

Martin Heidegger
as Interrogator:
The Final Paradigm



By

Daniel Fidel Ferrer

2024

**Martin Heidegger
as Interrogator:
The Final Paradigm**

By
Daniel Fidel Ferrer
2024

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator: The Final Paradigm.

By Daniel Fidel Ferrer.

Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. Imprint 1.0. 2024.

All Rights are Reserved. Intended copies of this work can be used for research and teaching. No change in the content and must include my full name, Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Enjoying reading and disagreeing.

Publisher: Kuhn von Verden Verlag. Language: English and German. Includes bibliographical references and an index. Pages 1-316.

1. Ontology. 2. Metaphysics. 3. Philosophy, German. 4. Thought and thinking. 5. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. 6. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854. 7. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. 10. Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century. 11. Philosophy, Modern -- 19th century. 12. Practice (Philosophy). 13. Philosophy and civilization. 14. Postmodernism. 15. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. 16. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. 17. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Martin Heidegger and his family for many things.

Caveat: I and most Heideggerians do not agree with everything that Martin Heidegger said or wrote. Remember this is about Philosophy. Disagreements allowed and encouraged. Even Heidegger changed his mind. No one has read this book for errors. As always, any errors, mistakes or oversights etc. are mine alone. Given a couple more years, I could improve this book. If I have mis-quoted or quoted you as an author and not properly acknowledge your writings, please forgive me, and send an update and I will correct those in the next edition of this book. There are many translation in this book from German, please re-check any translation with the originally. I may not have noted any changes I have made. Double check all of your own writings. It is ok to be pedantic and picky. However, I am sure there is no wisdom in that approach. Most bipeds need to think critical by themselves, since remember this is Philosophy.

For proper citations, please see Heidegger Circle's (Sigla) *Texts of Heidegger cited and abbreviations used*. Thanks to all of the editors of Gesamtausgabe and all of the translators of Heidegger's writings into English (ok there is some French too). "All mistakes are my own."

This is a book in words about words, so it would be disingenuous to claim that these translations and interpretations in these "words" are "only" mine. Who owns the words? I may be guilty of missubtraction. Heidegger's translation from Greek to German are perhaps all too well known. How to evaluate translations? Carefully. Even Heidegger points out the issues of "untranslatable terms." Heidegger on translation is well known topic. My advice on translation is simple: do your best. In order to let Heidegger speak these quotes are longer than mere snippets. I often include the German text so that Heidegger can be heard in German exact how he said it. The dates and years are used for the methodology of historical indexicality (historical context).

Table of Contents

Mottos

Division I.

Discussion of the title	pages 2-6
Prologue	pages 7-14
Heidegger, what do we know about him?	page 15-22
Early Heidegger	pages 23-41
What are the periods in Heidegger's thought?	pages 42-51
Preface and Setting the Stage	pages 52-65
Introduction	pages 66-82
Heidegger on Questioning	pages 83-94
The Crisis or Krisis in philosophy?	pages 95-106
Does Heidegger have a philosophy?	pages 107-127
Heidegger about the Nature of Teaching	pages 128-132

Heidegger against philosophy as a worldview or the standpoint of
standpointlessness pages 133-137

Heidegger's world-famous book *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*, SuZ, 1927)
pages 138-153

Heidegger's second attempt *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938)
pages 154-162

Heidegger on the image of the Bridge pages 163-170
Conclusion pages 171-188

Division II.

Engagement with Heidegger on history of philosophy (metaphysics). Reinigung as
cleaning, purifying pages 189-191

What is Heidegger's Metahistory of philosophy? pages 192-243

Appendix A. Reconstruction of a partial letter from Martin Heidegger to Dieter
Sinn. Dated. 24 August 1964. pages 244-248

Appendix B. Martin Heidegger's Dialogue and Critical Debate with Hegel.	pages 249-253
Appendix C. Heidegger on Pain (Schmerz)	pages 254-257
Appendix D. Update: 2023 Oct 24. Daniel Fidel Ferrer replies to Professor Thomas Sheehan (Sein question)	pages 258-269
Appendix E. Five Habilitations done with Martin Heidegger. Habilitationsschrift	pages 270-272
Heidegger Bibliography Individual Lectures Vortrag or Vorträge. Detailed	pages 273-294
Heidegger 's Gesamtausgabe (HGA or GA). Note GA 72 has yet to be published (2024).	pages 295-299
Letters. Briefe. Briefwechsel. Not complete	pages 300-303
Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien / Etudes Heideggeriennes (list of Heidegger texts)	pages 304-305
Jahresgaben der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft (from the internet) (list of Heidegger texts)	pages 306-308
Additional References (bibliographies)	pages 309-310
Heidegger Index Projects by Daniel Fidel Ferrer	page 311
Martin Heidegger Audio Recordings	pages 312-313
Additional acknowledgements	pages 314-316
Letter from Hermann Heidegger to Daniel Ferrer den 5.2.2002. In German. Hermann Heidegger's response to the Barbara Fiand collection being in the USA.	

Mottos

“Cherish those that seek the truth but beware of those that find it.”
Voltaire

“The questionable - is the Matter itself.”
“Das Fragwürdige - ist die Sache selbst.”
Vigiliae I, II / Notturmo, (1952/53 bis 1957). GA 100:54.
Martin Heidegger

Starting over, “I am rethinking the issue from the ground up.”
(Richard Polt, 2024). This is the correct spirit (*esprit de corps*).

Preliminaries

Discussion of the title

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator: The Final Paradigm.

We now have most of Heidegger's oeuvre. More specifically, over 100 volumes have been published in German, and many of his letter collections have also been published. Perhaps most of what the letter editors have been able to ascertain as the important letter collections have already been published based on the many citations to those letter collections. Granted some more to come; but we have the vast majority of his writings, and these appear to have been selected ostensibly by Heidegger himself to be his substantial publications (GA). There is a surfeit (overabundance) of texts. We are over the enjoyable amuse-bouches. In the past, we have had significant gaps (lacunae) in his oeuvre, which has meant shifting interpretative paradigms of what indeed was Heidegger's overall project. There was a wilderness of mirrors reflecting gaps and many missing documents. We only had a pale simulacrum, just a few baubles. But now we have Heidegger's **ipsissima verba**. Word for word (**ad verbum**). Now we can read and run the full gamut of his 37,577+ published pages in his collected writing (Gesamtausgabe, GA 1-102). We now have all of the accoutrements for a deep dive into Heidegger's writings that he has shared with us. My slogan is to read Heidegger's writing as a whole and that means the real unabridged version. No more shortcuts or just a few of his writings. The important slogan: **nota bene. Tolle, lege!** (take up and read). Following in the path of the great Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis (354-430 AD). The goalposts are now set for philosophers. You need to get over the cognitive rigidity that has closed your mind to the great adventure of re-reading the (more or less) complete set of Heidegger's writings. For many of us the Heidegger story in his writings (texts) has unfolded over decades and the partial and incomplete readings have led to confusion and chaos in the interpretations of Heidegger's central story.

We can take a new philosophical version of Minsky's cycle: displacement, boom, euphoria, profit taking, and panic. Heideggerians have had their cycles of Heidegger's text being published. We are over those cycles with regard to Heidegger "secret and hidden texts". We are at the end of a long line of partial readings of Heidegger. The sclerotic (ridged) philosophers can stand down now and make room for the new wave of Heideggerians that have the "whole" thing in hand now (40,000+ pages of Heidegger). Beside Heidegger's own publications during his life time (self-selected for important publications), we also have Heidegger's collective writing (not works) the Gesamtausgabe which he provided the guideline for publishing (one except GA 91, *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*, the splitter were selected by the editors).

Now in the light, it is important to follow the methodology of historical and personal history to know when and in what context Heidegger is writing or speaking. Heidegger's thoughts were not

created in the void of open space, but rather in a whole host of cross-roads. First there is Heidegger's own understanding of him developing his own thinking on different topics. Self-reflection. Second, there is the cultural and historical context at the time he was writing. With the general notion of Heidegger had only written one book (GA 3), then what kind of writing is he engaged in at the time. Who is the audience? Students at the university. Bremen business men. French intellectuals. Radio or TV presentations. Personal friends. Colleagues. The list is long. Heidegger's insights are pivotal for all European philosophy since at least 1927. We have two sets of additional kinds of writing. One six toros writings in the late 1930s and mid-1940s. What started with the GA 65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)* Dated: 1936-1938; through GA 66, 67, 69, and 70; and finally, the sixth volume GA 71. *Das Ereignis*, (1941-1942). With the yet unknown writing in the still unpublished GA 72 *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944). As with all of Heidegger's own context we need to proceed with the methodology with directionality and luminosity with regard to the thesis of this book as we proceed through Heidegger's writing, it all should become very clear what are Heidegger's core and central thoughts and his approaches to fundamental questions.

Pete Ferreira's Martin Heidegger Corpora is coming online, and we will have many more fruitful philological results in the future. There is a growing amount of philological research into Heidegger's no longer hidden (absconditus) Greek language resources (see James Holoka on his German philology). The Hermeneutical Situation and historical framework of Heidegger's thought which covers 60 years in the 20th century. Now we have reliable signposts for our trip. There is a certain oinoglossia (like wine-talk) of Heideggerian speak or Heideggerian-talk (lexicon of Heideggeriana or Heidegger-ese) in these pages, but hopefully eventually understandable or at least understandable by some intellectuals. Heidegger makes many gnomic remarks like most philosophers. Remember that Heidegger is neither a historian nor a social reformer. Can we define Heidegger and many other philosophers based on what they are seeking to overcome? Heidegger's deep philosophical insights are pivotal since the end of the neo-Kantians in the 1930s.

Starting at the beginning in America with John Wild, *The Challenge of Existentialism* (1955). The first famous Heideggerian that I meet personally was Calvin O. Schrag (Paul Tillich's teaching assistant at Harvard University) and he wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on Heidegger and Kierkegaard in 1957. But the *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* by Thomas S. Kuhn in 1962 was the background of idea of Paradigm shifts [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradigm shift] in the vast scape of intellectual ideas and movements. The best example we have of trying to provide a framework on Heideggerian studies is Thomas Sheehan, who wrote 23 years ago.

“We may chart at least four tendencies spread out across a spectrum running from right to left.

1) On the extreme right stands the *ultra-orthodox* interpretation which finds expression in the journal *Heidegger Studies*. This tendency is generally associated with the work of Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and the Heidegger Gesellschaft in Germany and with the Beaufret-Fédier-Vezin school of Heideggerians in France.

2) On the extreme left stands the *rejectionist wing*, much of it inspired by the revelations of Heidegger's scandalous involvement with the Nazis. Some of it has been fueled by John D. Caputo's 1993 manifesto *Demythologizing Heidegger*, which goes substantially beyond the question of Nazism and attacks the very core of Heidegger's philosophy. It is probably unfair to call these colleagues "self-hating Heideggerians" – perhaps kindlier, "Heideggerians against Heidegger." The space between these two extremes is occupied by a fluid center right/ center-left, devoted in the one instance to a strict commentary on Heidegger's texts and, in the other, to more free-wheeling efforts to place his thought in dialogue with other philosophers.

3) The center-right represents the *orthodox position*, comprised of scholars dedicated to getting Heidegger right, not unlike the "Dantisti" of Italian studies whose goal is a close reading of every line of the *Divina Commedia*. Among the immensely valuable achievements of this tendency has been the meticulous charting of the genesis of Heidegger's thought by Theodore Kisiel and John Van Buren.

4) On the center-left stand the *liberal-assimilationists*. Beyond getting Heidegger right, these scholars seek to put his work into dialogue with other contemporary philosophers and perhaps to amend or correct him in the process. The last thirty years have witnessed fruitful engagements of Heidegger's work with other Continental philosophies (Derrida, Levinas, Lacan, French feminism, etc.) as well as with non-Continental thought (Wittgenstein, analytical philosophy, pragmatism, and so forth). Among the latter we might locate Hubert Dreyfus' interpretation of the first half of *Being and Time* as anticipating certain anti-representationalist critiques within the philosophy of mind.

The above characterizations hardly exhaust the scholarly spectrum. Variations are endless, including the widespread application of Heidegger's thought (often "creatively" understood) within literary criticism, the arts, Eastern thought, ecology, and so forth. But however, one charts the multiple tendencies in mainstream Heidegger scholarship, they all remain grounded in the dominant paradigm's vision of *Sein*, *Dasein*, and the *Kehre*." (Sheehan, 2001).

At the outset, Sheehan is defiantly non-sanguine over all of the disagreements, schisms, and conflicts between various paradigms, camps, sub-camps, schools (many based in different countries with different amount of translations); and this has led to a deeply flawed departure from the true Heideggerian positions, which I will give in this book. We can call these previous Heideggerian interpretations as a real farrago (or slang in Hindi Khichdi खिचड़ी). Just some more gallimaufry (hodgepodge, a real mishmash). Starting over, "I am rethinking the issue from the ground up" (Richard Polt, 2024). First re-read Heidegger from the ground up and then proceed to the "re-thinking" stage from the ground up.

Obviously, the mainline coterie Heideggerians are completely fractured, which given the smattering of texts that came out that gave a very incomplete reading of Heidegger. One example, "myopia of many of his readers" (Francesco Guercio and Ian Alexander Moore). Make no mistake, the plain truth of the matter is this has to stop now, since we have the vast – vast majority of Heidegger's texts.

Professor Sheehan as always is trying to make some sense and order out of the general state of confusion (management of the chaos). The philosophical (or philological) approach of taking Heidegger's polysemy philosophical approach and attempting to analyze Heidegger's multi meanings and reduce it to a monosemy (a word has a single meaning) and then to re-write Heidegger has missed the point. Again, keep Heidegger's questioning stance in the full frontal picture and view. Any of these "answers" to his questions will have many meanings (Sinn) and Heidegger's own version of 'truths.' If you want the Wikipedia versions of western philosophy and/or Heidegger, you will be disappointed here. **Tolle, lege!** (take up and read) Heidegger's own text his *œuvre*. He knew that all of this would come out for his "readers."

Professor Sheehan continued with the motif with the title of a recent and excellent book, *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift*, Thomas Sheehan (2015). Heidegger has many more detractors than devotees. Just some partisan jeremiads. Of course, he did not want any devotees (no bhakta भक्त). But Heidegger did share his various life paths. Heidegger's mission is simply to awaken questioning and philosophizing within us. Maybe not "simple". The Gordian Knot (Γόρδιος δεσμός, Górdios desmós) is clear and take a bold step to bring Heidegger's purpose to the fore-front now.

Now we can get remarkably close to the "final" reading of his overall vision of philosophy. Fortunately, we now have an excellent "solution" at hand in this book. We have a split of the past Heideggerians, we will call them the farrago-Heideggerians or the incomplete-Heideggerians (left, right, center). Versus the scrupulously strict or meticulous correct Heideggerians that follow Heidegger message. There is no philological getting Heidegger's doctrines "right;" but rather, understanding and getting Heidegger's message "straight" and "correct." This is philosophy, so you can question all assumptions and theses etc.

More specifically, I am claiming to offer a full and systematic unified account of Heidegger's purpose in his writings. This is the final and complete paradigm of the Heidegger story. This is a reading of Heidegger that brings together from 1000s of threads to a much clear central single thread.

Final Question: what is the message that Heidegger has sent us? My answer to this question is the title of this book and its investigations, *Martin Heidegger as Interrogator: The Final Paradigm*. Interrogator as asking the questions or as the questioner. Heidegger did send us a "message;" namely, to ponder philosophical questions. Just like he said of Aristotle, all of the questions are still "open". I claim here that this is the only or the final reading of Heidegger. Dispute if you wish. Please. We must determine to re-read Heidegger and start afresh with all of his writing, since all of the early interpretations of Heidegger are now scuppered (sunk). Throw out and retract those earlier readings of Heidegger's thoughts. Stated differently, there is not a plurality of doctrines here; and I can claim without any trepidation. This is not the "third way" of reading Heidegger – this is the *final way*. Heideggerians need to get with the "program" otherwise, they are on a road to nowhere.

In the context of interpreting Nietzsche's saying on the "death of God," Heidegger makes an impressive note in his remarks in 1943:

“Of course, every explanation must not only take the matter from the text, but it must also, without insisting on it, add something of its own to it.” (“Jede Erläuterung muß freilich die Sache nicht nur dem Text entnehmen, sie muß auch, ohne darauf zu pochen, unvermerkt Eigenes aus ihrer Sache dazu geben.”) *Holzwege*. GA 5: 213. The older numbering GA 5: 197. Published by Heidegger in 1950. Of course, I am not claiming I am “adding” anything to Heidegger. Many others can accept that task. What we have here is the central core of Heidegger’s teaching and message to us, namely, *Heidegger as Interrogator*.

Prologue

Sonata

The prologue (πρόλογος, prólogos). Plus, to "set the scene".

Where do we stand with Heidegger?

What is the situation regarding Heidegger research?

A doxographic project? What is authentic with Heidegger? What is his story?

Heidegger wrote in 1928 (96 years ago),

“Compared with the duration of cosmic galaxies, human existence and its history is quite fleeting, only a “moment.” But this transience is nevertheless the highest mode of Being when it becomes an existing out of and towards freedom. The level and type of Being does not depend upon duration! *Mdohysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, GA 26:22; translation by Michael Heim), *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, 1984, page 18.

Compare Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) brilliant essay,

“About Truth and lie in the extra-moral sense.” (June 1873, about 151 years ago). “In some remote corner of the universe, which was poured out flickering in innumerable solar systems, there was once a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. It was the most haughty and mendacious minute of "world history": but only a minute. After a few breaths of nature, the star froze, and the clever animals had to die.”

Where do we stand regarding Martin Heidegger’s thought?

The critical touted and acclaimed, American philosopher, Richard Rorty (1931-2007), in 1990 makes this remark about Heidegger, “the greatest European thinker of our time”. No faffing about. Now given his international fame and so many of his translations from German into many other languages on the planet. The case can now be made for a much higher world ranking. This is now touted as the Heidegger Era. As a philosopher, Heidegger has street cred, that is, his name is recognized on the street. Think of Heidegger as a Jedi Grandmaster against the evil of the universe.

Furthermore, Heidegger has set the agenda for many philosophers in the world. No one yet is post-Heidegger. So far, the attempts to be “after or post” Heidegger have failed. There is no one on the docket that is even close to setting a new agenda for the main task of philosophy. Fortunately, there is a solution to figuring out what Heidegger has left us. Keep reading.

Based on world-wide publications and translations, Jürgen Habermas (1929-) is now the most famous living philosopher and public intellectual. In 1953, Habermas published an article entitled “Thinking with Heidegger and against Heidegger: On the Publication of Lectures Dating from 1935”. Habermas is loosely connected to the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt School. World-wide fame from this article, "Modernity versus Postmodernity" (1981). Heidegger is still setting the table for the world-wide philosophical engagement with our western Greek philosophical

past and of course are future in the nuclear age. For Heidegger this is technological Machination and Gestell or "enframing".

In this book it is important to let Heidegger speak. **Ipse dixit** (Latin for "he said it himself") or *autòs épha* (αὐτὸς ἔφα) or **Res ipsa loquitur** – the thing itself speaks.

We need to hear his distinct "voice" and what he said. Respect the text. This is to partially pin down Heidegger's language and to see if the translations make any sense. In this book there are many length quotes of what Heidegger said and what others have written and said about Heidegger. Aristotle mentions that bees have something divine about them (*Generation of Animals*, book 3). The methodological image of a bee going from flower to flower collecting the pollen has something to offer us for this current project. In this case, the argument from authority makes sense. This book is also an exercise in didacticism. Note. We are not seeking metaphysical truths from Heidegger, nor do we accept 'everything' he wrote, he himself admits to making errors. Many different kinds of errors.

We do not have a critical edition of Heidegger's writing, instead we have the so-called last hand ('Ausgabe letzter Hand') edition. Supposedly, the copyright runs out in the year 2046 (22 years from now) on Heidegger's writings and at that point many other kinds of publications can start. But the Heidegger family as the owners may have other kinds of copyright options in Germany before 2046 (e.g., Copyright Renewal). Stay tuned. There are many other ways of extending copyright just ask the Richard Wagner (1813-1883) family.

We need to reflect on the nature of 'engaging' any philosopher and Heidegger in particular. However, we are not re-writing Heidegger in English for understandably (See Thomas Sheehan on this project). Heidegger says, tell me your opponent and I will tell you how deep your philosophical understanding is. He says, something similar on your understanding of process of "translation." Both of these remarks are discussed later in this book. This is no small fillip. Heidegger's friend said this, "Tell me your relation to pain, and I will tell you who you are!" Ernst Jünger, "On Pain" (1934). Side note. See the later Appendix C. Heidegger is not an opponent in this book but is the *muse*, that is, a person to ponder about his core central nature. What are the ennobling truths of Heidegger's message? Heidegger's beneficence is on display.

Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) published collected writings are now almost completed in the year 2024 (Gesamtausgabe, GA 1-102). Not yet published GA 72 and an acknowledged number of large collections of letters. There is a great deal of breadth and complexity in his oeuvre, it is vastly sumptuous. So far about 37,577 pages (in 2024) have been published in the Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe (HGA or just GA), which is being published by the company of Verlag Vittorio Klostermann in the city of Frankfurt am Main, Germany. The founder Vittorio Klostermann was Heidegger's friend. His son is currently the owner of the publishing company, Vittorio Eckard Klostermann (1950-).

For instance, Heidegger writes about many different things in his life and thoughts. For example, his travel journal to Greece entitled, *Sojourn* (spring of 1962, *Aufenthalte*). Here is another

example, when his manuscripts went from his home in Freiburg to the archives at the DLA in Marbach. He wrote this slight elegiacally poem,

“From the 5th to the 6th of May 1975
Farewell to the Manuscripts.
The unspeakable assistance of yours
for the steps into the pathland of thinking
both of us foreseeing the one
salvation is only for mortals
the holy trail (heilige Spur).
Vierter Tell: Vereinzelt.“
Gedachtes. GA 81:355

Heidegger’s letter to Hannah Arendt (dated 1974), “In the meantime, you will have probably heard that I have decided to prepare a complete works, or rather: to prepare guidelines for it. It requires a great deal of reflection and note taking so as to avoid ending up with an edition as chaotic as that of the "Husserliana." 162. Freiburg, 17 IX 74. *Letters, 1925-1975 / Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger*; translated from the German by Andrew Shields. Therefore, the ‘last hand selection’ was done by Heidegger for the most part of his published writing. The known exception is a small part of GA 91. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter* where the *Denksplitter* (#1-140) were confirmed and selected by Hermann Heidegger (1920-2020) and Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1934 -2022). See “460 sheets, which comprise 140 independent pages” self-contained remarks (GA 91:771). So far, we do not know what these editors’ criteria that they used to select the *Denksplitter* section in GA 91. There is some reference to the fact that these ‘remarks’ were self-contained; in other words, not selected (cut and pasted) out of longer sections of Heidegger’s writings. These standalone remarks were selected for publication by his son and another scholar who had both fortunately worked on Martin Heidegger’s manuscripts for decades.

Walter Biemel (1918-2015) in an interview (published in 2001).
Discussions about the size of the Gesamtausgabe (GA, or HGA).
Heidegger’s reaction was interesting,

“At first, he didn't want exactly that. I was at a meeting with Vittorio Klostermann, Hermann Heidegger, von Herrmann, Klostermann's son and my wife. At that time, he thought of rather a limited edition. When Pöggeler later spoke of a hundred volumes, he reacted: "No no!" I don't quite know how it happened. His wife understood nothing of his philosophy; but she made sure he could work.”

(“Au debut, il ne voulait pas exactement cela. J' etais a la reunion avec Vittorio Klostermann, Hermann Heidegger, von Herrmann, le fils de Klostermann et ma femme. A ce moment-la, il pensait plut a une edition limitee. Quand Pöggeler, plus tard, a parle de cent volumes, il a reagi: « Non, non! » Je ne sais pas bien comment s'est fait. Sa femme ne comprenait rien a sa philosophie; mais elle faisait en sorte qu'il puisse travailler’). *Heidegger En France: Entretiens*. 2001, page 44.

Notably, collected writings (these are not collected ‘works’), the Gesamtausgabe was started when Heidegger was still alive in 1975 (first published was GA 24), which is now 49 years ago. At this stage in 2024, there are an epic of 37,577+ pages that are published in German. Latin: **Tolle, lege!** (take up and read). Required to read assiduously. Mastery of his writing takes time. Heidegger died 48 years ago. There are many published letter collections that have already been published (see bibliography at the end of this book) and of course, many more to come. At this point, it is hard to make the case about Heidegger’s “silence” on many topics. Some topics are missing, but we have confirmed a vast number of writings from Heidegger in all sorts of written formats (but only one “book”) he even wrote some fictional dialogues and a travel journal. He was very polymorphous in his writings (almost all were handwritten). Heidegger wrote many and some extensive letters to diverse kinds of philosophers, scholars, poets, scientists, atomic bomb researchers, translators, students, former students, novelists, psychiatrists, and et cetera. Many examples can be given. Alfred Denker has given an estimated number of 10,000 letters and some individual letters are over 50 pages long. As these are published or accessed in archives we will know more about Heidegger and his thinking. (Some of these letters are being sold off at public auctions). Will this change the main thrust of Heidegger’s legacy? Answer: no, I doubt it. Heidegger has had the chance to address and publish his substantial life works. The point is that we have the most important and the essential Heidegger – right now! Heidegger has selected almost all of the content of his 102 volume Gesamtausgabe. Furthermore, and this is often left out of accounts that consider his legacy, he arranged for his writings (a scriptorium) to be in a public archive (DLA), that is, not in a private house in Freiburg. General descriptions (catalog records) of the manuscripts are online and are publicly accessible (examples are given later in this book about the ‘rules to access’ the manuscripts, so there is not total access for the public to see the actual manuscripts. But definitely a start in the right direction. Some of the manuscripts that were written as addresses or speeches have numerous colored markings for intonation aids that Heidegger used in the actual delivery in front of people. We need some real philology and hermeneutics to read the color marking in these manuscripts. Even some of his brother’s books are in the Martin-Heidegger-Museum (Kirchstraße 7) in Meßkirch, Germany and can be seen and read there. Yes, book marginalia investigations are on-going and have already been published for decades. From his early Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) studies to Ernst Jünger (GA 90), and recently his Georg Trakl’s (1887-1914) marginalia. Martin Heidegger's GA 4 (Gesamtausgabe) has examples of Marginalia in Holderlin poems. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry* 1936-1968. *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. GA 4:199-202. Also, in the in the pre-GA publication of *Holzwege* there is various marginalia (1950, 1960 publication).

From the Held Report there are in DLA Heidegger Archive, “173 slipcases into four "series", each labeled with one of the capital letters A, B, C, D. [include] 47 slipcases with lecture manuscripts that are in chronological order.” Page 17. These slipcases are called Schuber in German. Kind of like a box to place magazines in libraries. Walter Biemel (1918-2015) helped Heidegger set this arrangement up.

Specific claim: we have enough of Heidegger’s writings to ‘claim’ that we can exam Heidegger as having enough to say, “the whole Heidegger” or something more specially like 90% of his important writings. Heidegger published a great deal of his “important” thought when he was

alive and made extensive plans for the GA with other scholars and a publisher (hence Gesamtausgabe HGA 1-102).

We are now at the stage of not having to wait for much more of Heidegger's writings to be revealed or unlocked. Some readers might still find some of Heidegger's writing encrypted. The Heideggerians have to overcome their "hope" that something will be published by Heidegger in the near future; and then, therefore it would clear up all of our questions about Heidegger. The Heidegger "yet to come" or the "hopium" movement is now done for. Note the great saying, "forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush" Warren Buffet.

In general, we can write about Heidegger's overall project without the worries that something major has yet to be published. In the past, there were many stages of the Heidegger's writings being published in German and then in English (Japanese, French, Spanish, etc.), so that the constant waiting for the "latest" Heidegger writings is basically over. We have a few more coming out, but nothing "earth shattering" in our overall understanding of what Heidegger was doing. No more excoriation disorder. We have about 24,000+ pages in translation from German to English thanks to the arduous work of the translators (again thank!). What is the gist of Heidegger overall project and what was his methodology for questioning? The many lacunae of the past have now been confirmed and filled with an enormous collection of Heidegger's writings. Finally, the 'long wait' is over. All of the previous paradigms based on different amounts of Heidegger's publication be available-- is over (scuppered). We can now re-think Heidegger's entire project from scratch. This is the final paradigm based on having Heidegger's substantial publications in our eager hands. We did not get an instruction manual on how to read Heidegger. Again, we have the inexhaustibility of philosophy, but we can now read most of the essential Heidegger in his own writings and letters. I do not think he held anything back from his readers (maybe he could have written it all clearer). It is glacial in its implications for a radical change in the engagement of Heidegger over the "central" and core his purpose of doing philosophy. In fact, we have the other problem. Alas, we have so many substantial publications that it is hard to know where to begin and what is more important than other parts of his published writing. The Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte) versus his lectures that were given to the public, and of course, he knew the "public" were sometimes students or philosophers or in the case of Bremen – they were businesspeople. Heidegger's double imprimatur seals all of this writing that he himself published. Heidegger Speaks!

No doubt there will be additional publications coming out for decades. [In 2004, I found an unknown G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) letter written in 1830 in a USA library archive, written almost 194 years ago]. Since 1955, there have been 32 newly found letters by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Or even in the case of René Descartes (1596–1650). Three unknown letters by Descartes have been found in the last 25 years. We are still waiting for Heidegger's thoughts on freezing embryos. Theodorus: "Well, we have plenty of time, haven't we, Socrates?"

But the overall final **judgement**: we have 95% of Heidegger's essential thoughts in writing now in 2024. It appears that Heidegger's last hand **selected** what was going to be in most (content) of the Gesamtausgabe volumes himself; and the editors just did the "text" of the volume published. They were text editors (Herausgeber) and not allowed to be text *interpreters*. The Heidegger's

‘last hand’ has selected the ‘best of the best’ of Heidegger’s thoughts; and these have already been published in GA. Past from Heidegger’s hand to our hands now. However, the new volume of *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter* (GA 91), published in May of 2022). We finally got a special note in the afterward that Hermann Heidegger (1920-2020) and Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann ((1934-2022), had selected the published part known as #1-144 Denksplitter; not selected by Martin (See GA 91:771). Thus, the rest of the Gesamtausgabe (GA 1-102) was selected or at least the overall outline of the texts and content was selected and approved by Martin Heidegger. Therefore, the “last hand” (“Ausgabe letzter Hand”) selected most of the content for Gesamtausgabe (GA 1-102); and of course, he worked with others (on and off, as mentioned in letters) over the content and transcripts of his manuscript since 1945. The bank in Meßkirch where his manuscripts were stored was bombed during World War II, but his manuscripts were in the bank’s vault, and they all survived. Or during World War II some of the manuscripts were kept at the family house of Heinrich Wiegand Petzet’s (1909-1997) in Icking, Germany. It is remarkably interesting that Heidegger extensively footnotes himself throughout the Gesamtausgabe.

Therefore, the claim besides being the author and creator of the content, he also reviewed his manuscripts and knew them very well (one might say, it was with magisterial and superior knowledge). So far, there are only a few documents that Heidegger ‘notes’ in his writings that have not already been published (discussed later in this book). In other words, did Heidegger make references to other exciting manuscripts that have not yet been published? Answer: a few are still left and to be published. According to Trawny in 2015: “In addition, two further booklets with the titles “Megiston” and “Grundworte” [basic words] were found in the DLA Marbach archives. Whether and how they belong to the “Black Books” has yet to be clarified.” (GA 97, page 521). More specifically, Heidegger himself mentions Grundworte in the text (GA 99, page 64); and Trawny (2019) says in a footnote at the bottom of the page, “publication nothing has been decided yet” (GA 99, page 64). GA 99. *Vier Hefte I - Der Feldweg und Vier Hefte II - Durch Ereignis zu Ding und Welt*.

Indeed, in some of Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte), he built his own short subject/name indexes which have been published in those volumes. This may sound a bit odd, but Heidegger adds footnotes and reference to his other writing in his own poems (GA 81). *Thought Poems: A Translation of Heidegger’s Verse. Gedachtes*. GA 81. Bravely translated by Eoghan Walls. We can understand this as Heidegger is our guide; thus, he is giving us help climbing up the mountain of his writings and providing for a deeper understanding of the weaving and interconnection of his thought. He is taking us from the base camp up the mountain.

A question about Heidegger’s selections.

If some manuscripts and writings were not included in the Gesamtausgabe, then does that mean that Heidegger decided they were too much of a “failed” attempt to be included? The number of pages given for the “not yet published” notes of Heidegger’s in the DLA is about 11,000 pages (according to the Held Report). For example, Heidegger pondered and wrote extensively about the nature of “language,” so how much of the unpublished materials is worth considering? Many of his ideas he condenses into his address and lectures. The status of Heidegger’s unselected

manuscripts is an open question. On the other hand, we have the published lecture series on Herder on language. *Seminar: Vom Wesen der Sprache* (Summer Semester 1939) GA 85. Heidegger discusses Hamann, Herder, Humboldt, and Jacob Grimm theory of language (GA 85:38) with some student Protocols and an interesting passing reference to Hegel on language (the invisible). The small part of the counterexample is the selection and use of student transcripts. There are strict guidelines on how to use the student's transcript given to the editors (See Franz-Karl Blust's Afterward in GA 22). The use of the student's transcript varies to a large degree and depends on how complete Heidegger's own manuscripts are so far. Normally, the use of the student's transcripts is addressed in the Editor's Afterward in each volume of the GA where they are used. There are also student protocols included in the GA, which are not transcripts of Heidegger's lectures. The protocols were like homework assignments for Heidegger's students to discuss topics from the on-going lectures. To be sure, a bit of summary but more like thoughtful essays by the students.

Perhaps the most famous example of his helper is "Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1934-2022), was assistant of Eugen Fink (from 1961 to 1970) and last private assistant of Martin Heidegger (from 1972 to 1976). At the behest of Heidegger, he was appointed main scientific editor responsible for the Gesamtausgabe starting in 1975". (From the publisher's web site, springer.com). Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1934-2022) was a full professor of philosophy at the University of Freiburg for many years. He certainly knew the Heidegger archival materials (at DLA) for the best selection of materials (see GA 91 Afterward).

Heidegger's letter to Medard Boss (1903-1990) gives us an overview of his working in (1970) on his manuscripts with another assistant, named: Eugen Fink; and gives an exceptionally good indication of how he sees the world circa 1970. Note on humans destroying our planet.

"September 8, 1970, from Freiburg im Breisgau.

... Are you giving lectures again during winter semester?

I have limited the real work of thinking and am busy ordering the manuscripts. An assistant of Professor Fink will help me in the following months. In addition, I will reduce the size of my library substantially. I had an invitation to Provence again, but I declined it. But thinking continues, that is, it remains the *same*, although the power of technological enframing is increasing daily in all domains of life. There is also the possibility of mankind's death. Reasons cannot be given why the people now populating the planet and destroying it in every possible way should continue to exist without end.

Der Spiegel is presently running a series of articles on Brazil and South America. If this subcontinent explodes and others with it, then Karl Marx will have achieved his "change of consciousness" in classical form." (*Zollikon Seminars*. page 360 in English translation).

So, is the judgment about 90% as known is contentious? Grant it -- we might not be able to decipher, and total understand Heidegger's writings, because few of us are up to "speed" on Heidegger's understanding the German language and literature background of his 60+ years of reading the great Greek and German traditions. Philosophy, literature, poetry, and works of art

are under Heidegger's eyes and the large scope of his philosophical thinking. Plus, for scholars and philosophers needing the extensive background is crucially needed to comprehend Heidegger's interpretation and thoughts on translating Greek in to "his" German language. His hidden philological sources of the Greek language. It has even been reported that Heidegger said, some of his interpretations of the Greeks are "nicht mehr haltbar" (no longer sustainable, part of his Plato interpretation). Still, they are deep and provoking insights into ancient Greek's philosophy. Of course, it is not just Heidegger writing in German; but his transformation and use of the living German language is unique (opposite of ossuary). In addition, he was very aware of southern German dialectics as well (one of his lady friends was a poet in Alemannic dialectic). Heidegger got the Johann-Peter-Hebel-Prize in 1960 (GA 13). See also Hebel's *Allemannische Gedichte*. In a general way, he was against the use of Latin and Latinized words as reported by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) (see below). Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the historical breaking point when he had to translation Latin concepts into German from Latin textbooks for his young students (some were age 16). Note that Kant lectured for 41 years and taught 284 courses from 1755-1796. After that we had Hegel's German with a lot less Latinized German. Work in progress. This is the battle of the Roman versus the Greek philosophy. Note very carefully (N.B), Greek philosophy is pre-Christian.

What is the intent of Heidegger's project?

Perhaps the answer to the question, "What is easy? To advise another." (Τὸ εὐκόλον; Τὸ ἄλλω ὑποτίθεσθαι) according to Thales. Can we advise our readers?

Heidegger says for example, "We know no goals and are only a going" ("Wir kennen nicht Ziele und sind nur ein Gang") *Mindfulness. Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:9. Heidegger did not come to some final list of central doctrines. More specifically, there are themes for Heidegger, but no doctrines or anything like Heideggerian canons.

** Johann Rudolf Ringier notes of Hegel's lecture of 1819/20 that were found in 1997. Earlier student's notes of the same lectures were found in the Lilly Library of the University of Indiana in 1969.

Heidegger, what do we know about him?

All humans like stories.

What is Heidegger's story?

Extended examples.

The end of the La Belle Époque was around 1914. Heidegger joined the German army in World War I (January 1918, age 29), and then he lived through the hyperinflation (November 1923) and was drafted (Volkssturm) for ditch digging along the Rhine in World War 2 (November 1944, discharged in December 1944); and he survived and enjoyed until 1976, age 86. Basically, from the time of horses and buggies to humans landing on the moon. These were extremely turbulent and perplexing years for the development of philosophy within the universities; and interesting for Heidegger, since eventual his reputation developed 'outside' of just the university's philosophy departments throughout the world. In other words, he became famous before twitter (now known as 'X') and Facebook (social media in general). "Everything great stands in the storm" (*Republic* 497d9). Or at least, Heidegger's translation of these words. One of the other translations "For all great things are precarious." Bad things happen to great things (ok maybe an example of deepity). Depends on if you are the 'right' vessel for great sayings.

This is not a hagiography. His father Friedrich Heidegger (1851-1924) and Mother Johanna Heidegger (born Kempf, in Göggingen near Meßkirch). Heidegger played as the left wing in soccer in Meßkirch as a youth following the old dictum **mens sana in corpore sano**. Heidegger left his hometown of Meßkirch in the 1903 for Konradihaus, Jesuit gymnasium in Constance and three years later in 1906 Bertholds gymnasium in Freiburg (about 70 miles from Meßkirch). Graduates from the Berthold Gymnasium in July 1909. In 1911 moves to #1 Hohenzollernstrasse," In 1914, he wears a Sapienz. Heidegger was engaged for a while to the Catholic lady Marguerite ('Gretel') Weninger during 1915-1917. Engaged to Elfride in March of 1916. We know how much his Elfride (wife, her last name was Petri) was to inherit when they got married (letter of 21 March 1917). The same year his Stipendium der Görresgesellschaft was 1500 Mark (about 5.53 Mark to one USD dollar \$ at that time). Elfride's father was Reserve Colonel Richard Petri from Alfeld on the Leim. We know that Heidegger quit smoking after he got married. His father's income taxes for the year 1903. Elfride Heidegger (1893-1992) his wife's nickname for Martin was "little Blackamoor". His Greek teacher was Sebastian Hahn from Rast. Heidegger like to listen to Vivaldi (according to Silvio Vietta), Brahms, Schubert, and Mozart (at the cabin 1957). Heidegger reportable said, that "Mozart is God's string music." One of his publishers Gunther Neske sent him some Vivaldi-Platte (music LP). Once he gave an LP record as gift of Gregorian chants. One Christmas Heidegger sent out a number of copies of Marie Luise Kaschnitz's (1901-1974) *Beschreibung eines Dorfes* (1966) for Christmas presents. Plenty of details about the delicate point of Martin's lady lovers (private letters discussing too much). His favorite wines (Markgräfler, "Auggener Schäf," a Gutedel and Wasenweiler Spätburgunder). In 1975, he is drinking wine, Côte du Rhône, Saint-Joseph. Wine glasses from Bremen. Heidegger's favorite artists Cézanne, Klee, and Paula Modersohn-Becker. Details of the many classes he took and taught. He builds a small swimming pool in his yard after hearing about Americans having swimming pools. The kinds of typewriters that were used in his family,

students, and close friends. Heidegger had three writing desks or what we might call his workshops (and his scriptorium) of thinking (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*). One desk at his home at Röt buck or now Röt buckweg, Zähringen, a suburb of Freiburg im Breisgau; later, in 1971 he builds a retirement home next door at Fillibachstraße, Zähringen; the second in "die Hütte" (cottage) in the hills above the town of Todtnauberg ("Rüt te" area), and the third desk at his brother Fritz's house in the library at Friedrich-Ebert-Straße, Meßkirch, Baden-Württemberg, Germany. During his time in Philipps University of Marburg as a professor, he lived at Schwanallee 21, in an apartment on the first floor where drafts of his first **magnum opus** *Being and Time* were written. Most likely he had a writing desk there too. Reported in a letter to Jasper, he got a phone in December 1928 (the secret phone number: 7104). Heidegger's letter to Ernst Laslowski (1889–1961), "Elfride gave me a fabulous record player for the cabin for my birthday. So, Mozart was often present on the quiet evenings...). Letter dated. Nov. 6, 1957. On some occasions, he would read from Adalbert Stifter (1805-1868) story *Die Mappe meines Urgrossvaters* (1864)

Heidegger's personal biographical information and journey. I know that is somewhat paltriness about how perspicacious Heidegger's deeper thoughts (those are coming). No worries.

After a lecture in Riga on the Baltic Sea, Heidegger writes to Jaspers, dated: Todtnauberg, September 24, 1928

"The boat ride from Stettin to Riga was magnificent-the sea was a mirror-so I hardly felt anything of the ocean's vastness. I must say, all in all, the sea strikes me as boring and unimportant - but that is just the one-sided impression of a mountain-dweller."

In 1935, Heidegger family adopts recently orphaned German girl, named Erika "geb, Birle" Deyhle (1921-2005) from São Paulo, Brazil, she is a distant niece of Elfride Heidegger (GA 16:818). She married the Swabian priest Wilhelm Deyhle (1914-1991) in 1944. Erika's mother was the godmother of Hermann Heidegger (1920-2020), so there was some kind of family connection. In some of Heidegger's letters and poems he mentions that his daughter Erika is there with him. Heidegger spoke at Erika's second daughter's wedding Ursula Greiner (1946-) in July of 1968 (GA 16:818, section 256).

Heidegger speech, "Short speech on the wedding day of Richard and Ursula Greiner, née Deyhle (Münsingen, July 20, 1968)". GA 16:818, section 256.

Note, Martin Heidegger has at least 14 grandchildren. Joni Mitchell (1943-) sang in 1969, "and we've got to get ourselves back to the garden". Was Heidegger looking for Max Yasgur's farm in 1969? February 2, 1950. Handwritten letter to "Mrs. Munzer," in part, "Thank you for the wonderful and over-rich Christmas cookies..." Many of Heidegger's handwritten letters are now for sale at auctions. Some of remarks about Heidegger are pablums (bland).

Martin liked parts of French countryside and five trips to Greece (and Amsterdam, Rome, Paris, Bremen, Berlin, Riga). No side trips to the Folies Bergère. Many of his friends, colleagues, and students have written extensively about him, since he greatly impacted their lives. Photo opportunities with many people. Even videos of Heidegger on YouTube ⁽¹⁾ now. In January of

1946, Heidegger had some kind of a mental breakdown and was taken to Viktor Emil von Gebssattel (1883-1976) for three weeks of medical treatment (Schloss Hausbaden in Badenweiler). But not malingering. The fodder for intellectual gossip or just feuilleton. All his human foibles are on display now; but we are not “judging” or “defending” Heidegger’s life. Given Heidegger’s unique and difficult to understand ‘philosophy’ done over some 60+ years, then these anecdotes (ἀνέκδοτον, “not given out”) may help to “see” Heidegger’s thinking within his historical context. Unlike Plato, Heidegger does not have any secret oral teachings or doctrines. No Ring of Gyges (Γύγου Δακτύλιος, Gúgou Daktúlios) for Heidegger. All or most of his personal secrets are out for public display now. Sadly, many Heideggerian scholars want to belong to the esôterikós (ἐσωτερικός, "belonging to a secret inner circle") group, but there is no such luck. The only thing that was partially a secret was Heidegger home phone number (in December 1928 the secret phone number was: 7104). The wait for some secret publication is “over.” There are no pseudepigrapha. Yes, expect many more writings to appear over the years, for example even his late invitation (for events) lists of names are being sold at auction. All of his chattels will be up for auction soon (although I hope not). But even one of his typewriters, the now famous Urania-Piccola Model R, serial number 110482, was purchased (R. Polt).

More specifically, there are more counterexamples.

It would be interesting to see this text.

At DLA. “Der hermeneutische Zirkel (Manuskripttitel) [Notizen] Umfang, Beilagen. 51 pages. DLA 75.7435,2. Folder C 27.” Not mentioned for future publication. Hermeneutical circle is mentioned in *Zollikon Seminars* seminar at M. Boss’s house May 14, 1965.

Update.

“In his notes titled "Der hermeneutische Zirkel" (Schuber C 27) Heidegger mentions Gadamer’s essay in the Heidegger Festschrift from 1959 and his own Hegel seminar from winter semester 1956-57 - so these notes are written in or after 1959.” From Dr. Mark Michalsk’s email reported in 2023 March. Thank you, Dr. Michalsk, from one of Nietzsche’s letters where he explains, “Jemandem den Daumen halten” (September 28, 1877) [similar to cross your fingers]. Maybe it will get published. Again, maybe just “cuckoo for cocoa puffs” or out of the question.

Another example, there is no known text at DLA, but it would be interesting to see any manuscripts related to Heidegger’s summer seminar of 1937 on the topic of Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. Or the Seminare von Säcking in 1952 with an unknown topic, but a manuscript was reported to be in DLA in 2003. Recently we the publication of over 900 pages of Heidegger on Kant (GA 84.2 *Seminare: Leibniz – Kant – Schiller*. Editor Günther Neumann). Mostly, on Kant’s third critique.

In his lecture on Aristotle, Heidegger famously says, “The only thing of interest regarding the person of a philosopher is this: He was born on such and such a date, he worked, and he died” (*Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (Summer Semester 1924. GA 18:5). This Heidegger statement has been often stated and re-stated over the years by many commentators. And this early note from 1919, "in which-as in any science - the personal attitude of the philosopher should remain excluded" (*Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*. GA 56/57:10). Hence, Heidegger was against any biographical information about philosophers. But of course, we have

so many of Heidegger texts now, we can now make his other counterexamples famous. For example, it should be noted in the Schelling book he talks a bit more about Schelling's life. Heidegger disliked doxographers (sometimes), but there are counterexamples.

One counterexample are some pages that Heidegger wrote about the life of Ernst Jünger (1895-1998, age 102) in *Zu Ernst Jünger* (GA 90:235, 1939-1940) and even the kind of literature that Jünger had written; and a comparison with other current writers as well. Examples of Heidegger's current literature analysis, "The "Rumänian Diary" (1924) by Hans Carossa, the war diary of the young Bernhard von der Marwitz ("Stirb und Werde"), the story "Verlorener Posten" (1935) by Friedrich Franz von Unruh about days of the Baden Leibregiment at the Lorettohöhe (1916) - all these writings have their own incomparable there rank next to Jünger's "Das Wäldchen 125". *Zu Ernst Jünger*. GA 90:236. Reference to Jünger diary of during World War I. The title is: *The Grove 125. A chronicle of the trench warfare in 1918* ("Das Wäldchen 125. Eine Chronik aus den Grabenkämpfen 1918"). Published in 1925. Jünger and the Battle of Langemarck (1917) was a turning point.

Later in 1970, Jünger published a famous work with title of *Annäherungen: Drogen und Rausch* (*Approaches: Drugs and Intoxication*) about his time with Albert Hofmann (1906-2008, age 102), the inventor or the finder of LSD-25. A passage from this book was sent by Jünger in a letter to Heidegger #61) Ernst Jünger to Martin Heidegger [Pentecost 1970]. 29 March 1970.

There are other counterexamples of Heidegger discussing the life of a philosopher, e.g., Heidegger discusses Aristotle's life and chronology of his writings (*Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (Summer Semester 1926). GA 22:144).

In the past, there have been many generational issues as various part of Heidegger's writings has been released and of course, generational issues as translations of his writings have been published (historically over the past 80 years: Japanese, English, French, and Spanish). For instance, William J. Richardson (1920-2016) reading was limited compared to what we have now (2024). Even though Pater Richardson read all of Heidegger he could find, it was just limited. Recent, "Why (Heidegger) Scholarship Is Generational?"

Some of his famous students like Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) and Karl Löwith (1897-1973) from the 1920s and 1930s are no longer living; but they have written extensively about their relationship and encounters with Heidegger and his thoughts. Some of his later students (e.g., Rainer Marten) are still living. But many of the "double secret" (*Überlegungen II-VI* (*Schwarze Hefte 1931-1938*), GA 94:531, Editor Afterward) publications that were not revealed to his later students; but now we have them all 33 of the Black Notebooks (*Schwarze Hefte*, (GA 94-102) about 3384 pages that are printed and published. Only one is missing from the archive: "Überlegungen I" or "Winke Überlegungen (I)" is still missing (GA 97 p.521 editor's note). Written around 1930 (94 years ago). There has been speculation as to what was in this volume. Heidegger's work on the unpublished third division of *Being and Time*, (speculation by Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann), family matters, or his ethical theories. Was there any dramatic change in Heidegger's life in the year 1930? Maybe just feuilletons. Whether it was lost, or Heidegger destroyed it? If it ever turns up, we will know some of the story. The last one that turned up

outside of the Heidegger's archive in DLA (Marbach), was this one: *Anmerkungen I*, published as GA 97 (2015) and was originally believed to be lost; but was found in the possession of the Heidegger scholar Silvio Vietta (1941-), who had received it from his mother Dorothea Vietta (1913-1959). Dorothea would sometime type Heidegger manuscripts, but the vast majority of the typing was done by the brother Fritz Heidegger. According to the *Klaus Held's Marbach-Bericht Report* (2020), Heidegger called his Black Notebooks, the "workshop notes" ("Werkstattaufzeichnungen").

Heidegger pointed out this problem in 1940, where he says, "All the world interprets. Nobody thinks." (Alle Welt interpretiert. Niemand denkt).

Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941). GA 96:276. "Überlegungen XV." DLA 75.7415,5. The chattering classes has given us lots of the "answers" for Heidegger's questions.

Heidegger tell us, "Denken stiftet nur Unruhe." ("Thinking only creates unrest.") *Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*. GA 97:256; *Anmerkungen III*, page 54. Historical side note, in Heidegger handwriting, there is a note that says this copy of *Anmerkungen III* made (typed?) by Dorothea Vietta (GA 97:525). Therefore, our thinking about Heidegger will create unrest and strife. We will be in a state of unrestfulness. But at least with the later Heidegger we can Gelassenheit (Amish versions is to "quietly wait") or wait for the ringing of the Being question. Heidegger used the expression "Gelassenheit" from 1919 to 1976. Connections with Jacob Boehme use of the expression of Gelassenheit or Eckhart's Abgeschiedenheit? Or is this Heidegger way of elucidating the Greek's stance on ataraxia (ἀταραξία)? Gelassenheit is an expression also used by the German philosopher, Philipp Mainländer (1841-1876).

What is in stock (Was vorliegt? GA 66:419) --- for research on Martin Heidegger?

What is the overall framework for understanding Heidegger? He used the image of a torn sock to illustrate Hegel's philosophy. On August 30, 1968, Heidegger delivered the self-made abridgment, on Hegel's saying, "A torn sock is better than a mended one". (GA 15). What is the appropriate image for Heidegger's thinking? It is confirmed as an acclivitous land - always upward.

Although even he noted in Heidegger's letter to Hannah in 1972, "There is, I suspect, not as much worthy of thinking as the libraries and bookstores might suggest". #143. Badenweiler, 10 III 72. *Letters, 1925-1975 / Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger*; translated from the German by Andrew Shields. Plus, look to the chattering classes of Heideggerians.

Back to the historical trail of Heidegger.

Heidegger wrote eleven book reviews that were very erudite, during the period March 1910 and April 1913.

We have about 102 volumes published in the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe (HGA or just GA). The letter collections GA 92 and GA 93 are not out yet; but in the meantime, many other letter collections have been published (even before Heidegger's death), and plans are for many more to come out with other publishers; we can take these two volumes out of the GA calculation for now. The latest volume, GA 91. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter* (2022) just came out in the

recent month May 2022. So, there is one volume left in the official GA program: GA 72. *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944); (*The Footbridges of the Inception*). Forthcoming after 2023 (according to Martin W.).

What else might be published in the near future?

On the History and Future of Heidegger's Literary Estate, with Newly Published Passages on Nazism and Judaism: Klaus Held's Marbach-Bericht.
By Ian Alexander Moore. 2020.

There may be more additional materials coming out as reported in Klaus Held's Report.

More specifically, Ian Alexander Moore reported, "The team decided that only a relatively small number of manuscripts met these various requirements. These manuscripts include further dialogues, including one with a character named "Ä.," perhaps "Der Ältere" or "The Elder" of "The Evening Dialogue" or "The Occidental Dialogue" (see GA 77: 205; GA 75:59); as well as texts on space, pain, and attunement. The manuscripts will be published in two or three supplementary volumes to the Collected Works."

From the actual report these are the details of what they found.

1. Gespräche (D5, »Auf dem Uferpfad am Strom«, sowie aus Chamois Nr. 10 »Die Zeit kommt ... « (21 Blatt), »A.: Dann gaben wires zu rasch auf. « (112 Bl))

2. Raum - Über den Schmerz (B22, 570 Bl.) - Stimmung (B30.2, 109 Bl.).
Page 24 of the report.

Example from DLA catalog.

“Über den Schmerz (Manuskripttitel) [Titel des Schubers; Notizen]

257 Bl. Mit 1 Beil. 1 Bl. Dr.

Heidegger, Martin: Inhaltsangabe enthält: "Der Schmerz und der Tod", "Die Physik und die Meta-Physik des Schmerzes", "Der erste Steg. Der Schmerz", "Über den Schmerz", "Der Schmerz selbst", "Die 'Gegebenheit' des Schmerzes", "Der Schmerz als das Widrige und Negative", "Der Schmerz und das animal rationale" u. a. Bemerkungen teilweise vorgesehen für GA Bd. 72." DLA 75.7300,3. As noted some of this content may be in GA 72 *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944). Editor Mark Michalsk. Forthcoming after 2023.

According to Peter Trawny the editor in 2015 (GA 97),

“In addition, two further booklets with the titles "Megiston" and "Grundworte" [basic words] were found. Whether and how they belong to the "Black Books" has yet to be clarified.” (GA 97, page 521). The title is listed as “Zum Sagen der Grundworte” (DLA 75.7419,2), Heidegger himself mentions *Grundworte* in the text (GA 99, page 64); and then Peter Trawny (2019) says in a footnote at the bottom of the page, “publication nothing has been decided yet”. The title as it is shown on the record at the DLA is “megiston gar isos,” and a note in the record that says before 1970, (DLA 75.7419,5).

Ultimately, the point is that Heidegger has selected the vast majority of the materials for the GA, and he knows the collection of his materials and manuscripts. In other words, we already have the “best of the best” of Heidegger’s thinking as selected by him. A case can be made that since this group was not in the initial published GA program “Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen 1919–1923” and that Heidegger was not involved in the actual final selection of these materials. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) has noted that even Heidegger might have been surprised of what turned up in these writings, so at least, that Heidegger most probably did not read these materials in many decades. Most plausible, Hermann Heidegger (1920-2020) helped with selection of these early materials and extensive student transcripts were used as well for these volumes. Claudius Strube edited a number of these early lectures.

Some of the GA volumes are in their fourth edition already. Plus, we have one example of a completely new publication based on finding Heidegger’s original manuscript. The case of GA 38 A. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* (Summer Semester 1934), ed. Peter Tawny, 2020. The new volume uses the newly found original manuscripts. From the publisher notes: “The manuscript – long believed to be irretrievably lost – of Heidegger's lecture “Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache,” already published in 1998 based on a postscript of one of Heidegger's students as Volume 38 of the Gesamtausgabe, is now being published newly as Volume GA 38A.”⁽²⁾.

We have marginalia published of Heidegger’s notes on his own publications (a few noted in GA 2, 5, 9, 31); and of course, on other authors as well. The best example is GA 90. *Zu Ernst Jünger*. Thomas Sheehan on his review of the new edition of *Wegmarken* GA 9 and his APPENDIX: SELECTED MARGINALIA. Another example⁽³⁾. Recent article on *Heidegger’s Trakt-Marginalia*⁽⁴⁾. Heidegger’s marginalia on Gadamer’s last lecture on Hegel recently sold online at auction.

Around October 1922, Heidegger was busy applying for jobs at University of Marburg (Philipps-Universität Marburg) and Göttingen, he wrote the following summary of his research.

“Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation.” This was found and published in 1989, it was found in the archives of one of Georg Misch’s (1878-1965) students at Göttingen, Josef König (1893-1974). So, this one was published 67 years after Heidegger authored this essay. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik* (Summer Semester 1922). GA 62:343.

We have examples of newly found versions of Heidegger’s lectures. For example, Dieter Thomä (2018) recently found a different version of the lecture *What is Metaphysic?* When Thomä published it in German, he called the “Urfassung” or in English the “Original version.” The typescript manuscript came from the estate of Ernst Zinn (1910–1990). The year that Heidegger gave this lecture was (July 24) 1929, that is 95 years ago from when it was found and recently published.

The problems with secrets are that if more than one person knows the secrets then others will come to know them. In the case of Heidegger, so many people wrote down what Heidegger said to them. Heidegger would often take students and scholars with him to take notes of lectures and

seminars. Therefore, there are no unwritten doctrines (ἄγραφα δόγματα, ágrapha dogmata) of Heidegger.

When Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe was in the planning stage there were many who were worried that the early lectures from Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen 1919–1923 (GA 56/57 to GA 63) were either lost or would not be allowed to be published by the Heidegger family. Hermann Heidegger (1920-2020) announced his decision to publish these lectures in April 1984. Now we have 1800 pages covering this period. Plus, six lectures from before 1929 published in GA 80.1 *Vorträge*.

Early Heidegger

Note on Franz Brentano (1838–1917). He received his Ph.D. from the University of Tübingen in 1862, with his thesis *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*. (*Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*). This work was given to Heidegger at the age of 18 (from Conrad Grober (1872-1948)) and had a deep impact on him. Edmund Husserl said the first time he heard the word phenomenology was in a class with Brentano. Husserl was greatly influenced by the later Brentano, specifically, this work, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (*Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*) (1874). Carl Braig (1852-1923), one of Heidegger's professors authored this book, *Vom Sein. Abriß der Ontologie* (1896). This was one of Heidegger's readings when he was in the Gymnasium.

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) wrote in his *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (*Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* (1843), "Hegel's philosophy is the last great attempt to rescue lost and fading Christianity through philosophy...". Did the early Heidegger start out with the task of the rescue of Christianity? Hans Jonas (1903-1993) speaks of "the well-known and always known fact that there is much secularized Christianity in Heidegger's thought" (2001, 241).

Famous atheists during this time, Mikhail Bakunin, Bruno Bauer, John Dewey, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, George Santayana, Arthur Schopenhauer, H. G. Wells, and the most renowned Nietzsche.

Heidegger letter to Karl Löwith Aug.19.21, "It belongs to my facticity that I am a "Christian theologian" (which I mention in passing)". In an earlier letter that is often overlooked, letter to Karl Löwith dated X.20.20; the passage by Heidegger states, "I myself am not even seen as a "philosopher" anymore, for I am "in fact only still a theologian." (See also the later letter, May 8, 1923). This is part of the early story and how Heidegger changed over time from a theologian to a philosopher to a questioner during the period of some 50 years. A bit of a brave deed (*andreia*, ἀνδρεία) given the family background. His father Friedrich Heidegger (1851-1924) was the local Catholic Church sexton.

A whole group of philosopher/scholars have made the study (erudite, and challenging work, *andreia*, ἀνδρεία) of the early Heidegger (pre-1927) as a major research and study area (to name a few Thomas Sheehan, Theodore Kisiel, John van Buren, Hugo Ott, and Alfred Denker). The *Husserliana* collection now runs to more than sixty volumes; the Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833-1911) *Gesammelte Schriften* is up to volume twenty-six. So fortunately, we have more materials on the background of Husserl and Dilthey, who Heidegger was in engaged in extensive studies before writing *Being and Time* (1927). Plus, many more philosophers that are discussed and footnoted in *Being and Time*, some of whom Heidegger spend time with personally, for example, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), Max Scheler (1874–1928), Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), and Oskar Becker (1889-1964) have published vast number of materials related to Heidegger issues and themes from this period in Heidegger's philosophical life.

One can argue that Heidegger only wrote one ‘book’ for publication. *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*, 1927) was the publication of a project and a “Preparatory” phenomenological investigation. Parts of it came from his student Simon Moser's (1901-1988) transcript of a course Heidegger taught during the Summer Semester 1925. Heidegger rushed all his investigation (drafts of lecture notes, review articles) to get a promotion to a full professorship at University of Philipps University of Marburg. Let us be clear that *Being and Time* was not planned as a book and what we have now (97 years later) is an incomplete project. Outline (Entwurf) for his research agenda. All the historical accounts mention the word “rushed” for publication. Of all of Heidegger’s writings that are published – which one is a book? Answer: that is GA 3. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929). Yes, there are many other writings that are published but only ‘one’ planned as a “book. Heidegger had his own “standards” for these writings to be called: “werke” or even a “book.” The writings have come out and are published as “books” but only one planned as a book (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*), the rest are collections of lectures, essays, addresses, private writings, off the table writings, speeches, etc.

Heidegger in a later writing, but still in the 1930s writes,

"From Enowning"

In its new approach this *Contributions to Philosophy* should render manifest the range of the question of Being. A detailed unfolding here is not necessary because this all too easily narrows down the actual horizon and misses the thrust of questioning. But even here *that* form has not yet been attained, which, precisely at this point, I demand for a publication as a "work". For here the new style of thinking must announce itself - the reservedness in the truth of Being; the saying of silence in reticence, the maturing for the swayingness of the unblended. *Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:427. *Mindfulness*, page 377.

On September 18, 1932, he writes to his lady friend Elisabeth Blochmann (1892-1972): "People think, and even talk about it, that I am now writing SZ II. It is good that they do so. But since SZ I once was for me a *way* that led me in a certain direction, and since this path is now no longer being trodden and has already become overgrown, I can no longer write SZ II. I am not writing a book at all" (Heidegger and Blochmann, *Briefwechsel*, p. 54). Kisiel translation (page 565).

Again, one of the many places that Heidegger says he is on a “way” (not *the* only way). This will be repeated often to provide an overabundance (surfeit) of evidence for the general theses of this book.

Heidegger started reading Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) in the 1930s and was impressed enough to teach a seminar on (1945), but they did not meet in person until 1948; and then he and his brother Friedrich "Fritz" Georg Jünger (1898-1977) were close friends of Martin for the rest of his life. Heidegger wrote more about Ernst Jünger than any other 20th century intellectual (GA 90, *Zu Ernst Jünger*, 472 pages). Jünger was not exactly a philosopher. Ernst was one of the few outsiders to be at God’s acre in May 1976 in Meßkirch at Martin’s funeral. The only one that Heidegger never said anything critical about was the poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843); everyone else was fair game for philosophical critical remarks including himself and even his

brother, Fritz Heidegger (1894-1980). See their letter exchange, in *Heidegger und der Antisemitismus*. 2016 (see more in the Appendix at the end of the book).

Back on the trail.

One example. Although Heidegger was close to Nietzsche on importance of the Greeks, we get this analysis of Nietzsche. In Heidegger's essay from 1946, 'Anaximander's Saying', Heidegger said, "The young Nietzsche does indeed, in his own way, establish a lively relationship to the personality of the pre-Platonic philosophers, but his interpretation of the texts are thoroughly commonplace (herkömmlich), even quite superficial (oberflächlich) throughout." (*Off the Beaten Track*, page 243). Heidegger's task was, "thinking Greek thought in a Greek fashion" (GA 5:336). Even Karl Marx (1818-1883) wrote on the Greeks philosophers, his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation is entitled, "Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature." April 1841.

Although there were many students of Husserl – almost all were in the end critical of his philosophy (e.g., Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) and Eugen Fink (1905-1975). Husserl attacked Max Scheler (1874-1928) and Heidegger; and both had learned from Husserl but were extremely critical of him in the end. Husserl was looking for "followers" in all the wrong places. Because of Heidegger's questioning approach his relationship with his students was more complex. Heidegger's letter exchange with Karl Löwith (1897-1973) gives us the best example of an openness of exchange of intellectuals between teacher and student, friends, and eventual colleagues with some ups and downs on both sides of the letter exchange.

Many philosophers have written about the many "influences" that have affected Heidegger's thought. Yes, he read a great deal and was influenced by what he read and conversations he had with many intellectuals and farmers. But we need to acknowledge at the start that he is a philosopher of an unusual and unique kind. A few of his published reviews from the 1910s can be considered "normal" by academic standards. But after that – No. One of the essential things about Heidegger's writings is = uniqueness and originality, to celebrate the inventiveness and innovation clearly also his dynamic vitality of thinking. He lived in tumultuous times and had his own way and path both in philosophy and in his thoughts about lived history. Heidegger was put on the planet for a purpose, he was a philosopher. Heidegger quotes this famous remark from Nietzsche at the beginning of this two-volume study of *Nietzsche*. Lectures from 1936-37 winter semester.

"At the age of twenty-eight, as a professor in Basel, Nietzsche writes (X, 112):

There are times of great danger in which philosophers appear-times when the wheel rolls ever faster-when philosophers and artists assume the place of the dwindling *mythos*. They are far ahead of their time, however, for the attention of contemporaries is only quite slowly drawn to them. A people which becomes aware of its dangers produces the genius." GA 6.1:1

First this is in opposition to Hegel who said, at the end of the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*: "when philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the coming of the dusk." Berlin, 25 June 1820. Philosophy comes at the end of rapid cultural and historical change. Whereas Nietzsche is seeing philosophers are "far

ahead of their time,” which is indeed the case for Nietzsche who was indeed ahead of time. On the timeline where does Heidegger fit in? And of course, where does Heidegger see himself on the timeline? In some of his remarks at the sound recording of one his speeches, he said it would 300 hundred years before his time would be understood. He gave some remarks about how we are just coming to the time, so that we can understand Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) philosophy, which oddly enough is about 300 years ago (from 2024). This was a common trope of philosophers not being understood in their time or needing hundreds of years before their legacy was known. Philosophers that thought they were not understood. Some outstanding examples, Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and especially, Nietzsche who proclaim he would be understood only posthumously. Heidegger would be on the list. Remember this is still academic philosophy and not written in the style of newspaper or Wikipedia. Heidegger said in 1935, “Philosophizing, we can now say, is extra-ordinary questioning about the extra-ordinary.” *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Freiburg lecture course Summer Semester 1935. GA 40. Thus, the philosophical language in questioning is problematic and difficult.

Yes, are we just now confronting Kant and Hegel? Some might say that we have engaged, confronted, and finally, have overcome Karl Marx or maybe the future of communism has yet to be written. Or, our right-wing friends would say, just leave the trash behind, the idea of communism is over. Just a note: if Herbert Marcuse is on the left-wing side, Heidegger is on the right-wing side compared to Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979). Heidegger mentions Marcuse in his Seminar in Le Thor 1969 (GA 15:90-92) about his understanding of *Being and Time* over time. Marcuse (Heidegger’s assistant (1928-1932) left a job in Berlin to join Heidegger in Freiburg because of his stimulating reading of *Being and Time* (1927). In the last volume of GA 102, *Vorläufiges I-IV. (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970)* Heidegger attacks Marcuse with a list of others (GA 102:7); Heidegger knew that Marcuse was writing unflattering (critical) things about him. There are articles and books about their relationship and philosophical similarities and more about their differences. Interesting historical note that both Hermann Heidegger (1920-2020) and Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) were enthralled with Schiller’s writing. This is not a case of sycophantic works (συκοφάντης, sykophántēs).

Some outline.

Perhaps a problem with polysemy (polysemy vs monosemy; a word has a single meaning). Digging deeper may make the problem worst. So many meanings (Sinn). Does Heidegger play with polysemy as a matter of course with philosophical thinking?

Being as character (1922), Being das Unablässige, the meaning (Sinn) of Being (1927), the truth of Being (1936), topology of Being (1947), the crossing out of Being, destiny [*Geschick*] of Being, the Ring of Being (Der Ring des Seyns), veil of Being (der Schleier des Seins), Sein als Sein läßt das Sein, das Sein selbst als das Ereignis, questioning is the strength of thinking, eschatology of Being, the Shepard of Being (Hirt des Seins), language as the house of Being (das Haus des Seins), das Sein selbst als das Ereignis, or something like this “Da-Seyn,” and Legacy of the Being Question (Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage). The date on this last question mark and final project is between the years 1973-1975. We also have the concepts of “preparatory thinking,” (GA 14:75); and “the thinking that is to come” (“*das künftige Denken*”. GA 9:364).

Future directions toward the new path and hence a new beginning (Anfang, die Anfängnis (GA 97:100) des Anfang). For instance, expressions like the Offenheit für das Geheimnis (openness to the mystery) or “empowering of Being” (Ermächtigung des Seins, GA 94:39). Or die wesenhafte Mehrdeutigkeit. “We must constantly emphasize that the only question which has ever moved Heidegger is the question of Being: what does “Be” mean?” *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. 67:377. Profundity or just some tantalizing perplexity? Or just some doubts – dubiety.

Example, Heidegger used the expression clearing or opening (die Lichtung) during a few years, approximately from 1963 to 1968 (die Lichtung des Seins) this will need additional philological research as more systems come online with Heidegger’s text. So, the questions are what led him to this expression and what led him away from using this expression? Many of these expression Heidegger would use and then after some discussion with his friends he would realize that it was taken too ontically. Best example, “es gibt.” What are Heidegger’s deepest thoughts? This question does not work, since for Heidegger there are no “levels.” Try again.

Heidegger in a short essay on the *Recollection in Metaphysics*, says, “The history of Being is neither the history of man and of humanity, nor the history of the human relation to beings and to Being. The history of Being is *Being itself, and only this.*” (“Die Seinsgeschichte ist weder die Geschichte des Menschen und eines Menschentums noch die Geschichte des menschlichen Bezugs zum Seienden und zum Sein. Die Seinsgeschichte ist das Sein selbst und nur dieses.” (‘Die Die Erinnerung in der Metaphysik’ *Nietzsche II*). *The End of Philosophy* (page 82). ‘Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik’ (1943) translated as ‘Recollections in Metaphysics’. *Nietzsche II*. GA 6.2:489.

Clearly, Heidegger is still working on sorting out ontological questions. Here are two examples from the Black Notebooks, “superior power of Being (Seyns) before all beings (Übermacht des Seyns vor allem Seienden). *Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*. GA 94:362. Additionally, “powerlessness of beings (Ohnmacht des Seienden)” (GA 94:362). For Heidegger, this is all a debouching (opening out) exercise.

Furthermore, we can make some remarks about the following group of writings (late 1930s up to 1944). The following six titles. These writings are the epic torso of Heidegger’s middle period. These are not the ‘summa’ of the later Heidegger, nor are they systematic treatises in any normal sense. The first one, the *Beiträge* is a bit more structured (there are seven or six (?) joinings ‘fügungen”, fugues, Fuge, joints, like overtures of Richard Wagner) and is more sustained and structured than the later writings (GA 66-71). No pizzicato here. Heidegger often refers to the *Beiträge* (einem neuen Anlaufdie Weite der Seinsfrage, GA 66:427) as a key and pivotal shift in his thinking after *Being and Time*. All the continuities and the discontinuities of Heidegger’s thinking is another group of books and attempts to track the “two” or “three” turns or reversals (Richardson) (Der Kehre, or Zuwendung) in Heidegger’s paths. The turning of thought (die Wendung im Denken), simple shift, downshifting, upshifting, pivoting, turns and getting off of the path, change in orientation, timber pathways; and core changing points that might be a “break” in Heidegger’s thought process is certainly an ongoing project for scholars, philosophers, and Heidegger himself when he was alive (see his letter preface to the Richardson’s book, “Brief an Pater William J. Richardson” (1962), in: GA 11:143-152). And the

overall pivots, from Heidegger I, Heidegger II, Heidegger III, Heidegger IV, etc. Heidegger's *Bewegung*. All four of Heidegger's turns (Thomas Sheehan). Paradigm shifts.

Is the research on Heidegger following his remarks about research Aristotle, "Bogging down of lines of questioning, motives of stagnation, causes of foundering"? *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (Summer Semester 1926). GA 22:14-15. Summer Semester 1926 at the Philipps-Universität Marburg). In the face of Heidegger's extensive writings are we foundering in our attempt to bring the core to light? Answer: no. Focus on the true questioning (at the outset this is the more unique unity in Heidegger's own path).

More specifically, he told Karl Löwith (1897-1973) that he was not interested in his philosophical development ("Frankly, I am not interested in my development" letter August 20, 1927). He told Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) the French philosopher (neo-Socrateanism) in 1955, even if Martin Heidegger had a philosophy (he often denies it), then as he said, "I would not be interested in it". These are epic remarks about the nature of his project. Heidegger's motivation and purpose is clear. He is not building a philosophy or a philosophical system or a doctrine. There is no doctrinal "teaching" through which secret knowledge can be transmitted as a handful of the 'creeds' to the select few followers. There is no canon of Heidegger's doctrines. There are no dogmas. Heidegger is contra the whole dogmatism project and some kind of "true" propositions that are handed down from philosophical systems. Side path. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the "Preface" of the 2nd edition of Kant's book, the philosopher Wolff is clearly defined as "the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers." Christian Wolff (1679-1754) hence forth is known as a famous dogmatist. Heidegger is anathema to this idea and project.

Back to our path.

Example, "a pathway of thinking (Gedankengang) *Überlegungen VII–XI*. (GA 95:52).

Some philosophers (Otto Pöggeler) who had seen *Beiträge* before (in 1963) the publication in 1989, have called this Heidegger second major work (das eigentliche Hauptwerk). These are no longer some kind of esoteric writings. Some might consider these in the sense of *esōterikós* (ἐσωτερικός) as only for the inner circle. No more Heidegger secret circles. They were private writings and were not meant for immediate publication. One can say that these were "off stage" writings. It no longer makes sense to talk about non-public writings, these writings are all out in the public and have been for decades (GA 65, published in 1989, or 35 years ago). The vast majority of these writings were with the help of his brother Fritz and with Martin assisting, converted from handwritten manuscripts to typed manuscripts, so this does not sound like they were going to be put these texts on the shelf and be forgotten. Thus, intended for some kind of scholars to "read them." These are clearly **not** didactic texts for students or scholars to "learn" about philosophical issues in the new standard language and style of Wikipedia. The purpose of the typed manuscripts? For "someone" to read them. Who and why? Ponder.

But they were always included in the plans for Gesamtausgabe eventually, and we have almost all of them now. There is no 'one' anymore that is "outside" or on the "inside" and we all can enter and read most Heidegger's writings. There is no inner circle anymore. No special circles of those with hidden (absconditus) knowledge. All of the so-called "secrets" or "double secrets"

have finally been unlocked. These statements are no longer contentious or jejune. Assuming we can de-code his thoughts and language (the coterie “us rare and few,” not for the οἱ πολλοί (hoi polloi)). Heidegger tells his students to study Aristotle for 15 years before attempting to read Nietzsche (*What is Called Thinking*, page 73). Maybe studying Maya script would be helpful too. Some of Heidegger’s writing are more turgid and nearly impenetrable than some of his other writings. Needed a number of new lexica for Heidegger’s words and meaning. Heidegger had a problem with polysemy (polysemy vs monosemy a word has a single meaning). What was Heidegger’s answer? He did not come down on the side of monosemy. Translations of Heidegger. Heidegger’s translators might be part of the problem of becoming and related to the code-talker paradox. See also *Dictionary of the Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon*.

Example, discussion of words as reported in a conversation that William J. Richardson had with Heidegger, where Heidegger told him “the word should no longer be "subjektivite” but "subjectite". (On Heidegger to Lacan).

For his single lectures or addresses outside of the university, he was well aware of his audiences and wrote differently for his audiences. One of the Heidegger most trusted friend (helped Heidegger with the DLA Heidegger archives), Walter Biemel (1918-2015) cautions us,

“But I have not yet mentioned the greatest danger in speaking about a thinker, viz., that we will translate his language back into a language familiar to us in order to make it understandable. But what we really do is mutilate what is proper to the thinker because he is present and functions and lives in *his* language. His language is his thought, and if we give up his language, we give up his thought. Yet we may think we can express what he said better and more clearly and make it more accessible, so we insinuate that he intentionally expressed himself in a difficult way in order to stand out and make some kind of impression.” From “Heidegger and Metaphysics” by Walter Biemel in *Heidegger the Man and the Thinker*, edited by Thomas Sheehan. So, this is not Wikipedia, and we need to let Heidegger and others speak and let their voices be heard.

Contra.

Thomas Sheehan writing about Right Heideggerians in 2022,

“But even so, a substantial number of Heideggerians seem dedicated to parroting Heidegger’s thoughts in his own idiosyncratic language instead of discovering what he was driving at and expressing it in clearer, less quirky language.”

He goes on to claim about the Right Heideggerians,

“They allege that *die Sache selbst*, ‘the thing itself,’ of Heidegger’s thought, was Ἀθήθεια—which they always write with a capitalized alpha to distinguish it from the lower-case ἀλήθεια of *Metaphysics* IX.10, which set Heidegger on his path to the *Grundfrage*. In another iteration they allege that ‘the thing it- self’ is called Φύσις, written with a capital lest we confuse it with the φύσις that Heidegger analyzed in his 1935 lecture course, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (GA 40).”

So, Sheehan’s project is to re-write Heidegger in better language so we can understand “what he was driving at.” This suggestion seems to be “Contra” Walter Biemel. For the purpose of these investigations, it is more important to note that Heidegger’s *Grundfrage* is indeed a “frage,”

namely, a question and Heidegger's overall questioning project and stance. Not unsurprisingly, the Heideggerian crowd has not yet re-read the vast Heidegger writings to find his overall "message". Why did many of Heidegger's own students not become Heideggerians? Heidegger got them thinking, questioning, and the kicked them out of the nest. Which by the way, was fine with Heidegger and maybe was his intention all along the way.

One part of the reading of these materials is to consider that Heidegger is mapping out, defining borders, charting areas, delimitation of his conceptual world. How are various terms and concepts related to each other? Heidegger starts again and then starts over again. Traditional conceptual schemata are turning upside down. Like Schelling, Heidegger's thinking never stops for a 'rest' (contra to Hegel). Hegel stopped thinking about philosophy and then went to Berlin to engage in the "political" in 1818.

As Hegel has remarked that Penelope (Πηνελόπη, Pēnelópē) starts from the beginning every day for her weaving (see Plato's *Phaedo*). This is part of the frustration of reading these "private" and "off stage" and "workshop" writings by Heidegger. It seems like he re-starts the thinking and writing process every time he picks on his ink pen (note he did not type much and liked to write by hand). In other words, we do not get a Wikipedia summary of his thinking. He did not write these "to" anyone; more in the sense of notes to himself (sorted of). His lectures and addresses do a better job of giving us some kind of "summaries" of his thoughts. Heidegger mentions Penelope in the *Zollikon Seminars*.

But this quote shows us the repeating nature of thinking, "All essential thinking demands that its thoughts and utterances be newly extracted (mined) each time, like an ore (Erz), out of the basic n (Grundstimmung). If the basic disposition is lacking, then everything is a forced clatter of the concepts and words." *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1939), GA 65:21.

As of now (2024), there are 10s of thousands of pages that are now published, and the road and highway is extremely long. Remember Heidegger was an esteemed professor, he talked a lot and answered questions from his own students and others that had traveled from around the planet to ask him questions. So, there was no just sitting down and having "idle" conversations with Heidegger that was restricted for only a few family friends, because the rest all came to ask their "questions" of the thinker.

With the old terminology, we might say that this is foundational horizons and borders of regional ontologies. But that is exactly what Heidegger is trying not to do. This latter idea is of course anathema to Heidegger's intention to twist free and break away from metaphysical thinking and its language. The question: does he get passed it? Does he cross the bridges and finally cross-over? (See the bridge section later in this book).

So, Heidegger's writings are "out there" and there are abundant number of publications that we are all working on "sorting them out." *Beiträge* was first published in 1989, which is now 35 years ago, and we have two different complete translations in English (1999, 2012) and at least eight major books on the *Beiträge* in English. Note: As of 2005, there were complete translations of *Sein und Zeit* into 21 different languages and it had been translated 6 times in Japanese. In fact, the first translation of *Sein und Zeit* into any language was into Japanese in 1939-40.

Back to the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938) and *Besinnung* (1938/39). Heidegger remarked about the place of these two writings in the overall sequence around 1940. This is a seriatim enumeration.

Heidegger wrote, “*Contributions and Mindfulness as preliminary works.*” (»*Beiträge*« und »*Besinnung*« als *Vorarbeiten*). *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1938/40). GA 69:173. Section 178. The Sequence of Publications. *The History of Beyng* (1938-40). Italics Heidegger’s.

He must have been expecting a lot more (indeed), since later on Heidegger refers to *Contributions* as his pivotal point after *Being and Time* (1927).

65. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938).

66. *Besinnung* (1938/39). *Mindfulness*.

69. *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1939-1940). *The History of Beyng*

70. *Über den Anfang*, (summer 1941). *On Inception* (?)

71. *Das Ereignis*, (1941-1942). *The Event*.

72. *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944). Not yet published. Maybe similar in format and in writing style as the other writings in this series. Extensive aphorisms (not according to Martin). Did Heidegger not share these with his “select” group of friends and students, so they did not become Heideggerians? Pushed them out of the nest without releasing this group of writings to his waiting fans. Held them back for years. Also, note that therefore, there was no one who read them and then could ask him the many questions that would come up with their readings.

GA 72. One of the last volumes yet to be published (forth coming after 2023). The English titles might be something like these: *Bridges of the Beginning* or maybe *Paths of the Beginning* (*Die Stege des Anfangs*) or *The Footbridges of the Inception*. Fits within the overall framework of Heidegger’s theme of the attempt to clear the way to the second beginning (*Anfang*, *inception*, *commencement*) of western philosophy guided by Heidegger. For Heidegger western philosophy starts with Anaximander (GA 78) and reaches its highest point in Hegel (GA 36/37) and hits the last and the consummate philosopher of western philosophy with Nietzsche (GA 6.1 and GA 6.2). Quote about Hegel, “In what way is Hegelian metaphysics as this theo-logic the completion of Western philosophy? Completion here means no higher, the absolute fully known.” (GA 36/37:76-77). Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) said he never got past and hence, never read any Hegel. But Husserl says the first philosopher he read was Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) like many of the Germans intellectuals of the period (before World War I).

There is an open question whether Heidegger can get past Nietzsche’s greatness and critical stance (winds that are blown into the *Beiträge* and much later too, Otto Pöggeler); if Heidegger can get past Nietzsche, then there is clearing for preparing for a new way to the beginning (*Anfang*, *inception*, *commencement*) that Heidegger wants -- indeed he can give *us* guidance. However, that is a bigger “if” than most of the Heideggerians can manage. So far Nietzsche has been able to knock out of the boxing ring all of the great philosophers (authors of all sorts) of the western philosophy tradition. Nietzsche was the greatest of the critical philosophers and engaged and then laid bare the whole history of philosophical ideas. Heidegger says, we are all doing some kind of metaphysic (or stuck in metaphysical language, yes even moralism, positivism, and

pragmatism too). See Heidegger's letter to Dieter Sinn (1931-) from 1964 (Appendix A). Heidegger mostly accepts Nietzsche's attack and rejection of western metaphysics (see later section for details).

Heidegger makes all sorts of critical remarks about his time and human civilization in other words the vicissitudes of the critics of civilization (Zivilisationskritiker) like Nietzsche (e.g., *Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtungen*), Spengler, and Ernst Jünger (1895-1998); plus, just about every other intellectual on the planet as well. Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* sold 600,000 copies (published in two volumes in 1918 and 1922). Or the "diagnosis of the age" (Zeitdiagnose) or a diagnostician of modernity? Was Heidegger simply a diagnostician? If this were the case, then there are plenty more intellectuals with deeper insights than Heidegger. We do not take this as one of Heidegger's primary concerns. For example, as a tell-tale sign – look at the "titles" of everything Heidegger wrote, then compared to the titles of Max Scheler (1874-1928) talks. Some comparisons examples of the titles by Scheler, "About militarism of mind and purpose. A Study in the Psychology of Militarism (1916)"; and "Prophetic or Marxist Socialism" (1919). While Heidegger was working on *Being and Time* (1926-1927), we have from Max Scheler lectures given at the German Ministry of Defense in Berlin, "Die Idee des ewigen Friedens und der Pazifismus (1926-1928)"; ("The Idea of Perpetual Peace and Pacifism").

Nietzsche's old idiom, "The philosopher as the physician of culture." Maybe Heidegger wanted to aspire to that role in his own very indirect way. It was all about the cataclysmic collapse of European civilization. We are without a home (*das Heimatliche der Heimat*). Plus, there are many other nostrums emerging as excuses as to why European civilization (the West) has been on the decline and the overall stink of its decay. Decadence and moral decline Nietzsche à la mode.

Frederick C. Beiser's (1949-) excellent series of books on the recent intellectual history of Germany, here he gives us a great overall picture of hermeneutical situation within Germany from 1860.

"The prevalence of pessimism in Germany after the 1860s was due chiefly to the influence of one man: Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860). It was Schopenhauer who made pessimism a systematic philosophy, and who transformed it from a personal attitude into a metaphysics and worldview. To be sure, Schopenhauer was not the only philosophical pessimist of his era; there were many others, among them Eduard von Hartmann, Philipp Mainländer, Julius Bahnsen, Ernst Lindner, Lazar Hellenbach, Paul Deußen, Agnes Talbert, Olga Plümacher and, last but not least, the young Nietzsche.

But all these later pessimists were, directly or indirectly, Schopenhauer's progeny. Schopenhauer was the spiritual father of pessimism in the late 19th century, and as such his influence shaped the spirit of his age. From a contemporary perspective, it is a surprising fact, which is hard to appreciate and explain, that Arthur Schopenhauer was the most famous and influential philosopher in Germany from 1860 until the First World War."

From the mid-1860s until the early 1900s, Kuno Fischer, Otto Liebmann, Jürgen Bona Meyer, Friedrich Paulsen, Rudolf Haym, Alois Riehl, Johannes Volkelt and Wilhelm Windelband authored articles, essays, book chapters or even whole books about Schopenhauer. Such, indeed, was their interest that Haym, Meyer, Fischer and Volkelt wrote some of the first monographs on him. During the late 1870s, the pessimism of Schopenhauer had replaced the materialism of Büchner, Moleschott, Czolbe and Vogt as the neo-Kantians' favorite whipping boy.”

Weltschmerz – Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860–1900. By Frederick C. Beiser.

The term “identity crisis” was coined by Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831–1933*. Noted that in the letters with (*Correspondence 1949–1975, Martin Heidegger and Ernst Jünger*) that Jünger was big on Schopenhauer. Brüder im Geiste. Ludwig Wittgenstein was influenced by Schopenhauer and his influence was still felt into the early 1900s. The group of intellectuals in Germany that were of age during the first World War I (1914-1918). On one hand you had the pessimism Schopenhauer; and then on the other hand you had the dry air of neo-Kantianism with the issues of modern ‘science’ needing a foundation. Kant’s dream of perpetual peace was hardly talked about. The counter example was the ex-president of the USA, Herbert Hoover’s (1874-1964) brilliant and ominous book *The Problems of Lasting Peace* (1942).

In general, everyone is concerned about the direction and future of their nation and the planet. These ruminations are endless. This is no exaggeration in our time with all of the “talking heads” on the public airways. Heidegger as a talk show host. Heidegger’s direct intentions or just some spurs remarks?

This is one of Heidegger’s more optimistic remarks,

“Around the year 2300 at the earliest, there may again be history.

Then Americanism will have exhausted itself, fed up with its own vacuousness.”

“Frühestens um 2300 mag wieder Geschichte sein. Dann wird sich der Amerikanismus am Überdruß seiner Leere erschöpft haben.” GA 96:225. *Überlegungen XII–XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*. *Ponderings XIV. Überlegungen XIV*.

Letter from Martin to his brother Fritz Heidegger, dated: “18th of August 1941.

“Dear Fritz, dear Liesel, dear Boys! [...] It is not Russianism that will bring about the destruction of the earth but Americanism, not just the English but all of Europe has fallen prey to it as it represents modernity in its monstrosity.”

Shocking to you? Heidegger said in the *Der Spiegel* interview, “Pessimism and optimism are positions that fall too short of the realm we are attempting to reflect upon here.” (23 September 1966; published May 31, 1976). 253. SPIEGEL-GESPRÄCH MIT MARTIN HEIDEGGER (23. September 1966). GA 16:652-683. See Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) on this topic. The old Pessimismusstreit.

Back on the trail and path.

Heidegger wrote "Like all Western thought since Plato, Nietzsche's thinking is metaphysics" (Heidegger's *Nietzsche*, Volume III, page 187). Heidegger's remarks (1964): “Throughout the entire history of philosophy, Plato's thinking remains decisive in its sundry forms. Metaphysics is

Platonism. Nietzsche characterizes his philosophy as reversed Platonism (“*umgedrehter Platonismus*,” dated 1871). Heidegger is attempting to become a post-Platonic philosopher.

More specifically, here Heidegger in 1964 is hoping for the best outcome, “With the inversion of metaphysics, which is already accomplished by Karl Marx, the utmost possibility of philosophy is reached”. (“Mit der Umkehrung der Metaphysik, die bereits durch Karl Marx vollzogen wird, ist die äußerste Möglichkeit der Philosophie erreicht.” “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” *Zur Sache des Denkens* (1962–1964). GA 14:71. Paris 21-23 April 1964. Note. Karl Marx (1818-1883) was the founder of Communism. *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (published 1848).

A few years later, Heidegger (1969) sealed Karl Marx’s fate as being captured by Heidegger’s history of metaphysic,

“For Marx Being (Sein) is production process. This is the representation he receives from metaphysics, from Hegel's interpretation of life as a process. The practical concept of production can only exist on the basis of a concept of Being derived from metaphysics.” (“Für Marx ist das Sein Produktionsprozeß. Das ist die Vorstellung, die er aus der Metaphysik, von Hegels Interpretation des Lebens als Prozeß aus empfängt. Der praktische Begriff der Produktion kann nur auf Grund eines aus der Metaphysik stammenden Seinsbegriffs bestehen Seminar in Le Thor 1969). *Seminare (1951–1973)*. GA 15:353.

Both Nietzsche and later Heidegger confessed to being stuck in metaphysical language ⁽⁵⁾. The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) stands in this tradition as well. For example. "I think I have summarized my position on philosophy by saying: Philosophy should really only be poetry. (Ich glaube meine Stellung zur Philosophie dadurch zusammengefasst zu haben, indem ich sagte: Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten).”

Can we just call out? Like the parataxis processes. Or only as a poet can we proceed? Heidegger wrote a great deal of poetry (GA 81. *Gedachtes*, 360p).

In 1942, he wrote: “Tell me what you think about translating and I’ll tell you who you are.” “Sage mir, was du vom Übersetzen hältst, und ich sage dir, wer du bist.” *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister"* (Summer Semester 1942), GA 53:67. See Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) views on the nature of translation.

Who are Heidegger’s opponents?

Hegel and Nietzsche.

“Tell me which thinker you have chosen as an “opponent” and how you have chosen that one, and I will tell you how far you yourself have entered into the domain of thinking.” (*Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks*, page 275). See the later section on Heidegger contra Hegel. Heidegger is not “negative” about Hegel, but rather, he wants to engage with the power of Hegel’s metaphysics.

Other philosophers? Early on it was his friend – Max Scheler (1874-1928), and then later his friends the Jünger brothers were a special kind of an opponent for Heidegger. Ernst Cassirer during the early 1930s, Heidegger and the rest of German intellectual world was past Ernst

Cassirer (1874-1945) and more importantly the whole sterile movement known as neo-Kantianism (“disparagingly known as “dry-as-dust” scholarship”). If Schopenhauer had dominated the public and popular philosophy, it was the neo-Kantians that had dominated German university philosophy departments with their neo-Kantian schools until the end of World War I. Heidegger’s teachers were neo-Kantians, but Heidegger was to engage and reject the neo-Kantians. Heidegger broke out of the neo-Kantian schism. Later (after 1927), he eschews the transcendental approach of the Kantians. But the young Heidegger had discussions with Paul Gerhard Natorp (1854-1924) at the Philipps University of Marburg in winter semester of 1923–24. Hans-Georg Gadamer did his doctoral thesis with Natorp in 1922 on Plato. As a student Gadamer was critical of Heidegger’s Aristotle interpretation of time in the winter of 1925-1926 (see Francisco J. Gonzalez).

The philosophical landscape has changed --- dramatically by Husserl and certainly with Heidegger’s growing influence. Cassirer went on to develop a more independent approach but the intellectual connections between the two philosophers were over. Cassirer left Germany on 12 March 1933 and did not to return. We can leave the neo-Kantians aside now; their end results were just a stage leading up to Heidegger. Heidegger assumed the mantle.

Heidegger could have used the follow remark from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) as a slogan since he read and reflected continuously on the Greeks and German traditions.

“Fundamentally, we are all collective beings, for how little we possess and how little we are that in the purest sense we call our property. We must all receive and learn from those who were before us, as well as from those who are with us.” Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832).

What is on hand with Heidegger?

Besides the collective writings (Gesamtausgabe) we have some additional remarks about how we came to know Heidegger’s thoughts. We can read the reliable signposts of Heidegger’s substantial writings that he selected for us.

Counterexample, Heidegger warning to us,

"Qui me non nisi editis novit, non me novit." (1696)

"He who knows me only from my publications does not know me."

Heidegger gives us the above quote from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Remarks, IV, *Anmerkungen I–V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*. GA 97:325).

1). The student transcripts of Heidegger’s lecture series have played a fairly significant role in some of the volumes in the published Gesamtausgabe. Heidegger’s discussion of Hegel’s publications and his own future publications:

“When I talked with Heidegger about the problem of postscripts, their publication and compilation on the occasion of the lecture publications in the old *Freundesausgabe* of Hegel’s works and their opacity, he said: "You know what I have said in “*Unterwegs zur Sprache*” and also from time to time about lecture postscripts, namely that they are cloudy sources. I stick to that, and I only hope that it will not happen to me once similar to Hegel." Heidegger has always

presented to us precisely the manner of publishing some of Hegel's lectures and their compilation as a cautionary example of how not to do it." Hartmut Buchner, "Fragmentarisches" in *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger* (Neske: Pfullingen, 1977), 50-51.

The cloudy or murky sources is about the 'transcripts' that were done by people present for the lecture and then circulated without Heidegger knowledge or approval. Shades of old Schelling too. Did they use tape recorders? Who knows? The problems with editing of the Hegel manuscripts by Hegel's friends are well known.

The editors of the Gesamtausgabe made a number of choices about the use of the students' transcripts of Heidegger's lecture series.

We do not have an inventory of all of Heidegger's students' transcripts. The use of student's transcripts is often noted by the Editor(s) of the different volumes of Gesamtausgabe in their Afterwards. The DLA archive in Marbach has an extensive collection (not showing online for some unknown reasons) and other archives around the world have some holdings of Heidegger's student manuscripts. Martin Heidegger mostly used the Sütterlin script (Sütterlinschrift) for his handwriting (taught in German schools 1915 to 1941). In early days, Heidegger wrote in exceedingly small handwritten script, and in the older Heidegger used a magnifying glass in attempt to read his own early writing and re-write them for his collective writings (GA). The good news is that many of Heidegger's student's handwriting was better than Heidegger and some of these were converted to typed manuscripts. Husserl used extensive abbreviation and he used the Gabelsberger shorthand for his writing which added extra layers to the process of transposing of Husserl's writing. (R. Carnap used the Stolze-Schrey system for shorthand). In one famous case one of Heidegger's editors wrongly took the abbreviation of "N. Soz." to be 'natural sciences' (in GA 39). But compared to Husserl, Heidegger did not use extensive abbreviations; however, many of his citations have been filled in over the years of editing his manuscripts. Heidegger wrote a limited number of lengthy passages in Gabelsberger shorthand but there are plenty of examples in these volumes, GA 22, GA 58, GA 63, GA 83, and GA 84.1. This was shorthand created by Franz Xaver Gabelsberger (1789-1849).

For historical note, there are currently 126 extant manuscripts by Kant's students (2022) and about 30 have been translated into English. Some of the others were lost during World War I and World War II, whereas other new ones have turned up. However, we must remember what Kant wrote about these kinds of student transcripts,

"Those of my students who are most capable of grasping everything are just the ones who bother least to take explicit and verbatim notes; rather, they write down only the main points, which they can think over afterwards. Those who are most thorough in notetaking are seldom capable of distinguishing the important from the unimportant. They pile a mass of misunderstood stuff under what they may possibly have grasped correctly." (Kant's Letter to Herz, 20 October 1778, AK 10:242).

Heidegger had much older students and many more than Kant. Of course, some students' notes were better than other students. Heidegger was often asked after his lectures, and he supplied the Greek words in Greek for the Greek quotes in his student transcripts. Herbert Marcuse

(Heidegger's assistant (1928-1932) was known for his collecting early student transcripts from before he was Heidegger's student (in the Herbert Marcuse archive in Frankfurt). Some of these transcripts were typed up and reviewed by Heidegger where he added some notes in his own handwriting. A few to mention, Walter Bröcker's (1902-1992) transcripts are often used for the early lectures including the Kassel lectures. Helene Weiss' (1898-1951) transcripts include lectures from 1920-1934; and later during some of the Freiburg lectures, it was Alfred Seidemann's (1895–1976) transcripts. But there are many more student transcripts that have been used in the production of GA; and have also been published on their own as Heidegger's lectures transcripts. The first time GA 38. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* (1998) was published, it was published without Heidegger's own lecture notes. After Heidegger's actual manuscript was found, the lecture series was re-published as GA 38 A. *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* (2020).

Another way that Heidegger publications have become known. Marion Heinz (1951-) reports that,

“When I was visiting the Marbach Literary Archive in May 1999, I was mistakenly handed a folder containing the protocols of the seminar on *Nature, History, and State*. This is notable because until then, this folder was completely unknown to scholarship. In the reading room I began to prepare a handwritten copy of the text—a photocopy could not be made. Shortly thereafter I sent a typed version of this copy to my colleagues Theodore Kisiel and Alfred Denker. As far as I know, my partial copy was then supplemented by Klaus Stichweh, and this completed text circulated among a few scholars. It was difficult to publish about this seminar in Germany for legal reasons. Gratifying that the text could finally appear in 2009.” Here is what was in the folder.

One example under review is one of Heidegger making changes to his lecture after the fact was found by Sidonie Kellerer (1978-). She called “artful falsifications.”

“The Founding of the Modern World Picture through Metaphysics”—which he had delivered on 9 June 1938 as part of a Freiburg lecture series. He published this text in 1950 in his essay collection *Holzwege* under the title “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”. Sidonie Kellerer found differences between the text as delivered and changes Heidegger made later without supplying the context of when those changes were made. Implying that the text was written in 1938 which it was not. Something Heidegger wanted to cover up.

Again, an example, of the publications of Heidegger's students' transcriptions.

“Heidegger held his seminar “On the Essence and Concept of Nature, History, and State” in ten sessions from November 3, 1933, to February 23, 1934. We do not have Heidegger's own notes or text for the seminar, if such existed; instead, the text consists of student protocols or reports on the seminar sessions. Heidegger reviewed these protocols himself, as confirmed by two interpolations he makes in the text.” Introduction to *Nature, history, state, 1933-1934*, page 2.

The editor Franz-Karl Blust gives us details remarks about editing one of Heidegger's early lectures (GA 22, 1926), he writes in the afterward,

“The use of the student notes posed a special editorial problem. Since Heidegger's manuscript is scantily elaborated in many places, it might have seemed appropriate to work the notes into the main text, so as to make it as readable, fluent, and consistent as possible. On the other hand, Heidegger did not authorize these notes. Hermann Mörchen wrote on the cover of his transcription: "In transcribing my notes, which I took down in telegram style, I have on occasion made small clarifications, by, for example, inserting copulas or other such parts of speech, but only ones that were obvious from the meaning. As a rule, I did not eliminate stylistic rough spots (it cannot be determined whether these arose precisely in the act of transcribing). Abbreviated words were written out in full, and the punctuation was altered in conformity with the sense. Lacunae in the text (sentences or phrases that were missed in the notetaking) are indicated, if I could tell that something was missing, by three dots. Repetitions, peculiar to Heidegger's lecture style, were preserved, provided they had not been omitted in the notes." Thus, the Mörchen transcription is by no means an exact stenographic record, as is also clear from a comparison with the Bröcker transcription. In at least one case, we have the transcriptions of Heidegger's students asking questions and Heidegger's response Helene Weiss' (1898-1951) Fortgeschrittene: Phänomenologische Übungen (Hegel, *Logik*, I. Buch). Seminar 1925-26 Winter Semester.

According to the strictures regulating the *Gesamtausgabe*, student notes cannot be incorporated if their style does not attest to their authenticity. With the Mörchen transcription, complete certainty is unattainable. This judgment does not denigrate its quality, but it does have consequences for a careful reconstruction of the text according to established editorial principles. That is why I did not incorporate the excerpts from the Mörchen transcription into the main text and relegated them, instead, to the appendix. Franz-Karl Blust. GA 22. *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (Summer Semester 1926) ed. Franz-Karl Blust. *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz, page 246. The Mörchen transcriptions mentioned here are 63 pages of text.

Note the Hermann Mörchen (1906-1990) authored his dissertation on “The imagination of Kant” in 1927/28 **summa cum laude**. Heidegger notes on this dissertation was just recently published in German as Gutachten über Hermann Mörchen, »Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant". *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. GA 91:586. “His *last* and *best* dissertation” at the Philipps-Universität Marburg).

From: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysic* (GA 3). Heidegger remarks, “The discussion of the "Transcendental Power of Imagination" set forth in the Kant book is supplemented by Hermann Mörchen in his Marburg dissertation (1928) entitled, "Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant," *Jahrbuch für Philosophic und phänomenologische Forschung*, volume XI (Saale: Max Niemeyer Halle, 1930).”

2). The role of the “Das Protokoll” has played a fairly significant role in some of the volumes in the *Gesamtausgabe*. There are a couple of 100 pages of student protocols as part of the *Gesamtausgabe* (out of 37,577+ pages). These were done as a kind summary of the previous Heidegger lectures by his students. The students were often called to read their protocol in front of the class for critical discussion. Rainer Marten (1928-) one of Heidegger's students who is

alive (2024), told me that for Heidegger the student's protocols were everything and the questioning was intense. See for example his Protokoll vom 6. 2. 1952 and 13. 2. 1952, Rainer Marten (GA 83:587-592).

An example of laughter was recorded and published in one of the student transcripts. Siegfried Bröse (1895-1984).

“(Transcript Bröse: Miss Schott, what do you want?" My self-reliance." Then you must not be allowed to marry. "Just to become independent, I have to get married..." (Laughter) Heidegger: Don't laugh! The answer is genuinely Hegelian.” Footnote on this page. *Seminare: Hegel – Schelling*. GA 86:578. Some risible and persiflage is to be expected over the course of years giving lectures. Another lecture in 1925, Löwith makes a joke about Hegel and Heidegger laughs. Yes, there was some rare, recorded pandemonium in Heidegger's classes. Sudden hilarity in class. Example of frolicsome.

3). Martin Heidegger Sound Recordings there are over 500 mins of voices recording that are published. Plus, videos and some T.V. interviews as well.

4). Written reports of conversions that people had with Heidegger. Plenty. Erinnerungen or reminiscences by scholars and intellectuals that have met and talked with Heidegger or had him as a teacher. I have heard personal reminiscences by Richard E. Palmer (1933-2015) when he had dinner with Heidegger (1965) and a number of others who were asking Heidegger philosophical questions. I also heard Reiner Schürmann (1941-1993) reminiscences of talking about Meister Eckhart (1260-1328) the well-known German mystic with Heidegger for several hours March 11, 1966. I heard Joan Stambaugh's reminiscences of Elfride Heidegger in the 1970s.

Published examples. *Von der Un-Verborgenheit: Fridolin Wiplingers Bericht von einem Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger*. The main one in English is a 250+ page book. *Encounters and dialogues with Martin Heidegger, 1929-1976* by Heinrich Wiegand Petzet (1909-1997). Both of them were cognoscenti. Frédéric de Towarnicki (1920–2008) Austrian-born. He did some French language translations and visited Heidegger starting in the 1940s. Published as articles the journal *Les Temps* and then retold them in his book *Les Souvenirs d'un Messager de la Forêt Noire* (1993) [23 conversations].

There is a great deal of breadth and complexity of Heidegger's own written œuvre; but we also have a great deal about his conversation with diverse kinds of intellectuals and the topics they talked about in their conversations. Noting the impact on their lives testifies and affirms the importance of Heidegger's thinking on them. Encountering Martin Heidegger in person was for most people an unforgettable experience. A South American family that comes to his house and just wants to see him or a student in the bar that asks him for an autograph (now being action off). Reportable that Heidegger expressed his pudicity over his public acclaim of being asked for his autograph.

In the context of Nietzsche's writing, Heidegger was one of those who was a "lumper," who treated Nietzsche's Nachlaß as at least equal with Nietzsche's published writings. Actually,

Heidegger said, was more on the side those states, the essential in Nietzsche's writings are the in the Nachlaß and indeed not in the published writings of Nietzsche. Heidegger quotes both.

Martin Heidegger thought that Nietzsche proper and real (die eigentliche Philosophie) philosophy was in the unpublished (Nachlaß) writings and not in Nietzsche's published works. "Nietzsche in the works which he saw published. ... the final form and was not itself published in any book, neither in the decade between 1879 and 1889 nor during the years preceding". GA 6.1:6 *Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst* (1936-37). Heidegger added, "The actual Philosophy remains in the Nachlaß". ("Die eigentliche Philosophie bleibt als »Nachlaß « zurück.") GA 6.1:7.

The other side is a group of Nietzsche scholars who are called "splitters" who draw a very sharp distinction between Nietzsche's published and unpublished work where they use only the published works of Nietzsche are used and they relegate the Nachlaß to the dust bin. So, there are no sharp "splitters" with Heidegger's writings. Heidegger in person saw the handwritten manuscript writings from the Nachlaß from at least Hegel, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Rilke.

We have to keep alive the way that Heidegger speaks to us. Let his texts speak. Words need to be well-watered as Johann Herder (1744-1803) said, "lose their meaning within a few generation". FHA 6:373. It is ok to be a bit perplexed aporetic (ἀπορητικός) when reading Heidegger.

From the last volume of Gesamtausgabe, GA 102. Heidegger writes,

"What does *Nachlaß* mean?

The merely left-behind and left-over or the thought ahead?

Whether they recognize once the before running in the "Nachlaß"? Bequest and legacy

After-coming-leaving

Who leaves the contemporaries behind.

("Was heißt *Nachlaß*?

Das bloß Zurück- und übrig-Gelassene oder das Vorausgedachte?

Ob sie einmal das Vorläufige im »Nachlaß« erkennen? Nachlaß und Hinterlassenschaft

Nach-Kommen-lassen

Der die Zeitgenossen hinter sich läßt").

GA 102. *Vorläufiges I-IV. (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970)*. Vorläufiges I. DLA 75.7420,1. From the publisher sample of text online from GA 102.

5). Heidegger's notes on others lectures etc.

There is a wide range of Heidegger manuscripts that are being sold at auction. One example is his personal address book with 500+ entries. But is another example,

"17 pages with Heidegger's autograph notes in black, red, and yellow ink; 7 larger pages with Gadamer's typed text, with Heidegger's notes in black, red, and yellow ink.

In a folder titled also in Heidegger's hand. Dated: July 1965. In fine condition.

