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Abstract	<p>This article provides an analysis of the phenomenology of affectivity underlying the work of Edith Stein. Taking as point of departure two of her works, <i>The problem of Empathy</i> (1917) and <i>Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities</i> (1922), the paper focuses on the idea that emotions fulfil a cognitive function: they make us accessible the realm of values. The argument of the paper is developed in two sections. The first section offers an overview of Stein's main theses about emotions, feelings, moods and sentiments and places them within the larger framework of the early phenomenological accounts on affectivity. The second section examines the claim that emotions are responsible for grasping values concentrating on two facets of this thesis: the first regards the epistemological question according to which values are grasped by affective phenomena, while the second regards the ontological question about the nature of these grasped values.</p>	
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Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model

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Abstract This article provides an analysis of the phenomenology of affectivity underlying the work of Edith Stein. Taking as point of departure two of her works, *The problem of Empathy* (1917) and *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* (1922), the paper focuses on the idea that emotions fulfil a cognitive function: they make us accessible the realm of values. The argument of the paper is developed in two sections. The first section offers an overview of Stein's main theses about emotions, feelings, moods and sentiments and places them within the larger framework of the early phenomenological accounts on affectivity. The second section examines the claim that emotions are responsible for grasping values concentrating on two facets of this thesis: the first regards the epistemological question according to which values are grasped by affective phenomena, while the second regards the ontological question about the nature of these grasped values.

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1 The Scope of Edith Stein's Philosophical Thought

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In recent decades, philosophers working on the problem of other minds have shown increasing interest in Edith Stein's work on the nature of empathy. This interest should be welcomed for various reasons. First of all, the study of Stein's work on empathy has contributed to the recovery of an often neglected period of the phenomenological movement known as "early phenomenology," which was led by the first disciples of Husserl and Pfänder and includes authors such as Reinach, Conrad-Martius, Scheler, Geiger, and Walther—to mention but a few.¹ Moreover, the study of Stein's claims about social cognition has led to a perception of her as an original thinker who gave new impulses to Husserl's phenomenology, leaving behind an image of a faithful assistant and the occasional accusation that she contributed to discrediting phenomenology among social scientists.² As the study of her theory of

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¹Cf. for an overview on this movement: Moran and Parker 2015.

²This accusation was formulated by Schutz: Schutz 1972, 140–141.

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28 empathy shows, she offered a phenomenological alternative for explaining this phe-
29 nomenon whose relevance is still alive in the contemporary debate on other minds.³
30 Last but not least, this recent attention has also contributed to making the analysis
31 offered by other female phenomenologists—such as Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Else
32 Voigtländer, and Gerda Walther—on similar topics, which have until now been
33 eclipsed by the works of their male colleagues, more visible.⁴

34 While we should support this new interest in Stein's social ontology and recog-
35 nise the importance of empathy as a key concept in her philosophical thought, we
36 should also observe that her contribution to the perennial themes of philosophy can-
37 not be reduced to this topic. This revival of Stein's philosophy of empathy—accord-
38 ing to my diagnosis—has not been accompanied by a sufficiently accurate study of
39 other aspects of her work. Her philosophical legacy should be revised by contextu-
40 alizing her claims in a broader framework, which comprises a philosophy of reli-
41 gion, a metaphysics, a theory of the foundation of science, a philosophy of mind,
42 and an investigation of human nature.⁵ The present paper is conceived against this
43 background and aims to analyze a crucial concept in Stein's understanding of human
44 affectivity. Taking as point of departure two main sources—*The Problem of Empathy*
45 (1917) and *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* (1922) (the latter contain-
46 ing two treatises “Sentient Causality” and “Individual and Community”)—my goal
47 is to shed light on the Steinian idea of the intentionality of feelings and investigate
48 the relationship between emotion and value.⁶ Focusing on this topic, I hope to show,
49 on the one hand, how Stein's work is placed in the larger context of the Brentanian
50 tradition, how she develops her claims in lively exchange with other members of the
51 early phenomenological group, and how she contributes in an original way to the
52 development of a phenomenology of affectivity. On the other hand, I also aim to
53 present her claims in a way that is fruitful for the contemporary meta-ethical debate
54 on feelings, emotions, and values. It is my conviction that Stein's ideas are as much
55 of a challenge today as they were in the time they were formulated, so that her work
56 can offer new insights in current discussions about human affectivity.

57 This paper is structured in two main sections. The first is devoted to Stein's
58 model of affectivity. Attention will be paid to feeling sensations, general feelings,
59 emotions, moods and sentiments. Following the new paradigm of the affective life
60 inaugurated by Brentano and then refined by his disciples, Stein considers emotions
61 not as mere subjective bodily feelings. Rather, he takes them to be intentional phe-
62 nomena that both are directed towards an object, and reveal to us what is valuable.
63 A similar view on the emotions as “feeling towards” has been developed in current
64 philosophy within the paradigm of “affective intentionality”.⁷ The second section
65 analyzes two facets of the claim that emotions are intentional states responsible for

³Cf. Zahavi 2014 and Szanto and Moran 2015.

⁴For an overview: Wobbe 1997 and Vendrell Ferran 2008

⁵Some recent works on Stein are imbued precisely with this spirit: Calcagno 2007 and Lebech 2009.

⁶Cf. for a general overview on Stein's theory of the emotions: Vendrell Ferran 2015.

⁷Here I have in mind especially Goldie 2000.

disclosing values: the epistemological question about how values are grasped and the ontological question about the nature of these values. I will argue that, while Stein follows Husserl's "a priori of correlation" between intentional objects (noema) and the modes in which they are manifested in consciousness (noesis), she develops correlational research that allows her to defend a singular version of axiological realism.

2 The Intentional Structure of Affectivity: Intricacies and Varieties

2.1 The Intentionality of Affective Phenomena in the Brentanian Tradition

This section examines the intricacies and varieties of the intentional structure of affectivity in Stein's model of the mind. I begin embedding her work in the Brentanian tradition of intentionality, and then in Sect. 2.2 I focus in on her model of affectivity and especially her theory of emotions.

