of the actual bed (2) made after the divine idea (1), and the painter produces an *imitation* (4) *of* this phantasm.[[9]](#endnote-9) Let us leave this possibility by the side.

Having reduced the artists to ignorant shadow-painters, Socrates introduces his second example—a bit and reins—hoping that his interlocutors will see sufficiently (*ikanôs idômen*, 601c). Apparently something is not yet sufficiently seen in seeing that “all of the poetic tribe… know nothing of the cobbler’s art” (600e). The new example *starts* at the bottom: the painter “paints a bit and reins,” the cobbler and smith make them, for the horseman who uses them, and the man who uses them tells the maker what is good or bad about his making.

This version of the three removes is considerably different. Most importantly, where the first version implied a metaphysical break as well as an epistemological distinction between the first two makers—for the *divine knower* of the bed is the source of the *human’s* *vision* and *making* of one, this second abrogates the metaphysical break, putting knower, maker, and imitator on the same level of being—human. The truth is certainly not a divine archetype, but, it seems, a human invention; perhaps produced through the trial and error of the man who uses and “reports what is good or bad, in actual use, of the instrument” (601e). At first, the ‘true’ thing belonged properly only to the god, and the human being who made the artifactual bed could only *view* the divine one. In the second version the true thing seems to be what the human horseman says, which he knows by use.

Further, not only has the top rung been lowered to human use, but the bottom rung was *spoken of* (at least) as closer to reality as well: the *painter began* this version by “drawing a bit and bridle,” not ‘an image of’ or ‘an image of the phantasm of’ them. Perhaps it is even from this originating drawing that the *ideas* of the reins, bit, and bridle are *developed into completeness* through the interaction of cobbler and horseman. *—*Or not; as was (not) the case with da Vinci’s helicopter. In any case, the idea of bit and reins is not said to spring fully formed from the mind of Zeus, nor, it seems, from the user, who reports to the maker about what is good and bad in his making, but is not described as ordering the originals (601d). Perhaps by this difference Socrates is suggesting that human ideas about things[[10]](#endnote-10) come from *working* with things rather than an inspired *nous*-ing of the divine idea of them—as the first example portrayed. Our ideas, then, are *in* things and work in them, as Aristotle will say.

Since there is no longer a vitiating metaphysical distinction between knower, maker, and imitator, it is possible for any one human being to be at any one of the three rungs regarding any thing. Further, one human being could be at each of them with regard to the thing at different times, if we may suppose that a horseman may also be a leather worker and a drawer of images. Perhaps the horseman alternates between maker and user rather rapidly, even stopping to draw a picture from a particular perspective with which to help him think about the issues—*such as a geometer might draw*, “thinking not of the line drawn” but the thing itself;[[11]](#endnote-11) only here the thing itself is itself a material, not ideal abstract, thing. User, maker, imitator may all be one and the same being here; they are certainly not metaphysically distinct. Truth is not something we receive from beyond; nor is the real bit and reins an idea of which we are merely receptive. The idea of the bridle, as Aristotle suggests was the case with tragedy,[[12]](#endnote-12) achieves its “sufficient development” through the efforts of several working together. The idea becomes workable, and the cobbler in us produces a working model, perhaps with a sketch—or sketch *first*.

As if to make this very point about the interchangeability of user, maker, imitator, Socrates slips in a third example of three removes:

For example, about flutes, a flute player surely reports to the flute maker which ones would serve him in playing, and he will prescribe how they should be made, and the other will serve him…. Doesn’t the man who knows report about good and bad flutes and won’t the other, trusting him, make them? (601e)

Here a *maker* rightly trusts an *imitative artist* (the flutist) in order to make that which the imitative artist knows to be suitable for his art.[[13]](#endnote-13) Another imitative artist (presumably) will paint this flutist fluting—perhaps at the bottom of a wine bowl—though he will not be able to imitate the sound.[[14]](#endnote-14) Not only are the positions on the scale from knower to maker to imitator no longer rigid designators of metaphysical distinction, but the position of each on the scale is clearly reversed here, pivoting around the maker to produce an *imitative artist who knows* three removes above an *imitator who merely produces an image* (as could a mirror).[[15]](#endnote-15) This third remove of the three removes argument puts the imitative artist (a flutist) at the top as the one who possesses knowledge.