An extensive file of Heidegger's notes on Gadamer's 1965 lecture *Von Hegel bis Heidegger*. "In the summer semester of 1965 I offered a lecture course titled 'Von Hegel bis Heidegger' [...]. Heidegger attended its final session and offered some remarks after my lecture. Basically, in those remarks Heidegger continued to emphasize the fact that Hegel's thought culminates in a form of absolute knowledge." – remembers Gadamer of his 1965 summer course at Heidelberg University and Heidegger's comments on it (Hahn, 1997).

The present papers are evidently related to this memory of Gadamer. They either served as preparatory notes for Heidegger's above-mentioned remarks, or they are a draft for a more extensive posterior response to the ideas Gadamer's delivered during his 1965 summer course.

The file consists of two parts. A 7-page typed transcript of Gadamer's lecture annotated by Heidegger, dated July 21, 1965. With a different pen - probably written later - Heidegger also refers to the publication of an extended version of Gadamer's lectures (*Anmerkungen zu dem Thema "Hegel und Heidegger,"* in *Natur und Geschichte: Karl Löwith zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed.: Braun, H.; Riedel, M., Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1967). The other part is a gathering of seventeen sheets with Heidegger handwritten notes on Hegel, corresponding with the content of what Gadamer's recalls about Heidegger's remarks." Note: access from the Földvári Books auctions, August 2022.

Another example, being sold recently is a "Reprint of Walter Bröcker's essay "Heidegger and the Logic" with Heidegger's own marginal notes."

What are the periods in Heidegger's thought?

Heidegger started publishing in 1910, with Friedrich Wilhelm Forster. *Autorität und Freiheit* [review]. In: *Der Akademiker* II Jhg., Nr. 7, May 1910; and we know he was still writing the year of his death in 1976 or 66 years later. Obviously, there were different periods of his focus over the years. For example, phenomenology of the 1920s, the Nietzsche courses in the 1930s. The period of the 1930s and early 1940s were especially about the German and world crisis. The work of art (1936). Hölderlin lectures during the same time period. The later emphasis on Gelassenheit stage, then his later stage on technology (Ge-stell) and the dissolution of language. Disintegration of Europe. The idea of the Four-Fold (Das Geviert). In middle all sort of various Heidegger's "turns" (Kehre), deportments and directions (τρόπος, tropos). Heidegger gave seminars and courses on the Greeks, Kant, and Hegel during his entire teaching career. One of the last things Heidegger wrote was *Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft und moderne Technik* to a conference during May 1976 in DePaul University of Chicago. His greetings to the conference are dated 11 April 1976. GA 16. Section 282. *Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft und moderne Technik — Gruß wort an die Teilnehmer des zehnten Colloquiums vom 14.—16. Mai 1976 in Chicago* (11. April 1976). GA 16:747.

Reported the last thing he wrote was to Father Bernhard Welte (22 May 1976) congratulating him, when he became an honorary citizen of the city of Meßkirch like Heidegger. Heidegger died 26 May 1976. An aside, Ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος (Andrôn gàr epiphanôn pása gê táphos), "For illustrious men have the whole earth for their tomb."

Back on track. Father Bernhard Welte (1906-1983) was a Papal House Prelate. Several months before Heidegger died, he had a conversation with Father Bernhard Welte about his funeral and the most famous German mystic, Meister Eckhart (1260-1328).

An early example from 1919, Heidegger says this as to the life or death of philosophy. Remember he has another 57 years of writing to go before the handwriting stopped.

"We stand at the methodical crossroads, which decides about life or death of philosophy at all, at an abyss: either into nothingness, i.e., absolute objectivity, or the leap into *another world* succeeds, or more precisely: into the world at all." ("Wir stehen an der methodischen Wegkreuzung, die über Leben oder Tod der Philosophie überhaupt entscheidet, an einem Abgrund: entweder ins Nichts, d. h. der absoluten Sachlichkeit, oder es gelingt der Sprung in eine *andere Welt*, oder genauer: überhaupt erst in die Welt." *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*). GA 56/57:63.

Major public parts of the Heidegger Saga and Quest.

Heidegger's *magnum opus*: *Being and Time, Sein und Zeit* (1927). Made Martin Heidegger world famous quickly. *Being and Time* had enormous impact outside the narrow confines of philosophy departments and continues to do so, now some 95 years later. The Heidegger Era while many are still waiting for the post-Heidegger Era. Heidegger as the Basileus (βασιλεύς). He then attracts some the best students from Germany and Japan. One of the most famous philosophers who came to Heidegger after reading *Being and Time* was Herbert Marcuse

(Heidegger's assistant (1928-1932) and his wife, Sophie Wertheim Marcuse (1901-1951), who also took classes from Heidegger, but was known as mathematician. Later on, Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) was considered the father of "left wing" in the USA during the 1960s and 1970s. A small digression, at the time the California Governor Ronald Reagan tried to stop his "Appointment" University of California San Diego in 1968. One of Marcuse's books sold over 100,000 copies. Even Pope Paul VI was against Marcuse (1972). Barack Obama (1961-) read Marcuse in the 1980s. Heidegger mentions Marcuse in his Seminar in Le Thor 1969, GA 15:90-92 about his understanding of *Being and Time*. In the last volume of the GA 102 *Vorläufiges I-IV. (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970)*, Heidegger attacks Marcuse with a list of others (e.g., Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno (1903–1969) that all were attacking him (GA 102:7) in public. Just some vile effluvium zealots (noted as an **argumentum ad hominem**). Who was Heidegger's logographos (λογογράφος)? On the other hand, was Adorno partially engaged in tergiversation? Changing sides? Or trying really hard to dismiss the whole fandango.

With the launch of *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger is general attacking the neo-Kantians in *Being and Time* among many philosophical schools. This attack, and new way of doing philosophy attracts many young intellectuals to Heidegger in 1920s and 1930s.

Someone who was there at the time. Saint Edith Stein (1891-1942) wrote,

"The fact that Heidegger is something big and can put all of us in his pockets is something that I believe also because of his book. I didn't know it before, I only saw the effects, the great influence that he has on the young generation."

("Dass Heidegger etwas Großes ist und dass er uns alle in die Tasche stecken kann, glaube ich auf Grund seines Buchen auch. Vorher wusste ich es nicht bzw. ich sah nur die Wirkungen, d.h. seinen großen Einfluss auf die junge Generation)."

(Edith Stein, letter to Roman Ingarden on 2 February 1927). Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross or Saint Edith Stein (1891-1942) wrote her dissertation under Husserl with the title of *The Empathy Problem as it Developed Historically and Considered Phenomenologically*. Note here her friend, Roman Ingarden (1893-1970).

Historical background.

Max Weber (1864-1920) gave this speech, "Politics as a Vocation" (Politik als Beruf) on 28 January 1919. Where he calls out the "academic prophets" (Kathederspropheten) of the time. The November Revolution (Novemberrevolution) was in November 1918. The Beer Hall Putsch was 8 November 1923. "In 1919, one loaf of bread cost 1 mark; by 1923, the same loaf of bread cost 100 billion marks". Wikipedia. Tough times in Germany.

1). In 1923, Heidegger had been invited by Ernest Cassirer (1874-1945) to give a lecture in Hamburg: Aufgaben und Wege der phänomenologischen Forschung Vortrag in der Hamburgischen Ortsgruppe der Kant Gesellschaft am 17 Dezember 1923. On the Tasks and methods of phenomenological research.

After that lecture, then the famous Cassirer–Heidegger debate (Disputatio) between Martin Heidegger and the *grand seigneur*, Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) in March 17 to April 6, 1929, at

the Hotel Belvédère, Davos, Switzerland. Heidegger gave three lectures, but his manuscripts are not in the archives. Location unknown. But he immediately came back home to draft his only book: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929). Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) and his teacher Hermann Cohen (1842-1918); were both neo-Kantians from the Marburg School. One of Heidegger's teacher's Heinrich Rickert Southwest (German) School (also known as the Heidelberg School or Baden School neo-Kantians. Neo-Kantianism (beginning in 1870s) movement was strongest philosophical movement in Germany universities until the end of the First World War. Examples, Kuno Fischer Hermann von Helmholtz, Friedrich Lange (read closely by Nietzsche), Otto Liebmann, and Eduard Zeller. Headed by Hermann Cohen at Philipps University of Marburg and another based in southwest Germany, which was headed Wilhelm Windelband. Later members of the Marburg School include Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer; later members of the Southwest School include Heinrich Rickert (Heidegger's teacher) and Emil Lask. Side note. Heidegger was against the logical theories of Hermann Lotze (1817-1881). Husserl gave lectures on Lotze's logic in 1912. Lotze was Heinrich Rickert's teacher. American philosopher, Josiah Royce (1855-1916) studied under Lotze as well.

There were some shared doctrines and differences between these groups of thinkers.

Background on Correspondence Theory of Truth.

Hegel in the *Science of Logic* (39 paragraph) says something clearly meant for thinkers, he says, "Truth is the agreement of thought with the object, and in order to bring about this agreement - for it does not exist on its own account - thinking is supposed to adapt and accommodate itself to the object". *Gesammelte Werke*. Page 21.28.

Hegel on the correspondence theory of truth in *Science of Logic*. See January 1957 Protokoll by Tokuya Kakihara. *Seminare: Hegel – Schelling*. GA 96:847.

Aristotle's well-known definition of truth (*Metaphysics* 1011b25): "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true". See also, *Categories* (12b11, 14b14), Plato in *Cratylus* 385b2, *Sophist* 263b. Thomas Aquinas says, "*Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*". Kant says in the second Edition to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787)," For no knowledge can contradict it without at the same time losing all content, i.e. all relation to any object, and therefore all truth." ("Denn ihr kann keine Erkenntniß widersprechen, ohne daß sie zugleich allen Inhalt verlöre, d. i. alle Beziehung auf irgend ein Object, mithin alle Wahrheit"). Kant AA Volume III, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, page B82.

Nota bene. Going again this long tradition is the Southwest School of neo-Kantians' rejection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth, which is similar to Heidegger's rejection. Southwest School was concerned with "Geisteswissenschaften" (the "human sciences").

In very general terms the Davos debate was about the Southwestern school versus the Marburgian neo-Kantianism. Books in English: *Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos* by Peter E. Gordon (2010) and *Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos: The Philosophical Arguments* by Simon Truwant (2022). During this time Cassirer was appointed as a rector at the University

of Hamburg for the academic year 1929-1930. Eugen Fink and Emmanuel Levinas were both there at Davos. What we have are the transcription by Heidegger's students Otto Friedrich Bollnow (1903-1991) and Joachim Ritter (1903-1974). Before the intellectual world in Europe was a drift. At the time, Heidegger was the "decisive victor" (newspaper at the time); and time and the historical records has proven that a new philosophical voice had was being heard in Europe. Heidegger was debouching from the neo-Kantian's narrow field of vision of philosophical enterprise.

From a book review, "In the spring of 1929, Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer met for a public conversation in Davos, Switzerland. They were arguably the most important thinkers in Europe, and their exchange touched upon the most urgent questions in the history of philosophy: What is human finitude? What is objectivity? What is culture? What is truth?"

Over the last eighty years the Davos encounter has acquired an allegorical significance, as if it marked an ultimate and irreparable rupture in twentieth-century Continental thought." Review of the *Continental Divide Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos* by Peter E. Gordon. Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) was there.

One of Husserl's students in a note from 1929 March 30, Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) wrote of taking a walk with Heidegger: "With H. walking. Discussion. His position: against idealism, especially in popular education. The new 'question of existence'. The need for a solution." Michael Friedman (2011, page 7). Later in a café on 3rd April 1929 in Davos they had a discussion. Carnap and Heidegger went there separated within a year. See the famous book, *A parting of the ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* by Michael Friedman. This goes to the fundamental divergence between the "analytic" and "continental" philosophy of the 20th and 21st century. Carnap and Cassirer both left Germany (1930s), whereas Heidegger stay the rest of his life in Germany. Rudolf Carnap left for the USA in 1935. For a while, he was at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton (1952–1954).

Heidegger says in *Kant and the problem of metaphysics*, "The *Critique of Pure Reason* has nothing to do with a 'theory of knowledge' (Erkenntnistheorie)" (*Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft* hat mit „Erkenntnistheorie" nichts zu schaffen)." GA 3:17. Husserl writes in the margin of his book at this point "nothing?" This is an astonishing thought. Husserl was reading Heidegger while on vacation in Tremezzo, Italy (west shore of Lake Como) in August 15 to September 5, 1929. Husserl wrote this on the margin, "The *Critique of Pure Reason* has nothing to do with a 'theory of knowledge'. Husserl underlines the whole sentence. In the margin: nothing?" (*Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and Confrontation with Heidegger* (1927-1931), Volume VI, Edmund Husserl *Collected Works*, page 440. This is the context of Heidegger's re-writing of the Kantian tradition. During this time, he was engaged in the Kantian interpretations. He was engaged in "totality of a living interpretation."

In his work on Leibniz, Heidegger says the following about neo-Kantians and epistemology: "It is crucial for understanding the Kantian concept of reality. Simple uncertainty about those connections misled the entire neo-Kantian interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* into a misguided search for an epistemology in Kant." *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im*

Ausgang von Leibniz, Marburg lecture course SS 1928. (GA 26). (*The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 65). Philipps University of Marburg.

Heidegger says elsewhere, "The interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as epistemology completely misses the true meaning." (*Basic Problems in Phenomenology*, E.T. p. 128). GA 24. *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Summer Semester 1927). This is the anti-epistemological reading of Kant by Heidegger which attacked almost all of the neo-Kantians.

After some published attacked by Cassirer about Heidegger's Kant reading, nevertheless, Heidegger invited Cassirer to deliver a lecture on the topic of Rousseau (year 1931) at the University of Freiburg (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg). At the time, they were considered the some of the leading philosophers of Germany. They were on friendly terms. In the year 1929, Cassirer was chosen as the Rector of the University of Hamburg; and Heidegger on April 21, 1933, becomes Rector of the University of Freiburg until he resigned April 23-27, 1934. Note: Heidegger's friend from the Greek Study Group, Hans von Soden (1881-1945), in 1927-1928, was elected as the Rector of the Philipps Philipps-Universität Marburg.

The final fate of neo-Kantianism for the 20th century was decided; and by year 1933, the neo-Kantianism schools were finished off by philosophical developments and large political changes within Germany itself. In the meantime, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant had turned the Kantian world upside down with a completely different approach to reading Kant. For example, Heidegger was against all of the epistemological readings of Kant. Heidegger would still be giving major lecture series on Kant up to the early 1940s. These appeared in the fall of 2022 GA 84.2 *Seminare: Leibniz – Kant – Schiller*, (Kant SS 1936, SS 1941, and SS 1942 but not the winter semester of 1944-1945). These are lectures were edited by the master Heidegger editor, Professor Dr. Dr. Günther Neumann. To speak Greek, it is demanding work (andreaia, ἀνδρεία) to edit these materials and the final text (GA 84.2) is over 900 pages.

Heidegger was an inspiration to a generation of German and French philosophers up to the mid-1930s; then his reputation carried a "stain" and intellectuals had to start following the parts and insights that help them. Remember at the time, the phenomenologists were gaining ground and neo-Kantianism professor of the period did not attract new students or followers. After the defeat of World War I, the Germans need something "new" and that was Heidegger. Other candidates? Jaspers? Jasper was greatly influenced through his life by sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). But it was the Heidegger Era. The zeitgeist was moving.

What was the stage at the time?

Hannah letter to Martin in 1969 shows how she saw things in the 1920s, "The university usually offered them either school-the neo-Kantians, the neo-Hegelians, the neo-Platonists, etc.- or the old schoolhouse discipline, in which philosophy; compartmentalized into such fields as epistemology; aesthetics, ethics, logic, and the like, was not so much taught as *finished off by abysmal boredom*." Letter #116. "Hannah Arendt for Martin Heidegger For you for September 26, 1969". The neo-Kantian's general approach to the western philosophical tradition was to see it ahistorical as the history of problems that mostly were mostly unsolvable. As shown in this book we will see that Heidegger's approach to the past and intellectual history of the western

civilization was vastly different than any other philosophers.

Main point.

Fresh start in German philosophy after the end of WW1 and end of neo-Kantianism's dominance in Germany! Many were delighted to have been to Davos and heard the new directions and new dawn of a new Era. At the end of the three weeks, it was to be the Heidegger Era going forward. Note. Heidegger would be later known as having perspicacious insights and interpretations of entire range of philosophers and poets (after 1930, mostly Greek and German). [Note. Heidegger gave a summer seminar of 1937 on the topic of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*. The report from a Paris newspaper is in the Herbert Marcuse Archive in Frankfurt am Main].

Heidegger in particular saw some of this trend in his friend Jaspers (1920s to early 1934). Even though there was truly little connection between their philosophical approaches and in fact both were overly critical of each other. But personally, they connected with a 'fresh start' that was needed at that time in Germany's history. There was a need for a new way forward, but in which *direction*, the seas were open for clear sailing. Heidegger was in the fast lane going forward and by 1930 was at the top of the intellectual ranking, hence stepping above Jaspers and Cassirer. Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) left Germany on 12 March 1933 and did not to return. In 1948, Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) moved to the University of Basel in Switzerland. Example from how the "new philosophy was seen" This is Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) letter to Martin Heidegger. Location Heidelberg. Date: May 23, 1973.

"It was with the greatest emotion that I received and read your Jaspers criticism, for the first time in more than 50 years. Hard to imagine, and at least not without hermeneutical reflection, how people read these pages then and how they read them today. Back then you felt more than you understood that a new philosophizing was beginning – “.

2). Letter on Humanism.

With regard to the Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism' it is a series of answers by Heidegger to questions pose by his French Colleague and longtime friend, Jean Beaufret (1907-1982) the questions are dated November 23, 1946. The answers from Heidegger are entitled, "Letter On Humanism" (Über den Humanismus) dated December 1946. Heidegger answered these questions by Jean Beaufret and Heidegger attacked the famous French philosopher's Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Let the games begin.

Background.

Sartre's address, given at the Club Maintenant in Paris, France, in October 1945, which was finally published by Sartre in 1946 as *Existentialism is a Humanism* (*L'existentialisme est un humanisme*). The expression that was used by Sartre that Heidegger took exception to was, "existence precedes essence". With Sartre's address and publication, he starts the movement known as "Existentialism." But note, it is hard to call it a "school," since almost no other philosophers were willing to be included. The term actually came from Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) in 1943; and was initially rejected by Sartre, but Sartre later developed it into a school with a purblind vision of the future. Mostly we get philosophers and writers that have so called

“Existentialism” themes. Heidegger in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ outright rejects the basic principle of Existentialism for him, so the stage is set, and Heidegger and Sartre become the main contestants in the 1940-1950s on the philosophical stage (the *zeitgeist*). For and against Existentialism. Heidegger writes a letter in French, October 28, 1945, to Sartre; but does not get a letter back from Sartre. In 1952, Jean-Paul Sartre visits Freiburg and meets Heidegger for less than two hours on December 23, 1952. Maybe they were both too busy with Christmas coming up, or just too much angst or nausea – take your pick.

3). Setting the stage. 1955. Heidegger first trip to France in front of many French philosophers, poets, and intellectuals; Heidegger gave a lecture and conducted a seminar for eight days. It all started with his lecture, *Was ist das – die Philosophie?* Colloque at Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, France, on 28 August 1955, then there were discussions until September 4, 1955. *Identität und Differenz* (1955–1957). GA 11:7-26. The single lecture is in GA 11; and we recently got the texts of the discussions coming out in *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*, GA 91:349-491 (2022). Note there was version of these discussions before in French, but the new GA 91 text is in German. Examples of some of the intellectual and philosophers who were there: Gabriel Marcel, Jean Beaufret, Paul Ricoeur, François Fédier (the driver), Abbots Morel and Pépin, Fathers Fessard, Kleiber, Léger, René Char, Georges Braque, Jacques Lacanand, Kostas Axelos, Lucien Goldmann, Alexis Philonenko, Walter Biemel, Jeanne Hersch, Beda Allemann, and Antoine Vergote. So, about 50 intellectuals and poets were there.

One session was on Kant’s *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*. (*Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes*. (1762, 1763). GA 91:378. And another session was on the preface to the Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Vorrede der »*Phänomenologie des Geistes*«, 1807) GA 91:425. See also *Heidegger in France*.

4). His last teaching engagement at the University of Freiburg (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg) was the *Martin Heidegger - Eugen Fink: Heraklit*. Seminar Wintersemester 1966/1967. GA 15 *Seminare* (1951–1973):11-263. Location the room Kollegiengebäude #11 of the University of Freiburg. There were thirteen sessions held about the great and ancient ἀνικτῆς (“riddler”). Interesting in this period (1966) for both philosophers besides the interpretation of the philosopher Heraklit, the central philosopher discussed the most often is: Hegel. Eugen Fink (1905-1975) was a close student and assistant of Edmund Husserl, 1925-1938. Eugen Fink had attended all of Heidegger’s courses (1928-1931). Plus, Heidegger had been friends with Fink since the 1920s. GA 29/30. *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit*. 1929. Has Appendix listed: For Eugen Fink on His Sixtieth Birthday. Freiburg i. Br., 30 March 1966. The celebration was held on 10 December 1965, at the Viktoria-Hotel in Freiburg. Noted by Heidegger that Fink helped him move Heidegger’s writing desk in 1929 (to 47 Röt buck, Zähringen). Eugen Fink was one of the last trust assistants for Husserl and stayed dedicated to him for the rest of Husserl’s life and beyond. After World War II, Fink got his own appointment at the University of Freiburg and developed his own philosophy. One example that comes up in this seminar is the book he wrote, *Play as Symbol of the World* (*Spiel als Weltsymbol* (1960). Fink authored books on Nietzsche and Hegel. In this seminar, Fink general starts first but

Heidegger's responds are famous. Both of these philosophers are first rate and Fink holds his own with Heidegger. It was Fink that wanted to use this seminar to gain a deeper understand of the Greek philosophers starting with Heraclites. More seminars were planned but did not happen. Parmenides was to be next.

Heidegger's version of the destiny of the history (*Geschichte, Seinsgeschick*) of Western metaphysics from its "first inception" or "first beginning" (*der erste Anfang*) in Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides up to its "completion" (*Vollendung*) in Hegel, Marx, and then finally with Nietzsche; and the "new" second beginning (*Anfang, inception, commencement*) attempted and prepared by Heidegger. The other beginning (*der andere Anfang*) or the second beginning. This is Heidegger's gift. Note, this is no small fillip.

This is all part of Martin Heidegger's published intellectual legacy. Can we avoid a confrontation with Heidegger? We can think with Heidegger, or against him; but not without taking him into account in the 21st century. The rest of the 20th century philosophers mostly engage in pseudo-problems. We can doff these so called modern philosopher now (which means to throw off or just get rid of).

Heidegger gives us some directions as our guide:

#253. SPIEGEL-GESPRÄCH MIT MARTIN HEIDEGGER
(23. September 1966). GA 16:652-683.

At the end of the interview, we read the final statement of Heidegger.

"For us today, the greatness of the thinker is too great. We can perhaps struggle to build narrow and not very far-reaching bridges of a transition (*Überganges*)

Spiegel: Professor Heidegger, thank you for this interview."

("Für uns Heutige ist das Große des zu Denkenden zu groß. Wir können uns vielleicht daran abmühen, an schmalen und wenig weit reichenden Stegen eines Überganges zu bauen. Spiegel: Herr Professor Heidegger, wir danken Ihnen für die dieses Gespräch"). GA 16:683.

1966. Der Rudolf Augstein and Georg Wolff for *Der Spiegel* magazine interview on September 23, 1966. Mistaken the title that is given as "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten". Whereas the end statement is much clearer on Heidegger's directions for us for the future. Note one of Heidegger's friends Erhart Kästner (1904-1974) help with the arrangements of this interview.

Side notes of the year 1966. In the USA, one of the slogans, "Turn on, tune in, drop out". This was used by people (Alan Watts (1915-1973), Timothy Leary (1920-1996), Oscar Janiger, etc.) they did indeed have the "answers" and "results" with a program (perhaps a 'mission') to carry out for what they considered as the new future of humanity. Overall, they were very upbeat on their program and what they expected for the future.

Are we ready for the crossing-over (leaping?) to the non-metaphysical new beginning a new *Inception* or the new Beginning (*Anfang*)? There are bridges that we can take. Looking for planks. Heidegger wants us to use Diogenes of Sinope's lantern to look for the entrance to the

bridge for the crossing. There is still much darkness. How to find the bridge and then get across the bridge (see later section on the image of the bridge in the later Heidegger's thought)?

Music example, "I feel that weight come off my shoulder" and then this sentence, "And I think I've crossed that line- to the other side..." "To The Other Side" by Deana Carter (1996).

Heidegger on the "jump."

"And the (walkway) passage is always only a run-up to the jump, that only lets Being jump as abyss. "Und der Gang ist jedesmal nur Anlauf zum Sprung, der einzig das Seyn als Ab-grund erspringen läßt." 96. *Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*. *Überlegungen XII*. GA 96:52.

Footnotes to this section.

1). Martin Heidegger on YouTube.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4F0V918bUqc>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AAovKeMTkyA>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-P00IDJpvg>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ROnoBqgDEn4>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qouZC17_Vsg

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CS9aYQn3bM>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FkJLngx3p8

2). <https://www.klostermann.de/Heidegger-Martin-Logik-als-die-Frage-nach-dem-Wesen-der-Sprache>

3). Faksimile der Marginalien Marlin Heideggers aus seinem Exemplar des zweiten Bandes der Großen Stuttgarter Hölderlin-Ausgabe. Die Marginalien gehören in die Zeit der Ausarbeitung des Vortrags » Hölderlins Erde und Himmel«. GA 4:198-199.

4). https://brill.com/view/journals/rip/51/1/article-p99_6.xml

5). Richard Polt explains this “in a note to his own copy of “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” “Heidegger writes that the entire text “continues to speak in the language of metaphysics” (LH 239). In a 24 August 1964 letter to Dieter Sinn, reflecting on his path of thought hitherto, Heidegger observes: “*Apart from the thing lecture, I have never once presented my own thinking purely on its own terms in publications, however far it has come in the meantime, but rather have always only presented it in such a way that, provisionally, I wanted to make my thinking understandable in terms of the tradition.*” Letter to Dieter Sinn of August 24, 1964, cited in Sinn, *Ereignis und Nirwana*, 172–73. Andrew J. Mitchell translation. See the later Appendix A about Heidegger’s amazing letter to D. Sinn.

Nietzsche’s note is here, *KGWB/NF*-1876, 23 [159]

“I want to expressly explain to readers of my earlier writings that I have given up on the metaphysical-artistic views which essentially dominate them: they are pleasant but untenable. Anyone who allows himself to speak publicly at an early age is usually forced to publicly disagree soon afterwards.” [23 = Mp XIV 1b. Ende 1876 — Sommer 1877]. (“Lesern meiner früheren Schriften will ich ausdrücklich erklären, daß ich die metaphysisch-künstlerischen Ansichten, welche jene im Wesentlichen beherrschen, aufgegeben habe: sie sind angenehm, aber unhaltbar. Wer sich frühzeitig erlaubt öffentlich zu sprechen, ist gewöhnlich gezwungen, sich bald darauf öffentlich zu widersprechen). “

Note the year, this is early in Nietzsche’s career 1876.

N.B. Es *muß* auf Heidegger zurückgegangen werden.

Preface and Setting the Stage

Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) published collected writings are almost completed now (Gesamtausgabe, GA 1-102). At this stage in 2024, there are 37,577+ pages that are published in the GA. However, there are still 10,000 pages of manuscripts in DLA Marbach archive, which may be published in the future or maybe never be published. The letter collections will continue to pour out. Forthcoming series, *Martin-Heidegger-Briefausgabe* / hrsg. von Alfred Denker und Holger Zaborowski. First rate editors and hope to see many more volumes come out from this series (yes, desire to see more, *desiderata*).

Letters collection with subjects like physics on one side, an example is the Noble Prize winner (1932) and worked on Germany's effort on the development of the A-bomb during World War II, Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976); and again, Germany's effort on the development of the A-bomb during World War II, Carl Friedrich Freiherr von Weizsäcker (1912-2007); Viktor von Weizsäcker (1886-1957) medical anthropology; and the other side with letter exchanges with Imma von Bodmershof (1895-1982) a famous German/Austrian Haiku poet. Of course, there is a much longer list of published letter exchanges so far (see some at the end of the book). The two popular published letter exchanges so far are with his wife; and also, with Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) (see last section for bibliographic references).

Hegel said in his "Preface" to the *Philosophy of Right (Philosophie des Rechts)* "...as a preface it is its place to speak only externally and subjectively of the standpoint of the work which it introduces. A philosophical account of the essential content needs a scientific and objective treatment." (...als Vorwort kam ihm ohnehin nur zu, äußerlich und subjektiv von dem Standpunkt der Schrift... Soll philosophisch von einem Inhalte gesprochen werden, so verträgt er nur eine wissenschaftliche, objektive Behandlung)." Berlin 25 June 1820.

So, following in the steps of Hegel let us try to provide a "preface" with some external and subjective remarks (even on the topic of Heidegger's personal recurring dreams).

Historical Stage.

Martin Heidegger is not releasing the old kraken; he is the kraken (Heidegger knew Melville's *Moby Dick*). He threw his colossal number of arms around the history of philosophy and brought to the surface (from the deep dustbins of history) the living thoughts of the great western philosophers. Heidegger unleashed the greatness within western philosophical tradition and brought it back to life. With regard to the uplifting of the history of metaphysics, Heidegger is closer in his approach to metahistory of philosophy with Hegel. Although in a much more unique way. But the "up lifting" is similar. The process of looking "into" the past is similar. Although they both "engage" with western metaphysical history, they end with opposite results. Both Heidegger and Hegel want to stand within the tradition. Radically different views of the tradition but both want to claim that they are on the "inside" not just on the "outside" looking into past history. Neither one thought much of medieval philosophers. Back to the great Greeks for Hegel, Friedrich Hölderlin (1770- 1843), Nietzsche, and Heidegger. In the German tradition we can add many more German philosophers to the translations (Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and

reading of the Greeks. With Hegel the history of western philosophy ends up with momentous results of the Absolute Idea, absolute knowledge, concrete Concept (Begriff). However, with Heidegger the tradition ends with low results of oblivion of the truth of Being. For Hegel, he stands at the end of the progress of philosophy. On the other hand, Heidegger wants to re-read the beginning with the Greeks and then start anew, with a new beginning after metaphysics. Setting the historical stages. Heidegger is contrary to the reading of the history of metaphysics as a 'progression to a higher or better place,' that is, namely Hegel's way. Heidegger and Nietzsche both see problematic issues in the history of metaphysics and reject any notion of the progress is "better;" while Hegel see himself at the end of western metaphysics as a great progression up to the Hegel's System of Philosophy as the "best" results.

Ultimately, where does Heidegger stand in his world and in the tradition of western philosophy?

Richard Rorty (1931-2007) has argued and clearly said with *italics* that "*The whole force of Heidegger's position lies in his account of the history of philosophy.*" *The Consequences of Pragmatism*, 1982, page 52. Richard Rorty italicizes the whole sentence! For Heidegger Plato, Hegel, and finally Nietzsche are all involved in getting us deeper into the western tradition (metaphysics); but they do not provide an "answer" and Heidegger can only give us some "hints," since he is not making a Heidegger Philosophy. On one hand, Heidegger is taking us deep into making the tradition shine and making those historical philosophers alive for us again; on the other hand, there are finally no 'solutions' in the tradition and we need to purify the tradition. Heidegger stated, "What unfolds as "destruction" in *Sein und Zeit* does not mean dismantling as demolishing but as *purifying...*" (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1939), GA 65:220-221). The word is purifying or "*Reinigung.*"

The "grand narratives" for example, the Renaissance, progress, the age of reason (enlightenment), emancipation, Marxism, communism, positivism, English and American capitalism, and some forms of democracy are all part of "modernity" (the rise of science and rational thought, individualism, industrialization, and urbanization); and the metaphysical underling foundations are general attacked by Heidegger, namely, as the post-modernist trends. These topics come up more in the Schwarze Hefte in the so called, "workshop notes" ("Werkstattaufzeichnungen") than in his lectures and addresses. In general, Heidegger directly attacks the underlying metaphysics; and then the "grand narratives" that come out from them. It is a mixed bag of criticisms and not written out in the style of a Wikipedia narrative. The Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte) were written from 1931-1970, or about 40 years of Heidegger use them for his writing in the back room of the workshop. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann said these were on Heidegger's table next to his bed and he wrote in notebooks at night before going to bed.

In this view, Heidegger is more like the Mennonitengemeinde (Menno Simons, (1496–1561) Meßkirch in his hometown. He is certainly not a propagandist for the "classless society" or even Klassenkampf. In his early youth he had to come to terms with the Pope Pius X's anti-Modernist oath also called the Oath Against Modernism of 1910 (SACRORUM ANTISTITUM). This Oath was in effect in 1967. Part of this is the later Heidegger's thoughts on technology and Ge-stell?

One example of Heidegger's remarks about anti-Semitism,

"Prophecy" is the technique of defense against the skillful of history. It is an instrument of the will to power. That the great prophets are Jews is a fact, the secret of which has not yet been thought. (Note for donkey (Esel): the remark has nothing to do with "anti-Semitism". This is so foolish and so reprehensible, as the bloody and above all bloodless proceeding of the Christianity against "the heathens". The fact that the Christian also brands anti-Semitism as "unchristian belongs to the high education of the sophistication of its power technique)." *Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*. GA 97:159. From *Anmerkungen II* (1946). Richard Polt translates the German word "Esel" instead of "donkey" as "jackasses". (www.academia.edu/11943010).

Notably, Heidegger's own personal behavior with many Jews people has eviscerated those claims that he was anti-Semitism in any general way. As you might expect, Heidegger's written records of his remarks are more complicated. However, this is the case for many intellectual topics across a broad area of issues and topics. Some of his remarks are ambiguous. At the outset, he was clearly negative on other topics such Americanism, Bolshevism, Socialism, Marxism, democracy, Biological racism, and various forms of Christian. Can we define Heidegger and many other philosophers based on what they are all seeking to overcome? Heidegger was subject to many of the same hazards and vicissitudes of life as the rest of us. We could make the case, that he was attacked in many public forums as well and most of those we be considered "personal" attacks. No end to useless and utterly unnecessary *argumentum ad hominem* against Heidegger as a person. Please note that philosophers need to make up their own minds --- be skeptical about any *argumentum ab auctoritate* (Argument from Authority) even from the author of this book.

Heidegger in the Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte, GA 94-102) sizes up the short comings of Christianity in the modern period. This is a topic for large studies. See "Mein bisheriger Weg" (1937-1938) etc. in GA 66 for Heidegger discussion of his way and some of his connections with Christianity.

Heidegger metahistory of western philosophy (metaphysics) is a major part of understanding where Heidegger stands and where he thought he stood moving forward to our future (including a few of the us too, 'rare few'). Not for the οἱ πολλοί (hoi polloi).

Background.

Paul Natorp's *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (1903). For Heidegger, Plato starts it with his theory of ideas (idea (ιδέα) of the dialogues. Think about the example of Aristotle's *On Ideas* (*Περὶ Ἰδεῶν*, *Peri Ideōn*). The term was used as early as Diogenes Laërtius, who called it "Theory of Ideas:" Πλάτων ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑπολήψει. Plato had created an incorrigible separation between sensible and supersensible (übersinnlich, eternal) worlds. This division would become the hallmark and signature of Western metaphysics in its 2000+ years of history and eventually lead to its end. This view of metaphysics by Heidegger all starts with Plato, hits its high point with Hegel, and reach its final end point with Nietzsche, so thought Heidegger. Are Heidegger's interpretations of these philosophers real or some kind of a simulacrum? Simulacrum or semblance or an imitation of the real philosopher? Heidegger has a story of the history of metaphysics, and these are Heidegger's signposts of how to read the history of metaphysics. Heidegger is attempting to become a post-Platonic philosopher – what does that really mean?

This distinction between the two worlds has a long history of interpretations in Heidegger and

with its collapse Heidegger wants to prepare for us a way out of metaphysics to a new beginning (Anfang). Heidegger is our guide. One part of this program is to remove the subject-object division as well (Heidegger used the concept of Worldliness of the World, Section 14 in *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2) and especially the leading role of subjectivity (now modern subjectivism) started with Descartes is part of Heidegger's overall program of stepping beyond the historical metaphysics as well. Perhaps one way is for removing the objective/subjective is for a communal version of the truth? Frederick C. Beiser (1949-), says, "Hegel, Schelling, Hölderlin, Novalis and Schlegel, "the objective idealists," because their absolute transcends the whole dichotomy of the subjective and objective. The absolute as the idea is neither subjective nor objective; it is the intellectual structure under which they are subsumed."

Heidegger wants to paint everyone, but not himself, under the broad strokes of falling prey to the overall 'subjectivism' in the modern era. Often this is Heidegger starting point in attacking 20th century philosophers. Interesting an attack similar to the way vainglorious Husserl did a public attack on Heidegger in 1931. According to the article, all was not well with the Husserl-Heidegger personal relationship after these attacks – as you might expect.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) follows a more direct approach (hebephrenic breakdowns). For example, he poses the question if "perhaps sick thinkers are more numerous in the history of philosophy?" (*The Gay Science: la gaya scienza*, 1886, Preface, section 2, et. p. 34). Nietzsche's remarks are often tormented and murky, hence they make for difficult understanding and straight foreword explanations are not so easy with Nietzsche. His virulence and caustic quality make some of his thinking and philosophy complicated to elucidate (but not churlish). Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy was ripened and put into a single page by Nietzsche in September 1888. The year 1888, saw Nietzsche write his last four books. Although *Twilight of the Idols (Die Götzen-Dämmerung)* was written in 1888 (in 8-9 days) it was not published until January 24, 1889. This page is its own section (the fourth), and it has a complete vision of the course of the history of philosophy, namely, Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy. Heidegger's remarks capture the importance of this section, "in a magnificent moment of vision, the entire realm of Nietzsche's thought is permeated by a new and singular brilliance" (*Nietzsche* Vol, et. p. 202). Obviously, this high praises from Heidegger.

Six points from Nietzsche's *Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer* (written August and September 1888). *HOW THE "TRUE WORLD" FINALLY BECAME A FABLE. The History of an Error.*

The six historical periods are:

- 1) Plato.
- 2) Platonism and Christian.
- 3) Kantian.
- 4) Auguste Comte (1788 - 1857) (positivism).
- 5) Early Nietzsche (but still caught between the two worlds).
- 6) Middy sun - Nietzsche's own final philosophy in the name of Zarathustra.

To summarize Nietzsche's Metahistory of Philosophy:

Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy is a fable and the history of an error, which is the fundamental logic of metaphysics, namely, the two worlds, the eternal super-sensuous world, and the apparent world. "The true world: eternally unattainable, but the object of great veneration and hope" (from the manuscript but not used by Nietzsche).

Near the end of Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy we have the two worlds abolished, but still the distinction is there. Nietzsche's early thought moves with this distinction and is still captured at the end. Heidegger slaps him on this one.

The end and goal of Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy is Nietzsche's own final and ultimate philosophy, code name: Zarathustra. Nietzsche is caught within his own shadow (skiagraphically). Elsewhere, Nietzsche has pointed toward humanities' future. The ultimate and most riddle some strait ways. Zarathustra taught the eternal return of the same and overman, (Übermensch, superman) above or beyond the current humanity. The Διόνυσος Dionysos' philosophy is also part of Nietzsche promise for his future writings.

Friedrich Nietzsche's metahistory of western philosophy blows away the foundation and the rest of metaphysics' history. Nietzsche like Kant Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) found all systems before them in "ruins" (Ruinen). Kant begins the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) with the image of the "battlefield of these endless controversies is called metaphysics" (Kant CPR, Avii). Kant then tells us a little story of about how in the beginning metaphysics started with "administration of the dogmatists, her rule was despotic" (Kant CPR, Aix). These battles continued and almost came to an end with the famous John Locke (1632-1704), but "fell back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism" (Kant CPR, Ax). For Kant there are no scraps on the table left for us some 243 years later.

Nietzsche's devastating attack leaves very few philosophers standing up. He negated, destroyed, and does some prophesying. Like Heidegger the main the issues for Nietzsche in his attack on the influence of Plato's eternal super-sensuous on the whole rest of history of metaphysics (which accordingly provides for Christianity's foundations). Nietzsche wants to knock them down and out! Grant it that he does take of some of the Greek thoughts in some versions of his doctrine of the eternal return of the same; nevertheless, that is truly little Greek influence in the overall scheme of Nietzsche's attack on metaphysics and on his attack on the history of western metaphysics. To quote Heidegger in the general context, "The history of Western philosophy thus turns out to be an ever-steeper decline from its own essence." GA 36/37. *Sein und Wahrheit*. 11-12p. Winter Semester 1933-34. The "spiritual lineage" is in decline and is going down (Nietzsche). Nietzsche could smell decline. "...nose, for example, which no philosopher has yet spoken of with admiration and gratitude" (*Götzen-Dämmerung*: Die "Vernunft" in der Philosophie). He wrote in his autobiography, "I have a finer nose for the signs of ascent and descent than any man has ever had, I am the teacher *par excellence* of this — I know both, I am both." *Ecce Homo: How one becomes what one is*, translation by Thomas Wayne. Nietzsche has the best nose for a philosopher. Second place, Heraclitus' Fragment 37.

On the other hand, Heidegger is attacking metaphysics and philosophy; but he also wants to find gold and diamonds that are still in the fertile fields of the western philosophical tradition. Starting in the 1930s, he will start his analysis of poetry and the arts. Is it possible to have a countermovement to Heidegger within the Heideggerian movement? Is there still some mojo and energy to re-engage Heidegger as a questioner? Heidegger is an archetypical questioner, and this is a sign of a great philosopher. Foreshadowing the main thesis of this book.

Heidegger's Motto (Leitspruch) for why he is looking at the history of metaphysics, "The greater a revolution has to be, the more profoundly must it plunge into its history." (Je größer eine Umwälzung sein muß, um so tiefer wird sie in ihrer Geschichte ansetzen) (Section "Nietzsche's Overturning of Platonism," 1936). GA 6.1:206. We have lost "it," and Heidegger is going to "find it" for us. Heidegger rejection of metaphysic and metaphysical views is part of the closeness between of Heidegger with Nietzsche (see later section history of western philosophy).

Kant thought he had no building block for a new system of philosophy.

In 1793, Kant wrote,

"It sounds arrogant, selfish, and demeaning to those who have not yet renounced their old system, to claim that before the emergence of critical philosophy there was none at all." ("Es klingt arrogant, selbstüchtig und für die, welche ihrem alten System noch nicht entsagt haben, verkleinerlich, zu behaupten: daß vor dem Entstehen der kritischen Philosophie es noch gar keine gegeben habe." (AK 6:206). *Metaphysical Foundations of the Doctrine of Right. Die Metaphysik der Sitten in zwei Teilen*. Section One, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*, Preface. We will be discussing Kant's metahistory of philosophy later in the book.

Heidegger gives us a taste of his overview of his analysis of recent philosophers. In the *Beiträge* (GA 65) we read the following detailed outline.

Start of Section 88.

"The "historical" lecture courses belong in the sphere of this task.

To make visible *Leibniz's* unfathomably multifarious way of questioning but nevertheless to think Da-sein instead of the *monas*,

to follow Kant's main steps and yet to overcome the "transcendental" approach by Da-sein,

to work out *Schelling's* question of freedom but to ground the question of "modalities" differently,

to bring *Hegel's* systematics into the dominating view and yet to think completely opposite,

and to bring a confrontation with *Nietzsche* as the closest one but to realize that he is the furthest one from the question of Being."

(III. Das Zuspiel

88. In den Umkreis dieser Aufgabe gehören die

»geschichtlichen« Vorlesungen

In den Umkreis dieser Aufgabe gehören die »geschichtlichen« Vorlesungen.

Leibnizens unergründliche Vielgestaltigkeit des Frageansatzes sichtbar machen und doch statt der monas das Da-sein denken,

Kants Hauptschritte nachvollziehen und doch den »transzendentalen« Ansatz durch das Da-sein überwinden,

Schellings Freiheitsfrage durchfragen und dennoch die »Modalitäten« frage auf einen anderen Grund bringen,

Hegels Systematik in den beherrschenden Blick bringen und doch ganz entgegengesetzt denken, mit *Nietzsche* die Auseinandersetzung wagen als dem Nächsten und doch erkennen, dass er der Seinsfrage am fernsten steht." GA 65:176. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938).

Therefore, opposite to Hegel and remarkably close to Nietzsche in general except for the Being question (which puts Heidegger in his attempt at a post-metaphysical period). Heidegger does go completely opposite of Hegel on all of Hegel's doctrine (ganz entgegengesetzt). See later in the book for an extensive list in Appendix B.

As Heidegger noted in,

"As modern metaphysics and thus all metaphysics comes closer to its completion, anthropomorphism is expressly required and adopted as the truth, although the fundamental position of anthropomorphism is grounded by Schelling and Nietzsche in different ways." *The End of Philosophy*, page 48. "Metaphysics as History of Being."

By looking to the history and origins Heidegger moves into a position to understanding the inner issues of metaphysics and what has driven its history. He does for the upheaval and revolution of philosophical thinking; a process that he is preparing for the few future ones (see GA 65).

What is Heidegger's approach ("how, or the namely" the method) that he uses for his encounter with western philosophers? Heidegger's answer:

"*What philosophical con-frontation is* (on the basis of the essence of philosophical truth). Not formal refutation and polemic, the demonstration of mere incorrect points, but *con-frontation—scission...*" "*Was philosophische Aus-einander-setzung ist* (aus dem Wesen der philosophischen Wahrheit) ...Aus-einander-setzung – Scheidung "13. Zur Vorlesung Sommersemester 1933. *Sein und Wahrheit*. GA 36/37:277. WS 1933-34). A divorce or separation or scission (Scheidung). Heidegger's italics.

Heidegger talked about "thoughtful dialogue between thinkers" and "In a dialogue the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent." (*Kant and problem of Metaphysics*, E.T. p. xx. 1929). Heidegger is not looking for proof from Nietzsche. Aristotle says in Book IV of *Metaphysics* (1006a), "For it is uneducated not to have an eye for when it is necessary to look for a proof, and when this is not necessary."

Heidegger uses this word to describe his encounters with other philosophers:

Auseinandersetzung (sometimes hyphenated like this: Aus-einander-setzung) as critical encounters. Sometimes as Auseinander-setzung, "setting in opposition." The German word

“Auseinandersetzung” in the standard dictionary is translated as a debate. Some translate this German word as “confrontation.” In addition, Heidegger use the word “kampf” or struggle this was a word often used in Germany in the 1930s. For example, Heidegger was to speak of “my struggle” (See GA 80.1) with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) or Nietzsche. The Greek word that is behind all of this is pólemos (Πόλεμος; "war"). In a very general sense of war--- of fighting over the nature of “truth” or “philosophy.” [See Heidegger’s letter to Carl Schmitt, August 1933, where he uses the term: pólemos, Πόλεμος]. Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). More than a melee.

Heidegger wrote in *Kant and Problem of Metaphysics* (1929) “every interpretation must necessarily use violence (Section 35)” All philosophical encounters are a confrontation over the interpretation of our world. Striking and violence or ripping into other thoughts may happen as needed. Part of the methodology of philosophy is a stance and a confrontation – this is not scholarly or merely erudite philology (φιλολογία or philologi). As thinkers, we must confront; however, not that we can simply reject Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804). First, we must think the same thoughts as Kant. To be inside Kant’s thinking, inside his mind. Finally, then as scholars we must at least hear the text. This is a philosophical method (following hermeneutics) Heidegger versus the mere philology of correct reading of the text. If you want to do just philology, then go elsewhere. On the other side, can we complain that Heidegger followed Plato’s *Cratylus* (Κρατύλος, Kratylos) a little too much? In the early Aristotle lectures (1920s) Heidegger talks about actually doing philology.

Remarks by Heidegger, “without falling prey to arbitrariness” (“ohne der Willkür zu verfallen”). *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen*, GA 82:38. Heidegger is no historian and after 1928 did not have any noted “methodology” for his philosophical investigations. No method to the madness.

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) stated this clearly, “I mean, behind all of Heidegger, there was the wish to overcome the Latin elements in the language of philosophy, and justly so. There are only Latin remains in all the foreign words in our discussion. “*Diskussion*”— I can say what I want, but it is, of course, just Latin. Kant had still lectured in Latin, then he translated and finally began to speak German. However, the texts that his students had were always still in Latin. Even for Heidegger this problem with Latin remained, so that he always strove to find the natural German language.” “Heidegger as Rhetor: Hans-Georg Gadamer Interviewed by Ansgar Kemmann.” (Translated by Lawrence Kennedy Schmidt). *Heidegger and rhetoric* / edited by Daniel M. Gross and Ansgar Kemmann, 2005. Pages 47-64. Note. Hans-Georg Gadamer considered W. Dilthey to be a great philosopher, whereas Heidegger did not and, in contrast to Gadamer, Heidegger thought Nietzsche was the important thinker to be taken up and critically encountered.

Heidegger is all about the Greek language and philosophical thinking, “It is given up to our present thinking to make the Greek thought even more Greek. (“Unserem heutigen Denken ist es aufgegeben, das griechisch Gedachte noch griechischer zu denken”). *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950–1959), *Sprache*, GA 12 pp. 134–135). He told J.L. Mehta (1912-1988) to learn Greek while he was in Germany.

In the 1910-1920s, then Heidegger led the attack against the sterile positivism and neo-Kantianism “bloodless intellect” whereas the foremost approaches of the Schulphilosophie, namely, like the neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism, and the growing logical positivism of the day. Now should we follow the latest, namely, Nietzscheanism as manifested in neo-Heideggerianism, Foucaultian poststructuralism, and Derridean deconstructionism? Where is Richard Rorty’s (1931–2007) pragmatism when we need something “practical”? How about a pragmatist synthesis of historicism and naturalism in a post-epistemological nightmare? Perhaps a bit of an exaggeration. Heidegger attracted the best of the best minds in Germany and Japan for his students in the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1950s, Heidegger’s few lecture series had over 1000 students in attendance (I know I am using the argument from crowd, *Argumentum ad populum*).

Cultural and psychological issues of debates and exams.

As Professor Sheehan has brought up the medieval technique of using disputations (**disputationes**) to resolved theological and philosophical issues. But also, as a way of making his points (thesis) about his excellent reading of Heidegger’s extensive writings. Medieval examples, 1240: the Disputation of Paris, 1263: the Disputation of Barcelona, 1413: the Disputation of Tortosa in Spain, Heidelberg Disputation (1518) with Luther, Leipzig Disputation (1519), and Akbar the Great, third of the Muslim Mughal emperors in India (1542–1605) held inter-religious debates. The great Trendelenburg-Fischer dispute over Kant (1865-1870). Recently, a number of books have been written about the critical Cassirer–Heidegger debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) in March 17 to April 6, 1929, in Davos Switzerland. Perhaps the most famous debate of the 20th century. There are plenty of other specific examples, Gadamer–Derrida debate April 1981 at the Sorbonne conference in Paris. Debate of Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault (1926-1984) at the Eindhoven University of Technology in the Netherlands (22 October 1971 at 7:30 p.m.). Peterson–Žižek debate Toronto on 19 April 2019 at some point about 6000 people were watching them. One topic was Donald Trump. Side note. Ad hominem fallacy. Foucault died in Paris from AIDS. Also known for his exploitation of Tunisian boys.

Buddhist debates. The best example are the Tibetan debates (dating from 1500s) involve two parties: a defender (dam bca’ ba), who answers, and a questioner (rigs lam pa). Tibetan monastic debate. Daniel E. Perdue is author of *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism*. There are plenty of examples of this Tibetan debating on YouTube, etc. This is not a dead tradition; quite the contrary the numbers are increasing and in many different languages (not just Tibetan). Also, debate was famous at the ancient Buddhist University (Nalanda mahavihara active from 427 until 1197) in India.

General overview of Tibetan debating.

“However, what you generally hear in philosophical debate are consequences, which are not "promises" but are logical implications drawn from the Defender's statements. The Defender is limited to several answers to the Challenger's arguments. These answers include:

- (1). "The reason is not established," which is the way of denying the minor premise.
- (2). "There is no pervasion," which is the way of denying the major premise; and

(3). "I accept it," meaning that the Defender accepts the argument and the conclusion.

The goal for the Defender is to give a consistent set of responses to the Challenger's arguments without contradicting what he said earlier. When the Defender contradicts earlier claims, the Challenger will shout, "Tsa!" meaning "Finished!" Your earlier claim is finished! If the Defender contradicts the fundamental thesis put forth at the first, the Challenger shouts "Tsa!" three times." By Daniel E. Perdue.

One of the points is to find logical contradictions, but not just formal logical contradictions but within Buddhist doctrines. See the "four-cornered" *Catuṣkoṭi* (चतुष्कोटि). The final one is not (P or not P); that is neither not being nor is that being.

The greatest of the Indian Buddhist philosopher put it succulently. When Nāgārjuna (150-250 CE), in his famous work, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (Sanskrit: *मूलमध्यमककारिका*, "Root Verses on the Middle Way").18:8. says,

sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ cātathyaṃ eva ca
Everything is actual, or not actual, or actual and not actual
naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyaṃ etad buddhānuśāsanam|
Or neither actual nor not actual; this is the Buddha's teaching.

Where does that leave us? Pyrrhonism the fourfold indeterminacy? Is this a paradox or logical thinking that leaves us nowhere? Heidegger has given a speech on the nature of contradiction (Widerspruch). 1932. Der Satz vom Widerspruch [Vorträge Freiburg, "Kränzchen"]. 16 December 1932. GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932. Plus, the recently published (2022 May) lengthy notes on this lecture, in *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. GA 91:189-342.

Back to the Tibetans. These Buddhist debates are done daily for hours and over the lifetime of a Buddhist monk that does not go into administrative duties – they might have done over 20,000 hours of formal debating in their lifetime. The nuns of Ge-den-chö-ling in Dharamsala, Kangra Valley, India are also engaged in debates as well. Beside the formal logical part of the debate there is somewhere between martial-arts movements, dancing, and theatre -- there is a visual arts performance part to the debating. Professor Dr. Georges B. J. Dreyfus points out the use and roles of humor as well within the debates. This is not a dead tradition. This part of Tibetan culture is alive and well in the Tibetan monasteries throughout the world.

The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk by Professor Dr. Georges B. J. Dreyfus (in 1985, he was the first Westerner to receive the Geshe Lharampa Degree, Wikipedia). I had the rare privilege to witness the young Professor Dreyfus engaging in this formal debate at the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics, Dharamsala, India one evening in 1978. Example given to me as a starting question in a Tibetan debate: point to the direction of suffering? The Tibetans often consider this to be a form of "dialectical" debate. In the tradition of Aristotle this would be under the form of "rhetoric." These are oral public debates. The majority of the time the two monks are standing. Their stance and their movements are symbolic and important to the overall debate.

Dialogical processes. Share and debate a text in the Jewish tradition known as Chavruta, also spelled chavruta or havruta (Aramaic: חֲבֵרֻתָא). Example of debate is the old *Bhagavad Gītā* in India and is dated around from around the 5th century BCE. There is a tradition in ancient rhetoric of using **utramque partem disserere** (arguing both sides). However, it does not have to be unbiased or impartial. Note. Anyone who has studied philosophy and logic you should feel like you have heard this before as a similar past event (a paradeigma, παραδειγμα). Please follow the "ethos of scholarly controversy" Gregory Vlastos (1907-1991).

Diverse cultural approaches. Recent examples,
“Isidor I. Rabi, the Nobel laureate in physics (1944). Questioned about his background. Dr. Rabi's answer, as reported by Dr. Sackler, 'My mother made me a scientist without ever intending it. Every other Jewish mother in Brooklyn would ask her child after school: 'So? Did you learn anything today?' But not my mother. She always asked me a different question. 'Izzy,' she would say, 'did you ask a good question today?' That difference - asking good questions - made me become a scientist!' *New York Times*, January 19, 1988, Section A, Page 26. Professor Rabi was one of the VIPs who attended the Trinity nuclear bomb (“Gadget”) test on July 16, 1945.

Great Debaters Movies. 2007.

Mr. Melvin B. Tolson, Wiley College in Marshall, Texas.

The film depicts the Wiley Debate team beating Harvard College in the 1930s. The real Wiley team instead defeated the University of Southern California, who at the time were the reigning debating champions. My favorite, Henrietta Bell Wells (1912-2008) was still alive when the film came out and she was consulted on the making the film.

Back on the trail.

Heidegger's recurring dream.

Heidegger's letter to Medard Boss, August 2, 1952, from Todtnauberg, Germany.

“Last night the examination dream [Abituriententraum] promptly reappeared.”

The footnote by Medard Boss.

“As Heidegger expressed it himself, it refers to the one dream, which he remembers, and which has recurred continuously since his youth: although at increasingly greater intervals. In these dream states, he finds himself again and again in similar ways in high school [Gymnasium] and is examined by the same teachers who once gave him the final exam [Abitur] in his waking life. (*ZOLLIKON SEMINARS Protocols— Conversations—Letters Martin Heidegger* Edited by Medard Boss, page 340). He went to the Heinrich Suso Gymnasium in Constance during 1903-1906. Hence his dreams that are discussed here are some 40 years later. Medard Boss (1903-1990).

It is remarkable about Heidegger's recurring dream – he spent decades giving exams himself to many others. Most likely some of them have examination dreams too. Of course, some of his students are still alive today (2024) and could be dreaming about Heidegger's intense questioning and having their own recurring dreams about undergoing “examination” by Heidegger.

This is setting the stage and the hermeneutical situation of answering the simple question: what is Heidegger up to? Technically the questions are: what was Martin Heidegger up to in his conversations, teachings, and writings? There are many conflicting conceptions of philosophy. Heidegger is in the middle of the debate. Loquaciousness is certainly part of Heidegger legacy, but he was known as a great listener and thinking before he answered questions. In a different context, Heidegger confesses (February 8, 1950) to Hannah: "For the most part we talk too much, but sometimes we also talk too little." *Letters, 1925-1975 / Hannah Arendt, and Martin Heidegger*; translated from the German by Andrew Shields. Hannah Arendt (1906-1975).

A few words of caution from Heidegger,
"He who thinks greatly must err greatly." ("Wer groß denkt, muß groß irren"). *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Section of the 'Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1947)'. GA 13:81.

Heidegger as a prophet and futurologist.

The later Heidegger uses a special German term "Ereignis" for what he is designating. There is a whole group of Heidegger scholarships regarding this term. We will leave it untranslated into English. But he is not suggesting it is some kind of destiny for humanity.

Heidegger wrote in the early 1930s, "In sixty years, our state will certainly not be led by the leader anymore; but what happens then is *up to us*. This is why we must philosophize" *Seminare: Hegel – Schelling*. GA 86:560.

Some more words of caution,
"The Ereignis is also not a "myth" and not a "secret" and not a destiny" ("Das Ereignis ist auch kein »Mythos« und kein »Geheimnis« und kein Schicksal"). *Über den Anfang*. 1941. GA 70:174.

Back to Heidegger as a prophet.

"One day, America will have to reflect on whether or not it is essentially engaged in the thinking that Nietzsche has accomplished and takes it as the seriousness of the destiny of Beyng." ("Eines Tages wird sich Amerika besinnen müssen, ob es mit dem Denken, das Nietzsche vollzogen hat, sich wesentlich einläßt und es als den Ernst des Seynsgeschickes nimmt."). *Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*. GA 97:464.

What is the epoch now? Heidegger says, "Nietzsche is the name for an age of the world: the epoch of the development and establishment of the dominion of man over the earth." ("Nietzsche ist der Name für ein Weltalter: Die Epoche der Entfaltung und Einrichtung der Herrschaft des Menschen über die Erde"). *Nietzsches Metaphysik* (announced for the winter semester 1941/42). *Nietzsches Metaphysik. Einleitung in die Philosophie — Denken und Dichten*. GA 50:84

Heidegger said in the 1939-1940 time period,

"And as far as the event of the decision concerning this essence is inceptual history, thinking remains historical from the ground up, and must therefore let itself be carried from the first commencement, via the end of the consummation of metaphysics, out into the other

commencement, by the ungraspable carrying force of those words whose bearers we do not at all need to know. Such thinking must think two hundred years ahead in order for the first Germans to awaken into a site cleared for the decision between the truth of beyng and the precedence of beings that has become a wasteland. And for a long time, the direct trace will be lacking that points the paths within the simple neighborhood of the rare moments of the history of Beyng.” Section #71. Beyng-Historical Thinking. *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1939-1940). *History of Beyng*. Translated by William McNeill and Jeffery Powell, page 73. GA 69:86-87.

And more profound and far reaching, Heidegger the futurologist expectantly predicts,

“Around the year 2300 at the earliest, there may again be history. Then Americanism will have exhausted itself, fed up with its own vacuousness.” (“Frühestens um 2300 mag wieder Geschichte sein. Dann wird sich der Amerikanismus am Überdruß seiner Leere erschöpft haben.”). *Überlegungen XIV. Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941). Ponderings XII–XV*. GA 96:225. He also said, “We are still European and still possess the European aspiration to the planetary.” Perhaps ominously predicating the future or just a hope for the future?

This is what Heidegger says about America in 1939-1941 time period, “Americanism is the organization of the unconditional meaningless-ness of “existence,” joined to the prospect of an enhanced “standard of living” (electric heating and cooling of homes, increase in auto-mobile ownership, rise in the number of moviegoers and of other “eco-nomic-technological-cultural” amenities of “life”). — *Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*. GA 96:268-269. *Ponderings XII–XV*. English translation page 213. Translator Richard Rojcewicz.

Now this includes the expressions “planetarianism and idiotism,” here Heidegger observes, “The essential pacesetter (Schrittmacher) of the unity of planetarianism and idiotism, but also its essential according to heir, is Americanism, probably the most barren shape of “historical” historicity.” “Der eigentliche Schrittmacher der Einheit von Planetarismus und Idiotismus, aber auch ihr eigentlich gemäßer Erbe, ist der Amerikanismus, die wohl ödeste Gestalt der »historischen« Geschichtslosigkeit.” *Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*. GA 96:266. Translator Richard Rojcewicz

You might be able to conclude what he might be saying in 2024 about America. Heidegger role as a “seer” or sage with insight into future developments.

Heidegger makes a point about time and philosophy, “All essential questioning in philosophy necessarily remains untimely, and this is because philosophy either projects far beyond its own time or else binds its time back to this time's earlier and *inceptive* past.” *Einführung in die Metaphysik. Introduction to Metaphysic*, Summer Semester 1935, page 6. GA 40.

We have much to ponder about Heidegger’s thought:

“The thought-provoking power of Heidegger’s writings is evident to those who allow themselves to be moved by them.” Richard Polt. Thinkers get drawn into Heidegger’s thinking and above all into his “questioning.” Heidegger has scholarly depth and often flashes of rhetorical flair and

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

detailed analysis and interpretation of the western tradition of metaphysics. Therefore, the major conclusion, is the inspired and “thought-provoking power of Heidegger’s writings”!

Argument from authority. Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) told an interviewer in 1982: “For me, Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of the century, perhaps one of the very great philosophers of the millennium”. *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*. Translation by M. Smith, page 117.

Heidegger is an inspiration to philosophers and thinkers. So many have learned so much from Heidegger (right or wrong). Taught “thinking” and of course, to question. Example from Heidegger, “questioning is the strength of thinking.” *Heidegger as Interrogator*.

N.B. Es *muß* auf Heidegger zurückgegangen werden.

Introduction

Exordium.

Heidegger is always unfolding in a fresh and rich context. Sometimes the context is especially important; and other times, the context is not needed. The overall and whole unity of Heidegger's thought is in his questioning approach. This book will uncover and show this as Heidegger's utmost thoughts. This is Heidegger in himself and not some kind of step beyond or after Heidegger (which by most judgements is nonsense because Heidegger is the center of the philosophical agenda – worldwide like no one else, think of how many of his translations).

Argumentum ad populum.

There is ample evidence from credible sources of Heidegger spoken and written word, so follow along and you will see the clear and marshalled evidence of the best paradigm of Heidegger as interrogator which is central and core to what Heidegger was driving at his whole life. This is a rich and innovative line of thought that is established in the form of a single line of continuous arguments and theses that answers the question. What was Heidegger's up to with his directions and pathways of his thought?

Around 2016, Martin Heidegger's grandson Arnulf Heidegger (1968-) said, "It was never the intentions of my grandfather to propagate a doctrine, to construct a system, or to gather a body of followers. The effort of his thinking is much rather directed toward evoking essential thinking." (ein wesentliches Fragen hervorzurufen"). Forward to *Martin Heidegger and the Truth About the Black Notebooks*, 2021. No followers and no disciples (no Bhikku, no votaries, no adherents). There are no fealty oaths or acolytes required. True disciples need a doctrinal corpus through which it can be transmitted as a few tenets to others. There are no secret "tenets" from Heidegger unless you consider that "questioning" is a secret. Certainly, Heidegger is lacking in any "doctrines" for some followers. What is the Heidegger canon? Answer: question marks. What is the real story of Heidegger – pathways? Once we figure Heidegger out, then what is the story? What are the core kernels of his thought? Answer: "questioning is the strength of thinking." Martin Heidegger as Interrogator.

Get to the essential questioning. What is the gist of Heidegger's writings?

More specifically, in this book, we are going to point somethings out about Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) philosophical stance and standpoint. What questions do philosophers ask and how do they approach answers that their questions raise? In this book, there will be more questions than answers. There is a core theme (leitmotif) in Heidegger's standpoint and other great philosophers in their basic mode and approach of the interrogative. This is certainly a contestable point. The philosophical "interrogative" is not a perspective or a worldview. Heidegger cautioned us against the standpoint of standpointlessness (*Essence of Truth*, 1931-32, pages 78, et page 56). This is a more provocative conversion to a much deeper understanding of the entire philosophical enterprise. What is – philosophy? The asking and transformation of the fundamental questions as the stance of interrogative nature of humans. In other words, to fathom the depths of Heidegger's approach of "questioning." Martin Heidegger's mission as the

interrogator of Being. Heidegger's primary task: to elevate our questioning. One approach suggests that Heidegger is not engaged in protreptic as persuasion but only as instruction and to point out. Some parts are teaching us and showing us the path forward.

Heidegger plants a motto or exergue or epigraph (ἐπιγραφή, epigraphé) at the beginning of the text of this lecture course (Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken" (Winter Semester 1941/42). The statement reads, "The lecture course is only a pointing." ("Die Vorlesung ist nur ein Hinzeigen"). *Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken"*. GA 52:1. Perhaps a reading of a disclosive character [Erschließungscharakter].

Is this description in this book of the "interrogative" exhaustive of everything that Heidegger thought? Answer: no. Heidegger had deep and unique insights, analysis of texts and philosophers, interpretations, and translations. This was over 60+ years of writing and teaching at the university level. Heidegger's questioning is deep and broad across all ontological questions and many other topics.

If you already have all of the "answers," then there is no reason to proceed to Heidegger's questioning in philosophy.

Plus, sometimes Heidegger gave us 'results' on his paths. What is Heidegger's basic stance and what are his core and fundamental intentions? The interrogative nature of Heidegger's thinking is central, dominant, and the leading approach Heidegger has to philosophical issues. Certainly, contra to Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Husserl. Their gift was their "results." Kant gave us mixed results. But maybe a little bit of Nietzsche's doctrine of the Will-to-Power was part of Nietzsche legacy and his "results." Can we divide the philosophers between "no results," "little results," and "lots of results"? Hegel stands out as the "lot of results" group. As Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) told Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) in July 1780, in the great town of Wolfenbüttel in northern German, he said, "There is no other philosophy than that of Spinoza". This single remark started the Pantheismusstreit. Lessing was not open to questioning. Some philosophers do not need questions but only a few "answers" for their relief. Philosophers as a 'fly' stuck inside the 'bottle.'

Remember that Heidegger was a university professor (ein bestallter Lehrer der Philosophie), and he told students and other many others what he thought. Letter to a student, Mr. Hartmut Buchner 1950, "...any path risks going astray, leading astray. To follow such paths requires practice. Practice needs craft. Stay on the path, in genuine need, and learn the craft of thinking, unswerving yet erring" (*Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1953). GA 7:187). Did he fall off the path of his own philosophical journey and sojourns? Answer: yes, of course. Heidegger was not faffing about, but any philosophical directions are problematic at best. We should note that Heidegger did not reuse his lectures series notes and wrote them out in great detail. One example is GA 19. *Platon: Sophistes* (Winter semester 1924/25), which is 668 pages. Another example of a lecture series that was written and not given is GA 78. *Der Spruch des Anaximander* (Summer, Fall 1942. Not delivered), which is 352 pages. One counterexample, GA 50 *Nietzsches Metaphysik* (1943-2). *Einleitung in die Philosophie - Denken und Dichten* (1944-45). Heidegger notes, "in the summer of 1944, I was ordered to dig trenches over near the Rhine, on the Kaiserstuhl ". (GA 9. *Wegmarken*). Heidegger at age 56 was draft into the Volksstrum and so

this first part of this volume is a similar lecture in *Nietzsche II* (1939–1946) GA 6.2. Remember with Heidegger there are often counterexamples given the vast number of materials published, complexity, and Heidegger's 60+ years of diligent writing.

The term *pedagogy* is a derivative from the Greek παιδαγωγία (*paidagōgia*) discussed in the writings from the 1920s.

Some time, Heidegger calls the “how” of his methodology, in a shorthanded way, phenomenological seeing. We need a clear confrontational formulation of Martin Heidegger as interrogator. Plus, the purging of the Heideggerians of whatever misconceptions that they have been creating over time. We have the intellectual milieu (contemporaneous hermeneutical situation) and current framing of the sophists and mostly eristic argumentation from many of the so called Heideggerians. The presumptuous myths of a “final” Heideggerian philosophy. Was Heidegger profound? In what way? What is the principle and thrust of Heidegger thinking? In which directions is Heidegger showing us to take? What is the pathway that Heidegger is guiding us to take? In Heidegger philosophy there are no “results”. In Bertrand Russell's (1872-1970) analogy (from Porthurno), Heidegger gives us “no bread”; and he gave us very few directions on how to bake bread. Remember his crooked path is “his” path and he has stepped off the path and got lost in the forest sometimes. One of his major publications that he published when he was alive is a series of essays that Heidegger gave the title of GA 5. *Holzwege* (1935–1946). Translated into English as “Off The Beaten Track,” “wood-ways,” “logging paths,” and sometime used to as “wrong path” in the woods. The logging paths to move the trees down the hill but the paths do not actually go anywhere. Perhaps the wrong way or the way in error (Irrwege)? What are Heidegger intentions with this title? *Holzwege*?

Good news, Heidegger was not in the northern Hürtgen Forest in 1944 (*Schlacht im Hürtgenwald*). Heidegger's Schwarzwald did not become like the Hürtgenwald. Heidegger notes “in the summer of 1944, I was ordered to dig trenches over near the Rhine, on the Kaiserstuhl“. (GA 9. *Wegmarken*). Compared to going to the Hürtgen Forest this was a far better results for Heidegger. During World War I, Heidegger was in the Ardennes Forest as a weatherman preparing for a German attack on the enemy. He survived but as we know tthat “trees and open country won't teach” (Plato). Should we think that Heidegger was “hors de combat“?

Note carefully, unlike the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Heidegger's lethality during World War I and World War II was in fact zero. Wittgenstein was “artillery observation post at night” [University of Manchester web site] he killed plenty of humans during World War I. Wittgenstein won plenty of awards (for killing humans) before he was captured (1918). Silver Medal for Valor 2nd Class. Perhaps Wittgenstein's famous ladder was indeed the ladder he climb to his observational post to kill people? *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 6.54.

What is our time in history?

Heidegger wrote this in his pivotal work the *Beiträge*, “The time of “systems” is over. The time of edification of the essential form of beings from the truth of Being (Seyns) has not yet come. Meanwhile, philosophy must be in transition at the other beginning have achieved something essential: the draft (layout), d.h., das heißt (that means) the grounding one opening of the time-space (Zeit- Spiel-Raumes) of the truth of Being

(Seyns).” (“Die Zeit der »Systeme« ist vorbei. Die Zeit der Erbauung der Wesensgestalt des Seienden aus der Wahrheit des Seyns ist noch nicht gekommen. Inzwischen muß, die Philosophie im Übergang zum anderen Anfang ein Wesentliches geleistet haben: den Entwurf, d. h. die gründende Eröffnung des Zeit- Spiel-Raumes der Wahrheit des Seyns.”). *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, 1936-1938. GA 65:5.

Heidegger is getting us high on hopium or just some philosophical copium to use the new expressions of building up our hope and helping us cope with the human condition; and more importantly, why we turn to philosophy and ask for “answers.’ From Heidegger’s workshop, he wrote, “There are only a few *questioners*. Most people merely want answers, or rather: they would like to be the answerers and to have their reward for that, even if that reward is only fame (*which* “admirers”?” —asked incidentally).” *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*. GA 94:396. Heidegger wanted to know about “admirers” of these people who had the answers. Maybe a part of Eric Fromm (1900-1980) thinking, that is, asking others for the answers. Historical note that Eric Fromm studied under one of Heidegger’s teachers, Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936).

What emerges from all of these hermeneutical investigations—namely, the following four theses, which being philosophy, are of course open for debate. We are bringing together the strings of what Heidegger thought and what his primary intentions were. Motivation and state of mind. These are distinctive themes in Heidegger's work. Sometimes these intentions were on the surface, and we can see them clearly and hear them too. In the 60+ years of his speeches, lectures, and writings he was sometime obscure and changed his mind as to regarding his intentions for some periods, but he came back on this path. Cutting through the nonsense and seeing his actual and real directions is the purpose of this undertaking. Continue reading. Latin: **Tolle, lege!** (take up and read).

Heidegger has given us a “gift” and it is now time to see the entire outline of Heidegger’s “gift” to us. His “gift” is not “answers” or “results” or some kind of “systems.” Speculatively, we might say that this is part of his methodology of questioning. Heidegger cannot be refuted, and he is not a problem to be solved, but rather, we want to ‘see him’ as a guide for us beginners as the rare and few as he called ‘them’ or ‘us’ on a new path of thinking and questioning. We are not setting aside all of the Heideggerians’ issues and problems. There is a multitude of questions in Heidegger’s writing, in fact, there are lots more questions marks in Heidegger’s writings in comparison to Hegel.

The contention (statement of thesis) here is that there is a unifying fundamental theme of Heidegger’s writing (etc.); namely, his questioning stance. On the other hand, he developed ideas and approaches to many philosophical issues, but the overall purpose was not to create doctrines or ideologies or worldviews. Heidegger pointed out a great deal about philosophical issues and he developed a way of considering the history of western metaphysics (one of the topics in this book). There are many other topics in 60+ years of writing and at least 50,000 published pages. But what unifies his approach? At the end of his journey what did he show us that he is made of? Obviously, the *œuvre* is too large, so there are plenty of counterexamples, some of these will be given in this book. There are the tracks and the pathways of the unprethinkable (das

Unvordenkliche). The hypothesis is that there is a general unifying theme (s) that is distinct in Heidegger's thinking that dominated his writings over the 60+ years. The question is: does it bring together enough the core and essential themes to justify the general concept of the "unification" of Heidegger's thought? There are many other tangential themes. The articles, monographies, videos, and poems of the Heideggerians continue unabated. Thank them all for their dedication and hard work of thinking with Heidegger.

I am showing a single core thread, and possible ignoring its rich nuances and complexities of Heidegger's complete thought; therefore, I am following Protagoras to argue on both sides. After the evidence is presented, then the critical thinker can decide faults and merits of the "whole" body of textual evidence given in this book. Follow the path ways.

We should sum up our findings at this stage in the investigations. These four theses (plural thesis) are the basic building blocks for the overall conclusion of the final paradigm. The next major parts.

The *divisio* (or *partitio*).

Main thesis.

Martin Heidegger as an interrogator.

Martin Heidegger as a questioner.

Martin Heidegger's passion, dedication, and love was for intense questioning.

General state of mind and stance.

Second thesis.

There is no Heidegger philosophy; but rather, only Martin Heidegger's stance, namely, questioning and "leaps" (leaps were big for Heidegger in the 1930s). Although note that questioning is not yet the "leap." Preparing a new way of thinking (mentioned in Richard Wisser conversation). Sometimes called the ontological and a phenomenological way of seeing (summer semester of 1919); and the much later in the Zollikoner Seminare (GA 98) during the 1960s. Heidegger never started with the intention and purpose of "building" a system or creating a Heidegger Philosophy. Heidegger is not an ideologist (yes, I know there are a few counter examples).

In the dialogue with the Japanese gentleman, Heidegger writes, "The lasting thing in thinking is the *path*. And ways of thinking contain the mysterious fact that we can go forward and backward, that even the way back leads us forward." ("Das Bleibende im Denken ist der *Weg*. Und Denkwege bergen in sich das Geheimnisvolle, daß wir sie vorwärts und rückwärts gehen können, daß sogar der Weg zurück uns erst vorwärts führt."). *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950–1959). GA 12:94. These quotes all count as "evidence" of Heidegger questioning stance.

Third thesis.

Heidegger is preparing for a way out of metaphysical thinking and language. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger rejects western metaphysics; but he knows that philosophical language is tied to metaphysics and so he explores the essential nature of language. He uses the image of the bridge to a new beginning (Anfang) in thinking and questioning. This is a trope τρόπος (tropos). The expression "Postmetaphysical Thinking" has been used as topic in philosophical research, but we

used it here as indicator beyond Hegel and certainly noted for Heidegger's attempt to get beyond Nietzsche's metaphysics. Do we get a sense of "humanity" beyond its metaphysical or Platonic-Judeo-Christian directions and contours from Heidegger? How much of Heidegger is still a huge mishmash (einen riesigen Mischmasch) of metaphysical values? Answer: Heidegger would hope to answer it is "none." Heidegger is attempting to delineate something after twisting out of metaphysics, but still with the Greek western tradition (not Zen Buddhism, *Der Spiegel* interview of 23 September 1966). Only Heidegger has the one solution to get out of the Klein Bottle. The weight never completely came off of Heidegger's shoulder for the "cross-over" to the other side or at least to see the bridges to the other side, the new Anfang (beginning, inception). See later section on the image of "bridge" in Heidegger. What does post-metaphysics mean in the context of Heidegger? We already have Jürgen Habermas' (1929-) fawning version. The situation of Heidegger to "metaphysics" is a core theme of Heidegger after 1930. The attempt at "metaphysics of Dasein" was left behind. Heidegger moved through his metahistory of metaphysics during the 1930s; and the last major part of the project is seen in these two essays, GA 69. *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1938/40) and *Koivón Aus der Geschichte des Seyns* (1939). The question of a non-metaphysical language remains (see the reconstruction of Heidegger's letter to D. Sinn, Appendix A). As the era of metaphysics reaches its end and it enters into conflict (See *Nietzsche II*. GA 6.2:262).

Fourth thesis.

The Being question (Seinsfrage) is a symbol and a synecdoche (συνεκδοχή, synekdochē) for Heidegger thinking from at least the year 1922 until his last writings in the year of his death (1976). He called his last project: Legacy of the Being Question (Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage). The question is: does Heidegger want to improve humanity? Create an idol of the project of Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage? Heidegger does not have much of a program but gives us hints and points toward the future as he saw it. Even at the end Heidegger gives us a feisty polemic and questioning. Simple truth: Heidegger had a one-track mind. Ereignis is a metonym for his project of the Being questions. Heidegger use of the expression 'Ereignis' is a **singulare tantum**, a unique singular expression (often link with the inexpressible (untranslatable) nature of the terms like the 'Tao' or 'Dao' of Taoism). Generally, it means that the term is untranslatable into other languages. A richly and overly determined concept. Thomas Sheehan has many excellent articles on his analysis of Heidegger's language and what Heidegger was driving toward in his development of some kind of "ontology." To paraphrase Aristotle, "Being is said in many ways," so Heidegger struggles with this, and we struggle with Heidegger's struggle. Polysemy.

Heidegger published the collection of lectures, essays, and letters in *Wegmarken*. 1919-58. First Published in German in 1967. This collection contains a letter sent to a conference which took place at Drew University in Madison, New Jersey, U.S.A. on April 9-11, 1964. Heidegger preface to the section is dated Freiburg im Breisgau, August 27, 1970. So, this was an update by Heidegger at age 80 years old and he approved the publishing. So, in this case not just approved by Heidegger but also published by him during his life (died 1976). Double approved and public. Heidegger's imprimatur on this statement about his philosophy is clear.

Here Heidegger clearly says, "The appearance is to be avoided as if it were an exposition of dogmatic theses from Heidegger's philosophy, when there is no such thing." Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany dated March 11, 1964. ("Der Anschein soll vermieden werden, als handle es

sich um eine Darlegung dogmatischer Thesen aus der Heidegger'schen Philosophie, die es nicht gibt"). *Wegmarken* (1919–1961 GA 9:69).

From one of his last letters, Heidegger (age 86) writes (the first sentence sets the whole tone and direction):

*“Greetings
to the participants in the tenth colloquium
May 14 - 16, 1976, in Chicago*

Thoughtful men exchange greetings by posing questions to one another. The question with which I send my greetings to you is that single question which I have persistently tried to ask in a more questioning manner. It is known as "the question of Being."

After a discussion of technology, Heidegger writes the last sentence,

“To think properly the legacy which derives from the beginning of the history of Being and which remained necessarily unthought in and for that beginning — Ἀλήθεια as such — and thereby to prepare the possibility of a transformed abode of man in the world.

Martin Heidegger
Freiburg i. Br.
April 11, 1976”

Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft und moderne Technik - Gruß wort an die Teilnehmer des zehnten Colloquiums vom 14.—16. Mai 1976 in Chicago (11. April 1976). GA 16:747.

Has this established credibility of these investigation going forward?

Contra principia negantem non est disputandum. (“Against one who denies the principles, there can be no debate”). These principles are not “given” out of the air.

Back on the trail of Heidegger’s project.

Core leitmotifs of Heidegger.

Sammelweis reflex means to reject new paradigm because it contradicts the old established and standard interpretation of Heidegger’s project. The time has come to look at the direct and considerable evidence for bringing to light the “real” Heidegger. Heidegger that does “attempts at questioning” and “preparing the way forward.” That is not Heidegger that is creating a doctrine, dogmatic positions, a system of philosophy, an ethic or morality, nor a political philosophy (his last period, 1976). **Tolle, lege!** (take up and read).

Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers book project written by Otto Pöggeler with some close collaboration with Heidegger. Reported by Otto Pöggeler (1928-2014), “Heidegger himself wrote on 17. April 1964 with regard to the “increasing interest” in this book: “But I think that now it would be time to stop writing about Heidegger. More important would be a substantial critique encounter (eine sachliche Auseinandersetzung).” *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, page 336. By Otto Pöggeler. Therefore, enough about Heidegger, return to the matter themselves.

From Hegel, Husserl, to Heidegger the motto is “To the things themselves!” (“Zu den Sachen selbst!” *SuZ* section 24). More “evidence” and examples of Heidegger’s own approach.

From polemos (Πόλεμος, Pólemos) as a war and a struggle (Kampf). Heidegger is calling for an Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger! Heidegger uses this word to describe his critical encounters and engagement with other philosophers: **Auseinandersetzung** (sometimes hyphenated like this: Aus-einander-setzung, GA 27) as critical encounters. Sometimes as Auseinander-setzung, “setting in opposition.” The German word “Auseinandersetzung” in the standard dictionary is translated as a debate or dispute. Some translate this German word as “confrontation.” One of the earliest examples of Heidegger’s use of the expression “Auseinandersetzung” comes from the last paragraph of his Habilitation. Dissertation: "The Doctrine of Categories and Signification in Duns Scotus" (1915). He names his opponent: Hegel. Part of Heidegger’s methodology of engagement with other philosophers.

In Heidegger discussions with Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) and Jean Beaufret (1907-1982) during September 1955 at a Colloque at Cerisy, France; Heidegger clearly stated: “There is no Heideggerian philosophy; and even if it existed, I would not be interested in that philosophy.” [more story below]. I take this thesis one more step. Heidegger never wanted a “Heidegger philosophy.” Even toward the end of his life, we can see this with the collected writings (Gesamtausgabe) project. At first, he did not want to publish his writings, but his wife and Hermann (son) persuaded him to do it. For Heidegger this was a dilemmatic decision, but in the end, we got an abundant of Heidegger’s thoughts on many different topics. The problem for beginners is where to start with Heidegger’s writings (40,000+ plus page) and how to go about the climb. Heidegger was magnanimous in giving us his writing. This is his gift of his writings. But he was pointing beyond his writings to matters of thought. Heidegger’s beneficence.

Walter Biemel (1918-2015) worked with Heidegger at the DLA archives but note these remarks about an interview with Biemel.

In the book *Heidegger in France*. Footnote from the section, “Conclusion.” “Footnote 103. See our interview with Kostas Axelos in *Heidegger en France*, vol. 2: *Entretiens*. [TN: This interview with Kostas Axelos was not included in the English edition.] It is moreover not certain that Heidegger genuinely wanted this monumental edition. It rather seems that old age and illness deprived him of the ability to oppose it forcefully. This hypothesis seems confirmed in our *Entretiens* with Biemel. [TN: The interview with Walter Biemel was not included in the English edition.]” *Heidegger in France* / Dominique Janicaud. Translated by François Raffoul and David Pettigrew.

Walter Biemel (1918-2015) in interview reported this, “I was at the meeting with Vittorio Klostermann, Hermann Heidegger, von Herrmann, Klostermann's son and my wife. At that time, he thought of rather a limited edition. When Pöggeler later spoke of a hundred volumes, he reacted: "No no!"

I don't quite know how it happened. His wife understood nothing of his philosophy; but she made sure he could work.” *HEIDEGGER EN FRANCE: Entretiens*. 2001. Page 44. Otto Pöggeler (1928-2014). So, yes, the 102 volumes did happen, but Martin Heidegger was not the

pushing force for the GA 102 volumes. He started out wanting only a limited edition of his writings. We have 101 GA volumes published now and are only waiting on GA 72 (oh, plus unknown letter collections). He was chary of the Hegel and Husserl collected works.

Remember in the late 1930s, he did not want to publish his letters either. The Gesamtausgabe project, he then – put his stamp and brand on with a clearly personal statement, the Motto (Leitspruch) --- "Ways —not works" ("Wege — nicht Werke" is the motto that Martin Heidegger handwrote a few days before his death for his Gesamtausgabe)." (...ist der Leitspruch, den Martin Heidegger wenige Tage vor seinem Tod für seine Gesamtausgabe letzter Hand zusammen mit dem Titelblatt handschriftlich aufsetzte). 1976. *Frühe Schriften* (1912–1916). GA 1:437. This short slogan shows us where he stood with regard to the question of his "motive."

Also note that Martin knew about Taoism. Example, the expression "teaching of the way" (*die Lehre des Weges*) (*daojiao* 道教). He worked on a translation of *Tao Te Ching* or the *Dao De Jing* (道德經) in 1946 with Paul Shih-yi Hsiao (蕭師毅) from Chinese to German. Heidegger's concept of the Four-Fold (Das Geviert) might have connections to Chapter 25 *Dao De Jing* (道德經), see also Heidegger's quote in *Vorläufiges I-IV. (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970)*. GA 102:243. Assuming we can call Heidegger's Four-Fold (Das Geviert) a concept at all since the expression "concept" (Begriff) is already tied up with Hegel's metaphysical system.

The following were some of Heidegger's last words in 1976.
Does this sound like Heidegger is pushing some of his doctrines?

"The Gesamtausgabe is intended to guide people to take up the question, to ask it and, above all, to ask it in a more questioning way." (Die Gesamtausgabe soll dadurch anleiten, die Frage aufzunehmen, mitzufragen und vor allem dann fragender zu fragen). *Frühe Schriften* (1912–1916). GA 1:437 in the Afterwards. Ultimately, Heidegger is elevating our questioning!

In the context of Heidegger's exegete lecture on Kant, he starts out on the first page with saying something very profound, "philosophy is always something crazy (die Philosophie immer etwas Verrücktes) (GA 41:1. *Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (Winter semester 1935/36).). The German word "Verrücktes" translations perhaps crazy, wacky, mad, insane, kooky, deranged, or nutty. The translators James D. Reid and Benjamin D. Crowe decided on the using "deranged." Of course, the question becomes if philosophy is crazy (Verrücktes) what does that make philosophers? Verrücktes? (Crazy man, madman). Maybe just a case of "opinionated professors."

Sort of the counterexample is what we have from, Heraclitus (Ἡράκλειτος Herakleitos, BC 535 – BC 475), "Thinking is a common enterprise for all" (xynon esti pasi to phroneein, ξυvόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονεῖν). Fragment #B 113.

Heidegger wrote in one of the second Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte), "51. *We must philosophize ourselves out of "philosophy."* (*Wir müssen uns aus der »Philosophie« heraus philosophieren*). GA 94:20-21. *Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*. Italics by

Martin Heidegger. How are we to get out of philosophical nonsense? Answer: use philosophy and thinking.

Or his remark, “Philosophizing is the beginning of the hike on the rough path of the great ones.” (“Mit dem Philosophieren beginnt die Wanderung auf den Rohen des Hohenzuges der Großen.” Einleitung in die Philosophie (Winter semester 1928/29). *Introduction to philosophy*. GA 27:401.

Heidegger also cautions us, “There is no philosophy of philosophy.” (Es gibt keine Philosophie der philosophie). *Vorläufiges I-IV. (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970)*. GA 102:185. Vorläufiges II, page 78. Kant saw his project as a “metaphysics of metaphysics.” (AK 10:269, Letter #166, lines 32-33). Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz dated after 11 May 1781 (243 years ago).

Where to start with Heidegger?

“Precisely what an author conceals is what one has to begin with in order to understand what the author himself describes as the real deal.” (“Gerade das, was ein Autor verschweigt, ist das, wobei man ansetzen muß, um das zu verstehen, was der Autor selbst als das Eigentliche bezeichnet.” *Platon: Sophistes* (Winter Semester 1924/25). GA 19:46.

Heidegger can no longer try concealing his thoughts from us and we are past the “double secrets” (as reported by others and not by Heidegger in GA 94:531) now as all of the black notebooks are published (GA 94:102). These are no longer apocryphal (ἀπόκρυφος) and hidden knowledge; and no “secret” knowledge for the magic tricks either. What happen to the uncovering of the hidden teaching? Nothing is absconditus or hidden. We have reached the anagnorisis (ἀναγνώρισις). No longer a “bedazzlement” (Blendung) with others (GA 90:13–14). Getting to the *Ur-Heidegger* project is now over. There is nothing left behind the curtains. His foibles and idiosyncrasies are all out now. “He who *thinks* greatly must err greatly.” “Wer groß *denkt*, muß groß irren.” *Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*. GA 97:179; and then again, in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (1910–1976), GA 13:81, see Heidegger’s handwritten note about this statement is in GA 13:254.

Provide a list of all of Heidegger’s doctrines? Lehre? If philosophy is a doctrine—a system of assertions, then we would argue that Heidegger’s doctrines is a noticeably short list indeed. Heidegger is not an ideologist, who is creating doctrines, he is against Marxism and other liberal ideologies. Was Heidegger a brilliant and prodigious case of the “non-doctrinal” thinker? One example, “Therefore, “Da-sein” is incomparable in every respect; it is not an object of a “doctrine” (in *Sein und Zeit* “investigation” means **fundamental questioning**, not “explaining” the extant).” *Mindfulness*. Page 123 (ET). 66. *Besinnung* (1938/39). As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) notes too: Husserl usage of “explicated” (zur Auslegung gebracht werden soil). Not a “doctrine” but rather, “fundamental questioning” is the project of *Being and Time (Sein und Zeit*, GA 2. (1927). More on this later in the book. Heidegger is following the questioning as an approach against the neo-Kantian version of the philosophy of history as just a series of problems.

One of Heidegger’s most famous students whose name was Karl Löwith (1897-1973), wrote this in 1940 about Heidegger’s lecture style.

“We gave Heidegger the nickname “the little magician from Meßkirch.”

. . . He was a small dark man who knew how to cast a spell as far as he could make disappear what he had a moment before presented. His lecture technique consisted of building up an edifice of ideas which he then proceeded to tear down, presenting the spellbound listeners with a riddle (Rätsel) and then leave him in the void (Leeren zu lassen or empty or empty handed).

“Er war ein kleiner dunkler Mann, der zu zaubern verstand, indem er vor den Hörern verschwinden liess, was er eben noch vorgezeigt hatte. Die Technik seines Vortrags bestand im Aufbau eines Gedankengebäudes, das er dann selbst wieder abtrug, um den gespannten Zuhörer vor ein Rätsel zu stellen und im Leeren zu lassen.” (*Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. My life in Germany before and after 1933: a report* / Karl Löwith; translated by Elizabeth King. Page 45 in English and German.

Karl Löwith (1897-1973) perhaps should have read the early Plato dialogues that often lead to puzzlement (aporia, ἀπορίᾱ) or riddles. Heidegger is a splendid example of this teaching and way of thinking. Karl Löwith starting in 1919 and ended up taking nine years of classes from Heidegger, so he knew what he was talking about and how it felt to be there in the classroom. I think the meaning of “Leeren zu lassen” means does not leave the students or even us with the “answer.” There are no ‘answers;’ we are left only with a pile of great “questions.” The students at the end up with puzzlement (aporia, ἀπορίᾱ) as instructional technique. Perhaps we can say we now know the outline of Heidegger’s riddles. There are some Heideggerian riddles, but in contrast no more secrets doctrines. Is Heidegger just a simple deconstructionist? What is the “value added” in his writings? There is an obvious impact and significance to his writings. Thought provoking and questioning. Socrates paraphrased by, “Ἐν οἶδα ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα” (Hèn oîda hótî oudèn oîda). “I know one thing, that I know nothing” in Plato's *Apology*.

Again, complete opposite of Hegel and his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817), which gave his complete system of philosophy to his students. The subtitle of Hegel’s book in German, “Zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen” (For the use of his lectures) says it all. In fact, Hegel did construct a System of Philosophy (a metaphysics) and he published it. Certainly, there are no secrets with Hegel’s metaphysical system. The main philosophical issues with Hegel are to address his basic “assumptions;” he gave plenty of details of the unfolding of his system.

In particular, Heidegger did not reject the western metaphysical tradition (one could argue that Kant did reject it); but rather he wanted to find the “living” in the great traditional philosophers. Instead of refutation of philosopher, Heidegger’s process is more like Hegel’s *Aufhebung*; negation, preserving and changing, and eventually advancement or uplifting or synthesis of the tradition to a living now. Heidegger *talks* about *Reinigung*, section 110, subsection 26. "(What unfolds as "destruction" in *Sein und Zeit* does not mean dismantling as demolishing but as *purifying*..." (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1939), GA 65:220-221). The German word: *Reinigung* = cleaning, purifying.

Therefore, we are not dismantling as demolishing the traditional western metaphysics, but Heidegger is cleaning it up and purifying it for us. Can we do the same process and procedures for Heidegger’s own approach and stance to philosophy? Yes, that is the project. We want to purify Heidegger and distill the essential stance for us. There are a number of issues in Heidegger’s writings that need to be “cleaned up.” Heidegger in a letter to Karl Löwith (1897-1973) uses the image of someone “jamming a spoke in your wheels” Todtnauberg August 20,

1927. We are not trying to stop Heidegger's wheels; but rather, follow his "paths" and "sojourns;" and the hints he gives us along his ways about being a great interrogator. Heidegger as Interrogator.

In the *Beiträge*, Heidegger heard the echoes and sounds of Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844-1900) saying. Nietzsche's words and the reverberations are still heard. Here is one example from Nietzsche of the central issue,

"What finally dawned on the philosophers: they no longer just had to accept the concepts as a gift, not only *purify* and illuminate them, but rather first of all make, create, present and persuade them to use them. Hitherto people have trusted his concepts as a whole, as if they were a wonderful dowry from some wondrous world: but in the end they were the legacies of our most distant ancestors, who were just as stupid as they were shy."

("Was am letzten den Philosophen aufdämmert: sie müssen die Begriffe nicht mehr sich nur schenken lassen, nicht nur sie *reinigen* und aufhellen, sondern sie allererst machen, schaffen, hinstellen und zu ihnen überreden. Bisher vertraute man im Ganzen seinen Begriffen, wie als einer wunderbaren Mitgift aus irgend welcher Wunder-Welt: aber es waren zuletzt die Erbschaften unserer fernsten, ebenso dümmsten als gescheutesten Vorfahren."). *NF*-1885,34 [195]. Notebook. April-June 1885.

The word purify "reinigen" is in bold and written in Nietzsche's blood (metaphorical). Heidegger gives some directions about reading Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) (note this is not part of one of his historical lecture series).

"For example, Kant's philosophy (what does it consist of?) can be held to be wrong (and what does this mean?). Out of proving the wrongness of Kant's philosophy, one can make a career and a life's work. Except that this is not philosophizing, not an inquiry into the sway of Being.

Where philosophizing is fundamentally and properly enacted, Kant's thinking does not appear as an "object" at all, but as inquiring along with, and ahead into, the same question. Therefore, what is under discussion is not whether Kant is right or wrong, but whether we are capable of meditating on the truth of his thought, that means, whether we are capable of thinking along with him more original (not more correctly)." *Mindfulness. Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:62.

Can we say, erroneous but ingenious? Yes, we are not reading great minds to find what is "correct" or "right;" but rather the philosophizing "with." Correctly means philological "right." What part of a philosopher's philosophy is still "alive" for us? A revised way of doing doxology.

Not to worry.

In the context of Max Scheler (1874-1928), Heidegger writes "Not realizing that a philosophy can never be refuted. (nicht ahnend, daß eine Philosophie nie widerlegbar)." Laufende Anmerkungen (L.A.) zu >>*Sein und Zeit*<<. 1936. *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen*. GA 82:37. This too is certainly contestable and maybe presumptuous by Heidegger [this would not be the first time].

We are already "in" philosophy as Heidegger remarked,

“But we are indeed not ‘outside’ of philosophy, although not because we already have some knowledge [*Kenntnisse*] about philosophy. Even if we expressly know nothing of philosophy, we are already *in* philosophy, because philosophy is in us and belongs to us, indeed in the sense that we are always already philosophizing. We philosophize even when we know nothing about it, even if we do not busy ourselves with philosophy. We philosophize not now and then, but rather constantly and necessarily, as far as we exist as human beings. To be as man, means philosophizing. The animal cannot philosophize and need not philosophize. A god, who philosophized, would be no god, because the essence of philosophy is to be a finite possibility of a finite being.” *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (WS 1928/29). GA 27:3. Yes, this is where “we” are now and have been for centuries.

Hegel’s student Christian Gotthold Zellman got this letter from Hegel.
Hegel Letter to Zellman [#85] Jena, January 23, 1807.

“But I was even more pleased that you are devoting this winter of solitude to the study of philosophy: both in any case remain united, for philosophy has something solitary about it. It does not, to be sure, belong in alleys and marketplaces, but neither is it held aloof from the activity of men, from that in which they place their interest, nor from the [sort of] knowing to which they attach their vanity.” *Hegel: The Letters*, page 122.

Hegel said “for philosophy has something solitary about it;” yes, this letter is something that Hannah Arndt noted to Heidegger in her letter (#116). Hannah Arendt for Martin Heidegger); since clearly both of them had a sense of being lonely. They both fell under the spell of thought and philosophy, and hence somehow shared that unique solitary of thinking.

Somewhere Heidegger makes a caustic remark about lecturers and want-to-be authors in philosophy. Here are two examples, “Descartes is now refuted by small-minded teaching assistants who have never suffered, or even conceived, a proper thought in its necessity, let alone that thought which would give them the right to consider a confrontation with Descartes and consider the preparation for such a confrontation. I mean philosophical preparation, not the preparation needed to advance one’s career as an author.” *Schwarze Hefte. Ponderings II–VI*. Black Notebooks 1931–1938. GA 94:367–368.

And again, “Impudent carping at Descartes from “folkish-political” viewpoints by overzealous and still untenured lecturers in “philosophy.” *Schwarze Hefte. Ponderings VII–XI* 1938–1939. GA 95:68–169. [Heidegger gives them a couple of slaps]. Some justifiable jeremiads (prolonged lamentation or complaints)?

Since Heidegger does not have a “philosophy” this is not an attempt to refute Heidegger. We need some of those “hard-headed” pseudo-philosophers to fix it all. Maybe it is a kind of “metaphilosophy.” The later Heidegger would agree with the presuppositionlessness of pondering and preparation for a kind of thinking that will start a new beginning (Anfang). Heidegger is clearing the way and getting us ready (is that a “doctrine”?). There is always confusion at the beginning of the trip and pathways forward. Which direction to take to go up the mountain (see the Schelling book for the image of climbing the mountain)? The rock quarry image (see GA 65 at the end).

Are we just to preserve or should we “dive-in”?

“1. The fundamental question of philosophy. We do not know, without further inquiry, *whether* there is such a question for philosophy at all and what it is; whether philosophy still can be and is allowed to be at all; whether we should even *preserve* philosophy out of respect for the tradition.” *Being and Truth, Sein und Wahrheit*. GA 36/37:266-267. Richard Polt’s translation. Notes for the Summer Semester 1933.

Heidegger’s methodology in reading of a philosopher, can be used as methodology on Heidegger’s own written texts. Heidegger says this about his way of reading of Kant (apply to all others), 1929, “Certainly, in order to write from what the words say, what it is they want to say, every interpretation [*Interpretation*] must necessarily use violence. Such *violence*, however, cannot be a roving arbitrariness. The power of an idea which shines forth must drive and guide the laying-out [*Auslegung*]. Only in the power of this idea can an interpretation risk what is always audacious, namely, entrusting itself to the concealed inner passion of a work in order to be able, through this, to place itself within the unsaid and force it into speech. That is one way, however, by which the guiding idea, in its power to illuminate, comes to light.” §35. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. GA 3:202. 1929. English translation page 141.

Heidegger gives us his view of the attacks on his interpretations. Two published reviews on Heidegger book *Kant and Problems of Metaphysics* (1929) were published in 1931 and 1932; and later we have Heidegger’s notes on them as well “On Odebrecht’s and Cassirer’s Critiques of the Kantbook (1931-1932)” published as the Appendix IV of GA 3. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Note the timeline, these lectures were held summer semester 1932 at the University of Freiburg. Heidegger remarks about his critics,

“It has now become fashionable to refute my interpretation of earlier philosophers by saying, “That is Heidegger, but not Hegel,” or “Heidegger, but not Kant,” etc. Certainly. *But does it follow ipso facto that the interpretation is false?* That cannot at all be decided “*ipso facto*,” especially not as long as one believes that there would be an interpretation true *in itself* and *binding on everyone at all times*. —The truth of one interpretation versus many others depends primarily on the level the interpretation occupies in its questioning and in its claim to understanding. If just any concepts and propositions are taken over from an arbitrarily adopted philosophical theory, namely, Heidegger’s, and the interpretation is measured up to these, then all my interpretations are in fact false. What is decisive, however, is not this but precisely the necessity and originality of the guiding questioning under which the interpretation stands.” *Beginning of western philosophy: interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides* (pages 80). *Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides)* (Summer Semester 1932). GA 35: 104-105. Endless kerfuffles about Heidegger interpretations.

A couple of lines later, Heidegger writes, “Up to now I have not felt myself seriously attacked, nor do I find myself actually defended by my so-called disciples. Needless to say, I do not believe my interpretations are flawless, nor am I unaware of the really weak portions of my endeavors.” GA 35:105-107.

Elsewhere, Heidegger remarks,

“All of this is trying to say, in brief: pay attention primarily not to the means and paths of our interpretation, but to what these means and paths will set before you.”

Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides) (Summer Semester 1932), GA 35:104-107. The “didactic poem” of Parmenides of Elea.” *Beginning of Western Philosophy Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides*, page 80-81.

Heidegger’s questions are not just rhetorical. Heidegger does not follow the longstanding tradition of establishing certain premises and drawing forth conclusions (the old sandbox pseudo approach to philosophy). Rather, Heidegger is following in the approach of questions and overlapping questions as the basic mode of philosophizing. He has been known to pillage the whole history of western metaphysics for developing a deeper understanding of a new beginning (Anfang) and his response to the “crisis.” Heidegger’s major point: “abandonment by Being” (Seinsverlassenheit) or the forgetting of Being” (Seinsvergessenheit). Is Heidegger’s assessment of the situation a doctrine? Answer: no.

Like Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s (1775-1854), Heidegger starts again over and over again. As Hegel has remarked that Penelope (Πηνελόπη, Pēnelópē) starts from the beginning every day for her weaving, which turns out is indeed a great metaphor for some of Heidegger’s writings (for example, GA 65 (section VIII. Das Seyn), GA 66, GA 77, and GA 71).

Heidegger could be talking about himself with regard to Schelling.

“When Schelling’s name is mentioned, people like to point out that this thinker constantly changed his standpoint, and one often designates this as a lack of character. But the truth is that there was seldom a thinker who struggled so passionately ever since his earliest periods for his one and unique standpoint. On the other hand, Hegel, the contemplative thinker, published his first great work when he was thirty-seven years old, and with its publication had gotten both his philosophy and standpoint straightened out. What followed was elaboration and application, although certainly in grand style and with a rich certainty.” *Schelling 's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, page 6. Joan Stambaugh’s translation.

What is the nature of philosophy?

Kant gives us ‘one’ answer in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

“Metaphysics, then, both of nature and of morals, primarily the critique of reason daring to take flight, which precedes in a **preliminary** (propaedeutic) manner, is actually the only thing that we can call philosophy in the real sense of the word.” (“Metaphysik also sowohl der Natur, als der Sitten, vornehmlich die Kritik der sich auf eigenen Flügeln wagenden Vernunft, welche vorübend (propädeutisch) vorhergeht, machen eigentlich allein dasjenige aus, was wir im ächten Verstande Philosophie nennen können”). Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), *Architectonic of Pure Reason. Critique of Pure Reason*. Published, 1781(A), 1787 (B). A850/B878. Immanuel Kant. AA III, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. AK 3:549.

With this quote you can see that Kant sees his own philosophy which ‘precedes’ the proper metaphysics of nature and morals, that needs, and this shows us in Kantian expression what is needed, Kant says famously, says a “metaphysics of metaphysics.” (AK 10:269, Letter #166, lines 32-33). Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz dated after 11 May 1781. The notion of ‘precedes’ is the basic Kantian concept of foundational philosophy. In a similar context Heidegger uses the

expression Step-Back (Schritt zurück); but Heidegger uses this to twist out of metaphysics. There is a similar, but with a much different intent between Kant and Heidegger. Heidegger after 1930 is an antifoundationalist, he is generally against foundations as way of doing philosophy (especially as noted in his previous transcendental approach in *Being and Time*, he is over that approach after 1930).

Heidegger gives us insights in to world-wide philosophy, but is this a series of statements or principal or a doctrine of Heidegger?

Heidegger in 1957 in the fourth lecture of the series on the Grundsätze des Denkens (Freiburg) discussed worldwide philosophy and the problem of interpretation before European contact. In the case, of the Lao-tse he is referring to the famous translation from Chinese to German by Richard Wilhelm (1873-1930) of the *Laotse Tao Te King* which Heidegger used (see *Vorläufiges I-IV*. (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970), GA 102:243).

Heidegger remarks,

"Thinking" - this is our occidental (western, abendländisches) thinking, determined by the *lógoç*, and attuned to it. This is by no means to say that the world of ancient India, China and Japan remained thoughtless. Rather, the reference to the *lógoç*-character of Western thinking contains the command to us that, should we dare to touch those foreign worlds, we should first ask ourselves whether we even have an ear for what is thought there and listen. This question becomes all the more burning as European thinking threatens to become planetary (planetarisch) in that today's Indians, Chinese and Japanese often only bring what they have experienced to us in our European way of thinking. From there and from here everything is stirred up into a gigantic mishmash (hodgepodge), in which it is no longer recognizable whether the ancient Indians were English empiricists and Lao-tse a Kantian."