As is well known, with the publication of *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874) Brentano re-introduced the idea of an intentional reference or intentional in-existence. As he famously states at this time, each mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself. His theory distinguishes three main forms of intentional reference or "intentional acts": in *presentations* something is presented, in *judgment* something is affirmed or denied, and in *love and hate* something is loved or hated (Brentano 2015: 92–93). This third form concerns the broader class of affective phenomena which, according to Brentano's innovative view, are forms of being related to an object. Brentano's theory of affectivity rests upon three main pillars, which will be object of scrutiny, criticism, and further development by the members of his school.

- 1) *The broad extension of "love and hate"*: According to the first pillar of Brentano's theory, the class of "love and hate" should be broadly conceived so that it comprehends a wide variety of phenomena such as feelings, emotions, desires, intentions, and acts of the will. Brentano gives three arguments in favor of this claim:

⁸Cf. For the complexities of the concept of intentionality: Drummond 2003, 65; Searle 2012, 9–22; and Salice 2012, 24.

⁹Notice that Brentano has an immanentistic account of intentionality according to which the object is included in the mental phenomenon itself. Therefore, his view differs substantially from later developments of the concept of intentionality which emphasize the idea that mental phenomena are transparent to the world and give us information about it. This difference between Brentano's account and recent account of intentionality has been pointed out by Barry Smith (Smith 1994: 42).

¹⁰Cf. for an account of the shared claims between Brentano and Husserl: Drummond 2003, 84 and Drummond 2013, 52.

- 95 (a) First, he takes the differences among all these phenomena to be only a mat-
 96 ter of degree: a *gradual transition* from one phenomenon of this class to the
 97 next is possible. That is, between the feelings of pleasure and pain, on the
 98 one hand, and the acts of the will, on the other, there are many transitional
 99 phenomena. As he puts it: “Consider the following series, for example: sad-
 100 ness – yearning for the absent good – hope that it will be ours – the desire to
 101 bring it about – the courage to make the attempt – the decision to act. The
 102 one extreme is a feeling, the other an act of the will; and they may seem to
 103 be quite remote from one another. But if we attend to the intermediate mem-
 104 bers and compare only the adjacent ones we find the closest connections and
 105 almost imperceptible transitions throughout” (Brentano 2015: 245–246). To
 106 describe this transition Brentano speaks of a “germ” of the striving con-
 107 tained within the yearning. The germ “germinates” when one hopes and
 108 “blooms” when one thinks of possibly doing something, has the courage to
 109 do so, and finally comes to a decision. With this claim, Brentano is overem-
 110 phasizing the link between emotions and inclinations to act.
- 111 (b) Second, all the phenomena of this class reveal an *acceptance or rejection* of
 112 their objects. Analogously to the case of judgments, there is an affirmation
 113 or denial of a fact in the case of the emotions, since the content can be agree-
 114 able as something good or disagreeable as something bad. The phenomena
 115 of this class are “concerned with an object’s value or lack thereof” (Brentano
 116 2015: 248). When we desire something, this something has a value for us;
 117 when something makes us happy, we love it and we desire its existence.
- 118 (c) Finally, all the phenomena of this class share the same *intentional structure*,
 119 i.e. the same reference to their objects, which cannot be reduced to the struc-
 120 ture of perception or judgment. This reference consists in the opposition
 121 between accepting (loving) or rejecting (hating) an object (he distinguishes
 122 between joy and sorrow, desire and aversion, striving for and striving against,
 123 willing and not willing). These appear with different degrees of intensity, in
 124 being morally good or wrong, and in being subjected to the laws of ethics
 125 (opposition, intensity, perfection, laws).
- 126 2) *Cognitive dependence*: In Brentano’s view, each mental act is a presentation or
 127 is grounded in a presentation. This is true for judgments, as well as for the third
 128 class of affective phenomena. The immediate consequence of this claim is that
 129 all affective phenomena depend upon presentations or judgments. With this
 130 claim, Brentano is defending a “cognitive theory of the emotions”. Cognitivism
 131 of the emotions exists in different versions, but the one defended by Brentano
 132 consists in making feelings, emotions, desires, and acts of the will depend upon
 133 presentations (such as perceptions and imaginings) and judgments (such as
 134 beliefs, suppositions, etc.). The function of these cognitions consists in giving us
 135 the object towards which the affective act is directed. To fear something or desire
 136 something requires that this something is given to us in a perception, imagining,
 137 judgment, supposition, etc.

3) *Fitting Attitude Theory of Value*. As mentioned above, the phenomena of love and hate are concerned with the value of their objects. The third pillar of Brentano's theory which gives an account of what is valuable was further developed in *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong (Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis 1889)*. In this lecture his aim is to break with the "subjective view of ethics" (Brentano 2009: X). To be valuable is to be the object of an appropriate phenomenon of the third class, i.e. values should be understood in terms of appropriate evaluative attitudes. In support of his claim, he focusses on the analogy between judgments and emotions. This analogy is based on the following tenants. First, the objects of both judgments and emotions are both the object of a presentation and, at the same time, of a pro or contra attitude. In the case of judgment, there is an opposition between affirmation or acceptance, on the one hand, and denial or rejection, on the other. In the case of the emotions there is an opposition between love and hate, inclination and disinclination, and being pleased and being displeased. Second, judgments and emotions may be correct or incorrect. A thing is true when the affirmation relating to it is correct, and a thing is good "when the love relating to it is correct" (Brentano 2009: 18). According to Brentano "the good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a love that is correct" (Ibid). Something is valuable when it elicits love as something that is lovable. The phenomena of the third class, thus, have appropriate objects. Finally, Brentan holds that human beings have a natural tendency to prefer goodness over badness. We tend to want to avoid error, to prefer the truth, and, in the same sense, to prefer the good over the bad. However, as he recognizes, this analogy is imperfect. In his words: "Everything that is true is equally true; but not everything that is good is equally good" (Brentano 2009: 26). In logic we distinguish between truth and error; but in ethics, what is good appears in degrees: something may be good but it is possible that there is something better.