Suppose that by this point ‘the mimetic’ has come to mean “a process of specious image-making which accounts for all poetic and visual art.”[[16]](#endnote-16) If so, its *inherent* falsity should make it impossible that an artist be in the first position; yet here she is. And of all imitators, it is the flutist, who can’t even use language while playing her instrument (which was purged from Kallipolis at 399de), who here is the example of the one who knows! Nonetheless Socrates closes this third example with the same anti-artistic moral: “Therefore, with respect to beauty and badness, the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly about what he imitates” (602a ). But now we have two mimetic artists: an imitator who does know (the flutist) and an imitator who ‘merely’ imitates (the painter of the flutist fluting?). But it is only this latter, this ‘mere’—or ‘mirrorly’—imitator who is the one, in each instantiation of the three removes argument, who is said to stand for “the maker of tragedy, if he is an imitator” and all mimetic artists by synecdoche. What, then, is this *flute player who knows*? Can not that imitator stand for the arts?

Figure 1 clarifies the sort of elision Socrates has accomplished. The original version had removed truth and reality from the human sphere, as both being properties of divine ideas; the carpenter makes a version of that and the painter imitates the made thing (an *eidôlon phantasmatos*); both are less real and less true than the first and each is hierarchically ordered regarding the other (in terms of truth, goodness and reality). In the second remove of the argument there are three different relations to *the same* earthly *thing*: the bit and bridle are painted by a painter, made by a cobbler, and used and known by the horseman. The fact that this version *starts* from the painter who “paints reins and bit,” not with the horseman, might indicate that the painter need not be working ‘derivatively’—he seems to be *presenting* rather than *re-presenting*, in which case he presents an idea (not a copy of a copy).[[17]](#endnote-17)





Socrates does not *say* either of these things, just as he does *not say* here that the painter paints *an appearance* of bit and reins, he just continues his elision into the third case. In this second story the human being is not said to be limited to merely re-presenting the more real and more true idea. Perhaps the painter (since he *starts* this version) is “presencing”[[18]](#endnote-19) the bit and bridle, or maybe a blackbird on a grapevine, or a gorgon (not an appearance I have experienced, or seen in a mirror).

Finally, in the third remove of the examples, we have the Dionysiac flutist presented as the figure of knowledge! Could her *poiêsis* be presencing a reality? She knows the use of the flute; her use is the truth and reality of the flute. She is, moreover, replacing the god who was nature maker in the first version of the argument; is the musician also, in a way, a nature maker?[[19]](#endnote-20) We have seen knowledge of the truth and nature slide from the particular possession of the transcendent god who is the nature maker, through the human horseman, to the immanent possession of the Dionysiac flutist. It is not merely the case that each place is now human, but in this third remove a practitioner of a music art is at both the top and the bottom of the ‘three removes’ argument.[[20]](#endnote-21)

So, what does it mean to *know* how to use a flute?

### How to play the Platonic flute

It is after his third example of the three removes argument that Socrates brings up the second major argument (of three in book Ten) against the arts—whether “tragic poetry in iambics and in epics” (602b) or any other sort of mimesis—namely, the fact that art works on that part of the soul that is “irritable and various,” and “not of the best,” which the artist “awakens and nourishes” (605a-c). This argument leads on immediately to the third argument against all the arts of the Muses—that they have the power to corrupt “even the decent.” These points take us back precisely to the earlier books’ discussion of the arts, which Socrates had recollected so imprecisely at the beginning of book Ten.

In that earlier discussion, the capacity of the mimetic to work on the lower part of the soul is precisely what *recommended* mimesis to us; the mimetic flows, blows, pulls, has a *natural* *ergon* working through eyes and ears (401c9); in fact it works *lanthanê,* unawares, escaping the notice or knowledge of those it works on;[[21]](#endnote-22) it works “before reason.”[[22]](#endnote-23) All the works of the artists together are to work on the young

like a breeze bringing health from salubrious places; and, beginning in childhood, it will, *without their awareness*, lead them…to likeness and friendship as well as accord (401cd).

The child will thereby come to

blame and hate the ugly in the right way while he is still young, before he is able to grasp reasonable speech. And when reasonable speech comes, the man who is reared in this way would take most delight in it.[[23]](#endnote-24)

So considering the fact that the mimetic “keeps company with a part of the soul” that is “not the best” (603c, 605b ) is not a new deduction from the three removes arguments; nor is it decisive about its worth. We *expect* this consorting, for it is the child at which mimesis first aims—or even without aiming, shapes—and the child *necessarily* has no connection to knowledge. The further claim, in each version of the book 10 argument, that the one who is third remove from the king has “no necessity of being with the one who knows” (602a ) is also neither new *nor necessarily negative*. It allows that there could be a mimetic being (such as the one who appears as third from the king in the third version of the argument) who is ‘merely’ imitating—or, mirrorly—book Ten’s originating image (596d). And this soul could be mirroring a flutist who knows. And what that flutist knows, according to the early discussion of the arts, is how to wordlessly shape the child’s nature to be friendly to the rational element which is not yet active in him. The child’s soul, being *alogon*, then, *is the third remove*; the child’s soul is merely mirrorly; perhaps this symbolizes the merely reproductive imagination in each of us.[[24]](#endnote-25)