("Das« Denken - dies ist unser abendländisches, vom, her *lógoç* bestimmtes und auf ihn abgestimmtes Denken. Dies heißt beileibe nicht, die Welt des alten Indien, China und Japan sei gedankenlos geblieben. Vielmehr enthält der Hinweis auf den *lógoç*-Charakter des abendländischen Denkens das Geheiß an uns, daß wir, falls wir es wagen sollten, an jene fremden Welten zu rühren, uns zuvor fragen, ob wir überhaupt das Ohr dafür haben, das dort Gedachte zu hören. Diese Frage wird um so brennender, als das europäische Denken auch darin planetarisch zu werden droht, daß die heutigen Inder, Chinesen und Japaner uns das von ihnen Erfahrene vielfach nur noch in unserer europäischen Denkweise zutragen. So wird von dort und von hier aus alles in einen riesigen Mischmasch umgerührt, worin nicht mehr zu erkennen ist, ob die alten Inder englische Empiristen waren und Laotse ein Kantianer"). "Grundsätze des Denkens." Freiburger Vorträge 1957, in *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge* (GA 79:145).

Is Heidegger a Eurocentric thinker?

Heidegger said in the *Der Spiegel* interview, "I am convinced that a change can only be prepared from the same place in the world where the modern technological world originated. It cannot come about by the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world." (23 September 1966; published May 31, 1976).

Answer: yes, and no. In general, yes, Heidegger is a Eurocentric thinker; and the vast major of his writings suggest that he is mostly concentrate (emphasis) on Greek and German philosophy. On the other hand, he had Japanese students and he reached out to the Asia world. Also, he had a student from Peru (Alberto de Reyna Wagner, 1915-2006) and the list goes on as well. After World War II, he had many visitors from around the world coming to Freiburg to meet with him and always to ask him “questions.”

“the greatest omission belongs to the fact that the possibility for an adequate discussion of East Asian languages is lacking” (GA3:251).

Heidegger on Questioning

A central core and essential single theme in Heidegger are the purpose of questioning.

Heidegger there are no permanent solutions or given 'answers' only on-going inquiries.

The methodology of Socrates (Σωκράτης (470–399 BC) is elenchus (ἔλεγχος) which is questions and answers and many time leading to a refutation. Sometimes this leads to no outcome and does not reach the goalposts. This leaves the characters in the dialogue (mostly written up by Plato) to aporetic (ἀπορία) state of being perplexed (examples in the *Euthyphro* (Εὐθύφρων) and *Laches*). As he says, "Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty, but as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another?" *Laches* 200e-201a. Socrates is questioned by Polus in Plato's *Gorgias* from 462b to 466e and then again from 470b to 474c; nevertheless, Polus does not get very far, and Socrates remains the primary questioner in most of the dialogues. The methodology of elenchus (ἔλεγχος) or zetesis (ζήτησις). A matter of questioning or debate, the stuff of controversy.

Accordingly, Heidegger speaks in one of his most famous speeches from 1929,

"First, every metaphysical question always encompasses the whole range of metaphysical problems. Each question is itself always the whole. Therefore, second, every metaphysical question can be asked only in such a way that the questioner as such is also there within the question, that is, is placed in question. From this we conclude that metaphysical inquiry must be posed as a whole and from the essential position of the existence [*Dasein*] those questions. We are questioning, here and now, for ourselves. Our existence - in the community of researchers, teachers, and students - is determined by science. What is happening to us, essentially, in the grounds of our existence, when science has become our passion?" *Wegmarken* (1919–1961). *Pathmarks*. "What Is Metaphysics?" GA 9. English page 82. Published by Heidegger in 1967.

A little earlier, let us again let Heidegger speak for himself (April 1925),

"Not a conceptual system but rather a vital questioning in search of the sense of history and so the sense of being human. *Questioning* is a questioning in the field of knowledge whose goal is the discovery and determination of actual reality.

In every question something is interrogated [*befragt*] from a definite point of view, so that what is interrogated is questioned *about* [*abgefragt*] something. Thus, the very raising of a question is in need of an original intuition of the object to be interrogated. Now where is the object, "history," to be found so that the sense of its being, its "*being* historical," can be read off from it? This sense of the question is what also constitutes the sense of a scientific crisis. A scientific crisis occurs when old concepts become unsettled at their core and phenomena come to light that prompt a revision of those concepts." Dilthey. *Supplements From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*. Kasseler Vorträge (1925). Page 124. Walter Bröcker's transcription. The

later publication is the “Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwartige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung” 16-21. April 1925). GA 80.1 *Vorträge*.

Heidegger clearly says, that “these lectures are proclaiming no eternal truths. I say this to obviate misunderstandings which could easily impede our collaboration. I am not capable of such a proclamation, nor is it my task. Rather, it is about asking questions, about practicing the right practice of asking the right questions. That seems to be little enough for those who insist on possessing answers. But the relationship between question and answer has its own special relationship in the field of philosophy. To use a metaphor, there is a mountain to climb.” [Slightly modified]. *Basic Questions of Philosophy Selected "Problems" of "Logic"* (GA 45). Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer. 1994, page 21.

(“Damit keine Mißverständnisse über diese Vorlesung sich festsetzen, die leicht die rechte Haltung der Mitarbeit verhindern könnten, sei kurz folgendes gesagt: Es werden hier keine ewigen Wahrheiten verkündet. Dazu bin ich weder imstande noch ermächtigt. Vielmehr handelt es sich um das Fragen, um die im wirklichen Vollzug zu erreichende Einübung des rechten Fragens. Das scheint wenig genug zu sein für den, der auf den Besitz von Antworten drängt. Aber mit dem Verhältnis von Frage und Antwort hat es im Bereich der Philosophie eine eigene Bewandnis. Es gilt, um im Bilde zu reden, einen Berg zu besteigen).” *Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte »Probleme« der »Logik«*. 1937. GA 45:22.

Around the same time, we read the remark, “Building on this mountain range” GA 65:58-59.

Heidegger said in 1935, “Philosophizing is asking questions about the Extra-ordinary”. Philosophieren ist Fragen nach dem Außer-ordentlichen.” *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Freiburg lecture course Summer Semester 1935. GA 40:15. This is an Egg of Columbus.

In Heidegger’s questioning shows us another example, *Die Frage nach der Technik* (1953). *The Question Concerning Technology*. Address given first at the Technische Hochschule München on November 18, 1953. At the very beginning Heidegger starts with this statement, “Questioning builds a way.” (GA 7:7).

Then at the end of the address, Heidegger says,

“But certainly, only if reflection on art, for its part, does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are *questioning*. Thus questioning, we bear witness to the crisis that in our sheer preoccupation with technology we do not yet experience the coming to presence of technology, that in our sheer aesthetic mindedness we no longer guard and preserve the coming to presence of art. Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious the essence of art becomes. The closer we come to danger, the more brightly the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. **For questioning is the piety of thought.**” (Je mehr wir uns der Gefahrnähern, um so heller beginnen die Wege ins Rettende zu leuchten, um so fragender werden wir. **Denn das Fragen ist die Frömmigkeit des Denkens**”). *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1953). GA 7:36.

The 1957 lecture vastly broadens Heidegger's claim beyond the philosophical realm to all "fields". He wrote, "Only in the air of such conjecture does questioning flourish, that essential questioning that belongs to the production of every solid work (Werkes), in whatever field."

("Erst in der Luft solchen Vermutens gedeiht das Fragen, jenes wesenhafte Fragen, das zur Hervorbringung jedes gediegenen Werkes, auf welchem Feld auch immer, gehört."). *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*. GA 79:83. Grundsätze des Denkens. Freiburger Vorträge (1957).

This is questioning as a Heidegger's methodology!

Side note. Consider the far-ranging book by Heidegger's close personal friend, Friedrich Georg Jünger (1898-1977), namely, *The Failure of Technology: Perfection Without Purpose (Die Perfektion der Technik)* (1946). This is on the destructive side of technology, and he is considering the essence of technology as well. Note the date of 1946. He is the younger brother of Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) and reportedly closer to Martin than Ernst.

Back to the trail.

Heidegger shows us the path; namely, building the way of questioning as the piety of thinking. Can we use the unphilosophical term and say, questioning is a virtue for thinkers and philosophers?

Zur Sache des Denkens. On the Matter for Thinking. "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," "My Way to Phenomenology." Dated: 1963. GA 14:99.

"But the path of questioning became longer than I suspected. It demanded many stops, and detours. What the first Freiburg and then the Marburg lectures attempted shows the **path** only indirectly." ("Aber der Weg des Fragens wurde länger, als ich vermutete. Er forderte viele Aufenthalte, Umwege und Abwege. Was die ersten Freiburger und dann die Marburger Vorlesungen versuchten, zeigt den **Weg** nur mittelbar."). Dated: 1963.

Zur Sache des Denkens. GA 14:99.

Note again the "Weg," namely, the path.

Heidegger uses the process of "questioning" which brings us forward.

"...but rather as a *questioning* leading toward and into a fundamental experience." ("...sondern als *fragende* Hinführung in eine Grunderfahrung"). *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1938/40). GA 69:13. *The History of Beyng* (1938-40).

Not relaxing but a "shout," Heidegger's remarks from the late 1930s,

"The questioning shouts of the thinkers are the echo of the impositions..."

("Die fragenden Zurufe der Denker sind der ungehörte Wderhall der Zumutungen...").

Überlegungen X, Section #4. GA 95:276. *Überlegungen VII-XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938-39)*. Or "way-making" (Be-wägung) (*Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950-1959). GA 12:249.

Martin's paths...Martin Heidegger's metaphor for his thought. One example, *Metaphors we live by*. The book's author (1980), George Lakoff (1941-). The clear signposts of Heidegger's titles which use the metaphor and image of a "way" are important as an indicator of how Heidegger

understood the purpose of his overall project (remember his synecdoche of the Being question). More discussion of his image of the "bridge" is in a later section of the book.

Can we say in general for Heidegger's so called "philosophy"? Some of the titles were created and done by Martin Heidegger and few of the titles were the work of his editors.

Gesamtausgabe:

Holzwege (GA 5), *Off the Beaten Track [Timber paths]; Wegmarken* (GA 9), *Pathmarks [Trailblazers]; Unterwegs zur Sprache* (GA 12), *Way to Language; Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (GA 16), *Speeches and Other Testimonies to a Course of Life; Die Stege des Anfangs* (GA 72), *The Bridges of the Beginning; Feldweg-Gespräche* (GA 77), *Country Path Conversations [field tracks]; Vier Hefte I - Der Feldweg. Vier Hefte II - Durch Ereignis zu Ding und Welt* (GA 99), *Four Notebooks I and II: The Country Path and Through Event to Thing and World*.

In the final seminar, September 8, 1973, in the Seminar in Zähringen, Germany. Heidegger is reported to have said, "In philosophy there are only ways (Wege); in the sciences, on the other hand only methods, that is, procedures." ("In der Philosophie gibt es nur Wege; dagegen in den Wissenschaften einzig Methoden, das heißt Verfahrensweisen."). *Seminare*. 1951-73. GA 15:399.

Other translation "modes of procedure (Verfahrensweisen)." William McNeill.

Heidegger in his early 80s (1973), says this, "Thinking still gives me pleasure. One must grow old to see a few things in this field. Looking back over the whole path, it becomes possible to see that the walk through the field of paths is guided by an invisible hand, and that essentially one adds little to it." Martin to Hannah #157. Freiburg, 19 Nov 73. *Letters, 1925-1975 / Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger*; translated from the German by Andrew Shields. The hand that has helped Heidegger along his path.

Some of the last writings by Heidegger. In February 1976, a few months before Martin Heidegger's death (26 May 1976), he wrote the Motto (Leitspruch) for his collective writing, "Ways - not works" (Wege — nicht Werke). *Frühe Schriften* (1912–1916), GA 1:437!

"From the notes [less than 1 page] left behind for the preface, two texts written down on separate sheets may be communicated, which explain the motto of his edition:

"The complete edition (GA) is to show in different ways: a way in the path field of the changing questioning of the ambiguous question of Being (Seinsfrage). The complete edition (GA) shall thereby guide to take up the question, to ask it and above all then to ask it in a more questioning way." GA 1:437. [Selected passage]. ("Die Gesamtausgabe soll auf verschiedene Weisen zeigen: ein Unterwegs im Wegfeld des sich wandelnden Fragens der mehrdeutigen Seinsfrage. Die Gesamtausgabe soll dadurch anleiten, die Frage aufzunehmen, mitzufragen und vor allem dann fragender zu fragen.") *Frühe Schriften* (1912–1916), GA 1:437.

More specifically, Heidegger had planned to write a lengthy introduction to his collected writings (Gesamtausgabe). He called his last project: Legacy of the Being Question (Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage). Martin died May 26, 1976, at age 86. (See editor's notes to the

short work, »Kehre? « »Sagen der Kehre«). Heidegger, M. (2007). "Kehre?" "Sagen der Kehre", Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft, Messkirch. Quote "The present text >"Kehre? 'Sagen der Kehre'< is taken from an extensive manuscript by Heidegger with the title "Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage". This manuscript was written in the first half of the seventies (presumably between 1973 and 1975) and represents the preparatory work of Heidegger's preparatory work for a large-scale introduction to the complete edition. Das Wegfeld des Denkens (DLA). The completion of this introduction was not completed for health reasons" (page 13).

Again, note the use of the word "weg" which is translated as "way" or "path."

"Every way of thinking is a way through the realm of errancy." (*Jeder Denkweg ist ein Weg durch die Irrnis* (III, 28).) *Auszüge zur Phänomenologie aus dem Manuskript "Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage."* Unveröffentlicht. *Jahresgabe der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft 2011/2012* (published more than 12 years ago).

Heidegger takes us further down the path of his thinking. Do not be hasty! There is a crisis but no big rush... yes, there is waiting to hear and to think.

Back in the year 1923, Heidegger lecture notes, "The readiness of questioning consists in a certain maturity of existence: not to fall into surrogates; also, it is not important to finish as quickly as possible, but to endure years in uncertainty, to mature out of it for the confrontation with things, to be free to deny oneself any premature answer." (*Die Bereitschaft des Fragens besteht in einer gewissen Reife der Existenz: nicht abfallen in Surrogate; auch kommt es nicht darauf an, möglichst schnell fertig zu werden, sondern auf Jahre in der Unsicherheit aushalten, aus ihr herausreifen für die Auseinandersetzung mit den Sachen, frei zu sein, sich jede vorzeitige Antwort zu versagen.*). *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* Wintersemester 1923/24. *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*. GA 17:3. No quick answers – "readiness of questioning." More evidence.

Next Heidegger gives us a great description of trails and paths.

"284. *The timber trail (Der Holzweg)*.

The trails and paths of the enduring are always timber trails, i.e., ones which lead some distance into the woods, into the forest, and suddenly end in the forest gloom. Otherwise, no one traverses them, and they are properly disparaged. Timber trails are "false," perverted paths, because on them there is no advancement, no getting anywhere. These trails are eerie. The enduring is always on a timber trail, and these trails are unknown to each other; they are disjointed, but only to the unique one is it determined to clear the timber so as to leave it undamaged in its emergence, and the many are determined to the concealedness that essentially occurs along such trails. Timber trails are then overgrown paths; they are forgotten, and yet on them was borne and transported the felled wood which, although its origin is forgotten and impossible to search out, somewhere allowed a fire to be kindled. The enduring of the difference (i.e., the thinking of the history of being) bears, on a timber trail, the burden of speaking." *Der Austrag des Unterschieds* (d. h. das seynsgeschichtliche Denken) trägt die Last des Sagens auf den Holzweg." X.

Directives to the event [257–258]. *Das Ereignis* (1943/42) GA 71:257-258. *The Event* (GA 71). Translated by Richard Rojcewicz (pages 221-222).

Another example, “a pathway of thinking (Gedankengang).” *Überlegungen VII–XI*. (GA 95:52).

Johann Hamann (1730-1788) who challenged his readers and produced a term for his philosophical way as “metacritique”. Hamann remarked “A writer who is in hurry to be to be understood today or tomorrow runs the danger of being misunderstood the day after tomorrow.” So, do not be in a rush or a hurry to answer your philosophical questions and ponder and we have to be careful on the timber trails (Der Holzweg).”

Otto Pöggeler (1928-2014) one of Heidegger’s close assistants says, “Is it sad if philosophers follow diverse paths, eventually being able at best to wave to one another across the intervening distance? Or is it sad when someone clings dogmatically to a philosopher, even a Kant, and so reduces to a minimum his own thinking? Perhaps it is the nature of philosophy that we all proceed from different places on the periphery, aiming at a common center, while still remaining bound by the prejudices of our time to our starting point on that periphery, in our thinking and in our politics. Rhetoric seeks to follow up such binding and development. Heidegger made remarkable contributions to this search but did not exhaust its tradition and its future possibilities.” “Heidegger’s Restricted Conception of Rhetoric” by Otto Pöggeler, *Heidegger and rhetoric* / edited by Daniel M. Gross and Ansgar Kemmann, 2005. Page 172. So do not be so “clinging” and there is a future for understanding the historical tradition in a new light.

The circle of questioning.

Hegel wrote an especially important passage at the end of the *Science of Logic*. This is the nucleus of Hegel and his method of creating his philosophical system. Hegel said, “By virtue of the nature of the **method** just indicated, the **Science** (Wissenschaft) exhibits itself as a **circle** returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground by mediation; this circle is moreover a **circle of circles**, for each individual member as ensouled by the **method** is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of the new member.” (*Science of Logic*, et page 842). This is connected with another remark at the end of the *Logic*, “The **method** itself by means of this moment expands itself into a **system**.” (*Science of Logic*, et. Page 838). With these two thoughts you should be able to see how Hegel conceptual created and then tied his system into an absolute system that had at its center the movement and yet, the complete totality of the world and God. Hegel’s metaphysical “notion” (concept, Begriff) as method is the *entelecheia* (Ἐντελέχεια, entelekheia) that is the internal movement of spiritual reality unfolding and expands itself into **the** system of philosophy. The “method” Hegel called the dialectical process, “What propels the concept onward is the already mentioned negative which it possesses in itself; it is this that constitutes the truly dialectical factor” (*Science of Logic. Werke*, 21.39). The question of process is an old question in philosophy (recent process philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). As seen in Plato, τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδέν. “things move and nothing remains still.” (Translation by Reeve, 1998). Plato’s *Cratylus* 401d.

The circle of circles has an interesting connection to Kant, when he said in the later part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, “Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in experience...and to find peace only in the completion of its **circle** in a self-subsisting systematic whole.” (“Die Vernunft wird durch einen Hang ihrer Natur getrieben, über den Erfahrungsgebrauch hinauszugehen, und nur allererst in der Vollendung ihres **Kreises**, in einem für sich Bestehenden systematischen Ganzen, Ruhe zu finden).” (Kant CPR, A798/B826, AK 3:518). Translation by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood.

Reason finds its peace in the circle, which is in the systematic whole of a complete and absolute metaphysical system. Kant wanted and knew that reason would lead to the science of a metaphysical system, but he did not make it up the mountain; but the direction is clear where Kant wanted to go and was headed toward a system. It took Hegel to put it all together as the completion of western metaphysics. The highest point of western philosophy is Hegel’s metaphysical system.

The circle of “reasoning” and “questioning” moves in circle everywhere.

Heidegger makes a note of this issue,

“What about the historical character of the question “What is a thing?”, was said, applies to every philosophical question, which we ask today and, in the future, provided, of course, that philosophy is a questioning that questions itself and therefore itself always and everywhere moved in circles.”

(“Was über den Geschichtscharakter der Frage »Was ist ein Ding? «gesagt wurde, gilt von jeder philosophierenden Frage, die wir heute und künftig stellen, gesetzt freilich, daß Philosophie ein Fragen ist, das sich selbst in Frage stellt und sich daher immer und überall im Kreis bewegt.)” *Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*. GA 41:48. *The question concerning the thing: on Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental principles*. Freiburg lecture course Winter Semester 1935-1936. Translation by James D. Reid and Benjamin D. Crowe.

Heidegger’s two senses of “questioning.”

1). “Questioning” in the sense of metaphysical-explanatory questioning that determines the “essence.” Condition of possibility. {Marginal remark in typescript}.” *Das Ereignis* (1943/42) GA 71:236-237. *The Event* (GA 71). Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. This is the first sense and kind of questioning. Maybe we can call this stage one or level one.

2). Heidegger delimits many different borders and issues in these six toros writings in the late 1930s and mid-1940s. Here is notable example of Heidegger’s sustain thought which points to the differences in “questioning” and lead us to the twisting (“Thinking in terms of the history of Being thinks, fügsam (compliant) into the twisting out of the pull of the joining into the pull of the beginning.” (“Das seynsgeschichtliche Denken denkt, fügsam in die Verwindung aus dem Zug der Fügung in den Fug des Anfangs,” *The Event*. GA 71:250) Free of metaphysics to a new unique and radical “questioning;” and Heidegger is leading the way and providing us a path toward the future. In Heidegger’s sense, toward a future that has a “history.” Do we have the

strength and the power to cross-over? By using the “Being-historical thinking” (seynsgeschichtliches Denken).

For instance, Heidegger outlines and delimits the kinds of “questioning.” Note these writings are not from a lecture series (period 1941-1942).

“Yet the overcoming of questioning is not a transition into questionlessness.

... In the strict sense, questioning exists only where the relation to being is already established and out of which, in its light, ἰδέα, there is an interrogation into beings, that which is, τί τὸ ὄν. Questioning exists only in metaphysics and, consequently, in “science.”

If questioning is taken in the strict sense (inquiry into what, why, how, whither, and whence of the look and composition of things, of their causes, production, representation, and objectification, and of their content), then inceptual thinking is not a questioning. The previous attempt to characterize this thinking of the truth of being, precisely as genuine questioning with respect to the question-worthiness of being, is insufficient and is a misunderstanding of the thinking of the *history of being*. The characterization of this thinking in terms of questioning and as questioning is unsuitable...

The unsuitability of questioning, however, is not an evasion into faith and a flight into non-thinking. On the contrary, the unsuitability of questioning must itself be endured in the enduring of the pain of the departure. *The enduring is essentially more steadfast in the abyss* than all questioning, which indeed rests on itself, does not attain being in its truth, and is not at all appropriated by being.

The enduring is also never poetry, because the enduring follows the twisting free into the beginning and never follows the presentation of beings as dwelling places and guesthouses of humans and gods.” *Das Ereignis* (1941/42) GA 71:237-238. *The Event* (GA 71). Translated by Richard Rojcewicz (pages 204-205).

Examples pointing us toward are need for the thinking the “future.”

“Future poetry stands outside of art, which is always metaphysical. Future thinking stands outside of philosophy, of which the same holds.” *Das Ereignis* (1943/42) GA 71:250-251. *The Event* (GA 71), page 216. Not to worry, “for metaphysics is the unavoidable episode between the first and the other beginning.” *Das Ereignis* (1943/42) GA 71:257-258. We are not just overturning but actually overcoming and then leaving metaphysics to itself --- at least, that is Heidegger’s plan. Heidegger notes, “This freedom of the question-worthiness of the Being (Seyns) in its twisting is the terror (shock, horror, Schrecken).” (“Diese Freiheit der Fragwürdigkeit des Seyns in seiner Verwindung ist der Schrecken”). *Das Ereignis* (1943/42). GA 71:280.

Heidegger was more about attempting a twisting (Verwindung) out metaphysics than with a simple overcoming (Überwinden (or Verwindung?)). We can abandon subjectivity, thoughts of eternity, and the whole metaphysical project (maybe). Twisting out of metaphysics first takes a step back (Schritt zurück). An inversion (eine Umkehrung) or the backward flip out of metaphysics not just a rückwärtsgerichtete Wendung but a Vorwärtsskipfung. Joan Stambaugh

suggested the best word is *Verwindung* or *Twisting Out*. One part of the other beginning (*Anfang*) is that it starts with non-willing. Nietzsche's *Will to Power* stuck in metaphysics. After the last stage of the "will to will" Heidegger is pointing us toward the future of the "non-willing." Heidegger wrote in 1944, "The Sage said: "What I really want . . . is non-willing [*Nicht-Wollen*]." *Feldweg-Gespräche*. GA 77: 51.

The whole post-Cartesianism (Descartes) metaphysic and anthropomorphism. This is leading us down the path of the other and new beginning (*der andere Anfang*).

Indeed, it is scary, but Heidegger is leading us toward the future. There may be history again. "Around the year 2300 at the earliest, there may again be history. Then Americanism will have exhausted itself, fed up with its own vacuousness." Frühestens um 2300 mag wieder Geschichte sein. Dann wird sich der Amerikanismus am Überdruß seiner Leere erschöpft haben. Überlegungen XIV. *Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*. *Ponderings XII–XV*. GA 96:225. Another list of jeremiads?

Notably, Heidegger had planned to write a lengthy introduction to his collected writings (*Gesamtausgabe*). He called his last project: *Legacy of the Being Question (Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage)*. The date of these writing is from 1973 to 1975; and it was not completed because of health reasons (Martin died May 26, 1976, at age 86). (See the editor's notes to »Kehre? « »Sagen der Kehre«). So far there are three documents that have been published as part of his project. The Heidegger's archive at DLA the general Accession number is HS.2006.0021.00003. There may be more parts to be published in the future.

1). Heidegger, M. (2011-12). "Auszüge zur Phänomenologie aus dem Manuskript "Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage", *Jahresgabe der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft*. 106 pages. Excerpts on phenomenology from the manuscript "Legacy of Being Question."

2). Heidegger, M. (2007). »Kehre? « »Sagen der Kehre«. *Jahresgabe der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft*. 13 pages. The "turning?" Saying the Turning.

3). Heidegger, M. (2018). *Das Wegfeld des Denkens*. *Jahresgabe der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft*. Editors Dietmar Koch, Klaus Neugebauer. The way field of thinking [or maybe The Wayfield of thought]. Zugangsnummer HS.2006.0021.00001. Zugangsnummer HS.2006.0021.00004.

3.1). See also. *Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage. Der Schritt zurück (Manuskripttitel) [It. Ordnerbeschriftung]*. Umfang, Beilagen 319 beschriftete Blatt in 4 Mappen Mappe 1: "Vom Geschick des Seins zur Befugnis des Brauches"; "Im Echo des Parmenides"; "Vom Geschick des Austrags her über die Ge-stellnis zum Brauch der Eignis hin aus dem Vorenthalt - der Befugnis."

Mappe 2: "Entwurf zu einer nicht vorgetragenen vom Eigentum her gedachten Besinnung [Ge-Viert]". HS.2006.0021.00002.

4). *Thought Poems: A Translation of Heidegger's Verse. Gedachtes*, GA 81. Boldly translated by Eoghan Walls.

“The third part, "Gedachtes für das Vermächtnis eines Denkens" ("Thought for the Legacy of Thought") is a collection of texts which Heidegger gave to his wife for her 80th birthday on July 3, 1973, and which was which was expanded in the years that followed. This collection of texts also belongs to those manuscripts, Elfride Heidegger added these to the Heidegger estate in the German Literature Archive after 1976.” Editor’s notes *Gedachtes*, GA 81:637.

Part Three THOUGHT POEMS FOR THE LEGACY OF A THINKING.

Some of the thought poems listed as, Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage (1. Fassung) GA 81:552
English translation pages. Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage (Zweite Fassung) GA 81:558.
Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage *Gedachtes*, GA 81:618. Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage Das Geringe.
Gedachtes. GA 81:622.

Attempting to catch Heidegger. Here Heidegger directly quotes Schelling,
"If you want to honor a philosopher, you must catch him where he has not yet gone forth to the consequences, in his fundamental thought; (in the thought) from which he takes his point in departure" (*Schelling's Collected Works WW*, Section 2, III, 60).

The “shepherd of being” (LH 252) is still looking for the flock of sheep. I think Nietzsche could help him – as Nietzsche was the epitome of an eagle.

In 1936, Heidegger wrote about *Being and Time* (1927), says.

“Making assumptions from assumed understandable.
What does it mean to understand the "prerequisites"? philosophy is "always" philosophy of *philosophy* - its *grasping as a starting point* is a creation that grasps itself out of the openness that has been achieved, that is, therefore puts it into the open and dares and jeopardizes itself as this creation. (Compare the procedure in the second beginning (Anfang).

Voraus-setzungen aus Vorausgesetzt begreiflich machen.
Was heißt, die »Voraussetzungen« begreifen? Philosophie ist
»immer« Philosophie der *Philosophie* - ihr *Begreifen als Ausgrif* ist ein Schaffen, das selbst aus dem errungenen Offenen sich selbst faßt, d. h. daher mit ins Offene stellt und sich selbst als dieses Schaffen wagt und aufs Spiel setzt. (Vgl. das Vorgehen im zweiten Anfang).” *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen. On His Own Publications* GA 82:128. Section: Laufende Anmerkungen (L.A.) zu »Sein und Zeit«<. Translation by Richard Polt.

Address of October 30, 1965, in Amriswil, on the occasion of a celebration for the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966), Heidegger gave a talk titled “*Das Ende des Denkens in der Gestalt der Philosophie*.”

“Questions upon questions, which a thinking of the kind that is philosophy cannot even ask, let alone answer. And this is so because such questions press upon thinking only if what remains unquestioned for philosophy, namely presence (Anwesenheit) as such, becomes worthy of questioning.” On the Question Concerning the Determination of the Matter for Thinking.” (“Fragen über Fragen, die ein Denken nach der Art der Philosophie nicht einmal fragen, geschweige denn beantworten kann. Denn solche Fragen bedrängen das Denken erst, wenn das, was

für die Philosophie das Fraglose bleibt, die Anwesenheit als solche, fragwürdig geworden ist”).
“Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens. GA 16:631.

Herbert Marcuse who was Heidegger’s assistant during the year 1928-1932. Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) wrote this about Heidegger in 1963.

“In recent decades, this philosophy, stripped of its political dimension, is without substance and cannot be taken seriously: endlessly repeating meaningless questions that endlessly remain unanswered—because they are not genuine questions.” Herbert Marcuse letter to Dr. Karel Kosik March 22, 1963. Here even Marcuse noted the endlessly repeated questions.

Sesquipedalianism – sometimes long words or just old German words that are re-worked by Heidegger with new meanings. Take common words with ordinary meanings and complete change them within a philosophical context (tropes, τρόπος, tropos).

In his so called “Thought Poems.” Heidegger wrote,

Legacy of the Being question (1st version)

Asking the questioner,
until the question,
not as close to the habit,
finds the answer -
but rather even as the question
is the answer:

Vermächtn is der Seinifrage (1. Fassung)

Fragender fragen,
bis die Frage,
nicht wie nah der Gewohnheit,
die Antwort findet -
sondern selbst als die Frage
die Antwort *ist*:

Gedachtes. GA 81:313.

Yes, but rather, the “question” **IS** the answer.

Stated differently, the question=answer=question-worthiness.

Now – toward the very, very end of Heidegger’s life we get this final message to us.

“Colloquium:

MODERN NATURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Greetings to the participants in the tenth colloquium May 14 - 16, 1976, in Chicago.

“Thinkers greet each other by asking each other questions. The question I am greeting you with is the only one I have been trying to ask more and more up to this hour. It is known under the title “the question of Being.” “die Seinsfrage.” Signed Martin Heidegger, Freiburg i. Br. am 11. April 1976.

One of the last things he wrote. Heidegger died in Freiburg on May 26, 1976. He was buried in Meßkirch, Germany. There is the questioning of Heidegger as his central concern.

One philosopher claim that “What Heidegger wants to do is renew metaphysics on a proper footing” this of course sounds a lot more Kant than Heidegger (if you read more of GA). Some try to claim that instead of having a doctrine Heidegger is trying to show us philosophy as a way of life. If questioning is a way of life that might explain some of what Heidegger is showing us as a pathway.

Heidegger on answers.

Heidegger wrote this at half strength (according to his letter to his brother Fritz Heidegger (1894–1980) and right at the end of World War II. The first dialogue is dated at the end as Meßkirch April 7, 1945.

“DER GELEHRTE (The Scholar):

τί τὸ ὄν: what are beings? [Was ist das Seiende?] What answer could be more essential than the answer to this question! Therefore, also the question of all questions is after all the way (Weg) to the answer of all answers.” *Αγγιβαση: A Triadic Conversation on a Country Path between a Scientist, A Scholar, a Guide. Feldweg-Gespräche. (1944-1945). GA 77:24.* Note unlike many other philosophical dialogues (like Plato), Heidegger does not give the participants actual names; but rather, gives very generic names (Scientist, A Scholar, a Guide). Why is that?

Was Heidegger really looking for the “the answer of all answers” (“Antwort aller Antworten”)? Answer: this is a deepity on Heidegger’s part. As far as I can determine this is the only place where Heidegger uses this expression. In general, according to this author (Ferrer), Heidegger is working on “questions” and not ‘answers’ nor the “answer to all answers.” For sure, it is rather that Heidegger is in the questioning business.

Therefore, there are no final dictums from Heidegger. Nor is there anything like a decree of Heidegger’s philosophy or even any kind of decrees (no *Horismos* (ὁρισμός)). In this section, we have caught the unfettered essence of Heidegger as a questioner. The unification of all of the major purposes of Heidegger’s thought – the “question” about Being. This chapter shows us the most important part of Heidegger’s thought over 60+ years of writing – namely, the questioning.

So, therefore, **quod erat demonstrandum** (ὅπερ εἶδει δεῖξαι). QED.
Heidegger as Interrogator.

The Crisis or Krisis in philosophy?

This is Heidegger of the mid-1930s as Germany was just starting to rebuild up for World War II. On 2 August 1934, Hindenburg died. Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed in June of 1935. In the USA, the Nye Committee (1934-1936) was investigating War profits, “Wall Street finance (notably J.P. Morgan) and the armaments industry (notably Du Pont)” and World War I”. Sources Wikipedia. The irredentism (restoration and claim of land and/or people) was still to come in full force later in the 1930s.

This was a kairological time for Heidegger and others. The Kairos (καιρός) time is ready for a radical new world or national order at the very least. It is time to get going. This is not the time to be faffing about, but to dive into the new age. Heidegger was already getting ready in 1919 after the end of World War I for a new way forward for his questioning approach and his turn toward phenomenology (at least as a new methodology for philosophy). Phenomenological seeing. This is not the time of the clock, but rather the time is right (ripe) for a “change.” The time for an opportunity. The study of Heidegger’s soteriology (salvation from ourselves)? Can Heidegger save us? Or only a God can save us from the crisis? Indeed, there was no shortage of worries about the crisis at hand. In this case, Heidegger was getting a glimmer of an “answer.” However, the “answer” was partially political and a problem in leadership. Marcuse in 1933 has seen a different “answer.”

Note when the opening bell starts when Marcuse started reading around 1932 when Marx’s *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts* (*Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844*) are published. Strong winds of Hegel were still blowing, but Marcuse felt the power of Marx and glimpsed the Marxist’s “answers”. The next 50 years in world history were on the side of Marcuse and Marx. In the 1930s, Heidegger stepped off the stage (perhaps he was the only one that thought he actually had a seat at the table). Well he had a seat at the table for a few months but quickly he was replaced.

This is Heidegger in 1941 – calling out the problems of the “planet”.

“Humanism or anthropologism are humanly last manifestations of Planetarism; in them the long-hidden essence of "history" and "technology" is expressed in the form of the devastation of the earth and in the form of the devastation of the globe.” (“Humanismus oder Anthropologismus sind menschentümlich letzte Erscheinungsformen des Planetarismus; in ihnen kommt die lang versteckte Wesensselbigkeit von »Historie« und »Technik« zum Austrag in der Form der Verwüstung des Erdballs”). *Über den Anfang*, (1941). GA 70:31. Not part of a lecture.

Defining where we stand.

‘The *Futural* is the *beginning of all occurrences* (*das Zukünftige ist der Anfang alles Geschehens*)’ *Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"* (Winter semester 1937/38). GA 45:36.

Heidegger notes the epoch or the whole age (written in 1939-1941) as “complete

meaninglessness”:

“Nietzsche’s thought of the eternal recurrence of the same expresses the essence of the will to power, and in this basic thought the beingness of beings consummates its history. The consummation of metaphysics through Nietzsche is the grounding of the last age of modernity: we name it the *age of complete meaninglessness*. This name thereby has a unique metaphysical and also transitional nominative power. Meaninglessness is here understood according to the concept of meaning worked out in *Being and Time*, viz., as the projective domain of projection and especially of the projection of being onto its truth, whereby truth is grasped as the clearing of self-concealing. Meaninglessness is truthlessness, i.e., the truthlessness of Being.” *Ponderings XII. Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*. GA 96:93–94. Note: the Marxist were working on the concept of alienation after the 1932 publication of the *Paris Manuscripts*.

Heidegger tell his students in the summer of 1935.

“This Europe, in its unholy blindness always on the point of cutting its own throat, lies today in the great pincers between Russia on the one side and America on the other. Russia and America, seen metaphysically, are both the same: the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless organization of the average man.” *Introduction to Metaphysics*. GA 40. Summer semester 1935. Page 29 in Richard Polt’s translation. Think of it later as the history of Berlin in April 1945 (that was the end of WWII).

To start with the later Heidegger on the current situation.

Heidegger letter in 1950, “This is the end for Germany, and for Europe in general. I do not believe America will come through.” 68. September 15, 1950. Letter to Hannah. *Letters, 1925-1975 / Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger*; translated from the German by Andrew Shields. Heidegger’s oldest son, Jörg Heidegger (1919–2019) had just come back recently from the Russian gulags in December of 1949.

Sounds scary.

Heidegger wrote about the “decay” here in the letter to Hannah 1974, “Except for a brief trip in May, we will be here the whole time and are looking forward to a visit from you *after* your lectures. Perhaps, when you are in Scotland, you can send us more exact dates for your stay *in this decaying Europe*.” Freiburg, 14 III 74. *Letters, 1925-1975 / Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger*; translated from the German by Andrew Shields. Heidegger also said, “Our Europe is disintegrating under the influence of a democracy that comes from below against the many above.” Letter to Petzet, page 222. I would call this dysphoric and all in time of epic disappointments for all of Germany. Contra the famous “Wirtschaftswunder.

Letter to Takehiko Kojirna (1963).

“As long as thinking does not set out on the path that has been pointed out to it with the step backwards, an error that is still circulating everywhere will continue to cause trouble. It consists in the demand that man must become the master of technology and must no longer remain its servant. But man will never become the master of what determines the nature of modern technology. Therefore, he cannot be its servant. The either/or of master and servant does not

enter into the realm of the facts that prevail here. If we have succeeded in bringing nuclear energy under control, does this mean that man has become the master of technology? Not at all. The compulsion to control testifies precisely to the power of control, expresses the recognition of this power, betrays the inability of human activity to overpower it, but at the same time contains the hint to submit to the still hidden secret of the power of control with reflection. Such reflection can no longer be accomplished by the Western-European philosophy of the past, but neither can it be accomplished without it, that is, without its newly acquired transmission being put on a suitable path. The modern world age, which unfolded in a few centuries and was prepared by two millennia, cannot be brought to light overnight or even by a merely human machination in such a way that a humanity of man rescued in its own right can find a dwelling place in it.”

Freiburg i.Br. den 18. August 1963 Martin Heidegger GA 11: 161.

Note this was after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 (which created the need for the Heidegger family to finally buy a radio).

Heidegger makes remarks, about “shocks” (Stöße) and trauma which brings us to the urgency or emergency (*die Not*) (see Richard Polt, *Time and Trauma: Thinking through Heidegger in the Thirties, Emergency of Being: On Heidegger's 'Contributions to Philosophy'*). Note the expression of Heidegger's, as “*the emergency of the lack of emergency*” (*die Not der Notlosigkeit*”). *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938). GA 65:11. This is the crisis and in Greek κρίσις (as the decision point). See also Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* written around 1936. The “painful existential contradiction” (*Crisis*, 17).

Unheimlichkeit as uncanny.

“The power of the *Unheimischen* appears so to overpower man, that he no longer stands a chance against it. How could we defend ourselves against the pressure [onslaught] of the *Unheimischen*?” (*Unheimi schen gegenüber zur Wehr setzen?*). *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges. Speeches and Other Testimonies to a Course of Life. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938). GA 16:575.

Unheimlichkeit as the translation of the Greek word “*deinós*” (δεινός) terrible, horrible, fearful. Or something like τρομερός (tromerós). (See also GA 40). “Unconcealment as uncanniness” (Die Unverborgenheit als Unheimlichkeit). *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Summer semester 1935). GA 40:174. It has its root in German and connecting to homelessness (Heimatlosigkeit). The uncanny and homeless are both connected to Nietzsche. We are “stuck” in it. Think of ἀλήθεια as “unconcealment” (Unverborgenheit). Again, the problem or play of Heidegger with the whole conceptualization of polysemy.

Heidegger was aware of the older tradition of the Jena Romantics (Jenaer Romantik) or the Early Romantics (Frühromantik). Heidegger quotes Novalis (1772-1801) in the winter of 1929 about the nature of philosophy and homesickness. “The philosophy is actually homesickness, a drive to be at home everywhere” “Die Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh, ein Trieb überall zu Hau se zu sein” Novalis, fragments #21. *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*. GA 29/30: 7. Freiburg lecture course Winter Semesters 1929-30. The quote is from Novalis, *Schriften*. Hg. J. Minor. Jena 1923. Bd.2, page 179, Fragment 21.

Heidegger's later remarks on homelessness, "The past expectation, admittedly already in doubt, that the homeliness of the homeland [*das Heimatliche der Heimat*] could still be immediately saved – this expectation we may no longer cherish. The expression that I wrote in 1946 to a French friend speaks more precisely to this point: "Homelessness is the fate of the world" (*Über den Humanismus*, Frankfurt a.M., first edition, 1949, page 27). Modern people are settling himself into this homelessness." An Address in Celebration, September 26, 1969. Translation by Richard Capobianco. Contra. Note: Buddhist monks define themselves as being homeless. The primacy of the Buddha's teachings.

Heidegger was becoming clear about Nietzsche in 1929; and then we get a whole series of Nietzsche lectures through in the 1930s (GA 43, 44, 47, 48, 87, and 88).

Example of what was behind Nietzsche's lectures.

"It has been clear to me for some time that the contemporary world has not yet understood Nietzsche."

Heidegger's Letter to Karl Löwith, XI.17 1929.

Note: Heidegger and Löwith both saw the profound influence of Nietzsche (contra Gadamer who was on the side of W. Dilthey).

Note the date 1929, Heidegger first Nietzsche lecture course was *Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst* (Winter semester 1936/37. GA 43. Heidegger never lectured directly on W. Dilthey, but we have plenty of extensive Nietzsche lectures.

Nietzsche wrote in 1886 (136 years ago),

"The tragic era for Europe: due to the *struggle* with nihilism."

(Das tragische Zeitalter für Europa: bedingt durch den *Kampf* mit dem Nihilismus). *KGWB/NF*-1886, 7 [31].

And again, from Nietzsche, "Nihilism stands in front of the door: where does this most uncanny (unheimlichste, sinister, weirdest, spooky) of all our guests come from? - [Der Nihilismus steht vor der Thür: woher kommt uns dieser unheimlichste aller Gäste? —]. *KGWB/NF*-1885, 2 [127]. Autumn 1885-Autumn 1886.

Heidegger wrote (1947): "The essence of the homeland, however, is also mentioned with the intention of thinking the homelessness of contemporary man from the essence of Being's history. Nietzsche was the last to experience this homelessness. From within metaphysics, he was unable to find any other way out than a reversal of metaphysics. But that is the height of futility."

"Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings*, page 241.

The philosophical project or enterprise is always in "crisis." When there is no settled or agreed definition of how to do philosophy, then there is even more of crisis and the need for a revolution to fix it. For example. "I think I have summarized my position on philosophy by saying: Philosophy is actually only allowed to write poetry. (Ich glaube meine Stellung zur Philosophie dadurch zusammengefasst zu haben, indem ich sagte: Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten)." The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Given his role as the erstwhile founder of mid-20th-century analytic philosophy one can see the issues of "how" to do

philosophy is an on-going question mark. [Note Wittgenstein killed soldiers during WW I as an artillery observer at the Eastern Front]. Wittgenstein remarked in the preface to *Philosophical Investigations* (circa 1945),

“The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. -- And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation.” (“Daß das Beste, was ich schreiben konnte, immer nurphilosophische Bemerkungen bleiben würden; daß meine Gedanken bald erlahmten, wenn ich versuchte, sie, gegen ihre natürliche Neigung, in einer Richtung weiterzuzwingen”). Second paragraph of the preface.

See it is the complete loss of a “method” for philosophy. René Descartes (1596-1650) wrote the famous, *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, or *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* (1621). Number IV. “There is need of a method for finding out the truth.” This was core part of the tradition of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel – they all were in search of a proper method of the “truth.” After Nietzsche, the “truth” is a question mark (“questioned”). Unless it is for the eagles to use against the sheep.

Kant only found ruins of the former metaphysical systems. Kant wrote in 1793, “Thus, philosophy has gone through three stages in regard to metaphysics. The first was the stage of dogmatism, the second skepticism, and third the criticism of pure reason.” (*What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?* et. page 61). Kant must give us the third stage as all other previous systems lay in ruins. Kant uses the metaphor “ruins.” After 231 years – then where are we? Still in ruins?

Heidegger letter to his wife, 28 June 1955.

“Hegel along since Leibniz has systematically discussed the principle [nothing is without a sufficient reason] in his greater ‘*Logic*’ – in one of the most difficult texts in philosophy.” Here Heidegger names the *Science of Logic* as the height of metaphysics. This is easy to read, but very difficult to think through ideas and leads to the central core of Hegel’s overall system of philosophy. Hegel has “results” and he had “answers” that includes the entire western tradition of metaphysics. Note the word “Science” or “Wissenschaft” in German does not mean the natural science as we hear the word in English today; but rather, a very broad philosophy as a science or Wissenschaft. Heidegger announces that, “From the Greeks to Nietzsche, the *guiding question* determines the same mode of asking about “Being.” The clearest and greatest example attesting to this unity of the tradition is Hegel’s *Logic*.” *Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65: 76-77.

G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), already in 1812, complains about the negative impact of Kant on philosophy and Hegel’s version of metaphysics. Hegel in the preface to his *Science of Logic* says the following about Kant, “The exoteric teaching of the Kantian philosophy — that the understanding ought not to go beyond experience, else the cognitive faculty will become a theoretical reason which itself generates nothing but fantasies of the brain — this was a justification from a philosophical quarter for the renunciation of speculative thought.” (Paragraph §3, dated: March 22, 1812, Nürnberg).

Hegel was reacting to renunciation of the speculative thinking by Kant, but Hegel would supply his own speculative thought to get us out of this great crisis. Hegel was responding to his own version of the crisis in philosophy by providing us with a philosophy – metaphysical system (this notable example given to us by the power of Hegel’s thinking).

Compare to the later Heidegger’s version of *Gelassenheit*. Heidegger actually used the expression “*Gelassenheit*” from 1919 to 1976; but there were changes in Heidegger’s meaning, and more importantly the emphasis and prominence that he was to place on the whole notion of “*Gelassenheit*”. Some philosophers are just publicizing the nature of the emergency, urgency, exigency, pressure, and the demand to do “something.” You are stuck inside the bottle. Namely, to allow them to tell you the “truth” and how to get you out of the predicament. I give you the “problem” and if you are lucky and you figure out my philosophy, it will get you out of the “hole” you are deep in – that is, up to your neck in the deep end of the pool. Putting you inside the Klein bottle and hence not giving you a way out of the bottle. Ok... maybe just leave you in the Klein bottle for a while. Constrains by assumptions. Philosophical “answers” as a Möbius strip. Heidegger sometimes puts us in a box. A separate discussion is needed to see how Heidegger constructs traps and a box for us to try to get in and out of the box. Some may feel like being inside/outside of a Klein bottle. In the mathematical sense there is not inside nor is there an outside to a Klein bottle, there is **only one side**. Albert Camus’ (1913-1960) book the *Myth of Sisyphus* (*Le Mythe de Sisyphe*) is lifelike on a Möbius strip? A Möbius strip like a Klein bottle has only one side. Will Heidegger’s example of meditative thinking’ (*das besinnliche Nachdenken*) help us with this riddle? Not likely. The only answer to the Trefoil Knot is to cut it since it cannot be untied. See M. C. Escher’s (1898-1972) knots.

In summary, Martin Heidegger’s case is like a door, which has a sign overhead that says, “no entrance” on one side and on the other side says, “no exit.” Perhaps Heidegger’s fundamental philosophical thinking has an entrance, but we have problem that it has no easy exit or maybe no exit at all. If there is no door and no entrance, then where do we start with Heidegger’s thinking? First place is to realize that there is “no Heidegger philosophy.” Is Heidegger’s thinking, questioning, and his writings are something that is “unfinished and unfinishable”?

On the other hand, we have Hegel’s famous statement in the preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), “True thoughts and scientific insight can only be won by the *labor of the concept*”. (“Wahre Gedanken und wissenschaftliche Einsicht ist nur in der *Arbeit des Begriffs* zu gewinnen).”

Heidegger wrote, “This philosophy of German Idealism, intellectual intuition, is no figment of the imagination, but the real labor of the Spirit on itself. It is no coincidence that “labor” is favorite word of Hegel’s.” *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*. Translation by Joan Stambaugh, page 47.

Hegel laying out the self-movement of the “concepts” (*Begriffs*). Perhaps Nietzsche’s Will to Power is related to the concept of the Latin **entelecheia**, from Ancient Greek ἐντελέχεια (*entelékheia*) (Aristotle, Leibniz, and Hegel are in this line of the tradition). This metaphysics is almost directly opposite of Heidegger’s thinking and creating a “system” that gives us a described the world, that is, namely – a metaphysical system. Heidegger says for example in the

introduction as a kind of a poem at the beginning of the text, he says, “We know no goals... We know no goals and are only a going” (“6a. Wir kennen nicht Ziele . . . Wir kennen nicht Ziele und sind nur ein Gang”). *Mindfulness. Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:9. Translation note. Der Gang derives from gehen (to go, to walk, to run).

But somehow, he ended up with the simple Four-Fold (Das Geviert). Nothing very profound in this concept. What would Hegel and Schelling think of this simple approach? Note: it appears Heidegger was in discussions about the Four-Fold with E. Fink.

Heidegger layout Aristotle’s four causes:

“(1) the *causa materialis*, the material, the matter out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; (2) the *causa formalis*, the form, the shape into which the material enters; (3) the *causa finalis*, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in relation to which the chalice required is determined as to its form and matter; and (4) the *causa efficiens*, which brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, and which is, in this instance, the silversmith” (*Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1953). GA 7:9). Shade of themes like categorematic and syncategorematic. Where does Heidegger’s simple Four-Fold (Das Geviert) stand within this intellectual tradition? See the early Heidegger on Aristotle.

In November 1963, Heidegger in discussions as reported before the actual on camera interview with the Buddhist monk from Thailand (Bhikku Maha Mani), Heidegger, “states that he has no system and “to be on the way”. H. W. Petzet, *Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger*, trans. P. Emad (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), page 176. Broadcast on March 16, 1965. Again, on Heidegger’s birthday September 26, 1969 (shortened). GA 16:589–593. Noted from afterwards in *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–1976). GA 16:813.

Heidegger remarks in his Schelling lecture “And this is a way, not “the” way, which never exists in philosophy. (Und zwar ein Weg, nicht »der« Weg, den es in der Philosophie nie gibt). 42. *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809). Summer semester 1936) GA 42:111. Therefore, in other words there is no “the” way in Heidegger and furthermore, for Heidegger there is no “the” way in philosophy as such or philosophy in general. Heidegger thinks there are “many” ways to do philosophy.

Mao Zedong (1893-1976, Mao Tse Tung) said in 1957, "The policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is designed to promote the flourishing of the arts and the progress of science." Hundred Flowers Movement (Chinese: 百花齐放). Heidegger thinks the same about philosophical “ways.” There are multitudes within Heidegger’s thinking – not just “the” one way.

Heidegger says, “Future thinking is a thinking that is *underway*.” *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938) GA 65, first page). In his next philosophical writing, Heidegger wrote about *Beiträge zur Philosophie* “But even here *that* form has not yet been attained, which precisely at this point, I demand for a publication as a “work” *Mindfulness*, GA 66 *Besinnung* (1938/39), et, page 377.

The philosophical project or enterprise is always in “crisis.” The ground underneath philosophy is never solid. Philosophers are at their best addressing the “crisis” in philosophy. Resolve not to take the uncomplicated way out of the dilemmas. Socrates as the purest thinker in the Western tradition never took “simple solution.” Obviously, some metaphysicians have tried to give the “answers.” The best and the most impressive case in the western tradition *is of course* – Hegel! A more recent example would be *Process and Reality* (1929) by Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947); or in the German tradition and a colleague of Heidegger would be Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950). He summarized his ontology in his book, *Neue Wege der Ontologie (New Ways of Ontology)* 1942.

Heidegger’s judgement (published during Heidegger’s lifetime), “In spite of the superficial talk about the breakdown of Hegelian philosophy, one thing remains true: Only this philosophy determined reality in the nineteenth century, although not in the external form of a doctrine followed, but rather as metaphysics, as the dominance of beingness in the sense of certainty. The countermovements to this metaphysics belong *to* it. Ever since Hegel's death (1831), everything is merely a countermovement, not only in Germany, but also in Europe. GA 7. *Vorträge und Aufsätze, “Überwindung der Metaphysik”* (1936–1946). Including Heidegger himself, he would be counted as a “countermovement” to Hegel. Therefore, it means a countermovement to metaphysics in general. Including Marx’s historical materialism.

Heidegger in his engagement with Hegel says, “any future, *still* higher standpoint over against it, which would be superordinate to Hegel’s system...is once. and for all impossible” (1938-1942. *Hegel*. GA 68:3–4). Heidegger’s task of overturning metaphysics will require a “historical confrontation” with Hegel’s system (*Sein und Wahrheit*. 1934. GA 36/37:13–14).

What is the overview of Hegel’s System of Science – System of Philosophy?

From the first Preface (1812) to Hegel’s *Science of Logic*.

“*Phenomenology of Spirit* as the ladder up to the *System of Science*. This second part would have contained the Logic and both the two real sciences of philosophy, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit, and would have brought the system of science to completion.” Partial paraphrase of one version of the overall outline of the Hegelian system. Next,

“Logic contains the Doctrine of Being, as Book One; Book Two, the second section of the same volume which contains the Doctrine of Essence is already in the presses; finally, the second volume will contain the Subjective Logic, or the Doctrine of the Concept.” Nürnberg March 22, 1812.

Now with the big overview of the Hegelian system comes in three parts: logic, nature, and spirit; or to use Descartes’ ontology, **substantia infinita** (creator or deus), **res extensa**, and **res cogitans**. Hegel says in this section, "Through this movement the pure thoughts become Concepts and come to be what they are in truth: self-movements, circles, that which is their substance, spiritual entities." This movement furthermore is "the nature of the scientific method in general". These ideas point to more than the *Phenomenology of Spirit* this rather leads to the *Science of Logic* as the pure thoughts as Concepts moving in circles. It is also in the *Science of Logic* that Hegel thinks through the dialectics and the methodology for logic and his

metaphysical system. The circles within pure thought (Concepts) move dialectically with negativity pushing the moments or stages of system as it expands itself. (See also paragraph 17 in the Preface), it says: "With this section the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is concluded. Spirit prepared itself in the element of absolute knowing (goal), but it is time to move on to the "true in the form of the true", namely, true infinite free Concepts (i.e., *Logic*)."

Hegel's general System of Science (system of philosophy) can also be laid out like this:

Science of Logic (ontologia, creator) mind of God before creation
Philosophy of Nature (cosmologia rationalis)
Philosophy Subjective and Objective Spirit (psychologia rationalis)
Philosophy of Absolute Spirit (theologia rationalis).

So, you can see these questions of God and theology in Hegel's system. Hegel wrote, "Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. *This realm is truth unveiled, truth as it is in and for itself.* It can therefore be said that this content is *the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit.*" *Science of Logic*, 21:34. The image is simple, Hegel's *Logic* is the mind of God before the world was created.

Hegel wrote at the end of the *Science of Logic*, "Philosophy has the same content and the same end as art and religion; but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute Idea, because its mode is the highest mode, the Notion." (*Science of Logic*, 12.236, et, page 735). Hegel's expression 'Begriff' translated as 'concept' and Miller translation here at as 'notion' is very dense and has a lot of pack into the way Hegel uses the expression for his philosophy. The 'Begriff' has the self-movement of the dialectic (Dialektik) built or baked into it. A crude example is that the seed becomes the tree because of the 'Begriff' within the seed. Karl Marx applied this to social groups and history. This is about Marx analysis of history and his methodology, and not necessarily about his future utopia of communism. Marx on Entfremdung and Entäusserung (alienation).

But Heidegger knew his most important and primary opponent was already determined in years before 1915 (107 years ago), when Heidegger wrote the last paragraph of his Habilitation. Dissertation: "The Doctrine of Categories and Signification in Duns Scotus" *Die Kategorien - und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*. Heidegger spells it out for us in details,

"The philosophy of living spirit, of active love, of reverent intimacy with God, the most general directions of which we were only able to indicate roughly, and especially a theory of categories guided by the basic tendencies of this philosophy, stand before the great task of a fundamental critical discussion (Auseinandersetzung) of that system of historical worldview that is the most powerful one regarding fullness as well as depth, wealth of experience and concept-formation and as such lifted up into itself all of the fundamental motives previously at work in philosophical problems—that is, a critical discussion of *Hegel*". Translation by Roderick M. Stewart and John van Buren. *Frühe Schriften* (1912–1916) GA 1:410-411.

“Die Philosophie des lebendigen Geistes der tatvollen Liebe der verehrenden Gottinnigkeit deren allgemeinste Richtpunkte nur angedeutet werden konnten, insonderheit eine von ihren Grundtendenzen geleitete Kategorienlehre steht vor der grossen Aufgabe einer prinzipiellen Auseinandersetzung mit dem an Fülle wie Tiefe, Erlebnisreichtum und Begriffsbildung gewaltigsten System einer historischen Weltanschauung, als welches es alle vorausgegangenen fundamentalen philosophischen Problemotive in sich aufgehoben hat mit *Hegel*.”
Frühe Schriften (1912–1916) GA 1:410-411. *Die Kategorien - und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*.

Another example from the later Heidegger.

“*Logic*...Hegel's thinking in its highest and widest power and breadth and strength.” (Denken Hegels in seiner höchsten und weitesten Kraft und Weite und Stärke). *Seminare: Hegel – Schelling*. Aus: Gespräch von der Sache des Denkens [1956/57]. 21. Ein Seminar. GA 86:498. Was Heidegger thinking in Greek the expression “apotheosis” (ἀποθέωσις, apothéōsis) as the highest point in metaphysics’ development?

What is the latest in Heideggerians’ fads and paradigm shifts? Heideggerian eco-phenomenologists? Will the real Martin Heidegger stand up – please? Perhaps just coquetry from the Heideggerians. Donatella di Cesare, Günter Figal versus Hans-Helmuth Gander on Heidegger’s life ways. Paradoxically, like all philosophers and thinkers, this is a much harder task than a simple philological enterprise. What is the philosophical methodology here? This is an extraordinarily complex question with regard to Heidegger. One point of interest is a remark he made about Kant, “Getting Kant right is to be left to Kant philology “. (*Kant and the problem of metaphysics*, some notes added are called “APPENDIX I” from 1945). We take that to mean that getting Kant “right” is not philosophy as Heidegger understands it. What is the philosophical task for thinking? Heidegger’s philosophy is only known to Heidegger – the rest of us are just guessing? Getting Heidegger “right” and having a correct understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy is not philosophy; but rather, it is Heideggerian philology. What would Heidegger tell us – again, please?

In Plato’s *Cratylus* (Κρατύλος, Kratylus) the stars of the dialogue, namely, Hermogenes (brother of Callias), Socrates, and Cratylus all engage in the philology linguistic inventiveness, but it is not philosophy. Did Heidegger understand the jokes in the *Cratylus*, or does he take this as a way of his own version of philology (where else he attacks philology). Heidegger notes that, “On Tuesday; unfortunately; I have Graeca.” One of his paramour letters to Hannah 17 VII [1925].

Who was there studying Greek language and Greek philosophers with Heidegger? What are the hidden (absconditus) sources of Heidegger transformation of the Greek philosophical language? More philological resources are being studied for their clues to Heidegger’s background in Greek and to a less degree his background in German language which is more obvious.

Gerhard Kruger (1902–1972) during his student years at Marburg, “Kruger was a regular visitor in Rudolf Bultmann’s (1884-1976) theology seminars and participant in the” Graeca” evenings at Bultmann’s home”. Bultmann’s apartment every Thursday evening. Paul Jacobsthal (1880-1957) and Paul Friedländer (1888-1968, Los Angeles), the two Graecum or Graeca colleagues were

Jewish. Nichol Hartmann. Some of have named additional later scholars, Erich Dinkler (1909-1981), Heinrich Schlier (1900-1978), Günther Bornkamm (1905-1990). Also, a member of the group was Hans von Soden (1881-1945), he was chair for church history and the New Testament; and then later in 1927/1928 he was elected Rector of the Philipps Marburg University. Hans-Georg Gadamer's (1900-2002) was a member of this group for 15 years. Note. Gadamer's father Johannes Gadamer (1867-1928), was elected Rector of the Philipps Marburg University as well. Other reports, on Saturdays, Heidegger and Bultmann met regularly on Saturdays to read the Gospel of John together.

There was another famous Graeca group in Berlin that had a long history of famous German Greek scholars. During the 1920s, Heidegger would spend time with these philologist and scholars in the Graeca group (number one rule was that Heidegger did not go first in his translation of Greek to German); and in the early 1950s there was report of another Graeca group in Freiburg that Heidegger would go to for discussions of Greek interpretations. Biweekly meeting of a Graeca group was proposed by Eugen Fink and Max Müller in 1948, and also included Erik Wolf (jurist) Karl Büchner and Hermann Gundert (classical philologists), Johannes Lohmann (linguist), Herbert Nesselhauf (historian) and Hans-Herwig Schuchhardt (archaeologist). The group met every two weeks at one of their homes. The group ended around 1960. Heidegger was often countered by Karl Büchner and Hermann Gundert in his Greek interpretations; and in later stages Heidegger was just listening and no longer giving interpretation of the Greek. Examples of some of the texts that were studied are Homer, *Seventh Letter of Plato*, and *Peloponnesian War* by Thucydides. The Greek educational model was likely discussed, namely, the paideia (παιδεία, paideia). For some reasons, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and Heidegger were all interested in the reform of the German educational system.

Back on the trail.

He told the French intellectuals in 1955, that he had forgotten the little Hebrew he knew in his youth. Heidegger never got to Sanskrit grammar like the *Ashtadyayi* or the *Mahabhashya*. Heidegger did ask Medard Boss to find out about a few German expressions in Sanskrit. Boss sent a letter to his friend in India, Erna M. Hoch (1919-2003) who in 1960 contacted Kanti Chandra Pandey (Kashmiri Shaivism) of Lucknow University. This is like asking Heidegger about Greek words. There are many other interpretations of Sanskrit terminology about the Indian schools of philosophy (Darshan Shâstra). Example, the famous word "Karma" has different meaning in the different schools of Indian philosophy and religions.

Do we need to downshift our expectations of knowing Heidegger's philosophical program? Are we doing philosophy or philology? Heidegger leaves us traces (Spuren) and hints through his writing and lectures. Philosophers should never follow along like slaves (**o homines ad servitatem paratos**, O men so ready to be slaves). We should have our "own" questions.

Kant said something and this needs to be read and re-read, and then re-read again; since this sounds like the great critical thinker that is in fact – Kant (not what the current readings of Kant would have us believe). Kant is reported to have said the following in his lectures on logic. Note this was published late in Kant's lifetime by his friend, Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, he wrote the preface on 20 September 1800. This book was authorized by Kant, but not prepared or previewed by Kant.

So, this was the book states,

“How should it be possible to learn philosophy anyway? Every philosophical thinker builds his own work, so to speak, on someone else's ruins, but no work has ever come to be that was to be lasting in all its parts. Hence, one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is not yet given. But even granted that there is a philosophy actually at hand, no one who learned it would be able to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively his cognitions of it would always be only historical.” (*Lectures on Logic*, “The Jäsche Logic.” *Immanuel Kants Logik, ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen* first published in 1800, et. page 538). Translations by J. Michael Young. Hint: “only historical” this means just for the “record.” Kant is pointing us forward to genuine philosophical thinking.

This needs to be unpacked, but packing it also makes it clearer. Heidegger said during a lecture course on Aristotle that the students should read Aristotle for 15 years before reading Nietzsche. In a discard draft by Nietzsche written for the section on “Why I Write Such Good Books” in his autobiography, *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is* (1888), Nietzsche said, “Usually, one must *condense*, or upset one’s digestion; I have to be diluted, liquefied, mixed with water, else one upsets one’s digestion”. With Heidegger, we also need to take the long drink of water and rethink everything (start from scratch); only by this way do we watch where Heidegger is guiding us. Remember this is still a preparatory exercise and all future thinking is *underway*. But we need to engage Heidegger to follow Heidegger’s own admonishment for thinking. Although we must be careful here, since Heidegger wrote in a letter to Medard Boss (1903-1990), dated February 21, 1971, Heidegger said, "I would like to dissuade you from the literature **on** Heidegger." (*Zollikon Seminars*, et. p. 290). Should we say that Heidegger is a case of piquant?

In the end, Heidegger, Germany, and the entire world was in *Krisis* from the 1918 until the late 1940s. Most of this was the two world wars, but there was an economic crisis as well. Depressions and periods of exceedingly high currency inflation. At the end of the World War II, there was new world order in place as the USA replaced the United Kingdom as the leader of the “free” world. Germany, Japan, Europa, China, Russia, Italy, Greece, Poland, were all re-building. Heidegger was aware of the atomic bomb and threat to the planet; and finally, he bought a radio after the Cuban missile crisis (1962). Heidegger’s emphasis on the *Krisis* shifted during this period. Did Heidegger have a solution to this crisis?

Consideration of the κρίσις (as the decision point) and “right” time in history (Καίριος or χρόνος). The right time in history provides for the opportunity to move forward out of the crisis. This decision point came to Heidegger at the right time. It was a time of epic disappointments.

From 1929 lecture in the context of Hegel, Heidegger says, “Every philosophy is only what it is when it is the philosophy of its time, i.e., not when it does the right thing for its contemporaries. Philosophy must be the philosophy of ‘it’s time’, that is, it must be such that the time is *right for it*. “*Der Deutsche Idealismus: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel*. GA 28:251-252.

One the core themes of Heidegger is his responding to the “*Krisis*.”

As Heidegger quoted *Patmos* (Hölderlin), “Die Gipfel der Zeit.” (“peaks of times”). *Hölderlins Hymnen »Germanien« und »Der Rhein«* GA 39: 52.

Does Heidegger have a philosophy?

In the Section, “Philosophy in Mindfulness of Itself” Heidegger writes about Philosophy, “Its goal is neither to communicate some knowledge, nor the *establishment of a doctrine*.” (“Ihr Ziel liegt nicht in der Mitteilung einer Erkenntnis, auch nicht in der *Aufstellung einer Lehre*”).

Besinnung (1938/39). *Mindfulness* page 41 Section 14. GA 66:50. This is a doctrineless approach. Can we create the word “doctrinelessnessing”? The abstract noun of being without a doctrine turned into a verb. The process and the state of being doctrinelessness.

From Heidegger’s early black notebook (Schwarze Hefte), we find this remark:

“179. Heideggerian philosophy”—to the extent that such exists at all—is always only *represented* by other ones, i.e., embedded as a standpoint and assembled into a nullity. (179 »Heideggersche Philosophie« - wird, sofern es das gibt, immer nur von den Anderen *vertreten*, d. h. als Standpunkt festgetreten und ins Nichtigte zusammengetreten.) Überlegungen und Winke III. *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*. GA 94:184.

The more famous public quote of Heidegger on the Heideggerian philosophy is a report from end of October 1955 at Colloque at Cerisy, France. The context is in front a number (50 in attendee) of French philosophers, poets, and intellectuals. Heidegger’s famous remarks, “As a response to those who wished to study the theses of Heideggerian philosophy, he stated (a statement thereafter often quoted by Jean Beaufret (1907-1982)): “There is no Heideggerian philosophy; and even if it existed, I would not be interested in that philosophy.” (*Heidegger in France*, p. 128)! The entire kerfuffle was rocking their world. They need “answers” and Heidegger was only giving “questions.” Ponder the questions!

Continues.

“Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) opened the session of September 1st, 1955, with a long presentation. He first expressed his surprise at having heard from Heidegger himself that there was no Heideggerian philosophy. While admitting and even approving of the absence of a system, he nonetheless maintained that Heidegger’s thought is a philosophy, if only for the fact that it is immediately recognizable and that it possesses that “unique quality” that allows it to be identified, just as one distinguishes Brahms’s style from Debussy’s.” (*Heidegger in France*, p. 129).

This general discussion continues with this remark from Heidegger “To Gabriel Marcel, Heidegger responded that the assertion that there is no Heideggerian philosophy is rather a sign of humility [*Demut*] before the very question of philosophy as metaphysics.” (*Heidegger in France*, p. 129). We will see more about this encounter in *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. GA 91:418.

Just released and published (2022) we have the following update in German from GA 91. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. The editor is Mark Michalski.

“There is no Heideggerian philosophy, and if there should be such a thing such a thing, I am not interested in this philosophy. (Es gibt keine Heideggersche Philosophie, und wenn es dergleichen geben sollte, so interessiere ich mich nicht für diese Philosophie. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. Mittwoch, 31. August 1955 — 5. Tag. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. GA 91:395-396.

Another passage from Heidegger from this seminar,

“You will not hear anything about Heidegger's philosophy, but you can take a look at the workshop and the craft of an attempt to enter into a questioning relationship with the subject of philosophy. You should recognize that and why this attempt is a very provisional one. This provisional attempt is only on a narrow path - a footpath; in order to stay on this path, it is necessary to initially forego many other wider paths and roads.”

(“Sie hören nichts über die Philosophie Heideggers, aber Sie können einen Blick werfen in die Werkstatt und das Handwerk eines Versuches, mit dem Thema der Philosophie in einen fragenden Bezug zu gelangen. Sie sollen dabei erkennen, daß und weshalb dieser Versuch ein sehr vorläufiger ist. Dieses Vorläufige läuft nur auf einem schmalen Pfad — einem Fußweg; um auf diesem Weg zu bleiben, ist es nötig, zunächst auf viele andere breitere Wege und Straßen zu verzichten.”). *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. Mittwoch, 31. August 1955 — 5. Tag. GA 91:396. Follow on expression, “Der schmale Fußweg... narrow footpath.” *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. GA 91:397.

Next Heidegger answers the questions directly.

“Heidegger:

First of all, I would like to touch upon two points that Mr. Gabriel Marcel at the beginning and also at the end of his lecture touched on:

1. what Heideggerian philosophy is,
2. universality.

When I said yesterday that there is no such thing as Heideggerian philosophy, it was not a joke; but rather it corresponds to what you called humility towards the end of your lecture. It means more precisely not only this, that I have not established a system; but rather, that the question I ask is not a question of traditional philosophy.” (“Zuerst möchte ich zwei Punkte berühren, die Herr Gabriel Marcel am Beginn und auch am Ende seines Vortrages berührt hat: 1. was die Heideggersche Philosophie ist, 2. die Universalität. Wenn ich gestern sagte, es gibt keine Heideggersche Philosophie, so war es kein Scherz, sondern es entspricht demjenigen, was Sie gegen Ende Ihres Vortrages als Demut bezeichneten. Es bedeutet genauer nicht nur dies, daß ich kein System aufgestellt habe und auch nie aufstellen werde, sondern daß die Frage, die ich stelle, keine Frage der traditionellen Philosophie ist.”) *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. [Donnerstag, 1 September 1955 — 6. Tag]. GA 91:418. Therefore – Heidegger is not attempting a SYSTEM! Nor is there anything like Heideggerian philosophy, see **Ipse dixit** (Latin for "he said it himself") or *autòs épha* (αὐτὸς ἔφα). Argument from authority (from the master himself).

Heidegger is not doing traditional ontology (like Hermann Lotze, N. Hartmann, or Sartre), a more fundamental questioning is Heidegger's attempt. However, this is not foundationalism like Kant's transcendental approach either.

Although it might appear that Heidegger is asking the question about Being of beings and doing ontology within the tradition of western philosophy; he in fact is asking the question in a more “**radical way**” that was done within the western ontological tradition – indeed, this is Heidegger’s “addition”, this is his ‘added point’, which is to ask the questions in a more radical way that has ever been done before. Question: did Heidegger succeed?

Gabriel Marcel wrote a play about Heidegger that was aired over Germany radio called *La dimension Florestan* was broadcast 17 Oct. 1953, and translated into German as ‘Die Wacht am Sein’ (‘The Watch Over Being’) (see Sarah Bakewell, 2016). This radio program was part of the discussion between Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre (1895-1980) in December 1953 at an in-person meeting at Heidegger’s house in Freiburg. According to reports from the Sartre’s side it did not go well. Their only meeting lasted less than two hours. But Heidegger noting afterward that Sartre’s German was good. Sartre had bigger issues with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the next year, just after Stalin's death, Sartre visited his great Soviet Union. It would be another six years before Sartre’s second magnum opus the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* comes out in 1960. There is only two references to Heidegger in this book. But the stamp of Karl Marx was clear in this book. For some time, Sartre was an apologist for the Soviet Union. His crimes and culpability are an open question. Heidegger noted after his meeting that Sartre was related to the great Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965).

Heidegger remarks from the mid-1940s, “*Sartre*”—supremely intelligent, but greater than his intelligence is his literary skill, and greater than this is his skill in giving himself out as original, and greater than that is his skill in concealing his sources; and greater than that is his *misunderstanding of Being and Time, On the Essence of Ground, “What Is Metaphysics?”* and the Kant book. Everything remains mired in the standpoint of Cartesian consciousness, in spite of all the talk about “freedom” and “concreteness” and “existence.” (Sartre« - äußerst intelligent, noch größer als die Intelligenz ist die schriftstellerische Gewandtheit...”). *Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*. GA 97:166.

Back to the Heidegger path.

Remarks from an Appendix from Freiburg im Breisgau, March 11, 1964, added to speech “Phenomenology and Theology. 1927”; Heidegger says this about himself, “The aim is to avoid the impression that this is a presentation of dogmatic theses from Heidegger's philosophy, which do not exist.” (“Der Anschein soll vermieden werden, als handle es sich um eine Darlegung dogmatischer Thesen aus der Heidegger’schen Philosophie, die es nicht gibt”). *Wegmarken*. GA 9:69. Heidegger published this volume before his death. Double approved. Heidegger’s imprimatur on this statement about his philosophy is clear cut and supports the evidence and the thesis of this book.

Does “non-philosophy” mean no philosophy at all? No, perhaps just another contra moves. How much can we be “against” until we are only defined as a countermovement? Hegel against Kant, Nietzsche against Plato; Heidegger against metaphysics (Platonism), and you can go on and fill in more of the blanks. The French philosopher François Laruelle (born 1937-) has looked at the movement of “non-philosophy” as against any and all of **the** “decision” that are made by philosophers – such as the ontic and ontological distinctions of Heidegger, since the place before

that distinction is the place that philosophers start. Heidegger sometimes talked of the step-back out of metaphysics. Well, this is about the step-back out of philosophy to that place where there are no distinctions made at all. Why do we need a scission of the world into any parts; hence the role of Heidegger? What does it mean for a thinker and a philosopher to talk about not having a philosophy? In Heidegger and for Heidegger, then there is no room for a Heideggerian worldview. Heidegger's worldview is not the essential Heidegger.

Heidegger's Letter to Roger Munier Freiburg i. B. 16. IV. April 16, 1973.

"For me it is a matter of really carrying out an exercise in a phenomenology of the inconspicuous; no one reaches phenomenological "seeing" by reading books." ("Für mich handelt es sich darum, eine Einübung in eine Büchern gelangt nie mand zum phänomenologischen «Sehen»"). *Seminare* (1951–1973). GA 15:417.

So much for all of the books being read 'by' and 'about' Martin Heidegger. Difficult to do "it" and again to have the proper "seeing" too. It is time for reading a little less Heideggerian literature as directed by Martin Heidegger himself. Maybe Heidegger is also directing this as a critique of Karl Löwith (1897-1973) who was a reader and searched bookstores for books for himself and Martin too. But there are plenty more that only "read" and do not pursue the Heideggerian questioning approach.

In Indian philosophy, the term that is often used for philosophy is the word, darshan or darshana (viewpoint or perspective), darśana (दर्शन), or the view or sight or "seeing." The ancient Indian Schools of Philosophy are called Darshan Shâstra. This is not the Greek version of the love of wisdom (philosophy, φιλοσοφία, Greek philo (love) and sophia (wisdom); but rather, the point is "seeing." [And please note even Marcuse attended lectures with Husserl. Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) spent a year studying with Husserl too. Carnap too.]. This is like what Heidegger is getting at with his notion of "phenomenological seeing." In the summer of 1923, Heidegger wrote, "...and Husserl gave me the eyes". "...und die Augen hat mir Husserl eingesetzt." *Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität* (Summer Semester 1923). GA 63:5. The common Greek word for "seeing" was "horáō" (ὁράω), a grasping of the material reality through sight and seeing. Or the Greek theaomai" (θεάομαι) to see or behold or viewing. Compare to the Sanskrit धी (dhī) and ध्यान (dhyāna). Rishi (Sanskrit: ऋषि) seer.

December 7, 1968, from Freiburg im Breisgau. Martin Heidegger letter to M. Boss.

"Ernst Jünger's statement is true in this case: "Whoever interprets himself is not up to his own standard." This is a deep statement for Heidegger, who never likes to talk about his own paths of thinking (about the (Kehre) "turn" exception is in Heidegger's 'Preface' or 'letter' to Richardson's book, about Heidegger: *Through Phenomenology to Thought*. Brief an Pater William J. Richardson" (1962), *Identität und Differenz* (1955–1957). GA 11:143-152).

Heidegger in the 1930-1940s often talks about the end of metaphysics and sometimes as the end of philosophy. Does Heidegger stand in the tradition with Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872)? "True philosophy is the negation of philosophy; it is really no philosophy at all." ("Vorwort" to *Sämtliche Werke* (Leipzig: Wigand, 1846), IV, 158. Heidegger's revolt to just give "answers." Heidegger says, "Every metaphysics is a "system value-estimations." (*Nietzsche* by Heidegger, Vol II, page 3). Heidegger in the early 1920s was already rejecting "values" systems in general.

This is just one more case of the impact of metaphysics on philosophy as “values” in general (Max Scheler). Heidegger says that “Value is ‘essentially the viewpoint’ (Gesichtspunktes) of power-reckoning of will to power (*Will to Power*, #715). In the *Letter on Humanism* he says, is it wrong to talk against values? Values are of course part of the subjective part of all modern thinking. Heidegger in the *Letter on Humanism* goes on to say, “To think against values therefore does not mean to beat the drum for valueslessness and nullity of beings.” (*Pathmarks*, page 265). In 1935, Heidegger talks about “fishing the troubled waters of values and totalities”. (*An Introduction to Metaphysics*. page 166).

Again, Heidegger makes the point, “All metaphysical engagement is a deciding about ranking of values.” *Nietzsches Metaphysik* (announced for the winter semester 1941/42). GA 50:3-25. The Greeks did not have “value” issues. Example, Plato’s ideas are not tied up with values. Heidegger points out this deep insight in metaphysics in general, but he does follow up with a conclusion that in order to twist out of metaphysics we have to deal with the question of “ranking of values;” and hence get to the bottom of essential nature of values and how to remove them. Thus, move on to ‘after’ or ‘beyond’ metaphysics in general. Heidegger’s task (contra metaphysics), but does he have a philosophy and a doctrine for this project? Answer: no. First blush, Nietzsche is against Christian values, and wants to do a creation of new values (non-Christian); and then do the revaluation of all values (Umwertung aller Werte). For Nietzsche stages of Nihilism are connected to the creation of values in different ways. Nietzsche’s values of eagle versus sheep. Nietzsche read a great deal about the life of Napoleon. What were Napoleon values versus Christian? Stages of Nihilism.

Imperfect Nihilism
Extreme Nihilism
Active Nihilism
Ecstatic Nihilism
Classical Nihilism

Finally, Nihilism becomes a divine way of thinking (1887, 9 [41]) for Nietzsche. Extreme Nihilism (active Nihilism?). Note: no longer any *hierarchy or ranking of values*. No rungs on the ladder. No highest or lower values. No goals (goallessness-ing). No ‘tablet’ of values. No real or actual value positing process. Goallessness is sometime translated from German as aimlessness. Nietzsche first used this term in 1875, and last time in a note from the Fall of 1887 – for twelve years. For Nietzsche, the word ‘goallessness’ (**Ziellosigkeit**) is a form and basic belief of Nihilist (*Will to Power*, #25). Goalless as progresslessness. For Nietzsche there is no “progress.” At one point, he says the Renaissance person was the highest point for humanity.

Back to Heidegger’s trail and path.

Another example from Heidegger from around the time of 1934-1936, “One thinks that my rectorate's speech does not belong in my “philosophy” assuming [providing] I have one”. *Überlegungen IV*, #257 (“Man meint, meine Rektoratsrede gehöre nicht in meine »Philosophie«; gesetzt, daß ich eine solche habe”). *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*. GA 94:286. Does Heidegger have a philosophy? Apparently, that is a deep philosophical question

that is still open for analysis. Where to begin with an analysis of Heidegger's philosophy (providing he has one)? In some ways, this is a philosophical melee. Join the fight.

The standard view of Heidegger's methodology is hermeneutical phenomenology as stated in the early sections of *Being and Time* (1927). In general, Heidegger quickly abandon any structure methodology after 1920s. But we have an unpublished and undated manuscript by Heidegger dealing with the *Der hermeneutische Zirkel* Marbach DLA 75.7435,2. (51 pages). Hermeneutical circle. "In his notes titled "*Der hemeneutische Zirkel*" (Schuber C 27) Heidegger mentions. Gadamer's essay in the Heidegger Festschrift from 1959 and his own Hegel seminar from winter semester 1956-57 - so these notes are written in or after 1959." From Dr. Mark Michalsk reported in 2023 March after seeing the manuscript in person at DLA.

But consider what Nietzsche said, "the methods, one must say it ten times, are what is essential." (*The Antichrist*, section 59, "die Methoden, man muss es zehnmahl sagen, sind das Wesentliche").

What is the core stance of the project of philosophical investigations? Not the details of the questions or the process or the details of the answers or the claims or counterclaims; but rather, the overall starting point (departure, first steps). The metalevel of the project of philosophy? What is – philosophy as a meta project? I am not claiming or arguing; but I am pointing out that for Heidegger and other great philosophers their stance is "interrogative." As we will see Heidegger is pretty clear on this topic most of the time and directs his students and us to follow him in this enterprise of questioning. Heidegger's initiative and starting point is the questioning as 'every beginning is difficult' (**omne initium difficile est**). Where does Heidegger depart from? Where does he get to?

Heidegger in the Schelling book says, "With this, I am not saying that "*Being and Time*" has become a thing of the past for me. Even today, I still have not "gone further," if only because I know ever more clearly that I am not permitted to go "further;" perhaps, however, I have come a bit closer to what was attempted in "*Being and Time*." ("Damit wird nicht gesagt, »Sein und Zeit« sei für mich selbst etwas Vergangenes geworden. Ich bin auch heute noch nicht »weitergekommen«, dies schon deshalb, weil ich immer deutlicher weiß, daß ich nicht »weiter-« kommen darf; aber vielleicht bin ich dem in »Sein und Zeit« Versuchten um einiges nahegekommen.") *Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. Zur erneuten Auslegung von Schelling: Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände* (1809) (I. Trimester 1941/Summer semester 1941). GA 49:26-27. Note: Schelling and Hegel often talked about getting "further" than the standpoint of Fichte.

It is the transformation and deeper understanding of the questioning that Heidegger is getting closer to again and again; not getting "further" to some answer. Heidegger often uses the metaphor of "step back." Following Hegel, Husserl, then Heidegger calls for the task "toward the matter for thinking" ("Zur Sache des Denkens"). The matter (Sache) is Being for Heidegger and that is established. The general approach and methodology that Heidegger uses is "questioning."

So, it is essential to understand Heidegger's philosophy and questioning; but I do not claim Heidegger was always clear about his core theme. Heidegger took many different pathways on

his journeys like the Greek, Odysseus (Ὀδυσσεύς). Sometimes Heidegger got off of the road and he got lost on the timber trails. There are many divagations (wandering) too. But rather regained his way back to the “questioning” pathways and stance.

Heidegger letter in 1950.

Ein Brief an einen jungen Studenten Freiburg i. Br. den 18. Juni 1950.

Dear Mr. Buchner.

[The last part of the letter].

“Way is always in danger to become wrong way. To go such ways requires practice in walking. Practice needs craft. Stay on the way in real misery and learn the craft of thinking undisturbed yet erring. Yours in friendship.”

“Alles ist hier Weg des prüfend hörenden Entsprechens. Weg ist immer in der Gefahr, Irrweg zu werden. Solche Wege zu gehen, verlangt Übung im Gang. Übung braucht Handwerk. Bleiben Sie in der echten Not auf dem Weg und lernen Sie un ent wegt, jedoch beirrt, das Handwerk des Denkens.” *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1953). GA 7:187. The student’s name is Hartmut Bucher. Taking the wrong way. Which walkway (peripatetic, περιπατητικός, peripatētikós) is to the Lyceum (Λύκειον) in Athens? The Lyceum (Λύκειον) is credited for having the first European library. Heidegger’s path and way leads through the great Greek thinkers. Like Aristotle, Heidegger read many books and liked to walk and talk with other thinkers.

Gandhi’s non-violent intentions were clear in his published writings; however, not so clear in some of his letters. Heidegger’s writings cover a period of over 60+ years and at least 38,802 published pages in German. Some have argued that Heidegger changed his mind over importance of the first edition (1781) of the Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* to the second edition (1787). In *Sein und Zeit*, first published in 1927 by Heidegger, Thomas Sheehan has noted that between the sixth and seventh edition (1949-1953) there were 480 changes that were made to the published text.

Heidegger on the publication of his letters:

“Hence, if *my letters and the like* could be important at all, no collection of them should be published since such a collection only serves the curiosity and the comfort of those who want to evade the task of thinking “the matter of thinking”. (*Mindfulness*, page 378. GA 66 *Besinnung* (1938/39). Yes, Heidegger did change his mind and there are publications of his letters even before his death in 1976. Another example, the concept of ‘metontology’ was dropped by 1936. This may have been connected with Heidegger’s engagement with Max Scheler. The notion of metaphysics of Dasein was dropped around 1930. In Heidegger's story of the history of metaphysic; first Plato (1930s) seen favorably and then Plato becomes the anti-hero and the villain (misrepresentation and in general just a caricature). Research is needed on the affinities of Heidegger and Socrates (and Plato). Heidegger in general uses Plato as the scapegoat and especially ‘Platonism’ and Neo-Platonism as the beginning of the downfall of philosophy and as the worst start to the historical western metaphysics. Heidegger at the point in 1940 (“Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit”) would say, ‘shame’ on Plato. During the next 30 years, it becomes a more complex relationship.

Some other examples of later published changes made by Heidegger.

In: *Heidegger's polemos: from being to politics* by Fried Gregory (pages 257-261) there is a translation and discussion of three examples of changes in Heidegger's *Nietzsche I* and *II* volumes compared to actual later published lectures in *Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst* (Winter semester 1936/37), GA 43:30-31, GA 43:190-193, GA 43:273-274. Example of passages that were left out of the earlier publications but included in the later published lectures by Heidegger. Here is example quote: "A very profound knowing and an even more profound seriousness are needed for us to grasp what Nietzsche means by nihilism. For Nietzsche, Christianity is just as nihilistic as Bolshevism, and consequently just as nihilistic as mere socialism." There are several other length examples given in English translation of the differences in these different published texts. There is a more famous example of changes made to the lecture *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Otto Pöggeler (1928-2014) was there and saw Heidegger's changes. Three graduate students who were reviewing at the same confirmed Otto's claim. These published editions show us how Heidegger wanted to change his "public image" from time to time. Fix up and polish the texts. Cover up his personal errors. Damage control? 20/20 hindsight. Sheehan notes that *Sein und Zeit* went through thirteen editions during Heidegger's lifetime. Philosophers change their minds and their publications as well. Sometimes other issues came up, "Urged to take over the rectorate, I act the first time against the innermost voice." ("Gedrängt zur Übernahme des Rektorats handle ich das erste Mal geegerz die innerste Stimme"). *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931-1938)*, GA 94:110.

An example, of the English translation problems. The footnote at the bottom of the page (GA 31:181) was not taken over into the English translation. It reads in German, "8 Das Problem der Instanz des Beweises des Entwurfs. Sofern er geschehen ist und je geschehen in einem Ganzen, liegt das Beweisen bzw. Widerlegen auf seiten des Mitredenden, nicht des Entwerfenden als solchen. Also, Wahrheit des Entwurfs gleich Unwiderlegbarkeit? Ganz und gar nicht! Was dann?" Was this left out on purpose or just a simple mistake? We need to be more assiduous, but at least double check on texts and translations. Missing paragraph from English translation (e.g., GA 8:192).

In an Appendix (1956) to the "Origin of the Work of Art (1935-36)" "This relationship is inadequately thought even in this presentation - a distressing difficulty that has been clear to me since *Being and Time*, and has since come under discussion in many presentations" (et, page 55). Even Heidegger sometimes has not resolved all of these philosophical issues.

Additional examples, "Rewording the past: The postwar publication of a 1938 lecture by Martin Heidegger" Discusses the various versions of the "The Age of the World Picture" and the re-writing of the history of the texts. The term that is used to express what happens by a scholar, was "artful falsifications." Heidegger got caught sometimes. Perhaps a lapse of hubris (ὕβρις, hubris) was his Achilles' heel (ἀχιλλεύιος πτέρνα). Obviously, he was not particularly good at hiding some re-writing of his manuscripts – he got caught. The lecture was in 1938, published in 1950 with altered texts by Heidegger, and he got caught in 2014 (64 years later). Original manuscripts are all in the DLA. Heidegger plays the role of the arch-manipulator. Consideration: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Ask him, mens rea "guilty mind"? Estoppel arguments – perhaps? Otto Pöggeler observed carefully and appositely, "Heidegger is like a fox who sweeps away his traces with his tail." We can see Heidegger most of the time, but sometimes in 40,000 pages gets caught as the fox.

Attackers against Heidegger's interpretations.

"Another who, after the debate with Friedländer, no longer agreed with this thesis was Heidegger himself. When I spoke with him about Plato in 1975, I was surprised at the candidness with which he voiced his dissatisfaction with his book *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*. The book was, he said, "no longer tenable (nicht mehr haltbar)." Quote from "Plato's Other Beginning" by John Sallis, page 186. Heidegger has thrown 'part' of his own interpretation of Plato under the bus as "no longer sustainable." A case of the philological reading of the origins and passages of ancient Greek's words. Yes, even Heidegger learns new things. Paul Friedländer (1882-1968) studied with Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff at Berlin before going to Philipps University of Marburg (1920) and was there at the same time as Heidegger during 1923-1928.

Paradoxically, one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century has no philosophical doctrines (or only a few). Stop this nonsense of needing philosophical doctrines.

Conclusion:

There is No Heideggerian philosophy. Another thesis that is certainly contestable. Heidegger's purpose and essential task was as an interrogator. In the last of GA volumes, number GA 102 we read this statement by Heidegger, "One expects "a philosophy", which I myself do not claim. (Man erwartet »eine Philosophie«, die ich selbst nicht beanspruche). Vorläufiges I. *Vorläufiges I-IV. (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970)*. GA 102:15. Clear now? *We have marshalled the evidence.*

If there is no Heideggerian philosophy, then therefore (**ergo**)

- ∴ there is no Heidegger political philosophy;
- ∴ there is no Heidegger ethics or moral philosophy;
- ∴ there is no **summum bonum** for Heidegger;
- ∴ there are no "final answers" from Heidegger;
- ∴ there is no esoteric knowledge (now or forthcoming);
- ∴ there are no "results;"
- ∴ there is no final "truth" or final "dictums;"
- ∴ there is no "doctrines;"
- ∴ there is no 'claim' to a "philosophy."

quod erat demonstrandum (ὄπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι). QED.

On the other side, we can take this statement from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's (1770-1831) from the 'Preface' (1807) to his complete system, where he says:

“The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of it can only be the scientific system of it. To cooperate so that philosophy to come closer to the form of science - to the goal of being able to the name of *love* of knowledge and to be *real* knowledge - is what I have in mind. and to be real knowledge - is what I have set myself.” (“Die wahre Gestalt, in welcher die Wahrheit existiert, kann allein das wissenschaftliche System derselben sein. Daran mitzuarbeiten, daß die Philosophie der Form der Wissenschaft näherkomme - dem Ziele, ihren Namen der *Liebe* zum Wissen ablegen zu können und *wirkliches* Wissen zu sein -, ist es, was ich mir vorgesetzt.” (Preface to *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 1807).

Yes, Hegel wanted to have “real knowledge” (wirkliches Wissen), but not just the love of wisdom and knowledge or the weakness of just asking “questions.”

Heidegger makes the following extraordinary remark about Hegel’s entire system and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s (1775-1854) destructive criticisms of metaphysical systems in general. Heidegger says about Schelling’s *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände* (1809), “The treatise which shatters Hegel’s *Logic* before it was even published.” (*Treatise* p.97).

Hegel’s *Science of Logic* is the fundamental foundation to his entire system. Once Hegel wrote his *Logic* the rest of his life was just working on the fine specific details of his system. In a sense, Hegel was finished thinking and philosophizing. His metaphysical system had been created and the entire outline was clear and published. All of Hegel’s systems questions had been answered at this point in his life. Yes, Hegel had the “answers” and his follower and disciple Karl Marx (1818-1883) had even more “answers” (“real knowledge” (wirkliches Wissen) which has gone on to make a momentous change to the history of the world. Marx’s communism is not just an armchair philosophical project. Its impact on world history “was” and still “is” enormous. Marx had a philosophical system which includes a future utopia (communism). Not utopian socialism.

In a much different light, think of the *summas* of medieval theology as “answers.” Compare the complained against Socrates that in the dialogues the method of Elenchus (ἔλεγχος, elenkhos) never resolves the questioning; and hence, never gets to the “answers” or to a “result” nor to the final goal posts. Many of the Plato dialogues are in this tradition of western philosophy. In this case, Heidegger is much closer to Socrates than Aristotle on these issues. Namely, the relentlessness and “inexorability of questioning.” (Unerbittlichkeit des Fragens). *Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (Winter semester 1935/36). GA 41:40.

Georg Picht (1913-1982) a famous Greek classicist remarks, “Shortly after the war, we took a walk in the forest above his [Heidegger’s] house. I got up my courage and tried to explain to him why his interpretation of Plato’s allegory of the cave did not convince me. This was a central point, because his entire interpretation of European metaphysics relied on it. . . . After posing, with restrained passion, a number of apt, exact questions, which I did not evade, he stood still and said, “I must say one thing to you: the structure of Platonic thinking is completely unclear to me” (See: *All of a Sudden: Heidegger and Plato’s Parmenides*). On one hand, maybe Heidegger did not think much about Plato and the dialogues. But on the other hand, this seems like a vast area of trying to interpret Plato’s methodology in the

“aporetic” (ἀπορητικός) dialogues where there are no answers given. Heidegger stands too close to Aristotle for an in-depth reading of Plato (one could argue this point). The “aporetic” dialogues where we end up without answers.

Heidegger was a peripatetic (περιπατητικός, peripatētikós) in more than just following Aristotle, there are lots of reports of Heidegger going for walks with other intellectuals and philosophers (e.g., Ernst Jünger, Georg Picht).

Indeed, there is a long history of issues regarding Heidegger’s misreading of Plato dialogues and greater questions about Heidegger’s and Plato’s methodology of the “dialogues.” Heidegger often just places Plato on the ‘shelf’ of Western metaphysical history. But the key question: did Heidegger learn from Plato’s dialogue methodology (Elenchus (ἔλεγχος, elenkhos)? What is Heidegger’s structure, methodology, or how to proceed with thinking, in comparison to the Plato dialogues? Heidegger remarks about Socrates “This is why he is the purest thinker of the West. This is why he wrote nothing. (*What is called Thinking*, page 17, 1952, GA 8:20). On one hand, Heidegger rejected Plato and especially the tradition of Platonism (metaphysic); but on the other hand, the purist thinker and the questioning approach of Socrates is to be commended. Heidegger could have learned even more from the Socratic’s Elenchus (ἔλεγχος, elenkhos) stance. So far Heidegger’s published dialogues GA 77. *Feldweg-Gespräche* (1944/45) has shown extraordinarily little style or flair for this kind of fictional dialogue. Perhaps we can only note what was going on Germany and with his sons as prisoner of war during some of this time. War in general is part of the context. Some other dialogues by Heidegger may be forthcoming according to Klaus Held’s Marbach-Bericht Report (2020). Note Heidegger’s letter to his brother Fritz that he was thinking of Plato’s *Phaedo* when he was writing his own dialogues in April 1945. [Historical note Adolf died 30 April 1945].

Heidegger’s remarks about Plato, “since Plato, thinking is determined from the standpoint of a suitably purified way of representing beings” (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938). GA 65: 458); and “Plato was never an ‘idealist’ but instead a ‘realist’” (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938). GA 65:215); and “since Plato, the truth of the interpretation of ‘Being’ has never been questioned” (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938). GA 65:188). Some claim that Heidegger is an ontological realist in the 1920s.

Consider Stephen Hawking (1942-2018), the famous physicist who published two popular books *Brief Answers to the Big Questions* and *A Brief History Of Time* (1988) both of these works step over into philosophy and metaphysics. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Schelling lead to the fundamental question in metaphysics and is indeed is the Big Question.

Heidegger points out, “The ultimate why question: why is there anything at all rather than nothing whatsoever?” Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? That is the question. Why is the universe full of things as opposed to “nothing at all”? Presumably, it is no arbitrary question. “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” - this is obviously the first of all questions.” *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935, GA 28). See GA 65 late section 280 “The transitional question.”

Are we searching for only a “divine” answer to all “why” questions? (See also the Richard Wisser Interview with Martin Heidegger (1969). This text is a transcript of Richard Wisser’s

interview with Heidegger on 17 September 1969. It was aired on television on 24, 1969 September, as a tribute to Heidegger in honor of his 80th birthday. Martin Heidegger im Gespräch with Richard Wisser, *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–1976) GA 16:702-710, #262). *Martin Heidegger in Conversation* Translated by B. Srinivasa Murthy and published by Arnold-Heinemann Publishers, India, in 1977. This video can be seen on YouTube.

On the other side, is the famous eleventh thesis from the “Thesis about Feuerbach” written by Karl Marx (early 1845). “Philosophers have hitherto only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it”. (Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden *interpretiert*, es kömmt drauf an, sie zu *verändern*). Heidegger quotes this same passage in his interview with Wisser (1969), Seminar Thor 1969, and in *Kant’s Thesis about Being* (1962). Did Heidegger fall in the trap that has been shown in the famous dialogue, Plato’s *Cratylus* (Κρατύλος, Kratylos)? Too much “talk” and not enough action.

Heidegger points out weakness of just questioning,
“Questioning is the sign of the lack of strength for action and works.”
“Fragen ist das Zeichen der Unkraft zum Handeln und Wirken.” GA 45:196. *Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"*. Freiburg lecture course Winter Semester 1937-38.

At least, Heidegger clearly sees the problem with philosophers just interpreting the world and taking no action. These critics of Heidegger as having a philosophy of “quietism” in the face of needs of the revolution (Marxism) or at least against the National Socialism of 1930-1940s; only Herbert Marcuse’s student, Dr. Angela Davis (1944-) sets the standard for activism among philosophers. Common Law. “Each of the charges in any of the indictments must stand on its own, and the basis for each charge must withstand scrutiny independent of all other counts.” Should we have the burden of showing similarly situated individuals (during the years 1930-1945, Germany) have not been put on trial? Lofty standards compared to the real actions of Frankfurt School members who were always critical of Heidegger. Professor Dr. Davis is listed as being an activist and a scholar. Also charges of Wittgensteinianism quietists as well. Wittgenstein’s dictum that “philosophy leaves everything as it is.” There is a lengthy list of quietism: Quaker quietism, quietism in Buddhist, Islam, and the traditional German mysticism with Heidegger’s links to Meister Eckhart (1260-1328). Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) links to mysticism of Plato and Franz Xaver von Baader (1765-1841).

On the other hand, Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas’ (1929-) were overly critical of the student movements in the 1960s; and Angela Davis and Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) were critical of Adorno in exchanges of letters from that time as well about Adorno reaction to the student movement. See Marcuse’s letter to Adorno 7 June 1969. The supposedly “radical” Frankfurt school members did not do well with their concrete “action” during the 1960s student protests according to Davis and Marcuse. Some personal animosities? Now included their *bête noire*. They were no longer simple apologists for Adorno. This outline of these issues means we are not sitting in “judgement” of these great philosophers. Just pointing out their exchange. Adorno’s actions from their American political perspective were a lost to him (obdurate?). His reputation is in tatters. Question: his lost(s) and his philosophical culpability? Adorno said, “I am a

theoretical human being who views theoretical thinking as lying extraordinarily close to his artistic intentions.” Maybe a real Spießler or αλεπού? Sounds more like a counter-revolutionary? In the media, some things did not go well with Frankfurt School philosophers versus the radical student movement of the 1960s. Heidegger cannot be comprehended or grasped materialistically from a Marxist perspective. Plus, a little more intellectual honesty from the Frankfurt School philosophers on their own materialism – please. No need for Close quarters combat just some academic discussions. It does smell bad (fetid).

In the Summer Semester of 1935, Heidegger told his students, “One says, for example, that because metaphysics did not contribute to preparing the revolution (Vorbereitung der Revolution), it must be rejected.” *Einführung in die Metaphysik. Introduction to Metaphysic*, Summer Semester 1935. GA 40:12.

In his preface to Heidegger's *Zollikon Seminars*, Medard Boss writes: "I made inquiries and Heidegger very clearly seemed to be the most slandered man I had ever encountered. He had become entangled in a network of lies by his colleagues. Most of the people, who were unable to do serious harm to the substance of Heidegger's thinking, tried to get at Heidegger the man with personal attacks." Salacious stories and attacks.

Weakness of just asking “questions” and not enough praxis (πρᾶξις, praxis) is a problem for ethical action when a revolution is needed. Both Hannah Arendt and Angela Davis point to this problem in the political philosophy of Kant, but both used Kant’s philosophy for their own programs. The steps from personal ethics and moral theory to social and community ethics; and then to political action are the steps from Kant to Hegel; and then on to Karl Marx. Only a few philosophers end up with the decisive step to Marx, for example, Davis and Robert Paul Wolf (1933 -). A purely ideological-political agendas. There is the other side with the more right-wing politics as well.

Hegel first major published work dated Jena, July 1801.

“As to the need of the times, Fichte's philosophy has caused so much of a stir and has made an epoch to the extent that even those who declare themselves against it and strain themselves to get speculative systems of their own on the road, still cling to its principle, though in a more turbid and impure way, and are incapable of resisting it. The **most** obvious symptoms of an epoch-making system are the - misunderstandings and the awkward conduct of its **adversaries**.” In the Preface, the *Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*. Translation by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, 1977, page 81.

Can we say that in the context of Heidegger we have some “awkward conduct of his adversaries”? Since, there are no “results” from Heidegger and certainly, there is no “Heidegger System;” then what are we left with for Heidegger adversaries? Answer: *argumentum ad hominem*. Gadamer wrote in 1977 (45 years ago), “Heidegger never lacked for enemies and still does not”. *Philosophical apprenticeships*, page 46. Even the anti-Heideggerian are “inspired” to action against Heidegger. So, both “for him” and “against him” are involved in the interpretation and exegesis of Heidegger’s writings.

Back to the German philosophical tradition. Of course, even assuming we know the “questions” and the “answers” are given; then Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) challenges us if we know what an author wrote and published, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) paragraph - A314. "I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention." ("Ich merke nur an daß es gar nichts Ungewöhnliches sei sowohl im gemeinen Gespräche als in Schriften, durch die Vergleichung der Gedanken, welche ein Verfasser über seinen Gegenstand äußert, ihn sogar besser zu verstehen, als er sich selbst verstand, indem er seinen Begriff nicht genugsam bestimmte, und dadurch bisweilen seiner eigenen Absicht entgegen redete, oder auch dachte.").

After the author, we may have a deeper understanding of the questions and answers. Kant wrote this 240+ years ago. What are the hermeneutical situations that are in the historical frame? For example, the sociology of the neo-Kantians. Or the sociology of why of Jacques Derrida's (1930-2004) philosophy gained a reputation in American universities in the 1960s? [Michele Lamont, 1987]. Was it a philosophical cause or was it just an economic sociological cause?

Getting the answer. The young Heidegger (age 34) already in his first course in Philipps University of Marburg knew about the “answer”. In the first little section entitled: “The task of the lecture and, the passion of the real and right questioning.” Heidegger writes,

“The readiness of questioning consists in a certain maturity of existence: not to fall into surrogates; also, it is not important to finish as quickly as possible, but rather to endure for years in uncertainty, to mature out of it for the confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with the matters (Sachen), to be free to deny oneself any premature answer.” (“Die Bereitschaft des Fragens besteht in einer gewissen Reife der Existenz: nicht abfallen in Surrogate; auch kommt es nicht darauf an, möglichst schnell fertig zu werden, sondern auf Jahre in der Unsicherheit aushalten, aus ihr herausreifen für die Auseinandersetzung mit den Sachen, frei zu sein, sich jede vorzeitige Antwort zu versagen.” *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* Winter Semester 1923-1924. GA 17:3.

Heidegger wrote, “Philosophy is always completed when its end becomes and remains that which is its beginning (Anfang, or inception), the question. For only by truly stopping in questioning, philosophy it forces the question-worthy into view; but by opening this the worthiest of the highest question....” (“Vollendet ist die Philosophie immer dann, wenn ihr Ende das wird und bleibt, was ihr Anfang ist, die Frage. Denn nur indem die Philosophie wahrhaft im Fragen stehen bleibt, zwingt sie das Frag-würdige in den Blick; indem sie aber dieses der höchsten Frage Würdigste eröffnet....” 1936. *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* GA 42:169. Goes and comes back to the “question.” What is or who is question-worthy?

Heidegger in this letter notes this about his students (1922):

“Not a single decent question gets posed; of course, everyone starts scribbling away when I say something; when I myself pose a question, a big guessing game ensues, and one can tell by their faces that they would be equally good at solving a crossword puzzle.” #36. Martin Heidegger to Karl Löwith (1897-1973). Freiburg, Nov. 1922. Instant hilarity, right?

Heidegger wanted his students to pose questions. Reports from the later seminars he got better responses from the medical students of M. Boss (see GA 89 *Zollikoner Seminare*). There were 50-70 medical students in each session with M. Boss.

The hidden king in critical discussions with his students. In Heidegger Winter semester of 1925/26 at the Philipps University of Marburg seminar on Hegel's *Science of Logic* (see Francisco Gonzalez, 2020) the Helene Weiss (1898-1951) transcriptions include Heidegger students in discussions with him (students named: Karl Löwith, Gadamer, Gerhard Krüger, maybe Hannah Arendt; and one student named: Wagner without a first name). Wagner was against Heidegger on his Hegel interpretation. But Gonzalez noted the heated discussion between Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002)'s presentation of Aristotle on the concept of time. This was during the time that *Being and Time* (1927) was being developed and pre-dates Heidegger attacked on Hegel and Aristotle in *Being and Time*. The point here is that Heidegger at least in these lectures is in this series interrogatives with Heidegger questioning his students about their Seminarprotokolle. Heidegger does what is called a "totality of a living interpretation;" but clearly, Heidegger's own students were talking "truth to power" with him on the Hegel and Aristotle interpretations. The interlocutors in this seminar wanted a piece of the action. Heidegger enabled them. Excellent example. See *Human Life in Motion Heidegger's Unpublished Seminars on Aristotle as Preserved* by Helene Weiss by Francisco J. Gonzalez.

In Heidegger's collective writings (Gesamtausgabe, HGA or just GA) there are some of his students' Protocols and transcripts from the courses. What? Yes, Heidegger's students are included in his published collective writings (in GA 84.1 *Seminare: Leibniz – Kant – Schiller*. There are twelve students' sessions recorded in this one volume (GA 84.1:353-647). Almost a one hundred pages of student's homework that was discussed with the class. Rainer Marten (1928-) one of Heidegger's students who is alive (2024), told me that for Heidegger the student's protocols were everything and the questioning was intense. See for example his Protokoll vom 6. 2. 1952 - Rainer Marten (GA 83:587-592). Note this is not exactly MS-PowerPoints presentation, but you are getting the point at least in the seminars – there was interactive questioning at the beginning of classes. There are Seminarprotokolle published in Martin Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. Remember Heidegger still had dreams about his own high school examinations (1909) in the 1950s according to Medard Boss (1903-1990).