Regarding the later developments of this idea via the members of the Brentano School, three important consequences of Brentano's view should be mentioned here. First, Brentano's position is known as the "fitting attitude theory of values" and has to be distinguished from "robust value realism". For value realism values exist independently of the possible reactions they may elicit in feeling subjects; for Brentano, on the contrary, values are related to the possible reactions of feeling subjects. Second, in this text, the correctness of the emotions is interpreted in terms of "appropriateness" and "fittingness" between them and objective entities which function as their correlates.¹¹ Finally, Brentano distances himself from those theories

¹¹ Cf. For an insightful interpretation of Brentano's concept of the correctness of judgments: see Moran 2000: 31. As Moran points out, during the same year as this lecture, Brentano also gave the lecture "On the Concept of Truth". If we follow the latter, the concept of correctness in the case of the judgments should not be interpreted as a correspondence between mind and world, but rather as an assertion of something based on evidence. The correlates of judgments are thus objective entities. Judgments assert "states of affairs" as existent. To understand this concept of truth, the notion of "evidence" is crucial. Truth is not understood as a correspondence between mind and the

175 according to which emotions grasp values. Explicitly in the 1924 edition of his
 176 *Psychology from an empirical Standpoint*, he claims: “I do not believe that anyone
 177 will understand me to mean that phenomena belonging to this class are cognitive
 178 acts by which we perceive the goodness or badness, value or disvalue of certain
 179 objects” (Brentano 2015: 247). He makes clear that he separates the class of the
 180 emotions from the class of the judgments, and furthermore he does not assume that
 181 the phenomena of the third class presuppose presentations of the good and the bad,
 182 or value and disvalue.

183 Brentano’s students in their respective works examined and refined these three
 184 claims on the intentionality of the affective life and introduced serious modifica-
 185 tions. These changes constitute the framework in which Stein built her own model.
 186 Here I will mention only those refinements that were influential on Stein’s work.

187 1) *Affective and conative phenomena*. Despite the general acceptance that the con-
 188 cept of intentionality found among Brentano’s pupils, they modified his first
 189 claim concerning the unity of the phenomena of “love and hate,” introducing a
 190 distinction between “affective phenomena” such as feelings and emotions, on
 191 the one hand, and “conative phenomena” such as desires and volitions, on the
 192 other. The main argument for this distinction is that while conative acts tend to a
 193 fulfillment of their goals, this tendency is not inherent for the affective ones
 194 (Stumpf 1928, 28; Meinong 1968, 39).

195 2) *Feeling sensations and intentional feelings*. The second modification concerns
 196 Brentano’s claim that intentionality is—to put it in current terminology—the
 197 “mark of the mental” (Crane 1998). Most of his students thought that there are
 198 mental phenomena that do not show this feature. Specifically for the phenomena
 199 of the third class, we should distinguish—as Stumpf, Husserl, and Scheler did—
 200 between “intentional feelings” and “feeling sensations” (Husserl 1992, 383;
 201 Stumpf 1928, 116; Scheler 1973a: 328). While intentional feelings are directed
 202 towards objects and resemble perceptions and judgments, feeling sensations
 203 (such as pleasure and pain) may be directed towards the object that is the cause
 204 of the sensations, but they are not intrinsically related to them. Further, only
 205 emotions have a founded nature, but not bodily feelings, which do not require
 206 cognitions in order to take place.

207 3) *Multiplicity of value theories*. Despite accepting a general relationship between
 208 the feeling subjects and values, the concrete understanding of this relationship
 209 was understood by each one of his students in a different way. Some of them,
 210 such as Meinong in his first value theory or Ehrenfels in the sphere of ethics,
 211 defend a clear-cut value emotivism according to which values are projections of

world, but as “fittingness” or “appropriateness” or form of “harmony” between the thing as it appears and the manner of judging about it. In “On the Concept of Truth”, Brentano also refers to the class of the emotions by comparing their correctness with the correctness of the judgments. Drawing on Moran’s interpretation of the Brentanian account of judgments and truth in 1889, and applying a similar interpretation to the case of the emotions, we can say that Brentano argues in this text that the emotions are directed towards objective entities.

our emotions or desires. Others, like Scheler or the late Meinong, will move towards value realism and advocate for different versions of it.¹²

Stein’s model of affectivity can only be fully understood in this larger phenomenological context, which takes Brentano’s thought as point of departure and reformulates each of the pillars of his theory of the intentionality of the emotions.

2.2 Stein’s Model of Affectivity

The criticisms developed by Brentano’s students motivate two questions about the intentionality of affective phenomena: Are all affective phenomena intentional? And, in case they show the feature of intentionality: Are all of them intentional in the same way? The idea that in the affective realm intentionality cannot always be interpreted in the same way seems plausible. It is possible that the general experience of being directed towards an object may adopt different forms depending on which affective phenomenon is taking place. Stein’s work offers us a way to analyze precisely this case. She offers a very accurate account of how to understand the “intentionality” of different affective phenomena. The model that I present here, however, is an abstraction of her thought. For Stein, experiences always have a two-fold structure: as my experience and as a shared experience with others (Lebech 2003, 67). That is, the ontology of the person always includes a reference to the other. For the sake of argument, I will focus only on the philosophy of the individual mind.

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Stein’s affective spectrum comprehends feeling sensations, general feelings, moods, emotions, and sentiments. In line with Scheler and Pfänder, she claims that each one of these phenomena constitutes a stratum of depth of the personality, where the bodily sensations constitute the more superficial strata and the sentiments the more central ones. In what follows, I present Stein’s taxonomy of the affective realm.

- (a) *Feeling sensations (also called sensations of feelings and sensual feelings)*. The first class of affective states is constituted by the bodily sensations of pleasure and pain, which are localizable in concrete parts of the body. They are “affective phenomena” because we feel attracted or repulsed by the objects that arouse them. Following Stumpf and Husserl’s criticism of Brentano and in line with Scheler, Stein considers them to be sensations and not “intentional feelings” (Stein 1989, 100; Stein 2000, 163). Pleasure and pain are, thus, not intentional, despite being directed towards the objects that cause them. This causal relation, however, does not reveal an essential link between the affective state and its object.
- (b) *General Feelings*. These affect the total condition of the body and cannot be localized in a concrete part of it. Feeling tired, alive, alert, or irritable are

¹²Cf. For an overview: Reicher 2009, 122–123 and Vendrell Ferran 2013, 75–85.

250 instances of general feelings, according to Stein (Stein 2000, 19). A similar
 251 claim was also developed by Max Scheler, who names such feelings “vital feel-
 252 ings” or “feelings of the lived body” (Scheler 1973a, b, 330). Such feelings
 253 manifest a momentary status of the subject and reveal its “lifepower”. They
 254 show a phenomenal dimension that is unique for each of them. This uniqueness,
 255 however, is not reflected in our languages, which are too poor to describe the
 256 diversity of qualitative aspects of our affectivity. Despite the fact that these feel-
 257 ings are directed towards vital values, they are not responsible for apprehending
 258 them. They just indicate them.