Finally, it was a precisely analogous danger to the third book Ten argument against poetry (i.e., that it corrupts), which required the strictures on the mimetic to be put into place with regard to the children and their upbringing in books Two and Three. There, however, the *bad* poets were not corrupting the good, but corrupting the innocent. The mimetic artist who merely mirrors whatever is happening in the neighborhood—like Mr. Zeus “doin’ his thang” with whatever fine looking heifer appears on his street—is not the artist who knows how to shape human nature to its true and happy natural ends. We need better songs, a better flutist, a truer *phutourgos*—one who shapes to humanity rather than to bovinity. Plato, like Aristotle presumes a difference here, and that cultures can fail. It appears, then, that book Ten’s discussion folds perfectly into that earlier discussion.[[25]](#endnote-26)

Book Ten’s renewed argument does not simply review; it offers considerable enrichment. Two matters, in particular, come to the fore. First, early on Socrates was building up a story in which *thumos* took the side of reason; Glaucon, ironically, saying he had never seen spirit taking the part of desire against reason (440b).[[26]](#endnote-27) In book Ten, however, it seems that all the passions, blurring together *epithumia* and *thumos*, are the single opponent of reason.[[27]](#endnote-28) Considering that regime of soul upon which so much effort has been spent, we cannot accept this enmity at face value. Rather, we should consider that since this discussion of the arts comes immediately after the series of devolutions soul and city suffer, the real point is that the patterns of order into which the three parts of the soul can be shaped by art or culture and a city’s laws are widely various and subject to at least as wide a variety of judgments as we may have of the devolving cities and souls which preceded this artistic discussion. There is no longer merely good and bad art, there is art that might move an oligarchic soul towards democracy should he happen to hear it, or perhaps move the tyrant soul towards a truer honor. I suppose we know there is art that moves the democrat towards tyranny, and *Republic* itself is a music that moves him otherwise.[[28]](#endnote-29)

Secondly, Seth Bernardete points out that the horse “first occurs as an example of a *thumoeidetic* animal whose human usefulness depends on rule;”[[29]](#endnote-30) so perhaps the maker of the bit and bridle, as the figure who stands between the first version of three removes and the third, is Plato’s hint that the mimetic artist is *properly made* into one who knows (from originally being third from the king) only after bit and bridle have been made for the horses of her soul. The soul has parts whose usefulness depends on rule, but these parts can only be bridled by (or perhaps are best bridled by) the third figure of the three removes: the flutist who knows. It is *mimêsis* which is the bridling *phutourgos* in every culture. This bridle cannot be painted, but it must be invented. The mimetic artist is the bridle maker for the thumotic and epithumotic parts of the soul. The *alogos* flute itself is a bit and bridle for a human being, a being originally *alogos* who can come to be at any of the three positions on the scale of the three removes. But this artist only rises to the top level of the three removes—really knowing—through *using* a bit and bridle herself. This is what the flutist must know how to do before she gives orders for her instrument’s making.

The flutist then, *the one who knows*—even though not using words—still breathes forth an order; her breath is the music, which expresses the shape of her well-bridled soul. Thus, even souls that merely mirror her music, are filled with the beauty and order that comes to it from the artist who knows, the still human, but almost divine *phutourgos*. Such a crafter of plausible cures to every sort of soul might well put this task at the head of her life, certainly does make useful *mêchanê*, and shapes every way of life.[[30]](#endnote-31) To think that knowing the flute’s use means knowing how to make a variety of imitative bird calls on it, as Annas presumes Plato’s argument about the imitative artist works, is as “tacky,” “philistine” and “fatuous” as she claims Plato’s arguments are here.[[31]](#endnote-32) Rather, by paying attention to how Plato plays his flute, we hear how to defend the flute-player.