Martin Heidegger was 39 years old, and he knew that his philosophical stance would be much different than his teacher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). In this little address to Husserl on his seventieth birthday, Martin Heidegger lays out his own personal project and philosophical agenda which places him squarely in tradition of western philosophy.

Heidegger told Husserl and the invited guests.

"Whoever, by dint of research, has arrived at this self-understanding of philosophy is granted the fundamental experience of all philosophizing, namely, that the more fully and originally research comes into its own, the more surely it is "only" the *transformation* (*Verwandlung*) of the same few simple questions.

But those who wish to transform must bear within themselves the power of a fidelity that knows how to preserve. And no one will feel this power grow within them without being caught up in wonder.” By Martin Heidegger, *For Edmund Husserl on his seventieth birthday* (April 8, 1929). Edmund Husserl zum siebenzigsten Geburtstag (8. April 1929). GA 16:56.

This is the basis of Heidegger’s brilliant lifelong project.

1). Transform a few simple questions (the meaning or truth of the Being of beings).

2). Staying within the great western philosophical tradition of starting with wonder (θαυμάζειν (thaumazein). See *Being and Time*, thaumazein (to wonder), page 172. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A, 982b11-12. And Plato, *Theatatus*, 155d. Indian philosophy is generally noted for starting philosophy with the ontological status of humans as suffering *Duhkha* (Sanskrit: दुःख). Human beings in time – suffering. This is not an ontic pain. Think of the later Heidegger on “pain” (der Schmerz); (Das Enteignis Der Schmerz (das Nichten GA Bd. 73.1). Or this one with a note online that is intended for publication in GA 72. DLA 75.7300,2; Der Schmerz; 173 Bl. Mit 1 Beil. 6 Bl. See the later section on Schmerz in this book.

Heidegger’s approach follows Aristotle and Plato at the start or the beginning of western (Greek) philosophy.

Wonder as the stance of questioning.

“But wonder is the **arche** -- it pervasively rules every step of philosophy. Wonder is **pathos**.” (*What is that – Philosophy*, page 33). August 1955. Ruling every step of philosophy and all methodology is a the simple – awe of “wonder” or “astonishment.” θαυμάζειν (thaumazein). That is the wonder and astonishment that we are self-conscious of being on a planet; and of course, wonder “why.”

In his 1928–1929 lectures, *Introduction to Philosophy*, Heidegger says that “Philosophy is philosophizing and nothing more. This simple thing must be understood.” (“Philosophie ist Philosophieren und nichts weiter. Dieses Einfache gilt es zu begreifen. Einleitung in die Philosophie”). GA 27:10. “Philosophy is the thinking of thinkers” GA 50:147.

Heidegger noted it in 1932. “Every day I am thankful that I have retained my old standards and the joy of growing ever closer to the simple questions.” Heidegger’s Letter to Karl Löwith, IV.19. 1932.

Martin Heidegger wrote this in an earlier letter to Hannah Arendt (1925), “But I can’t seem to find the time. I am slaving away on my Kassel lectures, which are all much too difficult now. Making things more accessible is a strange business in philosophy - the simpler things become, the more puzzling they remain. Nor do I want to talk the audience into believing that philosophy can answer their questions.” Letter #6. Todtnauberg, 21.III. 1925. Philosophy will not be handing out “answers.”

The lectures he was working on are titled: *Wilhelm Dilthey's Research Work and the Present Struggle for a Historical Worldview*. A series of ten popular lectures in Kassel at the Society for Art and Science of the Electorate of Hesse: The 'Kassel lectures.'

Here we can see Heidegger is noting that Philosophy is not about giving “answer their questions.” Heidegger is on the side of asking the questions and transforming the question – the “answers” are a different issue. An example: What is the meaning of the universe? Transforming us and deeper understanding of what the questions means for us – is a different project than “giving an answer.” With Heidegger’s philosophy there are no end “results” and no “eternal truths.”

Back to the trail and hints of Heidegger.

From the outset, even with his earliest works, there were discussions of the nature of “questioning” coming up in the lecture *Frage und Urteil*. Vortrag Freiburg in Rickerts Seminar. 10 July 1915. See GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Two volumes. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932.

Seminar in Le Thor 1968, August 30.

Heidegger’s big secret. Heidegger was coming up on his 79th birthday.

“That is why, in a real seminar, the teacher is the one who learns the most. For this reason, he must not teach the others what the text is; he must listen to what it says. The law of the seminar is to question unceasingly (Im Seminar gilt es unnachlässig zu frage). Learners (pupils) should support the questions of the teacher through their questions. Never *believe* anything; everything needs to be tested. Thus, we see that work is not to be measured in terms of quantity. Heidegger recalls that at Marburg his manner of working elicited mistrust. At first the students said that in a whole semester they had not even gotten out of Plato's *Sophist* In our seminar, Heidegger continues, we cannot be sure of getting beyond a few lines of the text. But one thing is sure, and that is that if we get these lines, we will then be able to read Hegel's whole book. That, he says, is das Geheimnis des Seminars [the secret of the seminar].” *A Heidegger Seminar on Hegel's Differenzschrift* Translated by William Lovitt. See GA 15. *Seminare*. Likewise, see what Socrates says, in the *Lesser Hippias* 369d-e, “I desire to learn”.

Here we can see how the student’s criticism of Heidegger’s teaching approach dates from the early Philipps University of Marburg lecture course Winter Semester 1924-25, Plato's *Sophist*. In more modern terms this is called: close reading. Most often Heidegger does not cover the entire text in his lecture series. We get the amuse-bouches. For example, *Übungen für Anfänger: Schillers Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* by Martin Heidegger. (Lectures for undergraduate students given: 4 November 1936 to 17 February 1937, GA 84.2). Heidegger only covers Schiller’s letters from 19 to 22 (total 1-27). There are many other examples of Heidegger’s close reading of texts that do not cover the majority of a philosophy text. In his lecture series on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), Heidegger did not get pass the fourth chapter. *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* Freiburg lecture course WS 1930-31. GA 32.

A general remark from Heidegger about the nature of questioning in the disciplines and fields of study.

“It is only in the air of such presumption that questioning flourishes, that essential questioning that belongs to the production of every solid work in whatever field.”

Lecture I, Basic Principles of Thinking: Freiburg Lectures 1957.

[Erst in der Luft solchen Vermutens gedeiht das Fragen, jenes wesenhafte Fragen, das zur Hervorbringung jedes gediegenen Werkes, auf welchem Feld auch immer, gehört]. *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge* GA 79:83. Lecture I.

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) correspondence with Karl Löwith (1897-1973). Karl was noted for drinking Danziger Goldwasser. The excellent editor of the letter collection, Alfred Denker noted: “It is surprising how open and critical Heidegger and Löwith are in their philosophical engagement with one another.” (E.T. page 288). Note the date of the first two letters is the year 1920 (104 years ago). Heidegger was about 31 years old, and Karl was about 23. Karl Löwith spend weeks and months with Heidegger at the Die Hütte (cottage) in the hills around Todtnauberg, Black Forest, Germany. Karl Löwith wrote this, “where the more intimate circle of students often spent hospitable weeks.” Note Heidegger also said, that Karl Löwith was “gifted in his multitudinous use of citations.”

These letters show Heidegger open about his thoughts.

“5. Martin Heidegger to Karl Löwith

[Freiburg] 1.24.20

Dear Herr, Löwith,

I am traveling today in wonderful weather to the Black Forest, and I won't return until Monday evening. I leave it to your instincts to dig out the questions that are most valuable to me.

I would like to thank you again personally for that excellent presentation of yours, in which I detected actual intellectual spirit without adherence to a specific scholarly dogmatism (which is the death of all philosophy).”

Ferrer's Notes:

- 1). Dig the **questions** out.
- 2). Dogmatism as the death of philosophy.
- 3). Praises his student intellectual spirit.

9. Martin Heidegger to Karl Löwith

Messkirch, IX.13.20

Dear Herr, Löwith,

Because I myself would like to learn something in these seminars—by way of opposition and difficulties, which themselves only arise in their necessary clarity when the participants measure up to the matter at hand—I have preliminarily decided to forgo my seminar on the phenomenology of religion, for it could only result in precisely the religious–philosophical prattle that I would like to stamp out in philosophy: namely, chattering on about the religious based on what one has read in an encyclopedia.’

Ferrer's Notes:

- 1). Learning from the opposition.
- 2). Get rid of the prattle and chattering.

103. *Martin Heidegger to Karl Löwith (1897-1973).*

Frbg, IV.19.32

Every day I am thankful that I have retained my old standards and the joy of growing ever closer to simple questions. They remain old-fashioned by their very nature, despite the ever-growing clamor about "ontology" and such."

Ferrer's Notes:

- 1). Simple joy by getting closer to **simple questions**.
- 2). Staying with the old-fashioned questions.

One of the last things Heidegger wrote was *Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft und moderne Technik* to a conference during May 1976 in DePaul University of Chicago. His greetings are dated 11 April 1976. Here he says,

MODERN NATURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Greetings to the participants in the tenth colloquium May 14 - 16, 1976, in Chicago.

Thoughtful men exchange greetings by posing questions to one another. The question with which I send my greetings to you is that single question which I have persistently tried to ask in a more questioning manner. It is known as "the question of **Being**."

So, the question is steadfast in Heidegger's thoughts.

Did Heidegger teach or write about doctrines?

Sometimes he might have slipped, but as you can see it is all about the question and the questioning approach. Heidegger as interrogator (best and final paradigm).

The most famous south Indian Buddhist philosopher named, Nāgārjuna (live 2nd century A.D.) wrote in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (<https://www.dhammadownload.com/india/mulamadhyamakakarika.html>) (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, *Middle View Stanzas*), *MMK* 25:24. "No Dharma has been taught by the Buddha anywhere to anyone". ("na kva cit kasyacit kaścīd dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ").

The Buddha helped us to see the four truths for the noble people and how to obtain a higher level, that is, by following the 8-fold path. Thus, not a Dharma was taught. The middle path of the Buddha. Think of the Buddha's 16 unanswerable questions in the Sabbasava Sutta. The term is acintya (अचिन्त्य) or not thinkable. The Buddha's silence on questions besides the "point."

Summary

1). Heidegger never wanted to produce a Heidegger Philosophy. But the truth is, “No Doctrines.” There are only “ways” and paths. By Heidegger’s own definition there are no “werke.”

2). Heidegger was against “the system.” The time for the system was over (“The age of the "systems" has past.” GA 65:4).

3). The early Heidegger complained that Aristotle did not build a system and his problems and questions were “open.” This was against Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) reading and most of the medieval reading of Aristotle as well. For Heidegger, Aristotle was not dead and in the dustbins of history; but rather, was alive with questions and brought to the forefront of current philosophy.

Example, “Aristotle is said to be the master coherent edifice, doctrinal system. Thomas. Pure fiction! Everything is open; basic problems.” *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (Summer semester 1926). GA 22:145-146. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz.

4). Heidegger’s brand of philosophy was the path of questioning.

As shown in the next section on teaching, “What always counts in the lecture-courses is the manner of proceeding - the sequence of steps - not a claim to final truths. The lecture-courses never wrap up in a completeness and in seemingly "finishing off" the works interpreted, but rather in the inner fullness of the hidden dynamics of questioning.” *Mindfulness*. GA 66 *Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:421. Translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary.

5). At the end of Heidegger’s lectures on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*,

“I close by breaking off and doing without an artificial summary. Everything is to remain open. Not a firm opinion about the work or even a point of view of its evaluation shall you raise, but rather, to learn to understand: the task of the confrontation (Auseinandersetzung), which becomes necessary here - what it is and what it demands.”

(“Ich schlieÙe, indem ich abbreche und auf eine künstliche Abrundung verzichte. Es soll alles offenbleiben. Nicht eine feste Meinung über das Werk oder gar einen Standpunkt seiner Beurteilung sollen Sie aufraffen, sondern verstehen lernen: die Aufgabe der Auseinandersetzung, die hier notwendig wird - was sie ist und was sie verlangt. “Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Winter semester 1930/31). GA 32:215. Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly.

6). Heidegger at the end of philosophy.

“The end of philosophy could be a sign for the beginning of thinking....” (“Das Ende der Philosophie könnte ein Zeichen sein für den Anfang des Denkens.”). *Anmerkungen I-V* (*Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948*). GA 97:236.

Ipse dixit (Latin for "he said it himself") or *autòs épha* (αὐτὸς ἔφα) from the master himself.

Stated differently, ultimately, the claim and arguments that Heidegger has a “philosophy” are unavailing and wholly without merit (meritless). In fact, pure fiction! Totally unconvincing arguments have been put forth (before the re-reading). Time to come to the realization of what Heidegger is up to, namely, Heidegger solely as the interrogator. There are no doctrines here. Heidegger’s claim is that he is only “pointing out.” Yes, indeed, perhaps a disclosive character (Erschließungscharakter).

Heidegger was about “questioning,” but does that mean that he wanted to get some kind of “answers”? Heidegger was not giving us explanation nor a descriptive metaphysics of the world. Maybe later with the four-fold you can call that a description of the world. Or, his use of the words like, *Ortschaft des Ortes*.

What would a final “answer” look like for all of Heidegger’s questions?

Martin Heidegger letter to Medard Boss dated June 30, 1955, from Messkirch.

“My plans are still uncertain for fall. Much depends on how I get the discussion about language on the right track. The issue becomes darker by the day, and at the same time, more exciting. Today I am amazed that years ago I dared to give the lecture on language. The greatest omission belongs to the fact that the possibility for a sufficient discussion about the East Asian languages *is lacking...*” (ZS 251 and German page 316). What would an “answer” look like in language that is off the books like Pirahã? Or even Japanese or Chinese? Or, more to the point even in English? Sapir–Whorf hypothesis. Heidegger mentions Leo Weisgerber (1899-1985) in his lecture on language of July 18, 1962. See Gerhard Storz, *Sprache und Dichtung*. München: Kösel-Verlag, 1957.

Heidegger about the Nature of Teaching

Heidegger was the scholarch (σχολάρχης, *scholarchēs*) of his metaphorical philosophical academy (Akadēmeia, Ἀκαδημία) or more likely the Lyceum (Λύκειον, *Lykeion*). This Heidegger's version of didacticism (διδασκτικός, *didaktikos*).

According to Walter Biemel (1918-2015), about some quip remarks that Heidegger made to Husserl (1859-1938) about a seminar where only Husserl talked. Heidegger said it was an exceptional seminar. Husserl asked in what way? And Heidegger replied, "In regard to the active participation of the students" (*Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study*, page 7). Heidegger was pushing for the Heutagogy approach to learning.

Martin Heidegger writes letter to Elisabeth Blochmann on October 12, 1968. (regard to teaching in Le Thor seminary, Provence, France). "On the other hand, against the rigid teaching and learning system of the French, my way of conducting a seminar (Socratic, as it were) was completely new and stimulating. Perhaps something new can develop here. In the end, living conversation is more potent than written words, which is in every way vulnerable to misinterpretation. But Plato already knew that at the end of his *Phaedrus* dialogue." (Storck 1989: 117).

Heidegger was contra Husserl on this issue. Walter Biemel (1918-2015) said, Heidegger vigorously wanted the participation of the students. He used the Protocol method in his many of his classes and seminars and interacted with his students during the classes and after class to correct their transcript; and especially including Heidegger correcting the Greek language script. Many examples of Heidegger's handwriting on his student's transcripts have been noted in the literature of student's transcripts.

Open question: was the master, Heidegger Acharya following in the tradition of Dionysian imitatio and Institutio Oratoria? Methodology for rhetoric and teaching. From Aristotle, Heidegger would have known the western tradition on rhetoric. In the Middle Ages Aristotle's mimesis was dropped for Dionysian imitatio. The author's name was Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Διονύσιος Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀλικαρνασσεύς, (60 BC- 7 BC).

What does Heidegger say about teaching (in 1951)?

"Teaching is even more difficult than learning. We know that; but we rarely think about it. And why is teaching more difficult than learning? Not because the teacher must have a larger store of information and have it always ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing else be learned than—learning. His conduct, therefore, often produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from him, if by 'learning' we now suddenly understand merely the procurement of useful information. The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they—he has to learn to let them learn. The teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the apprentices. The teacher is far less assured of his ground than those who learn

are of theirs. If the relation between the teacher and the taught is genuine, therefore, there is never a place in it for the authority of the know-it-all or the authoritative sway of the official. It still is an exalted matter, then, to become a teacher—which is something else entirely than becoming a famous professor.” *What is called thinking* GA 8. (1951). Heutagogy?

And this about Heidegger’s teaching style according to Walter Biemel,

“Those who [knew] Martin Heidegger only through his published writings [could] hardly form an idea of the unique style of his teaching. Even with beginners, he was able in no time to coax them into thinking, not just learning various views or reproducing what they had read but entering into the movement of thinking. It seemed as if by some miracle the Socratic practice of address and rejoinder had come to life again.” Walter Biemel (1976) *Martin Heidegger: An illustrated study by Walter Biemel*, J. L. Mehta, trans. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich). Page 6.

On the other side, Heidegger once protested about his students in 1922.

“Not a single decent question gets posed; of course, everyone starts scribbling away when I say something; when I myself pose a question, a big guessing game ensues, and one can tell by their faces that they would be equally good at solving a crossword puzzle.” Letter #36. Martin Heidegger’s letter to Karl Löwith Freiburg, Nov. 22. 1922.

Heidegger tried not just answer his own questions (like not a hypophora). Counterexample, which later in life Heidegger did use the style of anthyphora (ἀνθυποφορά) (where a speaker asks a question and then immediately answers it) in some his addresses to the general public. Some people suggest this as arguing with yourself in public by providing the answers to your own questions.

Heidegger laments this too, “I have not had any students, because none of them became my - a teacher.” (Schüler habe ich nicht gehabt, denn keiner wurde mir selber - ein Lehrer). *Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*. GA 97:462.

Or again, “And the ideal of the teacher is to be the one who can learn best.” (“Und das Ideal des Lehrers besteht darin, jener zu sein, der am besten lernen kann”). *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. Sonntag, 4. September 1955 — 9. Tag. GA 91:466.

Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (1900-2002) remark about Heidegger’s style of clothing.

“I saw them once as they met each other on the steps of Marburg University. Hartmann was going to his lecture, dressed as usual in striped pants, a black jacket, and a white, old-fashioned tie; Heidegger was on his way out in a ski suit. Hartmann stopped for a minute and asked, are you going to lecture like that?” There was a special reason for Heidegger’s satisfied laughter. Namely, he was giving a lecture on skiing that evening, which was to serve as an introduction to a new course on dry skiing. The way he began the lecture was pure Heidegger: “One can learn to ski only on the slopes and for the slopes.” *Heidegger’s ways* by Hans-Georg Gadamer; translated by John W Stanley, page 115. And now we know that Heidegger also taught skiing lessons as well. Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950). Not likely to be for cupidity.

Bring the great philosophers out of the dustbin of pure history and bring them alive to the present. Gadamer said,

“The way Hartmann and all the others, even the philologists, treated Aristotle certainly did not present him as a contemporary opponent! It was pure history. But with Heidegger, Aristotle suddenly came **alive**.” Gadamer interview.

“Heidegger as Rhetor: Hans-Georg Gadamer Interviewed by Ansgar Kemmann.” (Translated by Lawrence Kennedy Schmidt). *Heidegger and rhetoric* / edited by Daniel M. Gross and Ansgar Kemmann, 2005. Pages 47-64. Heidegger had the original expressive power of a great thinker with his encounters with traditional philosophers. It was the “thrust of his questioning.”

Hannah Arendt, wrote, “Thinking has come to life again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things altogether different from the familiar, worn-out trivialities they had been presumed to say. There exists a teacher; one can perhaps learn to think.” See “Heidegger at Eighty” by Hannah Arendt.

Heidegger’s relationship with his students is complex. Note he had many students over the period from the first lecture course, *The Idea of Philosophy, and the Problem of Worldviews* 1915–16 to the last seminar 1973 Husserl: *Logische Untersuchungen VI.2: Sinnlichkeit und Verstand* (in Zahringen, GA 15); which is 58 years of teaching (paused during part of World War II).

What was Heidegger first class that he taught?

Answer in this Colloquium über Dialektik. 1952 Sept. 15 On Dialectics. Muggenbrunn, Germany. Heidegger mentions that he worked on Parmenides fragment #3 in one of his earliest courses ----then the footnote says, W. S. 1915-16 Vorlesungen. Ober Vorsokratiker: Parmenides. But also mentioned Richardson’s with the title: Grundlinien antiken und scholastischen Philosophie. Or "Basic Trends of Ancient and Scholastic Philosophy" or in the university catalog listed as "History of philosophy.”

After the publication of **magnum opus** *Being and Time* (1927) for a while, he would start classes in the morning at dawn to reduce the number of students attending. Here is another example of Heidegger teaching style.

Karl Löwith (1897-1973) wrote,

“We gave Heidegger the nickname “the little magician from Meßkirch.”

. . . He was a small dark man who knew how to cast a spell as far as he could make disappear what he had a moment before presented. His lecture technique consisted in building up an edifice of ideas which he then proceeded to tear down, presenting the spellbound listeners with a riddle, and then leaving them empty-handed.”

[*Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933*. English] *My life in Germany before and after 1933: a report* / Karl Löwith; translated by Elizabeth King. Page 45.

Generally, to compare Heidegger to Socrates as a teacher but note that Socrates says in *Apology* (33a-b), “I have never been anyone's teacher”. They both lead their students to “aporetic (ἀπορία) state of being perplexed (examples in the *Euthyphro* (Εὐθύφρων) and *Laches*).

Back to Karl Löwith besides being a student, he was also a babysitter for Heidegger's two sons when they were young. Löwith spent many weeks with Martin at the Hütte (hut) and was one of Heidegger's most famous students. This is not an example of irrelevant authority as they had spent lots of time in discussions over nine years, plus an extensive published letter exchange.

After Löwith's published attacks of Heidegger, and Heidegger reacted as follows (1952): “I am not surprised that a fifty-five-year-old man who, from 1919 on, took my courses and seminars for nine whole years and almost every other day in Marburg dashed into our house in order to squeeze something out of me can report on some things and thereby *appear* to many uninformed people to be in the know. The same author, while an immigrant in the United States, spread the most outrageous lies about me. . . . In 1929, when Löwith was the reddest Marxist (today he has turned Christian and occupies the chair at the University of Heidelberg), he wrote about *Being and Time* saying it was a “concealed theology.” Later on, he changed that to “atheism”—as one uses that term.” Cited in H. W. Petzet, *Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger*, trans. P. Emad (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), page 91. His student at this time became anathema to him... later on they would be colleagues again.

Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) wrote, “And we experienced another one, an “academic” liberation: Heidegger's interpretation of the Greek philosophy and German Idealism, which gave us a new a new insight into the texts that had long been frozen.” in “Disappointment”. *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger* (Neske: Pfullingen, 1977), page 162. Although Marcuse was Heidegger's assistant (1928-1932), he later did not approve of Heidegger's philosophy. This statement shows the impact Heidegger had on students in his early lectures.

Heidegger's Seminar in Le Thor in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, France. 1968, August 30. Heidegger's secret. Heidegger was coming up on his 79th birthday.

“That is why, in a real seminar, the teacher is the one who learns the most. For this reason, he must not teach the others what the text is; he must listen to what it says. The law of the seminar is to question unceasingly. Learners (pupils) should support the questions of the teacher through their questions. Never *believe* anything; everything needs to be tested. Thus, we see that work is not to be measured in terms of quantity. Heidegger recalls that at Marburg his manner of working elicited mistrust. At first the students said that in a whole semester they had not even gotten out of Plato's *Sophist*.... In our seminar, Heidegger continues, we cannot be sure of getting beyond a few lines of the text. But one thing is sure, and that is that if we get these lines, we will then be able to read Hegel's whole book. That, he says, is das Geheimnis des Seminars [the secret of the seminar].” *A Heidegger Seminar on Hegel's Differenzschrift* Translated by William Lovitt.

Or again, “Im Seminar gilt es unnachlässig zu fragen” “In the seminar it is important to constantly ask questions.” *Seminare* (1951–1973). GA 15:286.

This is clear not just about the secret of the seminar, but the whole of Heidegger's stance toward philosophical thinking in general. Question and never believe anything. About the lecture course and their purpose, again leads to "questioning."

Heidegger remarks,

"What always counts in the lecture-courses is the manner of proceeding - the sequence of steps - not a claim to final truths. The lecture-courses never wrap up in a completeness and in seemingly "finishing off" the works interpreted, but rather in the inner fullness of the hidden dynamics of questioning." GA 66:421. *Mindfulness. GA 66 Besinnung* (1938/39). Philosophy is not a closed system and is not meant to give some "results" and be finished, but rather unfinished and unfinishable. An example, of '**de omnibus dubitandum est**' (everything must be doubted).

Summary

Fortunately, Heidegger's teaching approach was reflected in his way of questioning; and his way of questioning was reflected in his teaching approach. In other words, "the inner fullness of the hidden dynamics of questioning" *Mindfulness. Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:421.

Heidegger against philosophy as a worldview or the standpoint of standpointlessness

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), whom José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) called "the most important philosopher in the second half of the nineteenth century" (1946:131). Dilthey was attempting something he called "doctrine of world views" (*Weltanschauunglehre*). Included three components to all world views: *Weltbild* (world-picture), *Lebenswürdigung* (evaluation of life), and ideals of *Lebensführung* (conduct of life). Interestingly enough, see *Ontologie und Dialektik* (1960/61) Lecture One "Against the philosophy of standpoints and philosophical worldviews". Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno (1903-1969). In various places Heidegger writes about worldviews of anti-Bolshevism, anti-National Socialism, anti-Anglicism, and anti-Americanism, and at some period of time he was even anti-Alemannic (in his Black Notebooks). For it is no longer possible to deny the existence of anti- [take your pick] passages in Heidegger's writings. The question is how many of these might be world-views and not really important, since Heidegger says that philosophy is not about promoting world-views or world-pictures.

Overview of Dilthey from Wikipedia

"In 1911, Dilthey developed a typology of the three basic *Weltanschauungen*, or World-Views, which he considered to be "typical" (comparable to Max Weber's notion of "ideal types") and conflicting ways of conceiving of humanity's relation to Nature in Naturalism, represented by Epicureans of all times and places, humans see themselves as determined by nature in the Idealism of Freedom (or Subjective Idealism), represented by Friedrich Schiller and Immanuel Kant, humans are conscious of their separation from nature by their free will in Objective Idealism, represented by G. W. F. Hegel, Baruch Spinoza, and Giordano Bruno, humans are conscious of their harmony with nature."

Back to Heidegger's trail.

From the summer of semester of 1923 (99 years ago), the young Heidegger writes "B. The prejudice of freedom from standpoints.

Rejecting this way of proceeding in which the subject-object schema is foisted on fields of investigation is only one of the most urgent precautionary measures needed today. A second concerns a prejudice which merely constitutes the counterpart to the uncritical approach of generating constructions and theorizing. This is the *demand for observation which is free of standpoints*.

This second prejudice is even more disastrous for research because, with its express watchword for the seemingly highest idea of science and objectivity, it in fact elevates taking an uncritical approach into a first principle and promulgates a fundamental blindness. It cultivates a strange

modesty and grants a general dispensation from critical questioning by means of the apparent self-evidence of what it demands.” 63. *Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität* (Summer semester 1923) GA 63:81-82.

By 1927, then Heidegger is on the way. Example, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. (Summer semester 1927). GA 24.

Overview of Heidegger’s remarks from GA 24. The word worldview (Weltanschauung) was first and appears the only time was when used by Kant in the *Critique of Judgment* (his third critique Kant: AK:255) and there is no Latin or Greek equivalent it was coined in German first and was used later in English. The word and its meanings involved over time, Heidegger quotes and investigates the usage of the word “Weltanschauung” in Goethe, Alexander von Humboldt, Schelling, Hegel, Gorres, Ranke, Schleiermacher, Bismarck, and final Karl Jasper (his book on the *Psychology of Worldviews* was published in 1919); but the one philosopher of note and importance that Heidegger leaves out of this discussion was Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911).

Heidegger is against the entire notion of philosophy about building a worldview. Heidegger writes,

“A "world-view" is an off-shoot of metaphysics and in fact becomes simply possible there, where metaphysics enters the state of its completion. "World-view" is a modern deformation of metaphysics, and the measure of "World-view" is publicness wherein everyone finds everything accessible and raises a claim on such accessibility. This is not contradicted by the fact that "world-views" are entirely "personal" and tailored to "individuals" who perceive themselves as the solitary 'everyone' that represents an image of the world...” *Mindfulness. Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:402. Note that these remarks are not in a lecture series.

An example, Karl Jaspers’ 1919 work *Psychologie Der Weltanschauungen (Psychology of Worldviews)* came out and Heidegger said in the letter to his teacher Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), dated 27 January 1920, “This book must, in my opinion, be fought in the severest possible manner, precisely because it has so much to offer, which Jaspers has learned from everywhere, and because it appropriates an important trace of our times.”

Philosophy’s core is not in creating a worldview. The early Heidegger used the expression “attitudinal context” (Einstellungszusammenhang) as a stance. Interestingly enough Gadamer notes that he very rarely ever saw Jasper laugh or chortle, in other words, not exactly frolicsome.

Later in the early 1930s, Heidegger’s remark, “*Philosophy is not a worldview* in the sense of the presentation of a picture of the world that is constructed from the current results of the sciences today, the dominant tendencies of the various directions of practical activity, and the currently valid demands of life, with the added intention of raising the individual out of his individual isolation in his occupation within his own domain...”. (*Being and Truth*, Richard Polt translator). *Sein und Wahrheit*. Freiburg lecture course Winter Semester 1933-34. GA 36/37:8-9.

Extended remarks from 1938-1939. This is not from a lecture series.

“131. Metaphysics and "World-view"

A "world-view" is an off-shoot of metaphysics and in fact becomes simply possible there, where metaphysics enters the state of its completion. "World-view" is a modern deformation of metaphysics, and the measure of "world-view" is publicness wherein everyone finds everything accessible and raises a claim on such accessibility. This is not contradicted by the fact that "world-views" are entirely "personal" and tailored to "individuals" who perceive themselves as the solitary 'everyone' that represents an image of the world and represents the world as an image - "individuals" who provide themselves with a kind of self-orientation, (character), (e.g., Houston Stewart Chamberlain).

Fundamental to a "world-view" is:

1. the preeminence of beings (the actual) (forgottenness of being);
2. aiming at "goals" and "ideals" that should be realized;
3. arranging the ways and means of such realization;
4. all these in accord with a public common intelligibility that is willed in advance, which requires;
5. accordingly, thinking *historically* but thinking without choosing, and thinking calculatively and that means thinking *unhistorically* through and through."

Besinnung (1938/39). *Mindfulness*. GA 66:402 (E.T. 355).

Strongly noted:

“Philosophy and worldview are so incommensurable that no image could possibly depict the distinction between them” *Besinnung* (1938/39). *Mindfulness*. GA 66:38-39.

An important part of Heidegger’s understanding of philosophy is the topic of philosophical standpoint (Standpunktsphilosophien). This extensive quote comes from Heidegger’s engagement with Nietzsche in the Summer Semester of 1937. Heidegger here is arguing against the whole notion of a “standpoint of standpointlessness.”

Heidegger remarks,

“And in point of fact we still have scholars today who busy themselves with philosophy and who consider freedom-from-every-standpoint not to be a standpoint, as though such freedom did not depend upon those very standpoints. These curious attempts to flee from one's own shadow we may leave to themselves, since discussion of them yields no tangible results. Yet we must heed one thing: this standpoint of freedom- from-standpoints is of the opinion that it has overcome the onesidedness and bias of prior philosophy, which always was, and is, defined by its standpoints. However, the standpoint of standpointlessness represents no overcoming. In truth it is the extreme consequence, affirmation, and final stage of that opinion concerning philosophy which locates all philosophy extrinsically in standpoints that are ultimately right in front of us, standpoints whose one-sidedness we can try to bring into equilibrium.” *Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*. 1937 Summer Semester. et. page 118. Translations by David Farrell Krell.

A few years before, we found this remark. “Not freedom of standpoint (something fantastic), but rather, the right choice of standpoint, courage of standpoint, commitment and consolidation of standpoint is the task (Aufgabe), which of course takes place only in the philosophical work, not before and not subsequently.” (“Nicht Standpunktsfreiheit (etwas Phantastisches), sondern rechte Standpunktswahl, Standpunktsmut, Standpunktseinsatz und -festigung ist die Aufgabe, die freilich selbst nur in der philosophischen Arbeit, nicht vorher und nicht nachher, sich vollzieht”). *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*. Freiburger Vorlesungen, Wintersemester 1931-1932. GA 34:78.

The right choice of standpoint is in fact the interrogative, that is, the questioning standpoint. This is the proper standpoint of philosophy (Standpunktsphilosophien).

Heidegger has a similar remark from 1923,

“Ad 1: Not prejudice, which is a utopia. The opinion of having no prejudice is itself the greatest prejudice, is itself the greatest prejudice. Superiority to any possibility of something turning out to be a prejudice, turns out to be prejudice. Not free from prejudice, but rather, free for the possibility to escape from the moment of the decisive confrontation with the matter at hand, to abandon a prejudice.”

(Ad 1. Nicht Vorurteilslosigkeit, die eine Utopie ist. Die Meinung, kein Vorurteil zu haben, ist selbst das grösste Vorurteil. Überlegenheit gegenüber jeder Möglichkeit, dass sich etwas als Vorurteil herausstellt. Nicht frei von Vorurteilen, sondern frei für die Möglichkeit, im entscheidenden Moment aus der Auseinandersetzung mit der Sache heraus ein Vorurteil aufzugeben.”). *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (Winter semester 1923/24). GA 17:2.

The side issue of Nietzsche’s perspectivism is shown by one of his famous quotes. There are **No Facts** and only interpretations. Heidegger’s discussions of Nietzsche are called out; and is in fact against the “evocations of “perspectivism;” but rather, for Heidegger there is a right choice of a standpoint.

This is what Nietzsche famously says about Perspektivismus, 1886 (138 years ago),

“Against positivism, which stops at the phenomenon of “there are only facts,” I would say no, currently there are no facts, it is only interpretation. We can determine no **Factum** “in itself”: perhaps it is nonsense (Unsinn) to something as want (wollen). “It’s all subjective,” you say: but even this is interpretation, the “subject” is not given, but rather something added and invented and projected, stuck behind. —Is it necessary finally to put the interpreter still behind the interpretation? Even this is poetry, hypothesis.

As far as the word “knowledge” makes sense (Sinn), the world is recognizable: but it is different interpretable, it has no sense <meaning, Sinn> behind it, but rather many meanings (Sinne) “perspectivism”.

“(Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei dem Phänomen stehen bleibt „es giebt nur Thatsachen,” würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Thatsachen giebt es nicht, nur Interpretationen. Wir können kein **Factum** „an sich“ feststellen: vielleicht ist es ein Unsinn, so etwas zu wollen. „Es ist alles subjektiv“ sagt ihr: aber schon das ist Auslegung, das „Subjekt“ ist nichts Gegebenes, sondern

etwas Hinzu-Erdichtetes, Dahinter-Gestecktes. — Ist es zuletzt nöthig, den Interpreten noch hinter die Interpretation zu setzen? Schon das ist Dichtung, Hypothese.

Soweit überhaupt das Wort “Erkenntniß” Sinn hat, ist die Welt erkennbar: aber sie ist anders deutbar, sie hat keinen Sinn hinter sich, sondern unzählige Sinne “Perspektivismus.”

KGWB/NF-1886, Gruppe 7 [60]. [7 = Mp XVII 3b. Ende 1886 — Frühjahr 1887].

Summary

Contrary to many philosophers, Heidegger is against any kind of worldview (For example, Christian, Buddhist, liberalism, conservatism, positivism, perspectivism, and pragmatism. Capitalism, communism, Americanism, Internationalism, National Socialism, or even democratic republics). The purpose, goals, and task of philosophy is not to create a worldview or even to decide between opposing worldviews. The goal is not "essentially bumped one worldview off the table after the other." It should be noted that most worldviews come with a ranking of “values,” which is another sign for Heidegger of thinking being captured within metaphysics. Heidegger task is the overcoming of metaphysic, so he does not want to do a "repeater pencil" and fall back into metaphysics. At least, it is clear that Heidegger knew that one of the goals was the twisting free of metaphysics. Of course, it is not easy to think through.

Nota bene.

As Heidegger said, “...but rather, the right choice of standpoint, courage of standpoint, commitment and consolidation of standpoint is the task.” (“...sondern rechte Standpunktswahl, Standpunktsmut, Standpunktseinsatz und -festigung ist die Aufgabe.”) *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet* (Winter semester 1931/32). GA 34:78. And the overall task and standpoint is the path of questioning. Heidegger as interrogator.

See also. GA 27. *Einleitung in die Philosophie. Introduction to Philosophy*. Freiburg lecture course Winter Semester 1928-29. Translation by William McNeil. See second division Philosophy and Weltanschauung. The second division is ZWEITER ABSCHNITT PHILOSOPHIE UND WELTANSCHAUUNG. The first section is Erstes Kapitel Weltanschauung und Weltbegriff. GA 27:229-400.

Heidegger's world-famous book *Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, SuZ, 1927)*

"Also muss auf *SuZ* zurückgegangen werden." Heideggerians must return to his **magnum opus** *Being and Time* repeatedly. The first crucible of his thinking. In this way we are following Heidegger himself. Contentious? No.

Sein und Zeit

von Martin Heidegger

Achtzehnte Auflage

Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001.

xiii, 445 p.; 23 cm

'Zuerst erschienen als Sonderdruck aus

Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung'

Band VIII. Late April 1927.

To: EDMUND HUSSERL in Verehrung und Freundschaft zugeeignet, Todtnauberg i. Bad. Schwarzwald zum 8. April 1926.

Die Abhandlung »Sein und Zeit« erschien zuerst Frühjahr 1927 in dem von *E. Husserl* herausgegebenen Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung Bd. VIII und gleichzeitig als Sonderdruck.

In the, *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*.

Early in the process of drafting this famous book, Martin Heidegger had a first-floor study and apartment at 21 Schwanallee, Marburg, Germany; and later he rented a room from his friend Johann Brender (1889-1968) in a house which was a couple of 100 meters below Martin's cottage normally called the "Die Hütte". Die Hütte is high on a hill above the tiny town of Todtnauberg, Black Forest, Germany. Brender's original house burned down and was later converted into a bank. Heidegger worked on some parts of *Sein und Zeit* at the cottage but complained that his two young sons made a lot of noise. Rumors are that Heidegger may have grown his beard during this time as he worked on the manuscript. By May 1, 1927, Karl Jaspers wrote to Heidegger that he had the book in hand.

In the copy of *Sein und Zeit* given by Martin Heidegger to Edmund Husserl (on his 68th birthday, April 8, 1927), he wrote a quote from Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781).

"For the me the greatest clarity was always the greatest beauty."

"Die grösste Deutlichkeit was mir immer die grösste Schönheit."

Thomas Sheehan notes that between the sixth and seventh edition (1949-1953) there were 480 changes were made to the text. Plus, hundreds have been made since that time. In addition, more

recent editions have included Heidegger's marginalia. There are some real palimpsests (παλίμψηστος, palímpsēstos) in the DLA Heidegger archival collection. Heidegger sold the manuscript for *Sein und Zeit* for DM 100,000 in 1970 according to T. Kiesel (1995). More than just some paper assignats.

But in a more general way, *Being and Time* is just one example of Heidegger having re-worked and made many editorial changes and additions. We have the "last hand," but not the critical edition which might be seen only after the copyright runs out. Maybe in the year 2046. Currently, Heidegger died in 1976 + 70 years, which is the year 2046 when the copyright runs out unless there are other changes or options for the owners, namely, the Heidegger family.

Also, changes in all the German editions of *Being and Time* are noted in Rainer A. Bast and Heinrich P. Delfosse's "Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers "Sein und Zeit," vol. I (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), esp. pp. 359-365 and 387-402. See by the same authors, "Philologisches zu den beiden Neuausgaben von 'Sein und Zeit,'" *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 86 (1979), 184-192. (References by Thomas Sheehan).

There is also the Gesamtausgabe (GA) version.
GA 2. *Sein und Zeit* (1927).
Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p.
Revised 2018
Zweite Auflage 2018.

Example of earlier editions.

Sein und Zeit

Author: Martin Heidegger

Publisher: M. Niemeyer, Halle, 1929.

Notes. "Sonderdruck aus: 'Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung', Band VIII herausgegeben von E. Husserl ..."

Max Niemeyer, Verlag, Halle a.d.S, 1927. Af: Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. Bd. 7

Alt d. udk

Særtr.

In the early lecture course *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, History of the Concept of Time*, Summer Semester 1925. This edition was done with the help Heidegger's student Simon Moser's (1901-1988) transcripts. Moser's student transcripts were used by Heidegger in his famous, *Sein und Zeit* (1927).

On May 11, 1926, a copy of 11 galleys printed and re-edited with Heidegger's handwritten annotations and his various friend's handwriting too: Karl Löwith (1897-1973), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Wilhelm Szilasi (1889-1966), and Helene Weiss (1901-1951). The manuscript and galleys were re-written and re-checked in to the early part of January of 1927. Finally on March

22, 1927, the final printed book was done. By May 1, 1927, Karl Jaspers writes to Heidegger that he had the book in hand (see Kisiel, page 476-489).

Heidegger in discussion of phenomenology makes this historical note.

“Dilthey was the first to understand the aims of phenomenology. Already in the eighteen-sixties, his work was directed toward an elaboration of a new psychology.” *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (Summer semester 1925). GA 20:163–64.

Where to start? Here Heidegger notes about the method question.

“But we have noted that phenomenology is first of all a *pure methodological* concept which only specifies the *how* of the research.” *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (Summer semester 1925). GA 20:184-185.

Some remarks from his personal notebooks:

“Objection to the book: I have even today still not enough enemies—it has not brought me a Great enemy.” (*Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks*, page 8).

“People are waiting for the second volume of *Being and Time*; I am waiting for this waiting to cease and for people to finally confront the first volume. (*Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks*, page 135).

Later, Heidegger would often make judgements like this one about his overall project of *Being and Time*.

“The fundamental flaw of the book *Being and Time* is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too soon.” “zu früh zu weit.” *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950–1959). GA 12:89.

Advertisement written by Heidegger for the first half of *Being and Time*

“If, in this way, the fundamental question of ontology, namely, that concerning the meaning of Being in general, receives its answer, then, proceeding from this, it must become possible to grasp in a more radical fashion the impetuses and tendencies of scientific philosophy from antiquity to Hegel.” First published in 1927. Now in Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*. GA 14:125–26. Translated by Ian Alexander Moore. Note: *philosophia prima*.

In 1935, Walter Bröcker (1902-1992) says this about *Being and Time*.

“Heidegger's purpose in *Being and Time* ... is to show that, far from having reached the end of philosophical enquiry, ... we have hardly come in sight of the most fundamental problems which must be attacked, and that these problems must be attacked, not by science, which concerns itself with limited spheres of existence, but only by the philosophers of the future ... With this thematic task, which in its universality transcends all other endeavors of contemporary academic philosophy, Heidegger attempts to raise philosophy again to a height which in the nineteenth century, the age of science, it seemed to have lost forever” (Brock, pp. 116-17)

In a short sample from GA 102 (the last volume of GA) that the publisher has put online there is a single sentence from the first section of Vorläufiges I. Heidegger is writing in the last of the Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte).

“Das Vorgehen in »Sein und Zeit«: entfalten die Seinsfrage und bestimmen ihres Horizontes –; dies verlangt eine Analytik des im Seinsentwurf stehenden Daseins und der es bestimmenden ekstatischen Zeitlichkeit.”

(“The procedure in »Being and Time«: unfolding the question of Being and determining its horizon –; this requires an analysis of the existence standing in the draft of Daseins and of the ecstatic temporality (Zeitlichkeit) that determines it.”). GA 102. *Vorläufiges I-IV. (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970)*. Vorläufiges I. DLA 75.7420,1. This was written by the author some 38 years after the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927.

From Theodore Kisiel remarkable tracking on this work.

"May 1924 Heidegger writing to Karl Jaspers, I am counting on the few who will study it; only you will understand it's true intentions, what I want. On the whole, it is for me a transition work. From the fact that Husserl! finds the whole thing strange and can 'no longer find a place' for it in the usual phenomenology, I conclude that I am **de facto** already further away than I myself believe and see.").

(“May 24- Heidegger to Jaspers, about his book in progress: "Ich rechne auf Wenige, die es studieren; in den eigentlichen Intentionen werden nur Sie verstehen, was ich will. Im Ganzen ist es für mich ein Übergangsarbeit. Daraus, dass Husserl das Ganze befremdend findet und es in der üblichen Phänomenologie 'nicht mehr unterbringt', schliesse ich, dass ich de facto schon weiter weg bin, als ich selbst glaube und sehe.").

The genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time by Theodore Kisiel, page 483.

This was Heidegger estimation of his distance from Husserl. In fact, it was much further than Heidegger realized and eventually was revealed by Husserl in his re-reading of *Being and Time* and we now have Husserl's marginalia. Heidegger is a vastly different philosopher than Husserl; and he is not doing Husserl's version of phenomenology – at all.

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) letter to Christoph von Wolzogen. Dated. 23 September 1999.

“Especially if one has been largely inspired by Heidegger himself, I am convinced that Natorp's general psychology was basically even more important for Heidegger than Husserl's "Logical Investigations". (“Gerade wenn man selber von Heidegger weitgehend angespornt worden ist, bin ich doch überzeugt, daß gerade die allgemeine Psychologie Natorps im Grunde für Heidegger sogar wichtiger war als Husserls ‚Logische Untersuchungen“). Paul Natorp (1854-1924) and Heidegger walked and talked a great deal when both (1923-1924) were at Philipps-Universität Marburg.

By end of 1927, Heidegger was done with concept of phenomenology and certainly that it could not provide any “methodology” for philosophical projects. Clearly, Hegel was in line with the power of die Sache selbst (Husserl not so much). Even more so, Hegel breaths the air of historical thinking and Heidegger never got the level of Hegel’s historical dimensions or even attempted a complex analysis of history like Hegel. Compare Hegel’s historical depth and infusion in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. Heidegger is on the short end of this case and Husserl is not in the race.??

In the early 1940s, Heidegger had a thought about his famous book, namely, *Being and Time* (1927),

“If they kindle a storm of thought around the matter of “*Being and Time*,” then they would become real opponents; but the inability to think only leads to the cunning of enemies and the hot temper of those with ill-wishers.

(“Entfachten sie doch einen Sturm des Denkens um die Sache von »Sein und Zeit«, dann würden sie zu echten Wider-sachem; aber das Unvermögen zum Denken treibt nur in das Listige von Feinden und in das Hitzige von Übelwollenden”). *Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*. *Anmerkungen II*. GA 97:159.

Conclusion.

Also muss auf SuZ zurückgegangen werden.

Also muss auf SuZ zurückgegangen werden!

Heidegger on Heidegger's Project

Martin Heidegger's publication *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*. (Martin Heidegger, GA 42, but originally published in 1971 with the added notes from 1941) sheds light on his later relationship to *Being and Time*. This was written in 1936 with notes added from 1941. In the book about Schelling that Heidegger published in his own lifetime, Heidegger put a note in parenthesis about *Being and Time*, which reads:

“(I am not saying that *Being and Time* has become something past for me. I have still not “gotten any further” today because I know with ever increasing clarity that I must not get any “further,” but perhaps I have gotten closer in some things that was attempted in *Being and Time*) “. (*Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, et p. 189). Joan Stambaugh translation.

Martin Heidegger's own writings to come out as GA 82 *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen*. According to GA-65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* this includes the following: Anmerkungen zu "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1936), Eine Auseinandersetzung mit "Sein und Zeit" (1936), Laufende Anmerkungen zu "Sein und Zeit" (1935/1936). Some critical remarks and observations about *Being and Time* by Martin Heidegger about nine years after the first publication of *Being and Time* in 1927.

Heidegger on Heidegger,

"Auf diesen Entwurf geht alles zu und den Bereich dieser Besinnungen gehört auch die Eine Auseinandersetzung mit "Sein und Zeit". Diese Vorarbeiten sind immer neue Anläufe, um die Grundstellung für die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seyns zu finden."

„In this draft (Entwurf) all goes to, and the scope of these reflections also includes a discussion of "Being and Time". These preparations are always new attempts to find the basic position for the question of the truth of Being.” *Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:424.

Martin Heidegger in a letter to “Letter to David L. Edwards (January 28, 1965)”. In: *Heidegger and Christianity*. 1994, pp. 111-112. Heidegger speaks to the translators about the first complete English translation of *Sein und Zeit* from German into English.

SCM Press Ltd. Publishers, 7

Direktor: David L. Edwards, Bedford Square
London.

“Nachdem die von Ihnen veranlasste Übersetzung meiner Hauptschrift ‘Sein und Zeit’ sich jetzt in den englisch sprechenden Ländern verbreitet hat, möchte ich Ihnen meinen besonderen Dank übermitteln, dass Sie sich dieser Mühe unterzogen. Ganz besonders bitte ich darum, den beiden Herrn, die Übersetzung in einer langwierigen Arbeit ausführten, meinen Dank zu übermitteln. Wenn ich das jetzt erst tue, so bitte ich es damit zu entschuldigen, dass mir sehr viel daran lag,

kompetente Urteile über die Übersetzung zu hören. Sie sind inzwischen von verschiedenen Seiten eingegangen.

Ich weiss, wie schwer es ist, meine Arbeiten in einer anderen Sprache vorzulegen; ich bin darum besonders erfreut, das die Übersetzung so gut ausgeführt wurde.

Der Absatz zeit, eine wie grosse Lücke auf dem internationalen Büchermarkt wissenschaftlicher Werke mit dieser Übersetzung geschafften wurde.

Mit dem Wunsche erfolgreicher weiterer Arbeit. begrüsse ich Sie freundlich
Martin Heidegger.”

“Ich weiss, wie schwer es ist, meine Arbeiten in einer anderen Sprache vorzulegen “.

English translation.

“Now that the translation of my main work 'Being and Time', which you have arranged, has spread in the English-speaking countries, I would like to convey my special thanks to you that you have taken this trouble. In particular, I ask you to convey my thanks to the two gentlemen who carried out the translation in a lengthy work. If I am only doing this now, I would like to apologize for the fact that it was very important to me to hear competent opinions about the translation. In the meantime, they have been received from various quarters.

I know how difficult it is to present my work in another language; I am therefore particularly pleased that the translation has been so well done. The sales show how big a gap has been created in the international book market of scientific works with this translation.

With the wish to be successful in further work, I greet you kindly.

Martin Heidegger"

"I know how difficult it is to present my work in another language."

How did Martin Heidegger's whole project of *Being and Time* come about? According to the later Heidegger, he wrote in 1963,

"Professor Heidegger - you have got to publish something now. Do you have a manuscript?" With these words the dean of the philosophical faculty in Marburg came into my study one day in the winter semester of 1925-1926. "Certainly," I answered. Then the dean said: "But it must be printed quickly." The faculty proposed me **unico loco** as Nicolai Hartmann's successor for the chief philosophical chair.

Meanwhile, the ministry in Berlin had rejected the proposal with the explanation that I had not published anything in the last ten years. Now I had to submit my closely protected work to the public. On account of Husserl's intervention, the publishing house Max Niemeyer was ready to print immediately the first fifteen proof sheets of the work which was to appear in Husserl's *Jahrbuch*.

Two copies of the finished page proof were sent to the ministry by the faculty right away. But after some time, they were returned to the faculty with the remark: "Inadequate." In February of the following year (1927), the complete text of *Being and Time* was published in the eighth volume of the *Jahrbuch* and as a separate publication. After that the ministry reversed its negative judgment half a year later and made the offer for the chair. On the occasion of the strange publication of *Being and Time*, I came first into a direct relationship with the publishing house Max Niemeyer. What was a mere name on the title page of Husserl's fascinating work during the first semester of my academic studies became evident now and in the future in all the thoroughness and reliability, generosity, and simplicity, of publication work." Martin Heidegger, "My Way to Phenomenology;" English translation by Joan Stambaugh, page 80. From "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie". Essay written in 1963 in honor of the publisher Hermann Niemeyer. *Zur Sache des Denkens* (1969) Tübingen: Niemeyer, pp. 81-90. GA 14:91-102. *On Time and Being* (1972) New York: Harper and Row, 1978, pp. 74-82.

Heidegger's power of thinking in *Being and Time*.

Incredibly brilliant. Near the end of *Being and Time*, there are two remarkable passages (A, B) that show Heidegger at his peak critical power:

(A. passage).

"In terms of the possible ways in which primordial time can temporalize itself, we have provided the grounds for those structures that we only "indicated" earlier.

Setting forth the constitution of being of Da-sein, however, still remains *only one way that we may take*. Our goal is to work out the question of Being in general. Our thematic analytic of existence needs in its turn the light from a previously clarified idea of Being in general. That is especially true if the statement expressed in our introduction is retained as a standard for every philosophical investigation: Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, beginning with a hermeneutic of Da-sein which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guideline for all philosophical questioning at the point where it arises and to which it returns. (1).

Of course, this thesis must not be taken dogmatically, but as a formulation of the fundamental problem still "veiled": Can ontology be grounded ontologically or does it also need for this an ontic foundation, and which Being must take over the function of this foundation?"

"(1). Thus, not existential philosophy." This is Heidegger's footnote. *Being and Time*, English translation page 397. German text page 436.

(B. passage).

"We can never inquire into the origin and the possibility of the "idea" of being in general with the means of formal and logical "abstraction," that is, not without a secure horizon for questions and answers. We must look for a way (**2) to illuminate the fundamental ontological question and follow it. Whether that way is at all the only one or even the *right* one can be decided only after we have *followed* it. The strife in relation to the interpretation of being cannot be settled because it has not yet been started. And finally, it cannot be 'jumped into,' but the beginning of the *strife* already needs preparation. This investigation is solely underway to that. Where does it stand?"

" (**2). Not "the" sole way." This is an important Heidegger's footnote.

Being and Time, English translation page 398. German text page 437. Joan Stambaugh, 1996
State University of New York.

The last two paragraphs of *Being and Time*,

“We can never inquire into the origin and the possibility of the "idea" of being in general with the means of formal and logical "abstraction," that is, not without a secure horizon for questions and answers. We must look for a way* to illuminate the fundamental ontological question and *follow* it. Whether that way is the *only* one or even the *right* one can be decided only after we have *followed* it. The *strife* in relation to the interpretation of being cannot be settled *because it has not yet even been started*. And finally, it cannot be 'lumped into,' but the beginning of the strife already needs preparation. This investigation is solely *underway* (*unterwegs*) to that. Where does it stand?

Something like "Being" has been disclosed in the understanding of being that belongs to existing Da-sein as a way in which it understands. The preliminary disclosure of being, although it is unconceptual, makes it possible for Da-sein as an existing being-in-the-world to be related to *beings*, to those it encounters in the world as well as to itself in existing. *How is the disclosive understanding of Being belonging to Da-sein possible at all?* Can the question be answered by going back to the *primordial constitution of Being* of Da-sein that understands being? The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Da-sein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial *time* to the meaning of *being*? Does *time* itself reveal itself as *Being*?”

„Nach dem Ursprung und der Möglichkeit der »Idee« des Seins überhaupt kann nie mit den Mitteln formal-logischer »Abstraktion«, das heißt nicht ohne sicheren Frage- und Antworthorizont geforscht werden. Es gilt, einen Weg zur Aufhellung der ontologischen Fundamentalfrage zu suchen und zu gehen. Ob er der einzige oder überhaupt der rechte ist, das kann erst nach dem Gang entschieden werden. Der Streit bezüglich der Interpretation des Seins kann nicht geschlichtet werden, weil er noch nicht einmal entfacht ist. Und am Ende läßt er sich nicht »vom Zaun brechen«, sondern das Entfachen des Streites bedarf schon einer Zurüstung. Hierzu allein ist die vorliegende Untersuchung unterwegs. Wo steht sie? “. (*Sein und Zeit* (1927). GA 2, page 437). The German is the second to the last paragraph of the volume *Sein und Zeit*.

Clearly, we are underway (*unterwegs*) here. Again, I note the remark, “...still remains *only one way that we may take*.” Heidegger is not making the claim or the argument that his “way” is the only way for these investigations. Not “the” sole way. No absolute claim is being made; and note (N.B.) this at the end of his investigations, end the concluding section number 83. GA 2 *Sein und Zeit* (1927).

We are always underway. Heidegger wrote in a lecture in 1952 that he did not have to give to his students, where he said, “To answer the question "What is called thinking?" is itself always to keep asking, so as to remain underway. This would seem easier than the intention to take a firm

position; for adventurer-like, we roam away into the unknown.” *What Is Called Thinking?* Date 1951-1952. Translation by J. Glenn Grey, page 169.

Heidegger and Husserl’s Attack.

Heidegger remarks (not in lectures series),

“The danger of misinterpreting *Being and Time* (1927) in this direction, i.e., “existentiell-anthropologically”, and of seeing the interconnection of disclosedness, truth, and Dasein from the perspective of a moral resolve – instead of the other way, proceeding from the prevailing ground of Da-sein and grasping truth as openness and dis-closedness, as temporalizing-spatializing of the free play of the time-space of Seyn-such danger looms and gets stronger by many things that are unaccomplished in *Being and Time* (1927). But this misinterpretation is basically excluded (although not in the overcoming that is worked out), if from the beginning (Anfang) we hold on to the grounding-question of the “meaning of Seyn” as the only question.” *Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65. et. p. 60-61.

„Die Gefahr, „*Sein und Zeit*“ in dieser Richtung „existentiell anthropologisch“ zu missdeuten, die Zusammenhänge zwischen Entschlossenheit – Wahrheit – Dasein von der moralisch gemeinten Entschließung zu sehen, statt *umgekehrt* von dem waltenden Grunde des Da-seins her, die Wahrheit als Offenheit und die Entschlossenheit als die zeitigende Einräumung des Zeit-Spiel-Raumes des Seyns zu begreifen, diese Gefahr liegt nahe und wird durch das vielfach Unbewältigte in „*Sein und Zeit*“ verstärkt. Aber die Missdeutung ist im Grunde, wenngleich nicht in der ausführenden Überwindung, gebannt, wenn von Anfang an die Grundfrage nach dem „Sinn des Seyns“ als *die* einzige Frage festgehalten wird. “*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65:87-88.

In this interesting passage, Heidegger is telling us that *Being and Time* should not interpret as mere philosophical anthropology or as an issue of morality and ethics.

Because of its importance for understanding Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938) attack on Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, I have included two paragraphs from Husserl’s famous lecture. *Phenomenology and Anthropology*. The vainglorious Husserl delivered the lecture in 1931 to meetings of the Kantgesellschaft in Frankfurt (June 1), Berlin (June 10), and Halle (June 16). These lectures were discussed in the newspapers at the time and Heidegger was well aware of the content. Besides Heidegger, these two philosophers were part of Husserl’s attack, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and Max Scheler (1874-1928).

Husserl said,

“As is well known, over the last decade some of the younger generation of German philosophers has been gravitating with ever increasing speed toward philosophical anthropology. Currently Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy of life, a new form of anthropology, exercises a great deal of influence. But even the so called “phenomenological movement” has gotten caught up in this new trend, which alleges that the true foundation of philosophy lies in human being alone, and more specifically in a doctrine of the essence of human being’s concrete worldly Dasein. Some view this as a necessary reform of the original constitutive phenomenology, one that for the very first time would supposedly permit phenomenology to attain the level of authentic philosophy.

All of this constitutes a complete reversal of phenomenology's fundamental standpoint. Original phenomenology, which has matured into transcendental phenomenology, denies to any science of human being, whatever its form, a share in laying the foundations for philosophy, and opposes all related attempts at foundation-laying as being anthropologism or psychologism. Nowadays, however, the exact opposite is supposed to be held. Phenomenological philosophy is supposedly now to be constructed entirely anew from out of human Dasein." (Translated by Richard E. Palmer). See also, "Husserl on Ryle's Review of "*Sein Und Zeit*." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*. Vol. 1, Issue, 3, 1970.

Heidegger certainly knew who this was directed at without Husserl mentioning Heidegger or Scheler names. In fact, everyone knew that summer of 1931 in Germany.

Start at the beginning. The exergue.

Motto at the beginning of *Being and Time*.

In a Plato dialogue the Sophist with the young mathematician named Theaetetus, the Eleatic Stranger expresses puzzlement:

δήλον γάρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα (τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὅποταν δν φθέγγησθε) πάλαι γινώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν φόμεθα, νῦν δ' ἠπορήκαμεν . . .

"For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression 'being.' We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed." Plato, *Sophist* 244a.

("Denn offenbar seid ihr doch schon lange mit dem vertraut, was ihr eigentlich meint, wenn ihr den Ausdruck 'seiend' gebraucht, wir jedoch glaubten es einst zwar zu verstehen, jetzt aber sind wir in Verlegenheit gekommen"). Heidegger's translation from Greek to German: the word "being" in English is in German: seiend. See also Heidegger use of German expressions, Sein and Seyn. See: Martin Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes* (Winter semester 1924/25). GA 9:455-56. Heidegger's major point: "abandonment by Being" (Seinsverlassenheit) or the forgetting of Being" (Seinsvergessenheit).

Heidegger in his lectures on Schelling says this,

"But because this question is strange and alien, it cannot be put simply as a question sentence, but it requires at the same time and before a complete transformation of the question attitude and view position. And that is why "*Being and Time*" is a way and not a housing, and who cannot go, should not rest in it. And it is a way, not "the" way, which never exists in philosophy.

And therefore "*Being and Time*" is a way and not a housing, and who cannot go, shall not retire in it. And indeed, a way, not "the" way, which never exists in philosophy."

("Weil aber diese Frage fremd und befremdlich ist, kann sie nicht einfach nur als Fragesatz hingesetzt werden, sondern es bedarf zugleich und zuvor einer volligen Umwandlung der Fragehaltung und Blickstellung. Und deshalb ist »Sein und Zeit« ein Weg und kein Gehäuse, und wer nicht gehen kann, soll sich darin nicht zur Ruhe setzen. Und zwar ein Weg, nicht »der« Weg, den es in der Philosophie nie gibt.

Und deshalb ist »Sein und Zeit« ein Weg und kein Gehause, und wer nicht gehen kann, soll sich darin nicht zur Ruhe setzen. Und zwar ein Weg, nicht »der« Weg, den es in der Philosophie nie gibt.“). *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809) (Summer semester 1936). GA 42:111.

Note this book was published during Heidegger’s lifetime. Double approved. Heidegger’s imprimatur on this statement about his philosophy is certainly clear. So, therefore, “Und zwar ein Weg, nicht »der« Weg, den es in der Philosophie nie gibt.” “And this is a way, not "the" way, which never exists in philosophy.” (GA 42:111). *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809) (Summer Semester 1936).

Note here *Being and Time* is “a way” not “the” way. There are other “ways” and Heidegger is only claiming to be “a way.” Remark is clear, “the way” never is in the philosophical project according to Heidegger.

In his review of *Being and Time*, Wilhelm Dilthey's son-in-law, Georg Misch noted the words “present investigation is still only under way.”

Consider (Robert Cavalier):

“1) The formal structure of questioning a such: Every question is a 'seeking' (Suchen) and is guided by what is sought (Gesuchen). There is a mutual relatedness ('circularity') between these two poles: (a) seeking is directed to what is sought but (b) the seeking is already guided by what is sought (in advance). Let us look more closely at the structural moments of 'what is sought'.

“Questioning is a seeking for *knowledge*,
A scientific-theoretical question has three moments:

Befragtes: the subject matter: the *thing* we are questioning.

Gefragtes: the focus: what we are asking *about* that thing.

Erfragtes: the goal: what we are asking *for* regarding that thing.”
(Thomas Sheehan on *Being and Time*).

Heidegger is making explicit what is implicit in questioning--this seems to be a development of Nietzsche and has today become a central theme in European thought viz. truth and method. [Note: das Erfragte is what is really intended in das Gefragte. The disclosure of das Erfragte is essentially the fulfillment of das Gefragte: And this again refers to the necessity of re-evaluating the very structure of 'questioning-answering' (cf. Husserl L.I.I. Meaning intention--Meaning fulfillment)].” Robert Cavalier.

This analysis by Robert Cavalier shows Heidegger’s early connections to Husserl’s methodology and engagement of a structure approach to philosophical and phenomenological investigations. Heidegger will later emphasize that the project of *Being and Time* (*SuZ*) was a series of investigations. Of course, through the basic “questioning” of Da-Sein toward the meaning (Sinn) of the Being of beings.

Here is the best quote, “Therefore, "Da-sein" is incomparable in every respect; it is not an object of a "doctrine" (in *Sein und Zeit* "investigation" means **fundamental questioning**, not "explaining" the extant).” *Mindfulness*. Page 123 (ET). GA 66. *Besinnung* (1938/39). Heidegger

is not “explaining,” but rather, using phenomenological “seeing” (more on this in the later section of this book).

Heidegger in *Being and Time* outlines the subtitle of the Introduction as “The Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being” (*Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*), and then he divides the two parts of Introduction. The first part of the Introduction is entitled: I. The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Questions of Being.” And the second part is entitled: II. The Double Task in Working Out the Question of Being: The Method of the Investigation and Its Outline.” This all points to the purpose of *Being and Time* which is often overlooked since the majority of the text is about the analytic of Da-sein. The purpose of *Being and Time* is “raise anew the **question** of the meaning of Being.” This is all about the “question” of the meaning of Being, but here the position is about how Heidegger central and fundamental “thesis” (what else can we call it, since the concepts are used up), is a “question.” Heidegger is making us plainly aware that philosophy in *Being and Time* is about raising the **“question.”** Note the strong emphasis and focus on the ‘question.’ For Heidegger, it is all about the ‘question’ and not just lots of ontic questions, but rather, tracking the single and sole ontological question for Heidegger, namely, the meaning of Being or the truth of Being. Question: what is the truth of Being? Answer: temporality. Heidegger will later remove the “meaning” (Sinn) as to ontic and replace his project with the question of the “truth” of the Being of beings.

Compare the mostly overlooked (meist Übersieht) passage from Hegel’s *Science of Logic*,

“In keeping with this method, I remind the reader that the divisions and the headings of the books, the sections and chapters given in this work, as well as the explanations associated with them, are made for the purpose of a preliminary overview, and that strictly speaking they only are of *historical value*. They do **not** belong to the content and body of the science but 21.39 are rather compilations of an external reflection which has already gone through the whole of the exposition, therefore, knows the sequence of its moments in advance and anticipates them before they are brought on by the matter at issue itself.” *Science of Logic* (21.53. English page 34.) (For example: completely overlooked by Stanley Rosen in his book on the *Logic*). Fortunately, I recently found this discussion of this text in the protokoll Sitzung vom 28. 11.1955, by Heribert Boeder (1928-2013). *Seminare: Hegel – Schelling*. GA 96:765.

For Hegel, “Philosophical thinking in general still deals with concrete subject matters, with God, Nature, Spirit.” *Science of Logic*, 21:13.

Back to Heidegger, clearly, Heidegger is an ontologist. This is a crucial point to understand what Heidegger is doing. The question of the meaning of Being is his fundamental question in *Being and Time* and remained his primary matter for thought. In his work on *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (GA 32, lecture 1930), Heidegger says, “. . . the inner necessities of the first and last problem of philosophy - **the question of Being**” and he continues, “I have been concerned with renewing the question of **ontology** - the most central problem of Western Philosophy - the question of Being . . .” (E.T. p.13).

One of the last things he wrote February 1976, “ein Unterwegs im Wegfeld sich wandelnden Fragens der mehrdeutigen Seinsfrage” (GA 1:437). Lose translation: “a journey in the path of the

changing questioning of the ambiguous question of Being.” Again the “Being question” is primary and core almost 50 years after his major publication of *Being and Time* (1927). The Being question is a synecdoche for Heidegger’s whole project and his investigations.

Additional Heidegger says,

"We assert now that Being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy" (*Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Summer semester 1927. GA 24:11). "Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of Being, of Being's structure and its possibilities. Philosophy is ontological." (*Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (GA 24:11 lecture 1927). Therefore, Heidegger has “a” question, which is the “the” question for him. Later on, Heidegger talks about the basic question and the fundamental or the guiding-question; but later rejects that series of investigations.

Later Heidegger wrote,

“In regard to *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*

- The presentation is in places too didactic.
- The thinking follows the dependence (justified only didactically) on the differentiation between the “basic question” and the “guiding question” within the “question of Being.” This latter question is still grasped more in the style of metaphysics rather than thought in the fashion of the already conceived history of Being. *Das Ereignis. The Event*. 1941–42. GA 71: XXIV. Heidegger’s own forward to *Das Ereignis*.

It is interesting that some scholars think that the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)* GA 65, were never meant for publication, but here we have Heidegger suggesting that the *Beiträge* is too didactic (didaktikós, διδακτικός). So, not meant for publication, but it was to do some kind of “teaching” for someone. There was a lot of effort to go from handwritten manuscript to a typescript, plus of course, Heidegger footnotes the *Beiträge* in his other writings. In addition, Heidegger showed the typescript version to some philosophers as early as 1963. First published in 1989.

But in the passage, we see Heidegger’s need to conceive the Being question from within the history of Being.

Remarks in this letter,

“Philosophy is not fun—one can be destroyed by it; and he who does not risk this will never come to it.”

Letter to Karl Löwith, 1 February 1921.

Heidegger in an important passage wrote in *Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis)* GA 65,

“The question concerning the “meaning”, i.e., in accordance with the elucidation in *Being and Time*, the question concerning grounding the domain of projecting-open – and then, the question of the *truth of Seyn* – is and remains *my* question, and is my *one and only* question; for this question concerns what is *most sole and unique* (Section 4).”

This ties together his two major writing projects – note we hesitate to call them “works” or even “books” or some kind of final philosophical statements. Even note the emphasis within this passage and the use of the word “my,” since Heidegger is pointing out his own essential question (but note this is not just Mr. Heidegger’s personal question). To quote Heidegger, “But even here that form has not yet been attained, which, precisely at this point, I demand for a publication as a “work”.” *Besinnung*. English translation. *Mindfulness*. 1938-1939. GA 66:427.

Although Heidegger is fixated and obsessed on **one** question, he makes an important and crucial point about the nature of philosophy itself. Philosophy is a seeking (ontological not ontic). Heidegger says in *Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis)* GA 65, “This goal is the *seeking* itself” (Section 5) and he continues a little further down in the text where he says, “Seeking itself is the goal” (Section 5). Later in the text Heidegger, really emphasis the following passage, “*Whoever seeks has already found!*” Note that it is italicized and with an exclamation point he uses the punctuation of an “!”. This is not an ontic seeking of getting milk at the store, but rather being in a state of seeking and questioning. We are not searching for something and then representing that thing in thinking, nor are we seeking to use logic to formulate a logical proof or an “explanation” of a phenomena in the world. This clearly, not a metaphysics statement about the world (see Hegel for those).

Heidegger is pertaining to pathways and not philosophical works or grand systems. Heidegger said in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, “Questioning is here beginning and end.” (Page 242). Remember Heidegger said, “Seeking itself is the goal.” (“Das Suchen selbst ist das Ziel”). GA 65:18, et. 13. We can take Heidegger at his word and try to think through what that means for philosophizing. Since his project is not to reveal “eternal truth” nor giving a metaphysical description of our world nor creating a grand “system” nor creating some kind of liberal “worldview” nor creating a value system, so empirical facts do not need “proofs” or “logic” or to develop a philosophical “position.” Journey and seeking are a path toward philosophizing. Philosophy is philosophizing nothing more or less. Heidegger said in a lecture series, “The grandeur of man is measured according to what he seeks and according to the urgency by which he remains a seeker.” (*Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"*. *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”* (Winter semester 1937/38. GA 45:4-7). Again, “Das Suchen selbst ist das Ziel und zugleich der Fund.” (“The seeking (search) itself is the goal and at the same time the found.” GA 45:5. *Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"* (Winter Semester 1937/38).

The lack of seeking is pointing toward the distress (Notlosigkeit) of the current epoch.

In the late Zähringen seminar of 1973, Heidegger (age 84) says,
Dated: Die Sitzung von heute, Sonnabend den 8. Sept. 1973, beginnt mit der Verlesung des Protokolls.

“But in "S. u. Z." it did not come yet to a genuine realization of the history of Being, and out of this arose the clumsiness and strictly speaking naivety of the "ontological Destruction". Since then, the inevitable naivety of the still inexperienced has given way to a realization.

(“Aber in »S.u.Z.« kam es noch nicht zu einer echten Erkenntnis der Geschichte des Seins, und daraus entsprang die Ungeschicklichkeit und strenggenommen Naivität der » ontologischen Destruktion «. Seither ist die unvermeidliche Naivität des noch Unerfahrenen einer Erkenntnis gewichen.” *Seminare* (1951–1973). GA 15:395.

Back to Heidegger’s trail or more correctly put. Back to the path of Martin Heidegger.

“*Being and Time* is not a “philosophy about time,” and even less so a teaching on the “temporality” (*Zeitlichkeit*) of the human being, but rather clearly and surely a path to the grounding of the truth of Being; of *Being itself*, and not of beings, and also not of beings as beings. Leading the way is the leap into “Temporality” (*Temporalität*), into that wherein primordial time with primordial space essence together as unfoldings of the essencing of truth, of its [truth’s] transporting-transfixing clearing (*Lichtung*) and concealing. Of course, [therefore], the first, insufficient version of the third section of the first part of *Being and Time* had to be destroyed.” (Heidegger’s italics). *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*. GA 94:272.

Summary

Being and Time (1927, 97 years ago) was not planned as a “book” or a “werke”; but rather, as phenomenological investigations and outline of a proposed research agenda for Heidegger. At the very end of *Being and Time*, is a key phrase, “still remains *only one way* that we may take.” There is no single “**the way**” or “only one way” for Heidegger in *Being and Time*.

Relativism? See (Kusch 1989; Lafont 2000, 2007). Heidegger notes, “The theories of relativism and skepticism originate in a partly justified opposition against a distorted absolutism and dogmatism with respect to the concept of truth.” (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Summer semester 1927). GA 24:316). Heidegger’s early letter to Jaspers, he says he is a “dogmatic subjective relativist.” Later on in 1941, Heidegger writes, “The metaphysical thinking about truth is thus bound to the question of "eternal truths" in several ways and the "problem" of "Relativism" is only the reverse side of this assertion of the "eternal truths". And it is exactly relativism, not only the doctrine of the "eternity" of truth, which blocks every question about the actual truth....” *Über den Anfang*, (1941). GA 70:43. Note this remark is not in a lecture series.

Heidegger's second attempt *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938)

Heidegger in his later works always points out the *Beiträge* as the pivotal point in his thinking in the late 1930s. A renewal of his overall project but in a unique way. The second crucible of Heidegger's thought. One of the basic idea Heidegger is pushing is, "inceptual thinking" (anfängliches Denken), which is overall related to the new beginning (Anfang) that Heidegger is guiding us (rare and few future ones?) on the path toward a new start. This project for Heidegger is no small fillip. There is a surfeit (overabundance) of texts that support and give evidence for his ideas and a renewal.

We have both the accelerando (increasing speed) and crescendo (a gradual increase in loudness) in Heidegger's texts *Beiträge*. For some reason, many philosophers writing about the *Beiträge* have noted the comparison to music. Heidegger is starting up the orchestra (R. Polt).

Note the place of these two writings in the overall sequence around 1940. Heidegger wrote, "*Contributions and Mindfulness as preliminary works.*" (»Beiträge« und »Besinnung« als Vorarbeiten). *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1938/40). GA 69:173. Section 178. *The Sequence of Publications. The History of Beyng* (1938-40). Indeed, ominously as preliminary works, he must have been expecting a lot more, since later on Heidegger refers to *Contributions* as the pivotal point after *Being and Time*.

"In philosophy, propositions can never be proved; and not only because there are no highest propositions from which others could be derived, but because "propositions" are not the truth here at all, and also not simply what they testify about. All "proving" presupposes that the understander, in the way in which he represents the content of the sentence, remains unchanged in the enactment of the proving conceptual context. And only the "result" of the proof can demand a different way of thinking, or rather the thinking of things that have not been considered before." *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). *Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enowning)*. GA 65:13.

First off, we should mention the missing dedication from the current published version: "The manuscript 'copy' of the "Contributions to Philosophy" in the German Archive for Literature in Marbach contains a dedication, which was not carried over into the publication. For "Christmas 1957", Heidegger had dedicated the manuscript to Dory Vietta, the wife of Egon Vietta. Egon Vietta in 1950 published "The Question of Being by Martin Heidegger." The dedication consists of a handwritten copy of an ode of Pindar in the Greek original as well as in Hölderlin's translation. It includes erotic references. The question of whether the addition of this dedication to the manuscript has philosophical meaning, is debatable. But that the dedication

belongs to its history, cannot be doubted.” Peter Trawny essay on the *Beiträge zur Philosophie. The Bloomsbury companion to Heidegger*, page 218. Note: Dory Vietta also known as Dorothea Vietta (1913-1959).

What is the final hard rock of philosophy? Where is the ‘quarry’ for philosophers? What is it about the human condition that leads a few to philosophy? For Heidegger, Da-sein is not as *animal rationale*, the reasoning animal, or the human being with reason (we are much more than this just *rationale*). By using the expression Da-sein or Da-Sein, Heidegger then links the nature of humanity directly to the clearing and openness of Being. Humans are the being that is in the opening and it that special and unique relationship with the Being of beings.

At the same time, Heidegger should have more directly tied Da-sein’s nature to openness and the clearing that drives Da-sein to the questioning process, since without **questioning** there would be no Being question. Man is the questioning being in a finite world. At bottom, questioning comes from the essential and inner nature of humanity (for Heidegger that is Da-sein or Da-Sein). The Being question is for Heidegger the ground of Da-sein and the single question for philosophy. Heidegger does not draw the rest of the implications of the very nature of Da-sein of being open for questioning. Can we have questioning without somehow thinking that we need to use **reason** to answer the questions? Heidegger was against the notion of human being defined as “rational animal” (**animal rationale**). This is one example of a metaphysical definition of humans (Star Trek, “Bags of mostly water” or “carbon units”).

Philosophy *is* seeking. This seeking is a questioning and that means a radical questioning even the point of how humans can question anything. Man is the questioning being. How is Man open to the world as a questioner? *Man is the Interrogator!* Heidegger as philosopher certainly has made it clear that for him philosophy is the opening up and thinking through “questioning.” Heidegger has defined his project in terms of the *question* about meaning or truth of Being. His early formulation of the question about the meaning (Sinn) Being (1927) may sound too much on the subjective side of what Being “means” to a person, hence his later development of the question as the “truth” of Being and the Wesen of Being (Das Wesen des Seyns). Plus, of course many other expression of his task in questioning (See Thomas Sheehan for details on this path).

For Heidegger the question echoes. Note: this is not a series of questions; but rather, the one, sole, unique, and only question that is important enough to be worthy of being **the question for philosophers**.

The following quoted passages (with section numbers) are all from *Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1939) GA 65. *Beiträge*

Beiträge. GA 65, Section 1

”*Contributions to Philosophy* enact a questioning along a pathway which is first traced out by the crossing to the other beginning, into which Western thinking is now entering.”

This ties together the purpose and intention of the whole project, which Heidegger calls, with the public title of the *Contributions to Philosophy*. Today, Western thinking is entering a new other

beginning to philosophy. The purpose of this project is enacting a “questioning” (we know the direction of the questioning – Seyn and Ereignis). Before Section 1 on the first page of the text, Heidegger calls this venture an “attempt” and he follows that up with the remark that “Future thinking is a thinking that is *underway*.” (*Beiträge*. GA 65, et. p. 3). Philosophy is a questioning pathway that is an attempt that is underway. Remember at the front of the Heidegger’s *Gesamtausgabe*, he wrote “Pathways– not works.” This is not a transitional philosophical work that has nothing to say about truth. We can say that Heidegger’s philosophical stance is “questioning.” Other beginning (not the second beginning).

In the 1950’s Heidegger said, “I am writing all of this in the form of questions; for, as far as I can see, thinking can today do more than to continually ponder what evoked in the said questions.” (*On The Question of Being*, Letter to Ernst Jünger, “Zur Seinsfrage (1955) / Über die Linie” in *Wegmarken* (1919–1961), GA 9 *Pathmarks* et. p.306). Heidegger as Rishi (Sanskrit: ऋषि) seer.

(“Ich schreibe dies alles in der Form von Fragen; denn mehr vermag heute, soweit ich sehe, ein Denken nicht, als unablässig eig das zu bedenken, was die angeführten Fragen hervorruft.”). Note this was published in Heidegger’s lifetime in a number of places, he obviously thought this letter and what he was saying here was important for people to understand Heidegger.

Beiträge. GA 65, Section 4

“So that this attempt turns into an impetus, the wonder of enactment of questioning must be experienced and made effective for awakening and strengthening the *force* of questioning.”

What does it mean to think about the “*force (Fragekraft)* of questioning”? Heidegger has radically changed the nature of philosophy forever more with the force of his questioning about the truth of Being. Wonder started the first beginning with the Greeks. Out of wondering comes questioning and we can question the nature of wondering. Alternatively, in other words we can wonder about **wonder as such**. What is the nature of **the** “question? We make a point: question the question!

Beiträge. GA 65, Section 4.

” In the age of *total lack of questioning anything*, it is sufficient as a start to inquire into the question of all questions.” “Im Zeitalter der *völligen Fraglosigkeit von allem genügt* es, die Frage aller Fragen erst einmal zu fragen.”

This is about the total lack of ontological questioning. What time is it? When do I have to go to work? Versus: what is the nature of time itself? The kairological situation (time is not right). Of course, the “question of all questions” is simply the question about the truth of Being (Seyn). I do not think that Heidegger wants to rank questions with values, for example, which is the best question; but rather, what is the sole question for philosophy – the truth of Being (late 1930s).

“Question is here *beginning* and *end*.” (*Beiträge*. GA 65, Section 222).

The alpha and omega of philosophy is not freedom (Schelling’s claim), but rather “questioning.” We do not get further down the road by ending with metaphysical statements

about the world; then constructing a system and coming to a final philosophical position about the world – that is, a metaphysical system project.

Heidegger is contra systems like this, since for him the task of philosophy is the process of questioning. Perhaps the clearest position is when Heidegger is contra Hegel. Hegel constructed a complete metaphysical system and included the methodology in the inner ‘soul’ of the systems itself. Hegel’s system is the highest point of metaphysics. However, with Hegel, there are very few open questions – the system gives the “answers” and “results.” In a sense for Heidegger if you have “answers,” then you are creating either a metaphysical system or a worldview. See lecture, *Die Zeit des Weltbildes* (1938), *Holzwege* GA 5. More recently, Heidegger sees the way philosophers and others wanted to create a worldview based on ‘facts’ and call that philosophy. The worldview approach is all wrong. Heidegger points more toward the “stance” of thinking and questioning.

Beiträge. GA 65, Section 258

“...not into just any question but rather into questioning what is most question-worthy.”

Our question: what is most question-worthy? What is important to ask about? Not how to increase your latest stock holdings, but what is a question for all of humanity? What is the necessity of philosophical questioning? Can we take it or leave it? There is no necessity in determining logical proof. However, the ontological question drives philosophers or does it pull philosophers and thinkers toward the question of the truth of Being. The goal is the “seeking” and the “questioning.”

Sidenote on the Goal.

“In this manner the inceptual meditation of thought necessarily becomes genuine thought, which is to say, goal-positing thought. Not just any goal is posited, and not goals in general, but the unique and therefore *single goal of our history*. This goal is *seeking* itself, seeking after Beyng. Such seeking occurs, and is itself the deepest discovery, when humans decisively become preservers of the truth of Beyng, stewards of that stillness.” *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). *Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enowning)*. GA 65:17-18.
goal-positing

Heidegger later says in introduction poem, “We know no goals, we are only a going” (Wir kennen nicht Ziele und sind nur ein Gang) *Mindfulness. Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:9.

Beiträge. GA 65, Section 265.

“Thinking (1) on the one hand is meant as the name of the manner of questioning and thus in general for the manner of relating the questioning relation of man to the *Being* of beings, that is thinking in the sense (Sinn) of the basic posture of the “thinker” (the philosopher) (thinking as *questioning* the question of Being”). (“Das Denken (1) ist einmal gemeint als Name für die Art des Fragens und damit überhaupt die Art der Beziehung der fragenden Beziehung des Menschen zum *Sein des* Seienden, daß Denken im Sinne der Grundhaltung des »Denkers« (des Philosophen) (Denken als *Fragen* der Seinsfrage) “.

Rethinking section *Beiträge*. GA 65, section 265.

This is an important passage for how to understand Heidegger and what is “living” and ‘dead’ in Heidegger’s philosophy. Thinking is questioning! Ok, thinking is questioning about the Being question. In terms of *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger would talk about the Dasein being open to possibilities. Possibilities are what makes questioning possible. The basic nature of the philosopher is to “think” about Being question. Yes, philosophy is more than just ontology for school philosophers, but for Heidegger there is only question, one way to do philosophy, and one way for thinkers and one matter for thought – Being. Heidegger used the term “Beziehung,” that is, relationship. Our relationship to Being and our question about the relationship between man as philosopher with the Being of beings. Heidegger points toward this relationship, but he also is opening this as asking and questioning this relationship. Heidegger is opening the ontological questions in a much different way than previous ontology (recent Hartmann and Sartre).

Beiträge. GA 65, Section § 39,

“Once upon a time, in the beginning (Anfang) of occidental thought truth was the unquestioned, the unquestionable, but this by virtue of the highest need and necessity of the questioning for the being - now the essence of truth is also the unquestioned and is also the unquestioned and most unquestionable, but only as the most indifferent within the age of complete unquestionableness (Fraglosigkeit). in essence. The question of truth is without necessity (Notwendigkeit). This is an essential realization, which only comes to a real reflection. This realization, taking seriously with the situation of philosophy, is decisive alone. The concern philosophy as a cultural asset can be left to its own devices, can be left to itself.”

(Section “Die Not der Nothsigkeit.” “Einstmals war im Anfang des abendländischen Denkens die Wahrheit das Ungefragte, außer der Frage Stehende, aber dieses kraft der höchsten Not und Notwendigkeit des Fragens nach dem Seienden — jetzt ist das Wesen der Wahrheit auch das Ungefragte und Fragloseste, aber nur noch als das Gleichgültigste innerhalb des Zeitalters der völligen Fraglosigkeit im Wesentlichen. Die Wahrheitsfrage ist ohne Notwendigkeit. Das ist eine wesentliche Erkenntnis, die nur einer wirklichen Besinnung aufgeht. Diese Erkenntnis, das Ernstmachen mit der Lage der Philosophie, ist allein entscheidend. Die Besorgnis um die Philosophie als Kulturgut kann ruhig sich selbst überlassen bleiben.” *Beiträge*. ‘Die Not der Nothsigkeit.’ *Beiträge*. GA 65:183 § 39

We are in trouble. Our age is the “age of complete unquestionableness” this is the problem and the situation that Heidegger is working to correct. Fraglosigkeit or questionlessness is where we need to start bringing into light the question about the truth of Being (Sein, Seyn).

A few years later this is Heidegger’s partial assessment of the *Beiträge*,

“In regard to *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*

- The presentation is in places too didactic.
- The thinking follows the dependence (justified only didactically) on the differentiation between the “basic question” and the “guiding question” within the “question of Being.” This latter question is still grasped more in the style of metaphysics rather than thought in the fashion of the already conceived history of

Being. *Das Ereignis. The Event.* 1941–42. GA 71:XXIV. Heidegger’s own forward to *Das Ereignis*.

Heidegger sees the problems still within in some kind of metaphysics.

Summary

Again, “Questioning is here *beginning* and *end*.” (*Beiträge*. GA 65, Section 222).

Editor Afterward in *Beiträge*. GA 65, says there is a note written by Heidegger that says,

May 8, 1939: "'Beyng' as Division (Part) II is not well placed; as an attempt to grasp the whole once again, it does not belong in that position." *Beiträge*. GA 65:405.

The editors put this section at the end of GA 65, but it does not belong there. Again, Heidegger in the *Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1939) GA 65; went too far, he added the people “rare and few, the future ones” (VI. DIE ZU-KÜNFTIGEN) etc. (prosopography); and the last chapter should have been the “last gods” (VII. DER LETZTE GOTT).

Note. Heidegger wrote about philosophizing, “A God who philosophized would not be a God, because the essence of philosophy is to be a finite possibility of a finite being” GA 27.

The last two sections overstep everything he had written before, and he realized that with the section on DAS SEYN with the attempt to re-grasp the question. The section entitled “DAS SEYN” did not really fix anything and was not a good effort by Heidegger. But it should be considered as a standalone writing and not ‘added’ to the *Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis)*. Some of these themes are followed up by Heidegger in his next writings (*Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66, 70, 71, and we wait for GA 72 to be published). But in general, we see the breakdown in the little structure of the “fuges” from the *Beiträge* and that means that Heidegger realized the failure (if we can call it that) of his attempt here. Heidegger started up the “music band” or the “orchestra” (Simon Blackburn); but he exceeds his own limits. In the *Beiträge*, Heidegger is plucking the strings and hoping for some sound that might become and unfold as “music.” The structure of the *Beiträge* is Heidegger’s attempt to make some kind of a move to answer the “methodology” question; since, otherwise, he has to admit to the use of the “aphorist methodology.” This is Heidegger’s denial (note the importance of questioning),

“These “Ponderings” and all the previous ones are not “aphorisms” in the sense of “adages”; instead, they are inconspicuous advance outposts—and rearguard positions—within the whole of an attempt at a still ineffable meditation toward the conquest of a *way* for the newly inceptual questioning which is called, in distinction from meta-physical thinking, the thinking of the *history of Beyng*. Not decisive is *what* is represented and compiled into a representational edifice, but only *how* the questioning takes place and the fact that being is questioned at all.” Ponderings X in *Ponderings VII–XI*. GA 95:274. *Überlegungen VII–XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938-39)*. Is there a methodology or just concocted out of these notes?

In fact, Heidegger seems to be using grammatically inconsistent (*anakolouthos*, ἀνακόλουθον) for some of his grammar in the *Beiträge* (GA 65). The one translator's introduction uses the expression "directionality is convoluted." ‘

What is Heidegger's methodology in the *Beiträge* (and GA 66, 70, 71)? His puzzle about methodology is mentioned briefly in the *Zollikoner Seminare* (GA 89). September 12, 1965, notes (**). But from the passage and his trip from *Being and Time* (1927) that had address the methodological issues (GA 2:15), then the *Beiträge* (1936) without a section on methodology; but instead, we get the following structured outline:

the resonating
the interplay
the leap
the grounding
the future ones
the last God

Der Anklang
Das Zuspiel
Der Sprung
Die Gründung
Die Zukünftigen
Der letzte Gott

Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1939). GA 65:9.

How are these interconnected?

Perhaps an *aporia* (ἀπορίᾱ) again?

There is a note about not being a step from lower to higher. Note we go from page 6 of the *Beiträge* and then it skips to these remarks on page 82.

“The six fugues of the fugue each stand for themselves, but only to make the essential unity more forceful. In each of the six fugues, the same thing is attempted to be said about the same thing, but each from a different realm of the essence (*Wesensbereich*) of what is called the *Ereignis*”.

(“Die sechs Fügungen der Fuge stehen je für sich, aber nur, um die wesentliche Einheit eindringlicher zu machen. In jeder der sechs Fügungen wird über das Selbe je das Selbe zu sagen versucht, aber jeweils aus einem anderen *Wesensbereich* dessen, was das *Ereignis* nennt”).

Beiträge. GA 65:82. Note. dispensations (Fügungen) or sometime called: “unifications” not divisions. Joinability (Fugsamkeit). Needless to say, lots of ink has been poured on this topic; but yet, we know from *Being and Time* (1927) that Heidegger can write more clearly about the issues of “methodology”. There is just a unity (*wesentliche Einheit*) of these six (sechs Fügungen). Six what? Heidegger names them and yet, we come back to the “unity” (*Henology*) of the whole. So much for the pizzicato technique. Perhaps just a *false dilemma*? We transitional ones....

We have the interrelation of the many motifs and themes that emerge in these middle writings, but often the focus changes in the later writings. The attempt at a methodology and providing some kind of structure for his later writings based on the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1939) GA 65; was an attempt that did not continue on into the later writings. Heidegger writes in the second preface to *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, “In contrast to the methods of historical philology, which has its own agenda, a thoughtful dialogue is bound by other laws - laws which are more easily violated. In a dialogue the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent.” GA 3:XVII. Basically, no real structure (Gefüge). Nevertheless, we have a lot to learn from Heidegger’s attempts.

If we take many of the table of contents of collective writing (Gesamtausgabe) of Heidegger are not “his,” namely, created by the editors; then we have look at Heidegger’s writing as “possibility” following in the footsteps of Nietzsche and many that had come before him in writing and thinking with the aphorist methodology.

In his late project of trying to provide an introduction to his collective writing (Gesamtausgabe) *Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage*, Heidegger wrote against the system and the aphoristic methodology.

“All possibilities of a “systematics” even extending to aphorism are dubious.

The right determining of the way and terrain of the way ὁδός—not method and procedure.” (II, 201).

Translation by William McNeill. The noun ὁδός (hodós) means a road, a path, or a way. *Auszüge zur Phänomenologie aus dem Manuskript*. “Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage.” Unveröffentlicht. *Jahresgabe der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft* 2011/2012.

The turns from Heidegger I to Heidegger II to Heidegger III to Heidegger IV and to Heidegger V can be seen as turning away from any form of methodology.

Counterexample.

If we assume that the way of doing philosophy in general is the way that Heidegger did philosophy in the *Beiträge*, then graduate students would all be writing their own *Vom Ereignis*.

Final Conclusion .:

Three important remarks by Heidegger.

“The questionable - is the Matter itself.” “Das Fragwürdige - ist die Sache selbst.” *Vigiliae I, II / Notturmo*, (1952/53 bis 1957). GA 100: 54.

“Questioning is here *beginning* and *end*.” (“Das Fragen ist hier *Anfang* und *Ende*.”

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

(*Beiträge. Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1939)*.
GA 65:347. Section 223).

In 1963 Heidegger wrote,

“But the path of questioning was longer than I had expected. It required many stops, detours, and wrong ways (paths).” (“Aber der Weg des Fragens wurde länger, als ich vermutete. Er forderte viele Aufenthalte, Umwege und Abwege.”). “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie (1963). *Zur Sache des Denkens*. 1962-64. GA 14:99.

Therefore, *Heidegger as Interrogator*.

**Note on the methodology question from two letters 1965.

“This time I need more leeway to prepare for it because the correct introduction to the methodological problem creates considerably more difficulties than everything else to date. As I already told you, it became quite plain to me during the last seminar that the *methodological* question regarding its various possibilities *can no longer be avoided*.” Martin Heidegger to Medard Boss dated August 17, 1965, from Freiburg im Breisgau.

“I am still not quite clear about how to proceed with the reflection about *method*.” Letter from Heidegger to Medard Boss dated September 12, 1965, from Freiburg im Breisgau.

What?

Beingless [seinlos]

Beinglessness [Seinlosigkeit]

Methodology as the how to go about the answer.

Answer?

Heidegger on the Image of the Bridge

“The thinking of thinkers is a thanking.”

“Das Denken der Denker ist ein Danken.”

Das Ereignis (1941-1942). GA 71:275.

Heidegger never feared to cross the Rubicon to the other side of the river, but he was still thinking about using the bridge for the transition without knowing for sure where or what is the other side of the bridge. We transitional ones.... Some use of Heidegger's metaphors and metonymies of the bridge. Or just pareidolia (kind of an Apophenia (ἀποφαίνειν (apophaínein)? An example of this is to see a face in the clouds. Heidegger is attempting to give us some directionality with this image. Some vignettes are given. Heidegger is giving us some instructions, his version of didacticism (διδασκτικός, didaktikos). Is this a case of Heidegger actually trying to “explain” as opposed to Heidegger doing his phenomenological “seeing”?

Heidegger from the late 1930s writes,

“The bridges are lacking; the leaps have not yet been carried out. Still missing is the depth of meditation and of an experience of truth which would be capable of those bridges and leaps: the power of the crucial *decision* (q.v.).” (“Die Brücken fehlen; die Absprünge sind noch nicht vollzogen. Noch bleibt aus die Tiefe der ihnen genügenden Wahrheitserfahrung und Besinnung: die Kraft der hohen *Entscheidung* (vgl. dort).” *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)*. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65:32.

And in the *Beiträge* (Section, 82),

“Interplay is of a historical essence and builds the first bridge of the transition - but a bridge which thrusts out toward a shore that must first be decided.” (“82. *Zuspiel* ist geschichtlichen Wesens und ein erstes Brückenschlagen des Übergangs, eine Brücke aber, die ausschwingt in ein erst zu entscheidendes Ufer.” *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)*. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65:169.

In one of Heidegger's middle period writings (meaning not a lecture or address), he writes the following,

“The accumulated erudition does not help to cross the decisive bridge that needs to be built. And this bridge cannot be built by one person alone, either. This preparation of thinking must also already be acquired and preserved in an experience of the hidden beginning.” “Die angehäuften Gelehrsamkeit hilft nicht, über die entscheidende, erst zu schlagende Brücke zu kommen. Und dieser Brückenschlag kann auch nicht von einem Menschen nur gewollt und ausgeführt werden. Auch diese Vorbereitung des Denkens muß schon er-eignet sein und in einer Erfahrung des verborgenen Anfangs gewahrt.” *Das Ereignis*. GA 71:29-31. 1941-1942.

Heidegger wrote the following at just at the end of World War II,

“Younger Man: Waiting is a footbridge which supports our going, a footbridge on which we become who we are without already being who we are: *those who wait*.” (“Der Jüngere. Das Warten ist ein Steg, der unseren Gang trägt, auf dem wir werden, die wir sind, ohne sie schon zu sein: die Wartenden.”) *Country Path Conversations*. Evening Conversation: In a Prisoner of War Camp in Russia, between a Younger and an Older Man. English translation, page 147. Dated: Schloß Hausen im Donautal, on 8 May 1945. *Feldweg-Gespräche* (1944/45) GA 77: 227. Title of the conversation, Abendgespräch in einem Kriegsgefangenenlager in Russland zwischen einem Jüngeren und einem Älteren. Supposedly, he wrote these dialogues in just 14 days as mentioned in his letter to his brother dated 4 April 1945. The date 7 April 1945 was inscribed at the end of “Αγχιβασίη,” and 8 May 1945 at the end of the conversation in a prisoner of war camp” (GA 77 editors afterward). [Historical note Adolf died 30 April 1945]. Heidegger’s final note says,

“Schloß Hausen im Donautal, on 8 May 1945.

On the day, the world celebrated its victory,
without yet recognizing that already
for centuries it has been defeated by its
own rebellious uprising”

GA 77. *Feldweg-Gespräche*. (1944-1945). *Country Path Conversations*, page 157.
Translated by Bret W. Davis.

Back on the trail of Heidegger’s “bridge” analogy.

Heidegger in the context of answering the question of who Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (lecture 1953) is, he tells us about the “bridge”.

“The overman (Übermensch) goes beyond the nature of previous and present man and is thus a transition, a bridge. Since we can learn to follow the teacher who teaches the overman, we have to get to the bridge, to stay with the image. We think the transition is reasonably complete if we consider three things:

1. That from which the passer-by departs.
2. The transition itself.
3. That to which the transitional (Übergehende) crosses.”

(“Der Übermensch geht über die Art des bisherigen und heutigen Menschen hinaus und ist so ein Übergang, eine Brücke. Da- mit wir lernend dem Lehrer, der den Übermenschen lehrt, folgen können, müssen wir, um bei dem Bild zu bleiben, auf die Brücke gelangen. Den Übergang denken wir einigermaßen vollständig, wenn wir dreierlei beachten:

1. Das, von wo der Hinübergehende weggeht.
2. Den Übergang selbst.
3. Das, wohin der Übergehende hinübergeht.”).

Vorträge und Aufsätze (1936–1953). GA 7:107. “Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra.” Vortrag im Club zu Bremen am 8 Mai 1953. Note this lecture was to a group of businesspeople and not to a group of intellectuals per se in the northern city of Bremen, Germany.

There is a long discussion and description of a bridge in the lecture “Bauen Wohnen Denken” [Vortrag Darmstadt]. 5 August 1951. Heidegger says,

“Yet the bridge would never be a mere bridge if it were not a thing. To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the *fourfold* in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The location is not already there before the bridge is” *Building Dwelling Thinking. Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter, page 151. (See *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, GA 7:147-164.

Notes on Martin’s use of “Die Stege” and “Die Stege des Anfangs.” GA 72. *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944). The title *Bridges of the Beginning*, or maybe *Paths of the Beginning*, or *The Footbridges of the Inception*.

This is what was found in DLA archive records, and we are not sure if these will end up included in the actual GA 72 (forthcoming after 2023, according to Martin W.). There could be other manuscripts that are not seen online, etc. None of these are dated nor are remarks from GA 72 (see below). This is a list of some of manuscripts for GA 72 online DLA archives records, but none have dates listed.

These are in DLA records.

- 1). *Die sieben Stege*. Variationen I. 50 sheets. *Seven Bridges*.
- 2). *Die Stege des Anfangs*. Variation III. 58 sheets. *The footbridges of the beginning* (?). Anfangs – inception.
- 3). *Der zweite Steg*. Das Vorspiel. 18 sheets. *The second bridge*.
enthält: "Der 'erste Anfang'"; "Der erste Aufgang des Anfangs". Contains: "The 'First Beginning'"; "The First Rise of the Beginning".
- 4). Notes on the footbridges (title by editor), enclosures 126 sheets.
Summary of contents includes: "Preparation for the Seven Bridges"; "The Law of Proximity"; "The Beginning"; "Notes". HaupttitelKonvolut: Notizen zu den Stegen (Titel von Bearbeiter/in) Umfang, Beilagen. 126 Blatt Inhaltsangabe enthält u. a.: "Vorbereitung zu den sieben Stegen"; "Das Gesetz der Nähe"; "Der Anfang"; "Hinweise".
- 5). Collection signature A: Heidegger, Martin 1/Schuber/B 22. Accession number 75.7300,3.
Summary of contents "The pain and the death", "The physics and the meta-physics of the pain", "The first footbridge. Der Schmerz," "Über den Schmerz," "Der Schmerz selbst," "Die 'Gegebenheit' des Schmerzes," "Der Schmerz als das Widrige und Negative," "Der Schmerz und das animal rationale," and others. Remarks partly intended for GA vol. 72”.

Interesting remarks from *Zum Ereignis-Denken*. GA 73:912. Date unknown.

Lose translation from German to English. ‘Anfang’ has been translated as ‘inception’ and as ‘commencement.’

“The bridges (Stege) lead from the Ereignis, in its truth, to home and from home to the beginning (Anfang) that is appropriated in the Ereignis. The previous description of the "bridges of the beginning" (Stege des Anfangs) is still awkward and is not yet the actual saying of the word. Nevertheless, everything (alles) that was said there in preparation can be translated into the simple language of the Ereignisses. So how do the bridges fit into the Ereignis? After all, they are not some sort of introduction to the Ereignis from some outside source. Are they the guiding-joining in between that reaches into the beginning and touches one's homeland? How do the footbridges relate to the Ereignungen? They are their initial, clearing, granted structure.”

“Die Stege geleiten aus dem Ereignis, in dessen Wahrheit, zur Heimat und von der Heimat in den Anfang, der im Ereignis vereignet ist. Die bisherige Darstellung der »Stege des Anfangs« ist noch unbeholfen und ist noch nicht als der ereignete Spruch des Wortes. Gleichwohl läßt sich alles, was dort vorbereitend gesagt worden, übersetzen in die einfache Sprache des Ereignisses. Wie also gehören die Stege in das Ereignis? Sind sie doch nicht irgend eine Hinführung von irgend einem Außen her zum Ereignis. Sind sie das geleitend-fügende Zwischen, das in den Anfang reicht und an die Heimat rührt? Wie verhalten sich die Stege zu den Ereignungen? Sie sind deren anfängliches, lichtendes, gewährtes Gefüge.

From the manuscript section: Zu Ereignis VI Differenz und Unterschied. *Zum Ereignis-Denken*, GA 73:912. Note: GA 73 is not in chronological order but rather by themes (Editor's Peter Afterward); so, in this case, the date is unknown. The handwritten manuscript might have some clues as to the date it was composed.

In the late 1940s we read. These remarks could have been after GA 72. *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944) was written assuming the date of 1944.

From *Vier Hefte II*.

Heidegger on where the idea of bridge came from.

GA 99. *Vier Hefte I: Der Feldweg / Vier Hefte II: Durch Ereignis zu Ding und Welt*, (1947–1950). GA 99:156.

"The idea of the bridge, to think of the difference in its essence, came to me in the drawing by Wolf Huber (1510), [footnote 13] which I saw in the summer of 1938 in the Altdorfer exhibition [14] in Munich.

Now Stege's thinking thought is clearer from thinking through the nature of the difference; for this it was necessary to restrict the experience of this thinking to its own path and not only to free it from the confrontation with metaphysics, but above all from the conversation with Hölderlin. The footbridge:

a trace in the world-mountain of the actual oblivion
of the difference

If it says something thought, writing is in being through this
small measure determined in the written.

The forgetfulness of the difference if it is actually
and purely thought, corresponds to the abandonment of this thinking, which
remains incessant.

The bridge in the singular in the four (thing, event, mountain range,
world) names the same without pronouncing it as this, which
same is the difference itself.

Get the difference four times, each time into the [fourfold, Geviert]. Notes
VII, 182 ff.” GA 99:156.

The German Text:

“Der Gedanke des *Steges*, die Differenz in ihrem Wesen zu denken, kam mir entgegen in I der
Zeichnung von Wolf Huber (1510), die ich im Sommer 1938 in der Altdorfer-Ausstellung¹⁴ in
München sah. Jetzt ist *der* denkende Gedanke *des* Steges deutlicher aus dem Durchdenken des
Wesens des Unterschiedes; dazu war nötig, die Erfahrung dieses Denkens auf seinen eigenen
Pfad zu beschränken und es nicht nur aus der Auseinandersetzung mit der Metaphysik, sondern
vor allem aus dem Gespräch mit Hölderlin zu lösen.

Der Steg: eine Spur im Welt-Gebirge der eigentlichen Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes.

Eine Schrift ist, falls sie Gedachtes sagt, <lurch dieses in sein geringes Maß bestimmt im
Geschriebenen.

Der Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes entspricht, wenn sie eigentlich und rein gedacht ist, die
Verlassenheit dieses Denkens, die unablassig bleibt.

Der Steg in der Einzahl nennt in den Vieren (Ding, Ereignis, Ge-birge, Welt) das Selbe, ohne es
als dieses auszusprechen, welches Selbe der Unterschied selber ist.

Viermal den Unterschied bergen, jedesmal ins [Geviert]. Anmerkungen VII, 182 ff.” GA 99. *Vier
Hefte I: Der Feldweg / Vier Hefte II: Durch Ereignis zu Ding und Welt, (1947–1950)*. Note:
Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843).

Heidegger on the ocean in 1928 after his trip to Riga for for this lecture, “Zum Thema Kant und
die Metaphysik “. [Vortrag Riga]. September 1928.

70. MARTIN HEIDEGGER TO KARL JASPERS Todtnauberg, September 24, 1928

“The boat ride from Stettin to Riga was magnificent-the sea was a mirror - so I hardly felt
anything of the ocean's vastness. I must say, all in all, the sea strikes me as boring and
unimportant but that is just the one-sided impression of a mountain-dweller.” (In *Martin
Heidegger/Karl Jaspers Briefwechsel: 1920-1963*, edited by Walter Biemel and Hans Saner
(Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Vittorio Klostermann, 1990).

Consider Heidegger topographically as the mountain-dweller.

Heidegger's hut ("Hütte" built in 1922 by the farmer Pius Schweitzer), above the village of Todtnauberg in Black Forest (Schwarzwald), near the Hochschwarzwald ("High Black Forest"). The region of Kreenheinstetten. There is nearby the waterfall (Wasserfallsteig) of the Stubenbach stream, and the general pastoral landscape of woody hills. Ski slopes. Heidegger's die Hütte is about 18 miles north to Freiburg im Breisgau; and it is 30 miles south to Basel, Switzerland; and about 50 miles west to Mulhouse, France. Although Heidegger found the vast ocean boring, he loved the Black Forest and his hut; according to his son, Hermann Heidegger (1920-2020) based on the written logs at the die Hütte, Martin Heidegger spent 20 years of life there at the die Hütte (hut, cottage). There was no electricity until 1933. Wooden fireplace and stove for heat in the winter. This is a place for working, thinking, and writing. Written about the door was for some time a quote from Heraclius of Ephesus, Fragment B64: τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός (thunderbolt steers [guides] all things). The Κεραυνός (thunderbolt) may designate the god Zeus.