259 Stein introduces a distinction within this class between “feelings of living”
 260 (“*Lebensgefühle*”) and “states of living” (“*Lebenszustände*”) (Stein 2000: 21).
 261 According to this distinction, it is possible for a state of living to emerge with-
 262 out being felt, so that we do not have consciousness of the experience and, thus,
 263 it cannot be considered a feeling. We can be tired (a state of living) without
 264 feeling it (a feeling of living). It is also possible for a feeling of living to be
 265 given without being accompanied by the corresponding state of living. This is
 266 the case when I feel invigorated (a feeling of living) without the state of vigor
 267 really being given.

268 (c) *Moods*. This class is constituted by phenomena like feeling cheerful or depressed
 269 that cannot be localized in any part of the body. Moods are a general state of the
 270 soul that is not necessarily body-bound. In Stein’s view, moods have objective
 271 correlates. Comparing them to emotions, she writes: “In joy the subject has
 272 something joyous facing him, in fright something frightening, in fear something
 273 threatening. Even moods have their objective correlate. For him who is cheer-
 274 ful, the world is bathed in a rosy glow; for him who is depressed, bathed in
 275 black. And all this is co-given with acts of feeling as belonging to them” (1989,
 276 92). This passage suggests that emotions such as joy, as well as moods such as
 277 being cheerful, are intentionally directed towards the world. The intentional
 278 structure of both phenomena, however, is different. Emotions are directed
 279 towards values such as the joyous, the frightening, and the threatening, while
 280 moods can be characterized by a different kind of intentional reference. Moods
 281 constitute the background structure of our experience and are enduring affective
 282 states that influence and “colour” the way in which we are directed towards the
 283 world. This interpretation puts Stein in line with Husserl, who considers moods
 284 to be the emotive background of our experience. In Husserl’s view, moods are
 285 responsible for the world’s appearing to us in a certain light. They are not inten-
 286 tional because they apprehend what is valuable, but because they build the
 287 background of our reference to the world.¹³ The intentionality of moods, thus,
 288 can be described as a “background” intentionality and as such substantially dif-
 289 fers from the intentionality of the emotions which is directed towards values.

290 Moreover, Stein considers moods to be constituent elements of feelings.
 291 Emotions have, thus, “mood ingredients”. She observes that each feeling has a “cer-

¹³Cf. for an analysis of moods in Husserl: Melle 2012 and Quepons 2013.

tain mood component that causes the feeling to be spread throughout the 'I' from the feeling's place of origin and fill it up" (Stein 1989, 104). Given that they are the background which constitutes the intentional structure of the emotions, moods form part of the emotion itself. Accordingly, each feeling is characterized by a different mood component. Those feelings with weak mood components are more focused on their objects than those that have a strong mood component. Moods are responsible for the range of emotions we are able to experience and for the degree of focus on an object that each one of these emotions entails.

Furthermore, according to Stein, moods may function as dispositions to react. They are able to give direction to our thoughts, feelings, and actions. She writes: "And it's a peculiarity of the feelings that they bequeath to the soul such trend-determined overall states [...]. This lifted mood implies at the same time a 'disposition' to react in the sense of the original attitude, even where no adequate motive is given for such attitude" (Stein 2000, 217–218). This shows that it is not only beliefs or desires that may influence our actions, but also affective acts such as moods. The idea that affective phenomena may motivate actions can be found implicitly in Brentano's claim that there is only a gradual difference between an emotion and an act of the will. Stein, however, in line with the modifications realized by the early phenomenologists, considers affective and conative acts as phenomena belonging to different classes, which are nevertheless able to influence each other.

These three claims, which are the kernel of Stein's philosophy of moods, are relevant for contemporary philosophy in at least two respects. First, the current debate conceives of moods as having secondary importance in contrast with the primacy of emotions.¹⁴ On the contrary, Stein's approach shows that the nature of the emotions cannot be fully understood without an account of the relation between emotions and moods. To shed light on the nature of moods implies a better understanding of our emotional responses, given that moods are constituent elements of them. Moreover, it has been common in contemporary debates to consider moods as lacking intentionality, in contrast to the emotions, or, in the same vein, to consider moods as "generalized emotions".¹⁵ The Steinian account provides us with another image of this phenomenon: Moods are responsible for giving the world its significance, and in constituting the background of our experience they are deeper than emotions. They show a "background" intentionality which is distinct from the direct intentionality of the emotions, but nevertheless it is a form of being directed towards the world.

- (d) *Emotions*—or as Stein calls them, "feelings in the pregnant sense of the word"—build the fourth class of affective phenomena (Stein 1989, 100). Sadness, happiness, and aesthetic appreciation are instances of emotions. The phenomena belonging to this class may be characterized according to two features. On the one hand, they are felt in a specific way and show a phenomenal quality. On the

¹⁴Cf. for an exception to this view in the current debate: Ratcliffe 2013: 353. This author interprets some moods as existential feelings.

¹⁵An exponent of such view is Solomon 1993: 15 and 71.

332 other hand, they are intentionally directed towards the world and disclose val-
 333 ues. In order to develop this last feature, consider the following example from
 334 Stein:

335 Suppose that while I am hearing a report, and thus while this objectivity, ‘report’, is devel-
 336 oping for me into a series in the current of self-generating intellectual acts, a joy at this
 337 report is beginning to fill me up. ‘Joy’, this unity of experience, is oriented towards some-
 338 thing ‘external’ to the current. Indeed, it is joy ‘at’ the report, therefore an ‘act’. And some-
 339 thing on the objective side corresponds to it: the joyousness of the report, which attaches to
 340 it by virtue of its positive value. (Stein 2000, 75)

341 This passage suggests that emotions have a twofold intentional reference. In the
 342 example, the emotion of joy is directed towards the report, but it is also directed
 343 towards an objective correlate—the joyousness—of the report. Both objects will, in
 344 what follows, be the objects of analysis.