1. Gene Fendt is the Albertus Magnus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska, Kearney, where he has been teaching for over 30 years. Thanks to my Art Department colleague, Mark Hartman, for making figure 1 in accord with the philosopher’s vision of the truth. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. I will generally be using Bloom’s translation of *Republic* (New York: Basic Books, 1968); though I may, as here, adjust the translation to fit my understanding of the Greek without, save here, noting that I am doing so. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Neither Nehamas in “Plato on Imitation and Poetry in *Republic* 10,” nor Annas in “Plato on the Triviality of Literature,” mention the repetitions within the “three removes” argument; they treat all of them as the same. Both are in *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts*, ed. Julius Moravcsik and Philip Temko, (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield 1982). In the same volume, James O. Urmson explicitly conflates the first and second: “He who understands beds is primarily the user and secondarily the maker of beds. The painter of pictures of beds needs no understanding of beds” (“Plato and the Poets,” in Moravcsik and Temko, 129. Rosen, in *Plato’s Republic* (New Haven: Yale, 2005) treats only the first version, presuming (I presume), the other versions are merely the same about the same. Elizabeth Belfiore, in her dissertation, *“Imitation” and Book X of Plato’s Republic* (UCLA, 1978, University Microfilms 1981), considers only “the three beds;” see her chapter 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Jessica Moss erases the difference between the first two versions after she points it out in a footnote: “no Form is mentioned in the user/maker /imitator argument.” As she considers the knowledge at stake to be “knowledge of *value,*” she suggests the Form of beauty or excellence is the relevant knowledge the user has. Thus she melts the first two distinct examples of the three removes into an alloy. See “What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?” in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic,* ed. G.R.F. Ferrari (Cambridge, 2007), 425 n17. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Annas explicitly melts the second and third together: “one uses, makes or imitates the same kind of thing, like bridles or flutes” in *An Introduction to Plato’s Republic*, (Oxford: University Press, 1981), 337. Bernardete sees two schemes: the “threefold scheme of god, couchmaker and painter is replaced by the threefold scheme of the art of use, the art of making and the art of painting.” He then superimposes the second scheme on to the first. See, *Socrates’ Second Sailing* (Chicago: University Press, 1989), 218. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Near the conclusion of the *Sophist*, the Stranger bifurcates the “fantastic arts” (*phantastikon*) into “a kind produced by instruments,” such as mirrors, or paints and canvas, and a kind in which the producer of the appearance (*phantasma*) offers himself as the instrument (267a). He calls the second “mimetic,” and suggests letting the other half go. This distinction mimics the two discussions of “the mimetic” in *Republic*, for in book 3 the discussion largely turns on those things which the citizens will be allowed to imitate (“the mimetic” in *Sophist*), while in book 10 Socrates begins by reducing all of the mimetic to that mirroring and painting part written off in *Sophist*. My argument would be that in experiencing the mirroring kind we are allowing the second to happen as well, so book 10’s reduction of mimesis to mirroring or painting is taking the lesser for the whole. The other kind of the mimetic (called so in *Sophist*) is *always* in play for human souls. The mirror is but one aspect of soul: mere reproductive imagination. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Against the cavils of skeptics and unbelievers, as, e.g. Annas (“Triviality,” 22): “any attempt to harmonize books 3 and 10 must be deeply misconceived.” [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Nehamas thinks that Socrates’s introduction of theory of forms here is “strange” (“Plato on Imitation,” 54), but makes nothing much of it. Rosen (*Plato’s Republic*, 358-370) sets forth a fairly standard view of the issue, as does Gail Fine, *On Ideas, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms* (Oxford: University Press, 1993), 110-113, 116-119. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. James Adam settles this issue in the way which has become canonical: the painter copies “not what is, as it is” but “what appears, as it appears;” so the three removes are—what is (the Form of bed), what is made (a bed), what appears (what the painter paints). See *The Republic of Plato* (Cambridge: University Press, 1900), vol. 2, 394. However, if the artist makes an image of a phantasm, it would seem all kinds of imaginary things could appear out of mixing phantasms in the image—even such as never appeared: Gorgons, sphinxes, centaurs. Since Greek painters painted such mixed appearances, the third remove cannot really be “what appears” but must be “imitations of what appears”—so four removes from the god and truth. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. And perhaps only about made things; two of the oft-noted strangenesses of this section are that a) a carpenter rather than a philosopher has vision of the forms, and b) the forms are of artifacts not natural things (as was the case of the demi-urge in Timeaus, and despite the use of the name *phutourgos*), or yet the usual abstract ideas: the good, the just. See, e.g., Rosen, *Plato’s Republic*, 355. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Cf. 510b3-7, c3-e3. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. *Po*. 1449a6. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. This is why I treat this example as a third remove: the *user* here is precisely the *mimetic artist*. Gonzalez notices the flute-player, but then conjoins him with the horseman and table (or bed) *user*, as indicators that “a thing’s form is revealed in the use made of it, rather than in its concrete, sensible qualities. We know what a flute should be by playing one, not by making one.” He goes on to suggest that dialectic “is a user’s art related to poetry in the way that horsemanship is related to saddlery.” My point in separating this example out from the other is precisely that it is a *flutist* who is now in the position of knower. Francisco Gonzalez, *Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry* (Evanston: Northwestern, 1998), 140-141. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Socrates began book Ten using a mirror and painter as images of the imitative artist, thus limiting mimesis to re-presentation of the visible. Music and poetry literally can’t appear. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. The mirror was mentioned at 596d. This inversion of the position of the artist from bottom to top of the three removes is reversely mirrored by the position of *eidos.* Originally introduced at 596a6 “to precisely distinguish the type/Form from individual instances,” by 597b14 it applies to *all three* beds. In addition, the god has been made a kind of craftsman at 597c2, where the verb applied to him is *apergazesthai*. See Stephen Halliwell, *Republic 10* (Warminster, 1988), 114-115. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Halliwell, *Republic 10,* 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Rosen, as most, takes it for granted that “the truth, in the highest and fullest sense of the term, cannot be produced, only *reproduced*;” *Plato’s Republic,* 355. But the second version of the three removes argument at least questions this idea, for the horseman uses and knows the true bit and bridle and there is no higher knowledge (unless one imports the first version into this second—as Rosen); the later versions also evaporate the “puzzling” thesis that “there are Ideas of artifacts” and “the absurd attribution to the artisan of a perception of the Platonic Ideas” (*Ibid*.), for there is *no mention* of the divine or the ideal in the second and third versions of the argument. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. I mean to call to mind here what Heidegger calls “the basic Greek experience of the Being of beings in the sense of presence,” from which a thing may descend into equipmentality, through which matter-form structure we (philosophers and others) presume to comprehend all things. See “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Basic Writings*, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); the quotation is from p. 153. Heidegger clearly means to take aim at the canonical ‘Platonic denigration of art,’ but he has perhaps been preceded in this by Plato, who opens us to the truth of this interpretation of the artwork in his second and third reiterations of the ‘three removes’ argument. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
19. At 601d Plato brings beauty and rightness, living thing and made thing, *physis* and construction, together in one question: “Aren’t the virtue, beauty and rightness of each implement, living thing, and action related to nothing but the use for which each was made or grew naturally?” The divine *phutourgos* and human flutist giving direction to the flute-maker are thus brought into analogy without any implied debasement or inadequacy in the human. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
20. Constantine Cavarnos, in *Plato’s theory of Fine Art* (Athens: “Astir” Publishing, 1973) says that Plato “tends here [book 10] to use the term *imitation* as a synonym for pseudo art, and the term *imitator* as a synonym for pseudo artist,… [but this] should not blind us to the fact that in the same part of the work he conceives of the true artist as being an imitator and actually uses the word imitation in connection with him … as imitating the divine…such as may never have existed” (23-24). This last part, I am arguing, is the right sort of track to take—two sorts of mimesis: with and without knowledge. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
21. 410d, cf. 424d. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
22. *Rep* 402a, *Laws* 653b. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
23. 402a. Incidentally, this explanation of art shows that Ramona Naddaff is simply out of touch with the Platonic-Socratic understanding when she complains that “heteronomy, not autonomy, is cultivated” in the education of children by the required tales and music. See *Exiling the Poets: The production of censorship in Plato’s Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 27. The purpose of this early education is precisely to promote possible autonomy in a being completely incapable of it at this point in its development (before reason). [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
24. See Gene Fendt, “Plato’s Mimetic Art: The power of the mimetic and complexity of reading Plato” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, Vol. 84 (2010), 239-252 or *Comic Cure for Delusional Democracy: Plato’s* Republic (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2014), 1-20 for further connection of Plato’s position here with contemporary anthropological and brain development physiological theories. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
25. *Contra* Annas’ misconception, note 7 above. Halliwell is far more accurate in calling *Republic 10* “the kind of coda which adds to, at the same time as it completes, the larger design” (*Republic 10*, 2), enriched by and enriching the earlier discussions of “the internal dynamics of the soul” and “the metaphysical vista of books 5-7” (6). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
26. This, despite the fact that he himself had earlier been perfectly willing to go to war for prostitutes and pastries (373a-e). [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
27. Stephen Halliwell, “The Republic’s Two Critiques of Poetry” in *Politeia*, Otfried Höffe, ed. (Berlin: Akademis Verlag, 1997), 330. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
28. For considerable discussion of soul-regime structures and the changes between them see Fendt, *Comic Cure*, chapters 5 and 6. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
29. At 373a6, b6; Seth Bernardete, *Second Sailing*, 216. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
30. Contrast with the claims Socrates made against Homer at 599c, 600a, d. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
31. Julia Annas, *An Introduction*, 340-341. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)