No sidewalks, no refrigerator, no driveway, or garage. All of the closest neighbors are 500-600 yards away, down the hill. There is no path down the hill for the neighbors. The term rustic is often used. This video shows Hermann Heidegger at the hut and remembering his father. [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Quv4wUvvYIU>].

Another example of the mountain dweller, "I don't have much tolerance for large cities." Letter to Elisabeth Blochmann (1892-1972) Freiburg, May 25, 1932.

In Freiburg there is the river Dreisam and a famous bridge across it, named Friedrichsbrücke (1903–1967). In Heidegger's hometown of Meßkirch is the river Ablach and it is a tributary of the Danube River that flows into the Black Sea.

There is still a wooden bridge across the Rhine, the Alte Rheinbrücke (Old Rhine Bridge) at Sevelen, Switzerland.

In Heidegger's very public lecture series *Was heißt Denken?* (1952) in particular the first series "The lecture in the winter semester 1951/52 with hour transitions". GA 8.

First in the "Was heißt Denken? (1952) published in *Lectures and Essays* in 1954. This quote comes from a different volume.

"There is no bridge from the sciences to thinking, but rather only the leap. Where it takes us is not just the other side, but a completely different place." "Es gibt von den Wissenschaften her zum Denken keine Brücke, sondern nur den Sprung. Wohin er uns bringt, dort ist nicht nur die andere Seite, sondern eine völlig andere Ortschaft." (*Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1953). GA 7:133).

In the larger series of lectures at the end of the first series in 1951, Heidegger is engaged with Nietzsche and the topic of "bridge".

"Whether this highest hope, which Nietzsche thinks of, still allows us to hope for something, or whether this highest hope does not contain the actual devastation, we cannot determine as long as we refrain from daring to attempt to cross the bridge with Nietzsche. ("Ob diese höchste

Hoffnung, an die Nietzsche denkt, noch etwas hoffen läßt, oder ob diese höchste Hoffnung nicht gerade die eigentliche Verwüstung in sich birgt, können wir so lange nicht ausmachen, als wir es unterlassen, den Versuch zu wagen, mit Nietzsche über die Brücke zu gehen.’).

What Is Called Thinking? Was heisst Denken? 1951-52. GA 8:101.

Therefore, we must go with Nietzsche and attempt to cross the bridge. This is not just any bridge, rather this the “sole step” toward the whole of Nietzsche’s development and his thinking.

“But this walk over the bridge is not just one of many other steps in Nietzsche's thinking. The walk over the bridge is the actual and that always means the sole step of the entire thinking in which Nietzsche's metaphysics unfolds (developed).” (“Dieser Gang über die Brücke ist nun aber nicht einer unter vielen anderen Schritten im Denken Nietzsches. Der Gang über die Brücke ist der eigentliche und das heißt hier stets der einzige Schritt des ganzen Denkens, worin sich Nietzsches Metaphysik entfaltet.”). *What Is Called Thinking? Was heisst Denken?* 1951-52.

But for some reason Heidegger see the image of the bridge in a painting by Wolf Huber (1485-1553) the title is of the painting is ‘Landschaft mit Steg’ and it was painted some five hundred years ago (dated 1520); and this led him to use the image of bridge in some of later writing as an image as to both our current situation and where to go next (see GA 99. *Vier Hefte I: Der Feldweg / Vier Hefte II: Durch Ereignis zu Ding und Welt*, (1947–1950). GA 99:156). What is next? Is Heidegger using this painting as an ekphrasis (ἔκφρασις) or a life altering experience when he saw this work of art. A simple trope τρόπος (tropos).

253. SPIEGEL-GESPRÄCH MIT MARTIN HEIDEGGER (23. September 1966). GA 16:652-683. Mistaken title is given “Only a god can save us.” This remark that became the incorrect title is part of the confusion over Heidegger’s real project.

At the end of the interview, we read the **final statement** of Heidegger.

“For us today, the greatness of the thinker is too great. We can perhaps struggle to build narrow and not very far-reaching bridges of a transition (Überganges).

Spiegel: Professor Heidegger, thank you for this interview.”

(“Wir können uns vielleicht daran ab mühen, an schmalen und wenig weit reichenden Stegen eines Überganges zu bauen. Spiegel: Herr Professor Heidegger, wir danken Ihnen für die dieses Gespräch”). GA 16:683. Heidegger is giving us a sign and he knew that these remarks would not be published until after his death, which of course he did not predict would come ten years later in 1976.

Nevertheless, he knew that the passage’s place at the end of the interview would mean something to us who can read it properly and correctly. Again, re-read. “We can perhaps struggle to build narrow and not very far-reaching bridges of a transition (Überganges).”

Remember that with Heidegger we need to be clear about his way with the current kairological situation. Where are we in-time? Is this the “right time” for building a bridge to the other beginning (Anfang, inceptions, commencement)? See GA 70. *Über den Anfang*, (1941) and mostly likely the forthcoming, *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944). GA 72. *The Footbridges of the*

Inception. Perhaps "The Bridges of the Beginning". Other beginning (not the second beginning). As Heidegger remarked, "Die Gipfel der Zeit." "peaks of times." *Hölderlins Hymnen »Germanien« und »Der Rhein«* GA 39: 52.

Heidegger's issues words of caution,

"Beyond the beginning this title has the appearance with itself, as if the thinking is also still and already "beyond" the beginning; while this is never possible and can never be attempted."
("Über den Anfang Dieser Titel hat den Schein bei sich, als sei das Denken auch noch und schon »über« den Anfang hinaus; während doch dieses nie möglich ist und nie versucht sein kann"
(*Über den Anfang*. GA 70:forward). This was Heidegger of 1941. Are we in a transition? The later Heidegger thinks so. Is this a "goal" or a case of being on the way without "goals" (goallessness)?

Therefore, the image of the bridge in Heidegger's thoughts and writings.

Conclusion

A). Refutation of possible opposing arguments, or *confutation*.

Procatalepsis ('speaker raises an objection to their own argument'). What are the best counter arguments to these theses? I hope this will strengthen my arguments.

I am following Protagoras (490 BC to 420 BC) to argue on both sides.

Note: Socrates, Aristotle, and Protagoras were all on trial in Athens at the court of Heliiaia (Ἡλιαία) for asebeia (ἀσέβεια). Socrates did not survive. Greek example, *Dissoi Logoi* (δισσοὶ λόγοι) normally translated as contrasting arguments.

The **refutatio** or the refutation; some counterexamples.

Does our "final paradigm" explain more of Heidegger than do the other possibilities of interpretations? What is the story and the gist of Heidegger? What are Heidegger's signals, hints, and messages to us about his motives and his overall program? What have we figured out and understand of Heidegger? Can there be a "final" paradigm for understanding Heidegger?

Answer: yes, and you are reading it.

A remarkably interesting counterexample about "questioning." Heidegger argues against different levels, for example, there are no highest propositions (GA 65: 13-14). But in this case, we seem to be able to build a typology of "questioning" at least in the following passages from 1941-1942.

Setting the stage for the following length Heidegger text.

From the volume, *Das Ereignis (The Event)*. GA 71. Dated 1941-1942. Section §259. GA 71:237–238. This is taken from the sixth out of seven of the middle or toros of Heidegger's middle period of his great writings (perhaps called *Abhandlungen*). What started with the GA 65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)* Dated: 1936-1938; through GA 66, 67, 68, 69, and 70; and now this section coming at the end of the sixth volume (GA 71). Note the final one GA 72 has not yet been published (2024).

Example, from GA 71 in German "Das Ereignis, das Er-eignen, die Ver-eignung, die Übereignung, die Zueignung, die An-eignung, die Eigentlichkeit, die Eignung, die Geeignetheit, die Ent-eignung, das Eigentum".

The seven *Abhandlungen* have a total number of pages of about 1800 pages over some eight years (1936-1942) of intense writing. Plus, in the meantime, he is also teaching courses and at this period of teaching career mostly on Nietzsche. So, here is the section,

"259. *The enduring of the difference*

(Questioning and question-worthiness of Beyng)

is the pain of the experience of the event, i.e., of the distinction as essence out of the difference which twists free in the departure. The enduring is thinking. In this thinking, “questioning” also is over-come.² What is called “thinking”? Relation of Beyng *as such* to the human being. Yet overcoming questioning is not a transition into questionlessness.

The enduring is, if speaking in this way is still possible, *more of a questioning* than any question, because the enduring belongs to the abyss and therefore does not stop at a ground but goes back beyond it instead. If this is the essence of questioning, then enduring has the character of an inceptual questioning of that which, as abyssal beginning, is itself what is question-worthy. As far as the essential occurrence of Beyng (turning) pertains to the beginning, Beyng illuminates its worthiness for such questioning. But because we are wont to persist

[Footnote: #2. “Questioning” in the sense of metaphysical-explanatory questioning that determines the “essence.” Condition of possibility. {Marginal remark in typescript}].

exclusively in metaphysical and scientific questioning (i.e., in problems of research, calculation, and explanation), this talk of “questioning” and of question-worthiness is too easily degraded to that domain. *Inceptual questioning* is the enduring of the difference; it resides in the pain of the experience of departure. Enduring into the beginning.

The enduring of the difference is heedfulness for the abyss; this heedfulness is in itself the grounding of the truth of the beginning.

The enduring, as the painful experience of the departure of the twisting free, is *more of a questioning* than any sort of question, provided questioning is the appropriated relation to the beginning, i.e., to the down going “whence,” which, as having been, is the pure coming of the clearing.

In the strict sense, questioning exists only where the relation to Being is already established and out of which, in its light, ἰδέα, there is an interrogation into beings, that which is, τί τὸ ὄν. The questioning is only in metaphysics and according to it in “the science”. (Das Fragen ist nur in der Metaphysik und ihr zufolge in »der Wissenschaft«.).

If questioning is taken in the strict sense (inquiry into what, why, how, whither, and whence of the look and composition of things, of their causes, production, representation, and objectification, and of their content), then inceptual thinking is not a questioning. The previous attempt to characterize this thinking of the truth of Beyng, precisely as genuine questioning with respect to the question-worthiness of Beyng, is insufficient and is a misunderstanding of the thinking of the history of Beyng. **The characterization of this thinking in terms of questioning and as questioning is unsuitable.** [Note. I have highlighted this as especially important]. It must no longer enter into the saying of the event. What the previous attempts thought by this misleading characterization does retain its truth but lacks the decisiveness of the contrast between the thinking of the history of Beyng and “metaphysics.”

The unsuitability of questioning, however, is not an evasion into faith and a flight into non-thinking. On the contrary, the unsuitability of questioning must itself be endured in the enduring of the pain of the departure. *The enduring is essentially more steadfast in the abyss* than all questioning, which indeed rests on itself, does not attain being in its truth, and is not at all appropriated by Being.

The enduring is also never poetry, because the enduring follows the twisting free into the beginning and never follows the presentation of beings as dwelling places and guesthouses of humans and gods.

The enduring is the saying of the history of Beyng.

The enduring is the appropriated, proper, steadfast word of the relation of Beyng to the human being of the history of Beyng, whereby talk of "relation" is always misleading, since it insinuates that Beyng is like an object standing apart." *Das Ereignis (The Event)*. GA 71. Dated 1941-1942. GA 71:237–238. Translation by Richard Rojcewicz. Translation has been partially changed.

The German text:

259. Der Austrag des Unterschieds

(Fragen und Fragwürdigkeit des Seyns)

ist der Schmerz der Erfahrung des Ereignisses, d. h. der Unterscheidung als Wesens aus dem Unterschied, der in den Abschied sich verwindet. Der Austrag ist Denken. In diesem Denken ist auch das »Fragen« überwunden." Was heißt »denken«? Bezug des Seyns *als solchen* zum Menschen. Doch die Überwindung des Fragens ist nicht der Übergang in das Fraglose.

Der Austrag ist, wenn das so noch gesagt werden könnte, *fragender* als jede Frage, weil er dem Abgrund gehört und deshalb nicht bei einem Grund stehen bleibt, sondern über ihn zurückgeht. Wenn dieses das Wesen des Fragens ist, dann hat der Austrag die Art des anfänglichen Fragens dessen, was als abgründiger Anfang das Fragwürdige selbst ist. Sofern die Wesung des Seyns (Kehre) dem Anfang gehört, lichtet das Seyn seine Würde für solches Fragen. Aber weil wir leicht nur im metaphysischen und wissenschaftlichen Fragen (in Problemen des Erforschens und Rechnens und Erklärens) beharren, wird diese Rede vom »Fragen« und der Fragwürdigkeit zu gern in diesen Bezirk herabgesetzt. *Anfängliches Fragen* ist der Austrag des Unterschieds im Schmerz der Erfahrung des Abschieds; Austrag in den Anfang. Der Austrag des Unterschieds ist das Aufmerken auf den Abgrund; dieses Aufmerken ist in sich die Gründung der Wahrheit des Anfangs.

Der Austrag als der Schmerz der Erfahrung des Abschieds der Verwindung *istfragender* als jede Art von Frage, gesetzt, daß das Fragen die er-eignete Bezugnahme auf den Anfang ist, d. h. auf das untergängliche Woher, das als das Gewesende das reine Kommen ist der Lichtung. Gewesende das reine Kommen ist der Lichtung.

Streng gedacht ist das Fragen nur dort, wo der Bezug zum Sein schon festgemacht und aus ihm her, in seinem Lichte, *ιδέα*.

Seiende, was es ist, 'τί τὸ ὄν' - befragt wird. Das Fragen ist nur in der Metaphysik und ihr zufolge in »der Wissenschaft«.

Im Sinne des streng genommenen Fragens (nach dem Was, Warum, Wodurch, Wozu, Woraus des Aussehens und Bestehens, der Gewirktheit und Hergestelltheit und Vorgestelltheit und Gegenständlichkeit und des Bestandes) ist das anfängliche Denken kein Fragen. Der bisherige Versuch, dieses Denken der Wahrheit des Seyns gerade als das eigentliche Fragen zu kennzeichnen im Hinblick auf die Fragwürdigkeit des Seyns, ist unzureichend und ein Mißverständnis des seynsgeschichtlichen Denkens. Die Kennzeichnung dieses Denkens vom Fragen her und als Fragen wird hinfällig. Sie darf sich in die Sage des Ereignisses nicht mehr einmischen. Was unter dieser mißdeutenden Kennzeichnung in den bisherigen Versuchen gedacht wurde, behält seine Wahrheit, entbehrt jedoch der Entschiedenheit der Abhebung des seyns- geschichtlichen Denkens gegen die »Metaphysik«.

Die Hinfalligkeit des Fragens ist aber nicht das Ausweichen in den Glauben und die Flucht in das Nicht-mehr-Denken. Im Gegenteil: die Hinfalligkeit des Fragens muß selbst ausgetragen werden im Austrag des Schmerzes des Abschieds. *Der Austrag ist wesentlich inständiger im Ab-grund* als alles Fragen, das doch schon auf sich versteift und zugleich das Sein in seiner Wahrheit nicht erreicht und schon gar nicht von ihm ereignet wird.

Der Austrag ist auch nie Dichtung, weil der Austrag der Verwindung in den Anfang folgt und nie der Darstellung des Seienden als Wohnstatt und Gast-haus der Menschen und der Götter.

Der Austrag ist die Sage der Geschichte des Seyns.

Der Austrag ist das ereignet- ge-eignete inständige Wort des Bezugs des Seyns zum seynsgeschichtlichen Menschen, wobei die Rede von »Bezug« stets verfänglich bleibt, da sie unterstellt, das Seyn sei dergleichen wie ein abstehender Gegenstand" *Das Ereignis (The Event)*. Dated 1941-1942. Section 259. GA 71:237–238.

Goal: to overcome questioning.

Overcoming questioning does not lead to questionlessness.

Called out as inceptual questioning (anfänglichen Fragens, initial questioning, or initial questions). Type: metaphysical-explanatory questioning is only about "essence." Where is the ontology or genuine questioning?

NOTE:

"Questioning is only in metaphysics and, according to it, in "science."

"If questioning is taken in the strict sense (inquiry into the what, why, how, whither, and whence of the look and composition of things, of their causes, production, representation, and objectification, and of their content), then inceptual thinking is not a questioning." GA 71:237–238.

Therefore, we have questioning in the strict sense at the level trapped by metaphysics; and some form of anfänglichen Fragens (inceptual questioning) which leads to Heidegger's

thinking about Sein and Ereignis.

We, therefore, have a typology of “questioning.” Does this lead us away from the directions of this book? Procatalepsis. What are the best counter arguments to these theses?

Back to some counterexamples.

Apostrophic (ἀποστροφή, apostrophé, "turning away") attempt to try and speak to the other side of wild speculation, namely, that Heidegger was building toward a new ‘religion.’ An example of bothsidesism? A few short notes on Heidegger on theology.

Heidegger’s letter to Bultmann on December 18, 1928, that “the positivity of theology, which I believe I have put my finger on, is something other than that of the sciences. Theology is outside the sciences, but in a vastly different way than philosophy.”

Heidegger’s letter to Bultmann from December 16, 1932: “My effort has always been to help theology to awaken to itself from itself.” Martin Heidegger – Rudolf Bultmann, *Briefwechsel 1925–1975*. Andreas Großman and Chrisof Landmesser, eds, (Mohr Siebeck, 2009). Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) lifelong friend of Heidegger and a famous theologian and a New Testament scholar. Does Heidegger have some ultimate religious intentions? Answer: no.

Heidegger of the late 1930s says, “So remote is the God that we are unable to decide whether he is moving toward or away from us”. *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)*. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65:22-23.

Attacks. General lectures and attacks against Heidegger, see *Ontologie und Dialektik* (1960/61) by Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno (1903-1969). There are some 600 references to Heidegger in the collective writings of Adorno – unfortunately mostly negative (purely ideological-political agenda?). Adorno used a great knout against Heidegger but in the end it was unsuccessful. Heidegger as the Teflon philosopher. Adorno is the philosopher as ideologist and as a philosophical demagogue. Adorno’s close friend, Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) studied for a year with Husserl in 1919. In 1925, Horkheimer completed his Habilitation with a work titled *Kant’s Critique of Judgment as a Link between Theoretical and Practical Philosophy* at the University of Frankfurt. Attacked does not work. Against deepity – no deep analysis of Heidegger from Wiesengrund.

To wit, Heidegger developed his own distinct style of writing and questioning. But a distinct style of writing and questioning does not make a “philosophy.” A philosophical doctrine is a theory, tenets, principle, position, system, or some foundational axioms and assumptions. For some philosophers it is worldview or ideology. Heidegger engages and confronts philosophers and has insights and analysis, but no worldview or final positions. He talks about “a pathway of thinking (Gedankengang) *Überlegungen VII–XI*. (GA 95:52). The courage of a stance. Heidegger answers questions as he understands them. He did not faint questions or answers from his students or scholars. Unlike Jaspers, Heidegger was known to laugh. Instant hilarity, right? Sometimes Martin was frolicsome, but in fact, his brother Fritz was more well known for telling jokes.

As Heidegger unfolded the Being question, he gave us his insights. Professor Sheehan has given us the best documented investigations into Heidegger's trail on the path of Heidegger's new kind of ontology. Professor Sheehan has given us a detailed philological analysis of the Heidegger's terminology (German and Greek); but also, what it all means for understanding Heidegger's unfolding. There is a whole armada of synonyms (note again issues with polysemy) that Heidegger used over the six decades. Nevertheless, Heidegger is pointing things out and giving us insights; but again, these are not ontological or philosophical tenets or a doctrine or dictums. For Heidegger, the essential thinking is a questioning thinking or the humans as the interrogator of Being.

Is there a Heidegger's stratagem to hide a Heideggerian doctrine?

Answer: I do not think so. Perhaps an example of quatsch (Unsinn, nonsense)?

You may want to try – the **ignoratio elenchi** (irrelevant conclusion, Chewbacca defense). But there is always the **non obstante veredicto**. Questions?

Again.

“Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) opened the session of September 1st, 1955, with a long presentation. He first expressed his surprise at having heard from Heidegger himself that there was no Heideggerian philosophy. While admitting and even approving of the absence of a system, he nonetheless maintained that Heidegger's thought is a philosophy, if only for the fact that it is immediately recognizable and that it possesses that “unique quality that allows it to be identified, just as one distinguishes Brahms's style from Debussy's.” (*Heidegger in France*, p. 129). Writers have ‘styles’ without any philosophical doctrines etc.

Does a “style” make a philosophy?

Answer: no, I do not think so.

Debatable?

What is the ontological (or even metaphysical) status of the nascent development by Heidegger of the fourfold (das Geviert) and technological essence, the enframing (das Gestell)? Another example, of semicapitalism. Is there still a process thinking or dynamism (ala Hegel's dialectic) in these concepts? Heidegger's later thought and these examples, seems more ontic than ontological, but hardly a philosophical doctrine. Or the way Heidegger makes use of the expression, Gelassenheit (can be consider as unwillingness, willingness, (Willenslosigkeit). Another term that Heidegger uses is: Leergelassenheit or empty Gelassenheit.

Heidegger's topological thinking (Topologie des Seins) where the ‘jug’ is in ‘space’ and the kind of ‘space’ that the jug is in. The inside of the ‘jug’ within space and yet empty. Maybe consider the Heterotopias as a space too.

Heidegger's statement and reflection, “The jug is not a container because it is produced, but rather it must be produced because it is this container;” so, then compare this to a few lines from Toby Keith's (1961-2024) song the ‘Red Solo Cup’,

“Hey, red solo cup is cheap and disposable

And in fourteen years, they are decomposable

And unlike my home, they are not foreclosable....
Red solo cup
I fill you up
Let us have a party”

Compare the power of Heidegger’s thinking of 1927 with his version of 1950s (the “jug”). Jugs are just the hypernymous of beings. That is why many on the team Heideggerians follow the maximum of: Also muss auf *SuZ* zurückgegangen werden! Now we know the extent of Heidegger II and Heidegger III (the later Heidegger); the deep power of the thinking of Heidegger I is clearer. Perhaps that is why we have so many remarks and edition changes of *Being and Time* (1927) throughout Heidegger’s path of thinking. For example.

From the last volume of the Gesamtausgabe (GA 102), the late Heidegger writes,

“The procedure in »Being and Time«: unfolding the question of Being and determining its horizon -; this requires an analysis of the existence standing in the draft of Daseins and of the ecstatic temporality (Zeitlichkeit) that determines it.” GA 102. *Vorläufiges I-IV. (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970). Vorläufiges I.* DLA 75.7420,1. This was written by the author some 36 years after the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927. Again and again, Heidegger returns to his most famous writing.

Keith’s song “As Good as I Once Was” may have been a good song for Heidegger after 1927. What would Heidegger say about Keith’s lyrics, “I still throw a few back, Talk a little smack”? Heidegger later remarks on *Being and Time* (1927) exceed the total pages of *Being and Time*. Partial example, GA 16. *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–1976), pages 842.

B). Final Conclusions, or **peroratio**. ∴

“Thinking is questioning.” “Das denkerische Denken ist Fragen.”
Besinnung (1938-1939). GA 66:358.

“The questionable - is the Matter itself.” “Das Fragwürdige - ist die Sache selbst.” *Vigiliae I, II / Notturmo*, (1952/53 bis 1957). GA 100:54.

Notably, the relevance and preponderance of the previous evidence provides for the following ineluctable (inescapable or unavoidable) conclusions. This is the best and most likely reading of Heidegger’s writings and what others have told us about Heidegger and their interactions with him (mostly in the context of teaching and answering “questions”). Claim – Heidegger has answered to the best of his ability more questions from students, scholars, philosophers, etc. than most of the rest of the philosophers. They bring their best questions to the “master.” As claimed here, he also hands out plenty of questions too. He is the “question business” on both end of dialogue and conversations. Thank you.

Example of a student encounter with asking Heidegger (the professor) questions,

“Alexandru Dragomir once described to me a Sprechstunde with Heidegger. He had gone to the professor with eight questions relating to his doctoral thesis. Heidegger told him to ask them all at the beginning. He did not make a note of them, but after he had heard them, he began to answer each one in turn with a precision, a finesse and a depth that astonished the Romanian student. “I had never before seen, and I have never seen since, such a display of the splendor of the human mind. I emerged from my first Sprechstunde stunned, convinced that I had had the good fortune to meet a genius in flesh and blood.” *Alexandru Dragomir: Notebooks from the Underground* by Gabriel Liiceanu.

The following is the summary (symperasma, συμπεράσμα) and restatements from the previous sections. The assertion of the centrality of “questioning” in Heidegger’s overall program for 60+ years of thinking and writing (40,000+ pages).

General and clear results from the previous chapters.

Heidegger on Questioning

Answer: unambiguous and convincing evidence.

Crisis or Krisis in philosophy?

Answer: yes.

Is there a Heidegger’s philosophy?

Answer: no.

Heidegger about the Nature of Teaching

Answer: linked to his questioning approach to philosophy.

Heidegger against philosophy as a worldview or the standpoint of standpointlessness

Answer: linked to his questioning approach to philosophy and not creating a worldview, etc.

Heidegger’s stance is questioning and as the philosophical interrogator.

Heidegger’s world-famous book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, SuZ, 1927).

At the very end of *Being and Time*, is a key phrase, “still remains only *one way* that we may take.” There is no single “the way” or “only one way” for Heidegger in *Being and Time* in 1927. Note that Heidegger made 100s of changes over the years as new editions came out. There was no change to this passage or the last section of *Being and Time*. In *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, Heidegger writes, “...therein lies in the interpretation of historicity in *Being and Time* a directedness to the essence of Being itself, the *questioning* of which is the only endeavor of that book.” *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* GA 65: 32-34. N.B. the only endeavor of that book is “*questioning*,” that is, not a doctrine.

Heidegger's second major attempt Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis).

This is a failed attempt at creating some kind of methodology and a structure system, but there is the emphasis on the questioning and philosophy as underway. Many of the themes and motif of the later Heidegger are for the first time given some expression (note the focus will change over time). Some scholars call these writings the later Heidegger's own sourcebook for many of his indications and pathways (the topics and themes come back again and again).

Heidegger on the image of the Bridge.

Heidegger uses the image of the bridge to show they we are in a transition to another stage, land, or a general place that is "beyond" metaphysics at least in some kind of attempt. He often cautions against attempts to go beyond metaphysics. It is an easier story to say that Heidegger wants to get to place that that is "beyond metaphysics" or "post-metaphysics." The new beginning (Anfang). With his questioning approach he is only giving us some guidance toward seeing the beginning of the bridge. Heidegger is helping us navigate a way out of the Krisis, but the crisis is not behind us --- yet.

Heidegger last statement in the *Der Spiegel* Interview with Martin Heidegger September 23, 1966. This is a *very important* ending to this published interview on Heidegger's overall vision and his 'message' to us (from the master, our acharya).

"But thinking's greatest affliction is that today, as far as I can see, no thinker yet speaks who is great enough to place thinking, directly and formatively, before its subject matter and therefore on its path. For us today, the greatness of the thinker is too great. Perhaps we can struggle with building narrow and not very far-reaching footbridges for a crossing (transition).

SPIEGEL: Professor Heidegger, we thank you for this conversation."

"Aber die größte Not des Denkens besteht darin, daß heute, so weit ich sehen kann, noch kein Denkender spricht, der » groß« genug wäre, das Denken unmittelbar und in geprägter Gestalt vor seine Sache und damit auf seinen Weg zu bringen. Für uns Heutige ist das Große des zu Denkenden zu groß. Wir können uns vielleicht daran abmühen, an schmalen und wenig weit reichenden Stegen eines Überganges zu bauen."

Translation by William J. Richardson, S.J. with some modification.

"Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten," *Der Spiegel* 30 (Mai, 1976). Who picked this terrible title? Unfortunately, some shocking malfeasance of reading the actual text to pick this title. Sales needed (\$\$) were needed for this publication "Spiegel- Gespräch mit Marlin Heidegger" (23. September 1966). GA 16:652-683. Section 253. They had to bring in "God" for the sales (and more \$\$) and missed Heidegger's end and one of his final (ultimate) and key messages to us. Can we hear the message in these words? Are we prepared and ready to be the "vessel"?

"Wir können uns vielleicht daran abmühen, an schmalen und wenig weit reichenden Stegen eines Überganges zu bauen."

"Perhaps we can struggle with building narrow and not very far-reaching footbridges for a crossing (transition)." ∴ To wit, **also muss auf Heidegger zurückgegangen werden!**

Conclusion and the rest of the story.

The abridged version of the Heidegger story.
allegro.

Ultimately, Heidegger was put on earth for a purpose. Heidegger's path and journey is a simple story. He became an esteemed university philosophy professor. He diligently wrote out his courses and developed those lectures. The kairological situation (time was right) became clear to him in the 1920s that something fresh in philosophy was needed and he was convinced that the dry neo-Kantianism of his teachers was not the answer. Heidegger undertook and attempted phenomenology investigations into a new kind of ontology. He started attracting brilliant students that pressed him (debated) sometimes on his analysis. Heidegger published *Being and Time* (1927) in a rush to get promoted (promoted 19 October 1927). He became world famous. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, he had the time and developed his own approach to ontology, and he did a deep dive into these questions. These writings were not a "work," "treatise," "book," etc.; but clearly, he did not mean them for immediate publications (GA 65, 66, 70, 71, and 72). The writing style and thinking is unusual. It is ok to be a bit perplexed aporetic (ἀπορητικός) when reading Heidegger. From the outside and external perspective, they resemble several page aphorisms (which he denies). No specific sections on methodology. The first one, GA 65. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938) has some structure (fuges) as discussed earlier in this book, but his later writings had less apparent structure. Remember Heidegger wrote only one book (GA 3). After that we have a wide variety of writings, dialogues, essays, poems (through his whole life), lectures, speeches, seminars, travel journal, interviews, etc. His last teaching was, *Parmenides: das Herz der Aletheia Erläuterung zu einem Wort des Parmenides*, 1973 September at age 84. Martin Heidegger was a university philosophy professor (ein bestallter Lehrer der Philosophie), who taught courses from starting in 1919 until 1973 (paused for part of World War II). As a philosopher professor, he taught courses and answered questions from students for six decades. He developed his ideas and shared them, especially in his addresses and lectures outside of the university. He did not want to propagate or teach or spread any kind of a system or a doctrine or even a theory. He was partial ideologist in the early 1930s as documented by many scholars. We should note that as a teacher, Heidegger had many of his students become brilliant and world-famous philosophers for a whole host of reasons, but most acknowledge their debt to him (but they were not disciples, not votaries). He was not searching for or attempting to create disciples of his students like Husserl's or Hegel's followers. Heidegger wanted no adherents.

There are plenty of examples of Heidegger changing his mind and changing his mind about his interpretations, etc. Of course, over 60 years there is divagation (wandering) too. There are no final doctrines (ideologies) that Heidegger is pushing us to accept. In the end, there is his last project: *Legacy of the Being Question (Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage)* in the early 1970s. Heidegger had a one-track mind and often a laser-track focus on his questioning. But in his writings, he has multidimensionality that rings and echoes with all of us that read him with care. Some readers consider his interpretations provocative. He gave us many footnotes in his writings on the inter-connections of his other parts of his writings. This was not a case of hubris (ὕβρις,

húbris) or arrogance (supercilious) for Heidegger; but rather, think of this as Heidegger being our guide to his writings. Giving us helpful hints. He is our mountain climbing guide.

But remember not all of Heidegger is “correct,”

“Perhaps only my *errors* still have the power to provoke in an age that is over-burdened by truths from which the truth has long been missing.” (“Vielleicht haben auch nur meine *Irrtümer* noch eine Kraft des Anstoßes in einem Zeitalter, das überladen ist von Richtigkeiten, denen längst die Wahrheit fehlt”). *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte)*. GA 94:404.

In the following example, Heidegger gives us his impression of what he is doing. *Ipse dixit* (Latin for "he said it himself") or *autòs épha* (αὐτὸς ἔφα). This is what he wrote and how he sees himself,

“Since then, I exist in the role of an overseer in a gallery, who, among other things, has to see to it that the curtains in the windows are correctly opened and closed so that the few great works of the tradition are more or less properly illuminated for the randomly gathering spectators. Without the picture - I only read and work on the history of philosophy, i.e., I attempt to lay out what seems important to me for loosening up philosophizing without considering the economy of the lecture. As a half-Swabian, I have now attained Swabian adulthood, where you become clever enough to know what you can and may do, and what not.” Heidegger letter to Karl Jaspers. Freiburg i. Br., December 20, 1931.

Heidegger sees himself as overseer in a gallery – showing us and helping us to illuminate the great philosophers of the past. He is an adult Swabian. [Question. Did Heidegger like Träubleskuchen?].

The old parable of the blind men and an elephant.

“The medieval era Jain texts explain the concepts of *anekāntavāda* (or "many-sidedness") and *syādvāda* ("conditioned viewpoints") with the parable of the blind men and an elephant (*Andhgajanyāyah*), which addresses the manifold nature of truth. This parable is found in the most ancient Jain agams before 5th century BCE. Its popularity remained till late. For example, this parable is found in *Tattvarthaslokavatika* of Vidyānandī (9th century) and *Syādvādamanjari* of Ācārya Mallisena (13th century).” Wikipedia.

Each blind man touched the elephant in various places and hence drew different conclusions as to what an elephant was like. Jainism teaches through this example, the many sidedness of the truth. Truth unfolds in many directions. Even though Gadamer, Bimal, and Pöggeler spent months and years in philosophical conversations with Heidegger, in fact, we are privy to many more of Heidegger’s writings and letters than those named philosophers. Additionally, the “team of Heideggerians” have had decades to re-read and re-think many of his major publications and have published those investigations. There are plenty. Their thoughtful engagements have resulted in even deeper dives into Heidegger’s thought and indeed into his vast published writings. Some of the undecipherable expressions from years ago have now been deciphered and seen in the light of the later usages. Example is the shifting focus and way of the *Gelassenheit*. Heidegger used the expression “*Gelassenheit*” from 1919 to 1976. Interesting connections have

been made with the rest of the philosophers on the planet that have ever lived. We have many more philological resources than Heidegger. We also know more about Martin's hidden Greek language resources (his own team).

The Heideggerian "team" has had many powerful insights than a single individual may not have seen in Heidegger's writings. Professor Sheehan has written about the various paradigm in Heidegger research. The Right Heideggerians and the Strict Heideggerians. The old standard is the "classical paradigm." As noted, before, as Heidegger's writings have poured out, we have had different generational publications (over the years); and of course, different readings from Germany, Japan, France, Netherlands, and the USA (etc.). In the USA many of the early Heideggerians came from intensive study Husserl before coming to Heidegger's writings. Reported that Jean-Paul-Charles Aymard Sartre born in Paris 1905, starting in 1933, he reads assiduously nothing but Husserl for six years. We have Dilthey scholars (e.g., Rudolf A. Makkreel and Eric S. Nelson) that read some of Heidegger from the perspective of Dilthey. We could add a couple of thousand more to this list of philosophers and scholars that have different approaches to reading and engaging Heidegger's thought. So far, there are no clear "official" successors (Diadochoi, Διάδοχοι) to Heidegger. There are no diverse philosophical schools all claiming that Heidegger has the only ideology for philosophers. In general, this idea is completely contrary to Heidegger teachings and insight that he expressed. The most famous of the German schools from Hegel was the young Hegelians and old Hegelians, and then became, the left-Hegelians (Hippel's Wine Bar in central Berlin) and the right-Hegelians. There are plenty of Heideggerians that we can make distinctions and break them up into schools or camps or paradigms (after the re-reading of most his writings, knowing that now we have most of the writings published). There is certainly, a group of strong and certain, the "anti-Heideggerians" (Tom Rockmore, e.g.). Perhaps some duplicitousness.

In summary, the "team" is getting closer to filling in the picture of Heidegger's thought, his gift, and lasting legacy to us. Many of the older Heideggerian publications are outdated with very incomplete results, since so much has come out in the meantime (now 2024). The tables are now cleaned off and we can re-set the new project with 37,577+ published pages of Heidegger's writings. The "team of Heideggerians" has done much to make a fresh start even better. Heidegger's German words are well known now and his re-translation of the Greek words and Greek philosophers over 60 years of his re-thinking has mostly been published now. Even the anti-Heideggerians have made their contributions to grasping Heidegger's thought and its impact on other philosophers. Heidegger has set the agenda for philosophers. Although Heidegger wrote no political philosophy articles, somehow, he has set the agenda and discussion for many of the political philosophical issues coming out of the European World War II conflict. A very short list of those against Heidegger, his adversaries: Günther Anders, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Hans Jonas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sartre(?), Karl Löwith, Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Renaut, Maurice Blanchot, Emmanuel Levinas, Luc Ferry, Jacques Ellul, Guido Schneeberger, David Farrell Krell (2014), Tom Rockmore, Günter Figal (2015), and recently Peter Trawny (?). Many different kinds of distinctions can be made between this group, but we all must engage Heidegger at various levels and different interpretations.

As Kant said, “Sie haben gut kämpfen.” (“You have good fight”). *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. AK 3:494.

The following are the major core themes (leitmotifs) in Heidegger. This is certainly a contestable point. We have not exhausted all of the possible interpretations. This is the best overall interpretation that links all of his core themes. Heidegger is closer to Socrates as the purest thinker in the western tradition; and contra to the systems builders, for example, Kant, Fichte, Hegel (best and truest example), and Schopenhauer. Nietzsche’s Letter to Paul Deussen (16 December 1887), “perhaps this old Plato is my true great opponent? But how proud I am to have such an opponent!” Heidegger complains, “Objection to the book: I have even today still not enough enemies—it has not brought me a Great enemy.” *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*. *Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks*, GA 94:8. The anti-Heideggerians are not his opponent until they have grasped Heidegger [according to Thomas Sheehan, few of opponents have gotten to first base as a requirement to engage Heidegger]. Are we sure these scholars would have done things differently if they were confronted like Heidegger or should we just call it out as “Uchronia”? Some kind of fictional time or period in history.

We need to move the playing field of critical appraisal and confrontation of Heidegger past the “cottage industry” of simple **argumentum ad hominem** and what amounts to simple (unphilosophical) personal animosities. I view those **argumentum ad hominem** arguments as meritless. Just their personal bête noire (anathemas)?

Heidegger calls on us to move forward to eine sachliche Auseinandersetzung with “matter themselves.” First, we need to bring Heidegger into the light. Part of traditional philosophical writing is to show how these leitmotifs hang together; different leitmotifs are interwoven in these theses, distinct themes, and their complicated interweaving. There is some zigzagging on the path.

Now we can re-read these “Five Thesis” and conclude the basic outline of Heidegger’s thought – the “final paradigm” of how to understand Heidegger’s project. What is the gist of Martin Heidegger’s thought? What is the story here?

The Overall Five Theses

I intends to defend the following statements (claims, theses) and to dispute with any and all persons.

Main thesis.

Martin Heidegger as an interrogator.

Martin Heidegger as a questioner.

Martin Heidegger's passion, dedication, and love was for intense questioning.

Second thesis.

There is no Heidegger philosophy; but rather, only Martin Heidegger's stance, namely, questioning and "leaps" (leaps were big for Heidegger in the 1930s). Preparing a new way of thinking (mentioned in Richard Wisser conversation). Sometimes called the ontological and a phenomenological way of seeing (summer semester of 1919); and the much later in the Zollikoner Seminare (GA 98) during the 1960s. Heidegger never started with the intention and purpose of "building" a system or a Heidegger Philosophy (nor looking for disciples or followers (like Husserl and Hegel).

Third thesis.

Heidegger is preparing for a way out of metaphysical thinking and language. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger rejects western metaphysics; but knows that philosophical language is tied to metaphysics and so he explores the essential nature of language. He uses the image of the bridge to a new beginning (Anfang) in thinking and questioning. The current kairological situation. The expression "Postmetaphysical Thinking" has been used as topic in philosophical research; but we used it here as indicator beyond Hegel and certainly noted for Heidegger's attempt to get beyond Nietzsche's metaphysics. To basically and simply, to get free of Platonism (GA 65:208-213) and metaphysics. So far, there is no "claim" by Heidegger that he made it. Open question as to how far he got on the bridge.

Perhaps we are too close to Heidegger, but we can read his writings and hear him. He wrote this about Nietzsche.

"And presumably this is a step in Nietzsche's thinking, the extent of which we cannot yet gauge because we are too close to him and therefore forced to see everything too much in terms of "life", which Nietzsche basically wanted to overcome. This makes it all the more necessary for us to ask more original questions and thus not to fall into the misconception that Nietzsche's questions are thus "finished". " *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938). GA 65: section 234. Note: „ursprünglicher zu fragen“ . Perhaps to question more originally.

Fourth thesis.

The Being question (Seinsfrage) is a symbol and a synecdoche (συνεκδοχή, synekdochē) for Heidegger thinking from at least the year 1922 until his last writings in the year of his death (1976). Heidegger talks (1936-1939) of the experience of being on the path, “On this “way” if to keep falling down and getting up can be called a way, it is always and only the same question of the “meaning of Being” that is asked”. *Beiträge* GA 65:83-85. He called his last project: Legacy of the Being Question (Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage). The question is: does Heidegger want to improve humanity? Create an idol of the project of Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage? Is this a “doctrine” or “questioning”? Answer: questioning stance. Note for Heidegger the Being of beings is not a ‘metaphysical super-entity.’ Heidegger is trying to bust out of these views of Being and ontology in their metaphysical casing and framing. *Das Wegfeld des Denkens*.

Example.

“Philosophy is the questioning of Being (Sein). This designation can be interpreted in two ways. Both interpretations contain in their unity the essence of the previous and of the future philosophy and thus the indication of the transition from one to the other.” (“Die Philosophie ist das Fragen nach dem Sein. Diese Kennzeichnung läßt sich zwiefach deuten. Beide Deutungen enthalten in ihrer Einheit das Wesen der bisherigen und der knüftigen Philosophie und somit den Hinweis auf den Übergang von der einen zur anderen”). *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)*. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65:424.

Questioning takes us into the realm of the unknown (always). We are always underway.

“To answer the question “What is called thinking?” is itself always to keep asking, so as to remain underway. This would seem easier than the intention to take a firm position; for adventurer-like, we roam away into the unknown.” *What Is Called Thinking?* Date 1951-1952. Translation by J. Glenn Grey, page 169.

Final and Fifth thesis.

Ultimately, these 4 theses are all ineluctable interconnected in their core unity. The weaving of the warp and weft of Heidegger’s writings and thought is of course more complex than these investigations, but the point was to follow Heidegger’s path of thinking, that is, to “evoking essential thinking.” (“wesentliches Fragen hervorzurufen”). The German word “hervorzurufen” translated into English: 1). evoke, 2). raise, 3). provoke, and 4). elicit. Or an evocation or an elicitation; or perhaps “provocation” (Herausforderung) [but not in the Rainer Marten example].

Conclusion follows, Martin Heidegger as Interrogator.

So, therefore, **quod erat demonstrandum** (ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι). QED.

Final Conclusions (:)

Final allegro.

N.B. For the vast majority of the Heideggerians it is time to re-read all (“whole”) of Heidegger and take careful notes of what he is saying. It will take some time. But **the** carefully considered reading will come to the same conclusions as they are inevitable. Many of the earlier Heideggerians have had some muddled partial reading of Heidegger. Understandable as the texts have come out over many years. They engaged Heidegger but it was a confusing period for them. Of course, pity is too strong of word, but they can start and refresh their thinking and pondering Heidegger’s thought provoking questioning. What is your complaint about too much Diasyrmus? Pathopoeia παθοποιία (*pathopoiia*) We need some emotions in philosophy to get at the debate by Da-Sein. Pathos πάθος – please. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric Πητορικὴ* (1356a24–1356a25).

We know that Heideggerians are of good character. As it said, “For Brutus is an honourable man”. There are the current petulance levels considering the the smallness of philosophical engagement with Heidegger’s questioning paths.

Martin Heidegger as an interrogator. There is no Heidegger philosophy. Heidegger is preparing for a way out of metaphysical thinking and language. The Being question (Seinsfrage) is the beginning and the end of Heidegger’s quest. Heidegger has a one-track mind. Egg of Columbus. This is not a stratagem or a clever plot. But if this is stratagem it fooled many and has worked. Sometime Heidegger has put forth ideas and always answered the innumerable philosophical questions put to him; and has from time to time, fallen off of the path. Some of his attempts have not worked out. His public statements became clearer in the 1950s forward. But his questioning approach was always present, and this book provides the surfeit evidence for these final conclusions. **So, therefore, quod erat demonstrandum (ὅπερ εἶδει δεῖξαι). QED.**

But there are no final decisions for Heidegger. All of Heidegger is open to questioning (that is what he wants). As Heidegger says with regard to Aristotle being without question, we say about Heidegger himself, “Pure fiction! Everything is open.” Heidegger is against Saint Thomas’ (1225-1274) interpretation of Aristotle as a close system. Heidegger’s writing and thinking are entirely incapable and lacking congruity with the overall general idea of some kind of completion (or final position).

Heidegger does not have much of a program but gives us hints toward the future as he saw it. In the 1955, Heidegger said,

“I am writing all of this in the form of questions; for, as far as I can see, thinking can today do more than to continually ponder what evoked in the said questions.” (*On The Question of Being*, Letter to Ernst Jünger, “Zur Seinsfrage (1955) / Über die Linie” in *Wegmarken* GA9:405. *Pathmarks* et.p.306).

(“Ich schreibe dies alles in der Form von Fragen; denn mehr vermag heute, soweit ich sehe, ein Denken nicht, als unablässig eig das zu bedenken, was die angeführten Fragen hervorruft.”).

Note this letter was published in Heidegger’s lifetime in a number of places, he obviously

thought this letter and what he was saying here was important for people to understand Heidegger. Heidegger stood by his statement. Again ...he says, in **the form of questions**. No doctrinal philosopher or philosophical system here. *Martin Heidegger as Interrogator: The Final Paradigm* there is an overabundance of texts and evidence to support the five theses and the ineluctable conclusions of this book. If there is agreement (enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα, enthýmēma) to the body of evidence presented in this book, then this the final conclusions must be drawn. The previous interpretation of the “whole” of Heidegger are now scuppered (not just sinking, but rather sunk or pulverized). Holist approach to reading and thinking of the essential nature and spirit of Heidegger’s thought. Throw out all of the nonsense and re-read Heidegger anew. Socrates was the pure thinker as the philosophical questioner and Heidegger is second as the interrogator.

To wit, **also muss auf Heidegger zurückgegangen werden!**

Resolve

Two Resolutions:

- 1). Is Heidegger's overall project unfinished?
- 2). Is Heidegger's overall project unfinishable?

The penultimate question.

Like Kurt Gödel's (1906-1978) incompleteness theorems.

Is Heidegger's project as understood in this book cannot be finished and is by some definition a completely unfinishable project? Unattainable? Should we vote (Arrow's paradox)? Heidegger's "project" does not have a 'doctrine' and hence cannot be finished or completed. Hannah Arendt, said, "For the wind that blows through Heidegger's thinking — like that which still sweeps toward us after thousands of years from the work of Plato..." See "Heidegger at Eighty" by Hannah Arendt. What did Plato leave us to ponder? The methodology of Socrates (Σωκράτης (470–399 BC) is elenchus (ἔλεγχος). Back to Plato's method and dialogues.

To finish Heidegger's project then the current kairological time is no longer the right time. Remember he talked about 300 years after thinker's life to come to grips and terms with a great philosopher. Or, perhaps because of what the ancient Asian Indians seers and sages call this age or period, our current age, the age of the kali yuga (कलियुग) (age of darkness, when the values are all upside down). Heidegger gives us a hint with this remark, "Die Gipfel der Zeit." "peaks of times." *Hölderlin's Hymnen »Germanien« und »Der Rhein«* GA 39: 52.

Heidegger might follow up with a quote from Walt Whitman "Song of Myself" (1892). "I am large, I contain multitudes." Indeed. Indeed!

The last question:

Ultimately, is this the unavoidable "final paradigm" of understanding Heidegger's writings and thinking (namely, his overall project)? What is the end of this story?

One of Heidegger favorite quotes, Hölderlin's verse, "Denn. Wie du anfiengst, wirst du bleiben" ("As you began, so will you remain."). From the poem 'Der Rhein' written 1801-1802. Dedicated to Hölderlin's friend, 'To Isaak von Sinclair' (1775-1815).

This also stands unshakable ground (**jundamentum inconcussum**).

Division II

Engagement with Heidegger on history of philosophy (metaphysics). Reinigung as cleaning, purifying.

Socrates paraphrased by, “Ἐν οἶδα ὅτι οὐδέν οἶδα” (Hèn oîda hótì oudèn oîda). “I know one thing, that I know nothing” in Plato's *Apology*.

Admittedly,

“Once we are so related and drawn to what withdraws, we are drawing into what withdraws, into the enigmatic and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal. Whenever man is properly drawing that way, he is thinking—even though he may still be far away from what withdraws, even though the withdrawal may remain as veiled as ever. All through his life and right into his death, Socrates did nothing else than place himself into this draft, this current, and maintain himself in it. This is why he is the purest thinker of the West (“Darum ist er der rein-ste Denker des Abendlandes.” GA 80:20. This is why he wrote nothing. For anyone who begins to write out of thoughtfulness must inevitably be like those people who run to seek refuge from any draft too strong for them. And as yet hidden history still keeps the secret why all great Western thinkers after Socrates, with all their greatness, had to be such fugitives.” *What is Called Thinking?* Translation J. Glenn Gray, page 17. This is where Heidegger comes to terms with Socrates.

At the outset, this is important and to strongly note. Richard Rorty (1931-2007) has argued and clearly stated with *italics* that:

“The whole force of Heidegger’s position lies in his account of the history of philosophy.”

The Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982, page 52.

Richard Rorty italicizes the whole sentence! This is an especially important indicator of Kant, Hegel, Schelling, and Nietzsche --- who are read by Heidegger as a way for his own understanding of where he “stand” with regard to the history of metaphysics; and by extension, where do we “stand” as well. It is not clear that Rorty would include Heidegger’s reading of western metaphysics as eventually and finally landing in the swamp of technology (as usual with Heidegger his issues with “technology” are more complicated).

Heidegger in 17 Mai 1961 gave a lecture Kiel, Germany about Kant but he starts with this passage about “past philosophy”. Read carefully,

“According to the title, the following is intended as a lesson in Kant's philosophy. Through it we are taught about a past philosophy. This may be useful, but only if the *sense of tradition is still awake*.

This is hardly the case anymore, least of all where we are dealing with the transmission of that which has always and everywhere concerned us humans, but which we do not pay special attention to.” (“Nach dem Titel soll das Folgende ein Lehrstück ans der Philosophie Kants darstellen. Hierdurch werden wir über eine ver-gangene Philosophie unterrichtet. Dies mag seinen Nutzen haben; freilich nur dann, wenn der Sinn für die Überlieferung noch, wach ist.

Gerade solches trifft kaum noch zu, am wenigsten dort, wo es sich um die Überlieferung dessen handelt, was uns Menschen seit je stets und überall angeht, dessen wir jedoch nicht eigens achten.)” Kants These über das Sein (1961). GA 9: 445. *Wegmarken* (1919–1961). Festschrift for Erik Wolf on his 60th birthday.

This next passage shows us Heidegger understanding in his role as teacher as well.

“Since then, I exist in the role of an overseer in a gallery, who, among other things, has to see to it that the curtains in the windows are correctly opened and closed so that the few great works of the tradition are more or less properly illuminated for the randomly gathering spectators. Without the picture - I only read and work on the history of philosophy, i.e., I attempt to lay out what seems important to me for loosening up philosophizing without considering the economy of the lecture.” Heidegger letter to Karl Jaspers. Freiburg i. Br., December 20, 1931.

Given the vast number of published materials on Heidegger’s reading of the history of philosophy we can achieve some closure on the overall scope and outline of Heidegger’s engagement with the history of western philosophy (metaphysics). It will become clear how this is all tied to Heidegger’s conception of the history of Being. Given his perspicacious reading and insight into the history of philosophy it is important to engage in a reading and interpretation of his history of metaphysics. Called here: the metahistory of philosophy and metaphysics. The pattern of whole history 2500 years of western philosophical history.

In *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger was going to treat Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle to an engagement and confrontation (a cleaning up). Announcement in Part Two, *likewise has three divisions*. Footnote added that this Part Two did not appear.

In the same time period, Heidegger in a lecture series does a better at explaining his stance with regard to the historical tradition,

Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. The Philipps University of Marburg lecture course SS 1927.

“These three basic components of phenomenological method --reduction. construction, destruction -- belong together in their content and must receive grounding in their mutual pertinence. Construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, which is to say, a de-

constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition. And this is not a negation of the tradition or a condemnation of it as worthless; quite the reverse, it precisely signifies a positive appropriation of tradition. Because destruction belongs to construction, philosophical cognition is essentially at the same time, in a certain sense, historical cognition. "History of philosophy" as it is called, belongs to the concept of philosophy as science, to the concept of phenomenological investigation. The history of philosophy is not an arbitrary appendage to the business of teaching philosophy, which provides an occasion for picking up some convenient and easy theme for passing an examination or even for just looking around to see how things were in earlier times. Knowledge of the history of philosophy is intrinsically unitary on its own account, and the specific mode of historical cognition in philosophy differs in its object from all other scientific knowledge of history." *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. GA 24:31-32. Translation by Albert Hofstadter (published in 1981, or 43 years ago). The English translation, page 23.

What is Heidegger's Metahistory of philosophy?

Heidegger's major point: "abandonment by Being" (Seinsverlassenheit) or the forgetting of Being" (Seinsvergessenheit).

Historical context of metaphysics

Standard definition: Metaphysics (τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (*ta meta ta fysika*;) referred to Aristotle's texts after his *physica* (Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως" or "phusikes akroaseos"); and he defined the texts subject matter as the Being of beings (being as being, **to on he on**). Definitions: a being, Greek=on, Greek=entia, Latin=ens, German=Seiende. Sanskrit links: Sat as Being, sattva pure, truthful; and satya as "truth". Example from the Sanskrit saying: sat-chit-ananda [being-consciousness-bliss]. Baumgarten's definition: "Metaphysica est scientia prima cognitionis humanae principia continens." Kant used these editions throughout his teaching, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), *Metaphysica*, 3rd and 4th ed. (Halle: Carl Hermann Hemmerde, 1757). Of course, need to re-read Baumgarten, his *Metaphysics. A Critical Translation with Kant's Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials* (2013).

Non-object and the words are: Being, Greek=einai, Latin=esse, German=Sein (Seyn). Also used in English, Beyng. Metaphysics in general – is the thinking about ontology or the Being of beings and the main tradition coming from Plato's dialogue, *Sophist* and *Parmenides* (Παρμενίδης); and then especially: Aristotle and Aristotelianism through Avicenna (ca. 980-1037), Ibn Rushd or Averroes (1126-1198), Maimonides (1125–1204), Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), William of Moerbeke (1215-1286), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), Friedrich Trendelenburg (1802-1872), and Franz Brentano's (1838-1917) work *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (1862). Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950, his 1942 *New Ways of Ontology*), Heidegger, and of course the French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980, in his 1943 *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*. These remarks only mentions one line of the western ontological tradition.

And a note of thanks for Andronicus of Rhodes (Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Ῥόδιος) who has given us the gift of many of Aristotle's writings.

Note. Heidegger is standing in the ontological tradition, but he is asking the questions in a new and unique way. In all, we need to read and re-read Heidegger to understand the special differences.

To wrap up the essential metaphysical tradition Heidegger uses a code word "onto-theo-logical;" Heidegger is using this word taken from Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804). There are at least three places that Kant uses the term,

"Transcendental theology either thinks that the existence of an original being is to be derived from an experience in general (without more closely determining anything about the world to which this experience belongs), and is called cosmotheology; or it believes that it can cognize

that existence through mere concepts, without the aid of even the least experience, and is called ontotheology.” *Critique of Pure Reason* (AK 3:420. A632/B666).

“All rational theology is either that of deism (g transcendental). Or theism (g psychologically determined). The first either ontotheologie or cosmotheology.” (#6433. ω1-3. M 340'. 340': E II 1676. 873': M § 836. AK 18:715).

“Moral theology is thereby at the same time ontotheology. It is nevertheless a merely practical and subjective certainty, which is grounded on an interest, but on an objectively necessary interest and one which is inseparable from the essence of reason, not subordinate in any respect.” (#6099. 1783–84. M 372–3, AK18:451).

Accordingly, Heidegger critically calls all of western metaphysics: **onto-theo-logy** (Ontotheologie, ontology, theology, and logic). For logic, think G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831)'s *Science of Logic* – not Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) or W.V. Quine (1908-2000). Heidegger calls out the merging of three concepts and words ontology, theology, and logic into one expression: onto-theo-logy. In the Hegel lectures of 1930/31, he uses the expression “onto-theo-ego-logic” *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Winter semester 1930/31) GA 32:193. The basic ontotheological nature of metaphysics is unveiled.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in his unpublished essay, “*What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?*” [Published by Rink in 1804] defines metaphysics in general as “the science of advancing by reason from knowledge of the sensible (Sinnliche) to the knowledge of the supersensuous. (*Progress*, et. p. 53). The object of the Kantian problem is the transition from the sensible (sensory) to supersensuous. There are three basic components to the metaphysical supersensuous, namely, God, freedom, and immortality (*Progress*, p. 294-295). The epistemological question: but what can we know about these objects? In the second preface (1787) to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR) Kant said “Now after speculative reason has been denied all advance in this field of the supersensible, what still remains for us is to try whether there are not data in reason's practical data for determining that transcendent rational concept of the unconditioned, in such a way as to reach beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, in accordance with the wishes of metaphysics, cognitions **a priori** that are possible, but only from a practical standpoint. ” (Kant *CPR*, Bxxi).

Back on Heidegger's trail.

“Kant remains stuck *in* metaphysics; that is to say: he does not ask the question of Being at all.” “Kant bleibt *in* der Metaphysik stecken; das sagt: er stellt die Seinsfrage gar nicht.” *Das Ereignis* (1943/42). GA 71:113.

Compared to Hegel.

Hegel wrote,

“Philosophical thinking in general still deals with concrete subject matters, with God, Nature, Spirit.” *Science of Logic, Werke*, 21:13.

G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) of course tried to overcome the popular impression from reading the *Critique of Pure Reason* that Kant had indeed finished off the traditional metaphysics up to

Kant's time (Christian Wolff, 1679-1754; Alexander Baumgartner (1714-1762); Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), when Hegel talked negatively about the destruction of metaphysics "Untergang der Metaphysik" (*Science of Logic*, first preface, 1812) by Kant. For Hegel, the new metaphysics was a science of logic and Kant's rejection of the exotic theory of metaphysics did not allow for the new Hegelian speculative thinking. Kant's unspeculative thought was seen by Hegel as supporting the wrong-headed principle of the "renounce the speculative thinking" (*Science of Logic*, first preface 1812). Hegel's attack against Kant (died 1804) was clear by the year 1812.

In fact, Nietzsche wrote in one of his notebooks, "The consequences of Kant's doctrine. End of metaphysics as a science." (Summer 1872 - early 1873, 19 [51]. Therefore, even Nietzsche saw this as a general Kantian movement against metaphysics. In reading Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804), it seems like that Kant's strongest anti-metaphysical stance was in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). After reading the reviews and his other writings, again it seems like Kant wanted to bring the faith of God back in his doctrines. Kant wrote in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787), "Thus, I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." ("Ich mußte also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen)." (AK 3:19 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*).

In August 1714. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz writes a letter to Nicolas Remond in Paris.

"Truth is much more widespread than one thinks, but it is often in disguise, and often also enveloped or even weakened, mutilated, and corrupted by additions that spoil it or make it less useful. By giving attention to these traces of truth among the ancients or (to speak more generally) people of former times, one could drag the gold from the mud, the diamond out of its mine, light from the shadows; and that would indeed be some sort of *perennis philosophia*."

Leibniz says in the, "In the Leipzig journal [Acta Eruditorum] I adapt myself to the language of the schools, in the others I adapt myself more to the style of Cartesians" (GP III.624/WF 1, n.3). Leibniz is a very smart philosopher and able to adapt to the languages and styles of his opponents.

With Heidegger we are always on the edge of ambiguities, tensions, and inconsistencies. This is normal and so do not worry. See if you can be a Bee and gather the honey or gold from the mud or the flowers.

For Heidegger, the history of philosophy is the history of metaphysics, which begins with Platonism, hits its high point with Hegel, and then reaches its completion with Nietzsche and the reversal of Platonism. Heidegger sees himself as starting a new beginning. Both Hegel and Heidegger are rooted in the western philosophical tradition but in separate ways. They are both "fetching" from within the tradition.

Heidegger wrote, "The history of Being begins, with the forgetting of Being." Metahistory of philosophy as the Metahistory of metaphysics as the History of Being. We have lost something and need to go back to western philosophical tradition and find it ... Wiederholung (retrieval). Heidegger also noted, "We Germans are now precisely beginning to prepare ourselves to grasp

Leibniz. And what still lies in between and altogether before that? —” *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*. GA 94:359-360. *Ponderings II–VI*.

Remember:

“The history of Being is neither the history of man and of humanity, nor the history of the human relation to beings and to Being. The history of Being is Being itself, and only Being” *The End of Philosophy. Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik* (1943) translated as Recollections in *Metaphysics*. GA 6.2 *Nietzsche II*. Translation Joan Stambaugh.

Here Heidegger outlines the entire history of metaphysics. GA 65. *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)*. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). Section “119. The leap is prepared by asking the basic question.”

1. “The first beginning and its ending encompass the entire history of the guiding question, from Anaximander to Nietzsche.
2. The guiding question is not posed in the first beginning as an explicitly formulated question. Yet for that very reason it is grasped all the more originarily and is answered in a way that sets the norm: the emergence of beings, the presencing of beings as such in their truth, which latter is grounded in the guiding question is not posed in the first beginning as an explicitly formulated question. Yet for that very reason it is grasped all the more originarily and is answered in a way that sets the norm: the emergence of beings, the presencing of beings as such in their truth, which latter is grounded in $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ (gathering) and $\nu\omicron\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu$ (apprehension).
3. The way from here to the first - and henceforth guiding formulation of the question in Aristotle; the essential preparation in Plato; the Aristotelian confrontation with the first beginning, whereby that beginning receives an interpretation which becomes fixed for those who come later.
4. The ramifications of the question in the formulation (doctrine of categories; theo-logy) that now again steps back but still dominate every result and every approach; the recasting of the whole through Christian theology; in that form, the first beginning then alone remains historical, even still in Nietzsche despite his discovery of the inceptual thinkers as men of rank.
5. From Descartes to Hegel, another *recasting* but no essential change; withdrawal into consciousness and absolute certainty; with Hegel for the first time a philosophical attempt at a history of the question of beings from the basic viewpoint of absolute knowledge.
6. “What lies between Hegel and Nietzsche takes many forms, but no-where, not even in Kierkegaard, is it metaphysically originary.”
GA 65. *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)*. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65:232-233.

In one of the last seminar Heidegger also added Karl Marx at the end of metaphysics. Note Heidegger did not include W. Dilthey as a philosopher and we would include the person of Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) at the end of metaphysics but note that Heidegger does not consider Ernst Jünger as a philosopher.

In 1946, where Heidegger is discussing Anaximander, he first sets the stage.

“The only Western thinker who has thoughtfully experienced the history of thought is Hegel” *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 14. *Holzwege*. 1935-46. GA 5:323. (“Der einzige den des Abendlandes, der die Geschichte des Denkens denkend erfahren hat, ist Hegel.” Neither Kant, Schelling, nor Nietzsche was included as compared to Hegel.

Against Hegel and for the Greeks, “Solely in this does it become understandable that in the Greeks there were no concepts. For in conceptual grasping [*Be-greifen*] there lies the procedure of a taking-into-possession. The Greek ὀρισμός, by contrast, embraces firmly yet tenderly that which our seeing takes into view; it does not conceptually grasp.” *Seminare* (1951–1973). GA 15:399.

Nietzsche is the “end” and the last metaphysician in western philosophy, according to Heidegger. Here is noted in his writings (not in a student lecture series).

“13. The Consummation of Metaphysics

“Nietzsche not only constitutes an *end*, that is, the need for another commencement (Anfangs, inceptions); but rather, this very need only necessitates that even in its consummation, metaphysics itself-and that means the *truth* of beings as a whole-must at the same time, if only in an entirely veiled manner, become essential and force decisions. And precisely this is what is understood with greatest difficulty by the end of this era. For on the one hand, it clings to a rejection of metaphysics by way of positivism, and on the other hand, the affirmation of metaphysics is so alien (Κοινόν) that it becomes terrifying.”

(“Nietzsche setzt nicht nur ein *Ende*, d. h. die Not eines anderen Anfangs, sondern eben diese Not nur ernötigt, daß auch zugleich in der Vollendung die Metaphysik selbst – und das heißt die *Wahrheit* des Seienden im Ganzen –, wengleich ganz verhüllt, wesentlich wird und zu Entscheidungen zwingt. Und gerade dieses geht dem Ende des Zeitalters am schwersten ein. Denn einmal hängt es an der Verneinung der Metaphysik durch den Positivismus, zum anderen ist die Bejahung der Metaphysik so befremdlich (vgl. Κοινόν), daß sie zum Schrecken wird.”). Section “III. Passage. *The History of Beyng*.” *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. 1938/40. GA 69:19.

To reflect back to where Heidegger started in 1925, then start on his history of philosophy. Here is a long quote that lays out a more traditional history of philosophy and yet, with Heidegger’s own interpretation.

1925. Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung (16.–21. April 1925). Lectures given are the *Wilhelm Dilthey's Research Work and the Present Struggle for a Historical Worldview*. A series of ten popular lectures in Kassel at the Society for Art and Science of the Electorate of Hesse: The ‘Kassel lectures.’ Wilhelm

Dilthey (1833-1911).

Heidegger wrote,

“During the period 1780–1840, creative forces were unleashed that today we can no longer imagine. Then, with the collapse of Hegelian philosophy, reflection on historical reality subsided. What remained was positive, systematic work on history, and yet the question of the sense of historical being died out. Now it was the natural sciences that again took the actual lead in the formation of a worldview. When philosophy once again took stock of itself in the 1860s, this had the form of a historical return to Kant as the author of the three critiques and especially as the author of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, which offered a theory of the mathematical natural sciences. Philosophy was now understood as epistemology, a move carried out by the Marburg school of neo-Kantians. Philosophy no longer attempted to master the individual sciences, or to go beyond their results, but limited itself to a single domain of its own: theory of science. In his first critique, Kant had provided only a theory of the mathematical natural sciences. In the meantime, the historical sciences had developed. Thus, the task at hand was to extend Kant’s critique, i.e., to place a theory of the historical sciences alongside it. With the retreat from this way of formulating the question at the end of the nineteenth century and with the growth of concrete historical research, the need to raise the question of the sense of historical being became even more pressing. The question of formal foundations was superseded by that of material foundations (Troeltsch following upon Windelband and Rickert, who received their impulses from Dilthey; Spengler also derives from this position).

Modern philosophy of history owes its impulses and initiatives to Dilthey.

Yet modern theory has not really understood the authentic tendencies of Dilthey’s thought; in fact, it has seen to it that these tendencies have remained buried to this day.

We now will attempt to grasp the sense of the historical worldview in a more precise manner, i.e., we need to characterize this knowledge of the historical being of the world. The development of such knowledge is the task of philosophy and the historical sciences themselves. The possibility of a historical worldview is based on the attainment of clarity and transparency concerning the human condition. We need to make this presupposition truly clear to ourselves. The struggle for a historical worldview is not played out in debates about the historical conception of the world but rather in those about the sense of historical being itself. And here we are speaking of the labors of Dilthey’s research. We need to examine how philosophical questioning gains the transparency necessary for developing a historical worldview. We are raising the question: Which reality is historical in the authentic sense? And what does historical mean?

We will at first follow Dilthey on his paths of inquiry. It was Dilthey who, from the 1860s (along with Count Yorck), had a truly radical awareness of this problem.” From “Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview (1925)”. *Supplements From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, 2002. Pages 149-150

Heidegger moves these lectures (1925) to lay out the thrust of *Being and Time* (1927) in a few sentences and the relationship to the history of western philosophy to the fundamental problem; and completely prefigures his 50-year task! He writes,

“We focus our treatment of the history of philosophy on a fundamental problem, one that we already constantly have had in view but have not expressly formulated, namely, the question of the *Being of beings*. A question concerning the being of a particular realm of beings is, however, not yet radical, since I still do not know what I really want to know with the term “being.” Plato was the first to formulate this central question in *The Sophist*. With the decline of philosophical research, this question also falls into decline. Today one simply says: Being is the most universal concept and hence is indefinable. But what is decisive for a concept is not definition but its demonstration in terms of how things stand with the subject matter. This critical, foundational question is the central question of philosophy. It is at the same time a question about the way in which the sense of Being can be experienced. By formulating the question in this way, the otherwise chaotic appearance of the history of philosophy becomes very simple.”

Supplements From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond. 2002. Page 175. Charles Bambach, translator.

In August of 1934, how did Heidegger see the 19th century in general?

“Three great forces worked together in this process: 1. the new German poetry (Klopstock, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, and Romanticism), 2. the new German philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel), 3. the new German political will of Prussian statesmen and soldiers (Freiherr von Stein, Hardenberg, Humboldt, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and von Clausewitz).” *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–1976). GA 16:291.

Furthermore, from 1969, Heidegger gives some general background.

“For the history of thought is not just a bunch of differing opinions from the past but rather contains the claim which is made on us to pose the same question again and again, the question about the Being of beings. From this there follows the larger question which I emphatically claim to be phenomenological: If throughout its whole history metaphysics certainly speaks of the Being of beings in the various transformations of *idea*, *energeia*, *actualitas*, monad, objectivity, Absolute Spirit, absolute knowledge, Will to Power -- then in terms of what is the essence of Being to be determined?”

“The Understanding of Time in Phenomenology and in the Thinking of the Being-Question” (1979) (translation by Thomas Sheehan). “Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage”: Essay written in 1969 in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the death of Edmund Husserl. Helmut Gehrig, ed., *Phänomenologie—lebendig oder tot?* (1969) Karlsruhe: Badenia, p. 47. *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* (Norman) 10, no. 2, 1979, pp. 200–201.

From one of his writings is

End of Philosophy. Translated and introduction by Joan Stambaugh. *Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics* (1941, et. p. 65-66). *Nietzsche II*. GA 6.2:417-436.

Additional sources have been used for the completeness of this outline.

Being

Aletheia (apeiron, logos, hen-arche)

[Aristotle saw ἀλήθεια as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit)]. "Not Unverhohlenheit")

Revealing as the order as the start:

Hen

One

Logos

Physis, emergence (going back to itself).

Ousia, presencing, unconcealedness.

Idea, perceivability (*agathon*), causality.

Energieia, workness, assembly, *en-echeia* to *telos*.

Hypokeimenon, lie present (from *ousia*), *ergon*.

(Presence-stability--constancy-*aei*.)

Hyparchein, presencing which rules from what already lies present.

Substance, *substantia*

Actuality, *actualitas*

Actualitas: beings-the real-reality

creator-*ens creatum*

causa prima (ens a se).

Certitudo - *res cogitans*.

Vis-monas (*perceptio-appetitus*), *exigentia essentiae*.

Perception, *perception*

Subiectum

Monad

Position

Objectivity

Freedom

will-representedness

practical reason.

Will of reason (Kant)

Will of love (Schelling)

Will as absolute knowledge (Hegel)

Absolute concept (Hegel) Spirit

Will Power (Nietzsche)

Will to Power in the eternal recurrence of the same (Nietzsche)

Action and Organization-pragmatism.
Will to will (Spengler – maybe linked?) Machination
Production (Karl Marx)
Transcendental Ego (Husserl)
Machination (Enframing (Gestell or Ge-Stell)

[“Rilke’s poem thinks of man as the being who is ventured into a willing, the being who, without as yet experiencing it, is willed in the will to will” (WP, 112)].

Heidegger in a short essay on the *Recollection in Metaphysics*, says, “The history of Being is neither the history of man and of humanity, nor the history of the human relation to beings and to Being. The history of Being is *Being itself, and only this.*” (“Die Seinsgeschichte ist weder die Geschichte des Menschen und eines Menschentums noch die Geschichte des menschlichen Bezugs zum Seienden und zum Sein. Die Seinsgeschichte ist das Sein selbst und nur dieses.” (‘Die Die Erinnerung in der Metaphysik’ *Nietzsche II*). *The End of Philosophy* (page 82). ‘Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik’ (1943) translated as “Recollections in Metaphysics“. *Nietzsche II*. GA 6.2:489. Translation Joan Stambaugh.

Martin Heidegger in section 85 of his second magnum opus, says, “the thrust into the *crossing* and thereby the knowing awareness that *any kind* of metaphysics has and must come to an end, if philosophy is to attain its other beginning (Anfang).” (GA 65, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938) p.171-173, et. p 121). Note the “if.” Other beginning (not the second beginning).

Where does Hegel stand with Heidegger?

This is a report from Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) about Heidegger’s understanding of Hegel overall philosophy and the emphasis of Hegel greatness.

“Until his death, he repeatedly emphasized that he found talk of a collapse of the Hegelian system and Hegelian idealism entirely inappropriate. In his opinion, it was not Hegelian philosophy that had collapsed, but rather everything subsequent to it, including Nietzsche. He frequently said so in these terms. Similarly, he never wanted his own talk about the overcoming of metaphysics to be interpreted as meaning that he thought it possible to surpass Hegelian metaphysics, let alone that he claimed to have done so himself. As we well know, he speaks of taking one step backward as to a vantage point from which the realm of *Alethia*, the "clearing" of being, opens in thought. Heidegger thus saw in Hegel the logical end-figure of modern thought, the thought point from which the realm of *Alethia*, the "clearing" of being, opens in thought. Heidegger thus saw in Hegel the logical end-figure of modern thought, thought dominated by the idea of subjectivity. At the same time, he was not blind to Hegel’s own efforts to overcome the narrowness of subjective idealism, as he called it, in order to arrive at an orientation which would do justice to the "we," the community, to objective reason and to the objective spirit. But in Heidegger's eyes, this effort was mere hope, destined to be thwarted by the constraints of traditional Cartesian concepts and the Cartesian idea of method. He certainly did not fail to recognize that Hegel was one of *the* greatest masters in the art of

abstract thinking. That was perhaps also the reason, despite his preference for Schelling, he continually sought to come to grips with Hegel over the question of overcoming, or completing, Absolute Idealism.” In Heidegger and the History of Philosophy” by Hans Georg Gadamer, University of Heidelberg (Translated by Karen Campbell). 1981 Journal: *Monist* Volume 64. DOI: 10.5840/monist198164438.

Heidegger elucidates his idea of Hegel’s history of philosophy,

“Since, with *this* founding of the "idea" as the actuality of the actual, Hegel gathered the entire earlier (even pre-Platonic) history of philosophy into an affiliation, and since he conceived of such knowledge in its phases and their sequence as absolute self-knowledge, he thus came into possession of a necessity arising out of the essence of beingness (idea), a necessity according to which the phases of the history of the ideas had to form themselves into those phases.

In other words, Hegel's history of philosophy, seen in terms of his way of questioning, was the *first philosophical* history of philosophy, the first appropriate interrogation of history but also the last, and last possible, interrogation of that kind. On the whole, what has followed has been important scholarship, but basically -i.e., philosophically- it amounts to helpless and distracted blather whose unity derives only from the succession of the philosophers and of their writings or "problems." *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis). Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65: 214-215.

Here is one of Heidegger’s remarks (not in his lecture writings or address), where he says this about Hegel.

“Hegel tried to save dialectics from being desolated by itself, by spreading the contents (aesthetics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of law and philosophy of history). But it was precisely from this that the flattening of the "dialectical" arose, which in truth was the reality of the spirit itself into the unstoppable formalism.” (“Hegel versuchte die Dialektik vor der Verödung durch sich selbst zu retten, indem er die Ausbreitung der Gehalte (Aesthetik, Religionsphilosophie, Rechts- und Geschichtsphilosophie) betrieb. Aber gerade hieraus entsprang die Abflachung des »Dialektischen«, das ja in Wahrheit die Wirklichkeit des Geistes selbst ist, in den unaufhaltbaren Formalismus”). *Über den Anfang*. 1941. GA 70:50.

About the time Heidegger had finished the printing of *Being and Time* (1927) in a lecture series, he says this about Hegel,

“This overcoming of Hegel is the inwardly necessary step in the development of Western philosophy, which must be taken if it is to remain alive at all.”

"Diese Überwindung Hegels ist der innerlich notwendige Schritt in der Entwicklung der abendländischen Philosophie, der gemacht werden muß, wenn sie überhaupt noch am Leben bleiben soll." *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Summer Semester 1927). GA 24:254. It is Platonism and Hegel (metaphysic in general) is the knout that Heidegger carefully uses.

The greatness of Hegel is shown from this remark by Heidegger 1929, “Thus the confrontation with Hegel, absolute idealism and thus Western metaphysics, pushes (positively) into completely

hidden dimensions, which we must first create for ourselves through the profound elaboration of the problem of metaphysics. (The fact that it can force us to do so, if we allow ourselves to be forced to do so, lies in its *intrinsic greatness*)." *Der Deutsche Idealismus: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel*. GA 28:216.

Again, who is the blocking factor?

It is Hegel.

Where does the modern period of metaphysics begin?

Public Lecture Five given 1955 University of Freiburg. Heidegger said,

"We could also say: the principle of adequate reasons. When, as is the case of Leibniz's discovery and defining of the principle of sufficient reason, a mighty Principle comes to light, thinking and cognition in all essential regards enters into a new sort of movement. It is the modern manner of thinking in which we daily reside without expressly perceiving or noticing the demand of reason to be rendered in all cognition. Accordingly, in a more historically concealed than historiographically visible manner, Leibniz determines not only the development of modern logic into logistics and into thinking machines, and not only the more radical interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject within the philosophy of German Idealism and its subsequent scions. The thinking of Leibniz supports and molds the chief tendency of what thought broadly enough, we can call the metaphysics of the modern age. Therefore, for us the name of Leibniz does not stand as a tag for a bygone system of philosophy. The name names the presence of a thinking whose strength has not yet been experienced, a presence that still awaits to encounter us. Only through looking back on what Leibniz thought can we characterize the present age-an age one calls the atomic age-as an age pervasively be powered by the power of the **prindpium reddendae rationis sufficientis**. The demand to render sufficient reasons for all representations speaks in what today has become the object bearing the names "atom" and "atomic energy." *Der Satz vom Grund* published by Heidegger in 1957. Pages 64-65. Translated by Reginald Lilly.

Heidegger no coherent theory of the 'foundations of knowledge.' He is definitely not interested in this kind of philosophical project.

Note from 1929, Heidegger accordingly says, "Here is the root of Kierkegaard's paradox. But this says at the same time takeover of the whole problem of Hegelian metaphysics. Kierkegaard's position only makes sense and is right if he is and remains a Hegelian; and so, his polemic against Hegel - philosophically, ontologically-metaphysically speaking - is merely comical)." *Der Deutsche Idealismus: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel*. GA 28:205. No one can get past the power of Hegel.

Kant's Metahistory of philosophy

Heidegger said:

"Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is among those philosophical works which, as long as there is philosophy on this earth at all, daily become inexhaustible anew. It is one of those works that

have already pronounced judgment over every future attempt to "overcome" them by only passing them by." (*What is a thing*, p. 61, 1935-36).

SECTION: Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*

Let us begin by looking at the concluding section of the *Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*). The section is called, "The Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Fourth Chapter. The History of pure reason." (Kant *CPR*, A852/B800 to A855/B883). Kant starts off by talking about "place that is left open in his system and must be filled in the future." It is interesting to note the same kind of issue Kant talked about in his last unpublished work, the *Opus postumum* (written 1796-1804). This was collection of writings that Kant was working on extremely late in his long philosophical life, and he did not finalize or publish. Sometime Kant talks about a 'transition,' then a 'gap,' a 'pain like that of Tantalus,' and then the "unpaid bill of my uncompleted system" (Letter Christian Garve, September 21, 1798). This is in regard to the "Transition from metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics." This heading appears early in the *Opus postumum* (et. p. 10, AK 21:373).

So, where is the other part of which Kant had promised, "must be filled in the future" (Kant *CPR*, A852/B880) in the *Critique of Pure Reason*? Namely, the complete history of pure reason or a comprehensive history of philosophy. Kant never did work out a detailed history of philosophy or a history of pure reason. In fact, where Kant left holes or gaps in his philosophical system, then philosophers rushed in to complete the Kantian project. The neo-Kantians, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) are some examples of philosophers who have developed a history of philosophy along neo-Kantians lines.

Now back to Kant's outline of pure reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Kant starts by giving a 'cursory outline' of the 'chief revolutions' in metaphysics (Kant *CPR*, A855/B881). There are three issues in this small section.

1) "With regard to the object of all of our rational cognitions."

Kant said we have the sensual philosophers (Epicurus, 342-270 BC) and the intellectual philosophers (Plato, 427-348 BC).

2) "With regard to the origin of pure cognitions of reason" (Vernunfterkenntnisse). Kant said we have the empiricist (Aristotle 384-322 BC, John Locke 1632-1704) and the noologists (Plato, Leibniz 1646-1716).

3) "With regard to method." (In Ansehung der Methode).

Kant said we have naturalistic (Democritus 460-370 BC) and scientific methodology. The scientific leads to either the dogmatism (Christian Wolff (1679-1754) or skepticism (David Hume (1711-1776)). In this same section, Kant concludes that the "critical path alone is still open." ("Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen." (Kant *CPR*, A855/B883, AK 3:552). This is the very last page of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Note: Kant in this concluding section does not say "Wissenschaft," but rather, "szientifische" methodology (szientifischen Methode, AK 3:551). Why does he use this word (szientifische)?

This refers back to the Preface of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where Kant says, “It is treatise on the method” (Kant *CPR*, Bxxii). Kant sees himself within the history of metaphysics working on a subsection under ‘method’ and then ‘scientific.’ The location within metaphysics for the Kantian ‘critical path’ is under the direction of method, and then scientific headings.

Kant begins the *Critique of Pure Reason* with the image of the “battlefield of these endless controversies is called metaphysics” (Kant *CPR*, Avii). He then tells us a short story of how in the beginning metaphysics started with “administration of the dogmatists, her rule was despotic” (*CPR*, Aix). These battles continue and almost come to an end with the famous John Locke (1632-1704), but “fell back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism” (Kant *CPR*, Ax). Thus, the text of the *Critique of Pure Reason* begins with the history of philosophy and then the closing section is called the history of pure reason (Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft). Within this beginning and ending is this treatise on the method of the “metaphysics of metaphysics,” namely, the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Letter to Marcus Herz, May 11, 1781, *Correspondence*, et. p. 181). So, Kant is situating himself within his own history of pure reason, that is, within his own Metahistory of philosophy.

Kant says at the beginning of the chapter on the history of pure reason:

“I will content myself with casting a cursory glance from a merely transcendental point of view, namely that of the nature of pure reason, on the whole of its labors hitherto, which presents to my view edifices, to be sure, but only in ruins.” (Kant *CPR*, A852/B880). (Beginning of chapter, Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft).

There are two important matters here.

1) Kant is going to look at the history of pure reason, that is, the history of philosophy from a special point of view, namely, the “transcendental point of view.” Or, in other words, from Kant’s own point of view. This is a Metahistory of Philosophy from the transcendental point of view (transzendentalen Gesichtspunkte). The uniquely Kantian position.

2) The past is in “ruins” (Ruinen). Note this point very well. This is a crucial point and consistent conclusion for Kant.

Kant often uses these analogies and images of building a house. The second division of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is called “Transcendental doctrine of method.” He talks of the building edifices, building materials, height, strength, erection of a sturdy dwelling, etc. (Kant *CPR*, A707/B735). Thus, when we come to the last chapter of the section and Kant said that there are ‘only ruins,’ then keeping with this analogy from Kant’s view there is nothing to really ‘build-on’ from history of philosophy. Therefore, I understand Kant’s own position (from the ‘transcendental point of view’) that the history of philosophy is not helpful or more importantly, it is in “ruins.” I understand Kant is saying that Kant’s own transcendental or critical idealism is not based on the history of philosophy, and it is unique to Kant. In other words, Kant has to begin his building from the ground-up or from the essential foundations. There is nothing to build on, only a little dirt to begin the building. Therefore, sticking with this image, for Kant, the ground is reason.

Kant wanted to develop his own metaphysical system, but somewhere he got trapped writing the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He said in a letter that it would take him three months (1772) to finish his work. In reality, it took him another nine years before the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) was published. Here we start to see why. All Kant sees is ‘ruins’ everywhere. He does not have any building materials to even begin to build a sturdy dwelling (namely, a metaphysical system, a system of science).

Kant is doing a propaedeutic. Kant is just getting the ground ready for the building process or Kant in another publication he calls it a **prolegomena**. Now, this is not science or a doctrine or in terms of the image – this is not the sturdy dwelling, but rather, a propaedeutic, that is, laying out the foundational project (think of Heidegger’s *Kant and Problem of Metaphysics*). Kant said in an early part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, “...we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine but must be called only a critique of pure reason...” (Kant *CPR*, A11).

From the ruins there are no blocks to build a metaphysical system (συνίστημι, **synistemi, systema**). In other words, this is neither a Wissenschaft nor szientifische system. This points to why Kant had to do a “critique” before getting to the real knowledge of metaphysics. From this point of view the critique of pure reason project is not metaphysics, but rather a “critique” of reason, which needs to be done before the science of a metaphysical system. That is why Kant called the *Critique* a “metaphysics of metaphysics” in a letter. The fundamental foundation, the background, the primary ground, before doing the project of metaphysical systems. But for Kant this is not some kind of special physics in the Aristotelian sense, but rather the critique of pure reason.

SECTION: Kant’s *What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?*

Kant wrote this work in 1793 but did not send it in for consideration of the prize or send it in for publication. The German title is: *Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?* This was about the same time he was working on *Religion within the Bounds of Unaided (blossen) Reason*. This work (*Progress*) by Kant was edited by Kant’s student, friend, and twice week dinner guest; Friedrich Rink (1770-1821) (the manuscripts have subsequently been lost) and published shortly after Kant’s death in April 1804. Kant’s work was in response to a prize question announced by the Royal Academy of Sciences (Berlin, January 24, 1788). Kant in the end did not submit his manuscript. The submission deadline of 1 Jan 1792. Nevertheless, we have with this work another attempt by Kant to look at the past in philosophy and we then might see if another facet of Kant’s Metahistory of philosophy comes forward into the light.

Kant at the beginning of the ‘Introduction’ gives us a picture of his view of metaphysics. Kant said,

“But this science is metaphysics, and that completely changes matters. This is a boundless sea in which **progress** leaves no trace and, on whose horizon, there is no visible destination that allows one to perceive how near one has come to it.” (Et. p. 51).

There is no trace of anything good left, namely, no progress. The boundless sea is without a history and without even a horizon to navigate the ship. Kant is lost at sea. The sea is the history of metaphysics or at the very least, just the lost sea of metaphysics in general. Kant abruptly, then drops an interesting remark; “Ontology has made little progress since Aristotle’s time” (et. p. 53).

Kant then goes on to talk about the three steps taken by metaphysics.

“Thus, philosophy has gone through three stages in regard to metaphysics. The first was the stage of dogmatism, the second skepticism, and third the criticism of pure reason.” (et p. 61).

This sounds again like Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz (1646-1716) and Wolff (Wolff’s follower, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), Kant used his *Metaphysics* (1757) in his lectures), Hume, and then Kant. When Kant thinks of skepticism, I think in this context it must be Hume. Although already in December of 1792, in a letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck, Kant mentions the assumed name of Aenesidemus (real name is Gottlob Ernst Schulze, 1761-1833) where “an even wider skepticism has been advanced” (*Correspondence*, et. p. 445). The complete title of the book was *Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar - Philosophie*, 1792. In Germany, Schulze’s name during this time became synonymous with skepticism (was Fichte’s teacher for a while). Kant might also be thinking of the early Greek skeptics. For example, Kant mentions in a different context, “Pyrrho among others was a great Skeptic” (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, et. p. 305). Plus, on the same page he says, “Sextus Empiricus, who brought all doubts together” (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, et. p. 305). Thus, Kant was well acquainted with skepticism from a variety of sources in the complete history of philosophy.

How did Kant see these three stages in metaphysics?

Kant said,

“This temporal order is based on the nature of the human capacity for knowledge. When the first two had been gone through, metaphysics was in such a state that for many generations it swung from unbounded trust in reason in itself to boundless mistrust and then back again.” (*Progress*, et p. 61).

So, Kant is saying in this remark that Metahistory is based on “human capacity (Erkenntnisvermögens). Then Kant describes a process of trust (Vertrauen) or not trusts in reason. But clearly the movement and motion within history is a ‘swinging’ (schwankend, vacillation, wavering) back and forth between the two opposites of ‘unbounded’ and ‘boundless’ trust in reason. Thus, at this point Metahistory of philosophy is the swinging between trust and not trust in reason. Kant can see himself in this process as being for the trust in reason. In other words, Kant is on the side of rationalism. The Kantian Metahistory of philosophy is a process

between reason (**ratio**) and reasonlessness (note: this is not irrationalism; we must wait 100 years before this becomes an issue).

Perhaps Kant saw Schulze's contemporary skepticism as just part of the process. However, at the time, Karl Leonhard Reinhold's (1758-1823) widespread popularization of Kant's philosophy was underway and then Schulze's devastating critique of Reinhold's Kantianism as an infinite regress obviously upset Kant's agenda. Even Hegel had to come to terms with contemporary skepticism in his essay "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One," (1802) (*Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*) which is a critical discuss and review of Schulze's work. In this way Kant's Metahistory of philosophy could take into account the contemporary philosophical schools of his time.

Section: Kant's *Lectures on Logic*

The Blomberg Logic

Kant learned a great deal about the history of philosophy from the work of Johann Formey (1711-1797), *Kurzgefassetete Historie der Philosophie* von Hernn Formey, Berlin, 1763, (*Abridged History of Philosophy*). Kant wrote Formey a letter on June 28, 1763 (*Correspondence*, et. p. 69-70) and often had people send Formey copies of Kant's works (*Correspondence*, et. p. 88). At the time, Formey was the permanent secretary of the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences, he was a Wolffian, and wrote over 600 books and 17,000 letters. In fact, it is not clear where Kant produced the critical remarks about Greek philosophers since he read Plato and Aristotle in Greek. Perhaps it was Formey's views, for example, Kant remarked, "Plato was very rhetorical, and obscure, and in such way that he often did not understand himself. (*Lectures on Logic*, et. p. 23). About Aristotle, Kant said, "Aristotle developed a blind trust in himself, and he harmed philosophia more than he helped it." (*Lecture on Logic*, et. p. 23). Is this Kant or could this be Formey view of the history of philosophy?

Kant is of course talking through the lecture notes of his students. In this case, the Blomberg Logic was based on Kant's lectures of the early 1770s. Kant in one part of his lectures talks about the ancient philosophers as being either skeptical or dogmatists. This is a familiar refrain from Kant. However, Kant does go on to says,

"Carteius, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Wolffus, the last whom, through his industry, produced a systema of philosophy, were in recent times the ones who improved philosophy, and were its true fathers. All of the efforts of our philosophy are 1) dogmatic, 2) critical. Among critical philosophers Locke deserves priority." (*Lectures on Logic*, et. p. 24).

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was reviewed in 1782 by J.G.H. Feder (1740-1820). In this review Kant was portrayed as just restating Bishop George Berkeley's (1685-1753) Idealism and Kant responded is the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (2nd edition, 1787). However, in this passage we note two things of interest: a) Kant refers to more recent philosophers as the 'true fathers' of philosophy, b) again Locke seems to be praised for his importance. Kant often has critical remarks about Berkeley, for example, calling him a

“dogmatic idealism” (*CRP*, B274). Kant discusses this whole issue with Berkeley in his “Refutation of Idealism” (*CRP*, B274-287).

In the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic (1792), Kant said, “Dogmatism and skepticism are opposed to one another” (*Lectures on Logic*, et. p. 745). He then goes and states his position, “Criticism is the middle way between dogmatism and skepticism, the principle of a rightful trust in one’s use of reason” (*Lectures on Logic*, et. p. 480).

This shows Kant working and thinking through his relation to earlier philosophers and the history of philosophy. Although it does not give us any more direct insight into Kant’s Metahistory of philosophy, it does show his thoughtful dialogue with past philosophers.

Section: Kant’s *Lectures on Metaphysics*

Kant’s point of view on the history of metaphysics can be summarized by one of his remarks, “The whole of metaphysics is nothing other than a chain of built-up and overthrown systems.” (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, et. p. 134). This passage points again to Kant’s remarks about the history of philosophy being in ruins. Another passage says, “Up to now in metaphysics we still have not had anything satisfactory, for all systems can be shaken.” (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, et. p. 127).

Kant said that Hume “aroused me from a dogmatic slumber” (*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, 1783). However, in his lecture’s notes called *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (1782-1783) we have an interesting and perhaps a more candid remark about Hume from almost the same year. Kant said,

“Something similar to a critique of pure reason was found with David Hume, but he sank into the wildest and most inconsolable speculation over this, and that happened easily because he did not study reason completely, but rather only this or that concept. An investigation of practices (**facti**), how we arrive at cognition, where from experience or though pure reason. Locke accomplished much here....” (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, et. p. 137).

An interesting point, again we have the praise of the empiricist Locke and rather critical and almost cynical remarks about Hume. Kant is saying rather decisively that Hume’s philosophy looked at “only this or that concept.” This is Kant’s position on the overall consequence of Hume’s philosophical skepticism to Kant’s project of transcendental and critical idealism (“my transcendental, or, better, critical idealism” (*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, 1783). Kant’s critical idealism leads away from Humean skepticism. Kant does have unbounded trust in reason and the pervasiveness of these criticisms of Hume suggest strongly that Kant’s rationalism was the essential foundation of his project.

Kant’s transcendental philosophy (idealism) can be seen as providing the ontology of rationalism (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, et. p. 307). Kant said that “Transcendental philosophy is also called ontology, and it is the product of the critique of pure reason.” (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, et. p. 421). The concept of “critique” means an outline (*Vorriss*) of pure reason. A critique looks at the sources and boundaries (*Quellen und Grenzen*) (Kant *CPR*, A11), at the architectonic, at the

sources of pure reason and hence, a “critique” is the method, but reason is the content. Reason and rationalism are the touchstones of the Kantian project.

Conclusion on Kant’s Metahistory of Philosophy

A final note on one of Kant’s genuine and interesting positions.

“How should it be possible to learn philosophy anyway? Every philosophical thinker builds his own work, so to speak, on someone else’s ruins, but no work has ever come to be that was to be lasting in all its parts. Hence, one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is not yet given. But even granted that there was a philosophy actually at hand, no one who learned it would be able to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively his cognitions of it would always be only historical.” (*Lectures on Logic*, et. p. 538).

Again, we have the metaphor of philosophers among the “ruins.” The junky remains of broken systems. The metaphysical systems are broken down blocks and ruins, which give us nothing to build on. But then Kant sinks in his final conclusion. Every system is only ‘historical,’ even Kant’s system only gives us another part of the boundless sea. A philosopher must build his own system even though it is somehow on parts of ‘ruins.’ We can learn Kant’s system, but that does not mean we are philosophers. In the middle of this remark by Kant, we see the function of the “But even granted,” so he might grant you can have a philosophical system, but in fact, this does you no good, since you have this system only ‘subjectively’ and ‘historically.’ Crucial philosophical point for Kant.

Kant does see a course and development to the history of philosophy. Kant has a Metahistory of philosophy that can be seen through an analysis of his works. However, Kant did not develop his thinking in any systematic or comprehensive way. This topic is still left open in the Kantian system; however, we can try to fill the gap by an assessment of Kant’s writings, but the purists may insist on a more philological reading. Back to Kant’s project.

To summarize Kant’s Metahistory of Philosophy:

- 1) From the transcendental point of view, there are many edifices, but only ruins remain. Hence the need for Kant’s critical idealism.
- 2) Metaphysics as philosophy is a boundless sea and progress has left no trace.
- 3) Metaphysics as philosophy has been a swinging back forth between trust in reason and mistrust in reason.
- 4) This history of philosophy or Metahistory of philosophy is made of overthrown system and all philosophical systems are shaken and broken.
- 5) Philosophical systems can only be known ‘subjectively’ and ‘historically’ unless you create your own system.

Kant says in a Letter to L. H. Jakob

I wish you would try to compose a short system of metaphysics for the time being; I do not have the time to propose a plan for it just now. The ontology part of it would begin (without the introduction of any critical ideas) with the concepts of space and time, only as far as these (as pure intuitions) are the foundation of all experiences.” (September 11, 1787, *Correspondence* E.T. p. 125).

Philosophers should follow Kant’s suggestion – compose a system?

Kant's philosophical thinking was against these historical movements and philosophers.

Kant Contra

Against Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus, David Hume, Johann Georg Sulzer, Johann Nikolaus Tetens, and the general skeptical tradition. Gottlob Ernst Schulze skeptical attack against Kant in his book titled: *Aenesidemus* (1792). 1792. Kant wrote to his friend, Jakob Sigismund Beck, on December 4, 1792. AK 11:395).

"Under the assumed name of *Aenesidemus*, an even wider skepticism has been advanced, namely, that we cannot know at all whether our representations correspond to anything else (as object), which is as much as to say: whether a representation is a representation (stands for anything)."

Kant said in his lectures (1782-1783),

"Something similar to a critique of pure reason was found with David Hume, but he sank into the wildest and most inconsolable speculation over this, and that happened easily because he did not study reason completely, but rather only this or that concept. An investigation of practices (**facti**), how we arrive at cognition, where from experience or though pure reason. Locke accomplished much here..." (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, et. page 137. AK 29:781).

Against the *Sturm und Drang* (Storm and Urge (stress) movement (especially, Kant's former student – Johann Herder and also Kant's friend Johann Hamann). This movement included some big names in the German tradition for a while: the young Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller. They both eventually moved beyond the *Sturm und Drang* movement.

Against Pantheism (Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Baruch Spinoza).

Against Faith (Glaube, the German word for: "faith" or "belief"), as revelation and a kind of mysticism. Faith as the base of a personal God, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. So, it is not reason or metaphysics or philosophy that is the answer to our fundamental questions – but only by faith will we find our required answers.

Against fanaticism (fanatics) or enthusiasmism (Schwärmerei).

Against Common sense (Moses Mendelssohn's version).

Against Dogmatism (Christian Wolff, at least the Kantian version of Wolffian dogmatism). Wolff's **philosophia rationalis**.

Against rational metaphysics (attacked by Kant in 1st *Critique of Pure Reason*).

Against idealism. See Kant's "Refutation of Idealism," 2nd edition *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1787. (B274-B279). Against Cartesian skepticism or some version of Descartes idealism.

Against a version of Baruch Spinoza (atheism, "nihilism" (word first used by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi), fatalism, no personal God, or Deism vs. Theism. Accordingly, Spinoza was considered to believe in pantheism, atheism, nihilism, fatalism, and no personal God. The pantheism controversy (Pantheismusstreit) is also known as Spinozismusstreit.

Direct path: metaphysics leads to pantheism, pantheism is really Spinozism, Spinozism is fatalism, and fatalism is in fact, and finally: just simply, Spinozism is atheism. Potentially all philosophy and all metaphysics, therefore, leads to atheism too. These atheistic fears were whipped up against all philosophers of the time. Kant was of course – contra atheism and the Spinozism of the time. Fichte had the most problems with the attack against him as atheist. Note: "dismissed from the University of Jena in 1799 for atheism. In 1799 day of 5 July, Fichte questioned by police in Berlin. Hegel noted the issues with atheism. The atheism dispute (Atheismusstreit). But later see Hegel's lectures on the proofs of the existence of God in 1829.

In 1789 August 30 Kant's letter to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi.

"I have always thought it my duty to show respect for men of talent, science, and justice, no matter how far our opinions may differ. You will, I hope, appraise my essay on orientation, in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, from this perspective. I was requested by various people to cleanse myself of the suspicion of Spinozism, and therefore, contrary to my inclination, I wrote this essay. I hope you will find in it no trace of deviation from the principle I have just affirmed. With inner pain I have read some other attacks upon your views and those of some of your worthy friends, and I have even spoken out against such attacks." (AK 11:76-77). The essay that Kant wrote in his response discussed here was *What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? "Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?"* (1786).

Against the version of Spinoza's nonanthropocentrism.

Against Systems as such (in Spinoza's and Rene Descartes's view).

Against some version of Johann Hamann's countering of Rationalism with Awakening (Enweckung).

Against Berkeley. Example, Kant wrote to his friend, Jakob Sigismund Beck, December 4, 1792. AK 11:395).

"Herren Eberhard's and Garve's opinion that Berkeleyan Idealism is identical to Critical Idealism (which I could better call "the principle of the ideality of space and time") does not deserve the slightest attention ". Kant wanted to eviscerate these early forms of idealism.

Positive concept. Immanuel Kant used the expression "rational faith" (Vernunftglaube). See his later work: *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft)* (1793). And Kant uses the term "*What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in*

Thinking? "Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?" (1786).

Kant's rationalism is a special limited view of rationalism, an empirical, practical, based on freedom; and yet, rationalism and reason is still the chief source and anvil of Kant's truth. Thus, it is not Hume's skepticism, not Mendelssohn's common sense and his form of old rational metaphysics (Kant denied this in the first *Critique*); certainly not the rational dogmatism of Wolff (in fact, some part of Wolff's philosophy was empiricism). In addition, Kant did not see Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's concepts of revelation or faith as the only acceptable and final answer in metaphysics or theological disputes. Kant has also rejected the empiricism version of John Locke (1632-1704) in the first *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781.

Kant's new brand of philosophy mixes in his concept of freedom and practical morality to find the answer for Kant's critical and enlightenment philosophy. Even though Kant lived in isolation in northern Prussia, and he did not travel outside of region; he still wanted to be cosmopolitan in outlook and worldview. Many of Kant's friends did know the English language. So, he was aware of the broader philosophical developments even in the English-speaking world of the time.

Hegel's Metahistory of philosophy

This is clear what Hegel is up to,
“Philosophical thinking in general still deals with concrete subject matters, with God, Nature, Spirit.” *Science of Logic, Werke*, 21:13.

History of Philosophy. Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*

Like Heidegger, Hegel thought philosophy has to “deal with” its own history. The question is how? Hegel's outline and general course of history of philosophy can easily be summarized. Western philosophy started off as abstract and overtime western philosophy “progressed” and became more detailed. Progress was “uplifting” and developmental. Of course, not entirely true -- since Hegel rated Plato and Aristotle over the medieval philosophers.

At LHP 2:56; Hegel, *Werke* 19:79 Hegel says, “The fully worked-out and genuine dialectic is, however, contained in the *Parmenides*—that most famous masterpiece of Platonic dialectic.”

Hegel's Encyclopedia-system has three major parts:

- The science of logic.
- The philosophy of nature.
- The philosophy of spirit.

The third part (‘the philosophy of spirit’) is subdivided into three parts:

Part 1: Subjective spirit.

Part 2: Objective spirit.

Part 3: Absolute spirit.

For Hegel philosophy itself is identical with the history of philosophy as spirit and reason come to know pure absolute Spirit. Hegel said, “History we have before us here is the history of thought finding itself (p. 67-68). Starting with the Greeks as the most abstract and come to the final conclusion in Hegel's own absolute idealism system. The big parts (chunks) of Hegel's system comes in three parts: logic, nature, and spirit; or to use Descartes, **substantia infinita**, **res extensa**, and **res cogitans** (Hegel's words: Logic, Nature, Spirit). Hegel divides the history of philosophy in three periods, the Greek, Middle Ages, and the modern (starting with ‘ego cogito sum’), namely, Descartes starting point of ‘self-reflecting thought.’ Hegel says: “In philosophy as such, most currently and recently, is contained what the work from a thousand years has produced; it is the result of all that has preceded it.” The modern period is the where the subjective and objective are united in the absolute. That means for Hegel history did not stop with Hegel according to Hegel. The myth that Hegel thought history stopped with Hegel was adumbrated by Alexandre Kojève (1902-1968) and Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964) that put this myth into the Hegelian traditional interpretations. Hegel was constantly updating his lectures etc. Hegel work a great deal on the history of philosophy; starting on the history of philosophy in

Jena (1805) and lectured up until at least winter of 1829-1830. In 1833-36, volumes 13-15 in the first edition of Hegel's *Werke* were collected and edited by Karl Ludwig Michelet (1801-1893).

Hegel wrote.

“No philosophy, therefore, can make its appearance sooner than it does. It is true, of course, that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ancient philosophies were resurrected – this was necessary to the progress of Christian culture. Nevertheless, when past philosophies return again, they are like mummies of earlier thoughts. The World-Spirit has progressed, and a past philosophy is not its proper garment, the form in which it finds expressed what it in fact is.” (1825-1826, in Introduction).

Hegel wrote and this is key to understanding his relation to the past, “The last philosophy thus contains the previous ones, includes all the stages, and is the product and result of all the ones that preceded it...” (TW 20:461).

Hegel covers everything and shows us the power of his thinking.

Heidegger summary,

“This overcoming of Hegel is the intrinsically necessary step in the development of Western philosophy, which must be made for it to remain at all alive. Whether logic can successfully be made into philosophy again we do not know; philosophy should not prophesy, but then again it should not remain asleep.” (BP, 178) GA 24. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Summer semester 1927).

Notes on Kant about the importance of the Supersensible or übersinnlich.

“Nevertheless, this doubt, which, when it is advanced dogmatically, is called idealism, besides being a stimulus for metaphysics, from which, since it promises us so many as yet unopened prospects, one expects that it could have an objection against a matter that is so dear to us, can also, if everything sensible is placed merely in us, yield a hindrance to that which constitutes the final end of metaphysics, that is, advancing to the supersensible.”

Kant. AK 18:619.

“There are three supersensible objects with which human reason has been and will remain unremittingly occupied at all times: God, immortality, and freedom. Of the latter alone do we have an immediate conviction of its reality, yet without having insight into it. It is natural to begin with it in order to then judge about our possible cognition of the others.”

Kant. AK 18:629.

“The final aim of all metaphysics is to ascend from the cognition of the sensible to that of the supersensible. Now the *Critique of Pure Reason* proves that this can never be accomplished in a theoretical respect, but it can very well be done in a morally-practical respect by means of the

transcendental concept of freedom, which in respect to the theoretical faculty of cognition is [crossed out: fully] transcendent and absolutely inexplicable and indemonstrable, but which with respect to the pure practical faculty (determinable through pure reason alone) has indubitable reality through the categorical imperative.”

Kant. AK 18:668.

1799. 7 August. *Declaration Regarding Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre (Erklärung in Beziehung auf Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre)*. By Kant. (AK 12:370-371).

Kant says at the end, “Nevertheless the critical philosophy must remain confident of its irresistible propensity to satisfy the theoretical as well as the moral, practical purposes of reason, confident that no change of opinions, no touching up or reconstruction into some other form, is in store for it; the system of the *Critique* rests on a fully secured foundation, established forever; it will prove to be indispensable too for the noblest ends of mankind in all future ages.” (Kant. AK 12:371).

The following note from the elder Kant is remarkably interesting in the overall understanding of what Kant thought he was actually doing. It is from his later period, and the date is from around 1797.

AK 18:667 to AK 18:668 Notation on timeline for this note:
ω4: 1796-1798.

Dated timelines of these handwritten notes by Erich Adickes and his assistant Friedrich Berger. Adickes produced 22 distinct time periods in which to sort Kant's handwritten notes (*Nachlaß*). This note is dated toward the end of Kant's life. Kant died in 1804 at age 79.

From: *Notes and Fragments*. By Kant.

6343. 1796–98 (around May 1797). *LBI D 12. P. I*.