345 Emotions are directed towards objects such as material items, animals, persons,
 346 and states of affairs. We may feel disgusted by an odor, fear a dog, envy our neigh-
 347 bor, be afraid of a possible third world war, etc. To react emotionally to something
 348 requires that this something is given to us. Following the current terminology intro-
 349 duced by Anthony Kenny, we can name these objects “material objects” (Kenny
 350 2003, 132). Embedded in the Brentanian and Husserlian tradition mentioned above,
 351 and in line with other phenomenologists such as Pfänder, Stein claims that these
 352 objects are given to us in “theoretical acts” (Stein 1989, 98). The material objects of
 353 the emotions are given to us thanks to cognitions, i.e. emotions have a founded
 354 nature. Stein writes that “it holds true of the “affective acts,” as it did of the logical
 355 acts, that they are of a founded nature, that they are stance-takings toward an alleg-
 356 edly factual material, that they are ‘reactions’ of the subject to information of what-
 357 ever kind which has been imparted to him” (Stein 2000, 157).¹⁶

358 Which are the “theoretical acts” in question? It would be a misreading of Stein’s
 359 position to claim that only judgments function as “theoretical acts”, because in her
 360 view different types of “cognitive” phenomena work as bases for the emotions.¹⁷
 361 Brentano claimed that emotions depend upon presentations or judgments; Husserl
 362 claims that intentional feelings refer to objects or situations that are given in found-
 363 ing objectifying acts; and Pfänder claims that the basis of an emotion can be a per-
 364 ception, an intuitive representation, or even a non-intuitive “thinking in something”.
 365 In Stein’s view, perceptions, imaginings, and deductive thoughts count chiefly as
 366 theoretical acts. With this claim, she is defending a cognitive account according to
 367 which emotions are based on cognitions and depend upon them. Her version of
 368 cognitivism takes a wide range of phenomena into account as intellectual bases for
 369 the emotions. This contrasts with some versions of cognitivism developed in the
 370 analytic debate in the last decades of the twentieth century, such as, for example, in

¹⁶A similar claim may be found in: Stein 1989, 101

¹⁷Given that it is widely accepted by contemporary philosophers that emotions are based on cognitions, i.e. that emotions have cognitive bases, I speak here of “cognitive phenomena” to interpret Stein’s work. The term “cognition”, however, in current theories of the emotion is not used with a unitary meaning.

the belief–desire theory of the emotions (Green 1992) or those authors that assimilate emotions to a special kind of judgment (Solomon 1993, 126; Nussbaum 2005, 22). Stein's broader cognitivism has advantages compared to these latter approaches. It is able to explain how those emotions that are not based on judgments, such as disgust in face of a perceived object or fear of something merely imagined or supposed, are possible. It is also able to explain the emotions of those beings that do not possess sophisticated forms of cognition but nevertheless react emotionally. Recent developments of analytic philosophers go in a similar direction, avoiding an over-intellectualization of the affective life (Goldie 2000; Tappolet 2000).

Emotions are not only directed towards “material objects”, but also towards values. This claim was shared in one form or another by all the early phenomenologists. As in the example above, joy is directed towards the joyousness of the report. The joyousness is the intentional object of the emotion. To distinguish this kind of object from the “material objects” examined above, I will refer to them using Kenny's widely accepted terminology and speak of “formal objects” (Kenny 2003, 132). The formal object of an emotion is the evaluative category that is related to a material object. In the same sense that perceptions and judgments are objective acts that present an aspect of the world, emotions have their own intentionality, which consists in presenting values.

An interesting feature of the formal objects of the emotions is that they are restricted. Despite the fact that we may find different objects, situations, and states of affairs joyful, i.e. that joy may be directed towards different material objects, the emotion of joy is always related to the evaluative category of the joyfulness. In relation to these restricted objects, emotions may thus be appropriate or inappropriate. To feel joy with regard to something dangerous is inappropriate in the same sense that it is in appropriate to feel fear with regard to something joyful. From Brentano Stein inherits the idea that emotions are related to what is valuable. Stein, however, will develop her own version of the relationship between emotions and values. This version of the relationship will occupy me in the last section of this paper.

- (e) *Sentiments*. To this category belong gratitude, hatred, and love. The term “sentiment” (“Gesinnung”) used by Stein was coined by Pfänder in his *Psychologie der Gesinnungen* (1913/1916) and was also used by other phenomenologists such as Gerda Walther. According to Stein, sentiments belong to deep strata of the self and are directed towards the personal values of others (Stein 1989, 101). The intentional reference of sentiments is different to the intentional reference of the emotions. Sentiments are characterized by their ‘centrifugality’, i.e. they “stream” from the subject to the object, bridging the gap between both poles (Pfänder 1913, 362). Moreover, sentiments do not show a hedonic valence: For one who loves, this love may be felt in a painful way, and it is also possible for the hater to feel his hatred with pleasure. This constitutes a difference from the emotions, which oscillate between the poles of pleasure and pain: joy is always pleasant, disgust always unpleasant, etc.

We are now able to answer the two questions at the beginning of this section. First, not all affective phenomena are intentional: feeling sensations are a special

415 class of sensations and they do not show the feature of intentionality. Second, those
 416 affective phenomena considered at first sight as intentional show, on closer inspec-
 417 tion, strong differences in their form of being directed towards values: general feel-
 418 ings indicate values without apprehending them, emotions grasp values, moods
 419 show a background intentionality and sentiments aim for bridging the gap between
 420 subject and object.

421 Stein's model of affectivity is embedded in the Brentanian tradition. She inherits
 422 from Brentano the main claims on the intentionality of the affective life, but she also
 423 takes into account the modifications of this claim developed by those authors
 424 belonging to the phenomenological circles, coming to the conclusion that those
 425 phenomena that we call affective belong to different classes and show different
 426 modes of intentional reference to the world. In the remainder of this paper I will
 427 focus on one of these classes—the emotions—and analyze their relationship to val-
 428 ues in Stein's philosophy of mind.

429 **3 Axiological Phenomenology: Stein on the Disclosure** 430 **of Values**

431 *3.1 Emotion and the Feeling of Value as Unified Phenomenon*

432 How do emotions achieve their epistemic goal of grasping values? What is the
 433 nature of the disclosed values? Both questions—the epistemic and the ontologi-
 434 cal—will be the objects of analysis in these last sections of the paper. Regarding the
 435 epistemic question about the cognitive function of the emotions, Stein's analogy
 436 between feeling and perceiving is instructive: “It doesn't see that—just as with per-
 437 ception—a mental apprehension springs up on account of the egoic contents in their
 438 “function of manifestation” reveal to the subject the view into a new object world.
 439 This new object world, which unfolds before us as we feel, is the world of value”
 440 (Stein 2000: 158). On Stein's view, in the same sense that perceiving makes acces-
 441 sible the objects of the physical world such as colors and sounds, the act of feeling
 442 makes values accessible to us.¹⁸

443 The analogy between feeling and perceiving used to explain the apprehension of
 444 values thanks to affective acts was shared by all the early phenomenologists.
 445 Nevertheless, there are *prima facie* two different versions of this claim. One possi-
 446 bility, defended by Scheler, Geiger, and Ortega y Gasset consists in distinguishing
 447 between “feeling” (“Fühlen”) as the phenomenon whose function is to disclose val-
 448 ues, and “the feelings” (“Gefühle”) as those emotional responses that may arise
 449 once a value is grasped in an act of feeling (Scheler 1973a, 256; Geiger 1911, 141;
 450 Ortega y Gasset 1966, 325). The first of these phenomena—the feeling values—

¹⁸This claim can also be found in the current debate: de Sousa 1987; Tappolet 2000; Johnston 2001.

determines our access to the world so that each thinking and willing is conditioned by it. As Scheler claims: "Man, before he is an *ens cogitans* or an *ens volens*, is an *ens amans*" (1973b, 110–111). We first feel values and only afterwards perceive objects, think about them, and have emotions and volitions towards them.

An alternative possibility embraced by Stein, which in this point is in line with Husserl, consists in interpreting the act of feeling values and the feelings or emotions aroused by these felt values as two sides of the same coin (Husserl 1992, 404). This claim can be found already in Stein's dissertation when she writes:

People want to distinguish between 'feeling' ("*Fühlen*") and 'the feeling' ("*Gefühl*"). I do not believe that these two designations indicate different kinds of experiences, but only different 'directions' of the same experience. Feeling is an experience when it gives us an object or else something about an object. The feeling of the same act when it appears to be originating out of the 'I' or unveiling a level of the 'I'. (Stein 1989, 98–99)

In this quotation, she has Scheler in mind, despite of not mentioning him directly. In her later work *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* too, Stein defends the same position: "Under the heading of 'feel' or 'feeling' two different things are combined: for one, the acts in which we are confronted with values, with objects as value-endowed, as 'goods'; and apart from that, the attitudes that these values evoke in us" (Stein 2000, 159).¹⁹ Like Scheler, Stein claims that values are grasped in an act of feeling. Unlike Scheler, she considers this act of feeling and the emotions aroused by them to be unified so that each time we grasp a value we also experience an emotion. Moreover, in her view there is not a primacy of feeling values over perceiving, thinking, and willing, as becomes clear in the following passage:

Every fully constituted object is simultaneously a value-object. Basically, the value-free world of mere things is an abstraction that's suggested to us by the fact that we aren't equally persuaded by all the intentions that can arise on the basis of available material, but rather alternate between different 'orientations'. When oriented theoretically, we see mere things. When axiologically oriented we see values, and in particular, aesthetic, ethical, religious values, and so forth. (Stein 2000, 160)

According to this passage, the perception of values is not prior to the perception of things. Both are simultaneously given and it is only a question of our interest or orientation whether we "see" values or "see" things.

Stein's idea that the act of feeling and the emotions (the aroused feelings) are two facets of the same phenomenon is very relevant. The claim that both appear to be unified brings her theory close to current positions that define emotions as perceptions of values (the best example of such as position can be found in Tappolet 2000). Nevertheless, the Steinian model keeps the distinction between the act (which grasps or "perceives" values) and the state of feeling (the emotions) open. Keeping the distinction open is important in order to explain those cases in which it is possible to grasp a value without having the corresponding emotion, i.e. without fully reacting to it emotionally. Those theories that assimilate emotions to perceptions of

¹⁹Also in: Stein 2000, 79

492 values, on the contrary, have troubles explaining such cases.²⁰ Stein divides such
493 cases of “empty grasp” into the following three general types²¹:

- 494 (a) *Absolute lack of value feeling*. It is possible to perceive an object without per-
495 ceiving its value. We can listen to a melody without appreciating its value. In
496 these cases we are completely value-blind.
- 497 (b) *“Cold” value knowledge*. It is also possible to perceive an object and know that
498 this object has value because someone told us so or because we learnt it, but not
499 because we feel it. We can notice the generosity of somebody and see this gener-
500 osity as a motive for gratitude, but be unable to feel this gratitude vividly. We
501 know about the value by the testimony of others or by socialization, but we
502 remain “cold” about it, i.e. we are “empty inside” (Stein 2000, 161). Like the
503 case mentioned before, this is also a case of value-blindness.
- 504 (c) *Partial value feeling*. The last possibility consists in perceiving an object, parti-
505 tially feeling its value, but being unable to fully feel it. We have an inner rela-
506 tionship to the value, but we are not inwardly filled up with it. We can perceive
507 the beauty of a landscape and this perception requires a response from us. In
508 this case: “Beauty [...] insists that I inwardly open myself to it and let my inner
509 self be determined by it” (Stein 2000, 159). If the response does not take place
510 then the “beauty doesn’t entirely divulge itself to me. The intention inhering in
511 the mere information remains unfulfilled” (Ibid.). This last case suggests that in
512 the Steinian account it is possible to be aware of a value without feeling it fully.
513 She summarizes this possibility as follows:

514 The egoic contents that belong to a complete value-experience are not available here. In
515 spite of that, you can’t say that no inner relationship to the value exists. The missing con-
516 tents are represented by empty places, which are marked off as place-holders for the spe-
517 cific contents, bear within themselves an intention toward those contents and a ‘tendency’
518 toward fulfillment by them, and, by virtue of this place-holding, can serve as a basis of the
519 corresponding value-intention. (Stein 2000, 162).

520 Despite the recognition of this possibility, in Stein’s view, to fully grasp a value
521 we have to respond to it with a feeling, i.e. with an emotional reaction. Thus, feeling
522 values and responding emotionally to them are normally presented together. This
523 position differs substantially from the one defended by Scheler and other early phe-
524 nomenologists who defended the separation of feeling and the feelings as two dis-
525 tinct phenomena.