“The final aim of all metaphysics is to ascend from the cognition of the sensible to that of the supersensible. Now the *Critique of Pure Reason* proves that this can never be accomplished in a theoretical respect, but it can very well be done in a morally-practical respect by means of the transcendental concept of **freedom**, which in respect to the **theoretical** faculty of cognition is [crossed out: fully] transcendent and absolutely inexplicable and indemonstrable, but which with respect to the pure **practical** faculty (determinable through pure reason alone) has indubitable **reality** through the categorical imperative. – The reality of the concept of freedom, however, inevitably brings with it the doctrine of the **ideality** of objects as objects of intuition in space and time. For if these intuitions were not merely subjective forms of sensibility, but rather of objects in themselves, then their practical use, i.e., actions, would depend entirely on the mechanism of nature, and freedom together with its consequence, morality, would be annihilated.

Bottom page. Translator notes: Several disconnected phrases at the end of this note are omitted:

“In accordance with the letters, not the intended spirit;” “what the same man says in [this?] connection;” “An insurrection 46 of dogmatists in measure.”. Translation by Paul Guyer et al.

Complete German text from online AA. Elektronische Edition der Gesammelten Werke Immanuel Kants. AK 18:667 to AK 18:668 [<http://www.korpora.org/Kant/aa18/667.html>].

Heidegger and Turn Toward Nietzsche

We must return to Nietzsche as the most important of Heidegger historical questions marks; and not just the past, but rather, the “future” of western thought. Nietzsche is in the middle of the path. In the year 1929, Heidegger makes this remark.

“It has been clear to me for some time that the contemporary world has not yet understood Nietzsche.”

Heidegger’s Letter to Karl Löwith, XI.17 1929.

Letter of Leo Strauss to Karl Löwith, June 23, 1935): “I can only say that Nietzsche so dominated and bewitched me between my 22nd and 30th years, that I literally believed everything that I understood of him.”. Nietzsche had a major impact on most of the intellectuals of the time.

Heidegger complained to his friends that Nietzsche kaput him, he actually said, “Er hat mich kaputt gemacht!” in English, “Nietzsche kaput me!” (Broke me).” Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Heidegger und Nietzsche. Zu Nietzsche hat mich kaputtgemacht,’ *Aletheia* 9/10 (1996):19.

In his letter to Medard Boss dated August 16, 1960, he says “I am still stuck in the “abyss” of Nietzsche.” He must have been working on his two-volume set on Nietzsche which was finally published in 1961; at this point I hesitate to call them books these are rather from the Nietzsche lecture series to students by Heidegger in the 1930s. These two volumes are re-written by Heidegger of his lectures on Nietzsche dating from the 1930s at the University of Freiburg (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg). Accord to his friend and student Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002); Elfride Heidegger (Martin’s wife) was genuinely concerned (chary) about Martin having another mental breakdown; so, she asked Otto Pöggeler (1928-2014) who was helping edited the volumes, to stop working on Martin’s two-volume study of Nietzsche. These autobiographical statements by Heidegger show his ongoing engagement (Auseinandersetzung) and struggle and fight with Nietzsche’s critical stance. Of course, he removes some of the texts from the lectures and adds a few sentences. The cover up in which Heidegger has been later “caught.” Estoppel arguments – perhaps?

Heidegger sketches out his famous outline of recent historical metaphysics. Calls out the names: Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and Nietzsche and they obviously echo in Heidegger’s mind. In the *Beiträge*,

“Section 88. The "historical" lecture courses belong in the sphere of this task.

To make visible *Leibniz's* unfathomably multifarious way of questioning but to think Da-sein instead of the monas, to follow *Kant* in carrying out his main steps but, through Da-sein, to overcome the "transcendental" approach, to work out *Schelling's* question of freedom but to ground the question of "modalities" differently, to bring *Hegel's* systematics into the dominating view and yet to think in a completely opposite way, and to dare an encounter with *Nietzsche* as the closest one but to realize that he is stands the furthest one from the question of Being (Seinsfrage).”

(“88. In den Umkreis dieser Aufgabe gehören die » geschichtlichen« Vorlesungen. *Leibnizens* unergründliche Vielgestaltigkeit des Frageansatzes sichtbar machen und doch statt der monas das Da-sein denken, *Kants* Hauptschritte nachvollziehen und doch den »transzendentalen« Ansatz durch das Da-sein überwinden, *Schellings* Freiheitsfrage durchfragen und dennoch die »Modalitäten« frage auf einen anderen Grund bringen, *Hegels* Systematik in den beherrschenden Blick bringen und doch ganz entgegengesetzt denken, mit *Nietzsche* die Auseinandersetzung wagen als dem Nächsten und doch erkennen, daß er der Seinsfrage am fernsten steht.”

“Section 89. To understand Nietzsche as the end of Western metaphysics is not a historical statement of what lies behind us, but the *historical* approach to the future of Western thought.”

(89. Nietzsche als das Ende der abendländischen Metaphysik begreifen, das ist keine historische Feststellung dessen, was hinteruns Hegt, sondern der *geschichtliche* Ansatz der Zukunft des abendländischen Denkens.)”

GA 65. *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)*. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65:176.

Nietzsche puts the end to “eternals” and supersensible (Übersinnlichen).

In the summer 1885, Nietzsche wrote: “What distinguishes us from all Platonic and Leibnitz thinking separates most thoroughly, that is: we do not believe in eternal terms, eternal values, eternal forms, eternal souls, and philosophy as far as it is science (Wissenschaft) and not law, we mean only the biggest expansion of the concept (Begriff) "History".

(“Was uns von allen Platonischen und Leibnitzischen Denkweisen am Gründlichsten abtrennt, das ist: wir glauben an keine ewigen Begriffe, ewigen Werthe, ewigen Formen, ewigen Seelen; und Philosophie, soweit sie Wissenschaft und nicht Gesetzgebung ist, bedeutet uns nur die weiteste Ausdehnung des Begriffs “Historie “). Notebook: *KGWB* 38 = Mp XVI 1a. Mp XVI 2a. Mp XV 2b. Juni–Juli 1885. Number 38 [14].

What is left for philosophers at the table without the supersensible (Übersinnlichen)? Plus, no more philosophical backing for the churches and priests. What good are philosophers now?

Again – Nietzsche clears the air and history of western metaphysics.

KGWB/NF-1885, 34[82] — Nachgelassene Fragmente April–Juni 1885.

“- Anti-Kant.

Fortune, instinct, heredity, habit," who thinks to explain something with such words, must be humble today, and, moreover, badly trained. But at the end of the last century, it was raging. Galvani explained everything from habits and instincts. Hume explained the sense of causality out of habit; Kant, with great calm said: "it is a fortune". All the world was happy, especially when he also discovered a moral faculty. Here lay the magic of his philosophy: the young theologians of the Tübingen monastery went into the bushes - everyone was looking for "fortune". And what could not be found! Schelling christened "intellectual intuition," a power for

the "transcendental". Schopenhauer thought of an already sufficiently estimated fortune, of the will, that they have found that more and more, namely "the thing in itself". In England, the instinctualists and intuitionists of morality emerged. It was the old matter of faith and knowledge, a sort of "formal faith" which claimed some content. History is essentially theologians. Leibnitz is alive again, and behind Leibnitz-Plato. The terms as (anamnesis) ἀνάμνησις, etc. This skeptical movement is, in fact, directed against Sceptis, it has a pleasure in submission."

(— Anti-Kant.

"Vermögen, Instinkt, Vererbung, Gewohnheit" wer mit solchen Worten etwas zu erklären meint, muß heute bescheiden und überdies schlecht geschult sein. Aber am Ausgange des vorigen Jahrhunderts wüthete es. Galiani erklärte alles aus Gewohnheiten und Instinkten. Hume erklärte den Causalitätssinn aus der Gewohnheit; Kant, mit großer Ruhe sagte: "es ist ein Vermögen." Alle Welt war glücklich, besonders als er auch noch ein moralisches Vermögen entdeckte. Hier lag der Zauber seiner Philosophie: die jungen Theologen des Tübinger Stifts giengen in die Büsche — alle suchten nach "Vermögen." Und was fand man nicht Alles! Schelling taufte es "die intellektuale Anschauung," ein Vermögen für "Übersinnliche." Schopenhauer meinte an einem schon bereits genügend geschätzten Vermögen, am Willen, dasselbe gefunden zu haben und mehr, nämlich "das Ding an sich." In England entstanden die Instinktvisten und Intuitionisten der Moral. Es war die alte Sache vom Glauben und Wissen, eine Art "formaler Glaube" welcher irgend einen Inhalt in Anspruch nahm. Die Geschichte geht wesentlich die Theologen an. Im Stillen wird Leibnitz wieder lebendig, und hinter Leibnitz — Plato. Die Begriffe als ἀνάμνησις usw. Diese skeptisch beginnende Bewegung ist in der That gegen die Sceptis gerichtet, sie hat einen Genuß in der Unterwerfung.)"

Note: ἀνάμνησις, anamnesis, remembrance. To mention the past. Translations in Nietzsche context.

Note definition: sceptis ('skeptis') is a philosophical doubt or a skepticism concept. From Greek σκέψις skeptis, "inquiry".

Heidegger favorite quote from Nietzsche's understanding of Nietzsche's own position in the philosophical tradition; and hence Heidegger pointing to Nietzsche as mere upside-down Platonist. Note the early year of 1871.

"My philosophy *inverted* <upside down> *Platonism*: the farther from the true being, the more purely beautiful it is better. The life in appearance as a goal."

[Meine Philosophie *umgedrehter Platonismus*: je weiter ab vom wahrhaft Seienden, um so reiner schöner besser ist es. Das Leben im Schein als Ziel]. *NF-1870*, 7 [156]. [7 = U I 2b. Ende 1870 — April 1871.

Next is *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a philosophy of the future*. (1886). Emphasis added by author. Preface, June 1885.

"It seems that all the great things about the human race to enroll with eternal demands in the

heart, just as enormous and awe-faces to wander about the earth: a caricature of this kind was the dogmatic philosophy, for example, the Vedanta doctrine in Asia, the Platonism in Europe. Let us not be ungrateful to it, as surely it must be conceded that the worst, most tedious and dangerous of errors hitherto has been a dogmatist error - namely Plato's invention of **pure spirit** and the **good in itself.**”

Nietzsche on the general issue of the “machine” and man. For Heidegger it is Machination (Machenschaft) and the domination of machination" (Vormacht der Machenschaft). Here is Nietzsche from 1887 (137 years ago),

“I am trying an economic justification of virtue. - The task is to make man as useful as possible, and to bring him as near as possible to the infallible machine: for this purpose, he must be endowed with machine virtues (- he must learn to feel the conditions in which he works in a mechanically useful way as the most valuable ones: for this it is necessary that the others be made as insufferable as possible, as dangerous and disreputable as possible...). (“Ich versuche eine ökonomische Rechtfertigung der Tugend. — Die Aufgabe ist, den Menschen möglichst nutzbar machen, und ihn soweit es irgendwie angeht der unfehlbaren Maschine zu nähern: zu diesem Zwecke muß er mit Maschinen-Tugenden ausgestattet werden (— er muß die Zustände, in welchen er machinal-nutzbar arbeitet, als die höchstwerthigen empfinden lernen: dazu thut noth, daß ihm die anderen möglichst entleidet, möglichst gefährlich und verrufen gemacht werden...).” *KGWB/NF-1887,10*[11].

We have the concept of the steam technology used in the Aeolipile for 2000 years. How many steps to the global technologization of the known world?

Remember.

What is the epoch now? Heidegger says, “Nietzsche is the name for an age of the world: the epoch of the development and establishment of the dominion of man over the earth.” (“Nietzsche ist der Name für ein Weltalter: Die Epoche der Entfaltung und Einrichtung der Herrschaft des Menschen über die Erde”). *Nietzsches Metaphysik* (announced for the winter semester 1941/42). GA 50:84.

Connections with Nietzsche’s the thought of the eternal return of the same and spinning wheels of technology.

Nietzsche Contra Metaphysics

"Like all Western thought since Plato, Nietzsche's thinking is metaphysics" (Heidegger's *Nietzsche*, Volume III, page 187). Heidegger is attempting to become a post-Platonic philosopher. There are no innocent readings of philosophers (Alfred Denker).

About Kant's and metaphysics.

"Kant remains stuck *in* metaphysics; that is to say: he does not ask the question of Being at all." ("Kant bleibt *in* der Metaphysik stecken; das sagt: er stellt die Seinsfrage gar nicht.")

Das Ereignis. 1941-1942. GA 71:113. Note this remark is not in a lecture series nor in an address.

Heidegger's words of caution,

"This kind of overcoming of metaphysics, which Nietzsche has in mind in the spirit of nineteenth century positivism, is only the final entanglement in metaphysics, although in a higher form."

The end of philosophy, page 92. There are other places where Heidegger pushed the idea that Nietzsche's philosophy was also caught in the positivism. There are some discussions that point toward Heidegger trying to paint Nietzsche into a Roman (not a Greek) world view. Be careful of the simulacrum? Who is the real Nietzsche? **civis Rōmānus sum** (I am a citizen of Roma). Heidegger remarks, "all metaphysics, as well as positivism, its antagonist, talks the language of Plato" (SD 63, 74).

Notably, there is another example from Heidegger on Nietzsche and positivism.

"No modern thinker has struggled harder for knowledge and against the blurred and fluttering lack of knowledge than Nietzsche at a time when the alienation from knowledge was promoted most by science itself on the basis of the attitude known as *positivism*. Today, this *positivism* has *not been overcome* in any way, but rather only disguised and thus even more effective." ("Kein neuzeitlicher Denker hat härter um das Wissen und gegen die verschwommene und verflatternde Wissenslosigkeit gerungen als Nietzsche zu einer Zeit, in der die Entfremdung gegen das Wissen gerade durch die Wissenschaft selbst am meisten gefördert wurde auf Grundjener Haltung, die man *Positivismus* nennt. Dieser *Positivismus* ist heute *in keiner Weise überwunden*, sondern nur verschleiert und dadurch noch wirksamer."). *Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis*. GA 47:177

Nietzsche in a number of places writes again concept of Knowledge. What is metaphysics without knowledge, without epistemology? Definition of Epistemology, Greek ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, meaning 'knowledge', and λόγος, logos.

Here is an example of Nietzsche rejection of knowledge:

"Against the scientific prejudice. The greatest fabulous thing is that of knowledge. One wants to know how things are in themselves: but behold, there are no things in themselves! But even if there were an in-itself, an unconditioned, it could not be recognized! Something unconditional cannot be recognized: otherwise, it would not necessarily be! However, to know is always to put oneself in the condition - -; such a "recognizer" wants that what he wants to know does not concern him; and that the same thing is of no concern to anyone at all: in the first place a

contradiction is given, in the will to know and the desire that it should not concern him (why then know!) and secondly, because something that concerns no one, not at all is, so also cannot be recognized. - To know means to "condition oneself into something": to feel conditioned by something and between us - so it is under all circumstances a determination to make conscious of conditions (not a fathoming of beings, things, "in-itself")." *KGWB/NF-1885*, 2[154]. *Will to Power*, #555. *KSA* 12, 2[154], page 141-142. (36)

Heidegger wrote (1947):

"The essence of the homeland, however, is also mentioned with the intention of thinking the homelessness of contemporary man from the essence of Being's history. Nietzsche was the last to experience this homelessness. From within metaphysics, he was unable to find any other way out than a reversal of metaphysics. But that is the height of futility." "Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings*, page 241.

Heidegger wrote (1964):

"Throughout the entire history of philosophy, Plato's thinking remains decisive in its sundry forms. Metaphysics is Platonism. Nietzsche characterizes his philosophy as reversed Platonism. With the reversal of metaphysics that was already accomplished by Karl Marx, the uttermost possibility of philosophy is attained. It has entered its end." "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking." *Basic Writing*, page 433. *GA* 14. *Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens* (1964). "Dies zu folgern, wäre voreilig." ("It would be premature to conclude this"). *GA* 14:71.

Martin Heidegger in his 1930s lecture calls Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) the last western metaphysician without the analysis of Nietzsche's own work on leaving metaphysics aside. Nietzsche did not overcome metaphysics because he never "had" it in the first place. No one ever thought that Karl Marx (1818-1883) was a metaphysician or that he set out to overcome metaphysics. Karl Marx overcame G.W.F. Hegel's (1770-1831) metaphysical system as idealism (turn Hegel on his head, the so-called 'inversion', *Umkehrung*); but that is always in terms of Hegelian idealism versus Marxian historical materialism. Short version: idealism versus materialism. On the bigger world stage of history, Karl Marx's historical materialism (locked in as a metaphysics) as communism still influence whole nations and over a billion people on the planet live under some kind of communist rule (at least in writing); but much less than during the 1950s.

For Heidegger (1889-1976) of the 1936-1937 Nietzsche lectures, his Nietzsche is the Janus-faced figure of Nietzsche being the last metaphysician of the western philosophical tradition; and on the other hand, pointing the way out of metaphysics to Heidegger's new beginning (*Anfang*) of thought, in fact, Heidegger would not use philosophy or metaphysics to describe his new beginning. Heidegger later sees himself as the starting point for the new beginning and then puts Nietzsche back into Heidegger's overall meta-history of Being as being "just" another metaphysician. According to Heidegger, metaphysics never gets the ontological difference and never asks about the meaning (*Sinn*) of Being or the truth of Being. Note: of course, metaphysics is still trapped in the 'eternal' world.

Did Nietzsche overcome metaphysics or was he still stuck in Platonic metaphysics? The following will analyze Nietzsche's view of traditional metaphysics and then his rejection of metaphysics. The second part will then examine Nietzsche's claims about the will to power, **amor fati**, eternal return of the same, overman, and revaluation of all values to determine if Nietzsche has in fact reached beyond metaphysics. Was Nietzsche the last metaphysician in the western tradition?

Nietzsche wrote early on:

"I call myself the last philosopher because I am the last person. Nobody talks to me as myself, and my voice comes to me like that of a dying person."

KGWB / NF-1872,19 [131] – Notebook summer 1872 - early 1873.

Is it true that in fact Nietzsche is doing some kind of metaphysics?

What does the word "metaphysics" stand for in the western philosophical tradition?

In fact, Nietzsche wrote, "The consequences of Kant's doctrine. End of metaphysics as a science." (*Summer 1872- early 1873, 19 [51]*). Therefore, even Nietzsche saw this as a general Kantian movement against metaphysics. In reading Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804), it seems like that Kant's strongest anti-metaphysical stance was in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). After reading the reviews and his other writings, again it seems like Kant wanted to bring the faith of God back in his doctrines. Kant wrote in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787), "Thus, I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." (Ich mußte also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen"). (AK 3:19 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*).

Nietzsche as the last metaphysician?

Heidegger wrote, "With his thought on the will to power Nietzsche anticipates the metaphysical ground of the completion of the modern age. Metaphysical thinking completes itself in the thought of the will to power. Nietzsche, the thinker of the thought of the will to power, is the last metaphysician of the West." (*Nietzsche as Metaphysician*, published 1961).

Does Nietzsche's final position actually include the Will to Power in any way that could be counted as metaphysical? Answer: Heidegger says, "Yes." Heidegger may also be interpreting Nietzsche as to his intentions even if Nietzsche's writings suggested that Nietzsche pulled back from any metaphysical claim about the Will to Power (or the will to more, will to will).

Heidegger said, "Nietzsche remains caught in *metaphysics*: from beings to Being; and he exhausts all possibilities of this basic position..." (*Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. GA 65, page 18. Note English translation p. 127, 1936-1939).

For Heidegger, Nietzsche's will, revaluation of all values, analysis of nihilism, overman, **amor fati**, eternal return of the same, is all part of modern metaphysics of subjectivity (Subiectitat) and subjectivity (Subjektivität). (See also: Husserl's attack of at least on Heidegger (and you can include others for example Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Scheler) of all doing some kind of philosophical anthropology. This was done in the famous Husserl lecture "Phenomenology and

Anthropology” given the 10 of the June 1931, in Berlin, Germany). Dilthey name was called out by Husserl.

One anti-metaphysical strand.

Lou Andreas-Salomé sort of Nietzsche’s women friend was the first one to write about the major periods in the development of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche wrote and published some 15+ books. Some have suggested that Nietzsche during his middle period as being a straight positivist. Interestingly, during this time besides his reading of Ernst Mach (1838-1916), he also sent a copy of *Genealogy of Morals* to Ernst Mach in late 1887. The Vienna Circle that influences recent philosophical development (Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), Wittgenstein, Quine, Gödel, and many more) was first called Ernst Mach Society. Rudolf Carnap attended Husserl’s advanced seminars on phenomenology during 1924 and 1925 and by 1932 had published “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache” attacking one of Husserl’s famous student Martin Heidegger. The historical context shows multiple influences leading to our present question of the place of metaphysics and its overcoming in the current philosophical discussions – we even have a recent title like *Postmetaphysical Thinking* (1988) by Jürgen Habermas (1929 -). Additionally, we have recent postmetaphysicians obligated to Heidegger, such as Jean-Luc Nancy, Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Gianni Vattimo. Note. Carnap was with Heidegger at the Davos Debate, and they meet several times during the three weeks of the Debate in 1929.

In Chapter 20 of Heidegger’s *Nietzsche I* ("Nietzsche's Attempt to Overturn Platonism on the Basis of Fundamental Experience of Nihilism") Heidegger says, "It is indisputable that prior to the time of his work on the planned **magnus opus**, *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche went through a period of extreme positivism; these were the years 1879-81, the years of his decisive development toward maturity. Such positivism, though of course transformed, became a part of his later fundamental also..."

What does Nietzsche say about metaphysics itself?

Nietzsche interestingly enough writes, in the notebook from the end of 1876 to summer 1877.

KGWB/NF-1876, 23 [159]

“I want to expressly explain to readers of my earlier writings that I have given up on the metaphysical-artistic views which essentially dominate them: they are pleasant but untenable. Anyone who allows himself to speak publicly at an early age is usually forced to publicly disagree soon afterwards.” [23 = Mp XIV 1b. Ende 1876 — Sommer 1877].

Nietzsche’s notebook ***Summer 1872- early 1873. 19 [83]***.

“But if metaphysics is eliminated, then gradually humanity will appear much other great again. I mean, the philosopher will prefer other areas...”

Nietzsche’s notebook ***Winter 1872-1873. 23 [7]***

“What is philosophy now? 1. The impossibility of metaphysics.”

Nietzsche’s notebook ***Summer 1872- early 1873. 19 [247]***.

“The truth and its value as a pure metaphysical.”

Nietzsche’s notebook *Summer 1878. 29 [45]*

“Why should you not play metaphysically allowed? and use the enormous power of the whole work out?”

Nietzsche’s notebook *Summer 1878. 29 [49]*.

“Why not allow religion and metaphysics as a game of adults?”

Nietzsche wrote in his published writings:

“It is still a metaphysical faith on which our faith in science rests, we also we know of today, we are godless and antimetaphysicians, we also take our fire from the fire that a thousand-year-old faith has inflamed, those Christians Faith which was *Plato* 's belief that God is the truth, that the truth is divine ... But just as this becomes more and more unbelievable, when nothing proves to be more than divine, except the error blindness, the lie - if God proves to be our longest lie?” (*Genealogy of Morals*, Third Essay, Section 24).

Rejections of metaphysical ideas by Nietzsche “Among Germans I am understood immediately when I say that philosophy has been corrupted by theologian instinct. The Protestant pastor is the grandfather of German Philosophy...” *The Antichrist: Curse on Christianity*, page 109. Translation by Thomas Wayne.

1). Rejection of ontology and Being (Sein, Seyn).

Nietzsche’s version of the rejection of ontology and the doctrine of Being. Certainly, a different version from Heidegger’s lifelong pursuit of meaning and truth of the Being of beings (contra Thomas Sheehan’s counterclaim). Nietzsche rejected Being (Sein) an empty (“But with this Heraclitus will always be right that Being is an empty fiction. The "apparent" world is the only one: the "true world" is only lied to ...)” (*Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*, “Reason in Philosophy” section #2, 1888). (Aber damit wird Heraklit ewig Recht behalten, dass das Sein eine leere Fiktion ist. Die “scheinbare” Welt ist die einzige: die “wahre Welt” ist nur hinzugelogen”).

Nietzsche used the term ontology three times in his writings (*Philosophy in the Tragic age of the Greeks*; (1873) and in two notes: 1886 7 [4]; and 1888, 14 [169]).

First time about Parmenides theme of ontology, moral ontology, and brief remark about the ontological proof of God. In the discussion of Parmenides and theme of ontology, Nietzsche follows up with these thought about Being (*Philosophy in the Tragic age of the Greeks*, (1873); section #11).

“This is precisely why the concept of "being" - which is only just Being **essentia** - is not even close to an **existentia** of Being. The logical truth of that opposition, "Being" and "nothingness (Nichtsein)" is completely empty, if not the underlying subject matter, unless the intuition can be given from this conflict, by abstraction, is derived, it is

without this go back to the view, just game with representations (Vorstellungen), by which is in fact nothing detected.”

KGWB/Notebook June–July 1885. 38 [14].

“From the etymology and history of the language we all take their words as become, as many still becoming, in a way that must be the most general terms, as the falsest, and the oldest. "Being (Sein)", "substance" and "unconditional", "equality", "thing" -: the thinking invented the first and oldest of these schemes, which in fact contradicted the world of becoming the most thoroughly...” [38 = Mp XVI 1a. Mp XVI 2a. Mp XV 2b. Juni–Juli 1885].

Later in this same note, Nietzsche writes:

“The "thing" is only a fiction, the "thing-in-itself" even a contradictory illicit fiction: but also, the recognition, the absolute and consequently also the relative, is also only a fiction! In this way, the necessity of recognizing a subject for recognition, some pure "intelligence," an "absolute spirit" is lost: this mythology, which Plato had not given up completely for Kant and who, with the Christian ground dogma "God is a spirit," threatened all science of the body, and thus also the development of the body with death, ---- this mythology has now had its time.”

KGWB/Notebook 14 [169].

“The will to power

- 1). Put, it is worth more, why should it be more real than this?
... is reality a quality of perfection? - But that is the ontological proof of God ...]

[Der Wille zur Macht

- 1). Gesetzt, sie ist mehr werth, warum sollte sie mehr real sein als diese?
... ist die Realität eine Qualität der Vollkommenheit? — Aber das ist ja der ontologische Beweis Gottes...]

- 2). Rejection of God.

KGWB/NF-1885, 34 [204]. April-June 1885.

‘Finally, it came to me that the world's most negative of all possible modes of thinking is that which in itself is called evil, and which acknowledges only the unconditioned, one, conscience, and beings: I found that God was the most destructive and most hostile of all thoughts, and that the knowledge of this "truth" has been waiting so long for the monstrous confusion of the dear pious and metaphysicians of all times. Forgive me that I myself am not at all willing to renounce one of these two ways of thinking - I should have to abandon my task, which requires opposing means.’

Above this remark, it is written the expression, “Die Logik des Atheismus.”

“I am bound to affirm my unbelief; in my eyes there is no greater idea than the denial of God. What is the history of humanity? Man did nothing but invent God so as not to kill himself. I, as the first one, push back the fiction of God ...”

KGWB/NF-1887, 11 [334] —November 1887 — March 1888. 11 = W II 3. KSA, pages 143-144.

Most famous section and quote from Nietzsche.

Section entitled “The Madman”:

“God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?” *The Gay Science* (“*la gaya scienza*”), Section 125, 1887.

Moreover, and then in the *The Gay Science* (“*la gaya scienza*”), “The greatest recent event – that “God is dead,” that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable – is already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe.” 1887, section 343. *The Gay Science* (“*la gaya scienza*”).

“The overman is the meaning of the earth... I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of other-worldly hopes!... Once the sin against God was the greatest sin; but God died... To sin against the earth is now the most dreadful thing.” (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*, page 125).

From Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer

"Reason" in language: oh, what a deceitful old wench! I fear we are not going on God, because we still believe (faith, glauben) in grammar..."

Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer. Friedrich Nietzsche [*Götzen-Dämmerung*. English]. The "reason" in Philosophy, Section 5. Page 18.

“The term "God" has been the greatest objection to existence (Dasein)... We deny God, we deny the responsibility in God: we only deliver to the world. – (Wir leugnen Gott, wir leugnen die Verantwortlichkeit in Gott: damit erst erlösen wir die Welt).” *Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*. Four Errors, section 8.

From *The Antichrist: Curse on Christianity*.

“The Christian concept of God — God as God of the sick, God as spider, God as spirit — is one of the most corrupt conceptions of God ever attained on earth; perhaps it even represents the low-water mark in the descending development of the god-type. God degenerated into the contradiction of life instead of being its transfiguration and eternal yea! In God, a declaration of war against life, nature, and the will to life! God the formula for every slander of “this world,” for every lie about “that world”! In God nothingness deified, the will to nothingness sanctified! ...*The Antichrist: Curse on Christianity*, page 116-117. Translation by Thomas Wayne.

From *The Antichrist: Curse on Christianity*.

“This does not set *us* apart, that we find no God again, neither in history, nor in nature, nor behind nature — but that we feel what has been revered as God to be not “godly” but pitiful, absurd, harmful, not merely an error but a *crime against life*... We deny God as God... If one were to prove this God of the Christians to us, we would know still less how to believe in him.” *The Antichrist: Curse on Christianity*, page 151. Translation by Thomas Wayne.

From *The Antichrist: Curse on Christianity*.

“Section 19.

But there is a curse on them for not being able to cope with it: they have absorbed the disease, the age, the contradiction into all their instincts - they have not created a god ever since! Two

thousand years almost and not a single new God!” (Zwei Jahrtausende beinahe und nicht ein einziger neuer Gott!”). Translation by Thomas Wayne.

From: in *Ecce Homo How one becomes what one is*, (written in 1888, but first edition published in 1908). Section 10. “Why I am so smart.”

“You just have to start learning something here. What humanity has so far seriously considered are not even realities, mere imaginings, more strictly spoken, lies out of the bad instincts of sick, in the deepest sense harmful natures - all the concepts of "God," "soul," "virtue," "Sin", "beyond", "truth", "eternal life" ...” Section 10, “Why I am so smart (Warum ich so klug bin, or clever)”.

From *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a philosophy of the future*. (Section 57, (1886).

“Perhaps the day will come when the concepts of “God” and “sin,” which are the most solemn concepts of all and have caused the most fighting and suffering, will seem no more important to us than a child’s toy and a child’s pain seem to an old man, – and perhaps “the old man” will then need another toy and another pain, – still enough of a child, an eternal child!”).

3). Rejection of metaphysicians.

KGWB/NF-1885, 34 [204]. April-June 1885.

“Finally, it came to me that the world's most negative of all possible modes of thinking is that which in itself is called evil, and which acknowledges only the unconditioned, one, conscience, and beings: I found that God was the most destructive and most hostile of all thoughts, and that the knowledge of this "truth" has been waiting so long for the monstrous confusion of the dear pious and metaphysicians of all times. Forgive me that I myself am not at all willing to renounce one of these two ways of thinking - I should have to abandon my task, which requires opposing means.”

KGWB/Notebook Fall 1887. 10 [150]

“Note for donkeys (jackasses). It has been forgotten to admit to this positing of ideal also the reality of persons: one became atheistic. But have you really renounced the ideal? ---- The last metaphysicians still seek in essence to him the real "reality," the "thing in itself", in relation to all others is only apparent. Their dogma that because our world is so obvious phenomenon is not the expression of this ideal, it just does not "true" - and basically not even in the metaphysical world, returns as the cause. The unconditioned, if it is that highest perfection, may make impossible the reason for everything related Schopenhauer, who had decided otherwise, necessary to the metaphysical reason to think as opposed to the ideals, as "evil blind will": he was such then "that which appears" to be, which reveals itself in the world of appearance.” [10 = W II 2. Herbst 1887].

KGWB/Notebook late 1876 - summer 1877. 23 [27]

“And this is the value of such metaphysicians as Schopenhauer: they attempt a world view (Weltbild): only pity is that it transforms the world into a human being: one might say that the world is in great Schopenhauer. That is just not true.”

KGWB/Notebook Spring-Summer 1888. 16 [58]

“For the spider, the spider, the most perfect being, for God is a metaphysician, metaphysician: that is calls (das heißt), he spins ...”

From the *Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer* (Four Errors, section 3).

“Not to mention the "thing in itself", the **horrendum pudendum** [a terrible shame] of the metaphysicians!”

From *The Antichrist: Curse on Christianity*:

“Even the palest of the pale were still able to become master over him, the gentlemen metaphysicians, the concept-albinos. They spun their webs around him so long that he, hypnotized by their movements, became himself a spider, a metaphysician. Henceforth he spun the world again out of himself — **sub specie Spinozae** — henceforth

he transfigured himself into something ever thinner and paler, became an “ideal,” became “pure spirit,” became “absolute,” became the “thing-in-itself” ... Downfall of a God: God became the “thing-in-itself” ...” *The Antichrist: Curse on Christianity*, page 116. Translation by Thomas Wayne.

4). Rejection of the idea of eternal.

KGWB/Notebook June–July 1885. 38 [14].

In the summer 1885 Nietzsche wrote:

“What distinguishes us from all Platonic and Leibnitz thinking separates most thoroughly, that is: we do not believe in eternal terms, eternal values, eternal forms, eternal souls, and philosophy as far as it is science (Wissenschaft) and not law, we mean only the biggest expansion of the concept (Begriff) "History".

(Was uns von allen Platonischen und Leibnitzischen Denkweisen am Gründlichsten abtrennt, das ist: wir glauben an keine ewigen Begriffe, ewigen Werthe, ewigen Formen, ewigen Seelen; und Philosophie, soweit sie Wissenschaft und nicht Gesetzgebung ist, bedeutet uns nur die weiteste Ausdehnung des Begriffs “Historie “). Notebook: 38 = Mp XVI 1a. Mp XVI 2a. Mp XV 2b. Juni–Juli 1885. Number 38 [14].

5). Rejection of supersensuous. (Übersinnlichen).

“It was the honeymoon of German philosophy, all the young theologians of the Tübingen institutions soon in the bushes - all sought after "faculties". And what they found not all - in that innocent, rich, still youthful period of the German spirit, in which blew the romance, the wicked fairy, into singing, back when "find" you and "invent" to not did hold apart! Above all a fortune's "supersensible": Schelling christened it *intellectual intuition* which came and with it the heartiest longing of the basically pious inclined German. It is this whole arrogant and fanatical movement...” (*Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a philosophy of the future*. (Section 11, (1886).

KGWB/NF-1885, 34[82] — Nachgelassene Fragmente April–Juni 1885.

“- Anti-Kant.

Fortune, instinct, heredity, habit," who thinks to explain something with such words, must be humble today, and, moreover, badly trained. But at the end of the last century, it was raging. Galiani explained everything from habits and instincts. Hume explained the sense of causality out of habit; Kant, with great calm said: "it is a fortune". All the world was happy, especially when he also discovered a moral faculty. Here lay the magic of his philosophy: the young theologians of the Tübingen monastery went into the bushes - everyone was looking for "fortune". And what could not be found! Schelling christened "intellectual intuition," a power for the "transcendental". Schopenhauer thought of an already sufficiently estimated fortune, of the will, that they have found that more and more, namely "the thing in itself". In England, the instinctualists and intuitionists of morality emerged. It was the old matter of faith and knowledge, a sort of "formal faith" which claimed some content. History is essentially theologians. Leibnitz is alive again, and behind Leibnitz-Plato. The terms as ἀνάμνησις, etc. This skeptical movement is, in fact, directed against Sceptis, it has a pleasure in submission."

Note definition: scepis ('scepis) is a philosophical doubt or a skepticism concept. From Greek σκέψις (scepis), "inquiry".

6). Rejection of Platonism.

Nietzsche's early notes are often quoted by Martin Heidegger.

KGWB/Notebook. End 1870 to April 1871. 7 [156].

“My philosophy *inverted* <upside down> *Platonism*: the farther from the true being, the more purely beautiful it is better. The life in appearance as a goal.”

[Meine Philosophie *umgedrehter Platonismus*: je weiter ab vom wahrhaft Seienden, um so reiner schöner besser ist es. Das Leben im Schein als Ziel]. NF-1870, 7 [156]. [7 = U I 2b. Ende 1870 — April 1871.

Next in *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a philosophy of the future*. (1886). Emphasis added by author. Preface, June 1885.

“It seems that all the great things about the human race to enroll with eternal demands in the heart, just as enormous and awe-faces to wander about the earth: a caricature of this kind was the dogmatic philosophy, for example, the Vedanta doctrine in Asia, the Platonism in Europe. Let us not be ungrateful to it, as surely it must be conceded that the worst, most tedious and dangerous of errors hitherto has been a dogmatist error - namely Plato's invention of **pure spirit** and the **good in itself**.”

I think the follow quote from James Magrini gives us the background about Nietzsche overall engagement and attempt to completely overcome or overturn Platonism as seen from a metaphysical point of view.

“At the backdrop of this Platonist-Christian (Platonism) privileging of the super-sensuous world, Nietzsche attempts to return to the realm of the senses which involves an overturning of the Platonic world view. What ensues is a revaluation of the metaphysical standard of truth and an initiation towards a “physiological” aesthetics. At first glance, positivism appears to accomplish such a move as described, for positivism inverts Platonism’s value system by removing the super-sensuous from a position of importance, no longer designating it as “true Being.” In its place, empirical presentation (positum) becomes the new “truth” standard of reality. Nevertheless, positivism is not a radical overcoming of Platonism in the Nietzschean sense, for it continues the proliferation of nihilism, and like its counterpart, embraces the unnatural bifurcation of existence, i.e., the comparative ideal of the “true world” against which values are measured and judged. Although positivism casts aside the ideal of the super-sensuous as the “true world,” it retains the ideal of the “true world,” and along with it the “blueprint of an ‘above and below.’” Positivism continues to operate within Platonism’s system of hierarchy. Empirical validation becomes the gold standard establishing the world of “appearances” (in this case, the super-sensuous world), as that which constitutes all things which are not truly in Being. Initially, Nietzsche’s undertaking seems to repeat the move of positivism, i.e., establishing the “sensual” as the criterion for determining “True reality.” However, Nietzsche does not intend to establish an alternative form of positivism by merely reversing the structure of knowledge. Rather, he seeks to attack the root of nihilism, abolishing the destructive “essence” of Platonism – the distinction between “true and apparent” world.” KRITIKE VOLUME THREE NUMBER ONE (JUNE 2009) 116-138. “Truth, Art, and the “New Sensuousness”: Understanding Heidegger’s Metaphysical Reading of Nietzsche.” By James Magrini.

Nietzsche says in the *Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*:
“6. The true world--we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of (pinnacle) humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)”

Now you can see how Nietzsche’s metahistory of philosophy fits in with his critical engagement with Platonism and metaphysics in general. The question remains for Heidegger at least – does Nietzsche abolish the Platonic distinction between the true and apparent world (true world as eternal)? Heidegger would answer with a definitive: no.

KGWB/NF-1888, 24 [1] - Period from October to November 1888.

“It has been dearly paid that this Athenian went to school with the Egyptians (probably among the Jews in Egypt.) In the great disgrace of Christianity, Plato is one of those fatal ambiguities which made it possible for the nobler natures of antiquity which led to the "cross" ... My recovery, my preference, my cure of all *Platonism* was Thucydides every time. Thucydides, and, perhaps, the *Principe* of Machiavelli, are most closely related to me, by their absolute will not to pretend and to see reason in reality-not in "reason," even less in "morality." the miserable fairy-tale, which the classical German educated as a reward for his "seriousness" in the intercourse with antiquity, cures nothing so thoroughly as Thucydides.”

Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer. Section: *What I owe to the ancients*, 2.
First publication 24/11/1888.

“My recreation, my preference, my *cure* from all Platonism was at any time Thucydides. Thucydides and, perhaps, the *Principe* of Machiavelli, are themselves most closely related unconditionally by the will, and is nothing to fool and to see reason in reality - not in the "reason", even less in "morality"....” *Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*

Heidegger writes in his essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” (1940) that Nietzsche is the “most unrestrained Platonist in the history of Western metaphysics” (et. p. 174). Nietzsche is entirely caught by metaphysics (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938. GA 65:127). Heidegger points toward one of his basic attacks against Nietzsche are the claims that Nietzsche early on recognized his basic philosophical position was the task of overturning Platonism. The two basic points for Heidegger in Western metaphysics are the first beginning marked by Plato and the second who marks the end is Nietzsche. This distinction is the relationship between the supersensuous (Übersinnlichen) and sensuous. Plato’s ideas are in the domain of the supersensuous and Nietzsche’s Ockham’s razor cuts (**lex parsimoniae**) away the supersensuous (true world, see Section 4 from Nietzsche's *Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*, HOW THE "TRUE WORLD" FINALLY BECAME A FABLE. The History of an Error) and leaves us with the sensuous or apparent world. Of course, at some points, Nietzsche wants to do away with this distinction and hence this leads us out of Platonism. Certainly, Plato and Nietzsche were antipodes in the world of ideas. For Nietzsche there are no eternal ideas. Heidegger’s point is that Nietzsche wanted to invert Platonism and still in general Nietzsche was stuck in the Platonist distinction of the supersensuous and sensuous worlds. Nietzsche’s thinking was hung-up within this distinction. Of course, one can argue that this was not the real “Plato” but some version of Platonism that has come down through the Christian interpretation of Plato.

Nietzsche was on the verge of seeing through his inversion of Platonism, but taking his overall consideration is still within the web of Platonism. Western philosophy is just a series of footnotes to Plato according to a famous saying by Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). However, with Heidegger he sees this as the metahistory of metaphysics and forgottenness of Being as being caught in the limitation of Platonism or the inadequacy of western metaphysics. After Heidegger sees these limitations, this is the way that Heidegger wants to break out into a new, other beginning for philosophy. Other beginning (not the second beginning). Heidegger’s break out is done through a confrontation with Platonism and its entanglement in Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism. Western metaphysics has happened all within the limitation and realm of Platonism. Nietzsche sees Christianity as Platonism for the people. Heidegger says that Nietzsche is the 'most unbridled Platonist' (zagelloseste Platoniker).

For Heidegger, Nietzsche is simply the extreme opposition (the antagonist opponent) to eternal truth and ideas of Platonism. Although Nietzsche was reading many of the early Greek philosophers, the task for Nietzsche is still within the dominion of the fundamental trends of his engagement with Platonism. It should be noted that there is nothing of Kant or Hegel or the German philosophers in Nietzsche’s on-going development and thinking. The crux to Nietzsche for Heidegger is Nietzsche’s opposition to Platonism. For Heidegger, Nietzsche is trapped within the limited horizon of Platonism. Heidegger said, “Nietzsche remains caught in *metaphysics*: from beings to Being; and he exhaust all possibilities of this basic position...” (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938). GA 65:127 section 182). Hence, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche task is simply the overturning (Umkehrung) of Platonism.

Heidegger on the other hand is completely in contrast to this reading of Western metaphysics. Through the philosophical comprehension of the early Greeks and a deeper understanding of Aristotle, Heidegger gains a sweeping perception of the Greeks that leads to recovery and retrieval of the question about the meaning or the truth of Being of beings without those essential elements of Platonism. Heidegger's judgment of Nietzsche as the "most unrestrained Platonist" shows unmistakably Heidegger's contra interpretation of the Greeks. Heidegger wrote, "Nietzsche was stuck in this interpretation because he did not recognize the guiding-question as such and did not enact the crossing to the grounding-question." (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938). GA 65:153, section 110).

Nietzsche's Letter to Paul Deussen (16 December 1887), "perhaps this old Plato is my true great opponent? But how proud I am to have such an opponent!"

Plato the philosopher also "studied gymnastics with Ariston the Argive wrestler" and "he wrestled at the Isthmian (Ἰσθμια) games." *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* (p. 135). By Diogenes Laertius (Διογένης Λαέρτιος, 180-240 Anno Domini). But I am not sure how Nietzsche would have done in physically wrestling match with Plato. But Nietzsche was an expert on Diogenes Laertius, he called himself "son of Laertius" and he would have known about the wrestler – Plato. Nietzsche's opponent.

7). Rejection of the dignity of humanity (metaphysicians).

KGWB/Notebook late 1886 — early 1887. 7 [3]

"The most common sign of modern times, man has lost in his own eyes to incredible dignity. Long as the center and tragic hero of existence at all, then at least try to prove themselves as related to the crucial and inherently valuable side of existence – like all metaphysicians do, want to stick that the dignity of man with their belief that the moral values are cardinal values. Those let God drop, the stricter the cling faith to morality."

8). Rejection of eternal values.

Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a philosophy of the future. 1886.

"According to new philosophers, there is no choice for spirits strong and original enough to give the impetus to opposite estimates of value and re-esteemed "eternal values" to repent, to advance; envoy to people in the future, which in the presence of the constraint and tie knots, forcing the will of thousands of new ways (Bahnen)."

9). Rejection of immorality.

The Antichrist: Curse on Christianity, Section 203. 1888.

"Granted the "immortality" to every Peter and Paul was previously the largest, the most vicious attack on noble humanity. - And we underestimate the fatality is not that of Christianity has slipped off into politics!"

Dawn. Thoughts about moral prejudices. (Morgenröte – Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurteile). 1881. Section IV, 211.

“To the dreamers of immortality. - This beautiful awareness of yourself so you want everlasting life? Is not that shameless? Think you not at all the other things that you will be forever and ever bear him how they have you been if borne with a more than Christian patience?”

Charges again Heidegger and Nietzsche as following “irrationalism.”

As Heidegger notes, “irrationalism’ is simply what rationalism cannot grasp, and grows out of the same simplistic antinomy between *homo humanus*, which is firmly identified with *animal rationale*, and the model of *homo barbarus* that the Enlightenment inherited from the Classical period, where what was deemed to be the status of the ‘non-human’” (*Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Winter semester 1928/29). GA 27:320).

Heidegger on the five stages on Nihilism

There are many questions about these stages or shapes of Nihilism. Do individuals and societies (nations, cultures) go through these same stages, or can one actually jump stages? Did Nietzsche himself personally go through these stages in his life? Doubtful. Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, Edmund Husserl (our age Crisis), and Heidegger all thought Western Civilization was in decline and was in some of these stages of nihilism. Of course, their actual positions and stances on Nihilism are more complex than this generalization. We must have life-affirming values or at least that is the next starting point. Nietzsche wrote in one of his notebooks,

“To the plan.

The radical nihilism is the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence, if it is about the highest values, which one recognizes, added the insight, that we do not have the slightest right to assume a beyond or an "An-ich" of things, which is "divine", which is bodily morality.

This insight is a consequence of the raised "truthfulness": thus, itself a consequence of the belief in morality.

This is the antinomy: as far as we believe in morality, we condemn existence.

The logic of pessimism up to the last Nihilismus: what is driving there? - Concept of valuelessness (Werthlosigkeit), senselessness (Sinnlosigkeit): to what extent moral values are behind all other high values.

- Result: moral values are condemnations, negations, morality is the turning away from the will to existence (Dasein)....

Problem: But what is **morality**?

(“Zum Plane.

Der radikale Nihilismus ist die Überzeugung einer absoluten Unhaltbarkeit des Daseins, wenn es sich um die höchsten Werthe, die man anerkennt, hinzugerechnet die Einsicht, daß wir nicht das geringste Recht haben, ein Jenseits oder ein An-sich der Dinge anzusetzen, das “göttlich,” das leibhafte Moral sei.

Diese Einsicht ist eine Folge der großgezogenen “Wahrhaftigkeit”: somit selbst eine Folge des Glaubens an die Moral.

Dies ist die Antinomie: so fern wir an die Moral glauben, verurtheilen wir das Dasein.

Die Logik des Pessimismus bis zum letzten **Nihilimus**: was treibt da? — Begriff der Werthlosigkeit, Sinnlosigkeit: in wiefern moralische Werthungen hinter allen sonstigen hohen Werthen stecken.

— Resultat: die moralischen Werthurtheile sind Verurtheilungen, Verneinungen, Moral ist die Abkehr vom Willen zum Dasein...

Problem: was ist aber die **Moral?**”).

KGWB/NF-1887,10[192] — Nachgelassene Fragmente Herbst 1887.

Active Nihilism affirms the goallessness and affirms life without goals or values. Heidegger gives us one example, “Nihilism means, in Nietzsche’s sense that we lack all *goals*.” Heidegger’s italics. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938). Section 72. GA 65:138-139. Incomplete Nihilism is when revelations of values are incomplete or just when old values are re-inverted, which is the flip-flop of core values. The idea of complete Nihilism no longer needs the concept of values at all. Nihilism as the will to the continuing return of nothingness-ing, valuelessness-ing, and goallessness-ing. Values started with Plato and the ideal and/or the idea (ἰδέα) of the Form of the Good (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, agathon); and idea of values is now at the historically end of western philosophy with Nietzsche and his revaluation of all values.

Heidegger’s attack on the use of value and of course, “highest goals” for humanity.

“When meaninglessness is complete, "values" (life and cultural values) are proclaimed as the highest goals and forms of humanity. The "values" are only the hidden translation of the truthless being into the mere titles of what is considered estimable and calculable in the single circle of feasibility. And the valuation of the revaluation of all values, no matter in which direction it may take place, is the final transgression into complete meaninglessness.” (“Wenn die Sinnlosigkeit sich vollendet, werden die »Werte« (Lebens- und Kulturwerte) als die höchsten Ziele und Zielformen des Menschen ausgerufen. Die »Werte« sind je nur die versteckte Übersetzung des wahrheitlosen Seins in die bloßen Titel dessen, was als das Schätzbare und das Verrechenbare im einzigen Um-kreis der Machbarkeit gilt. Und das Werten der Umwertung aller Werte, gleichviel in welcher Richtung sie sich vollziehen mag, ist die endgültige Verstoßung in die vollendete Sinnlosigkeit). *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Section Kotvón Aus der Geschichte des Seyns (1939). GA 69: 201-202.

Heidegger says for example in the introduction as a kind of a poem at the beginning of the text, he says, “We know no goals... We know no goals and are only a going” (“6a. Wir kennen nicht Ziele . . . Wir kennen nicht Ziele und sind nur ein Gang”). *Mindfulness. Besinnung* (1938/39). GA 66:9. Translation note. Der Gang derives from gehen (to go, to walk, to run). Yes, there are no goals and certainly no “highest goals.” The concept is goal-lessness. Philosophical question. If there are no rankings and no values, does it necessarily follow there are no goals either for the overall project for “goals for humanity”? Nietzsches does not allow for progress any more for humanity (see *Twilight of the Idols*, section “The 'Improvers' of Mankind”).

General outline:

- 1). Imperfect Nihilism
- 2). Extreme Nihilism
- 3). Active Nihilism
- 4). Ecstatic Nihilism

5). Classical Nihilism

Fifth Level is simply Nietzsche's Overman (Übermensch). English translation: superman, overman, beyond-man, hyperhuman, hyperhumanity, superhuman, etc.

Nietzsche writes in 1887,

“This man of the future will redeem us not just from the ideal held up till now, but also from the things *which will have to arise from it*, from the great nausea, the will to nothingness, from nihilism, that stroke of midday and of great decision which makes the will free again, which gives earth its purpose and man his hope again, this Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and of nothingness – *he must come one day* “. (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), second essay, #24. *Nietzsche Reader*, page 424). (“Dieser Mensch der Zukunft, der uns ebenso vom bisherigen Ideal erlösen wird, als von dem, was aus ihm wachsen musste, vom grossen Ekel, vom Willen zum Nichts, vom Nihilismus, dieser Glockenschlag des Mittags und der grossen Entscheidung, der den Willen wieder frei macht, der Erde ihr Ziel und dem Menschen seine Hoffnung zurückgibt, dieser Antichrist und Antinihilist, dieser Besieger Gottes und des Nichts — *er muss einst kommen...*”).

The word used in German is Antinihilist.

Note in this passage by Nietzsche the crucial point: “makes the will free again” (*Willen wieder frei macht*).

Nietzsche's points and his doctrine:

- 1). Man of the future.
- 2). Against the great nausea.
- 3). Against the will to nothingness.
- 4). Against nihilism.
- 5). Give hope again.
- 6). Stroke of midday.
- 7). Give earth its purpose.
- 8). Again, as the antichrist (against Christianity).
- 9). Again, the Anti-nihilism doctrine.
- 10). Conqueror of God and nothingness.

Therefore, the man of the future “must come one day.”

This “person” and group of “persons” on the planet.

Without any doubt, ultimately this man of the future is not Nietzsche's Last Man; but rather the Overman (Übermensch). English translation: superman, overman, beyond-man, hyperhuman, hyperhumanity, superhuman, etc. The überhistorischen Menschen, supra-historical man, transhistorical man, or over historical man.

Martin Heidegger's particularly early reading of Nietzsche is evident in the following quote from the year 1910 (Heidegger's age, 21). Maybe this is the first time Heidegger writes about the "overman" in his written publications.

Side note a few years after 1910: Winter Semester 1913-1914, Heidegger goes to Heinrich Rickert's (1863-1936) lectures on German Philosophy from Kant to Nietzsche (Historical Introduction to Contemporary Problems in Philosophy).

Heidegger wrote in 1910,

Chapter Two. PER MORTEM AD VITAM

"Thoughts on Johannes Jørgensen's Lies of Life and Truth of Life (1910)

Oscar Wilde the dandy, Paul Verlaine the "brilliant drunkard," Maxim Gorky the great vagabond, the Overman Nietzsche—all interesting people. And when in the hour of grace one of these interesting people becomes conscious of the great lie of his gypsy's life, smashes the altars of false gods, and becomes a Christian, then they call this "tasteless, revolting."

As you read the following quotes from Heidegger you can see that his positions are more Heidegger's attacks of against Nietzsche; and of course, the language is more infused with Heidegger's notions (especially, the will and will-to-willing).

Here is a larger number of Heidegger quotes with the years listed with the publications. This should give the reader some general ideas of Heidegger critical encounter and attacks (Auseinandersetzung) with regard to Nietzsche's doctrine of the overman. Needless to say, this could be a topic for full-length books and/or doctoral dissertations. These are quoted here to give the reader a first impression of Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche doctrine of the overman. I would claim from the amounts of quotes and reference to Nietzsche from 1910 until in the 1970s, Heidegger is in constant engagement with Nietzsche. Although there are only a few references to Nietzsche in Heidegger first major work (some may say his best work) David Farrell Krell has argued that Heidegger was still "seeing" Nietzsche while he was writing *Being and Time* (1927).

Heidegger wrote, "In terms of the history of being, however, the essence of the human being is different. It essentially surpasses all the loftiness of the *overman* and yet includes an essential indigence which of course has nothing to do with the wretchedness of the sinful human being of metaphysics. The event-related nobility and event-related indigence of historical humanity are the same." *The Event*. (GA 71:213-214. *Das Ereignis* (1941/42).

Heidegger summarizes,

"Experiences that being human as belonging within the reality determined in its entirety by the will to power, is determined by a form of man's essence that goes beyond and surpasses man hitherto. The name for this form of man's essence that surpasses the race of men up to now is "overman." By this name, Nietzsche does not mean any isolated exemplar of man in whom the

abilities and purposes of man as ordinarily known are magnified and enhanced to gigantic proportions.

"Overman" is also not that form of man that first originates upon the path of the practical application of Nietzsche's philosophy to life. The name "overman" designates the essence of humanity, which, as modern humanity, is beginning to enter into the consummation belonging to the essence of its age. "Overman" is man who is man from out of the reality determined through the will to power, and for that reality. Man, whose essence is that essence, which is willing, i.e., ready, from out of the will to power is overman. The willing that characterizes the essence of man that is willing in this way must correspond to the will to power as to the Being (Sein) of whatever is.

Therefore, simultaneously with the thinking that thinks the will to power, there necessarily arises the question: In what form must the essence of man that becomes willing from out of the Being of what is, present itself and unfold, in order that it may be adequate to the will to power and may thus be capable of receiving dominion over all that is?" (*Die Frage nach der Technik* (1949), *The Question Concerning Technology*, in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. 1936-53. GA 7:96).

General remarks on Heidegger's Critique of Nietzsche's Overman

Heidegger sees Nietzsche's overman as being trapped in the metaphysical as the last Western metaphysician, who thinks human and the overman as will and man as **homo animal rationale**. (For example, Heidegger writes in 1927, *Being and Time*, 48: "Man...Interpreted to mean an **animal rationale**, something living which has reason. But the kind of Being which belongs to is understood in the sense of occurring and Being-present-at-hand.").

Overman as willing of the will to power; therefore, it is modern metaphysical thinking. The Overman lives after the metaphysical (onto-theo-logical) God is dead (the super-sensuous as an idea has disappeared). God is dead and now the Overman lives. However, Heidegger does not see Nietzsche as leading the way out of metaphysics (certainly, there is evidence that Nietzsche and Marx before him lead the way out of traditional western metaphysics). The claim is that only Heidegger has a true path out of metaphysics. Although Heidegger gives Nietzsche no credit for attempting to overcome (flips metaphysics out of the eternal program) metaphysics. Heidegger only gives Nietzsche credit for the final end result of reversing Platonism. Platonism conceived by Heidegger as the first beginning (Anfang) of metaphysics; hence Nietzsche as the final end point of the 2000-year history of metaphysics; and hence the final reversal of the metaphysical super-sensuous (eternal beyond appearances, Plato's forms) to just the appearances.

Alternatively, one might say the empirical perceptions of sensuous of appearance only (no abstract forms of the eternal perfect Triangle via Plato). *Phaedo* forms as eternal (79d2) All metaphysical thinking of humans as **homo animal rationale**. Heidegger thinks of humans as Da-Sein as being in the open and clearing of Being (Sein). **Contra:** an animal with reason.

We can say that Nietzsche's Overman is the "who," who can stand in place after return of the Same, and therefore, breaks human history into Two parts (before and then after; or Nietzsche as the breaking point). Nietzsche splits history into two parts. However, this formulation almost says too much.

Heidegger ties Nietzsche's Overman to Nietzsche doctrine of the will as will to willing; and then hence, to the great metaphysical concept of will (started with Kant, for sure). The concept of the "will" hit the high point in Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788-1860), *World as Will and Representation* (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, 1818/1819).

Summary

Can we think the Overman as a stand-alone doctrine without the metaphysical overtone (underlying and providing a framework or – not)?

Nietzsche's Overman thought of as...

- 1). Better humanity
- 2). Super individual (Neapolitan, Goethe, Reinhold Messner).
- 3). Humanity's hero
- 4). The old superman of the T.V. and the movies

Nietzsche wrote,

“This man of the future will redeem us, not just from the ideal held up till now, but also from those things which had to arise from it, from the great nausea, the will to nothingness, from nihilism, that stroke of midday and of great decision that makes the will free again, which gives earth its purpose and man his hope again, this Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and of nothingness – he must come one day ...” (translation by Carol Diethe). *Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals, II. Section 24)*.

(“Dieser Mensch der Zukunft, der uns ebenso vom bisherigen Ideal erlösen wird, als von dem, was aus ihm wachsen musste, vom grossen Ekel, vom Willen zum Nichts, vom Nihilismus, dieser Glockenschlag des Mittags und der grossen Entscheidung, der den Willen wieder frei macht, der Erde ihr Ziel und dem Menschen seine Hoffnung zurückgibt, dieser Antichrist und Antinihilist, dieser Besieger Gottes und des Nichts — er muss einst kommen...”). *Zur Genealogie der Moral. Essay II, section 24. KGWB/GM-II-24*.

The counterexample, to Heidegger's and Nietzsche's notebooks. Are seven notebooks known by the title now as, *Gundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (Foundations of a Critique of Political Economy)*, written by Karl Marx during the winter of 1857-1858; but not published until 1939.

Untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus

Heidegger wrote a noticeably clear and sharp critical remark about Nietzsche's true understanding of the Greeks Heidegger statement is a book he published.

Heidegger said "To be sure, **Nietzsche** fell prey to the commonplace and untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus. This is one of the essential reasons why his metaphysics never found their way to the decisive question. Nietzsche did re-conceive the great age of the inception of Greek Dasein in its entirety in a way that is surpassed only by Hölderlin." *Introduction to metaphysics. Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Summer Semester 1935) (GA 40:133).

The supposed commonplace opposition is that for Parmenides, Being is the one and never changes and for Heraclitus, Being is becoming and always in flux. According to historians Heraclitus and Parmenides were supposedly antipodes. Heidegger said that this was not true, and he calls this a commonplace and untrue opposition.

Nietzsche in an exceptionally telling passage in his autobiography, *Ecce Homo* outlines his philosophy in relationship to Heraclitus. Nietzsche said,

"I retained some doubt in the case of *Heraclitus*, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away *and destroying*, which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and war; *becoming*, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of *Being* (Sein) –all of this is clearly more closely related to me than anything else thought to date. The doctrine of the "eternal recurrence" that is of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things – this doctrine of Zarathustra *might* in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus. (*Ecce Homo How One Becomes What One Is (Ecce homo: Wie man wird, was man ist)*, on his own book entitled: "The Birth of Tragedy" section 3).

In this passage Nietzsche links up his closeness to Heraclitus (αἰνκτής, "riddler"), Dionysus, his connections to Zarathustra and the doctrine of the eternal return of the same; but most important for Heidegger is thought that for Nietzsche, the philosopher Heraclitus is involved in the "radical repudiation of the very concept of *Being* (Sein)" (radikaler Ablehnung, refusal). This is clearly where there is a split between Heidegger and Nietzsche on the issue of the rejection or refusal of Being, since for Heidegger, Being is full and not empty (Hegel) or a fiction (Nietzsche).

But how much did Nietzsche know and scrutinize Heraclitus' thinking? In a sense Nietzsche was never disciplined enough to collect all of the saying of these Greek philosophers in one collection. That was accomplished by Hermann Diels with the publication of *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch*, which was first published in 1903.

As Heidegger points out that Diels' work is dedicated to Wilhelm Dilthey, although not because that Dilthey was a great Greek scholar. Nietzsche did work on an Index to the prestigious philology journal *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*. This indexing and review of contemporary philology gave Nietzsche a better understanding of the current philology research at that time. So, in fact, Nietzsche did work on Greek philology before his submersion into Greek philosophy. But it

was his insight into Platonism that drove Nietzsche's philosophical response. Of course, this is part of Nietzsche's tangled relationship with Socrates, the purist thinker of the Greek philosophy.

Appendix A.

Reconstruction of a partial letter from Martin Heidegger to Dieter Sinn.

Heidegger's letter is dated. 24 August 1964.

Heidegger's letter is briefly quoted and cited by many in scholarly literature (e.g., Richard Polt). Dieter Sinn (1931-) has written on topics other than philosophy. He is listed as Philosoph, Historiker, and Publizist. The city of Mannheim is listed.

Extracts of Martin Heidegger's letter to Dieter Sinn, 1964.

August 24, 1964. 5¼ pp. on 6 pp. and 3¼ pp. on 4 pp. 4°.

This is the complete letter extractions from Dieter Sinn's book, pages 172-173. Note Dieter Sinn has breaks in the sentences, etc. Partial parts of the letter. Same with the second source, auctions online KOTTE Autographs. These are all partial extractions from Heidegger's 5-page letter. Reconstruction of what we have at hand may help us understand this letter.

Martin Heidegger's lengthy letter to Dieter Sinn (1931-) the extracts by Dieter Sinn from Heidegger's letter. Note. There is a later letter that Dieter Sinn sent to Heidegger that is dated 31.12.1964 (in the DLA archive, 75.7388,2, Mannheim) unknown content. There is some correspondence between Dieter Sinn and Hans-Georg Gadamer in DLA as well -- unknown content. Dieter Sinn wrote an article for the *Hegel-Tage Urbino 1965* (published 1984) the book was edited by Gadamer. Title of Dieter Sinn's article is "Hauptmomente der Hegelkritik im deutschen Hegelianismus."

On 24 August 1964 Martin Heidegger sent a letter to Dieter Sinn (1931-). Two different sources extracted different sections from this long letter. Listed as 5 pages. Heidegger is responding to four questions from Dieter Sinn. Those questions and Sinn's letter are not included and are unknown. Sources say that Dieter Sinn was responding to Heidegger's Heidelberg lecture. Perhaps it is this lecture, *Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens*. Heidelberger Fassung (Vortrag am 24. Juli 1964). GA 80.2. But unless Dieter Sinn was there in-person it is hard to know how he got a copy of the lecture.

N.B. As you can see these are various extractions from the letter, I am not sure of the chronological order to these questions and the response since I do not have a copy of the letter.

Dieter Sinn books. *Ereignis Und Nirwana Heidegger, Buddhismus, Mythos, Mystik: Zur Archæaotypik des Denkens*. By Dieter Sinn. Bonn: Bouvier, 1991, pages 172-173. See also his earlier book on Heidegger, *Die Kritik am Identitätsprinzip: von Heidegger zu Hegel*. Bonn: Bouvier, 1988. Second source of the letter is from the KOTTE Autographs website (this text is no longer online) of the auction sale of this specific letter of Heidegger to Sinn. Until we get the complete letter, we only have these extracts from the letter, but clearly some critical issues are pointed out by Heidegger and this letter is quoted by different scholars over the issue of Heidegger admitting his own use of metaphysical language. This is a crucial point about the use of language and the general considerations of overcoming metaphysics and metaphysical language.

Dieter Sinn in his book (1991, beginning of page 172) gives this information about the letter he got from Heidegger.

“Zum abschluf dieses ersten teils teile ich hier erstmals einige passage aus einem längeren brief mit, Heidegger mir (als beantwortung einiger meiner fragen) unter dem datum vom 24, august 1964 geschrieben hat und der einiges wesentliche zum oben geführten interpretationsversuch unterstreicht:

Heidegger writes:

“Einmal habe ich bisher mein Denken, so weit es inzwischen gekommen ist, noch nie rein aus ihm selbst in Veröffentlichungen dargestellt, vom Ding-Vortrag abgesehen, sondern stets nur so, daß ich mein Denken aus der Tradition her in einem ersten Versuch verständlich machen wollte.

“"At the end of this first part, I share here for the first time some passages from a longer letter, which Heidegger wrote to me (as an answer to some of my questions) under the date of August 24, 1964, and which underlines some essentials of the above-mentioned attempt at interpretation”.

Starting the letter from Heidegger,

“Apart from the Thing Lecture, I have never once presented my own thinking purely on its own terms in publications, however far it has come in the meantime, but rather have always only presented it in such a way that, provisionally, I wanted to make my thinking understandable in terms of the tradition.” Letter to Dieter Sinn of August 24, 1964, cited in Sinn, *Ereignis und Nirwana*, 172. Andrew J. Mitchell translation”.

Heidegger continues (I think, since the actual chronology of this letter is unknown):

“Zum anderen bleibt dieses Denken in einer besonderen Weise im Übergang von der Metaphysik in den anderen Anfang. Deshalb spricht es z.T. immer noch die Sprache der Metaphysik oder verwendet deren Sprache in anderer Bedeutung. Wenn ich z.B. bewußt im Humanismusbrief und später vom ‘Sein selbst’ spreche, meine ich ‘das Ereignis,’ so wie ich es zuerst im ‘Satz der Identität’ erläutert habe.

“Heidegger continues (I think, since the actual chronology of this letter is unknown):

"Secondly, this thinking remains in a special way in transition from metaphysics to the other beginning (anderen Anfang). That is why it to some extent still speaks the language of metaphysics or uses its language in a different sense. For example, when I consciously speak of 'Being itself' in the Letter on Humanism and later, I mean 'das Ereignis' as I first explained it in the 'Theorem of Identity.' [Der Satz der Identität, lecture given 1957 June 27].

Maybe the next remark.

Der Gedanke selbst ist mir seit 1936, also zur Zeit der Publikation der Holzwege schon gegenwärtig, - aber stets als Frage und dies immer bedrängender bis heute und morgen. Hier liegt ein fundamentaler Unterschied verborgen, der den *Denkstil* (italics in text) betrifft im Vergleich mit Hegels ‘System der Wissenschaft.’ Darin herrscht zwar die Bewegung der Dialektik, des jedoch innerhalb der notwendige Geschlossenheit des absoluten Wissens...

“The thought itself has been present to me since 1936; thus, at the time of the publication of *Holzwege*, - but always as a question and this more and more pressing until today and tomorrow. Here lies hidden a fundamental difference that concerns the style of *thinking* (italics in text) in comparison with Hegel's '*System of Science*'. In it, the movement of dialectics prevails, but within the necessary unity of absolute knowledge....”

Zu Ihrer ersten Frage – zunächst die Antwort: Lichtung und Geivert ‘lassen’ sich nicht nur zusammendenken, sie müssen zusammengedacht werden. Lichtung ist nicht bloß eine offene Leere. Lichtung ereignet. Zu diesem Ereignen gehört vor allem die Sage. (Es kam) mir nur darauf an, von der Anwesenheit her auf sie hinzuweisen, ohne sie schon eignes aus dem Ereignen zu denken...

“To your first question - first the answer: clearing and Geivert not only 'can' be thought together, they must be thought together. Clearing is not just an open void. Clearing happens. This happening includes, above all, the saga. (It was) only important to me to refer to it from the point of view of its presence, without already thinking it out of the happening itself..

Im ‘Satz Identität’ habe ich die Identität als Ereignen gedacht und dort auch darauf hingewiesen, daß zum Ereignen die Enteignis gehört. ‘Ereignis des Seins’ wird nicht erst jetzt als Enteignis gedacht. Die Rede vom Entzug und von der ‘Verweigerung’ und ‘Vorenthalt,’ vom ‘Sparen’ ist nur aus dem zum Ereignen gehörenden Enteignen zu denken. Insgleichen ist Lichtung stets Lichtung des Sichverbergens...

“In the 'Theorem of Identity' I thought of identity as happening and also pointed out there that dispossession belongs to the happening. 'Event of Being' is not only now thought of as dispossession. The talk of withdrawal and of 'refusal' and 'withholding', of 'saving' can only be conceived from the dispossession that belongs to the happening. Similarly, clearing is always a clearing of concealment...”

“Die Wendung ‘Ereignis des Seins’ kann auch meinen: das Ereignen als das, worin Schickung verwahrt ist. Ereignen schickt, gewahrt Sein; Schicken [page 173] als sich als solches noch vorenthaltenes Eignen bei Verbergung des Giverts...
Sein wird dann in das Ereignis zurückgenommen, dieses selber (ist) kein Sein mehr....”

“The phrase “event of Being” (Ereignis des Seins) can also mean: the happening as that in which sending is preserved. Eventing sends, preserves Being; sending [page 173] as something that is still withheld as such when the gift is concealed...
Being is then taken back into the event (Ereignis), which itself (is) no longer Being....”

“Noch in ‘Sein und Zeit’ sieht es so aus, als sei die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein (nach dem Sein als solchem) im Unterschied zur Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden nur eine Potenzierung der transzendentalen Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit, jetzt angewendet (‘erweiter’) auf das Sein als solches. Daß es so nicht ist, habe ich alsbald erkannt und demzufolge den Title ‘Fundamentalontologie’ nicht mehr gebraucht....”

“Still in 'Being and Time' ('Sein und Zeit') it looks as if the question about the meaning (Sinn) of Being (about Being as such), in contrast to the question about the Being of the beings, is only a potentiation of the transcendental question about the conditions of possibility, now applied ('extended') to Being as such. That it is not so, I recognized immediately and consequently no longer used the title 'fundamental ontology'

“... mit dem Denken der Lichtung als solcher ist die 'Überwindung der Metaphysik' vollzogen, ist 'das Geheimnis' (Wahrheitsvortrag) aus dem enteignenden Ereignen gedacht....”

(“... with the thinking of the clearing as such the 'overcoming of metaphysics' is accomplished, 'the mystery' (truth-telling) is thought out of the expropriating event (Ereignen)....”).

“Ebenso ist die Vergessenheit griechisch zu denken als Verbergung, d.h. als der im Ereignis als Enteignis ereignete Entzug...”

“Similarly, oblivion is to be thought of in Greek as concealment, i.e. as the withdrawal that occurs in the event (Ereignis) as dis-possession...”

From second source online letter auction notes:

Ich frage also: läßt sich Lichtung und Geviert zusammendenken [...]. Ist also, so möchte ich fragen, mit dem Denken aus der Lichtung die Überwindung der Metaphysik vollzogen und damit das ‚irgendwie‘ des Geheimnisses eingelöst? [...]

“Therefore, I ask: can clearing and Four-Fold be thought together [...]. Therefore, I would like to ask, has the overcoming of metaphysics been accomplished with thinking from the clearing and thus the 'somehow' of the mystery been redeemed?”

Zur dritten Frage:

Toward the third question:

Back to Sinn's book:

“Sie sehen richtig, daß 'das Geheimnis' noch von der griechisch gedachten ἀλήθεια her erörtert wird. Allein auch von der Lichtung her ist die Rede vom Geheimnis möglich. Ich vermeide sie, weil sie zu geheimnisvoll klingt und weil ohnedies schon genug ‚Mystisches‘ meinem Denken unterstellt wird, während es sich überall um einfache Sachverhalte handelt”

“You see correctly that 'the mystery' is still discussed from the Greek concept of ἀλήθεια. Only from the clearing is it possible to speak of the secret. I avoid it because it sounds too mysterious and because enough of the 'mystical' is already imputed to my thinking, whereas everywhere it is a matter of simple facts.” Sachverhalte may be translated as “facts of the matter.”

Second source:

Die ‚Ambivalenz‘ im Denken der Vorsokratiker ist dahin zu verstehen, daß sie noch nicht eigens in der ontologischen Differenz das Sein dachten. Dieses ‚noch nicht‘ erweckt den Aschein [typo?], als dächten sie schon gleichsam über die Metaphysik hinweg – das Sein als solches. Dieses ‚noch nicht‘ legt es nahe, im Gespräch mit den Vorsokratikern durch ihr Denken

die Frage nach dem Sein als solchen zu erläutern, d. h. im Auslegen ihnen Nicht-mehr-Griechisches unterzulegen. Gadamer hat in seinem *Beitrag zur Festschrift 'Anteile'* (1950) treffend von der ‚Vorgeschichte der Metaphysik‘ gehandelt. Das ‚noch nicht‘ als Vorgeschichte ist etwas anderes als das ‚nicht mehr‘ nach der ‚Überwindung der Metaphysik‘... “

“The 'ambivalence' in the thinking of the pre-Socratics is to be understood as meaning that they did not yet think Being specifically in terms of ontological difference. This 'not yet' gives the impression [typo?] that they were already thinking beyond metaphysics, as it were - Being as such. This 'not yet' suggests that, in conversation with the pre-Socratics, the question of Being as such should be explained through their thinking, i.e., that in interpreting them they should subordinate what is no longer Greek. In his *contribution to the Festschrift 'Anteile'* (1950), Gadamer aptly referred to the 'prehistory of metaphysics'. The 'not yet' as prehistory is something different from the 'no longer' after the 'overcoming of metaphysics'... “

Back to Sinn's in the book:

”Die Lichtung des Sichverbergens als das Ereignen wird erfahrbar in der Erfahrung des Ge-Stells. ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’ gehört nicht in die üblichen Analysen der Situation des Menschen im technischen Zeitalter sondern die Frage nach der Technik ist als Frage nach dem Ge-Stell die Vorträge nach der Erfahrung des Ereignisses selbst...”

“The clearing of hiding as the happening can be experienced in the experience of the Ge-Stell. 'The question of technology' does not belong in the usual analyses of the situation of man in the technical age, but rather the question of technology (Technik) as a question of the Ge-Stell is the lectures on the experience of the event itself... (nach der Erfahrung des Ereignisses selbst...)”.

“Sie fragen zum Schluß ‘Was heißt hier Prüfen?’ Das ist eine berechtigte Frage. Die Antwort kann nur im Hinblick auf die Sache des Denkens gegeben werden. Sie ist von einer Art, daß die Prüfung des Denkens in erster Linie nicht mehr etwas ist, was das Denken selbst (z.B. als Bewußtsein) für sich selbst zu seiner Sicherung und Gewißheit vollzieht. Die Prüfung ist von der Art, daß das Denken als solches geprüft wird im Ereignis von diesem, ob das Denken in das Entsprechen gelangt ist oder nicht. In der Erfahrung des Ereignisses wird das Denken selber als solches auf die Probe gestellt...”

“At the end, you ask 'What does testing (checking, Prüfen) mean here? That is a legitimate question. The answer can only be given with regard to the matter of thinking. It is of such a kind that the testing of thinking is primarily no longer something that thinking itself (e.g., as consciousness) carries out for itself for its own assurance and certainty. The test is of the kind that thinking as such is tested in the event (Ereignis) of this, whether thinking has arrived at the corresponding or not. In the experience of the event, thinking itself as such is put to the test...”

Ereignis Und Nirwana Heidegger, Buddhismus, Mythos, Mystik: Zur Archèaotypik des Denkens.
By Dieter Sinn, Bonn: Bouvier, 1991, pages 172-173.

[<https://www.kotte-autographs.com/en/>].

Appendix B.

Martin Heidegger's Dialogue and Critical Debate with Hegel.

At the outset, there are no innocent readings of philosophers (Alfred Denker). This includes Heidegger's reading of philosophers and of course, this book (Ferrer) reading of Heidegger too.

In Heidegger lecture of 1936 April 8, he wrote,

“Subsequently pure thinking as origin of Beyng broke through with even greater impact and attained its deepest and most substantial systematic form in Hegel's *Logic*. What Hegel named "logic," as he well knew, is what one previously named metaphysics, ontology, the doctrine of Beyng. With Hegel's logic the way of Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle completes itself, *but not from its beginning*. This remains unmastered [unbewiltzt] and is retrospectively always only interpreted, i.e., misinterpreted, on the basis of the basic orientation that falls short of it.” “Europe and German Philosophy.” Translated by Andrew Haas.

Heidegger earlier in Summer Summer of 1933, “In turn, this *fundamental trend of questioning* must be found above all where Hegel's philosophy—and that means at the same time the tradition before him and up to him—sought the *core of philosophical labor*. That is the philosophical discipline that bears the ancient name “*metaphysics*.” GA 36/37. *Sein und Wahrheit. Being and Truth*. Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt.

“In a letter to Gadamer of 2 December 1971 cited by the latter (Lawrence 1981, 65 n22), Heidegger revealingly writes:

“I myself do not know clearly enough how my ‘position’ vis-à-vis Hegel is to be determined – it would not be enough to put it down as a ‘counterposition’; the determination of ‘position’ is connected with the question concerning the mystery of the ‘beginning’ (des Anfangs); it is far more difficult, because simpler than the explanation Hegel gives for it before the start of the ‘movement’ in his *Logik*. I have repeatedly opposed the talk about the ‘breakdown’ of the Hegelian system. What has broken down, that means to have sunk away, is what came after Hegel – Nietzsche included.” Quoted by Francisco Gonzalez. [doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0154].

Note: contra or contrary to X.

Sketches of Heidegger's contra positions to Hegel.

- 1). Heidegger is contra systems in general. See Schelling Book. (GA 42). Also, in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, he said, "Die Zeit der "Systeme" ist vorbei." GA 65:51. 1936-1938.
- 2). Heidegger notes Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* as subjectivity, "rein im Elemente des Denkens." *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* section 14. p. 67. Heidegger contra subjectivity. The absolute idea.
- 3). Heidegger is contra Hegel's *Unendlichkeit* and *Ewigkeit*. (GA 80). Infinity and Eternity.

- 4). Heidegger is contra Hegel's *Die ontotheologische Verfassung der Metaphysik*. (GA 11).
Ontology, theology, and logic.
- 5). Heidegger is contra Hegelian dialectics. (GA 1, GA 56/57, GA 63).
- 6). Heidegger is contra Hegel's concept of time from the philosophy of nature (See *Sein und Zeit*, section 82) (GA 2).
- 7). Heidegger contra Hegel's idea of time in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* als der reine Begriff tilgt die Zeit.
- 8). Heidegger sees the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* as the major work as contra the *Wissenschaft der Logik*. There is some connection between *Being and Time* (the existenziale Analytik des Da-sein) and the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Whereas there appears to be no connection between Analytik of Da-sein and the *Wissenschaft der Logik*. (GA 32).
- 9). Heidegger's *Being and Time* the main thesis is the essence of Being is time, this the exact opposite of Hegel's philosophy (GA 32).
- 10). Heidegger is contra the way Hegel thinks the history of philosophy (abstract developing to the highest standpoint - Hegel). Metahistory.
- 11). Heidegger is contra Hegel on speculative philosophy. Hegel's Letter "Philosophical content has in its method and soul three forms: it is, 1, abstract, 2, dialectical, and 3, speculative." Hegel to Niethammer Nuremberg, October 23, 1812. [*Werke* III, 301-16].
- 12). Heidegger is contra Hegel correspondence theory of truth. See page 34 of this book.
- 13). Heidegger is contra Hegel on Philosophie as Wissenschaft.
- 14). Heidegger is contra Hegel on Wissenschaft as a circle.
- 15). Heidegger is contra Hegel on the absolute.
- 16). Heidegger is contra Hegel dissolving ontology into logic. GA 24:254.
- 17). Heidegger's anfänglich denken contra Hegel on begreifende Denken. Hegel said, "immanente Entwicklung des Begriffes ist die absolute Methode" 41 Or Heidegger's remark on besinnliches Denken (letter to M. Boss, Sept 12, 1965).
- 18). Heidegger is contra Hegel's absolute metaphysics.
From Heidegger Schelling book, 1971.
- 19). Heidegger is contra Hegel's Logik im Sinne der Theo-Logik.
GA 36/37:76.
- 20). Heidegger is contra Hegel's Gott als absoluter Geist.
- 21). Heidegger is contra Hegel's Sein als "Das Sein ist das unbestimmte Unmittelbare." See *Science of Logic*, page 101.

22). Open Issue: Heidegger's Die Negativität (1938-1939).
GA 68:3-61.

23). Open Issue: Hegel's Aesthetics. See Staiger-Heidegger Briefwechsel.

24). Open Issue: Heidegger places Hegel in the history of Being as will to absolute knowledge (Wissen).

27). Open Issue: "Hegel jumped over his Schatten. . .and into Sonne." GA 41:153. The elimination of Endlichkeit des menschen. Always the question for Heidegger is Hegel's thesis of the "eternal" vs Heidegger's Da-Sein as finite. The finitude questions.

Hegel's place in our history.

"The name "logic" achieves its dignity when it becomes the title of the supreme of Western metaphysics. It then designates what? in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the spirit prepares for itself as its own element, in which its moments "extend in the form of simplicity" and "organise into the whole." The movement of this organization of the Absolute is the "Logic or Speculative Philosophy" (see Preface to *Phenomenology of Spirit*). *What Is Called Thinking?* Date 1951-1952. Translation by J. Glenn Grey, page 239. Yes, it is the supreme.

Heidegger and Auseinandersetzung with Hegel (Übereinstimmung).

Heidegger's letter to his wife, 28 June 1955.

"Hegel along since Leibniz has systematically discussed the principle [nothing is without a sufficient reason] in his greater 'Logic' – in one of the most difficult texts in philosophy."

Hegel and Heidegger on the traditional concept of truth as agreement or "correspondence" (Übereinstimmung).

From Hegel's Great Logic. *Science of Logic. Wissenschaft der Logik*

Hegel writes,

"The concept of logic has hitherto rested on a separation, presupposed once and for all in ordinary consciousness, of the *content* of knowledge and its *form*, or of *truth* and *certainty*. Presupposed *from the start* is that the material of knowledge is present in and for itself as a ready-made world outside thinking; that thinking is by itself empty, that it comes to this material as a form from outside, fills itself with it, and only then gains a content, thereby becoming real knowledge.

Further, these two component parts (for they are supposed to be related to each other as component parts, and cognition is compounded from them in a mechanical, or at best chemical, manner) are said to stand to each other in this order: the object is complete and finished all by itself and, for its actuality, can fully dispense with thought; thought, for its part, is something deficient and in need of a material in order to complete itself, and also, as a pliable indeterminate form, must adapt itself to its matter.

Truth is the correspondence of thought with the object, and in order to bring about this correspondence - for it does not exist in and of itself - thought must submit to and accommodate itself to the object.” 21.29.

“Wahrheit ist die Übereinstimmung des Denkens mit dem Gegen-stande, und es soll, um diese Übereinstimmung hervorzubringen - denn sie ist nicht an und für sich vorhanden -, das Denken nach dem Gegen-stande sich fügen und bequemen.” *Wissenschaft der Logik I.* page 37.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wissenschaft_der_Logik

In general, the date is 1812, but Hegel did add some revisions later but not to this part.

Heidegger’s remarks in the Hegel and correspondence theory of truth.

Seminare: Hegel – Schelling

Seminars: Hegel – Schelling

Date: 1927-1957.

GA 86.

Tokuya Kakihara protocol. 11 Januar 1957.

“§ 42 sagt aber Hegel: »Das Wissen der Vernunft ist daher nicht die bloße subjektive Gewißheit, sondern auch Wahrheit, weil Wahrheit in der Übereinstimmung oder vielmehr Einheit der Gewißheit und des Seins oder der Gegenständlichkeit besteht. «

Dieselbe Auffassung über die Wahrheit können wir in den Sätzen S. 53, Z. 1 2 von unten und darauf folgend, auch finden. In der Auffassung, daß die Wahrheit eine Übereinstimmung der Gewißheit und des Gegenstandes sei, steht zwar Hegel auf dem traditionellen Begriff der Wahrheit, aber bei Hegel ist die Übereinstimmung vom Grund der Gewißheit her beherrscht.

Diese Wahrheit ist die, die sich erst im Gang des dialektischen Denkens bewährt. Im letzten Abschnitt von Seite 53 schreibt er: »der Anfang seiner Wissenschaft (Dativ) immanent bleibe«. Das besagt, daß der Anfang in der Wahrheit beständig und gegenwärtig im Element der Bewegung des Denkens immanent bleibt”

Draft translation.

"But Hegel says in § 42: "The knowledge of reason is therefore not mere subjective certainty, but also truth, because truth consists in the correspondence or rather unity of certainty and being or objectivity."

We can also find the same conception of truth in the propositions p. 53, lines 1 2 from below and following. In the view that truth is a correspondence between certainty and the object, Hegel stands on the traditional concept of truth, but with Hegel the correspondence is dominated by the ground of certainty.

This truth is the one that only proves itself in the course of dialectical thinking. In the last section of page 53 he writes: "the beginning of his science (dative) remains immanent". This means that

the beginning in truth remains constant and present immanent in the element of the movement of thought" GA 86: 178.

“246. § 268

Wesen der Gesinnung. Vgl. Pfänder.23

Begriff der »Bildung«, vgl. § 270 (dazu § 187).

Begriff der Arbeit.

§ 268. » Wahrheit und Gewißheit«.

Wahrheit: Übereinstimmung des Seins mit dem Denken und umgekehrt - ontologisch - aber idealistisch.”

Nature of the mind. Cf. Pfänder.23

Concept of "education", cf. § 270 (also § 187).

Concept of work.

§ 268 "Truth and certainty".

Truth: correspondence of being with thought and vice versa - ontologically - but idealistically."

=

GA 86: 314

die in das unbedingte - Bedingungen verursachende [?] gegründete

Wahrheit des Seienden.

Wahrheit als Übereinstimmung des Seienden als Wirklichen.

Ausgang der Metaphysik Platon Aristoteles)

die neuzeitliche Metaphysik ihre Vollendung.

Der erste Anfang und die abendländische Philosophie.

the truth of beings founded in the unconditional - causing conditions [?]

Truth of the beings.

Truth as the correspondence of the beings as the real (Wirklichen).

Origin of metaphysics Plato Aristotle)

the modern metaphysics its completion.

The first beginning and Western philosophy.

Heidegger said in 1958 “Accordingly philosophy as the self-development of spirit into absolute knowledge and the history of philosophy are identical. No philosophy prior to Hegel's had acquired such a fundamental grounding of philosophy, enabling, and requiring philosophizing itself to simultaneously move within its history and be in this movement philosophy itself.

(“Hegel and the Greeks” Conference of the Academy of Sciences at Heidelberg. 1958).

Translations by William McNeil

Appendix C.

Heidegger on Pain (Schmerz)

Some research notes. Heidegger started reading Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) in the 1930s and was impressed enough to teach a seminar on him (1945), but they did not meet in person until 1948; and then he and his brother Friedrich "Fritz" Georg Jünger (1898-1977) were close friends of Martin for the rest of his life and meet often and exchange letters and poems with the Jünger brothers, which some are now published.

Heidegger wrote more about Ernst Jünger than any other 20th century intellectual (GA 90, *Zu Ernst Jünger »Der Arbeiter«*. 472 pages, general dates are 1934-1954). It should be noted that even that requires a question mark. Why was Jünger so important to Heidegger? Think about the other possible names of those philosophers living in the 20th century. Compare Dilthey, Paul Natorp, Husserl, Scheler, Cassirer, Sartre, Russell, Wittgenstein, John Dewey, or even Jaspers.

Jünger as caught in metaphysics (see *Überlegungen VII-XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938-39)*, GA 95:370). Jünger was not exactly a philosopher nor a university professor. Heidegger mentions reading Jünger novel *On the Marble Cliffs. Auf den Marmorklippen* (1939). Notes on GA 90:9-10). This is mentioned see GA 9. *Zur Seinsfrage* (1955). However, the majority of Heidegger's issues are with the following three essays that Ernst Jünger wrote in the early 1930s. They did exchange books after the 1930s and Heidegger may have read some of them (see *Correspondence, 1949–1975 / By Martin Heidegger and Ernst Jünger; translated by Timothy Sean Quinn, 2016. Pages 144*).

Background references for Ernst Jünger's main essays titles that Heidegger was interested in thinking through.

1930. *Total Mobilization*. 'Die totale Mobilmachung,' in E. Jünger (ed.) *Krieg und Krieger*, pp. 9–30. Berlin: Junkerund Dünnhaupt Verlag. The term "Total Mobilization" from Lenin. Ernst Jünger, "Die Totale Mobilmachung," *Sämtliche Werke, Band 7* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980),

1932. *Der Arbeiter. Herrschaft und Gestalt*; Bogdan Costea and Laurence Paul Hemming, *The Worker. Dominion and Form*. Northwestern University Press (2017). Heidegger conducted a small seminar in the winter of 1939-1940 on this essay. GA 9. *Zur Seinsfrage* (1955)

1934. *Über den Schmerz*. Translation by David C. Durst, *On Pain*. New York: Telos Press Publishing (2008).

Also note:

Über den Schmerz
By Martin Heidegger.

Jahresgabe der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft, 2017–2018.
Edited by Dietmar Koch and Klaus Neugebauer.
Enthält Faksimile der handschriftlichen Fassung mit Transkription.
Pages 55.

Plus,

Pain is Being Itself: Heidegger's Algontology.

By Ian Alexander Moore. References DLA: 75.7300,2 and 75.7300,3.

GA 73. *Zum Ereignis-Denken* has notes about Schmerz.

These DLA records show that GA 72; the title *Bridges of the Beginning* or maybe *Paths of the Beginning* (forthcoming after 2023, according to the publisher).
may include these materials concerning the term and concept of “Der Schmerz.”

See notes in the records from someone (unknown).

"z. T. vorgesehen für GA Bd. 72".

[Accessed 2024 <https://www.dla-marbach.de/katalog/handschriften/>]

GA Bd. 72

Bestandssignatur A: Heidegger, Martin 1/Schuber/B 22

Zugangsnummer 75.7300,2

Ordnungsgattung Manuskripte

Gattung Prosa

Weitere Gattung Verschiedenes

Person VON Heidegger, Martin [Verfasser/in]

Haupttitel Der Schmerz (Manuskripttitel) [Entwurf, Notizen]

Umfang, Beilagen 173 Bl. Mit 1 Beil. 6 Bl. Dr.

Sprache Deutsch

Bemerkungen z. T. vorgesehen für GA Bd. 72

Übernommene Sigel B 22

Mediennummer HS009143004

Benutzungshinweis beschränkt benutzbar

Ausleihhinweis Am Standort

Bestandssignatur A: Heidegger, Martin 1/Schuber/B 22

Zugangsnummer 75.7300,1

Ordnungsgattung Manuskripte

Gattung Verschiedenes

Person VON Heidegger, Martin [Verfasser/in]

Haupttitel Der Schmerz (Manuskripttitel) [Notizen]

Umfang, Beilagen 140 Bl.

Sprache Deutsch

Übernommene Sigel B 22

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

Mediennummer HS00914283X
Benutzungshinweis beschränkt benutzbar
Ausleihhinweis Am Standort

==

Bestandssignatur A: Heidegger, Martin 1/Schuber/B 22
Zugangsnummer 75.7300,3
Ordnungsgattung Manuskripte
Gattung Verschiedenes

Person VON Heidegger, Martin [Verfasser/in]
Haupttitel Über den Schmerz (Manuskripttitel) [Titel des Schubers; Notizen]
Umfang, Beilagen 257 Bl. Mit 1 Beil. 1 Bl. Dr.
Sprache Deutsch
Unteraufnahme(n) Dabei: Heidegger, Martin: Hebel - Der Hausfreund [Prosa. Reden und Vorträge]
Inhaltsangabe "Der Schmerz und der Tod", "Die Physik und die Meta-Physik des Schmerzes",
"Der erste Steg. Der Schmerz", "Über den Schmerz", "Der Schmerz selbst", "Die 'Gegebenheit' des Schmerzes",
"Der Schmerz als das Widrige und Negative", "Der Schmerz und das animal rationale" u. a.
Bemerkungen teilweise vorgesehen für GA Bd. 72
Übernommene Sigel B 22
Mediennummer HS009143167
Benutzungshinweis beschränkt benutzbar
Ausleihhinweis Am Standort

Also listed but not for GA 72.

A: Heidegger, Martin 1/Schuber/B 49
Zugangsnummer 75.7327,3c
Ordnungsgattung Manuskripte
Gattung Verschiedenes
Person VON Heidegger, Martin [Verfasser/in]
Haupttitel Der Beginn - Der Schmerz (Drucktitel) [Notizen]
Umfang, Beilagen 93 Bl.
Sprache Deutsch
Inhaltsangabe Enthält auch: "Das Wort"; "Der Abend der Zeit"; "Der Beginn - Der Schmerz - Der Tod - Die Begegnung";
"Die Geschichte des Sagens und der Untergang des Abendlandes"
Übernommene Sigel B 49
Mediennummer HS010239396

A: Heidegger, Martin 1/Schuber/D 3
Zugangsnummer 75.7385,1
Ordnungsgattung Manuskripte

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

Gattung Verschiedenes

Person VON Heidegger, Martin [Verfasser/in]

Haupttitel Sein - Fuge (Manuskripttitel) [Schuber-Beschriftung]

Weitere(r) Titel Bch Fg (Manuskripttitel) [Notizen]

Umfang, Beilagen 110 Blatt

Sprache Deutsch

Inhaltsangabe enthält u. a.: "Zur Fuge"; "Folge"; "Die Fuge. Die N. der N."; "Vierung"; "Geläut"; "Ding"; "Ver-hältnis"; "Anfang"; "Die Freyheit und der Schmerz";

"Fuge und Be-fragung"

Übernommene Sigel D 3

Mediennummer HS01217772X

Benutzungshinweis beschränkt benutzbar

Ausleihhinweis Am Standort

A: Heidegger, Martin 1/Schuber/C 14

Zugangsnummer 75.7372,3

Ordnungsgattung Manuskripte

Gattung Verschiedenes

Person VON Heidegger, Martin [Verfasser/in]

Haupttitel Konvolut: Notizen zu Georg Trakl (Titel von Bearbeiter/in)

Umfang, Beilagen 219 Blatt

Sprache Deutsch

Inhaltsangabe enthält u. a.: "Das Geschlecht - Der Schmerz"; "Schwester"; "Frauen - Mütter"; "Das blaue Weite"; "Das Böse"; "Offenbarung und Untergang"; "Vogelflug"; "Dichten";

"Das Anschauen"; "Demut und Neige. Der Fromme. 'Geistliche'"; "Der Gerechte"; "Der Bruder"

Übernommene Sigel C 14

Person ÜBER Trakl, Georg [Behandelte Person]

Mediennummer HS011929623

Benutzungshinweis beschränkt benutzbar

Ausleihhinweis Am Standort.

Appendix D.

Update.

Daniel Fidel Ferrer replies to Professor Dr. Thomas Sheehan.

Rewriting Heidegger by Thomas Sheehan.

THE 57TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE HEIDEGGER CIRCLE BOSTON UNIVERSITY,
MAY 13, 2023, INVITED LECTURE WITH A RESPONSE TO RICHARD POLT'S
RESPONSE.

Aristotle: 'Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas' "Plato is my friend, but a greater friend is the truth."

Or Isaac Newton's version, "Amicus Plato amicus Aristoteles magis amica veritas".

Your quote from one of your previous articles,

"William J. Richardson notes that in the later Heidegger the word Sein "has almost completely disappeared from his vocabulary." The old ways of thinking with Heidegger are scuppered.

Footnoted to:

Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 633.16–17; also 633 note 30: "Even in SZ, presumably, Heidegger sensed the inadequacy of the term but could find no other way to designate the process under discussion." Quoted by Thomas Sheehan. *Parrhesia* 29 2018 · 212-233. Therefore, "you can't get there from here." Instead of attempting to get out of Heidegger's bottle, you must do not get in at all. Can we drop Heidegger or not? Stay out of the bottle.

Questions for Professor Thomas Sheehan (Rewriting Heidegger).
Drinking the juice. Sein-sauce.

Dear Professor Sheehan,

I sense that the above quote is in the for-ground of your rewriting Heidegger project.

In your rewriting Heidegger paper, I think Dr. Polt did not take your bait. But since you are fishing – let me try. I will try and take your bait. Just on the Sein-sauce question, which you have

discussed in other papers in the past as well. Deeply flawed but interesting and thought provoking.

“Thoughtful men exchange greetings by posing questions to one another.” One of Heidegger’s last letters, 1976.

In 1966, Heidegger wrote a letter and said, “instead of a “Heidegger Symposium,” a Colloquium on the Question of Being”.

We must engage in -- Zen and the art of Heideggerian combat. Disputations. “Sind die Worte nur Wörter und diese nur Fangnetze für die Gedanken?” GA 74:73. "Are words only words and these only nets for thoughts?" GA 74:73. Dated around 1944.

Is philosophy more like a chess game or getting out of a Klein bottle? Or is philosophy “to arrive at *God without God*” (lofty). Or, to “to show the fly out of the fly bottle’ (*Philosophical Investigations* §309).

It appears to me that you did not get into Heidegger’s bottle, and you are attempting to re-write Heidegger without getting into his bottle. One of Heidegger’s bottles is the Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage or Die Ermächtigung des Seins (GA 94:36, expression 15 times in GA). One of the last things he wrote about GA, “Die Vielzahl der Bände bezeugt nur die bleibende Fragwürdigkeit der Seinsfrage...” (GA 1:438). “...lasting questionability of the Being question.” (GA 1:438). Dated 1970s.

Note. I do not have to teach Heidegger nor explain Heidegger to my colleagues either. For you – maybe too many students want “answers” from **the** professor. However, we are over the enjoyable amuse-bouches. Doxographic project? However, the critical touted and acclaimed, American philosopher, Richard Rorty (1931-2007), in 1990 makes this remark about Heidegger, “the greatest European thinker of our time”. No faffing about.

You are many levels above my limited competence (not ex aequo). But perhaps we both have more to learn from Heidegger. If we can, let us work on Heidegger together. You have shown with many example the general state of confusion of Heidegger’s polysemy approach to his German “terms.” I dare not say, his “concepts.” The labyrinth and confusion exist on many levels with Heidegger’s German. Was he being playful or just not careful with his terms? Of course, “why”? His etymology, philological, and historical approach to some of his “terms” have not given us a lot of hope.

In your work you have a large number of people (Prosopography) running around. I am not sure where I fit into the crowd. There is a whole spectral of left-right Heideggerian. I think you might consider me on the right, and you are on the left (not a political distinction). Long ago in our only phone conversation (20-30 years ago) you asked me if I knew what Heidegger meant by Being. I said, I did not know. Many thousands of pages later – I am no closer. I am not sure Heidegger would answer your question with an “answer.” Heidegger’s writing is noticeably short on “answers” and extraordinarily long on questions. I think of Heidegger as an Interrogator (*Martin Heidegger as Interrogator: The Final Paradigm* forthcoming).

Back to your essay.

On your overall project of re-writing Heidegger. I add a pertinent quote from Walter Biemal at the end. That topic is more philosophical and less philological. Of course, once you are done re-writing Heidegger, you will have the necessary tools (methodology) to re-write Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche – all of whom need re-writing too.

Perhaps we can learn from Herbert Marcuse, who wrote this about Heidegger, “Beyond that, wordplay that gropes in the dark and does violence to the language while engaged in a Teutonic phantasy (in every other language this wordplay is lost, and it simply becomes untranslatable!).” Herbert Marcuse letter to Dr. Karel Kosik March 22, 1963. This is a highly attenuated claim.

Response.

One example of a quote from your essay but you have mentioned this quote from Heidegger in some of your other essays as well.

Your quote:

“In 1962 he declared that Sein is no longer the proper object of thought (“nicht mehr das eigens zu Denkende”).⁶ 6 GA 14: 50.2f.”

Dr. Alfredo Guzzoni (1931-) wrote that protocol – not Heidegger (see the last section with complete quotes etc.). It is Guzzoni’s Protokoll. Heidegger read this Protokoll, and he had it published before his death – for sure, Heidegger was aware of this remark (no doubt).

Martin said,

“There is no such thing as wanting to be a philosopher; one either is a philosopher, or one is not.”

I am not going to claim to be a philosopher, but I do want to pose a few questions and some observations about Martin to you. Note that Heidegger said, that Karl Löwith was “gifted in his multitudinous use of citations.” I will try to follow Karl with some examples. I am sure you know many more examples and that you have had plenty frustrations with the topic of what is the “core” of Heidegger’s philosophy and basic thought. Just -- get in-line with the rest of us. I always try to read everything you write, but as you can see – I do not always understand the depth of your Heidegger reading.

Out of chaos comes questions (some order to things). I am not sure where or when we might get some “order” out of the “core” of Heidegger’s philosophy (since there is no Heidegger philosophy). Looking for “answers” and philosophy in all the wrong places.

Details.

“little more than a tempest in a Heideggerian teapot” T. Sheehan.

Famous eleventh thesis from the “Thesis about Feuerbach” written by Karl Marx (early 1845). “Philosophers have hitherto only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it”.

(Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden *interpretiert*, es kömmt drauf an, sie zu *verändern*). Heidegger quotes this same passage in his interview with Wisser (1969), Seminar Thor 1969, and in *Kant's Thesis about Being* (1962).

Are we merely “seekers” or do *you* want philosophers to “change the world”? Heidegger is merely a “seeker,” and his essential nature is as an Interrogator (Ferrer). Philosophers (Hannah Arendt, Ayn Rand, Angela Davis) often want to push a worldview and “change the world.” Heidegger is against philosophy as worldview. Philosophy Bakes No Bread nor grows grapes. “We must philosophize ourselves out of “philosophy.” (GA *Ponderings* II–VI [20–21]. “Philosophy is philosophy, nothing less and nothing more.” *Ponderings* VI [469–471]. Mission and task of philosophy and the philosophers?

“to the question whether philosophy has a social mission,” he replied, somewhat curtly: “No! I see none!” HEIDEGGER AND ADORNO. Iain Macdonald. Richard Wisser, “Das Fernseh-Interview,” in ed. Günther Neske, *Erinnerung and Martin Heidegger* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1977), p. 260.

Current situation.

Now we have about 40,000 pages of Heidegger’ writings. About 60 years of writing. Walt Whitman “Song of Myself” (1892). “I am large, I contain multitudes.” There are many ways of reading and thinking about Heidegger – I agree. Multitudes within Heidegger’s thought!! “Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend.” China 1956. Getting Heidegger correct is to be left to Heideggerian philology (perhaps that is “us”). So much for the tea in that teacup. In the Philosophy Documentation Center doing a search on Martin Heidegger, we got 44,586 documents. For sure, that is a lot of “reading” about Heidegger’s thoughts.

Remark.

We have lots of different legacy readings of Heidegger because his major writings have come out in bunches over time (GA 65, e.g.). Now we need a re-start of reading Heidegger knowing we have 40,000 pages to read. I am still trying to understand his major writing, GA 73. *Zum Ereignis-Denken*. You are one of the few that have worked on this group of writings. Please help us with this one.

As you have noted. Lots of commentary. “That’s exactly what a good deal of Heidegger scholarship has been doing for decades, and it’s why (with Eduard Gans in mind) I call such scholars ‘Right Heideggerians,’ single-mindedly dedicated to an extended, ‘thoughtful,’ and occasionally ‘poetic’ commentary on the 100-plus volumes of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe. The strongest voice among these Right Heideggerians is, as we shall see, Professor Richard Capobianco of Stonehill College, Massachusetts.”

After reading your “Rewriting Heidegger” (MAY 13, 2023), I got clearer on my understanding of what is going on Martin Heidegger’s thinking. What is Heidegger up to? Someone stops you on the street and asks you --- what was Heidegger doing? I sense that the Heideggerian philology project (is this the “right” Heideggerians?) is closer to what I am doing in asking you these questions.

He changed his mind and made errors and perhaps was inconsistent sometimes. Note. Did Heidegger change his mind from 1971 (you met him) to 1976? Maybe he did not write well and did not clearly define his “conceptual mummies.” As I have noted, Heidegger had a problem with polysemy (polysemy vs monosemy a word has a single meaning) or he just played us. Welcome to the real world. 600+ pages per year. He also was learning and engaging many philosophers and even his own students (“secret of the seminar”). Japanese students and scholars as well. Many smart students engaged Martin. Even Marcuse heard “the call” and some Americans did too. He was a university professor (most of the time), so we cannot take that out of the equation.

One of Heidegger’s favorite quotes, Hölderlin’s verse, “Denn. Wie du anfiengst, wirst du bleiben” (“Because. As you began, so will you remain.”). From the poem ‘Der Rhein’ written 1801-1802. Dedicated Hölderlin’s friend, ‘To Isaak von Sinclair’ (1775-1815). I do not think he made it far, but he got closer to the questions (as he mentioned in his published Schelling book).

What is Heidegger up to?

Heidegger is not giving us “answers” (there is no Heidegger philosophy). Heidegger is “giving” (gifts) us questions. Obviously, we do not have 40,000 pages of questions. But in which “ways” and “pathways” has Heidegger taken us? *Wege — nicht Werke*. Think instead of looking where Heidegger’s finger is pointing toward. You are attempting to get below the surface of reading Heidegger and rewrite Heidegger’s philosophy. I deny that Heidegger was “really” attempting to write a philosophy (most of the time, Disputations. *utramque partem disserere*).

What image and analogy does Heidegger give us?

Pointing toward.

One example he gives us in this passage.

“Since then, I exist in the role of an overseer in a gallery, who, among other things, has to see to it that the curtains in the windows are correctly opened and closed so that the few great works of the tradition are more or less properly illuminated for the randomly gathering spectators. Without the picture - I only read and work on the history of philosophy; i.e., I attempt to lay out what seems important to me for loosening up philosophizing without considering the economy of the lecture. As a half-Swabian, I have now attained Swabian adulthood, where you become clever enough to know what you can and may do, and what not.” Heidegger letter to Karl Jaspers. Freiburg i. Br., December 20, 1931.

Heidegger will not be known in the future over his answers in *Sein und Zeit* or working out section 65. Heidegger wrote about *SuZ*, “171. Connection to the conclusion of *Being and Time* I (p. 437f.). After that, the “investigation” is “underway” in the kindling of the question of Being. Underway on which way? Over the understanding of Being— *Dasein*—temporality—time, and toward the “meaning of Being.” *Ponderings II–VI: Black Notebooks 1931–1938*. You see he is “underway.”

His questions and his questioning approach. The grandson, Arnulf Heidegger (1969-). “It was never the intentions of my grandfather to propagate a doctrine, to construct a system, or to gather

a body of followers. The effort of his thinking is much rather directed toward evoking essential question.” (ein wesentliches Fragen hervorzurufen”).

Heidegger told a group of about 60 intellectuals in France, “There is no Heideggerian philosophy, and if there should be such a thing such a thing, I am not interested in this philosophy. (Es gibt keine Heideggersche Philosophie, und wenn es dergleichen geben sollte, so interessiere ich mich nicht für diese Philosophie. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. Mittwoch, 31. August 1955 — 5. Tag. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. GA 91:395-396.

Looking for “the” answers or philosophy in all the wrong places --- again.

Stuck in Heidegger’s bottle.

Thomas Sheehan on the “THE BEING TRAP.”

Trace Some Quotes from Heidegger on the Being (Sein, Seyn, etc.). Drinking the juice. Sein-sauce.

I asked Reiner Schürmann, when he told a group of students the story of engaging with Heidegger on the topic of Master Eckhart (in a dark room) – indeed was Heidegger really a mystic? His decisive answer: was No. So, for me, there is no mystical Being in my part of the Tennessee mountains.