526 A further remark regarding Stein’s discussion of cases of “empty grasp” is neces-
527 sary in order to understand the context of her theory. The concept of value-blindness
528 was one of the topics treated by Max Scheler in his book *Formalism in Ethics and*
529 *Non-formal Ethics of Values* (Scheler 1973a, 193). It was also one of the main pre-
530 occupations of the phenomenological analysis regarding value developed by
531 Dietrich von Hildebrand in *Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis* (1922), whose

²⁰Cf. For objections against these theories: Mulligan 2004.

²¹Lebech adds a fourth case of empty grasp, according to which the grasped value does not exist (Lebech 2009, 266).

publication coincides with Stein's *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* 532
 (1922). Von Hildebrand distinguishes three forms of moral value blindness: a) *total* 533
value blindness according to which one is unable to understand what is morally 534
 good and what is wrong; b) *partial value blindness* according to which one is able 535
 to understand some values (for instance, the value of good as well as the values of 536
 justice, loyalty and so on), but not other (like the values of humility, etc.); and c) 537
subsumption value blindness, which concerns the blindness not of the value types, 538
 but rather of the bearers of values (von Hildebrand 1982, 44). Scheler's and von 539
 Hildebrand's discussion regarding the possibility of value blindness are motivated 540
 by value realism: values exist and it is possible that we are not aware of them. 541
 Stein's considerations seem to be in line with these authors. This leads me to the 542
 final section of the paper. 543

3.2 Axiological Realism and Intentional Constitution 544

What is the nature of the grasped values? Stein's position is not easy to place within 545
 the phenomenological axiological landscape. This last part of the paper attempts to 546
 give some insights about this question and to elaborate a very rough answer. Instead 547
 of discussing the virtues or shortcomings of her theory, I will offer in this section an 548
 interpretation of her account as embedded in the tradition of value realism. In my 549
 opinion, this aspect of her philosophy, that puts her in direct dialog with other early 550
 phenomenologists, has not been emphasized enough. 551

In phenomenology two main positions can be distinguished on the nature of 552
 values.²² On the one side, in later developments of this movement, authors such as 553
 Sartre or Merleau-Ponty defended the claim that values are created by the autonomy 554
 of the human being.²³ On the other side, we find in early periods a wide spectrum of 555
 positions that fall under the label of "value realism" and try to develop Brentano's 556
 fitting attitude theory of values in new directions, considering values to be the objec- 557
 tive correlates of affective acts. Nevertheless, not all authors endorsed identical ver- 558
 sions of axiological realism. Authors like Scheler defended robust versions of this 559
 doctrine, according to which values exist independently of the subjects who grasp 560
 them and the objects in which they are given. They consider the perception of values 561
 to be prior to the perception of their bearers and it is this value perception that deter- 562
 mines our thinking and willing. In contrast, Husserl claimed that the subject has an 563
 active role in the disclosure of values. According to him, we first have access to the 564

²²Cf. for an overview of different positions on value in phenomenology: Drummond 2002a, 8 and Drummond 2002b, 29.

²³In his insightful interpretation of Sartre, Strasser claims that Sartre's account of the intentionality of the emotions, rather than being "correlativist", is actually "dynamic" (Strasser 1977, 83–85). For Sartre, in other words, emotions are a magical transformation of the world, but not a form of apprehending values. Rather than being disclosive, the intentionality of the emotions in the Sartrean sense has to do with our world-shaping capacities. Thus, the idea of the appropriateness of the emotions is not one of Sartre's central preoccupations

565 objects that are given to us in cognitive acts such as perceptions or judgments, and
 566 then we may recognize a value in these objects, i.e. we experience them as valuable.
 567 Despite this active role of the subject, however, in Husserl's theory "it remains true
 568 [...] that values are disclosed rather than created" (Drummond 2002a, 8).

569 According to my interpretation, Stein's conception of values should be embed-
 570 ded in the early phenomenological tradition of axiological realism.²⁴ Three observa-
 571 tions can be made in support of this claim.

572 1. *Vocabulary*. In the *Empathy* book and in her *Philosophy of Psychology and the*
 573 *Humanities*, Stein adopts the entire vocabulary of value realism. It is common in
 574 both works the use of expressions such as "grasping values" (Stein 2000, 159),
 575 "responding to values" (Stein 2000, 159), and "the "discovery" of values" (Stein
 576 2000, 220). This vocabulary suggests that values are disclosed, grasped,
 577 endorsed, or discovered by them. As mentioned above, in her view it is also pos-
 578 sible that we are "value-blind".

579 2. *Epistemology*. As expounded in the last section, values are given to us in acts of
 580 feeling, which Stein conceives as emotional responses. If values require a
 581 response from feeling subjects, they cannot be created at will. Stein is not defend-
 582 ing a creationist account of values: neither a position close to social constructiv-
 583 ism, or a form of projectivism and subjectivism. Values are not creations,
 584 constructions, or projections of our feelings, they are entities that present to us
 585 with enough authority to demand a specific answer. The epistemology of values
 586 requires not only that we are "susceptible" to them, but also that we have enough
 587 "life power" to experience them, because responding to a value consumes psy-
 588 chic energy (Stein 2000, 220). Values that belong to a higher hierarchy concern
 589 us more deeply and they require more energy to be grasped. And it is also pos-
 590 sible that some values are accessible only to some individuals who are respon-
 591 sible for discovering them and making them accessible to the community.

592 3. *Objectivity*. According to Stein, values are no less objective than the data of the
 593 outer world (Stein 2000, 164). The clarification of this last point will take us to
 594 the core of the question about the ontological nature of value, and will allow us
 595 to develop the Steinian version of value realism. Despite being embedded in the
 596 tradition of axiological realism, Stein's version of realism is closer to Husserl
 597 than to Scheler.²⁵ Values, for Stein, are "constituted". It is precisely this use of the
 598 concept of "constitution," as *terminus technicus* inherited from Husserl, that
 599 plays a central role in explaining how values are objective, for Stein. How to
 600 interpret this constitution?

601 A first possibility—rejected by Stein—consists in seeing values as dependent on
 602 the objects in which they are given. In this case values would be constituted by the
 603 factual qualities of the material objects perceivable by the senses. Beauty would
 604 then emerge with respect to qualities of the objects that are perceived by the senses.

²⁴In this point, my interpretation differs from Lebech, who claims that Stein's theory of values cannot be interpreted as either value realism or subjectivism (Lebech 2010, 139).

²⁵In the same sense: Lebech 2009, 258.

Stein notices, however, that this cannot be the case. First, the same object may be perceived by different individuals without them perceiving it as having the same value-qualities. Second, it is possible that values do come to givenness when extra-egoic data do not play any role. This is the case when we perceive the elegance of an argument or when we value a joyful pardon: in neither case are any objects perceived by the senses. Stein concludes that value-qualities cannot be constituted by factual qualities of the objects. When they appear inseparable, this is because a value-constitution goes hand in hand with object-constitution.

According to Stein, the intuitive givenness of a thing is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the apprehension of its value. As she states: "Rather, an inner condition of the subject must be added in order to render possible the acquisition of the value" (Stein 2000, 162). Given that values are not intrinsically dependent on the objects by which they are given, the question arises whether they are dependent on egoic contents. In Stein's view, egoic contents have a twofold constitutive function: "One, they are the material on the basis of which values come to givenness for us. And two, they deliver up the stuff for the corresponding affective attitude" (Stein 2000, 160). For example, the feeling of delight provides the basis for the apprehension of the value of beauty of a color and founds my gladness about this value of beauty. Like Husserl, Stein acknowledges that the subject have an active role in the disclosure of values. The idea of the constitution of values means that valuing something always requires the activity of the "I" as a valuing subject.²⁶

This activity of the "I" should not be interpreted as a creation of values by the subject, but as the place making it possible for value to come to givenness. According to the "a priori correlation between noesis and noema" formulated by Husserl, there is a correspondence between experiencing (perceiving, judging, feeling, etc.) and what is experienced (perceived, judged, felt, etc.). For the case of values, this means that there is a correlation between the valuing subject and what is valuable. The correlation between subject and object allows phenomenological research to adopt two different directions of investigation. On the one hand, it is possible to focus on the given phenomena. As Moritz Geiger put it, in this case there is a "turn to the object" (Geiger 1933, 15). This way was mostly followed by early phenomenologists such as Scheler and Geiger. On the other hand, it is possible to prioritize the pole of the subject and consider consciousness in its constitutive dimension. This interpretation is associated with Husserl's transcendental idealism, but its roots can already be traced in his *Logical Investigations*. Stein's analysis should be placed in line with Husserl, because she explains the constitution of values by examining the valuing subject. At the same time, like other early phenomenologists, she is also interested in the pole of the object: in values themselves as objects of our experience. According to Stein's view, which tries to combine both orientations (the turn to the object and the turn to the subject), the pole of the object—in this case the values—can only be explained regarding the constituting activity of the subject. Constitution, hence, has

²⁶ Cf. for an elucidation of the concept of constitution in Stein: Lebeck 2004, 68 and 2009, 267; and in Husserl: Moran and Cohen 2012, 71.

647 nothing to do with projection of affective states or creation of values, but with an
648 analysis of the subject as the place that makes it possible for values to appear to us.
649 It is the activity of the subject that confers upon values an intelligible structure.

650 Stein's idea of an intentional constitution of values aims for an understanding of
651 values examining the role of the subject as the space in which the values become
652 possible. The idea of constitution implies that the valuing subject and the values
653 themselves are related to one another, that there is a direction from the subject
654 towards the object, and that in being directed the subject plays an active role: values
655 are dependent on valuing persons and the emotional experiences they are able to
656 arouse. This correlation between the valuing subject and values themselves is central
657 for understanding how the intentionality of the emotions works. Given that
658 emotions are object-directed and that they disclose values, they have conditions of
659 satisfaction. Valuing subjects constitute values but these values are not arbitrarily
660 related to the subjects. That we constitute values implies that we identify them
661 thanks to our emotional experience. Thus, there is a relationship between the "I"
662 and the value that can be considered appropriate or not. Further, values are perceived
663 as higher or lower. Egoic contents may have different significances for the
664 constitution of various realms of value. These different realms correspond to the
665 different strata of the personality and each one is constitutive for a different realm
666 of value (Stein 2000, 163).

667 To sum up: Stein's axiological position should be understood as an original
668 application of phenomenological research that runs in two directions. Given the
669 object of study, namely values, we can say that Stein defends a peculiar form of
670 value realism. Like Scheler, she admits the existence of a realm of values that can
671 be grasped and discovered thanks to our feelings. Unlike Scheler, but in a sense that
672 may also be found in Husserl, Stein thinks that the nature of these values can only
673 be fully understood if we turn to the subject and examine it as the place that makes
674 it possible for the values to be given to us in an intelligible way. This double perspective
675 shows that she takes the phenomenological datum of a correlation between
676 mind and world seriously. Her work can be seen as an attempt to develop a form of
677 value realism within the phenomenological framework of the Husserlian a priori
678 correlation.

679 **4 Concluding Remarks**

680 In this paper, I examined the Steinian model of the intentionality of the affective
681 phenomena and focused on the case of the emotions. I embedded Stein's work in the
682 larger framework of the Brentanian tradition on intentionality and the modifications
683 realized by his students in order to explain how our affective acts put us in contact
684 with the world. Stein shared common ground with early phenomenologists in the
685 idea that not all affective phenomena are directed towards their objects in the same
686 way. Regarding the emotions, she develops an interesting account according to
687 which they require cognitive bases to take place and are directed towards the values

disclosing them. Taking seriously Husserl's idea of a priori correlation she adopts a realist position about values; these, however, can only be understood under an accurate analysis of the subject. Her analysis reminds us that the objects of our experience cannot be fully understood without a simultaneous analysis of the experiencing subject. This paper was conceived as an attempt to shed light on Stein's claims about the affective life, revitalize her insights, and present her as a philosopher of the emotions whose claims are able to deal with the highly topical matters that still dominate current philosophy of mind.²⁷

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Author Queries

Chapter No.: 4 421425_1_En_4_Chapter

Queries	Details Required	Author's Response
AU1	Please Provide complete affiliations for "Vendrell Ferran"	
AU2	Please provide reference details for "Lebech 2003"	
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AU4	References "Quepons Ramírez (2013), Schütz (1972)" were not cited anywhere in the text. Please provide a citation or delete the reference from the reference list.	

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