Some Heidegger example passages that I think are Contra your position. Let us see what Heidegger actually wrote [Ipse dixit (Latin for "he said it himself") or αὐτὸς ἔφα].

Starting in 1927.

"We assert now that Being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy" (*Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Summer semester 1927. GA 24:15. "Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of Being, of Being's structure and its possibilities. Philosophy is ontological."

§ J. Philosophie als Wissenschaft vom Sein. Wir behaupten nun: Das Sein ist das echte und einzige Thema der Philosophie. GA 24:15.

“Jetzt behaupten wir lediglich, das Sein sei das echte und einzige Thema der Philosophie.” GA 24:15. “Das besagt negativ: Philosophie ist nicht Wissenschaft vom Seienden, sondern vom *Sein* oder, wie der griechische Ausdruck lautet, *Ontologie*.” GA 24:15

1930.

In his work on *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (GA 32, lecture 1930), Heidegger says, “. . . the inner necessities of the first and last problem of philosophy - the question of Being" and he continues, "I have been concerned with renewing the question of ontology - the most central problem of Western Philosophy - *the question of Being* . . ." (E.T. p.13).

Full quote:

“Es ist mir nie eingefallen, eine >Existenzphilosophie< zu verkünden. Es handelt sich vielmehr darum, daß das' innerste Problem der abendländischen Philosophie, die Frage nach dem Sein - die auf den Λόγος, bezogen ist nicht nur als Mittel, sondern als Gehalt -, daß das Problem der Ontologie neu gestellt wird. Ob die Philosophie die Wissenschaft und überhaupt Wissenschaft sei, läßt sich nicht aus irgendeinem Erkenntnisideal her entscheiden, sondern allein aus dem Sachgellalt und den inneren Notwendigkeiten ihres ersten und letzten Problems, der *Frage nach dem Sein*.” GA 32:18.

1931-1938.

“Therefore, what matters before everything and for everything is only the one task: to open up the world-place and its great attunements of disclosive questioning— the power of Being. — *Intimations x Ponderings* (II) and Directives [93–95]. *Ponderings II–VI* Black Notebooks 1931–1938.

1936-1938.

“Philosophy is the questioning of Being (Sein). This designation can be interpreted in two ways. Both interpretations contain in their unity the essence of the previous and of the future philosophy and thus the indication of the transition from one to the other.” (“Die Philosophie ist das Fragen nach dem Sein. Diese Kennzeichnung läßt sich zwiefach deuten. Beide Deutungen enthalten in ihrer Einheit das Wesen der bisherigen und der knüftigen Philosophie und somit den Hinweis auf den Übergang von der einen zur anderen”). *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)*. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). GA 65:424.

1946-1948.

“but rather the hearing for the voice of the of Being.”
“sondern um das Gehör für die Stimme des Seyns” GA 67:265.

"Nur dem Da-sein als dem Zwischen ist der Schmerz der Erfahrung gemäß als die Stimmung, die von der Stimme des Seyns als verwundenen gestimmt bleibt". (GA 71:210).

About 30 usages of “Stimme des Seyns” in Heidegger GA collection (38,520 pages version).

Heidegger Symposium at De Paul University in Chicago, November 11 and 12, 1966.

Letter to Manfred S. Frings from Martin Heidegger.
Freiburg/Breisgau, October 20, 1966.

“Die grésste Freude ware es fiir mich, wenn es sogleich—in den ersten Augenblicken des Symposiums—gelange, die Gesprache rein und entschieden auf die Sache zu richten. Dann kénnte sich statt eines “Heidegger-Symposiums” ein Kolloquium tiber die Seinsfrage verwirklichen. Denn diese Frage ist es—und sie allein —die meinen Denkweg und seine Grenzen bestimmt.” GA 16:684.

English translation *A Letter from Heidegger*. Translated by W. J. Richardson, S.J. "I would be very glad if it were possible to orient the discussion at once—in the first moments of the symposium—purely and decisively toward the subject matter itself. In that way there would develop, instead of a "Heidegger Symposium," a Consultation on the Being-question [Seinsfrage]. For it is this question—and it alone—that determines the way of *my* thought (meinen Denkweg) and its limits."

Heidegger wrote this shortly before his death: "The Gesamtausgabe is intended to guide people to take up the question, to ask it and, above all, to ask it in a more questioning way." (Die Gesamtausgabe soll dadurch anleiten, die Frage aufzunehmen, mitzufragen und vor allem dann fragender zu fragen).

GA 1:437.

Heidegger had planned to write a lengthy introduction to his collected writings (Gesamtausgabe). He called his last project: Legacy of the Being Question (Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage). The date on this project is around 1973-1975. Some parts of this have been published. Some of the thought poems listed as, Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage (1. Fassung) GA 81:552 English translation pages. Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage (Zweite Fassung) GA 81:558. Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage *Gedachtes*, GA 81:618. Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage Das Geringe. *Gedachtes*. GA 81:622.

1976.

The year he died in February 1976, "ein Unterwegs im Wegfeld sich wandelnden Fragens der mehrdeutigen Seinsfrage" (GA 1:437). Lose translation: "...a journey in the path of the changing questioning of the ambiguous question of Being."

1976. One of the last things that Heidegger wrote he died 26 May 1976 (aged 86).

"Greetings to the participants in the tenth colloquium May 14 - 16, 1976, in Chicago.

Thoughtful men exchange greetings by posing questions to one another. The question with which I send my greetings to you is that single question which I have persistently tried to ask in a more questioning manner. It is known as "the question of Being."

Grußwort *an die Teilnehmer des zehnten Colloquiums vom U. - 16. Mai 1976 in Chicago*.

"Denkende grüßen einander, indem sie sich gegenseitig Fragen stellen. Die Frage, mit der ich Sie grüße, ist die einzige, die ich bis zu dieser Stunde immer fragender zu fragen versuche. Man kennt sie unter dem Titel "die Seinsfrage."

GA 16:747.

Therefore, my position is contrary to yours.

Q.E.D.

Questions?

By Daniel Fidel Ferrer

=

Background and notes.

Thomas Sheehan quote.

- In 1962 he declared that Sein is no longer the proper object of thought (“nicht mehr das eigens zu Denkende”).6... 6 GA 14: 50.2f.

Dr. Alfredo Guzzoni (1931-)

“Das Protokoll des Seminars zum Vortrag »Zeit und Sein« ist Dr. Alfredo Guzzoni zu verdanken. Der Text wurde von mir überprüft und an einigen Stellen ergänzt. Das Seminar fand in Todtnauberg (Schwarzwald) vom 11-13. September 1962 in sechs Sitzungen statt. Die Veröffentlichung des Protokolls dient der Absicht, das Fragwürdige im Text des Vortrags zu verdeutlichen und zu ver-schärfen.” GA 14:103. ZUR SACHE DES DENKENS

Zu 1. Wenn das Ereignis nicht eine neue seinsgeschichtliche Prägung des Seins ist, sondern umgekehrt das Sein in das Ereignis gehört und dahin zurückgenommen wird (auf welche Weise auch immer), dann ist für das Denken *im* Ereignis, d. h. für das Denken, das in das Ereignis einkehrt - sofern dadurch das Sein, das im Geschick beruht, nicht mehr das eigens zu Denkende ist

- die Seinsgeschichte zu Ende. Das Denken steht dann in und var Jenem, das die verschiedenen Gestalten des epochalen Seins zuge- schickt hat. Dieses aber, das Schickende als das Ereignis, ist selbst ungeschichtlich, besser geschicklos (footnote 3#).

“aber endlich angewiesen auf ..., geortet im ... Brauch

Der Endlichkeit des Ereignisses ent- steht die ekstatische Zeitlichkeit - in dieser zeigt sich - west an - die Zeit als Nacheinander der Jetztte.”

The author is listed Guzzoni, Alfredo.

Type: Protokoll.

Bestandssignatur A: Heidegger, Martin 1/Mappen

Zugangsnummer 75.7191,3

Ordnungsgattung Manuskripte anderer

Gattung Prosa

Person VON Guzzoni, Alfredo [Verfasser/in]

Haupttitel Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag "Zeit und Sein" (Drucktitel)

Weitere(r) Titel Protokoll zum Seminar über "Zeit und Sein" (Manuskripttitel)

Umfang, Beilagen 34 Blatt, davon 32 Blatt Typoskript

Entstehungszeit 09.1962 [Datum des Seminars]

Entstehungsort Todtnauberg

Sprache Deutsch

Unteraufnahme(n) Darauf: Heidegger, Martin: Anmerkungen [Verschiedenes]

Bemerkungen s. GA Bd. 14

Mediennummer HS012727041

Benutzungshinweis benutzbar
Ausleihhinweis Am Standort.

Alfredo Guzzoni, ed., *Neunzig Jahre philosophische Nietzsche-Rezeption* (Königstein, 1979).

"Die Kunst und das Denken": Colloquy with Hoseki Shin'ichi Hisamatsu held on May 18, 1958, University of Freiburg, transcribed by Alfredo Guzzoni.

"Seminar Protokoll zu Heideggers Vorlesung 'Zeit und Sein'": Transcript of a six-session seminar given September 11-13, 1962, in Todtnauberg, prepared by Alfredo Guzzoni.

Die Einheit des ον πολλαχως λεγομενον bei Aristoteles

Author: Alfredo Guzzoni. Thesis, Dissertation, German, 1957. Publisher: 1957.

Notes from Heidegger.

"the fit of being" (Seynsgefüge)

Zugehören zum Seyn

"incapable" of "listening to the voice of Seyn" because they do not belong to the essence of history (GA 97: 9)

Diese Zugehörigkeit gründet in einem Gehören, das sich selbst nur von uns aus bewahren läßt durch ein Hören und Gehorchen im Gehorsam zur Wahrheit des Seyns.

"This belonging is founded in a listening that can only be preserved by us by listening and obeying in obedience to the truth of Being. "

der Wille des Seyns. [Innigkeit des Seyns]," an intimacy requiring

"detachment from every 'personal' domain" (CP 192, 6/GA65 244, 4

Sie wagen

das Sagen

der Wahrheit des Seyns:

Seyn ist Ereignis

Ereignis ist Anfang

Anfang ist Austrag

Austrag ist Abschied

Abschied ist Seyn.

Topologie des Seyns

Zeuge des Seyns.

“Aber das denkende Dichten ist in der Wahrheit die Topologie des Seyns.”

[“»Ortschaft« meint die Zusammengehörigkeit der Bestimmungen des »Seins«, das j edoch, i n die Eignis zurückgebracht, die Zugehörigkeit des Menschen zu diesem - in der Weise des Brauches - einschließt. (vgl . »Topologie des Seyns« in »Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens« 1 94·7, S. 23 [GA Bd. 1 3, S. 84] und »Wegmarken«, S. 240 [GA Bd. 9, S. 4 1 2])”].

“Der Dichtungscharakter des Denkens. - Was nur wie die Utopie eines verunglückten Dichtens aussieht, könnte eines Tages die Topologie des Seyns werden. Im Gefolge seines Wesens bliebe das Denken, was es ist: die Strenge des Dichtens, das den Aufenthalt des letzten Gottes in der Ortschaft des Seyns zur Sprache kommen läßt. Im »Unterschied« wird die Verwindung des Seyns in das Sagen der Ortschaft der Wahrheit des Seyns [, in] 1 ihre Ortschaft versammelt. Die »Phänomenologie des Geistes« ist das Ende. Die Topologie des Seyns ist der An-fang. Dabei handelt es sich nicht um Hegel, nicht um Heidegger, nicht um das Verhältnis dieser beiden. Die Ortschaft des Seyns ist der Unterschied. (GA 97:201-202 *Anmerkungen II*.)

“Vermächtn is der Seinifrage (1. Fassung)

Fragender fragen,

bis die Frage,

nicht wie nah der Gewohnheit,

die Antwort findet -

sondern selbst als die Frage

die Antwort ist:

rufend den Vorenthalt

»heiliger Namen«,

nennend in ahnender Sage

den eignenden Brauch:

Worte, die tragen

vor das Geheimnis des Seins.”

(III Gedachtes.für das Vermächtnis eines Denkens 313).

One of the Heidegger most trusted friend (helped Heidegger with the DLA Heidegger archives), Walter Biemel (1918-2015) cautions us,

“But I have not yet mentioned the greatest danger in speaking about a thinker, viz., that we will translate his language back into a language familiar to us in order to make it understandable. But what we really do is mutilate what is proper to the thinker because he is present and functions and lives in *his* language. His language is his thought, and if we give up his language, we give up his thought. Yet we may think we can express what he said better and more clearly and make it more accessible, so we insinuate that he intentionally expressed himself in a difficult way in order to stand out and make some kind of impression.”

From “Heidegger and Metaphysics” by Walter Biemel in *Heidegger the Man and the Thinker*, edited by Thomas Sheehan.

Appendix E.

Five Habilitations done with Martin Heidegger. Habilitationsschrift.

Sources from Wikipedia and the internet.

1). Karl Löwith (1897-1973).

Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen: Ein Beitrag zur anthropologischen Grundlegung der ethischen Probleme. Habilitationsschrift zur Erlangung der Venia Legendi der Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät der Philipps-Universität zu Marburg, vorgelegt von Dr. Karl Löwith (*The Individual in the Role of Fellow Human Being: A Contribution to the Anthropological Foundation of Ethical Problems.* Habilitation. Work toward the Attainment of the Right to Teach in the Graduate Faculty of Philosophy of the Philipps University of Marburg, presented by Dr. Karl Löwith) (Munich: Drei Masken, 1928). Republished with its 1928 *Vorbemerkung* and original pagination in Karl Löwith, *Mensch und Menschenwelt. Beiträge zur Anthropologie [Human Being and Human World to Anthropology]*, ed. Klaus Stichweh, *Sämtliche Schriften* 1 (Stuttgart: 1981), 9–197.

2). Gerhard Krüger (1902–1972).

A philosopher. Doctorate under Nicolai Hartmann at Marburg in 1925 with a work on “Kants Lehre von der Sinnesaffektion” (“Kant’s Theory of sensory Affection”), habilitation under Heidegger at Philipps University of Marburg in 1928–1929 with a work on *Philosophie und Moral in der Kantischen Kritik* (published in 1931). During his student years at Marburg with Heidegger, Krüger was an always a visitor in Rudolf Bultmann’s theology seminars and participant in the Graecum “Graeca” evenings at Bultmann’s home.

Krüger completed his “Habilitation” in 1929 with a dissertation that was published in 1931 as *Philosophy and Morality in the Kantian Critique*. Gerhard Krüger studied philosophy in Jena, Tübingen and Marburg with Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann, and Martin Heidegger. He defended his philosophy thesis on Kant, in 1925, under the supervision of Nicolai Hartmann. After his habilitation in 1929 in Marburg, he first became a Privatdozent before receiving a chair in Münster (1940). In 1944, at the invitation of the German Institute of Bordeaux, he gave a lecture at the Faculty of Letters on “The Nietzschean conception of man”. In 1946 he accepted a position in Tübingen and then moved in 1952 to Frankfurt. He was teaching there until 1953, when he had a stroke and no longer taught.

3). Walter Bröcker (1902-1992).

His doctorate as Dr. phil. took place in Marburg in 1928 with Martin Heidegger with Kant's work "*Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*". *Attempt of a phenomenological interpretation and critique of Title of the “critique of judgment” Kants “Kritik der ästhetischen*

Urteilstkraft": Versuch einer phänomenologischen Interpretation und Kritik des I. Teiles der "Kritik der Urteilstkraft". The habilitation in 1934 at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau with the work about Aristotle with Heidegger. *Aristoteles*, von Walter Bröcker. Publisher: Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1935.

Walter Bröcker went to the University of Kiel as a full professor of philosophy in 1948, where he worked until he taught philosophy when he retired. His most important student was Kurt Hübner. Walter married one of Heidegger's students Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (1906-1999) and they both edited volume, GA 61. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (Winter semester 1921/22),

4). Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002)

He later studied classics and philosophy in the University of Breslau under Richard Höningwald, but soon moved back to the Philipps-Universität Marburg to study with the neo-Kantian philosophers Paul Natorp (his doctoral thesis advisor) and Nicolai Hartmann. He defended his dissertation *The Essence of Pleasure in Plato's Dialogues (Das Wesen der Lust nach den Platonischen Dialogen)* in 1922.

Habilitationsschrift.

Its first title, which did not correspond entirely to its contents, was: "Phenomenological Interpretations of Plato's *Philebus*." Later, however, it was changed to *Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus*, the final title of the book published in 1931. It was conceived as an introductory study of Nicomachean *Ethics*. It was assessed positively by both Friedländer and Heidegger, and Gadamer graduated on February 23, 1929. One of Heidegger's most famous students traveled widely and gave lectures. His major work and his most famous is, *Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode)* published in 1960. He preferred W. Dilthey over Nietzsche.

The DLA record of his assessment.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg

Person VON Heidegger, Martin [Verfasser/in]

Friedländer, Paul [Verfasser/in]

Jaensch, Erich Rudolf [Verfasser/in]

Haupttitel Gutachten über die Habilitationsschrift von H.G. Gadamer, Interpretation des platonischen "Philebos" (Manuskripttitel)

Umfang, Beilagen 7 Bl. Kopie

Entstehungszeit 1928.

5). Karl Ulmer (1915-1981).

During his military service he received his doctorate in Cologne in 1940 with a thesis on "The meaning of the copula in Aristotle" and completed his habilitation in 1944 under Martin Heidegger on "Truth, Art and Nature in Aristotle: A contribution to the elucidation of the metaphysical origin of modern technology". *Wahrheit, Kunst und Natur bei Aristoteles: Ein Beitrag zur metaphysischen Herkunft der modernen Technik* (published in 1954).

In 1957, Professor Dr. Ulmer became associate professor and in 1962 a full professor for

philosophy in Tübingen. In 1970, he moved to the University of Vienna as a professor of philosophy. Some of his more famous students: Hans Peter Balmer, Wilhelm Lütterfelds, Werner Stegmaier, Bernhard Taureck, Ernst Tugendhat, Norbert Wokart, and Heimo Hofmeister.

Notes.

There may be other “habilitation” done with Martin Heidegger, but this is the list that have been founded as of 2024 by the author.

The case of Herbert Marcuse (Heidegger’s assistant (1928-1932). He worked on the following habilitation under Heidegger, *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity (Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit)* in 1932; but for various political issues this was not completed as a “habilitation”. Later Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) told slightly different stories about whether Heidegger actually read this book or not; and more importantly if he “submitted” to Heidegger for approval. Fortunately, however, there is a solution, but without Marcuse’s manuscript turning up in Heidegger’s library, we can take this as a highly attenuated claim. Given the fact that Heidegger would often write his own marginalia in books, then the claim would be stronger if there was marginalia on Marcuse’s manuscript. Wait and see.

Nevertheless, it was clear that Marcuse would not be allowed to teach in Germany (1932 period). Marcuse left Germany for Switzerland in May 1933 (at age 34); and then left Switzerland to emigrate to the United States of America in June 1934. Their final in-person meeting was in 1947 at the die Hütte, Todtnauberg, Germany. Letter exchange in 1947-1948. At the time, Marcuse was working for the USA government on the “Russian desk.”

Herbert Marcuse, "Enttäuschung," in *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger*, edited by Gunther Neske (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977). About Marcuse’s archival materials. Thomas Regehly, "Übersicht über die 'Heideggeriana' im Herbert-Marcuse-Archive der Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek in Frankfurt am Main," in: *Heidegger Studies* 7 (1991), pages, 179-209.

Lectures

Part 1.

Acknowledgements:

During several years of reading Heideggerian materials, I have taken notes and fill-in this list. Plus, I have also done searching in the Martin Heidegger Archives Deutsches Literaturarchiv online. Plus a few of the scholars I have used: William J Richardson, Theodore Kisiel, Thomas Sheehan, Miles Groth, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Alfred Denker, Peter Trawny, Dr. Dr. Günther Neumann, Dr. Dr. Holger Zaborowski, Richard Polt, Frank Schalow, David Farrell Krell, John Sallis, Otto Pöggeler, Chris Bremmers, Ulrich von Bülow, Christian Sommer

Vortrag or Vorträge. These might be considered Heidegger's epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικός, epideiktikós) or public output. Martin Heidegger's List of Addresses, Lectures, and Speeches (not his classes lecture series given to students at the universities).

Martin Heidegger Archives. Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, in the town of Marbach am Neckar, Germany. Also known as: DLA - German Literature Archive. Example of the numbering and format that is used in DLA for parts of Heidegger's manuscript collection. Example. Title: Die Stege des Anfangs. Variation III (Manuskripttitel), Zugangsnummer 75.7373,2; /Schuber/C 15; Mediennummer HS011931710; Übernommene Sigel C 15.

For the 1930s period. The following list below may not be complete. The best sources for the 1930s are: *Ergänzungen Zu Einer Heidegger-Bibliographie* by Guido Schneeberger. Bern: Suhr, 1960. This book contain many texts by Heidegger and newspaper articles about his addresses and public speeches during this period. Plus, Hermann Heidegger edited his father's writings. GA 16. *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–1976). *Speeches and Other Testimonies to a Course of Life*. The volume GA 16 table of content list 290 different texts.

The following is in general chronological order by year.

Heidegger would often repeat the addresses at different locations.

Strongly note. Not all of these manuscripts of lectures/addresses are extant; meaning they are no longer existing. Many of these have been published but others are lost to the winds of time.

For historical purposes, Martin Heidegger's first publication found by Alfred Denker.

“Allerseelenstimmungen” (All Souls' Moods). Heuberger Volksblatt 11, no. 133, November 5, 1909.

1909. September 9, 1909 reported local Abraham of Saint Claire Club speech.

1910. Heidegger gives a lecture on Abraham at Sancta Clara (1644-1709) first in Hausen im Tal, near Meßkirch; and then in Kreenheinstetten, Germany.

1912. Modernismus -Vortrag im, Manner-Verein Zentrum' in Meßkirch am 2 April 1911. Nach einem Bericht im Heuberger Volksblatt (13), Nr. 41, 5. April 1911.

1912. Die tierische Ahstammung des Menschen und das Urteil der Wissenschaft. -Vortrag im "Katholischen Gesellen und Jünglingsverein" in Meßkirch am 21. April 1912. Nach einem Bericht im Heuberger Volksblatt (14), Nr. 47, 22. April 1912.

1912. - Über den Verlauf der Generalversammlung der, Gorresgesellschaft' im ‚Manner-Verein Zentrum' am 13. Oktober 1912 in Meßkirch. Nach einem Bericht im Heuberger Volksblatt (14), Nr. 126, 25. Oktober 1912.

1912. Über Nietzsche -Vortrag im, "Katholischen Gesellen und Jünglingsverein" in Meßkirch am 20. Oktober 1912. Nach einem Bericht im Heuberger Volksblatt (14), Nr. 124, 21. Oktober 1912.

1913.

Spiritismus (moderner Geisterglaube) und Wissenschaft. Vortrag im, "Katholischen Gesellen und Jünglingsverein" in Meßkirch am 16. März 1913. Nach einem Bericht im Heuberger Volksblatt (15), Nr. 31, 14. März 1913.

Note: “oral examination for the doctorate, which I passed on July 26, 1913.”

1913. Sozialismus. Vortrag im, Manner-Verein Zentrum' am 13. April 1913 in Meßkirch, nach einem Bericht im Heuberger Volksblatt (13), Nr. 43, 14. April 1913.

1913. Denkende Pferde. Vortrag im, "Katholischen Gesellen und Jünglingsverein" in Meßkirch am 26. August 1913. Nach einem Bericht im Heuberger Volksblatt (15), Nr. 98, 22. August 1913.

1915. Frage und Urteil. Vortrag Freiburg in Rickerts Seminar. 10 July 1915. In: Heidegger – Rickert, *Briefe 1912-1933* and in: GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Two volumes. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932. This was given at Rickert’s seminar on Lotze’s *Logic*. First title was, “On the Question” (“Über die Frage”).

1915. Probevortrag. Der Begriff der Zeit in der Geschichtswissenschaft. 27 July 1915. GA 1 413–33. The Concept of Time in the Science of History.

1916. Über die Philosophie in den kriegsführenden Ländern. -Vortrag am 29. Februar 1916. Nach einem Eintrag Engelbert Krebs' in seinem Tagebuch.

1916. Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft. 1916. See GA 1. Writing by Elfride Heidegger. -Probevorlesung vom 27. Juli 1915 vor der philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Freiburg i.Br. zur Erlangung der *venia legendi*. Erstveröffentlichung in überarbeiteter Fassung in: *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* (161), [Leipzig] 1916, S. 173-188. Aufgenommen in: *Fruhe Schriften* (1972), S. 357-375. Mit den Randbemerkungen aus den Handexemplaren des Autors aufgenommen in: GA 1 (1978), S. 413-433.

1917. Über das Wesen der Religion. Vortrag Freiburg, über Schleiermachers zweite Rede *Über die Religion*; in: GA 60:219-322. *Phänomenologie des religiösen. August 2, 1917*. Informal table talk from jotted notations which then became one of the notes for a treatise on the “*Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life*.” “*Zu Schleiermachers zweiter Rede ‘Über das Wesen der Religion’*” published in GA 60, 319–322/241–44 (typed in Fiand 21–23). Heidegger gave a private lecture entitled ‘Das Problem des Religiösen bei Schleiermacher’ on the occasion of Elfriede Heidegger’s birthday, 1 August 1917; remembered in two letters by Heinrich Ochsner, dated 2 and 5 August 1917.

1920. Über Psychologie (April 1920). GA 80.1. *Vorträge. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932*.

1920 April. Über Oswald Spengler. Vortrag Wiesbaden. Oswald Spengler und sein Werk *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* Vortrag in Wiesbaden, im Rahmen einer, Wissenschaftlichen Woche’, veranstaltet von der, Vereinigung für Hochschulkurse’ am 14. April 1920. See letter Heidegger to Karl Löwith on March 23, 1920. “Some time ago I was asked to speak for two hours on Spengler at a ‘scientific week’ in Wiesbaden. Other speakers include [Max] Born (Frankfurt) on Einstein’s laws, [ann] Oncken (Heidelberg) on recent history and Wolzendorf (Halle) on a juridical problem. . . .” From Heidegger’s letter to Karl Löwith on March 23, 1920.

1923. Aufgaben und Wege der phänomenologischen Forschung Vortrag in der Hamburgischen Ortsgruppe der Kant Gesellschaft am 7 Dezember 1923. By invitation of Ernest Cassirer. Tasks and Ways of Phenomenological Research (lecture to the Hamburg group of the Kant Society).

1924. *Der Begriff der Zeit* [Vortrag Marburg]. Tübingen 1989. 25 July 1924. In: GA 64 *Der Begriff der Zeit*. Some times with the title, *Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft*,” given in July 1924 for the Theologenschaft in Marburg.

1924. Dasein und Wahrsein nach Aristoteles. Vortrag Elberfeld-Barmen, Köln, Dortmund. In: GA 80.1. 1 to 8 December 1924. „that this lecture had in fact taken place: on December 1 or 2 in Elberfeld-Barmen, December 4 in Cologne, and December 8 in Dortmund.“ T. Kisiel. Wahrsein und Dasein: Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea Z* (lecture for the Kant-Gesellschaft Köln, December 2 and 4, 1924, manuscript compiled 1923/24). GA 80.1. *Vorträge. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932*. Max Scheler was at the lecture in Köln report by Thomas Sheehan found in the archive of Franz Josef Brecht. Reports that Scheler said, Wednesday December 3, 1924, in Cologne. The so called, “Ruhr-Rede” (“Ruhr-Talk”). The Ruhr valley, France and Belgium withdrew their troops from the Ruhr by August 1925. Being-here and Being-true according to Aristotle: Interpretation of Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

1924. Das Problem der Sünde bei Luther [Vortrag in Bultmanns Seminar]. 14 and 21 February 1924. In: Bernd Jaspert (Hrsg.), *Sachgemässe Exegese. Die Protokolle aus Rudolf Bultmanns Neutestamentlichen Seminaren 1921-1951*. Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1996. Another reference is listed as »Die Ethik des Paulus« teil In den Seminarsitzungen vom 14. und 21. Februar 1924. *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond* (John van Buren, ed.) (2002) Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 39–48. “The Problem of Sin in Luther” (2002) [John van Buren] “Das Problem der Sünde bei Luther”: Student transcript of a two-part talk given in Rudolf Bultmann’s seminar on “The Ethics of St. Paul” on February 14 and 21, 1924.

1925. Kasseler Vorträge (1925). Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung 16–21. April 1925.

Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung (16 - 21 April 1925, 5 days 2 hours each evening), See GA 80.1 *Vorträge. Teil I: 1915 BIS 1932*. Gehalten in Kassel vom 16.IV-21.IV.1925) [Vorträge Kassel]. DLA Person VON Heidegger, Martin. Bröcker, Walter [Schreiber/in]. Haupttitel Wilhelm Dilthey's Forschungsarbeit und der Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung (Manuskripttitel) [10 Vorträge, gehalten in Kassel 1925; Vortragsnachschrift] Umfang, Beilagen 62 Bl. Kopie Bemerkungen 2 Exemplare à 31 Bl. mit jeweils unterschiedlichen Anstreichungen Mediennummer HS005355797. *Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview* (1925). *Supplements From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*. Edited by John van Buren, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2002. Hannah Arndt was present at the last two double sessions. April 20 and 21, 1925 (see letters).

1925. October 15, Talk at the wedding feast of brother Fritz. “Zum Hochzeitstag von Fritz und Liesel Heidegger,” GA 16, 52–54.

1926. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit [Vortrag Marburg]. Other title: “Über die Wahrheit”. 24 May 1926. Pentecost Monday. Fuchs, Ernst [Schreiber]. Accession number 97.140.1. Marburg Academic Association. Later version in 1930, GA 9.

1926. Begriff und Entwicklung der phänomenologischen Forschung [Vortrag Marburg]. In: GA 80.1. *Vorträge. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932*. Decemeber 1926. Vortrag im Marburger kulturwissenschaftlichen Kränzchen. Conception and Development of Phenomenological Research.

1927. Summer Semester in Bultmann’ seminar. Heidegger on the topic of Luther’s Commentary on Galatians.

1927. Phänomenologie und Theologie II [Vortrag Tübingen].
9 March 1927 and 14 February 1928 Marburg. In: GA 9. *Wegmarken* (1919–1961).

1927. Phänomenologie und Theologie. I. Teil: Die nichtphilosophischen als positive Wissenschaften und die Philosophie als transzendente Wissenschaft [Vortrag Tübingen]. In: GA 80.1. *Vorträge. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932*. Second part given an the invitation of the Department of Evangelical Theology at Tübingen on 8 July 1927.

1927. Kants Lehre vom Schematismus und die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins [Vortrag Köln]. 26 January 1927. Köln bei Scheler und in Bonn. Kant’s Doctrine of the Schematism and the Question of the Meaning of Being (in Cologne and then with Max Scheler in Bonn).

1927. Around June 27. “On Interpreting the New Testament“. Heidegger’s text Grumach’s Nachlaß, DLA, Marbach.

1927. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik [Vortrag]. Vortrag vor der Ortsgruppe der Kant-Gesellschaft in Bonn am 1. Dezember 1927. Note: dates may have been November 1-4, 1927 for Cologne and Bonn. See November 11, 1927, Heidegger letter to Georg Misch.

1928. Theologie und Philosophie [Vortrag Marburg]. 14 February 1928 and 9 March 1927 in März. Second part given Evangelical Theologians' Society of Tübingen on 8 July 1927. In GA 9. *Wegmarken* (1919–1961).

1928. Zum Thema Kant und die Metaphysik [Vortrag Riga], an dem Ferienhochschulkurse der Herdergesellschaft zu Riga. September 1928.

Take a trip by sea. Heidegger says in a letter to Jaspers, the sea is boring.

1929. Philosophische Anthropologie und Metaphysik des Daseins [Vortrag Frankfurt]. 24 January 1929. In: GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Two volumes. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932. Vortrag in der Kantgesellschaft Frankfurt 24. January 1929.

1929. Edmund Husserl zum siebzigsten Geburtstag. Vortrag am 8. April 1929. GA 16. *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–1976). Husserl 70th birthday Festschrift in his honor.

1929. Summer Semester. Anfänger: Über Idealismus und Realismus im Anschluß an die Hauptvorlesungen (Hegels 'Vorrede' zur *Phänomenologie des Geistes*). I have seen some of the student transcript's texts of these lectures from Herbert Marcuse archives in Frankfurt am Main.

1929. What is metaphysics? 24 July 1929. Freiburg. Difference versions in the literature. In: GA 9:103–22. *Wegmarken* (1919–1961). Recently found different version edited by Dieter Thomä, *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 66, no. 1 (2018): 87–97. “Was ist Metaphysik? Urfassung”. The typescript manuscript came from the estate of Ernst Zinn (1910–1990). This version has a stronger peroration compared to the other more scholarly version. Had an clear effect on the people that heard the speech. Heidegger later says, “so to speak as the meta-metaphysics“ GA 66 section 109. Arnulf Heidegger said it was interesting document but he could not confirm that it was “official“ part of the Heidegger canon based on the appearance of the typed manuscript. It is clearly some version of Heidegger's lecture but where it fits into the cycle of different versions of the lecture is unknown. Arnulf Heidegger scuppered the plans to put it in the “official“ list of writings (canon) by Martin Heidegger. Most scholars would included it as being close enough.

The year that Heidegger gave this lecture was (July 24) 1929, that is 89 years ago from when it was found and recently published.

1929. Die heutige Problemlage der Philosophie [Vortrag Karlsruhe und Amsterdam]. 4 December 1929. 1930 March 21 Amsterdam. Die heutige Problemlage der Philosophie (Vortrag in der Kantgesellschaft Karlsruhe 4. December 1929 und vor der wissenschaftlichen Vereinigung zu Amsterdam 21. März 1930). See GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932. Invited by Hendrik Josephus Pos (1898-1955) a Dutch philosopher. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

1929. Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und die Aufgabe einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik. Dazu: Disputation in einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft zwischen Cassirer und Heidegger Lectures. 17-

27. March 1929. Davos. Cassirer–Heidegger debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) in March 17 to April 6, 1929 at the Hotel Belvédère, Davos, Switzerland. Heidegger gave three lectures but his manuscripts are not in the archives. Location unknown. But he immediately came back home to write his only book: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929). GA 3. “Kontroverse in einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft” (Bericht, Davos, 25. 3. 1929, 25 pp.) in Herbert Marcuse Archive.

1930. Hegel und das Problem der Metaphysik [lectures Amsterdam]. 21 March and 22 March 1930. In: GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932. See above note above about Amsterdam trip. Invited by Hendrik Josephus Pos (1898-1955) a Dutch philosopher. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

1930. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit [Vortrag Bremen]. 8 October 1930. First given 14 Juli 1930 Karlsruhe, Vortrag am 8. Oktober 1930 in Bremen, 5. Dezember 1930 in Marburg, 11. Dezember 1930 in Freiburg. GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932.

[1. Version:] Vortrag am 14. Juli 1930 in Karlsruhe. Page 329

[2. Version:] Vortrag am 8. Oktober 1930 in Bremen (»Erste Ausarbeitung«). Page 345. Note after the lecture he read out loud the Zhuangzi's famous parable about the happiness of the fish, from the translation of Martin Buber.

[3. Version:] Vortrag am 5. Dezember 1930 in Marburg a. d. L. und am 11. Dezember 1930 in Freiburg i. Br. Page 379

[4. Version:] Überarbeitung an Pfingsten 1940. Page 407.

According to Walter Biemel also in Dresden in spring 1932.

In: GA 9. *Wegmarken* (1919–1961). Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (1930).

1930. December 5. At the Protestant Theological Association in Marburg under “Philosophieren und Glauben. Das Wesen der Wahrheit” “Philosophizing and Believing: The Essence of Truth.” The October version in Freiburg and in the spring of 1932 in Dresden. Vortrag vor der Evangelisch-theologischen Fachschaft in Marburg.

1930. Augustinus: Quid est tempus? [Vortrag Beuron]. 26 October 1930. In: GA 80.1 “Augustinus: Quid est tempus? (*Confessiones* lib. XI) (26. Oktober 1930)” in the *Gesamtausgabe* edition (GA 80.1). The monastery copy of the typed lecture at the Beuron library carries the title “Des hl. Augustinus: Betrachtung über die Zeit. *Confessiones* lib. XI.” DLA 75.7064,1 note 26 pages.

1930. Philosophieren und Glauben. Das Wesen der Wahrheit [Vortrag Marburg]. 5 December 1930. DLA Philosophieren und Glauben (Das Wesen der Wahrheit) [Nachschrift] Umfang, Beilagen 16 Bl. Kopie.

1931. Höhlengleichnis – Vorarbeit (um 1931). GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Two volumes. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932.

1931. Ἀλήθεια und Höhlengleichnis (13. November 1931). GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932.

1931. Über das Wort und den Begriff "Metaphysik" 01.05.1931.

1932. Der Satz vom Widerspruch [Vortrag Freiburg]. 16 December 1932. There are different written versions (editors notes two versions and maybe a third version now lost GA 91:755); and extensive notes about this lecture and topic. GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932. DLA Vortrag bei einem "Kränzchen" am 16.12.1932, mit dem Vermerk "z. T. umgearbeitet im Zusammenhang mit der Vorlesung im S. S. 33" vorgesehen für GA Bd. 80 bzw. See also GA 91:189-342 *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter* for his lengthy notes. There was no typed version and the editor had to create it from the handwritten manuscripts. Words underlined in crayon were not italicized per Heidegger instructions to the GA editors.

Table of Content

Ergänzungen und Denksplitter. GA 91:189-342.

III. Der Satz Vom Widerspruch (1932)189

Vortrag 191

Der Satz vom Widerspruch [Erste Fassung] 191

Beilagen zur ersten Vortragsfassung 216

Der Satz vom Widerspruch [Zweite Fassung] 217.

Beilagen zur zweiten Vortragsfassung 247

Aufzeichnungen aus dem thematischen Umkreis des Vortrags257

A. [Die Grundsätze der ›Identität‹, des ›Widerspruchs‹] 257

B. ἔλεγχος 272

C. Die ›Begründung‹ des Satzes 292

D. Aristoteles Met. Γ 319

E. Zur Geschichte des Satzes vom Widerspruch. 342

1932. TO PSEUDOS. τὸ ψεῦδος. Vortrag im Freiburger Kränzchen am 22. Juli 1932. In GA 80.1. *Vorträge*. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932.

1932. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit [Vortrag Dresden]. Durchgesehene Fassung in: GA 9. *Wegmarken* (1919–1961).

1933. Der deutsche Student als Arbeiter [Vortrag]. In: Schneeberger und GA 16.

1933. GA 16, # 59. Arbeitsdienst und Universität (14.6.1933). Bei der Übergabe des Wohnhauses der Studentenschaft.

1933. GA 16, # 41. Zur Immatrikulation (6. Mai 1933).

1933. Amtes für Wissenschaft der Deutschen Studentenschaft am 10 und 11. Juni 1933, Schlageter [Vortrag]. In: Schneeberger und GA 16. *Ergänzungen Zu Einer Heidegger-Bibliographie* by Guido Schneeberger. Bern: Suhr, 1960. This book contains many texts by Heidegger and newspaper articles about his addresses during this period.

1930-1933. GA 15, # 286. Die Universität im Neuen Reich (30. Juni 1930). And: Vortrag vor der Heidelberger Studentenschaft am 30. Juni 1933. On the 14 of July in Kiel, Heidegger presented the lecture "Die Universität im Neuen Reich" that he had already given in Heidelberg on June 30. GA 16:764-755.

1933. GA 16 #51. Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität 27.05.1933. Heidegger's rectorial address. University of Freiburg.

1933. GA 16, #37. Prälat Göller (Grabrede am 2. Mai 1933). Eulogy.

1933. GA 16, #48. Nach der Rede des Führers am 17. Mai 1933.

1933. Zum 30. Januar 1933. 30.01.1934. Should be in GA 16.

1933. Aus der Rede Sr. Magnifizenz des Rektors der Freiburger Universität Prof. Heidegger. 08. 1933. August 1933.

1933. GA 16, 116. Gelockerte Sammlung (16. Dezember 1933).

1933. GA 16, #101. Zum Semesterbeginn. Universitätsführer Wintersemester 1933/34 (3. November 1933).

1933. GA 16, # 286. Die Universität im Neuen Reich (30. Juni 1930). And: Vortrag vor der Heidelberger Studentenschaft am 30. Juni 1933.

1933. Amtes für Wissenschaft der Deutschen Studentenschaft am 10 und 11. Juni 1933, Schlageter [Vortrag]. In: Schneeberger und GA 16.

1933. Nationalsozialistische Wissensschulung [Vortrag]. In: Schneeberger und GA 16. *Ergänzungen Zu Einer Heidegger-Bibliographie* by Guido Schneeberger. Bern: Suhr, 1960. This book contains many texts by Heidegger and newspaper articles about his addresses and speeches during this period.

1933. Die Universität im Neuen Reich. Vortrag vor der Heidelberger Studentenschaft am 30. Juni 1933. Also given July 1933 in Freiburg.

1933. [Die Universität im neuen Staat]. 30. Juni 1933 in Kiel. Same talk as above.

1933. GA 16, # 63. Morgige Sonnwendfeier der Universität (23.6.1933).

1933. [Universität und Wissenschaft] Vortrag im Rahmen des Todtnauburger Wissenschaftslagers' vom 4. bis 10. Oktober 1933.

1933. [Die Universität im nationalsozialistischen Staat] Vortrag in Tübingen am 30. November 1933 im Schillersaal des Museums.

1933. GA 16, #104. Ansprache am 11. November 1933 in Leipzig.

1933. Schöpferische Landschaft: Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz. In: GA 13.

1934. GA 16, # 135. Die Notwendigkeit der Wissenschaft (22. Februar 1934).

1934. GA 16, #154. 25 Jahre nach unserem Abiturium (Klassentreffen in Konstanz am 26./27. Mai 1934). 25 Jahre nach unserem Abiturium [Prosa. Reden und Vorträge] (Drucktitel), 26.05.1934], Class reunion.

1934. GA 16, # 155. Die deutsche Universität - Zwei Vorträge in den Ausländerkursen der Universität Freiburg am 15/16. August 1934.

1934. Die gegenwärtige Lage und die künftige Aufgabe der deutschen Philosophie [Vortrag Konstanz]. 30 November 1934. In: GA 16: 316-334. Dedication Luise Krohn.

1934. GA 16, #123. Pankow — ein großer Arzt (15 Januar 1934).

1934. GA 16, #124. Zur Eröffnung der Schulungskurse für die Notstandsarbeiter der Stadt an der Universität (22 Januar 1934).

1934. GA 16, # 125. Der Ruf zum Arbeitsdienst (23 Januar 1934).

1935. Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes [Vortrag Freiburg]. Kunstwissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft. 13 November 1935. Later 17 January 1936 in Zürich. GA 5. GA 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. There are at least three different versions of this lecture (see 1936). Reportedly the first version was placed in the drawer in the house and not given. According to H.W. Petzet, "The version printed in the "Holzwegem". Contains the text of the three lectures that Heidegger gave on Nov. 17, Nov. 24 and Dec. 4 in Frankfurt Frankfurt lectures of November /December 1936 represent the "third draft".

1936. GA 16, #162. Zum 80. Geburtstag der Tante Gertrud (16. März 1936). For Aunt Gertrud's 80th birthday (March 16, 1936).

1936. Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung [Vortrag Rome]. 2 April 1936 In: GA 4:33-48 (*Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*). Italian-German Cultural Institute. Karl Löwith (1897-1973) was there and has reported from his perspective of what happen.

1936. Das Dasein und der Einzelne [Vortrag Zürich]. 18 January 1936. In GA 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. DLA. 16 Bl. Entstehungszeit 18.01.1936 [Datum des Vortrags]

1936. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes [Vortrag Frankfurt am Main]. In: GA 5. November 17 and 24, December 4, 1936. GA 5. *Holzwege* (1935–1946).

1936. Europa und die deutsche Philosophie [Vortrag Rome]. 8 April 1936. In: Hans-Helmuth Gander. *Europa und die Philosophie*. Frankfurt am Main 1993 and Delivered at the Hertziana Library of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute in Rome. GA 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

1937. Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft. 26 November 1937. See „Philosophie, Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung“ von Hartmut Tietjen.

Note: There is no known text at DLA. But Heidegger gave a summer seminar of 1937 on the topic of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*. The report from a Paris newspaper is in the Herbert Marcuse Archive in Frankfurt am Main.

1938. Besinnung auf die Wissenschaft. [Vortrag am 9. Juni 1938 in Freiburg]. In: GA 16.

1938. Die Begründung des neuzeitlichen Weltbildes durch die Metaphysik / Die Zeit des Weltbildes -Vortrag am 9 Juni 1938. GA 5. *Holzwege* (1935–1946). In GA 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

Die Begründung des neuzeitlichen Weltbildes durch die Metaphysik

I. Ausarbeitung (vor Juni 1938)

II. Ausarbeitung (Freiburger Vortrag am 9. Juni 1938)

Erläuterung zu Anmerkung (Zusatz) 8 der II. Ausarbeitung: Der Spruch des Protagoras und die »Subjektivität« des Descartes (um 1939/40).

Note: The lecture was in 1938, published in 1950 (*Holzwege*) with altered texts by Heidegger, and he got caught in 2014 (64 years later). Original manuscripts are in the DLA. Read with caution as some of the text was dropped and other part were altered (based on political issues).

1939. Von der Grundbestimmung des Wissens. Vortrag im Freiburger Kränzchen am 9. Juni 1939. In GA 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

1939. Andenken und Mnemosyne [Prosa. Reden und Vorträge] (Drucktitel), 1939. See GA 75. *Zu Hölderlin / Griechenlandreisen*. Not clear from GA 75 – that this was a lecture. Für Kurt Bauch.

1940. Der Spruch des Parmenides [Vortrag Freiburg]. In: GA 80.2. *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. Vortrag im Freiburger Kränzchen. 06.1940 [Datum des Vortrags] 18 pages.

1941. Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Eine Auslegung des Höhlengleichnisses (Politeia VII) (29. April 1941). In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

1941. "Wie wenn am Feiertage..." 1941. Offener Vortrag an der Universität Freiburg i. Br. am 14. März 1941, wiederholt am 27. März 1941. BR/s. GA 4. *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (1936–1968). Reported given sometime in 1939 as well.

1941. Zur Geschichte des Existenzbegriffs [Vortrag Freiburg]. In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. Vortrag im Freiburger Kränzchen am 7. Juni 1941.

1943. Nietzsches Wort »Gott ist tot« [Vortrag]. In: GA 5. *Holzwege* (1935–1946), pp. 209-267. Über Nietzsches Wort »Gott ist todt« (6. Juni 1943) in 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. Note from DLA. Remarks with dedication for Eugen Fink, 26.9.1969.

1943. Heimkunft An die Verwandten [Vortrag]. In: *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (1936–1968). GA 4:7-8. In the auditorium of the University of Freiburg, delivered on June 6, 1943, and repeated on June 21, 1943. "Vorbemerkung zur Wiederholung der Rede". This was

given because of the 100th anniversary of the death of the great poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843).

1944/45. Von der Vergessenheit (1944/45). GA 80.2. *Vorträge*. Teil 1: 1915 BIS 1932.

1944. Schlussstück der Auslegung des Heraklitspruches 112. 1944. Zugangsnummer HS.2004.0052.00025. Mediennummer HS001574946

1944. Andenken an den Dichter. Zugangsnummer 75.7286,2a-2b. Andenken an den Dichter Widmung an Hölderlin, aufgenommen in: *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlin Dichtung* (1944). Not sure this is lecture.

1944. GA 16, # 177. Max Kommerell (gestorben am Abend des 25. Juli 1944)

1945. Die Armut [Vortrag]. In: *Heidegger Studies* 10, 1992. Also in GA 73:873-881. *Zum Ereignis-Denken*. Details here: [<https://www.heidegger-gesellschaft.de/jahresgaben/>] see 1992. 75.7333,2f.

“Published for the first time from Martin Heidegger’s literary remains, the text entitled “Poverty” was presented on June 27, 1945, by Heidegger to a small audience in Forsthaus von Burg Wildenstein in Hausen,” (Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann). First published in *Heidegger Studien* 10 (1992), pages 5–11). In English *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad*. Springer, 2011. Pages 3-9. Title is just: “Poverty.” This is Heidegger’s interpretation and thoughts about a saying by Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843). Hölderlin wrote, “For us everything is concentrated upon the spiritual, we have become poor in order to become rich.” It was a torpor time in Germany. Whole cities were gone.

1946. Wozu Dichter? [Vortrag]. Vortrag in engstem Kreis zum Andenken an R. M. Rilkes zwanzigsten Todestag. Erstveröffentlichung in: *Holzwege* (1950), pages. 248-295. GA 5. *Holzwege* (1935–1946), pages, 269-320.

1947. GA 26. Section #191. Obituary for Pius Schweizer (December 1947).

1949. Einblick in das was ist: Das Ding. Das Ge-stell. Die Gefahr. Die Kehre. Vier Vorträge („Das Ding, Das Ge-stell, Die Gefahr, Die Kehre“) im Club zu Bremen am 1. Dezember 1949, unverändert wiederholt auf der Bühlerhöhe am 25. und 26. März 1950. Insight Into That Which Is. Das Ge-stell “positionality.” The lecture „The Thing“ given in Icking 10 June 1950.

DLA Die Gefahr (Manuskripttitel) aus Sammlung: Einblick in das was ist (Drucktitel) Umfang, Beilagen 22 Blatt Typoskript Durchschlag mit handschriftlichen Zusätzen. Mit 1 weiteren Exemplar 25 Blatt. Vortrag in Bremen. GA 79. *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*.

1949. GA 16, #195. Theophil Rees zum sechzigsten Geburtstag (9. Juli 1949).

1949. GA 16, #194. Zehn Jahre treue Hilfe (1. April 1949).

1949. Der Hinweissee. GA Bd. 79. *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*. Part of the lecture “Ding” lecture.

1949. GA 16, #197. Jetzt wird es Ernst. 22.09.1949. Gedenken an Rudolf Stadelmann; Jetzt wird es ernst; Antrag auf Vollpensionierung.

1949. *Der Feldweg* written. Unknown when and where this was given as a lecture or just to read to friends. Published in 1949. Conradin Kreutzer-Stadt Meßkirch. Then in Oct 1949, 400 printed copies.

1950. Summer Semester “Wirklichkeit, Illusion und Möglichkeit der Universität. Ein Vortrag Martin Heideggers,” which is an unpublished transcript of an extemporaneous lecture Heidegger gave in Summer Semester 1950, available in Max Müller’s papers at the Universitätsarchiv Freiburg under call number is E 3/172. Location: Todtnauberg. Freiburg Studium Generale. The date given is 8 July 1950. *The actuality, illusion, and possibility of the university*.

1950. "This winter I am teaching privatissime in our house a 'reading exercise' (H-M-W, 33). Unknown content etc.

1950. Das Ding [lecture Munich] and Das Ge-Stell, Die Kehre. 6. Juni 1950. In: Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Künste, Band I. Munich 1951; in *VA*. GA 7. Über das Ding (Mai 1950). In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. Munich at the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts in Munich, on June 6, 1950. The third lecture „Die Gefahr“ was left out. See *Die Gefahr* (1949), in: GA 79.

1950 Die Sprache

1. Fassung (Vortrag am 7. Oktober 1950 auf Bühlerhöhe). In memory of Max Kommerell.

2. Fassung (Vortrag am 14. Februar 1951 in Stuttgart). Die Sprache I [Vortrag Bühlerhöhe]. 7. Oktober 1950. In: GA 12:9-30. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950–1959).

Die Sprache (7. Oktober 1950 auf Bühlerhöhe und 4. Februar 1951 in Stuttgart). In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

1950. The lecture “The Thing”. This famous lecture was given in Icking, Germany 10 June 1950.

1951. Bauen Wohnen Denken [Vortrag Darmstadt]. 5 August 1951. In: *VA*. GA 7. "Building Dwelling Thinking." A typewritten carbon with the note "Darmstadt Lecture, August 5, 1951 (Schloss Walchen, August 20, 1951), 2nd version" is in Arendt MB. The copy contains a number of handwritten notes by Hannah A. See also p. 107 and pp. 251 f H. A. also discussed this manuscript in her *Denktagebuch* in November 1951. Also, *Bauen Wohnen Denken*. Erste Fassung (5. August 1951). In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. See also „Overcoming Metaphysics“ section XXVI as mentioned by Heidegger in connection with Darmstadt, 1951.

1950/1951. Die Sprache II [Vortrag Stuttgart]. 14 February 1951. DLA Author unknown. Bericht von der Diskussion mit Prof. Martin Heidegger zu seinem Vortrag "Die Sprache" in Stuttgart am 15.2.1951 (Manuskripttitel). 6 Bl. Dg. mit hs. Zusatz. The day after the lecture.

1951. »dichterisch wohnt der Mensch « [Vortrag Bühlerhöhe]. 5 November 1951. In: *Akzente. Zeitschrift für Dichtung* 1, 1954; in: *VA*. GA 7.

1951. Zur heutigen Dichtung. Lecture 1951 March 10. In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. 91.24.8. Erbetene Vorbemerkung zu einer Dichterlesung auf Bühlerhöhe am 24. Februar 1951.

1951. Λόγος. Das Leitwort Heraklits (4. Mai 1951). In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. [Heraklit 2.] Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos. Club zu Bremen am 4. Mai 1951 und veröffentlicht als „Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)“. GA 7. *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1953).

1951. »...dichterisch wohnt der Mensch...« (1951). 1951. »dichterisch wohnt der Mensch « [Vortrag Bühlerhöhe]. 5 November 1951. In: Akzente. Zeitschrift für Dichtung 1, 1954; in: VA. GA 7. . *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1953).

1952. Colloquium über Dialektik. Eugen Fink, Max Müller, Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck, Marly Biemel, Walter Biemel, Henri Birault. 1952 Sept. 15 On Dialectics. Muggenbrunn, Germany. Published in Hegel-Studies. Band 25, page 9-40. Appendix last lecture (XII) from the summer semester of 1952 („What is Called Thinking“), but not given. Hegel’s interpretation of Zeno. Hegel says, Being is thinking. Parmenides says, thinking is Being. The conversation with Parmenides never comes to an end; not only because much is obscure in the surviving fragments of his „doctrinal poem“, but because what is said itself remains questionable. Transcripts by Eugen Fink and Walter Biemel. Marly Biemel and Margherita von Brentano took the minutes. Also Bernhard Welte and Heinrich Ochsner were there according to Max Müller (letter of 2.5. 1990). Colloquium über Dialektik, *Seminare: Hegel – Schelling*. GA 86:745–63.

1952. Seminare von Säckingen. The mystery seminar may include addresses, etc. Dates as March 15 and July 20. There are a few mentions of this seminar in literature but at this point an unknown subject and who attended. A document of this seminar was listed as being in the DLA (in 2003); but there is no record of this online now in 2024. So, put here as place holder as more information may come out about this seminar.

1952. Was heißt Denken? [Vortrag Bayerische Rundfunk]. May 1952. In: Merkur 6, 1952; in: VA. GA 7. In May 1952, Bavarian Radio broadcast Heidegger's reading, "Was heißt Denken?" CD: *Von der Sache des Denkens*.

1952. Festschrift für Hans Jantzen (1951) Berlin: Mann, pp. 7-18. Reprinted in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* III (1954) Pfullingen: Neske, 1978, pp. 3-25. GA 7 (2000), pp. 211-234.

1952. Mensch und Raum (1952) Darmstadt: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt, pp. 72-84. Reprinted in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* II (1954) Pfullingen: Neske, 1978, pp. 19-36. *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1953). GA 7 (2000), pp. 145-164.

1952. Georg Trakl. Eine Erörterung seines Gedichtes / Die Sprache im Gedicht. Vortrag auf der Bühlerhöhe am 4. Oktober 1952. GA 12. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950–1959).

1953. Die Frage nach der Technik [Vortrag München]. 18. November 1953. In: *Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Schöne Künsten*, Band III. München 1954; in: VA. GA 7. (Technik und Kunst - Ge-stell). Safranski (*Martin Heidegger*, pp. 393 ff.) writes of this event: "This evening saw a gathering of the whole München intelligentsia of the fifties,. .. It was probably Heidegger's biggest success in postwar Germany." Die Frage nach der Technik. Entwurf (vor

dem 18. November 1953). In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. 75.7354,4b. Reported that Heisenberg and Ortega y Gasset were there.

1953.] “Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger”: Protocol of informal discussions at the Protestant Academy of Hofgeismar, held in early December 1953, recorded by Hermann Noack, corrected and completed by Heidegger in 1973.

[1953. Wissenschaft und Besinnung [Vortrag München]. 4 August 1953. In: *VA*. GA 7. Lecture first given May 15, 1953, at a conference held by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft wissenschaftlicher Sortimentler [Science Book Dealers Study Group] Schauinsland, near Freiburg. Revised for presentation on August 4, 1953, to a small group in München.

1953. On December 9, I was with Elfride in Marburg, where I lectured on "Science and Reflection" in the great hall (with a broadcast to the large lecture hall in Landgrafenhaus).

1953. Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra? [Vortrag Bremen]. In: *VA*. GA 7. Vortrag im Club zu Bremen am 8. Mai 1953.

1954. Die Frage nach der Technik repeated address on 150th anniversary of Kant death. 12 February 1954 in Freiburg.

1954. Festschrift zur Feier des 350jährigen Bestehens des Heinrich-Suso-Gymnasiums in Konstanz (1954) Konstanz: Heinrich-Suso-Gymnasium, pp. 60-76. Reprinted in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* III (1954) Pfullingen: Neske, 1978, pp. 53-78. GA 7 (2000), pp. 263-288.

1954. Wissenschaft und Besinnung 18.03.1954 (see earlier version 1953).

DLA notes: Haupttitel Wissenschaft und Besinnung (Drucktitel) Weitere(r) Titel Wissenschaft und Besinnung. Vortrag vor jungen Buchhändlern Schauinsland (Manuskripttitel) [Druckfahne, 1. Korrektur] Umfang, Beilagen 9 Bl. Dr. mit hs. Zusatz Entstehungszeit 18.03.1954 Entstehungsort Freiburg im Breisgau.

1954. Besinnung. Given in Zürich, Constance, and Freiburg 19 June 1954.

1954. Johann Peter Hebel [Vortrag Zähringen]. 5 September 1954 and 9 November 1954. In: GA 16. *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–1976).

1954. Martin Heidegger: Tischrede bei der Primiz des Neffen H. Heidegger, Pfingsten 1954. Martin Heidegger: Table Speech at the First Mass of the Nephew H. Heidegger, Whitsun 1954.

1955. Gelassenheit [Vortrag Meßkirch]. In: *Gelassenheit*. Pfullingen 1959; and in: GA 16. Gelassenheit. Bodenständigkeit im Atomzeitalter": Address given October 30, 1955, on the 175th anniversary of the birth of the composer Conradin Kreuzer, Meßkirch. An LP recording of the address was issued by Telefunken in 1955. Available on CD: *Von der Sache des Denkens*. Vorträge, Reden und Gespräche, Munich: Der Hörverlag, 2000. Martin Heidegger: Commemorative Address on the 175th Birthday of Konradin Kreuzer on 30.10.55 in Meßkirch.

1955. Was ist das – die Philosophie? Colloque at Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, France, on 28 August 1955. *Identität und Differenz* (1955–1957). *Identität und Differenz* (1955–1957), GA 11:7-26. Heidegger first trip to France. There were several days seminars after the lecture which

are in GA 91:347-491. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*. Examples of some of the intellectual and philosophers who were there: Gabriel Marcel, Jean Beaufret, Paul Ricoeur, François Fédier (the driver), Abbots Morel and Pépin, Fathers Fessard, Kleiber, Léger, René Char, Georges Braque, Jacques Lacanand, Kostas Axelos, Lucien Goldmann, Alexis Philonenko, Walter Biemel, Jeanne Hersch, Beda Allemann, and Antoine Vergote. About 50 French intellectuals were there participating in the seminar. See the book, *Heidegger in France*.

1955. Dankansprache am Ende des Seminars. 09.1955.

1955. Johann Peter Hebel [Vortrag Göppingen]. In: GA 16. Die Sprache Johann Peter Hebels, 'Der Lichtgang 5 (1955), 4. 2 sheets.

1955. „Heidegger’s lecture “Science and Reflection” stood at the center of the discussion, to which Heidegger contributed by closely engaging Fink’s introductory essay, “Exposition des Problems der Einheit der Wissenschaften” (Exposition of the problem of the unity of the sciences)”. Note in Eugene Fink collected works. Freiburg Studium Generale.

1956. Der Satz vom Grund [Vortrag] Vortrag im Club zu Bremen am 25. Mai 1956 und an der Universität Wien am 24. Oktober 1956. GA 10. *Der Satz vom Grund* (1955–1956) Reported that Jean Guittou, who visited Heidegger in October 1956 for a lecture in Freiburg on “Pascal and Leibniz”.

1956. Hebel—der Hausfreund”: Expanded version of "Gespräch mit Hebel beim 'Schatzkästlein' zum Hebeltag," an address given in 1956, in Lörrach. Rede zur Eröffnung des Hebeltages 1956 in der Stadthalle Lorrach am 9. Mai 1956. GA 16:534-545.

1956. Paul Klee. At group of architects Freiburg. Swiss German, Paul Klee (1879-1940). Related to "Heideggers nachgelassene Klee-Notizen" in *Heidegger Studies*, 9 (1993):5-12.

1957. Der Satz der Identität [Vortrag Freiburg]. In: *ID*. GA 11. On the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the University of Freiburg. 27. June. 1957. Part of a lecture series (five) Grundsätze des Denkens given in the summer of 1957.

1957. Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik [Vortrag Freiburg]. In: *ID*. GA 11. Vortrag in Todtnauberg am 24. Februar 1957. Based on Winter Semester 1956-57 lectures on Hegel's *Science of Logic*.

1957. Grundsätze des Denkens [I, II, III: Der Satz der Identität, IV, V] - Fünf Vorträge Sommersemester 1957 im Studium Generale der Universität Freiburg.
DLA says, Haupttitel aus: Grundsätze des Denkens (Drucktitel) [5. Vortrag]. Grundsätze des Denkens (Logos, Sprach, Sage) (Manuskripttitel) Umfang, Beilagen 20 Blatt Entstehungszeit 1957 [Sommersemester]. Zugangsnummer 75.7377,2.

1957. Antrittsrede in der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften [Vortrag Heidelberg]. Address when Heidegger became a member. Noted by Heidegger in GA 1:55. Fall 1957.

1958. Für Hartmut und Brigitte Buchner zum Abschied [Prosa. Reden und Vorträge] (Manuskripttitel), 09.03.1958.

1958. Das Wesen der Sprache. Drei Vorträge, gehalten im Studium Generale der Universität Freiburg i.Br. am 4. und 18. Dezember 1957 und am 5. Februar 1958.

THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE. The three lectures were delivered in the Studium Generale of the University of Freiburg i. Br. on the 14th (maybe 4th) and the 18th of December 1957, and on 7. February 1958. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950–1959). GA 12:147-204.

1958. Das Wort [Vortrag Wien, Konstanz, Amriswil]. In: GA 12. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950–1959). Dichten und Denken. Zu Stefan Georges Gedicht ‚Das Wort‘ / Das Wort. Vortrag bei einer Morgenfeier im Burgtheater zu Wien am 11. Mai 1958 in Vienna, in Konstanz am 12. Juni 1959 und in Amriswil am 15. Juni 1959.

1958. “On May 19th, 1958, the day after Martin Heidegger and Shin’ichi Hisamatsu led a one-day colloquium in Freiburg on the topic of “Art and Thinking,” the two men came together to discuss the success of the colloquium. The conversation soon turned to the work of Paul Klee, the Swiss artist, and from there to the newest developments in Heidegger’s thinking about language. Heidegger had just presented some of this new thinking during his lecture on Stefan George’s poem “Das Wort” in Vienna a week earlier. Having attended the lecture in Vienna, Hisamatsu used the opportunity of the conversation to ask Heidegger for elaboration on this new thinking and to clarify connections between it and language in the Zen tradition. “(Carolyn Culbertson, Tobias Keiling, 2017). The conversation was transcribed and later published in volume GA 16:776. #290. Wechselseitige Spiegelung - Gespräch zwischen Shinichi Hisamatsu und Martin Heidegger am 19. Mai 1958. First was #230. DIE KUNST UND DAS DENKEN Protokoll eines Colloquiums am 18. Mai 1958. GA 16:552.

1958. Hegel und die Griechen [Vortrag Aix-en-Provence, Heidelberg - July]. 20. März. 1958. GA 9:427-444. Hegel und die Griechen (20. März 1958). In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

1958. In: *Die Gegenwart der Griechen. Festschrift für Hans-Georg Gadamer zum 60. Geburtstag*. Tübingen 1960; in: GA 9.

1958. Enthält u. a.: "Die Preisgabe der Seinsfrage"; "Heidelberger Seminar - Heidegger und die Vorsokratiker (zu H. G. Gadamer's 60. Geburtstag)". 27 Blatt. DLA Accession number 75.7366.5 Media number HS011918325. Konvolut: Notizen.

1958. GA 16, # 229. Liebeserklärung an die Provence (20. März 1958).

1958. Note not an address or lecture. “On the Essence and Concept of φύσις” published for the first time in 1958, almost twenty years after having written it.“

1959. Der Weg zur Sprache [Vortrag München, Berlin]. In: GA 12. In the auditorium of the University of Munich on January 23, 1959, and in the Ernst-Reuter-Haus in Berlin on 28. January 1959. Bavarian Academy of Fine Art. Connection with Buber.

1959. Hölderlins Erde und Himmel [Vortrag München]. 6. Juni 1959. In: GA 4. Vortrag, gehalten bei der Tagung der Hölderlin-Gesellschaft im Cuvillies-Theater der Residenz in München am 6. Juni 1959. Wiederholt bei der Bibliotheksgesellschaft Stuttgart im Blauen

Saal der Liederhalle am 14. Juli 1959, für das Studium Generale in der Aula der Universität Freiburg i.Br. am 27. November 1959 und in der Neuen Aula der Universität Heidelberg am 18. Januar 1960. Accession number 75.7348,1.

1959. Über die Be-Stimmung der Künste im gegenwärtigen Weltalter [Vortrag Baden-Baden, Haus Schweizer]. In: In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. On the 7 und 8. Mai 1959. DLA Umfang, Beilagen 86 Bl., davon 1 Bl. Dr. mit Materialien "zu den Vorbemerkungen" u. a. über Klee, Hegel, Gropius, Nietzsche.

1959. Das menschliche Dasein als ein Bereidi des Vemeahmenkonns. Seminar September 8 1959.

1959. Christlicher Glaube und Denken, With the Theological Working Group of the "Old Marburgers" at Höchst in Odenwalt (Hesse) on Wednesday, 22. October 1959.

1959. Dankrede anlässlich der Verleihung der Ehrenbürgerschaft der Stadt Meßkirch": Address given on 27 September 1959. GA 16:558-561. CD set *Von der Sache des Denkens*.

1960. Ansprache zum 80. Geburtstag Ludwig von Ficker. Innsbruck am 13. April 1960. GA 16:563-564.

1960. GA 16, # 234. Dank bei der Verleihung des staatlichen Hebelgedenkreises (10. Mai 1960). 200th anniversary of the birth of Johann Peter Hebel. Hebel Prize given to Heidegger.

1960. Sprache und Heimat [Vortrag Wesselburen]. 2. Juli 1960. In: *Hebbel-Jahrbuch* 1960, Heide in Holstein 1960. In: *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (1910–1976). GA 13:155-180. Accession number 75.7195. 02.07.1960 [Datum des Vortrags]. Sprache und Heimat (1960) Lecture given on 2 July 1960 in Wesselburen on the occasion of the annual conference of the Hebbel Society at its festive evening, which was organized jointly with the Klaus Groth Society. (GA 13:249).

1960. Bild und Wort [Symposium]. Location: Bremen? Heidegger may have only been attending this group and did not give a lecture. See, *Encounters and dialogues with Martin Heidegger 1929-1976* by Heinrich Wiegand Petzet (1909-1997). DLA 75.7336,1b listed as 5 pages. „In the end the first approach was chosen. The participants prepared for the seminar by concentrating on five texts: a quotation from Augustine's *Confessions* (10.7-8), Heraclitus's Fragment 112, Chuang-Tzu's simile of the carillon stand, the text of Paul Klee's lecture in Jena ("On Modern Art"), and Heidegger's couplet "Nur Gebild wahr't Gesicht / Doch Gesicht ruht im Gedicht" (Only image preserves the face/ But the face rests in the poem). Thus, we had the prerequisite foundation for the seminar discussion. It lasted two days and one evening and was held partly in the Bremen *Kunsthalle* (art gallery)-in front of a painting by Rembrandt and an abstraction by Manessier) - but for the most part in Obemuland. These meetings basically showed that hardly anyone was really equal to Heidegger's method of inquiry, especially when preparation could not be as thorough as with students at a university." *Encounters and dialogues*, page 59. Seminar guests "Jean Beaufret from Paris, the clergyman Paul Hassler from Basel, Dr. Martin Nagel, and Heidegger's old friend Dr. Ingeborg Schroth" Petzet, page 60.

1961. Kants These über das Sein [Vortrag Kiel]. 17. Mai 1961 In: *Existenz und Ordnung. Festschrift für Erik Wolf zum 60. Geburtstag*. Frankfurt am Main 1962; in: GA 9:445-480. *Wegmarken* (1919–1961).

1961. GA 16, #236. 700 Jahre Meßkirch (Ansprache zum Heimatabend am 22. Juli 1961). GA 16:574-582.

1961. Dank an die Heimatstadt Meßkirch. GA 16:558-561. 27. September 1959.

1961. Akademie heute (Manuskripttitel) [Notizen]. Zugangsnummer 75.7336,1a Notizen zu einem Vortrag in Berlin, November 1961.

1961. Das Verhältnis des heutigen Menschen zur Kunst. Not given. Nicht gehaltene Rede vom 2. Dezember 1961 zum fünfundfünfzig Geburtstag van Inge Krummer-Schroth. GA 16:583-584.

1961. Systematisches Seminar von Prof. Dr. Ebeling, WS 1960/61.

Protokoll der Sitzung vom 3.3.1961 (found in the estate of Wilhelm Anz) mit Prof Dr. Martin Heidegger. Heidegger über Luther im Seminar Gerhard Ebelings (1961). On March 3 and 4, 1961, Heidegger took part in the two concluding sessions of the systematic seminar conducted by Gerhard Ebeling in the winter semester 1960/61 in Zürich. Gegenstand jener Seminarsitzungen war Luthers »Disputatio de homine« (1536).

1962. Zeit und Sein [Vortrag]. In: *ZSD*. Given 31. January 1962, at the Studium Generale, University of Freiburg. GA 14. *Zur Sache des Denkens*, pages 1-25.

1962. 11-13. September 1962. Heidegger wrote, “The minutes of the seminar on the lecture "Time and Being" are due to Dr. Alfredo Guzzoni. The text was checked by me and supplemented in some places. The seminar took place in Todtnauberg (Black Forest) from 11-13. September 1962 in six sessions“.

1962. Max Kommerell [Vortrag]. In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. Vortrag in der Gedächtnisfeier von Max Kommerell 27. Februar 1962). 27.02.1962 [Datum des Vortrags].

1962. GA 16, # 238. Die Rettung des Arztiums (19. Oktober 1962). Speech for the wedding of Peter Reesam.

1962. Überlieferte Sprache und technische Sprache [Vortrag Comburg].

In: 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. 18. Juli 1962. “Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache”: Lecture given 18. July 1962, Comburg (Schwäbische Hall). “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” in *Journal of Philosophical Research* 23, 1998, pp. 129–45. Jörg Heidegger was a graduate assistant at this school at the time.

1963. From a Conversation with a Buddhist Monk. Between Bhikku Maha Mani und Martin Heidegger im Herbst 1963 in dessen Haus in Freiburg - Zahringen. Discussion at Heidegger's house and then TV interview. GA 16:589-593. Broadcast on November 1963, 16. March 1965 and the program was partially repeated and expanded on the basis of the 1963 conversation on the 80th anniversary of Martin Heidegger's birth (26. September 1969). For Heidegger's

discussions see *Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger, 1929-1976* by Heinrich Wiegand Petzet (1909-1997).

1963. Zur Sache des Denkens. On the Matter for Thinking. "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," "My Way to Phenomenology." Dated: 1963. GA 14:99. "Der Zwei-te Teil schließt ab mit dem Text Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage, Heideggers nach-trägliche schriftliche Ausformulierung dessen, was er im Rah-men eines philosophischen Fachgespräches im kleineren Kreise an der Freiburger Katholischen Akademie im Anschluß an seine Verlesung des Textes Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie mündlich ausgeführt hatte (veröffentlicht in: Phänomenologie — lebendig oder tot? Veröffentlichungen der Katholischen Akademie der Erz-diözese Freiburg Nr. 18, 1969, S. 47)." GA 14:155.

1964. GA 16, #241. Tischrede zum 70. Geburtstag des Bruders am 6. Februar 1964. Table Talk or after dinner talk on the brother's 70th Birthday - delivered in Meßkirch on February 6, 1964. GA 16:594-597.

1964. Über Abraham a Santa Clara [lecture Meßkirch]. Martin's Hall, Meßkirch 2. Mai 1964. GA 16:598-608.

1964. Bemerkungen zu Kunst - Plastik – Raum. Vortrag anlässlich einer Skulpturenausstellung von Bernhard Heilige in der Galerie, Im Erker' in St. Galle am 3. Oktober 1964. In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

1964. Für Rene Char zum Andenken an den großen Freund Georges Braque. Freiburg. 16. September 1963.

1964. Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens. 1964. GA 14. Read by Jean Beaufret in Paris 21-23 April 1964. Colloque organise par l'Unesco a Paris. Lecture given during a colloquium on Kierkegaard in Paris, France. Supposedly there were 1000 people listening to the reading.

1964. Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens. Heidelberger Fassung (Vortrag am 24. Juli 1964). GA 80.2

1964. Zur Lesung von A. Stifters "Eisgeschichte" aus "Die Mappe meines Urgroßvaters" [Prosa. Reden und Vorträge] (Manuskripttitel), 26.01.1964 [Senddatum], broadcast date. Adalbert Stifters Eisgeschichte Beitrag Martin Heideggers in der Sendereihe, Wirken- des Wort' der Schweizerischen Radio- und Fernsehge- sellschaft 1963/64, gesendet von Radio Zürich am 26. Januar 1964 und erschienen in: Wirkendes Wort (hergestellt von der Schweizerischen Bibliophilen-Gesellschaft), Zürich 1964, pages 23-38. GA 13:185-198.

1964. Die Bestimmung (Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung) der Sache des Denkens. Heidelberger Fassung (Vortrag am 24. Juli 1964). Die Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens [lecture Kiel]. Vortrag zum 65. Geburtstag von Walter Bröcker in Kiel am 19. Juli 1967. In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

1965. Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens. 30.10.1965. "partly delivered on October 30 in Amriswil". Accession number 75.7222,1. Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der

Sache des Denkens (30. Oktober 1965). Der Text ist die erweiterte Fassung einer Rede, die Martin Heidegger unter dem Titel »Das Ende des Denkens in der Gestalt der Philosophie« anlässlich einer Feier für den Schweizer Psychiater Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) in Amriswil gehalten hat. "Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens. GA 16:620-633.

1965. Das Ende des Denkens in der Gestalt der Philosophie [lecture]. 30. Oktober 1965.

1965. Für Mikaela und Friedrich Rebholz [Prosa. Reden und Vorträge] (Drucktitel), 05.06.1965. Speech at the wedding. GA 16:610-616.

1965. GA 16, #245. Zum siebzigsten Geburtstag von Siegfried Bröse am 8. August 1965. GA 16:617-619.

1966. Für Eugen Fink zum sechzigsten Geburtstag [Prosa. Reden und Vorträge] (Drucktitel), 03.1966. GA 29/30:533-536. 29/30. *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit* (Winter semester 1929/30). For Eugen Fink on His Sixtieth Birthday. Freiburg i. Br., 30 March 1966. The celebration was held on 10 December 1965, at the Viktoria-Hotel in Freiburg. Noted by Heidegger that Fink helped him move Heidegger's writing desk in the 1929 to his home at Röt buck or now Röt buckweg, Zähringen, a suburb of Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany.

1966. Dankeswort für Dr. Müller-Skjold (Anfang Mai 1966). In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967. Kreuzfahrt vom 17. April bis 1. Mai 1966. DLA 75.7352,13.

1966. GA 16, # 247. Verlust der Heimat (Für Gerta Grahl zum 80. Geburtstag am 15. Februar 1966). GA 16:634-637. (Translation, Lost of homeland).

1967. Die Bestimmung (Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung) der Sache des Denkens. Heidelberger Fassung (Vortrag am 24. Juli 1964). Die Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens [lecture Kiel]. Vortrag zum 65. Geburtstag von Walter Bröcker in Kiel am 19. Juli 1967. GA 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

1967. Die der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denken. Vortrag in der Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste in Athen am 4. April 1967. 1. "Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens," in *Denkerfahrten: 1910–1976*, ed. Hermann Heidegger (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983), 35–49. English translation by Dimitrios Latsis, amended by Ullrich Haase: "The provenance of Art and the Destination of Thought (1967)," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 44:2 (2013): 119–28. DLA 75.7368,4. In 80.2 *Vorträge*. Teil 2: 1935 BIS 1967.

1967. "Seminar in Harnburg-Wellingsbüttel". Seminar, gehalten in den Jahren 1967/68 im Hause of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker in Hamburg-Wellingsbüttel edited by Ewald Richter 'Heideggers Seminar in Wellingsbüttel', in: *Heidegger Studies* (16), 2000. Berlin, pages 221-245. Heideggers Seminar in Wellingsbüttel. At Carl Weizsäcker's home in Wellingsbüttel. Seminars on Heidegger's recent lectures, "Time and Being" (1962) and "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" (1964). Weizsäcker and Kant on science. Aristotle Physik (B 1, 192 b 13ff.). Aristotle and Husserl concepts. Zenon's paradoxes.

1967. Erinnerung an Hans Jantzen. Wort der Freunde zum Freund in die Abgeschiedenheit. Speech Feb. 20, 1967.

1968. Speech at the wedding of his adopted daughter's (Erika 'Birle' Deyhle) daughter. In other words, Heidegger's granddaughter's wedding. GA 16: section 256. Ruhe im Herzen -- klar die Gedanken (20. Juli 1968, Münsingen,). Kurze Ansprache am Hochzeitstag von Richard und Ursula Greiner, geb. Deyhle. Ursula Greiner (geb. 1946-). Richard and Ursula Greiner, née Deyhle daughter, Ursula Greiner (1946-). GA 16:690-694.

1968. 20. August 1968. Leads discussion. Hegel: Differenzschrift. GA 15:286. *Seminare*. (1951–1973). Über Seminararbeit. Hegels Differenzschrift. "A Heidegger Seminar on Hegel's Differenzschrift." *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (FALL 1980), pp. 9-45. Topic of tornness in Hegel's dialectics. [<https://www.jstor.org/stable/43155290>].

1968. Das Gedicht [lecture Amriswil]. Also known as "Hölderlin: Das Gedicht." Vortrag zum 70. Geburtstag von Friedrich Georg Jünger in Amriswil am 25. August 1968. "The Poem" (2000) [Keith Hoeller]. "Das Gedicht": Revised version of a lecture given on August 25, 1968, in honor of Friedrich Ernst Jünger's 70th birthday. *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* [4th ed.] (1971) Frankfurt: Klostermann, pp. 182–92. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry* (2000) Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, pp. 209–19.

1968. Zur letzten amtlichen Vorlesung von H.-G. Gadamer Ende des Wintersemester 1968/69. 75.7285,4. HS009036087. Gadamer's typed lecture with Heidegger's handwritten notes on it was recently sold at auction.

1968. About Heidegger's lecture a Kolloquium, das im Juli 1968 zum Thema "Zeit und Sein". It is not clear by the record in DLA if Heidegger was there or if he answers the various questions. Listed as 171 pages, but the document is in DLA Marbach under his name. Haupttitel Notizen zu "Zeit und Sein" (Manuskripttitel) Umfang, Beilagen 171 Bl. Entstehungszeit 1962 [?] -1968 Unteraufnahme(n) Dabei: Böhme, Gernot: Fragen zum Vortrag "Zeit und Sein" [Verschiedenes] Dabei: Meyer-Abich, Klaus M.: Fragen zum Kolloquium über "Zeit und Sein" [Verschiedenes] Dabei: Miller, A.: Fragen zum Thema "Zeit und Sein" [Verschiedenes] Dabei: Richter, Ewald: Fragen an Professor M. Heidegger zum Vortrag "Zeit und Sein" [Verschiedenes]/ Inhaltsangabe Notizen zum Vortrag und zu einem Kolloquium, das im Juli 1968 zum Thema "Zeit und Sein" stattfand.

1969. This text is a transcript of Richard Wisser's interview with Heidegger on 17 September 1969. It was aired on television on 24 September 1969, as a tribute to Heidegger in honor of his 80th birthday. Martin Heidegger im Gespräch with Richard Wisser, GA 16:702-710, #262).

1969. GA 16, #263. Dankansprache am 26. September 1969 in Meßkirch

1969. GA 16, #265. Fragen nach dem Aufenthalt des Menschen — Dankrede an der Geburtstagsfeier in Amriswil (28. September 1969). Thanksgiving speech at the birthday celebration in Amriswil, in: NZZ No. 606, 05.10.1969 Nachlaß Bernhard Welte. Emil Staiger's Amriswil speech ("Martin Heidegger"), and M. H.'s response, with a title added by the editors,

"Fragen nach dem Aufenthalt des Menschen" (Questions on the whereabouts (Aufenthalt, residence) of man).

1969. "Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage": Essay written in 1969 in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the death of Edmund Husserl. GA 14.

1969. Le poeme (Manuskripttitel). In French. From Martin Heidegger and René Char to Friedrich Georg Jünger 1969. See GA 4.

1970. The lecture "On the Question of the Destiny of Art," which Heidegger gave on April 9, 1970, at the at the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts in Munich. "Die Frage nach der Bestimmung der Kunst," lecture in the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts, April 9, 1970. DLA record. Die Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens 1964. Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Kunst 1970 (Manuskripttitel) [Notizen; Schuber-Beschriftung]. Umfang, Beilagen 125 Blatt". So, some sources suggest that the manuscript was lost, but this record does appear in DLA Marbach. DLA 75.7370,2. Schuber/C 12.

Heidegger had a slight stroke on his way from Munich to Meßkirch and he later recovered. He was apoplectic. Elfride Heidegger to Susanne Fink in a letter of 14. April 1970, "I am in Augsburg, where I was called last Saturday because on the trip from Munich to Meßkirch my husband suffered a slight stroke and was brought here to the hospital. He is now much better." This stroke caused Martin's handwriting to change.

1971. Das Wohnen des Menschen Beitrag, geschrieben für Gustav Hillard Steinbomer zum 90. Geburtstag. Erstveröffentlichung in: Hesperus (Festschrift für Gustav Hillard Steinbomer zum 90. Geburtstag am 24. Februar 1971). GA 13 (1983), pages 213-220.

1973. GA 16, #275. Statt einer Rede — Zur Einweihungsfeier für das Gymnasium in Meßkirch am 14. Juli 1973. Instead of speech. Inauguration ceremony for High School.

1974. Tischrede zum achtzigsten Geburtstag unseres Bruders und Schwagers [Prosa. Reden und Vorträge] (Manuskripttitel), 06.02.1974. [80th birthday for brother and brother-in-law. Speech for the 80th birthday of the brother on the 6th. February 1974 in Rothaus (Black Forest, Schwarzwald). GA 16:736-737.

1974. Heidegger's 85th birthday was on September 26, 1974. Heidegger reported said, in a moving speech, "Silence is the gratitude of old age." Petzet, page 220. Heidegger also read from a letter he had gotten from a woman Russian philosopher. GA 16:741. Meßkirch.

Unknown dates for these two:

Es ist Herbst. Zugangsnummer/Accession number DLA 75.7068,2. Schuber/A 23. 5 pages.

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

Ein Gesetz des Denkens als der Anspruch "des" Seins. mit den handschriftlichen Vermerken "Bremen" und "Schluß". Mediennummer HS010695145 Übernommene Sigel B 72. In the DLA. Schuber/B 72. 14 pages.

Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe (HGA or GA)

Published by Verlag Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland, Germany.
Volumes or Band with abbreviations. Citation format HGA or simply GA 3: page numbers.
Example, GA 8:120. Band or Volume 8 and page 120.

Part 2.

GA 1. *Frühe Schriften* (1912–1916)

GA 2. *Sein und Zeit* (1927)

GA 3. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929)

GA 4. *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (1936–1968)

GA 5. *Holzwege* (1935–1946)

GA 6.1. *Nietzsche I* (1936–1939)

GA 6.2. *Nietzsche II* (1939–1946)

GA 7. *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1953)

GA 8. *Was heißt Denken?* (1951–1952)

GA 9. *Wegmarken* (1919–1961)

GA 10. *Der Satz vom Grund* (1955–1956)

GA 11. *Identität und Differenz* (1955–1957)

GA 12. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950–1959)

GA 13. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (1910–1976)

GA 14. *Zur Sache des Denkens* (1962–1964)

GA 15. *Seminare* (1951–1973)

GA 16. *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (1910–1976)

GA 17. *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (Winter semester 1923/24)

GA 18. *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (Summer semester 1924)

GA 19. *Platon: Sophistes* (Winter semester 1924/25)

- GA 20. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (Summer semester 1925)
- GA 21. *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (Winter semester 1925/26)
- GA 22. *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (Summer semester 1926)
- GA 23. *Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant* (Winter semester 1926/27),
- GA 24. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Summer semester 1927)
- GA 25. *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Winter semester 1927/28)
- GA 26. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (Summer semester 1928)
- GA 27. *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Winter semester 1928/29)
- GA 28. *Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel)* (Summer semester 1929)
- GA 29/30. *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit* (Winter semester 1929/30)
- GA 31. *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Summer semester 1930)
- GA 32. *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Winter semester 1930/31)
- GA 33. *Aristoteles, Metaphysik IX, 1–3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft* (Summer semester 1931)
- GA 34. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet* (Winter semester 1931/32)
- GA 35. *Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie* (Summer semester 1932)
- GA 36/37 *Sein und Wahrheit* (Summer semester 1933) and (Winter semester 1933/34)
- GA 38. *A Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* (Neuedition nach dem Originalmanuskript) (Summer semester 1934).
- GA 39. *Hölderlins Hymnen »Germanien« und »Der Rhein«.* (Winter semester 1934/35)
- GA 40. *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Summer semester 1935)
- GA 41. *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (Winter semester 1935/36)
- GA 42. *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (Summer semester 1936)
- GA 43. *Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst* (Winter semester 1936/37)
- GA 44. *Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken* (Summer semester 1937)

- GA 45. *Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte »Probleme« der »Logik«.* (Winter semester 1937/38)
- GA 46. *Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemäßer Betrachtung* (Winter semester 1938/39)
- GA 47. *Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis* (Summer semester 1939)
- GA 48. *Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus.* (II second trimester 1940)
- GA 49. *Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus* (I. Trimester 1941/Summer semester 1941)
- GA 50. *Nietzsches Metaphysik / Einleitung in die Philosophie* (announced for the Winter semester 1941/42) and (Winter semester 1944/45)
- GA 51. *Grundbegriffe* (Summer semester 1941)
- GA 52. *Hölderlins Hymne »Andenken«* (Winter semester 1941/42)
- GA 53. *Hölderlins Hymne »Der Ister«* (Summer semester 1942)
- GA 54. *Parmenides* (Winter semester 1942/43),
- GA 55. *Heraklit* (Summer semester 1943) and (Summer semester 1944)
- GA 56/57. *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* (Kriegsnotsemester 1919) and (Summer semester 1919)
- GA 58. *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Winter semester 1919/20)
- GA 59. *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks* (Summer semester 1920)
- GA 60. *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* (Winter semester 1920/21) and (Summer semester 1921) and undelivered course 1918/19
- GA 61. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles* (Winter semester 1921/22)
- GA 62. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik* (Summer semester 1922)
- GA 63. *Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität* (Summer semester 1923)
- GA 64. *Der Begriff der Zeit* (1924)
- GA 65. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–1938)
- GA 66. *Besinnung* (1938-1939)
- GA 67. *Metaphysik und Nihilismus* (1938/1939, and 1946-1948)
- GA 68. *Hegel* (1938-1939, 1940, 1942)
- GA 69. *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1938-1940)

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

GA 70. *Über den Anfang* (1941)

GA 71. *Das Ereignis* (1941-1942)

GA 72. *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944) Note. Publication after 2023. Not yet published.

GA 73.1. *Zum Ereignis-Denken*

GA 73.2. *Zum Ereignis-Denken*

GA 74. *Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst*

GA 75. *Zu Hölderlin – Griechenlandreisen*

GA 76. *Leitgedanken zur Entstehung der Metaphysik*

GA 77. *Feldweg-Gespräche* (1944/45)

GA 78. *Der Spruch des Anaximander* (Summer, Fall 1942. Not delivered)

GA 79. *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*

GA 80.1. *Vorträge 1915 bis 1932*

GA 80.2. *Vorträge 1935 bis 1967*

GA 81. *Gedachtes*

GA 82. *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen*

GA 83. *Seminare: Platon – Aristoteles – Augustinus*

GA 84.1 *Seminare: Kant – Leibniz – Schiller*

GA 84.2 *Seminare: Kant – Leibniz – Schiller.*

GA 85. *Seminar: Vom Wesen der Sprache* (Summer semester 1939)

GA 86. *Seminare: Hegel – Schelling*

GA 87. *Nietzsche: Seminare 1937 und 1944*

GA 88. *Seminare: 1937/38 und 1941/42.* 1. Die metaphysischen Grundstellungen des abendländischen Denkens. 2. Einübung in das philosophische Denken.

GA 89. *Zollikoner Seminare*

GA 90. *Zu Ernst Jünger*

GA 91. *Ergänzungen und Denksplitter*

GA 92. *Ausgewählte Briefe I.* ed. Mark Michalsk. *Forthcoming.* Unknown date.

GA 93. *Ausgewählte Briefe II.* ed. Mark Michalsk. *Forthcoming.* Unknown date.

GA 94. *Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

GA 95. *Überlegungen VII–XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938-39)*

GA 96. *Überlegungen XII–XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*

GA 97. *Anmerkungen I–V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*

GA 98. *Anmerkungen VI–IX (Schwarze Hefte 1948/49-1951)*

GA 99. *Vier Hefte I und II (1947–1950)*

GA 100. *Vigiliae und Notturmo (1952/53 bis 1957)*

GA 101. *Winke I und II (Schwarze Hefte 1957–1959)*

GA 102. *Vorläufiges I–IV (Schwarze Hefte 1963-1970)*

Letters. Briefe. Briefwechsel.

Note: some of the letter exchanges include other documents, clarifications, and excellent and sumptuous editorial notes. This is not by any means a complete list. Some English translations are at the end of the list. Forthcoming series, *Martin-Heidegger-Briefausgabe* / hrsg. von Alfred Denker und Holger Zaborowski. First rate editors and we all hope to see many volumes come out from this series. As well as this series, GA 92. *Ausgewählte Briefe I.* ed. Mark Michalsk. Forthcoming. Unknown date. GA 93. *Ausgewählte Briefe II.* ed. Mark Michalsk. Forthcoming. Unknown date.

Part 3.

Briefe und Begegnungen. Briefe und Begegnungen. By Martin Heidegger and Bernhard Welte
Klett-Cotta (March 1, 2003).

Briefwechsel 1952-1967.

Martin Heidegger and Ludwig von Ficker. Herausgegeben von Bruno Pieger. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag (March 1, 2004).

Briefwechsel 1957-1976. Series: Martin Heidegger Briefausgabe Band II/3

Author: Martin Heidegger, Otto Pöggeler. Publisher: Karl Alber

Release Date: 2021.

Hannah Arendt / Martin Heidegger. Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse.

Herausgegeben von Ursula Ludz. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998.

Briefe an Max Müller und andere Dokumente. Martin Heidegger / Max Müller, Briefwechsel.

Herausgegeben von Holger Zaborowski. Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 2003.

Briefe und Begegnungen. Martin Heidegger / Bernhard Welte. Briefwechsel.

Herausgegeben von Alfred Denker und Holger Zaborowski. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2003.

Martin Heidegger / Elisabeth Blochmann. Briefwechsel 1918-1969.

Herausgegeben von Joachim W. Storck. Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schiller-gesellschaft, 1989.

Martin Heidegger / Imma von Bodmershof, Briefwechsel 1959-1976.

Herausgegeben von Bruno Pieger. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2000.

Heideggers Briefwechsel mit Medard Boss wurde teilweise veröffentlicht in: Martin Heidegger,

Zollikoner Seminare. Protokolle - Zwiege-spräche - Briefe. Herausgegeben von Medard Boss.

Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1994.

Heideggers Briefwechsel mit Ludwig von Ficker wurde teilweise veröffentlicht in: Ludwig von Ficker, Briefwechsel 1940-1967. Herausgegeben von Ignaz Zangerle, Walter Methagl, and Franz Syer. Innsbruck: Haymon Verlag, 1996.

Teile von Heideggers Briefwechsel mit Hans-Georg Gadamer wurde veröffentlicht von Jean Grondin in seinem Buch Hans-Georg Gadamer. Eine Biographie. Tübingen: Mohr, 1999.

Heideggers Briefwechsel mit Paul Häberlin wurde veröffentlicht in: Paul Häberlin / Ludwig Binswanger. Briefwechsel 1908-1960. Herausgegeben von Jeannine Luczak. Basel: Schwabe, 1997.

Martin Heidegger / Edmund Husserl. Briefwechsel 1916-1933.

In: *Husserliana Dokumente.* Band 3. Teil 4. Die Freiburger Schüler. Herausgegeben von Karl Schuhmann und Elisabeth Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.

Martin Heidegger / Karl Jaspers. Briefwechsel 1920-1963.

Herausgegeben von Walter Biemel und Hans Saner. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1990.

Martin Heidegger / Erhart Kästner. Briefwechsel 1953-1974.

Herausgegeben von Heinrich W. Petzet. Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1986.

Heideggers Briefwechsel mit Max Kommerell wurde teilweise veröffentlicht in: Max Kommerell, Briefe und Aufzeichnungen: 1919-1944.

Aus dem Nachlaß herausgegeben von Inge Jens. Freiburg: Olten, 1967.

Martin Heidegger / Heinrich Rickert, Briefe 1912-1933.

Herausgegeben von Alfred Denker. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.

Rudolf Bultmann/Martin Heidegger: Briefwechsel 1925–1975. Edited by Andreas Großmann and Christof Landmesser. Foreword by EBERHARD JÜNGEL. Pp. xxvi + 342. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann and Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009. Mit einem Geleitwort von Eberhard Jungel.

Heidegger und der Antisemitismus. Positionen im Widerstreit. Mit Briefen von Martin und Fritz Heidegger. Hg. von Walter Homolka und Arnulf Heidegger. Verlag Herder, 2016, 443 Seiten.

Also... Letters to his brother Fritz Heidegger (1894-1980). See some of their letter exchange, in *Heidegger und der Antisemitismus.* 2016.

Martin Heidegger Briefausgabe / Briefwechsel mit seinen Eltern (1907-1927) und Briefe an seine Schwester (1921-1967) 2013. Pages 213.

Martin Heidegger Kurt Bauch. Briefwechsel 1932 – 1975. Abt.2. By Martin Heidegger and Kurt Bauch. Karl Alber: Freiburg/München, 2010.

Briefwechsel 1919-1973. By Martin Heidegger and Karl Löwith. Alber Karl (February 1, 2017).

Note selected persons that Heidegger wrote letters to that are in the following collection. Martin

Heidegger Archives. Online: Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, in the town of Marbach am Neckar, Germany. Also known as: DLA - German Literature Archive. Most of Martin Heidegger's manuscripts are in the DLA's collection. Search for Heidegger in their Manuscript Collections.

There are known (in the DLA) Heidegger's letters that were sent to the following people:

Bauch, Doris
Barth, Heinrich
Bauch, Kurt
Beaufret, Jean. Jean Beaufret (1907-1982)
Bense, Max
Blaum, Eddo
Blumenthal, Sophie
Bondy, François
Burckhardt, Carl Jacob
Böckmann, Paul
Bröcker, Walter
Bultmann, Rudolf
Carossa, Hans
Deschner, Karlheinz
Feick, Hildegard
Gerber, Elisabeth (started from 1930 with letter from Elfride) Elisabeth Gerber-Krumsiek.
Grimme, Adolf
Groothoff, Hans-Hermann
Harbou, Andrea von
Heinemann, Gustav
Hillard, Gustav
Holthusen, Hans Egon
Hoop, Jan H. van der
Keidel, Eugen
Keil, Barbara
Kommerell, Max
Krohn, Luise
Laslowski, Ernst
Linder, Heinz-Peter
Mörchen, Hermann
Nette, Herbert
Otte, Eleonore
Petzet, Heinrich Wiegand
Picht, Georg
Picht-Axenfeld, Edith
Rahner, Karl
Reich-Ranicki, Marcel

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

Schadewaldt, Wolfgang
Schröter, Manfred
Siewert, Gustav
Sternberger, Dolf
Strohschneider-Kohrs, Ingrid
Szilasi, Wilhelm
Tugendhat, Ernst
Weiss, Helene
Wocke, Helmut
Wurm, Franz
Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von

Includes a number of letters from Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976) to Martin Heidegger, but there are none listed from Martin Heidegger to Werner Heisenberg. This list is not complete.

English translation of letters.

Correspondence: 1919-1973 / by Martin Heidegger and Karl Löwith; translated by J. Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen. Description: Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, [2021]. Pages 295.

Correspondence, 1949–1975 / By Martin Heidegger and Ernst Jünger; translated by Timothy Sean Quinn. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016. Pages 144.

Letters, 1925-1975 / By Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger; translated from the German by Andrew Shields. Harcourt; 1st edition (December 1, 2003). Pages 360.

Letters to his Wife: 1915 – 1970. By Martin Heidegger. Polity; 1st edition (February 1, 2010). Pages 248.

Zollikon Seminars: Protocols - Conversations – Letters. By Martin Heidegger and Medard Boss. Franz Mayr (Translator). Northwestern University Press; 1st edition (September 12, 2001). Pages 360.

Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien / Etudes Heideggeriennes

Part 4.

Heidegger Studies is a peer-reviewed, annual journal dedicated to promoting the understanding of Heidegger's thought through the interpretation of his writings. Heidegger Studies provides a forum for the thorough interpretation of the whole of Heidegger's work (including works published during his lifetime) that is called for by the publication of his Gesamtausgabe. (From the internet).

Zerklüftung des Seins , Vol. 28/2012.

Die "Seinsfrage" in 'Sein und Zeit'. Das Transzendente in 'Sein und Zeit' , Vol. 27 / 2011.

Zum "Brief" über den "Humanismus". Der Mensch- und das Seyn. Was ist Metaphysik? Das Wesen des Menschen. Gut und Böse, Vol. 26 / 2010.

Beiträge zur Philosophie. Das Da-sein und Das Seyn (Ereignis) [Zweiter Teil], Vol. 25 / 2009.

Die Ortschaft im Echo des Parmenides, Vol. 24 / 2008.

Beiträge zur Philosophie. Das Da-sein und Das Seyn (Ereignis), Vol. 23 / 2007.

Zum "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" (Zu Frankfurter Vorträgen), Vol. 22 / 2006.

Die Neuzeit. "Die" Wissenschaft. Wissenschaft und Denken, Vol. 21 / 2005.

Seinsvergessenheit , Vol. 20 / 2004.

Die Dichtung, Φιλοσοφία - Ποίησις - Das Gespräch, Vol 19 / 2003.

Das Wesen der Wahrheit: zu "Beiträge zur Philosophie", Vol. 18 / 2002.

Die Frage nach dem Sein, Vol. 17/2001.

Briefe an Julius Stenzel (1928-1932), Vol. 16/2000.

Das Sein (Ereignis), Vol. 15 / 1999.

Aufzeichnungen zur Temporalität (Aus den Jahren 1925 bis 1927), Vol. 14 / 1998

Aus den Aufzeichnungen zu dem mit Eugen Fink veranstalteten Heraklit-Seminar, Vol. 13 / 1997.

Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem (Auszug aus der Nachschrift Brecht), Vol. 12 / 1996.

Über die Maxime "Zu den Sachen selbst", Vol. 11 / 1995.

Die Armut, Vol. 10 / 1994. Also in GA 73.

Die nachgelassenen Klee-Notizen (Zsgest. von G. Seubold), Vol. 9 / 1993.

Die Unumgänglichkeit des Da-seins ("Die Not") und die Kunst in ihrer Notwendigkeit (Die bewirkende Besinnung), Vol. 8 / 1992.

Unbenutzte Vorarbeiten zur Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1929/1930: "Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit" , Vol. 7 / 1991.

Zur Überwindung der Aesthetik. Zu "Ursprung des Kunstwerks" , Vol. 6 / 1990.

Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks: Erste Ausarbeitung , Vol. 5 / 1989.

Brief an Jean Beaufret / Letter to Jean Beaufret , Vol. 3-4/ 1987-88.

Die Grundfrage nach dem Sein selbst, Vol. 2 / 1986.

Jahresgaben der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft **(from the internet)**

Part 5.

Auszüge zur Phänomenologie aus dem Manuskript »Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage« 2011/2012.

»Das Geringe« Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß (Faksimile und Umdruck) 2010.

»Das Eigentümliche« Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß (Faksimile und Umdruck) 2009.

»Eine gefährliche Irrnis« Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß (Faksimile und Umdruck) 2008.

»Kehre?« »Sagen der Kehre« Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß (Faksimile und Umdruck) 2007.

Ausgewählte Briefe an Hans-Georg Gadamer (Faksimile und Umdruck) 2005/2006

Zu E. Mörikes Gedichten „September-Morgen“ und „Um Mitternacht“ Unveröffentlichter Vortrag, Pädagogische Akademie II., Freiburg 12. Juli 1955. (Faksimile) und Umdruck

Ausgewählte Briefe Martin Heideggers an Heinrich Wiegand Petzet (1931-1971) (Faksimile und Umdruck) 2003

Ein Brief an Friedrich Georg Jünger (19. August 1953) (Faksimile und Umdruck) 2001

Rückweg und Kehre Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 2000

Ein Brief an Ernst Jünger (December 18, 1950) (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1998

Die Herkunft der Gottheit Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1997

„Existenzialismus“ Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile and Umdruck) 1995

Besinnung auf unser Wesen (1943/44) Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1994

Das Gedächtnis im Ereignis. Das Wesen des Menschen Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1993

Die Armut (1943/44) Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1992. Also in GA 73.

Cézanne Aus der Reihe Gedachtes für René Char. L'Herne 1971. Spätere Fassung 1974. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1991

Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft und moderne Technik Grußwort an die Teilnehmer des 10 Colloquiums vom 14.-16 Mai 1976 in Chicago. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1989

Das Wesen der Philosophie (Philosophie und Poesie) Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile and Umdruck) 1987.

Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft und moderne Technik

Grußwort an die Teilnehmer des 10 Colloquiums vom 14.-16 Mai 1976 in Chicago. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1989

Cézanne

Aus der Reihe Gedachtes für René Char. L'Herne 1971. Spätere Fassung 1974. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1991

Die Armut (1943/44) Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Naßlaß. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1992

Das Gedächtnis im Ereignis. Das Wesen des Menschen

Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1993

Besinnung auf unser Wesen (1943/44)

Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1994

„Existenzialismus“ Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile and Umdruck) 1995

Die Herkunft der Gottheit

Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 1997

Ein Brief an Ernst Jünger (December 18, 1950)

(Faksimile und Umdruck) 1998

Rückweg und Kehre

Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript aus dem Nachlaß. (Faksimile und Umbruch) 2000

Ein Brief an Friedrich Georg Jünger (19. August 1953)

(Faksimile und Umdruck) 2001

Ausgewählte Briefe Martin Heideggers an Heinrich Wiegand Petzet (1931-1971)

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

(Faksimile und Umdruck) 2003

Zu E. Mörikes Gedichten „September-Morgen“ und „Um Mitternacht“

Unveröffentlichter Vortrag, Pädagogische Akademie II., Freiburg 12. Juli 1955. (Faksimile und Umdruck) 2004

Additional References (bibliographies).

Master List:

“Martin Heidegger Schriftenverzeichnis (1909-2004)”. By Chris Bremmers listing of his works in *Heidegger-Jahrbuch* (3495457011), Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, vol. 1, pages 419–598. Note the year 2004.

Also, as this citation,

Martin Heidegger- Schriftenverzeichnis (1909-2004). Denker, Alfred (Contributor) Gander, Hans Helmuth (Contributor) Zaborowski, Holger (Contributor) Bremmers, C.J.G.(Creator).

The following are listed in chronology order.

Heidegger: Bibliography of addresses and courses he took and taught: German and English. By Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2022.

<https://archive.org/details/heidegger-bibliography-2022>

Translating Heidegger. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities; and *Voice that thinks: Heidegger studies with a bibliography of English translations, 1949-2015.* New York: ENI Press, 2016. By Miles Groth.

Grundriss Heidegger: Ein Handbuch zu Leben und Werk, 2014.

By Helmuth Vetter.

“A Heidegger Bibliography: The Gesamtausgabe Texts and their Current Translations.”

Continental Philosophy Review, 47, pages, 423-447. (2014). Thomas Sheehan. Note year 2014.

Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927, New, completely revised edition, Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, editors, Routledge, U.K., 2012.

Supplements: from the earliest essays to Being and time and beyond by Martin Heidegger; edited by John van Buren. 2002.

Uncollected Texts of Martin Heidegger

[<https://www.beyng.com/docs/KingG/UncollectedTexts.html>].

Others

[<https://www.heidegger-gesellschaft.de/en/year-books/>

[<https://open.org/series-599>

[<https://open.org/series-578>

1). Guide to the Helene Weiss Heidegger lecture notes, 1920-1949.

[<https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/ft0h4n974f/>]

2). "Übersicht über die "Heideggeriana" im Herbert Marcuse-Archiv der Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek in Frankfurt am Main" by Thomas Regehly. *Heidegger Studies* Vol. 7 (1991), pp. 179-209 (31 pages).

3). Nachlass (Nachlaß) Simon Moser

[https://www.deutsche-digitale-](https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/COWGTCNW34SJGGGOFCKC2ZBAGLHTVYOI)

[bibliothek.de/item/COWGTCNW34SJGGGOFCKC2ZBAGLHTVYOI](https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/COWGTCNW34SJGGGOFCKC2ZBAGLHTVYOI)

Eigene Nachschriften von Vorlesungen Martin Heideggers Archivale

Nachschrift der Marburger Vorlesung: "Platon. Sophistes", Teil 2

Nachschrift der Marburger Vorlesung: "Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Prolegomena zur Phänomenologie von Geschichte und Natur", Teil 1,

Nachschrift der Marburger Vorlesung: "Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs", Teil 2

Nachschrift der Marburger Vorlesung: "Logik", Teil 1

Nachschrift der Marburger Vorlesung: "Logik", Teil 2

Nachschrift der Marburger Vorlesung: "Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie"

Nachschrift der Freiburger Vorlesung: "Einleitung in die Philosophie", 2. Exemplar

Nachschrift der Freiburger Vorlesung: "Einleitung in die Philosophie", 1. Exemplar

Nachschrift der Freiburger Vorlesung: "Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik"

4). Nachlaß Bernhard Welte Laufzeit: 1912-2006

2008 bearbeitet von\ Steffen Lippitz und Gerhard Neumeier. Pages 247.

5). *Loyola University Chicago ~ Archives and Special Collections*. UA1999.03

Martin Heidegger Collection

Dates: ca. 1918-1976 Creator: Fiand, Barbara Extent: 1.75 linear feet Level of description:

Folder. Fritz Heidegger in 1978 gave Sister Fiand a suitcase of the Heidegger manuscripts. The

Heidegger family retains copyright. Includes marginalia on published writings.

Heidegger Index Projects by Daniel Fidel Ferrer

Ferrer, D. F. (2021). *Heidegger's Middle Period (German and English): an index*
<https://archive.org/details/mh-middle-index>

Ferrer, D.F. (2018). *Heidegger Zum Ereignis-Denken (GA73): An Index*
<https://archive.org/details/HeideggerGA73BookIndex>

Ferrer, D.F. (2017). *Heidegger Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942-1948): An Index.*
<https://archive.org/details/HeideggerGA97Index>

Ferrer, D. F. (2016). *Heidegger Schwarze Hefte (1931-1948): An Index*
<https://archive.org/details/HeideggerSchwarzeBlackNotebooksIndex>

Ferrer, D.F., Sharma, Ritu (2016). *Heidegger Being and Time, Sein und Zeit (1927): An Index*
<https://archive.org/details/SeinZeitBeingTimeIndex>

Ferrer, D. F. (2016). *Martin Heidegger Esoteric Writings: An Index*
<https://archive.org/details/HeideggerEsotericIndex>

Ferrer, D.F. (2016). *Martin Heidegger on the Greeks: An Index.*
<https://archive.org/details/HeideggerGreeksIndex>

Ferrer, D. F. (2016). *Martin Heidegger 1910-1932: An Index.*
<https://archive.org/details/MartinHeidegger19101932Index1>

Ferrer, D.F. (2016). *Heidegger Überlegungen XII-XV (GA96): An Index.*
<https://archive.org/details/HeideggerGA96Index>

Ferrer, D.F. *Name Index for: Martin Heidegger's
Contributions to philosophy (from enowning) (1936-1938)
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) Volume 65 of Gesamtausgabe (GA)*

Ferrer, D.F. *Ism-logy Index for: Martin Heidegger's
Contributions to philosophy (from enowning) (1936-1938)
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) Volume 65 of Gesamtausgabe (GA)*

Martin Heidegger Audio Recordings

Von der Sache des Denkens.

Edited by Hartmut Tietjen

München: Der Hörverlag. ISBN: 3895841951

5 sound discs (ca. 310 min.).

Titles:

CD: 1

1. *Martin Heidegger im Gespräch mit Richard Wisser* (ZDF 25.09.1969)

2. *Was heißt Denken?* (Vortrag / BR, Mai 1952)

3. *Zeit und Sein* (Vortrag / SWR, 29.1.1962)

CD: 2

1. *Zeit und Sein* (Vortrag / SWR, 29.1.1962) (Fortsetzung)

2. *Dankrede anlässlich der Verleihung der Ehrenbürgerschaft der Stadt Meßkirch* (SWR, 27.9.1959)

3. *Der Satz der Identität* (Vortrag, 27.6.1957)

CD: 3

1. *Der Satz der Identität* (Vortrag, 27.6.1957) (Fortsetzung)

2. *Die Sprache* (Vortrag, 23.1.1959)

CD: 4

1. *Die Sprache* (Vortrag, 23.1.1959) (Fortsetzung)

2. *Gelassenheit* (30.10.1955)

3. *Der Feldweg* (12.12.1952)

CD:5

Gelassenheit 30.10. 1955 58 mins

Der Feldweg 12. 12. 1952 15 mins.

Der Satz der Identität

(CD, 46 mn). Stuttgart. Klett-Cotta.

Vortrag zur Fünfhundertjahrfeier der Universität Freiburg im Breisgau

June 6th, 1957. Also, Pfullingen: G. Neske, Year: 1957

Description: 1 sound disc; 33 1/3 rpm, microgroove; 12 in.

Hölderlins Erde und Himmel

(2 CD, 84 mn). Stuttgart. Klett-Cotta

2 sound discs (84 mins). 4 3/4 in. Neske; ISBN: 3788505192.

Aufgenommen in der neuen aula der Universität Heidelberg am 18th January 1960. Also,

Pfullingen: Günther Neske, Year: 1960

Description: 2 sound discs. 33 1/3 rpm. 12 in.

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator

Martin Heidegger liest Hölderlin

(CD, 50 mn). Stuttgart. Klett-Cotta.
Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1997. (ISBN 3-7885-0518-4)
1 sound disc; analog, 33 1/3 rpm, mono.; 10 1/4 in.

Martin Heidegger Bauen Wohnen Denken

Eine Aufnahme des Westdeutsche Rundfunks Köln.
WDR 1951 Jahr der ersten Veröffentlichung
Hg. von Eduard Führt in Zusammenarbeit mit den
Waxmann Verlag mit freundlicher Genehmigung:
Klett-Cotta und WDR.
ISBN: 3-89325-896-5.
Description: CD. Digital audio. 4 3/4 in. 77 mins.
Vortrag am 25. September 1951

This CD comes with the book entitled:

Bauen und Wohnen.

Martin Heideggers Grundlegung einer Phänomenologie der Architektur

Münster, New York; Waxmann, 2000.
(ISBN 3-89325-819-1)

Die Kunst und der Raum

St. Gallen: Erker, 1950-1959?
1 sound disc; analog, 33 1/3 rpm, mono.; 10 1/4 in.

*Zum Atomzeitalter Gedenkrede anlässlich einer
Konradin-Kreutzer-Feier gehalten am 30.10. 1955 in Meßkirch.*

Gedenkrede anlässlich einer Konradin-Kreutzer-Feier
gehalten am 30.10. 1955 in Meßkirch.
Telefunken. Year: 1955.

Description: 1 sound disc; analog, 33 1/3 rpm, mono; 12 in.

Family and Friends. Acknowledgements.

Acknowledgments should be Jake Rapp, Ashmita (born Ferrer) Rapp, Khitt Rapp, Mocha Rapp, LuluMax Rapp, and the Pareto Efficiency. Dr. Dr. Günther Neumann, Alfred Denker, Dr. Dr. Holger Zaborowski, Thomas Sheehan, Richard Polt, Frank Schalow, David Farrell Krell, John Sallis, Peter Trawny, Otto Pöggeler, Chris Bremmers, Miles Groth, Christian Sommer, Thomas Sheehan, the cities of Verden and Wolfenbüttel in Deutschland (my family's distant homeland); and of course, friends in the Fiji Islands. Fiji, my friend Titilia and her famous three Vasa(s). And especially Naomi R.

My Family.

Vogelsang family of Verden an der Aller, Landkreis Verden, Lower Saxony, from Deutschland.

Johann Friedrich Gerock 1776 – 1845. His son Jacob F. Gerock was born in 1801 in Baden-Württemberg, Germany, he died July 2, 1884 - Lebanon Co, Lebanon, PA. Rebecca Gerock was born in 1826 in Pennsylvania. She married Frederick Yeager on July 29, 1843. Elias G. Yeager born 1846 and died in Indianapolis 1898. When Elias G. Yeager was born in 1846 in Pennsylvania, his father, Frederick, was 22 and his mother, Rebecca, was 20. He had two sons and five daughters with Anna Firestine between 1868 and 1884. He died on April 26, 1898, in Marion, Indiana, at the age of 52, and was buried in Indianapolis, Indiana. Amanda Mattie Yeager was born on May 16, 1878, her father, Elias, was 32, and her mother, Anna, was 34. She had one daughter with Gus Lindstrom, her name was Ruth Gustie Lindstrom 1895— 1990; she married Ernesto Louis Bartolome Ferrer on June 10, 1915, in Indianapolis. They had four children during their marriage. The oldest son being my father, Ernesto Louis Bartolome Ferrer, junior. Amanda Mattie Yeager died on November 12, 1958, in Indianapolis, Indiana, at the age of 80.

Old Germany. Kuhn side of my family. Carsten Dierk Müller B: 1686 Niedersachsen, Germany, and D: 28 May 1753; wife, Mette Christine Lappenberg B: 13 September 1684 and D: 29 January 1718. Julius Hinrich Vogelsang B: 31 Dec 1690 and D: 23 Jan 1757; his wife Anna Gesche Bertram B: 18 Aug 1693 and D: 30 September 1750.

My mother's family: Sarah Ann Moore. Birth about 1775 in Kentucky. Daughter Hannah Modiset Morton Birth: 1804 in Mortonville, Woodford County, Kentucky, and died 1871 Missouri. Hannah Modiset Morton married Jones Bradley Reavis (1824) Hannah Modiset Morton was born 1824 in Mortonville, Woodford County, Kentucky. James Overton Reavis Birth: 20 March 1842. Monroe, Missouri. Death: 14 July 1888 in Monroe, Missouri. He was my great-grandfather.

Note and a shout out to: Pete Ferreira's awesome web site [<https://www.beyng.com/> |

Heidegger was hyper-critical of the translations of Greek philosophical terms into Latin. But on the other hand, Heidegger wrote in German and not in Greek. Why? Nietzsche said, he wished that he had written *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in French instead of German. Heidegger could have written *Being and Time* in Greek instead of German. *Einai kai chronos* published in 1975 translated by Achilleas A. Vagenas. We have to thank Dieter Sinn for bringing out Heidegger's own metaphysical underpinning in his self-acknowledged writings (see Appendix A). Perhaps there is one exception.

Finished in the spring of 2024.

Part of a poem "Der Trunkene im Frühling" used by Gustav Mahler (1860-1911) in *Das Lied von der Erde*. The German source is from Hans Bethge based on Chinese writings of Li Bai (李白) (701-762) from the period of the Tang dynasty. Music key: A Major.

*"Was hör' ich beim Erwachen? Horch!
Ein Vogel singt im Baum.
Ich frag ihn, ob schon Frühling sei, -
Mir ist als wie im Traum."*

*"What do I hear when I wake up? Listen!
A bird is singing in the tree.
I ask him if it's spring already -
I feel like I'm in a dream."*

Note:

Conflict of interest: Author states no financial conflict of interest, but plenty of other conflicting issues. Why are beings, rather not nothing (no things)? Who can answer? The rights of the sovereign cannot be shared (I. Kant). What can be done about this?

den 5.2.2002

Herrn
Daniel Ferrer
309-A Park Library
Central Michigan University
Mount Pleasant, Michigan 48859 U.S.A.

Sehr geehrter Herr Ferrer !

Infolge einer schweren Operation im letzten Jahr blieb Ihr Brief vom 17. July 2001 unbeantwortet bei mir liegen.

Ich bitte um Entschuldigung und um Verständnis, daß ich erst heute mich bei Ihnen für diesen Brief vielmals bedanke.

Wieso die "Überlegungen VII, IX, X, und XI nach den USA gelangen konnten, ist mir nicht erklärlich: Mein Vater hatte diese "notebooks" für jegliche Nutzung und Einsicht bis zum Jahr 2005 gesperrt !

Ich wäre dankbar,, wenn diese notebooks sofort an mich zurückgeschickt werden.

Die Masse der von Ihnen in Ihrer Liste aufgeführten Typoskripte ist in den Bänden der Gesamtausgabe bereits veröffentlicht.

Mit dem Deutschen Literaturarchiv in Marbach werde ich klären, was sich von den bei Ihnen befindlichen Typoskripten noch nicht dort befindet. Dann würde ich darum bitten, daß davon Kopien auch an das Deutsche Literaturarchiv nach Marbach gelangen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen !



Photo collection related to Martin Heidegger.

Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. Imprint 1.0. 2024. All Rights other Reserved. Photos taken my camera, my film, my development, and so owned by Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer.

Meßkirch Palace

Inside is the

Martin-Heidegger-Museum

Kirchstraße 7

88605 Meßkirch

Germany. Deutschland.



Die Hütte" ("the hut"). Southern Germany. Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer





Daniel Fidel Ferrer at Heidegger's die Hütte ("the hut"). Todtnauberg, Southern Germany. Deutschland. Heidegger's hut ("Hütte" built in 1922 by the farmer Pius Schweitzer), above the village of Todtnauberg in Black Forest (Schwarzwald), near the Hochschwarzwald ("High Black Forest"). The region of Kreenheinstetten. There is nearby the waterfall (Wasserfallsteig) of the Stubenbach stream, and the general pastoral landscape of woody hills. Ski slopes. Heidegger's die Hütte is about 18 miles north to Freiburg im Breisgau; and it is 30 miles south to Basel, Switzerland; and about 50 miles west to Mulhouse, France. Although Heidegger found the vast ocean boring, he loved the Black Forest and his hut; according to his son, Hermann Heidegger (1920-2020) based on the written logs at the die Hütte, Martin Heidegger spent 20 years of life there at the die Hütte (hut, cottage). There was no electricity until 1933. Wooden fireplace and stove for heat in the winter. This is a place for working, thinking, and writing. Written about the door was for some time a quote from Heraclius of Ephesus, Fragment B64: τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός (thunderbolt steers [guides] all things). The Κεραυνός (thunderbolt) may designate the god Zeus.

No sidewalks, no refrigerator, no driveway, or garage. All of the closest neighbors are 500-600 yards away, down the hill. There is no path down the hill for the neighbors. The term rustic is often used. Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer



Front Door. Heidegger's die Hütte ("the hut"). Todtnauberg, Southern Germany. Deutschland. Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer.



Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Proverbs 4:23. Above the front door of Martin Heidegger's house, Rötebuck or now Rötebuckweg, Zähringen, a suburb of Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany. Deutschland. Photo slightly enhanced in color. Address removed per Hermann Heidegger's request.

Index

A

- AA[3], *44, 80, 216*
aa[1], *216*
AAovKeMTkyA[1], *51*
Ab[3], *50, 173–174*
ab[6], *49, 54, 169, 219, 230, 291*
abandon[5], *90, 112, 136, 226, 228*
abandonment[4], *80, 148, 167, 192*
Abbots[2], *48, 287*
abbreche[1], *126*
Abbreviated[1], *38*
abbreviation[2], *36*
abbreviations[2], *36, 296*
Abend[2], *256, 283*
Abendgespräch[1], *164*
Abendlandes[4], *189, 196, 256, 275*
abendländische[1], *253*
abendländischen[11], *79–81, 158, 201, 218, 264, 297, 299*
abendländisches[2], *81*
Aber[12], *84–85, 147, 153, 162, 173, 179, 201, 219, 225–226, 268*
aber[25], *51, 64, 77, 108, 112, 120, 136–137, 142, 148, 158, 160, 163, 169, 174, 235, 245, 252–253, 266*
abfallen[2], *87, 120*
Abflachung[1], *201*
abgefragt[1], *83*
Abgeschiedenheit[2], *19, 293*
abgesehen[1], *245*
abgestimmtes[1], *81*
Abgrund[2], *42, 173*
abgründiger[1], *173*
Abhandlung[1], *138*
Abhandlungen[4], *21, 171, 298*
Abhebung[1], *174*
Abich[1], *293*
abilities[1], *239*
ability[2], *73, 177*
Abitur[1], *62*
Abituriententraum[1], *62*
Abiturium[2], *281*
Abkehr[1], *235*
Ablach[1], *168*
able[18], *2, 13, 31, 64, 79, 88, 103, 106, 116, 123, 129, 131, 171, 194, 209, 227, 229*
ablegen[1], *116*
Ablehnung[1], *242*
abmühen[2], *179*
abode[1], *72*
abolish[1], *231*
abolished[3], *56, 231*
abolishing[1], *231*
Abomb[1], *52*
About[12], *7, 32, 66, 132, 201, 207, 221, 261, 264, 272, 287, 293*
about[394], *7–13, 15–19, 24–37, 39, 41–46, 48, 51, 53–54, 56, 58–60, 62, 64, 66–67, 69, 71–81, 83–84, 89–90, 92–99, 101–105, 107–112, 115–118, 120–121, 123–129, 131–134, 136, 140–144, 149–160, 162–164, 168–169, 171, 174–175, 177–178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188, 190, 192–194, 197–198, 200–201, 203, 205–208, 215, 217, 219–220, 222–225, 227, 230, 233–235, 238, 242, 244–245, 247, 249, 252, 254–255, 259–263, 269, 271–273, 278–280, 283, 285, 288, 315*
Above[2], *226, 229*
above[25], *4, 16, 35, 41, 47, 54, 56, 64, 74, 86, 96, 116, 138, 166, 168, 231, 245–246, 249, 258–259, 265, 278, 280*

Abraham[3], 273–274, 291
 Abridged[1], 207
 abridged[1], 180
 abridgment[1], 19
 Abriß[1], 23
 Abrundung[1], 126
 abruptly[1], 206
 Absatz[1], 144
 Abschied[4], 173, 267, 287
 Abschieds[3], 173–174
 abschluß[1], 245
 ABSCHNITT[1], 137
 Abschnitt[1], 252
 absconditus[4], 3, 28, 75, 104
 absence[2], 107, 176
 Absicht[2], 120, 266
 Absolute[7], 53, 103, 198–199, 201, 214, 251
 absolute[32], 31, 41–42, 53, 55, 88–89, 103, 146, 195, 198–199, 201, 214, 226, 229, 231, 235, 246, 249–251, 253
 absolutely[2], 215–216
 absoluten[3], 42, 235, 245
 absoluter[1], 250
 absolutism[1], 153
 absorbed[1], 227
 Absprünge[1], 163
 absteher[1], 174
 abstract[7], 107, 201, 214, 240, 250
 abstraction[4], 145–146, 225, 289
 Abstraktion[1], 146
 absurd[1], 227
 Abt[1], 302
 abtrennt[2], 218, 229
 abtrug[1], 76
 abundant[2], 30, 73
 Abwege[2], 85, 162
 abysmal[1], 46
 abyss[7], 42, 50, 90, 172–173, 217
 abyssal[1], 172
 academia[1], 54
 Academic[2], 276, 302
 academic[8], 25–26, 43, 45, 119, 131, 140, 145
 Academy[8], 205, 207, 253, 284, 286, 288, 294
 academy[1], 128
 Ācārya[1], 181
 accelerando[1], 154
 accept[5], 6, 8, 61, 77, 180
 acceptable[1], 213
 accepted[1], 270
 accepts[2], 32, 61
 access[3], 10, 41
 Accessed[1], 255
 accessed[1], 10
 accessibility[2], 134–135
 accessible[6], 10, 29, 122, 134–135, 269
 Accession[8], 91, 165, 276, 288–289, 291, 294
 acclaim[1], 39
 acclaimed[2], 7, 259
 acclivitous[1], 19
 accommodate[2], 44, 252
 accomplish[1], 231
 accomplished[12], 34, 63, 97, 208, 211, 215–216, 222, 242, 247
 Accord[1], 217
 accord[1], 135
 accordance[3], 152, 193, 216
 According[15], 12, 19–20, 38, 55, 109, 128, 143–144, 190, 222, 233, 242, 278, 281
 according[31], 12, 14–15, 20, 31, 38, 64, 94, 96, 117–118, 121, 129, 139, 149, 152, 165, 168, 172, 174, 183, 196, 201, 214, 232, 255, 275, 285
 Accordingly[7], 83, 103, 146, 193, 202, 212, 253
 accordingly[3], 56, 135, 202
 account[9], 5, 44, 49, 52–53, 144, 189, 191, 207
 accounts[2], 10, 24
 accoutrements[1], 2
 accumulated[1], 163
 Acharya[1], 128
 acharya[1], 179
 achieve[1], 190
 achieved[3], 13, 68, 92
 achievements[1], 4
 achieves[1], 251
 Achilleas[1], 316
 Achilles[1], 114
 ächten[1], 80

achten[1], 190
 Achtzehnte[1], 138
 achtzigsten[1], 294
 acintya[1], 125
 acknowledge[2], 25, 180
 acknowledged[2], 8, 316
 Acknowledgements[1], 315
 acknowledges[2], 226, 228
 Acknowledgments[1], 315
 Acknowledgements[1], 273
 acolytes[1], 66
 acquainted[1], 206
 acquired[4], 45, 97, 163, 253
 acre[1], 24
 across[7], 3, 50, 54, 67, 88, 168
 act[2], 38, 114
 Acta[1], 194
 Action[1], 200
 action[10], 39, 118–119, 121, 293
 actions[3], 118, 216
 Active[3], 111, 236
 active[4], 60, 103, 111, 128
 activism[1], 118
 activist[1], 118
 activity[3], 78, 97, 134
 actual[34], 10, 20–21, 24, 37, 40, 61, 69,
 83, 94, 101, 111, 114, 124, 135, 153,
 165–169, 179, 197, 201, 235, 245
 Actualitas[1], 199
 actualitas[2], 198–199
 Actuality[1], 199
 actuality[3], 201, 251, 284
 Actually[1], 39
 actually[20], 47, 59, 68, 79–80, 90, 95,
 97–98, 100, 106, 163, 167, 209, 216–217,
 223, 235, 263, 272
 actus[1], 114
 AD[2], 2, 238
 Ad[3], 60, 136
 ad[10], 2, 43, 54, 60, 66, 99, 105, 119, 183
 adaequatio[1], 44
 adages[1], 159
 Adalbert[2], 16, 291
 adapt[5], 44, 194, 252
 add[5], 6, 52, 182, 252, 260
 added[20], 36–37, 40, 76, 92, 104, 109,
 134, 136, 143, 159, 190, 196, 219, 230,
 235, 293
 adding[1], 6
 addition[10], 12–14, 20, 59, 109, 139, 151,
 154, 213
 Additional[4], 114, 151, 199, 310
 additional[6], 3, 11, 20, 27, 35, 105
 Additionally[3], 27, 181, 224
 additions[2], 139, 194
 Address[7], 84, 92, 98, 286–287, 289
 address[18], 10, 12, 40, 47, 76, 84, 121,
 129, 160, 163, 201, 221, 280, 286–288
 addressed[1], 13
 Addresses[1], 273
 addresses[15], 10, 24, 29–30, 53, 129,
 180–181, 273, 280, 285, 310
 addressing[1], 102
 adds[3], 12, 86, 217
 adequate[3], 82, 202, 239
 adherence[1], 124
 adherents[2], 66, 180
 Adickes[2], 216
 administration[2], 56, 204
 administrative[1], 61
 admiration[1], 56
 admirers[2], 69
 admit[3], 83, 159, 228
 admits[1], 8
 Admittedly[1], 189
 admittedly[1], 98
 admitting[3], 107, 176, 244
 admonishment[1], 106
 Adolf[4], 117, 164, 203, 303
 adopted[3], 58, 79, 293
 adoption[1], 81
 adopts[1], 16
 ADORNO[1], 261
 Adorno[16], 43, 118, 133, 175, 182
 adult[1], 181
 adulthood[2], 181, 262
 adults[1], 225
 adumbrated[1], 214
 advance[7], 78, 135, 149–150, 159, 193,
 233
 Advanced[1], 45
 advanced[4], 206, 211, 215, 224
 advancement[2], 76, 87

advancing[2], 193, 215
 adventure[1], 2
 adventurer[2], 147, 185
 adversaries[4], 119, 182
 Advertisement[1], 140
 advise[2], 14
 advisor[1], 271
 aei[1], 199
 Aenesidemus[4], 206, 211
 Aeolipile[1], 220
 aequo[1], 259
 Aesthetic[1], 270
 aesthetic[1], 84
 Aesthetics[1], 251
 aesthetics[3], 46, 201, 231
 Aesthetik[2], 201, 306
 Af[1], 139
 affected[1], 25
 Affection[1], 270
 affiliation[1], 201
 affinities[1], 113
 affirm[1], 226
 affirmation[3], 135, 196, 242
 affirmed[1], 212
 affirming[1], 235
 affirms[3], 39, 236
 affliction[1], 179
 afresh[1], 5
 After[28], 7, 14, 16, 37, 40, 43, 46, 48, 70,
 72, 82, 91, 99, 116, 120, 130–131, 145,
 166, 180, 194, 223, 232, 261–262, 270
 after[91], 7, 15, 17, 20–21, 25, 27, 31–32,
 35–37, 41–42, 47, 53, 55, 59, 62, 66, 71,
 75–76, 80–81, 84, 88, 92, 94–97, 106,
 109, 111–112, 115–116, 128, 130, 137,
 139, 141, 143, 145–146, 151, 154, 157,
 165–167, 169, 177–178, 182, 188–189,
 192–193, 205, 229, 238, 240, 248–249,
 254–255, 278, 284, 286, 288, 291, 299
 Afterward[6], 13, 18, 159, 166
 afterward[4], 12, 37, 109, 164
 Afterwards[2], 36, 74
 afterwards[4], 36, 51, 101, 224
 Again[24], 5, 11, 17, 24, 37, 76, 87, 97,
 101, 111, 146, 151–152, 159, 169,
 176–177, 186, 202, 209, 218, 237
 again[73], 11, 13, 27, 30, 33, 44, 52–53,
 62, 64, 75, 78, 80, 83, 85, 91, 98,
 104–105, 110, 112, 124, 129–132, 140,
 149, 159–160, 176–177, 179, 194–195,
 197–198, 206–208, 215, 219, 221,
 223–224, 227, 229–230, 234, 237, 241,
 263
 Against[25], 53, 72, 133, 136, 175, 196,
 211–212, 221, 237
 against[81], 4, 7, 14, 17, 43–46, 48–49, 54,
 60, 66, 75, 81, 96–97, 99, 102, 109, 111,
 114–116, 118–119, 121, 126, 128,
 133–137, 153, 155, 161, 171, 175,
 178–179, 182, 186, 194, 202, 211–212,
 215, 219, 221, 223, 227, 230–232,
 237–238, 261
 Agamben[1], 224
 agams[1], 181
 agathon[2], 199, 236
 Age[1], 114
 age[60], 8, 14–15, 18, 23, 25, 32–33, 51,
 53, 63, 67, 71–73, 86, 91, 95–97, 120,
 126, 140, 152, 156, 158, 180–181, 188,
 202, 216, 220, 223–225, 227, 235,
 238–239, 242, 248, 272, 294, 315
 aged[1], 265
 agenda[11], 7, 24, 66, 121, 153, 161, 175,
 182, 207
 agendas[1], 119
 Ages[2], 128, 214
 ages[1], 216
 Agnes[1], 32
 ago[30], 3, 7, 10–11, 18, 21, 26, 28, 30, 75,
 87, 98, 103, 119–120, 124, 127, 133,
 136, 153, 169, 181, 191, 220, 259, 275,
 277
 agph[1], 249
 ágrapha[1], 22
 agree[2], 78, 261
 agreed[2], 98, 115
 Agreement[1], 95
 agreement[4], 44, 187, 251
 ahead[7], 25–26, 40, 64, 77, 128
 ahistorical[1], 46
 ahnend[1], 77
 ahnender[1], 268
 Ahstammung[1], 274
 aid[2], 83, 193
 AIDS[1], 60

aids[1], 10
aim[3], 109, 215–216
aiming[2], 88, 135
aimlessness[1], 111
aims[1], 140
air[6], 33, 72, 85, 124, 142, 218
aired[3], 109, 118, 293
airways[1], 33
Aix[3], 56, 204, 288
AK[29], 36, 57, 75, 80, 89, 134, 183,
193–194, 203–204, 211–212, 215–216,
223

Akademie[9], 284–285, 287, 290–292, 307,
309
Akademiker[1], 42
Akbar[1], 60
akroaseos[1], 192
Akzente[2], 284–285
al[1], 216
ala[1], 176
Alain[2], 182, 224
Alan[1], 49
Alas[1], 11
Albany[2], 275–276
Alber[5], 301–302, 310
Albert[8], 18, 46, 48, 100, 109, 165, 191,
217
Alberto[1], 82
albinos[1], 229
Alemannic[2], 14, 133
Aletheia[3], 180, 199, 217
Alethia[2], 200
Alexander[9], 4, 20, 134, 140, 192, 194,
206, 255
Alexandre[2], 214
Alexandru[2], 178
Alexis[2], 48, 287
Alfeld[1], 15
Alfred[18], 10, 23, 37, 52, 88, 102, 124,
221, 232, 249, 273, 301–302, 310, 315
Alfredo[10], 260, 266–267, 290
Algontology[1], 255
alien[2], 148, 196
alienation[3], 96, 103, 221
alive[19], 10–11, 27, 39–40, 53, 61–62, 68,
77, 121, 126, 130, 201, 215, 219, 230

All[31], 11, 15, 17, 19, 24, 27–28, 30, 59,
64, 80, 111, 116, 148, 154, 161, 168,
186, 189, 193, 205, 207, 218, 227, 230,
240, 273
all[314], 2–5, 10–13, 15–16, 18, 24–25,
27–28, 30–33, 35–36, 42–44, 46, 48–49,
53–59, 64, 67, 69–70, 74–79, 81, 83,
85–86, 88–90, 94–100, 102–111,
113–114, 117–118, 120–122, 124–125,
127, 129–130, 133, 135–136, 139–141,
143, 145–146, 148, 150, 154–157, 159,
161, 166–168, 171, 173, 176, 178,
180–193, 195, 201–203, 206, 208–212,
214–216, 218–219, 221–223, 226–236,
238–239, 242, 244, 246, 249, 251, 258,
260, 263, 265, 273, 301
Alle[2], 19, 219
alle[5], 43–44, 104, 219
allege[2], 29
alleges[1], 147
allegorical[1], 45
allegory[1], 116
allegro[2], 180, 185
Allein[1], 247
allein[7], 80, 116, 146, 158, 203, 264
allem[7], 27, 74, 86, 156, 167, 246, 265
Allemann[2], 48, 287
Allemannische[1], 14
Allen[1], 89
allen[4], 44, 218, 229, 235
Aller[1], 315
aller[5], 94, 98, 111, 156, 236
allererst[2], 77, 89
Allerseelenstimmungen[1], 273
Alles[2], 113, 219
alles[11], 81, 95, 126, 136, 143, 156, 166,
174, 186, 219
alleys[1], 78
allgemeine[1], 141
allgemeinste[1], 104
allow[6], 64, 100, 194, 202, 225, 236
allowed[8], 11, 22, 39, 79, 87, 98, 225, 272
allows[7], 51, 107, 165, 168, 176, 206, 224
Almost[1], 121
almost[20], 8, 10–11, 25, 28, 46–47, 52, 56,
100, 131, 151, 204, 208, 228, 240, 258,
288

Alois[1], 33
 alone[14], 78, 92, 128, 147, 158, 163, 195, 200, 203, 215–216, 240, 265
 along[16], 15, 30, 66, 77, 86–87, 99, 105, 155, 197, 203, 231, 242, 251
 alongside[1], 197
 aloof[1], 78
 Alpes[1], 131
 alpha[2], 29, 156
 Already[1], 140
 already[56], 2, 10, 12, 21, 24, 34, 67, 71, 74, 77–78, 88, 90, 95, 98–99, 102–103, 110, 120, 128, 141, 145–146, 149–152, 158, 162–165, 170, 172, 198–199, 203, 206, 219, 222, 227, 230, 242, 246–248, 280, 316
 als[139], 20–21, 26, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 48, 50–52, 58, 63, 71, 75, 77, 80–81, 85, 92–93, 97–98, 104, 107–109, 114, 120, 136, 138, 141, 147–148, 154, 156–158, 162, 165–167, 169–170, 173–174, 186, 218–221, 226, 230, 236–237, 240–241, 245–248, 250–251, 253, 256, 263–264, 266, 268, 276, 279, 285, 289, 295, 297–298, 316
 alsbald[1], 246
 Also[31], 10, 31, 60, 74, 82, 105, 114, 118, 138–139, 142, 177, 192, 249, 254, 256, 273, 280, 283–285, 293, 302–303, 306, 308, 310, 313
 also[148], 2, 6, 8, 12–14, 19, 23, 25–26, 29, 35, 37–41, 43–44, 48, 52–54, 56–57, 60–64, 71, 74–75, 80, 83, 87, 90–92, 94, 96–98, 102–103, 105–106, 108, 110, 117, 120, 124, 129–131, 137, 139, 143, 145, 148, 153–155, 158, 163, 166, 170–173, 176–177, 179, 182, 187–188, 194, 196–198, 201–202, 206, 208, 211–213, 215, 218, 221–226, 228, 230–231, 233, 237, 239, 241, 244–247, 252–253, 258, 262, 273, 278–279, 284, 294
 Alt[1], 139
 altars[1], 238
 Altdorfer[2], 166–167
 Alte[1], 168
 alte[1], 219
 alten[3], 57, 81
 Ältere[1], 20
 altered[4], 38, 114, 282
 Älteren[1], 164
 altering[1], 169
 alternative[1], 231
 Alternatively[2], 156, 240
 Although[19], 19, 25, 52, 55, 70, 106, 109, 131, 152, 168, 182, 206, 208, 231–232, 238, 240
 although[12], 13, 17, 58, 62, 78, 80, 87, 102, 146–147, 221, 242
 altogether[3], 130, 195, 242
 Always[1], 251
 always[67], 5, 19, 23, 28–29, 35, 50–51, 59, 62, 66, 74, 78–79, 82–83, 87, 89–90, 92, 96, 98, 102, 106–107, 112–113, 118, 120, 126, 128, 132, 135, 138, 143, 146, 154, 169, 173, 175–176, 185–186, 190, 194, 209, 212, 221–222, 225, 242, 245–246, 249, 260, 270
 Am[6], 255–257, 267
 am[204], 1, 4–6, 8, 13, 20, 23–24, 28, 33, 43, 47, 56, 58, 60, 64, 70, 77, 79, 81, 84, 91, 93, 108–109, 112, 118, 122, 124–125, 127, 129, 131, 140–141, 143–144, 146, 156, 162, 165, 167, 171, 183, 186, 188, 190, 196, 201, 217–221, 223, 225–226, 228–229, 233, 244, 259–261, 263, 271–275, 277–294, 296, 301–303, 311, 313–314
 Amanda[2], 315
 amazed[1], 127
 amazing[1], 51
 ambiguities[2], 194, 231
 ambiguous[4], 54, 86, 151, 265
 ambivalence[1], 248
 Ambivalenz[1], 247
 amend[1], 4
 amended[1], 292
 amenities[1], 64
 America[9], 3, 13, 63–64, 96, 272
 American[7], 7, 39, 44, 53, 118, 120, 259
 Americanism[9], 33, 54, 64, 91, 133, 137
 Americans[2], 15, 262
 Amerika[1], 63
 Amerikanismus[4], 33, 64, 91
 Amherst[1], 293

amica[2], 258
 Amicus[2], 258
 amicus[1], 258
 Amish[1], 19
 Among[4], 4, 207, 225
 among[13], 32, 37, 43, 118, 181, 190, 194,
 203, 206, 209, 231, 261–262
 amor[2], 223
 amount[2], 3–4
 amounts[4], 11, 183, 201, 238
 ample[1], 66
 Amriswil[9], 92, 288, 291–293
 Amsterdam[8], 16, 277–278
 Amtes[2], 280
 amtlichen[1], 293
 amuse[3], 2, 123, 259
 An[35], 13, 39, 41–42, 90, 98, 111, 114,
 123, 128–129, 132, 134–135, 163, 171,
 175, 208, 211, 216, 235, 268, 282, 286,
 312
 an[377], 5, 7–11, 13, 15–17, 19, 23–25, 27,
 30–31, 34, 36–39, 41–43, 45–46, 49,
 51–58, 60, 63–65, 70–73, 75–79, 81–90,
 92, 95–96, 99–100, 104, 106, 108–110,
 112–120, 122–124, 126–131, 133–136,
 140–141, 145–147, 149–152, 154, 156,
 158–161, 163–164, 166, 169, 171–173,
 176–177, 179–181, 183–187, 189–193,
 195–196, 200–202, 204–209, 211, 213,
 215, 217–221, 224–233, 235, 238, 240,
 242, 244–246, 252, 259, 261–262,
 265–267, 270–272, 276–278, 281–285,
 287–291, 293, 301–302, 305–308, 312,
 315
 anagnorisis[1], 75
 anakolouthos[1], 160
 analog[3], 314
 analogies[1], 204
 analogy[4], 68, 164, 204, 262
 Analyse[1], 224
 Analysen[1], 248
 analyses[1], 248
 analysis[21], 18, 25, 57, 65, 67, 71, 103,
 112, 141–142, 149, 175–177, 180, 209,
 222–223
 analytic[5], 45, 98, 145, 150
 analytical[1], 4
 Analytik[3], 141, 250
 analyze[2], 5, 223
 analyzed[1], 29
 anamnesis[2], 219
 ananda[1], 192
 anathema[3], 28, 30, 131
 anathemas[1], 183
 Anaximander[11], 25, 31, 49, 67, 79–80,
 195–196, 299
 ancestors[1], 77
 Ancient[4], 38, 100, 130, 207
 ancient[13], 14, 48, 60, 62, 81, 110, 115,
 181, 188, 207, 215, 249
 ancients[2], 194, 231
 AND[3], 93, 125, 261
 And[62], 17, 26–27, 48, 50, 63–64, 70, 78,
 83, 92, 98–99, 101, 110, 122, 128–129,
 131, 135, 137, 145–146, 148–150,
 153–154, 163, 176–177, 184, 189,
 191–192, 195–197, 212, 218, 227–230,
 233, 236, 238, 280, 315
 and[2989], 2–21, 23–50, 52–198, 200–242,
 244–255, 258–267, 269–294, 296–298,
 301–302, 304, 307–308, 310–312,
 315–316
 Andenken[8], 67, 282–283, 291, 298
 andere[18], 42, 49, 86, 91, 97, 101, 108,
 118, 168, 177, 198, 273, 277, 286, 296,
 301
 Anderen[1], 107
 anderen[15], 58, 69, 144, 160, 169, 185,
 196, 218, 220, 245, 264
 anderer[2], 245, 266
 anderes[1], 248
 Anders[1], 182
 anders[1], 137
 Andhgajanyāyah[1], 181
 Andre[1], 84
 Andrea[1], 303
 Andreas[3], 175, 224, 302
 andreia[3], 23, 46
 Andrew[10], 9, 19, 51, 63, 86, 96, 245, 249,
 304
 Andrôn[1], 42
 Andronicus[1], 192
 anecdotes[1], 17
 anekāntavāda[1], 181
 anerkennt[1], 235

anew[5], *53, 148, 150, 187, 203*
 Anfang[67], *27, 31, 49, 55, 63, 69–71, 78–80, 91–92, 95, 120, 126, 147, 153–154, 158, 161, 165–166, 169–170, 173–174, 179, 184, 200–201, 222, 240, 245, 252–253, 257, 267, 292, 297, 299*
 Anfänger[2], *123, 277*
 anfänglich[1], *250*
 anfängliche[1], *174*
 anfänglichen[3], *173–174*
 Anfängliches[1], *173*
 anfängliches[2], *154, 166*
 Anfängnis[1], *27*
 Anfangs[23], *3, 20, 31, 86, 89, 163, 165–166, 169, 173, 196, 249, 273, 299*
 Anfangsgründe[4], *7, 45, 57, 297*
 anfiengst[2], *188, 262*
 angedeutet[1], *104*
 angeführten[2], *156, 186*
 angehäufte[1], *163*
 angeht[2], *190, 220*
 Angela[4], *118–119, 261*
 Angeles[1], *104*
 angenehm[1], *51*
 angespornt[1], *141*
 angewendet[1], *246*
 angewiesen[1], *266*
 Anglicism[1], *133*
 Anglo[1], *95*
 angst[1], *48*
 animal[13], *20, 78, 155, 165, 234, 240, 256*
 Animals[1], *8*
 animals[2], *7*
 animosities[2], *118, 183*
 Anklang[1], *160*
 anlässlich[3], *313–314*
 Anlauf[1], *50*
 Anlaufdie[1], *27*
 Anläufe[1], *143*
 anlässlich[3], *289, 291–292*
 anleiten[3], *74, 86, 265*
 Anmekungen[1], *167*
 Anmerkung[1], *282*
 Anmerkungen[24], *19, 35, 41, 54, 63, 75, 77, 92, 109, 126, 129, 142–143, 266, 268, 300, 312*
 Ann[1], *315*

ann[1], *275*
 Anna[3], *315*
 Annäherungen[1], *18*
 annihilated[1], *216*
 anniversary[7], *198, 283, 286–287, 289–290, 294*
 anniversary[1], *286*
 Anno[1], *233*
 annotated[1], *41*
 annotations[1], *139*
 announce[1], *24*
 announced[6], *22, 63, 111, 205, 220, 298*
 Announcement[1], *190*
 announces[1], *99*
 ANNUAL[1], *258*
 annual[2], *289, 305*
 Another[19], *17, 21, 37, 39, 41, 67, 88, 91, 104, 108, 111, 113, 115, 168, 176, 208, 275*
 another[43], *8–9, 13–14, 27, 29, 40, 42, 44, 48, 72, 83–84, 88, 105, 109, 124–125, 130–131, 137, 144, 179, 195–196, 205, 208–209, 217, 221–222, 228, 259, 265*
 ans[1], *190*
 Ansatz[3], *58, 218*
 Anschauen[1], *257*
 Anschauung[2], *219, 298*
 Anschein[2], *71, 109*
 Anschluß[2], *277, 291*
 Ansehung[1], *203*
 ansetzen[2], *57, 75*
 Ansgar[5], *59, 88, 130*
 Ansichten[1], *51*
 Ansprache[4], *281, 289–290, 293*
 Anspruch[2], *219, 295*
 Anstößes[1], *181*
 Anstreichungen[1], *276*
 Answer[29], *10, 12, 24, 28, 66–67, 71, 75, 80, 82, 94, 111, 119, 130, 150, 162, 171, 175–176, 178, 185, 223*
 answer[57], *5, 14, 29, 39, 53, 58, 62, 71, 76, 80, 84, 87–88, 92–95, 100, 112, 117, 120, 122–123, 127, 129, 140, 146, 155, 159, 162, 178, 180, 185, 211, 213, 231, 245–246, 248, 259, 263, 316*
 answered[11], *30, 47, 63, 116, 144, 146, 177, 180, 186, 195*

answerers[1], 69
 answering[4], 63, 149, 164, 177
 Answers[1], 117
 answers[64], 5, 19, 47, 49, 60, 66–67, 69, 76, 83–84, 87, 94–95, 99–100, 102, 107–108, 110, 112, 115–117, 120, 122–123, 127, 129, 145–146, 157, 175, 211, 259–260, 262–263, 293
 antagonist[2], 221, 232
 Anteile[2], 248
 Anthropological[1], 270
 Anthropologie[2], 270, 277
 anthropologisch[1], 147
 anthropologism[2], 95, 148
 Anthropologismus[1], 95
 Anthropology[3], 147, 224, 270
 anthropology[5], 52, 147, 223
 anthropomorphism[3], 58, 91
 anthypophora[1], 129
 Anti[4], 218–219, 230, 237
 anti[21], 4, 53–54, 119, 133, 182–183, 194, 223–224, 237, 241
 Antichrist[14], 112, 225, 227, 229, 233, 237, 241
 antichrist[1], 237
 anticipates[2], 150, 223
 anticipating[1], 4
 antiepistemological[1], 46
 antifoundationalist[1], 81
 antihero[1], 113
 antiken[6], 18, 28, 38, 126, 130, 297
 antimetaphysicians[1], 225
 Antinihilist[3], 237, 241
 Antinomie[1], 235
 antinomy[2], 234–235
 antipodes[2], 232, 242
 antiquity[3], 140, 231
 Antisemitismus[3], 25, 302
 ANTISTITUM[1], 53
 Antoine[2], 48, 287
 Antrag[1], 284
 Antrittsrede[1], 287
 Antwort[10], 84, 87, 93–94, 120, 246, 248, 268
 Antworten[2], 84, 94
 Antworthorizont[1], 146
 anvil[1], 213

Anwesenheit[3], 92–93, 246
 Any[3], 5, 208
 any[70], 5, 8, 17–18, 24, 27, 30–31, 40, 44, 47, 53–54, 56, 59, 66–67, 78–79, 87, 94, 98–99, 102, 109–112, 118, 120, 129, 136–137, 142–143, 148, 157, 161, 169, 172, 176, 180, 184, 189, 193, 200, 205, 208–210, 221–223, 232, 236–238, 254, 301
 anybody[1], 83
 anymore[5], 23, 28, 63, 190
 Anyone[3], 51, 62, 224
 anyone[6], 30, 125, 131, 189, 221, 289
 anything[24], 6, 11, 14, 16, 24, 62, 94, 108, 117, 123, 131–132, 144, 155–156, 159, 167, 192, 206, 208, 211, 242
 anyway[2], 106, 209
 anywhere[4], 68, 87, 125, 242
 Anz[1], 290
 anzusetzen[1], 235
 Apart[2], 51, 245
 apart[3], 173, 227, 229
 apartment[3], 16, 104, 138
 apeiron[1], 199
 aphorism[1], 161
 aphorisms[3], 31, 159, 180
 aphorist[2], 159, 161
 aphoristic[1], 161
 apocryphal[1], 75
 apologist[1], 109
 apologists[1], 118
 apologize[1], 144
 Apology[3], 76, 131, 189
 apophaínein[1], 163
 Apophenia[1], 163
 apoplectic[1], 294
 aporetic[6], 40, 83, 117, 131, 180
 aporia[3], 76, 160
 apostrophé[1], 175
 Apostrophic[1], 175
 apotheosis[1], 104
 apothéōsis[1], 104
 apparent[10], 56, 134, 180, 225, 228, 231–232
 Apparently[1], 111
 appeal[1], 189
 appear[11], 2, 17, 25, 37, 77, 109, 131,

144, 190, 224, 294
 appearance[8], 71, 170, 198, 215, 219,
 228, 230, 240
 appearances[3], 231, 240
 appeared[1], 46
 appears[9], 11, 97, 101, 134, 203, 228, 231,
 250, 259
 appendage[1], 191
 APPENDIX[2], 21, 104
 Appendix[17], 8, 25, 32, 48, 51, 58, 71, 79,
 109, 114, 244, 249, 254, 258, 270, 285,
 316
 appendix[1], 38
 apperance[1], 277
 appetitus[1], 199
 application[3], 4, 80, 239
 applied[2], 103, 247
 applies[1], 89
 apply[1], 79
 applying[1], 21
 appointed[2], 13, 44
 Appointment[1], 43
 appointment[1], 48
 appositely[1], 114
 appraisal[1], 183
 appraise[1], 212
 appreciate[1], 32
 apprehending[1], 103
 apprehension[1], 195
 apprentices[2], 128
 apprenticeships[1], 119
 approach[57], 5, 24–25, 35, 46, 52, 55,
 57–58, 66–67, 69, 73, 75–76, 80–81, 95,
 101, 107–108, 110, 112, 117, 122–123,
 125, 128, 132–133, 149, 157, 178–180,
 186–187, 195, 217–218, 259, 262, 289
 Approaches[1], 18
 approaches[6], 3, 47, 60, 62, 69, 182
 appropriate[3], 19, 38, 201
 appropriated[5], 90, 166, 172–173
 appropriates[1], 134
 appropriation[1], 191
 approval[2], 36, 272
 approve[1], 131
 approved[6], 12, 71, 109, 149
 approving[2], 107, 176
 approximately[1], 27

April[71], 19, 22, 25, 34, 42–43, 45–46, 60,
 71–72, 77, 83–84, 93–94, 96, 110, 117,
 122, 125, 138, 164, 196, 205, 218–219,
 226, 228, 230, 249, 274–278, 281–283,
 289, 291–292, 294, 315
 apt[1], 116
 aptly[1], 248
 Aquin[1], 297
 Aquinas[3], 44, 126, 192
 Aramaic[1], 62
 Arbeit[5], 100, 136, 143–144, 253
 Arbeiten[2], 144
 Arbeiter[3], 254, 279
 arbeitet[1], 220
 arbeiteter[1], 274
 Arbeitsdienst[2], 279, 281
 Arbeitsgemeinschaft[1], 278
 Arbeitsgemeinschaft[3], 16, 277, 286
 arbitrarily[1], 79
 arbitrariness[2], 59, 79
 arbitrary[2], 117, 191
 arch[1], 114
 archaeologist[1], 105
 arche[2], 122, 199
 Archèaotypik[2], 244, 248
 archetypical[1], 57
 Architectonic[1], 80
 architectonic[1], 208
 architects[1], 287
 Architektur[1], 314
 Archiv[1], 311
 archival[3], 13, 139, 272
 Archivale[1], 311
 Archive[10], 10, 37, 47, 92, 154, 272–273,
 278, 282, 303
 archive[21], 10–11, 18–19, 36–37, 52, 91,
 165, 244, 275, 310, 312
 Archives[4], 273, 303, 311
 archives[12], 9–10, 12, 21, 29, 36, 44, 73,
 165, 268, 277–278
 Ardennes[1], 68
 arduous[1], 11
 Are[13], 13, 49, 54, 79, 105, 117, 166, 170,
 179, 183, 241, 259, 261
 are[590], 2–5, 8, 10–42, 44–47, 49, 51–64,
 66–70, 72, 74–80, 83–87, 90–91, 93–102,
 104–105, 109–127, 129–130, 133–136,

138–140, 143, 145–147, 149–150, 152,
 154–155, 157–161, 163–166, 168–169,
 171–172, 175–177, 179–190, 192–194,
 196–197, 203–205, 207–210, 214–218,
 221, 224–225, 227–228, 230–233,
 235–236, 238–239, 244, 249, 251,
 253–254, 258–263, 273, 278–279,
 281–282, 285, 287, 290, 301–304, 310,
 316
 area[4], 16, 23, 54, 116
 areas[2], 30, 224
 Arendt[22], 9, 19, 46, 52, 63, 78, 86, 96,
 119, 121–122, 130, 188, 261, 284, 301,
 304
 Argive[1], 233
 arguably[1], 45
 argue[7], 24, 70, 75–76, 117, 171, 232
 argued[4], 53, 113, 189, 238
 argues[1], 171
 arguing[4], 62, 112, 129, 135
 Argument[4], 48, 54, 65, 108
 argument[5], 8, 60–61, 146, 171
 argumentation[1], 68
 Arguments[1], 44
 arguments[12], 60–61, 66, 114, 127, 171,
 175, 183, 217
 Argumentum[2], 60, 66
 argumentum[6], 43, 54, 119, 183
 arise[3], 124, 237, 241
 arises[2], 145, 239
 arising[1], 201
 Ariston[1], 233
 Aristoteles[15], 21, 23, 253, 258, 267, 271,
 275, 279, 297–299
 Aristotelian[2], 195, 205
 Aristotelianism[1], 192
 aristotelischen[2], 17, 296
 Aristotle[65], 5, 8, 17–18, 21, 23, 28–29,
 35, 44, 54, 58–59, 61, 71, 100–101, 106,
 113, 116–117, 121–122, 126, 128, 130,
 171, 186, 190, 192, 195, 199, 203,
 206–207, 214, 233, 249, 253, 258, 271,
 275, 292
 ark[1], 311
 armada[1], 176
 armaments[1], 95
 armchair[1], 116
 arms[1], 52
 Armut[4], 283, 306, 308
 army[1], 15
 Arndt[2], 78, 276
 Arnold[1], 118
 Arnrilswil[1], 293
 Arnulf[5], 66, 262, 277, 302
 arose[3], 38, 153, 201
 Around[7], 21, 33, 64, 66, 84, 91, 276
 around[24], 15, 18, 30–31, 36, 52, 62, 82,
 95, 97, 105, 111, 113, 124, 142, 154,
 191, 216, 229, 259, 265
 aroused[1], 208
 arranged[2], 10, 144
 arrangement[1], 10
 arrangements[1], 49
 arranging[1], 135
 arrive[4], 200, 208, 211, 259
 arrived[2], 121, 248
 arrogance[1], 181
 arrogant[3], 57, 229
 Arrow[1], 188
 Art[19], 92, 114, 123, 157, 164, 173, 196,
 219, 231, 248, 271, 288–289, 292, 294
 art[11], 13, 42, 84, 90, 103, 169, 200, 259,
 289
 articles[1], 280
 artful[2], 37, 114
 Arthur[5], 23, 31–32, 240
 article[7], 7, 21, 51, 55, 244
 articles[11], 13, 24, 26, 33, 39, 70–71, 182,
 258, 273, 280
 artificial[1], 126
 artillery[2], 68, 99
 artist[1], 288
 artistic[3], 51, 119, 224
 artists[2], 15, 25
 Arts[3], 284, 294
 arts[5], 4, 57, 61, 101
 Arzt[1], 281
 Arzttums[1], 290
 As[56], 3, 7, 10, 20, 30, 35, 37–38, 46, 54,
 58–60, 62, 67, 71, 75, 80, 83, 88, 94, 96,
 106–107, 112, 119, 126, 136–137, 147,
 162, 170, 172, 176–177, 180–183, 186,
 188, 200, 234, 238, 242, 244, 261–262,
 301
 as[1163], 1–316

ascend[2], *215–216*
ascent[1], *56*
ascertain[1], *2*
Aschein[1], *247*
asebeia[1], *171*
Ashmita[1], *315*
Ashtadyayi[1], *105*
Asia[3], *82, 220, 230*
Asian[3], *82, 127, 188*
aside[5], *35, 42, 69, 222, 231*
Ask[1], *114*
ask[37], *8, 30–31, 62, 66, 69, 72, 74, 81–82, 86, 89, 92–93, 105, 108–109, 125, 131, 144, 157, 178, 184, 193, 221, 247–248, 265, 288, 316*
asked[12], *36, 39, 62, 69, 83, 128–129, 185, 217, 259, 263, 275*
Asking[1], *93*
asking[26], *5, 38–39, 62, 66, 69, 84, 93, 99, 105, 109, 116, 119, 123, 146, 149, 158, 177, 185, 192, 195, 261*
asks[4], *39, 129, 222, 261*
asleep[1], *215*
aspiration[1], *64*
aspire[1], *32*
Assaiante[1], *304*
assembled[1], *107*
assembly[1], *199*
assert[2], *151, 263*
assertion[3], *107, 153, 178*
assertions[1], *75*
assessed[1], *271*
assessment[4], *80, 158, 209, 271*
asset[1], *158*
assiduous[1], *114*
assiduously[2], *10, 182*
assignats[1], *139*
assignments[1], *13*
assimilationists[1], *4*
assistance[1], *9*
assistant[14], *3, 13, 26, 37, 43, 48, 93, 131, 216, 272, 290*
assistants[3], *48, 78, 88*
assisting[1], *28*
associate[1], *271*
associated[2], *3, 150*
Association[2], *276, 278*
assume[3], *25, 161, 235*
assumed[4], *35, 92, 206, 211*
Assuming[2], *29, 74*
assuming[3], *111, 120, 166*
assumptions[5], *5, 76, 92, 100, 175*
assurance[1], *248*
assured[1], *128*
ästhetische[1], *123*
ästhetischen[1], *270*
astonished[1], *178*
astonishing[1], *45*
astonishment[2], *122*
astray[4], *58, 67, 161*
At[43], *4, 9–10, 13, 17, 25, 45–47, 49, 52, 54, 69, 73, 84, 106, 111, 118, 123, 126, 131, 137, 153, 155, 169, 178, 189, 200, 207, 214, 231, 245, 248–249, 272, 278, 287, 292*
at[432], *2–3, 5, 8–13, 15–21, 23–26, 28–30, 32–33, 35, 38–48, 51–53, 56–62, 64, 66–74, 76–79, 83–84, 86, 88, 90–91, 94–95, 97, 99–110, 112–124, 126–131, 133, 135–136, 138, 141, 145–150, 152, 154, 156, 159, 161, 163–164, 168–169, 171–176, 178–180, 182, 185–186, 188, 190–193, 195–198, 200–209, 211, 214–218, 221–224, 226, 228, 230–236, 240, 242, 244–246, 248–249, 251, 253, 258–260, 264–265, 270–276, 278, 281–282, 284–287, 289–290, 292–294, 301, 315*
ataraxia[1], *19*
atheism[9], *131, 212*
Atheismus[1], *226*
Atheismusstreit[1], *212*
atheist[1], *212*
atheistic[2], *212, 228*
atheists[1], *23*
Athen[1], *292*
Athenian[1], *231*
Athens[2], *113, 171*
Atlantic[1], *310*
atom[1], *202*
atomic[4], *10, 106, 202*
Atomzeitalter[2], *286, 314*
attach[1], *78*
Attack[1], *147*

attack[19], *32, 43, 55–56, 60, 68, 147, 194, 211–212, 223, 231, 233, 236*
 Attacked[1], *175*
 attacked[11], *25, 46–47, 53–54, 79, 121, 140, 211*
 Attackers[1], *115*
 attacking[5], *43, 55, 57, 224*
 Attacks[1], *175*
 attacks[17], *4, 26, 43, 53–55, 79, 104, 119, 131, 175, 212, 232, 238*
 attain[4], *90, 147, 173, 200*
 attained[8], *24, 101, 152, 181, 222, 227, 249, 262*
 Attainment[1], *270*
 attainment[1], *197*
 Attempt[2], *224, 270*
 attempt[43], *12, 23, 28, 31, 36, 58, 71, 78, 90, 108, 154, 156, 159, 161, 168–169, 172, 175, 179, 181, 184, 190, 195, 197, 203, 205, 228, 230, 245, 262*
 attempted[9], *49, 85, 112, 142–143, 160, 170, 180, 197*
 Attempting[1], *92*
 attempting[17], *5, 29, 33–34, 54, 71, 90, 108, 133, 163, 180, 221, 240, 258–259, 262*
 attempts[12], *7, 27, 72, 135, 140, 143, 148, 161, 172, 179, 186, 231*
 attendance[1], *60*
 attended[7], *41, 48, 62, 110, 224, 285, 288*
 attendee[1], *107*
 attending[2], *130, 289*
 attention[5], *25, 80, 190, 194, 212*
 attenuated[2], *260, 272*
 attest[1], *38*
 attesting[1], *99*
 attitude[4], *17, 32, 148, 221*
 attitudinal[1], *134*
 attract[1], *46*
 attracted[1], *60*
 attracting[1], *180*
 attracts[2], *42–43*
 attuned[1], *81*
 attunement[1], *20*
 attunements[1], *264*
 Au[2], *9, 110*
 Auch[1], *163*
 auch[30], *6, 43, 63–64, 81, 85, 87, 107–108, 112, 120, 124, 143, 158, 163, 170, 173–174, 181, 196, 219, 246–247, 252, 256, 266*
 auction[6], *17, 21, 40, 244, 247*
 auctions[4], *10, 16, 41, 244*
 auctoritate[1], *54*
 audacious[1], *79*
 audience[3], *3, 122, 283*
 audiences[2], *29*
 Audio[1], *313*
 audio[1], *314*
 auditorium[2], *282, 288*
 Auf[3], *20, 143, 254*
 auf[65], *20, 34, 43–44, 51, 58, 65, 75, 80–81, 84–87, 108, 113–114, 120, 124, 126, 138, 141–142, 144, 164, 167, 173–174, 177, 179, 185, 187, 216, 218, 221, 246, 248, 252, 264, 266, 282–285, 307–308*
 Aufbau[1], *76*
 aufdämmert[1], *77*
 Aufenthalt[4], *268, 293–294*
 Aufenthalte[3], *8, 85, 162*
 Auffassung[2], *252*
 Aufgabe[13], *57–58, 104, 126, 136–137, 218, 220, 222, 277, 281, 291*
 Aufgaben[2], *43, 275*
 Ausgang[1], *165*
 aufgegeben[2], *51, 59*
 aufgehoben[1], *104*
 aufgeht[1], *158*
 Aufgenommen[2], *274, 313*
 aufgenommen[2], *274, 283*
 aufgestellt[1], *108*
 aufheben[2], *194, 223*
 Aufhebung[1], *76*
 aufhellen[1], *77*
 Aufhellung[1], *146*
 Auflage[2], *138–139*
 Aufmerken[2], *173*
 Aufnahme[1], *314*
 aufraffen[1], *126*
 aufs[1], *92*
 Aufsätze[16], *67, 84, 101–102, 113, 165, 168, 239, 285–286, 296*
 aufsetzte[1], *74*

aufstellen[1], 108
 Aufstellung[1], 107
 Aufzeichnungen[4], 279, 302, 305
 aufzugeben[1], 136
 aufzunehmen[3], 74, 86, 265
 Aug[2], 23, 315
 Augenblicken[1], 264
 Auggener[1], 15
 augments[1], 127
 Augsburg[1], 294
 Augstein[1], 49
 August[54], 19, 28, 33, 41, 45, 48, 51, 55,
 59, 62, 71, 76, 95, 97, 108, 122–123,
 131, 162, 165, 194, 198, 212, 216–217,
 244–245, 263, 274–275, 280–281, 284,
 286, 292–293, 307–308
 august[1], 245
 Auguste[1], 55
 Augustine[1], 289
 Augustinus[5], 2, 278, 299
 Aula[2], 289
 aula[1], 313
 Aunt[1], 281
 Aurelius[1], 2
 Aus[20], 58, 63, 71, 73, 75, 104, 136, 173,
 236, 268, 280, 289, 296, 302, 305, 308
 aus[76], 6, 18, 20, 34, 51, 58, 69, 72, 74,
 77, 80–81, 87, 89, 91–92, 95, 109, 120,
 136, 138–139, 160–161, 163, 166–167,
 173, 219, 237, 241, 245–247, 264, 267,
 274–275, 279, 283, 287, 291, 305,
 307–308
 Ausarbeitung[6], 51, 278, 282, 306
 Ausbreitung[1], 201
 Ausdehnung[2], 218, 229
 Ausdruck[2], 148, 263
 ausdrücklich[1], 51
 Ausdrucks[1], 298
 Auseinander[2], 58, 73
 Auseinandersetzung[24], 58–59, 72–73,
 87, 103–104, 120, 126, 143, 167, 183,
 217–218, 238, 251
 Ausformulierung[1], 291
 ausführenden[1], 147
 ausführten[1], 143
 Ausgabe[3], 8, 12, 51
 Ausgang[4], 7, 46, 253, 297
 Ausgänge[1], 219
 ausgeführt[3], 144, 163, 291
 ausgerufen[1], 236
 ausgestattet[1], 220
 ausgetragen[1], 174
 Ausgewählte[13], 84, 95, 118, 152,
 298–299, 301, 307–308
 ausgewählter[2], 21, 298
 Ausgrif[1], 92
 aushalten[2], 87, 120
 Ausländerkursen[1], 281
 Auslegen[1], 248
 Auslegung[7], 75, 79, 112, 136, 282–283,
 298
 Ausleihhinweis[6], 255–257, 267
 ausmachen[1], 169
 ausschwingt[1], 163
 Aussehens[1], 174
 aussieht[1], 268
 Ausstellung[1], 167
 Austrag[17], 87, 95, 173–174, 267
 Austrags[1], 91
 Austrian[5], 34, 39, 52, 68, 98
 Ausweichen[1], 174
 Auszug[1], 305
 Auszüge[4], 87, 91, 161, 307
 auszusprechen[1], 167
 authentic[4], 7, 147, 197
 authenticity[1], 38
 Author[5], 139, 267, 284, 301, 316
 author[21], 12, 54, 60, 75, 78, 85, 94, 120,
 128, 131, 141, 177, 197, 219, 230, 266,
 272
 authored[5], 21, 23, 33, 38, 48
 authoritative[1], 129
 Authority[1], 54
 authority[5], 8, 65, 108, 129, 131
 authorize[1], 38
 authorized[1], 105
 authors[4], 21, 31, 78, 139
 auto[1], 64
 autobiographical[1], 217
 autobiography[3], 56, 106, 242
 autograph[3], 39–40
 Autographs[2], 244
 autographs[1], 248

Autor[2], 75
 Autorität[1], 42
 Autors[1], 274
 autòs[4], 8, 108, 126, 181
 Autumn[2], 98
 Außen[1], 166
 Außer[1], 84
 außer[1], 158
 äußerlich[1], 52
 äußerst[1], 109
 äußerste[1], 34
 äußert[1], 120
 Available[1], 286
 available[2], 11, 284
 avec[1], 9
 average[1], 96
 Averroes[1], 192
 Avicenna[1], 192
 Avii[2], 56, 204
 avoid[4], 9, 49, 109, 247
 avoided[2], 71, 162
 awaits[1], 202
 awake[1], 190
 awaken[3], 5, 64, 175
 Awakening[1], 212
 awakening[1], 156
 awards[1], 68
 aware[10], 14, 25, 29, 97, 106, 147–148, 150, 213, 260
 awareness[3], 197, 200, 234
 away[23], 27, 30, 56, 114, 120, 122, 129, 141, 145, 147, 161, 168, 175, 185, 189, 208, 232, 235, 242, 249
 awe[3], 122, 220, 230
 awesome[1], 315
 awkward[3], 119, 166
 Ax[2], 56, 204
 Axelos[4], 48, 73, 287
 Axenfeld[1], 303
 axioms[1], 175
 Aymard[1], 182
 Ayn[1], 261
 aYQn[1], 51
 Azur[1], 131
 ἀραιδεία[1], 105

B

ba[1], 60
 Baader[1], 118
 babysitter[1], 131
 Back[33], 19, 25, 28, 31, 33, 42, 47, 52, 61–63, 72, 81, 85, 87, 105, 109, 111, 120, 123, 131, 133, 150, 153, 164, 175, 188, 193, 209, 247–248, 260
 back[49], 11, 16, 29, 31, 44, 48, 52–53, 56, 64, 69–70, 86, 88, 90, 96, 110, 112–113, 120, 137, 146, 160, 172, 177, 179, 194–196, 199, 202–204, 206, 209, 222–223, 226, 229, 246, 269, 271, 278
 backdrop[1], 231
 Background[5], 44, 47, 54, 254, 266
 background[12], 3, 13–14, 23, 43, 62, 104, 198, 205, 230
 backing[1], 218
 backward[3], 70, 90, 200
 backwards[1], 96
 Bad[3], 15, 138–139
 bad[2], 119, 228
 Baden[5], 16, 18, 44, 289
 Badenia[1], 198
 Badenweiler[2], 17, 19
 BadenWürttemberg[1], 315
 Badiou[1], 224
 badly[2], 218, 230
 bag[1], 53
 Bags[1], 155
 Bahnen[1], 233
 Bahnsen[1], 32
 Bai[1], 316
 bait[2], 258
 bake[1], 68
 baked[1], 103
 Bakes[1], 261
 Bakewell[1], 109
 Bakunin[1], 23
 bald[2], 51, 99
 Balmer[1], 272
 Baltic[1], 16
 Bambach[1], 198

Band[10], *138–139, 254, 284–285, 296, 301–302*
 band[1], *159*
 Bände[1], *259*
 Bandes[1], *51*
 bank[3], *12, 138*
 Bar[1], *182*
 bar[1], *39*
 Barack[1], *43*
 Barbara[2], *303, 311*
 barbarus[1], *234*
 Barcelona[1], *60*
 Bare[1], *212*
 bare[1], *31*
 Barmen[2], *275*
 barren[1], *64*
 Barth[1], *303*
 Bartolome[2], *315*
 Baruch[3], *133, 211–212*
 base[3], *12, 183, 211*
 Based[2], *7, 287*
 based[22], *2–4, 11, 21, 44, 54, 124, 157, 161, 168, 197, 204, 206–207, 213, 277, 282, 316*
 Basel[5], *25, 47, 168, 289, 302*
 Basic[13], *38, 46, 84, 98, 124, 130, 151–152, 191, 222, 263*
 basic[37], *12, 20, 30, 48, 66–67, 70, 76, 80, 96, 103, 111, 126, 133, 143, 149, 151, 154, 157–158, 183, 190, 193, 195, 223, 232, 249, 260*
 Basically[3], *15, 41, 161*
 basically[9], *11, 141, 147, 184, 201, 228–229, 289*
 Basileus[1], *42*
 Basis[1], *224*
 basis[7], *34, 58, 118, 122, 221, 249, 290*
 Bast[1], *139*
 Battle[1], *18*
 battle[1], *14*
 battlefield[2], *56, 204*
 battles[2], *56, 204*
 baubles[1], *2*
 Bauch[5], *282, 302–303*
 Bauen[5], *165, 284, 314*
 bauen[4], *49, 169, 179*
 Bauer[1], *23*
 Baum[1], *316*
 Baumgarten[4], *192, 206*
 Baumgartner[1], *194*
 Bavarian[5], *284–285, 288, 294*
 Bayerische[1], *285*
 Bayerischen[2], *284–285*
 BC[12], *74, 83, 128, 171, 188, 203*
 bca[1], *60*
 BCE[2], *62, 181*
 Bch[1], *257*
 Bd[14], *20, 97, 122, 138–139, 255–256, 266, 268, 279, 283*
 Be[6], *27, 85, 196, 221, 257, 289*
 be[413], *2, 5, 7, 10–13, 17–22, 24–34, 36–40, 46–47, 49, 52, 54, 56–57, 59, 61–64, 66, 68–69, 71–73, 76–81, 83–84, 86–88, 90–91, 93–109, 113–114, 116–123, 126, 128–137, 139–140, 144–146, 148–149, 151, 153–156, 158–163, 165–166, 169–171, 173, 176, 179–180, 182, 185, 187–190, 192, 194, 198, 200–209, 213–216, 218, 220–223, 225–228, 230, 232, 234, 238–239, 242, 246–251, 253–254, 260–265, 267, 272–273, 280, 289, 315*
 beachten[1], *164*
 beanspruche[1], *115*
 beantworten[1], *92*
 beantwortung[1], *245*
 bear[3], *84, 122, 234*
 Bearbeiter[2], *165, 257*
 bearbeitet[1], *311*
 beard[1], *138*
 bearers[1], *64*
 bearing[1], *202*
 bears[2], *87, 249*
 beat[1], *111*
 Beaten[3], *25, 68, 86*
 beating[1], *62*
 Beaufret[12], *47–48, 73, 107, 287, 289, 291, 303, 306*
 BeaufretFédier[1], *3*
 beautiful[3], *219, 230, 234*
 beauty[1], *138*
 BECAME[2], *55, 232*
 became[28], *15, 42, 85, 129, 131, 145, 162, 169, 180, 182, 186, 197, 206, 214, 224,*

228–229, 270–271, 275, 287
 Because[5], 25, 124, 147, 191, 262
 because[67], 13, 24, 26, 29–30, 37, 43, 55,
 64, 66, 72, 78, 87, 90–93, 103, 106, 112,
 116, 119, 128–129, 133–134, 143,
 145–146, 148, 154, 159, 162, 172–173,
 176, 184, 188, 208–209, 211, 222–223,
 227–228, 233, 242, 247, 249, 252, 261,
 267, 269, 283, 285, 294
 Beck[3], 206, 211–212
 Becker[2], 15, 23
 become[50], 3, 24, 30–31, 34, 37, 39, 48,
 54, 62, 64, 68, 79, 81, 83–84, 96–97, 99,
 102, 112–113, 119, 122, 129, 140,
 142–143, 148–149, 157, 159, 164,
 180–181, 190, 196, 202–203, 221,
 226–227, 229, 262, 283
 Becomes[2], 106, 242
 becomes[32], 7, 25, 46, 56, 74, 81, 84, 86,
 92, 103, 111, 113, 120, 126–127,
 134–135, 157, 195–196, 198, 207, 225,
 228, 231, 238–239, 251, 260
 Becoming[1], 310
 becoming[8], 29, 98, 129, 226, 242, 251
 bed[2], 53
 Beda[2], 48, 287
 bedarf[2], 146, 148
 bedazzlement[1], 75
 bedenken[2], 156, 186
 bedeutet[3], 108, 218, 229
 Bedeutung[2], 23, 245
 Bedeutungslehre[2], 103–104
 Bedford[1], 143
 bedingt[1], 98
 Bedingungen[2], 246, 253
 bedrängen[1], 92
 bedrängender[1], 245
 Bedrohung[1], 281
 Bee[1], 194
 bee[1], 8
 been[134], 2, 4, 8, 10–12, 14, 17–21, 24,
 28–32, 36–38, 43, 47–48, 54, 60, 68, 70,
 78, 80, 91–93, 96, 98, 101, 109,
 113–114, 116–118, 125, 127–128,
 130–131, 139, 141, 144–148, 150, 152,
 154, 159–160, 163–164, 166, 171–173,
 175, 177, 181–182, 184, 193, 199,
 201–202, 205–206, 209, 211, 215, 217,
 220–221, 225–228, 230–231, 234, 242,
 246–247, 261, 263, 265, 272–273, 277,
 289
 Beer[1], 43
 bees[1], 8
 Before[2], 45, 156
 before[78], 8, 15, 19–20, 22–23, 26–29, 31,
 35, 37, 40, 42–43, 48, 53, 56–57, 62–63,
 68, 74, 76, 80–81, 86, 101, 103,
 106–107, 109, 113, 115–116, 127, 130,
 136, 148, 150, 154, 159, 161, 165,
 178–179, 181–182, 195, 205, 207, 214,
 240, 242, 249, 260, 264–265, 270
 befragt[2], 83, 174
 Befragtes[1], 149
 befremdend[1], 141
 befremdlich[2], 148, 196
 Befugnis[2], 91
 began[6], 37, 59, 129, 178, 188, 262
 Begegnung[1], 256
 Begegnungen[3], 301
 begin[12], 11, 47, 75, 84, 112, 202–205,
 210, 215
 Beginn[3], 108, 256
 beginnen[1], 84
 beginnende[1], 219
 beginners[3], 69, 73, 129
 Beginning[16], 31, 49, 79–80, 86, 115, 165,
 170, 204, 255
 beginning[118], 3, 25, 27, 30–31, 44, 47,
 49, 53, 55–56, 67–68, 70–72, 75, 78, 80,
 84, 88–92, 95, 101, 108, 112–113,
 120–122, 126, 145–148, 152, 154–156,
 158–159, 161, 163, 165–166, 169–170,
 172–173, 178–179, 184, 186, 194–195,
 200, 204–205, 222, 227, 232, 236,
 239–240, 245, 249, 253
 beginnt[2], 75, 152
 begins[6], 56, 189, 194, 204
 Begreifen[1], 92
 begreifen[4], 92, 122, 147, 218
 begreifende[1], 250
 begreiflich[1], 92
 Begriff[21], 34, 53, 74, 88, 103, 120, 218,
 229, 235, 250, 252–253, 274–276, 279,
 298
 Begriffe[4], 77, 218–219, 229
 Begriffen[1], 77

Begriffes[1], 250
 Begriffs[4], 100, 218, 229
 Begriffsbildung[1], 104
 Begründung[3], 279, 282
 begrüße[1], 144
 behält[1], 174
 behalten[1], 225
 Behandelte[1], 257
 Behandlung[1], 52
 beharren[1], 173
 behaupten[3], 57, 263
 behavior[1], 54
 beherrschen[1], 51
 beherrschenden[2], 58, 218
 beherrscht[1], 252
 behest[1], 13
 behind[18], 26, 40, 59, 71, 75, 86, 98, 136, 179, 218–219, 227, 230, 235
 behold[2], 110, 221
 Bei[1], 279
 bei[20], 38, 136, 164, 170, 173, 246, 252, 267, 271, 275–276, 279, 286, 288–289
 Beide[2], 185, 264
 beiden[3], 139, 143, 268
 Beil[4], 20, 122, 255–256
 Beilagen[21], 17, 91, 165, 255–257, 266, 271, 276, 278–279, 283, 286–287, 289, 293–294
 beileibe[1], 81
 beim[2], 287, 316
 beinahe[1], 228
 BEING[1], 263
 Being[380], 4, 7, 16, 18–19, 23–24, 26–27, 31–32, 34, 42–43, 53, 57–58, 67–68, 71–72, 75, 77, 79–81, 83, 86, 89–94, 96–99, 102, 109, 112, 114, 117–118, 121–122, 125, 130–131, 134, 138–160, 172–173, 176–178, 180, 185–186, 190, 192–195, 197–201, 217, 221–223, 225–226, 231–233, 238–240, 242, 245–251, 255, 259, 261–265, 267, 270, 275–276, 285, 290, 292, 310, 312, 316
 being[139], 2, 8, 10–12, 17, 21, 24, 26, 34, 39–41, 45, 61, 69, 77–78, 83, 88, 90, 92, 96–98, 100, 104, 107, 110, 114, 116, 118–119, 121–122, 128, 130–131, 135, 137, 145–148, 152–153, 155, 158–160, 164, 167, 170, 172–173, 181, 185–186, 192, 197–198, 200–201, 206–208, 210, 215, 219, 222, 224–225, 227–230, 232, 236, 238, 240, 252–253, 259, 267, 277, 285, 315
 beingconsciousness[1], 192
 Beingless[1], 162
 Beinglessness[1], 162
 beingness[3], 96, 102, 201
 beings[59], 27, 35, 64, 68, 78, 90, 94, 96, 109, 111, 117, 122, 135, 146, 149–150, 153, 155, 157–158, 172–173, 177, 185, 192, 195–196, 198–200, 222–223, 225–226, 228, 232–233, 247, 253, 316
 beirrt[1], 113
 Beiser[3], 32–33, 55
 Beitrag[5], 248, 270–271, 291, 294
 Beiträge[97], 3, 27–28, 30–31, 53, 57–58, 68–69, 76–77, 97, 101, 117, 143, 147, 151–152, 154–163, 171, 175, 178–180, 184–185, 195, 200–201, 217–218, 232–233, 236, 249, 264, 270, 298, 305, 312
 Bejahung[1], 196
 bekommen[2], 194, 223
 Belgium[1], 275
 belief[6], 111, 211, 225, 227, 233, 235
 believe[16], 43, 79, 96, 105, 123, 131–132, 141, 175, 212, 218, 227, 229, 235
 believed[4], 19, 21, 130, 217
 believes[2], 79, 192
 Believing[1], 278
 believing[1], 122
 Bell[1], 62
 bell[1], 95
 Belle[1], 15
 belong[14], 12, 17, 20, 57, 78, 102, 111, 150, 159, 190, 217, 248, 267
 belonging[5], 17, 146, 238–239, 267
 belongs[17], 23, 54, 78, 82, 85, 92, 124, 127, 146, 155, 172, 191–192, 240, 246
 below[9], 14, 73, 96, 138, 165, 231, 252, 262, 273
 Belvédère[2], 44, 278
 Bemerkungen[7], 20, 99, 255–256, 266, 276, 291
 bene[3], 2, 44, 137
 Benedicta[1], 43
 beneficence[2], 8, 73

Benjamin[3], *74, 89, 105*
Bense[1], *303*
benutzbar[6], *255–257, 267*
Benutzungshinweis[6], *255–257, 267*
bequemen[1], *252*
Bequest[1], *40*
ber[1], *108*
berechtigte[1], *248*
Bereich[2], *84, 143*
Bereidi[1], *289*
bereits[2], *34, 219*
Bereitschaft[2], *87, 120*
Berg[1], *84*
bergen[2], *70, 167*
Berger[1], *216*
Bergère[1], *16*
Bericht[12], *20, 39, 117, 274, 278, 284*
Berkeley[4], *207–208, 212*
Berkeleyan[1], *212*
Berlin[23], *16, 25–26, 30, 32, 52, 96, 105, 115, 144, 147, 182, 205, 207, 212, 224, 254, 285, 288, 290, 292*
Berlinische[1], *212*
Bern[3], *273, 280*
Bernd[1], *275*
Bernhard[11], *18, 42, 272, 285, 291, 293, 301, 311*
Berthold[1], *15*
Bertholds[1], *15*
Bertram[1], *315*
Bertrand[3], *23, 68, 193*
Beruf[1], *43*
berührthat[1], *108*
beruht[1], *266*
besagt[2], *252, 263*
bescheiden[1], *219*
beschränken[1], *167*
beschränkt[5], *255–257*
Beschreibung[1], *15*
beschriftete[1], *91*
Beschriftung[2], *257, 294*
beseech[1], *227*
Beside[2], *2, 61*
Besides[2], *35, 147*
besides[6], *12, 48, 125, 131, 215, 224*
Besieger[2], *237, 241*

besinnen[1], *63*
besinnliche[1], *100*
besinnliches[1], *250*
Besinnung[38], *14, 24, 31, 75, 77, 91, 101, 107, 113, 126, 132, 134–135, 143, 149, 152, 154, 157–159, 163, 177, 236, 282, 286, 298, 306–308*
Besinnungen[1], *143*
Besitz[1], *84*
besonderen[2], *143, 245*
besonders[3], *143–144, 219*
Besorgnis[1], *158*
besser[4], *120, 219, 230, 266*
Best[1], *27*
best[38], *3, 12–13, 21, 25, 34, 38, 42, 53, 56, 60, 66–67, 88, 91, 99, 102, 125, 129, 149, 156, 171, 175–177, 183, 238, 251, 273*
bestallter[2], *67, 180*
bestand[1], *76*
Bestandes[1], *174*
beständig[1], *252*
Bestandssignatur[4], *255–256, 266*
bestcht[1], *129*
Beste[1], *99*
bestehen[1], *34*
Bestehenden[1], *89*
Bestehens[2], *174, 286*
besteht[4], *87, 120, 179, 252*
besteigen[1], *84*
besten[1], *129*
bestimmen[1], *141*
bestimmenden[1], *141*
bestimmt[2], *167, 264*
bestimmte[1], *120*
bestimmtes[1], *81*
Bestimmung[19], *17, 42, 93, 244, 291–292, 294, 298*
Bestimmungen[1], *268*
Bestirnung[1], *292*
bête[2], *118, 183*
Bethge[1], *316*
Betrachtung[2], *278, 298*
Betrachtungen[1], *32*
betrays[1], *97*
betrieb[1], *201*
betrifft[1], *245*

Better[1], 241
 better[21], 19, 29–30, 36, 53, 68, 120–121, 182, 190, 208, 212, 219, 230, 242, 269, 294
 Between[1], 290
 between[66], 4, 25–26, 35, 37, 40, 43–45, 47, 54–55, 57–58, 60–61, 64, 67, 81, 84, 87, 90, 94, 96, 109, 113, 119, 121, 129, 135, 137, 139, 149, 151, 158, 164, 166, 172, 175, 182, 195, 206–209, 217, 222, 231–232, 234, 242, 244, 250, 252, 278, 288, 315
 Beuron[2], 278
 Beurteilung[1], 126
 bewahren[1], 267
 bewährt[1], 252
 Bewandtnis[1], 84
 beware[1], 1
 bewegt[1], 89
 Bewegung[4], 28, 219, 245, 252
 Beweis[1], 226
 Beweisen[1], 114
 Beweises[1], 114
 Beweisgrund[1], 48
 bewirkende[1], 306
 bewitched[1], 217
 bewußt[1], 245
 Bewußtsein[1], 248
 Beyng[29], 31, 50, 63–64, 85, 154, 157, 159, 172–173, 192, 196, 249
 beyng[8], 64, 87, 90, 238, 310, 315
 Beyond[13], 4, 83, 170, 197–198, 219, 228–230, 233, 260, 275–276
 beyond[36], 4, 48, 55–56, 64, 66, 71, 73, 85, 89, 99, 111, 123, 131, 164, 170, 172, 179, 184, 193, 197, 211, 223, 228, 235, 237–238, 240, 248, 310
 bezeichnet[1], 75
 bezeichneten[1], 108
 bezeugt[1], 259
 Beziehung[5], 44, 157–158, 216
 Bezirk[1], 173
 bezogen[1], 264
 Bezug[4], 108, 173–174
 bezüglich[1], 146
 Bezugnahme[1], 173
 Bezugs[3], 27, 174, 200
 Bhagavad[1], 62
 bhakta[1], 5
 Bhikku[3], 66, 101, 290
 bias[1], 135
 bibilographies[1], 310
 bibliographic[1], 52
 Bibliographie[2], 273, 280
 Bibliography[3], 273, 310
 bibliography[3], 10, 310
 Bibliophilen[1], 291
 Bibliotheksgesellschaft[1], 288
 Biemal[1], 260
 Biemel[26], 9–10, 29, 48, 73, 128–129, 167, 268–269, 278, 285, 287, 302
 bien[1], 9
 bifurcation[1], 231
 Big[2], 117
 big[12], 33, 43, 70, 87, 102, 120, 123, 129, 144, 184, 211, 214
 bigger[3], 31, 109, 222
 biggest[3], 218, 229, 285
 Bild[2], 164, 289
 Bilde[1], 84
 Bildung[1], 253
 bill[1], 203
 billion[2], 43, 222
 Bimal[1], 181
 bin[8], 40, 84, 112, 141, 144, 228
 binding[2], 79, 88
 binds[1], 64
 Binswanger[3], 92, 292, 302
 biographical[2], 16–17
 Biographie[1], 302
 Biological[1], 54
 Birault[1], 285
 bird[1], 316
 birge[1], 167
 birgt[1], 169
 Birle[2], 16, 293
 Birth[4], 242, 315
 birth[3], 286, 289–290
 Birthday[4], 48, 286, 291–292
 birthday[19], 16, 92, 101, 118, 121–123, 131, 138, 190, 275, 277, 281, 293–294
 BIS[41], 61, 123, 274–279, 281–286, 288–292

bis[18], *1, 41, 93, 161, 177, 235, 245, 265, 268, 280, 292, 297, 299–301, 305*
 Bisher[1], *77*
 bisher[1], *245*
 bisherige[2], *166, 174*
 bisherigen[6], *164, 174, 185, 237, 241, 264*
 bisheriger[1], *54*
 Bishop[1], *207*
 Bismarck[1], *134*
 bist[1], *34*
 bisweilen[1], *120*
 bit[10], *12–13, 18, 23, 27, 40, 60, 67, 112, 180*
 bitte[2], *143*
 Biweekly[1], *105*
 Bl[23], *20, 122, 255–256, 271, 276, 278, 281, 284, 286, 289, 293*
 Black[29], *11–12, 18–20, 27, 34, 53–54, 66, 74, 78, 124, 133, 138, 140–141, 168, 183, 262, 264, 290, 294*
 black[5], *40, 75, 107, 129*
 Blackamoor[1], *15*
 Blackburn[1], *159*
 Blanchot[1], *182*
 bland[1], *16*
 blanks[1], *109*
 blather[1], *201*
 Blatt[12], *20, 91, 165, 257, 266, 283, 287–288, 294*
 blaue[1], *257*
 Blauen[1], *288*
 Blaum[1], *303*
 bleibe[1], *252*
 Bleiben[1], *113*
 bleiben[8], *99, 108, 158, 164, 188, 201, 262, 281*
 Bleibende[1], *70*
 bleibende[1], *259*
 bleibt[14], *40, 93, 120, 136, 163, 167, 173–174, 193, 221, 245, 252, 264*
 Blendung[1], *75*
 blew[1], *229*
 Blick[4], *58, 108, 120, 218*
 Blickstellung[1], *148*
 bliebe[1], *268*
 blind[6], *181, 200, 207, 228*
 blindness[3], *96, 133, 225*
 bliss[1], *192*
 Blochmann[5], *24, 128, 168, 301*
 block[1], *57*
 blocking[1], *202*
 blocks[4], *70, 153, 205, 209*
 Blomberg[2], *207*
 blood[2], *77, 178*
 bloodless[2], *54, 60*
 bloody[1], *54*
 bloom[2], *101, 261*
 Bloomsbury[1], *155*
 blossen[1], *205*
 blowing[1], *95*
 blown[1], *31*
 blows[2], *56, 188*
 bloß[2], *40, 246*
 bloße[1], *252*
 bloßen[2], *212, 236*
 blueprint[1], *231*
 Blumenthal[1], *303*
 blurred[1], *221*
 blush[1], *111*
 Blust[4], *13, 37–38*
 bM[1], *51*
 boat[2], *16, 167*
 Böckmann[1], *303*
 Bodenständigkeit[1], *286*
 bodily[1], *235*
 Bodmershof[2], *52, 301*
 body[7], *66, 70, 150, 187, 226, 263*
 Boeder[1], *150*
 Boehme[1], *19*
 Bogdan[1], *254*
 Bogging[1], *28*
 Böhme[1], *293*
 bold[2], *5, 77*
 Boldly[1], *91*
 Bollnow[1], *45*
 Bolshevism[3], *54, 114, 133*
 bomb[4], *10, 52, 62, 106*
 bombed[1], *12*
 Bona[1], *33*
 Bondy[1], *303*
 Bonn[7], *244, 248, 276–277*
 bonum[1], *115*
 Book[7], *58, 102, 227, 249, 275, 286*

book[135], 3–5, 8, 10, 12, 18–19, 23–25,
 27–28, 30, 33, 38–40, 43–46, 48, 52, 54,
 57–58, 66–67, 69–70, 72–73, 75–76,
 78–79, 85–86, 100, 102, 105–106,
 109–110, 112, 115, 122–123, 131, 134,
 138, 140–144, 149–150, 153, 175, 178,
 180, 183, 186–188, 206, 211, 242,
 244–245, 247–250, 262, 271–273, 278,
 280, 287, 314
 BookIndex[1], 312
 booklets[2], 12, 20
 Books[6], 12, 20, 41, 44, 106, 293
 books[27], 10, 24, 26–27, 30, 32–33, 43,
 48, 55, 60, 110, 113, 117, 127, 150, 152,
 207, 217, 224, 238, 244, 254, 272, 310
 bookstores[2], 19, 110
 boom[1], 2
 Bordeaux[1], 270
 borders[3], 30, 89
 boredom[1], 46
 boring[4], 16, 167–168, 277
 Born[1], 275
 born[12], 15, 17, 39, 109, 182, 315
 borne[2], 87, 234
 Bornkamm[1], 105
 Böse[2], 257, 305
 Boss[22], 13, 17, 62, 105–106, 110, 119,
 121, 127, 162, 217, 250, 301, 304
 BOSTON[1], 258
 Both[9], 8, 34, 39, 49, 52, 119, 185, 194,
 264
 both[43], 9, 25–26, 40, 44–45, 47–48,
 52–53, 56, 62, 70, 78, 80, 96–98, 102,
 117, 119, 131, 141, 154, 169, 171, 177,
 194, 211, 259, 271
 bother[1], 36
 bothsidesism[1], 175
 Bottle[1], 71
 bottle[15], 67, 100, 258–259, 263
 bottles[1], 259
 Bottom[1], 216
 bottom[5], 12, 20, 111, 114, 155
 bouches[3], 2, 123, 259
 bought[1], 106
 bound[4], 88, 153, 161, 226
 boundaries[3], 193, 205, 208
 boundless[6], 206, 209
 Bounds[2], 205, 212
 Bourdieu[1], 182
 Bouvier[3], 244, 248
 box[4], 10, 100
 boxing[1], 31
 boy[1], 33
 Boys[1], 33
 boys[1], 60
 BP[1], 215
 BR[2], 282, 313
 Br[15], 48, 72, 93, 97, 113, 181, 190, 262,
 274, 278, 282, 288–289, 292
 Brace[1], 129
 Bradley[1], 315
 Brahms[3], 15, 107, 176
 Braig[1], 23
 brain[1], 99
 brand[3], 74, 126, 213
 brands[1], 54
 Braque[3], 48, 287, 291
 Brauch[3], 91, 266, 268
 Brauches[2], 91, 268
 braucht[1], 113
 Braun[1], 41
 brave[1], 23
 Bravely[1], 12
 Brazil[2], 13, 16
 Bread[1], 261
 bread[4], 43, 68
 breadth[3], 8, 39, 104
 break[5], 27, 30, 182, 232
 breakdown[5], 17, 102, 159, 217, 249
 breakdowns[1], 55
 breaking[3], 14, 126, 240
 breaks[2], 240, 244
 breaths[2], 7, 142
 brechen[1], 146
 Brecht[2], 275, 305
 Breisgau[14], 13, 16, 71, 109–110, 162,
 168, 264, 271, 286, 292, 313
 breitere[1], 108
 Bremen[18], 3, 11, 15–16, 165, 278, 283,
 285–287, 289, 295
 Bremer[6], 81, 85, 124, 283, 299
 Bremmers[4], 273, 310, 315
 Brender[2], 138

brennender[1], 81
 Brentano[5], 23, 192, 285
 Breslau[1], 271
 Bret[1], 164
 Bridge[3], 163, 168, 179
 bridge[45], 30, 50, 70–71, 86, 163–170, 179, 184
 Bridges[7], 31, 86, 165, 170, 255
 bridges[11], 30, 49, 71, 163, 166, 169
 Brief[11], 27, 110, 113, 117, 305–308
 brief[4], 80, 96, 225, 245
 Briefausgabe[4], 52, 301–302
 Briefe[20], 123, 274, 299, 301–302, 305, 307–308
 Briefen[1], 302
 briefest[1], 231
 briefly[2], 160, 244
 Briefwechsel[1], 167
 Briefwechsel[24], 24, 175, 251, 301–302
 brightly[1], 84
 Brigitte[1], 287
 brill[1], 51
 brilliance[1], 55
 brilliant[8], 7, 33, 75, 122, 145, 180, 238
 Bring[1], 130
 bring[18], 5, 28, 33, 44, 57, 70, 81, 130, 135, 177, 179, 183, 194, 217, 220, 223, 252
 bringen[5], 58, 179, 218
 bringing[5], 69, 72, 97, 158, 316
 brings[5], 5, 85, 97, 101, 216
 bringt[1], 168
 British[2], 148, 292
 broad[4], 54–55, 67, 99
 Broadcast[2], 101, 290
 broadcast[4], 109, 285–286, 291
 broadens[1], 85
 broader[1], 213
 broadly[1], 202
 Brock[1], 140
 Bröcker[13], 37–38, 41, 83, 140, 270–271, 276, 291–292, 303
 Broke[1], 217
 broke[2], 35, 249
 broken[4], 209, 249
 Brooklyn[1], 62
 Bröse[3], 39, 292
 brother[20], 10, 16, 19, 24–25, 28, 33, 85, 94, 104, 117, 164, 175, 254, 276, 291, 294, 302
 brothers[3], 34, 227, 254
 brought[11], 52, 60, 97, 102, 126, 140, 150, 183, 206, 294
 Brücke[7], 163–164, 168–169
 Brucken[1], 163
 Brückenschlag[1], 163
 Brückenschlagen[1], 163
 Brüder[1], 33
 Bruder[1], 257
 Bruders[2], 291, 294
 Brücke[1], 169
 Bruno[4], 23, 133, 301
 Brutus[1], 186
 Buber[2], 278, 288
 Buch[2], 38, 302
 Buchen[1], 43
 Bucher[1], 113
 Büchermarkt[1], 144
 Büchern[1], 110
 Buchhändlern[1], 286
 Büchner[3], 33, 105
 Buchner[4], 36, 67, 113, 287
 Buddha[7], 61, 98, 125
 buddhena[1], 125
 Buddhism[3], 60, 71, 81
 Buddhismus[2], 244, 248
 Buddhist[14], 60–61, 98, 101, 118, 125, 137, 290
 Buffet[1], 11
 buggies[1], 15
 Bühlerhöhe[2], 283, 285
 Bühlerhöhe[6], 284–285
 build[10], 49, 126, 169, 171, 205, 209
 builders[1], 183
 Building[3], 84, 165, 284
 building[21], 28, 57, 69–70, 76, 85, 130, 134, 169, 175, 179, 184, 204–205
 buildon[1], 204
 builds[6], 15–16, 84, 106, 163, 209
 built[6], 12, 103, 163, 168, 208
 Bülow[1], 273

Bultmann[14], 104–105, 175, 270, 275–276,
 302–303
 Bultmanns[2], 275
 bumped[1], 137
 bunch[1], 198
 bunches[1], 261
 bUqc[1], 51
 Burckhardt[1], 303
 burden[2], 87, 118
 burdened[1], 181
 Buren[7], 4, 23, 103, 275–276, 310
 Burg[1], 283
 Burgtheater[1], 288
 buried[3], 94, 197, 315
 burned[1], 138
 burning[1], 81
 bus[1], 115
 Büsche[1], 219
 bushes[3], 218, 229–230
 business[5], 3, 94, 122, 177, 191
 businesspeople[2], 11, 165
 bust[1], 185
 busy[5], 13, 21, 48, 78, 135
 But[144], 2–5, 7–8, 10–11, 13, 17–19,
 24–25, 28–32, 35–37, 40, 44, 46–47, 52,
 60, 62–63, 67, 69, 72–73, 78–80, 84–85,
 96, 98, 101, 103, 106, 109–110, 112–113,
 116–117, 121–123, 126, 128, 130–131,
 139–140, 144–145, 147–148, 151–154,
 159–160, 162, 165, 169, 171–172,
 175–176, 179–181, 183, 186, 198,
 200–202, 205–206, 209, 212, 218,
 221–222, 224–228, 230–231, 233, 235,
 240, 242, 244, 252, 258–259, 262, 269,
 278, 282, 289, 316
 but[395], 1–3, 5–14, 16–19, 24–25, 29,
 32–36, 38–39, 43–44, 46–49, 51–53,
 55–61, 63–64, 67–71, 73, 75–81, 83, 85,
 87–91, 93–95, 97–100, 102–106,
 108–112, 114, 116–117, 119–121,
 125–129, 131–132, 134–140, 142–143,
 145–146, 148–161, 163, 165–168, 172,
 175–176, 178–182, 184–187, 190,
 192–198, 200–201, 204–205, 208–209,
 211, 215–218, 221–222, 224, 226–228,
 232, 237, 241–242, 244–246, 248–249,
 252–254, 256, 258–260, 262, 264,
 271–273, 277–278, 285, 289, 293–294,

304, 316
 buy[1], 97
 Bxxi[1], 193
 Bxxii[1], 204
 By[39], 20, 33, 58, 61, 72, 88, 90, 122, 126,
 134, 138, 140, 142, 155, 194, 198, 216,
 231, 233, 238, 244, 248, 254–255, 265,
 275, 301–302, 304, 310
 by[525], 2–4, 6–9, 11–14, 17–19, 21–23,
 25, 29–39, 41, 43–50, 53–59, 61–66,
 71–81, 83–93, 96–98, 100, 102–103,
 105–107, 109–110, 112–115, 117–121,
 123–131, 133–141, 143, 145–152,
 154–156, 158–159, 161, 163–169,
 172–181, 184–186, 188–189, 191–198,
 200–203, 205–209, 211–212, 214–217,
 219, 221–222, 224–232, 237–238,
 240–242, 244, 249, 251–255, 258–260,
 265, 267, 269–278, 280, 282–287,
 289–293, 296, 301–302, 304–305,
 310–313, 316
 bygone[1], 202
 bzw[3], 43, 114, 279

C

ca[4], 61, 192, 311, 313
 cabin[2], 15–16
 café[1], 45
 calculable[1], 236
 calculation[2], 19, 172
 calculatively[1], 135
 California[3], 43, 62
 call[26], 4–5, 16, 34–35, 47, 74, 80, 89, 96,
 127, 152, 157, 159, 179, 183, 188, 202,
 212, 217, 223, 238, 261–262, 284
 Called[10], 29, 147, 169, 174, 185, 189–190,
 251, 285
 called[74], 8, 10, 19, 21, 24, 28–29, 37–38,
 40, 47, 49, 53–54, 56, 68–71, 79, 86, 88,
 91, 93, 104, 108–110, 117, 121, 123,
 129, 133, 136, 138, 146–147, 150,
 159–160, 171–172, 184–185, 191–193,
 200, 203–205, 208, 215, 222, 224, 226,
 228, 233, 265, 275, 294, 305

Callias[1], 104
 calling[3], 73, 95, 207
 Calls[1], 217
 calls[14], 43, 68, 112, 128, 155–156, 183,
 193, 202, 205, 222, 229, 242
 calm[2], 218, 230
 Calvin[1], 3
 came[31], 4, 19, 21, 24, 30, 35, 42, 44, 47,
 56, 62, 69, 71, 106, 114, 130, 134,
 144–145, 166, 178, 182, 201, 226,
 228–229, 249, 277–278, 288
 camera[1], 101
 Camp[1], 164
 camp[2], 12, 164
 Campbell[1], 201
 camps[3], 4, 182
 Camus[1], 100
 Can[21], 3, 14, 34, 49, 54, 67, 76–77,
 85–86, 95, 107, 119, 145–146, 155, 157,
 171, 179, 240, 258
 can[212], 2, 4–8, 10–12, 18–19, 21, 24–29,
 31, 34–36, 43–44, 49, 52–53, 59, 66,
 69–70, 72–77, 79–81, 83, 89–90, 94–98,
 100, 103, 108–109, 114–118, 120,
 122–123, 125, 127–131, 135–136, 141,
 145–146, 150–152, 154–156, 158–162,
 164–166, 169–170, 176, 179, 181–186,
 190, 192–194, 197–198, 202, 205–206,
 208–209, 214–217, 223, 225, 231–232,
 235, 238, 240, 244, 246–248, 251–252,
 258–260, 262, 264, 267, 269, 272, 316
 candid[1], 208
 candidates[1], 46
 candidness[1], 115
 cannot[36], 13, 38, 69, 78–79, 81, 92–93,
 96–97, 100, 106, 119, 123, 131, 145–146,
 148, 155, 163, 168, 184, 188, 209, 211,
 221–222, 234, 262
 Cannstatt[1], 139
 canon[4], 28, 66, 277
 canons[1], 14
 capable[8], 36, 77, 84, 128, 163, 239
 capacity[2], 206
 capital[2], 10, 29
 Capitalism[1], 137
 capitalism[1], 53
 capitalized[1], 29
 Capobianco[2], 98, 261
 capture[1], 55
 captured[4], 34, 56, 68, 137
 Caputo[1], 4
 carbon[2], 155, 284
 cardinal[1], 233
 care[1], 180
 career[5], 42, 51, 77–78, 171
 careful[6], 38, 88, 106, 186, 221, 259
 carefully[6], 14, 68, 114, 186, 190, 201
 caricature[3], 113, 220, 230
 carillon[1], 289
 Carl[9], 23, 52, 59, 192, 292, 303–304
 Carnap[10], 36, 45, 110, 224
 Carol[1], 241
 Carolyn[1], 288
 Carossa[2], 18, 303
 carping[1], 78
 carried[7], 46, 63, 144, 154, 163, 191, 197
 carries[2], 248, 278
 carry[1], 49
 carrying[3], 64, 110, 217
 Carsten[1], 315
 Carteius[1], 207
 Carter[1], 50
 Cartesian[4], 109, 200, 212
 Cartesianism[1], 91
 Cartesians[1], 194
 case[41], 7–8, 10–11, 21, 26, 29, 32, 36,
 38, 54, 71, 74–75, 78, 81, 95, 100, 102,
 106, 110–111, 115–116, 142, 163, 166,
 170–171, 180, 190, 202, 207, 231, 242,
 272
 casing[1], 185
 Cassier[1], 43
 Cassirer[29], 23, 34–35, 43–47, 60, 79, 254,
 275, 277–278
 cast[3], 76, 130, 227
 casting[1], 204
 casts[1], 231
 cataclysmic[1], 32
 catalog[3], 10, 20, 130
 cātathyam[1], 61
 catch[2], 92
 categorematic[1], 101
 categorical[2], 216
 Categories[3], 44, 73, 103

categories[2], *103, 195*
Catholic[2], *15, 23*

caught[17], *55–56, 94, 114, 122, 147, 217, 221, 223, 232, 254, 282*
causa[5], *101, 199*
Causalitätssinn[1], *219*
causality[3], *199, 218, 230*
cause[4], *96, 120, 228*
caused[3], *119, 228, 294*
causes[5], *28, 90, 101, 172, 174*
causing[1], *253*
caustic[2], *55, 78*
caution[5], *63, 170, 221, 282*
cautionary[1], *36*
cautioned[1], *66*
cautions[4], *29, 75, 179, 268*
Cavalier[3], *149*
cave[1], *116*
CD[13], *285–286, 289, 313–314*
cdlib[1], *311*
CE[1], *61*
ce[1], *9*
cease[1], *140*
cela[1], *9*
celebrate[1], *25*
celebrated[1], *164*
Celebration[1], *98*
celebration[4], *48, 92, 292–293*
cent[1], *9*
Center[1], *261*
center[9], *4–5, 66, 88, 233, 287*
centerleft[1], *4*
central[22], *2–3, 5–6, 8, 11, 14, 48, 66–67, 77, 83, 94, 99, 116, 149–150, 182, 198, 263*
centrality[1], *178*
centuries[4], *78, 97, 164, 215*
century[28], *3, 24, 32, 45–46, 49, 55, 60, 62, 65, 98, 102, 115, 125, 133, 140, 181, 197–198, 218, 221, 230, 254*
ceremony[1], *294*
Cerf[1], *119*
Cerisy[4], *48, 73, 107, 286*
certain[9], *3–4, 24, 73, 80, 87, 120, 182, 191*
Certainly[8], *66–67, 76, 79, 144, 225, 232*

certainly[26], *13, 27, 35, 53, 63, 66, 71, 77, 80, 84, 115, 119, 130, 142, 148–149, 155, 182–184, 198, 200, 213, 236, 240*
certainty[12], *38, 80, 102, 193, 195, 248, 251–253*
Certitudo[1], *199*
Cesare[1], *104*
cetera[1], *10*
Cézanne[2], *15, 308*
CézanneAus[1], *308*
Cf[1], *253*
cf[2], *149, 253*
chain[1], *208*
chair[5], *105, 131, 144–145, 270*
chalice[3], *101*
Challenge[1], *3*
challenged[1], *88*
Challenger[4], *60–61*
challenges[1], *120*
challenging[1], *23*
Chamberlain[1], *135*
Chamois[1], *20*
champions[1], *62*
chance[2], *10, 97*
Chandra[1], *105*
change[23], *10–11, 13, 18, 25, 27, 81, 93, 95, 113–114, 116, 118, 178–179, 195, 216, 260–262, 294*
changed[10], *23, 35, 69, 80, 113, 131, 156, 173, 262, 271*
changes[19], *37, 46, 100, 113–114, 139, 161, 177–178, 206, 242*
Changing[1], *43*
changing[7], *27, 76, 86, 151, 180, 265*
chants[1], *15*
chaos[3], *2, 5, 260*
chaotic[2], *9, 198*
Chapter[4], *74, 203, 224, 238*
chapter[6], *94, 123, 159, 204*
chapters[3], *33, 150, 178*
Char[6], *48, 287, 291, 294, 308*
character[10], *20, 26, 67, 80–81, 89, 127, 135, 172, 186*
characterization[3], *90, 172*
characterizations[1], *4*
characterize[4], *90, 172, 197, 202*
characterizes[3], *34, 222, 239*

characters[1], 83
 Charakter[1], 81
 charge[1], 118
 Charges[1], 234
 charges[2], 118
 Charles[2], 182, 198
 chart[1], 3
 charting[2], 4, 30
 charts[1], 4
 chary[2], 74, 217
 chattels[1], 17
 chattering[4], 19, 124–125
 Chavrusa[1], 62
 chavruta[1], 62
 cheap[1], 176
 check[1], 114
 checked[2], 140, 290
 checking[1], 248
 chemical[1], 251
 chen[1], 114
 Cherish[1], 1
 cherish[1], 98
 chess[1], 259
 Chewbacca[1], 176
 Chicago[17], 42, 72, 93, 101, 125, 131, 264–265, 308, 311
 chief[4], 144, 202–203, 213
 chiefly[1], 32
 child[5], 62, 228
 children[1], 315
 China[4], 81, 106, 261
 Chinese[6], 74, 81, 101, 127, 316
 Chinesen[1], 81
 Ching[1], 74
 chit[1], 192
 chö[1], 61
 choice[5], 136–137, 233
 choices[1], 36
 Chomsky[1], 60
 choosing[1], 135
 chortle[1], 134
 chosen[4], 34, 46, 289
 Chris[3], 273, 310, 315
 Chrisof[1], 175
 christened[3], 218, 229–230
 Christian[28], 14, 23, 28, 54–55, 71, 78, 111, 131, 137, 192, 194–195, 203, 211, 215, 226–227, 231–232, 234, 238, 273, 315
 Christianity[22], 23, 54, 56, 114, 143, 225, 227, 229, 231–233, 237
 Christians[2], 225, 227
 Christine[1], 315
 Christlicher[1], 289
 Christmas[5], 15–16, 48, 154
 Christof[1], 302
 Christoph[1], 141
 chronicle[1], 18
 Chronik[1], 18
 chronological[4], 10, 166, 244, 273
 chronology[4], 18, 245, 310
 chronos[1], 316
 Chuang[1], 289
 chunks[1], 214
 Church[1], 23
 church[1], 105
 churches[1], 218
 churlish[1], 55
 circa[2], 13, 99
 CIRCLE[1], 258
 Circle[1], 224
 circle[17], 17, 28, 88–89, 112, 124, 236, 250
 circles[8], 28, 88–89, 102–103
 circular[1], 242
 circularity[1], 149
 circulated[2], 36–37
 circulating[1], 96
 circumstances[1], 222
 cit[1], 125
 Citation[1], 296
 citation[1], 310
 citations[4], 2, 36, 124, 260
 Cited[1], 131
 cited[4], 51, 244–245, 249
 cities[3], 168, 283, 315
 citizen[2], 42, 221
 city[4], 8, 42, 165, 244
 Civilization[1], 235
 civilization[5], 32, 47
 cīvis[1], 221
 Claim[1], 177
 claim[38], 5, 10, 12, 29, 52, 57, 61, 79, 85,

94–95, 112, 114–115, 117, 126–127,
 132, 134–135, 146, 156, 184, 198, 223,
 238, 240, 260, 272
 claimed[4], 177, 200, 219, 230
 claiming[5], 5–6, 112, 149, 182
 claims[6], 54, 61, 112, 184, 223, 232
 Claire[1], 273
 clamor[1], 125
 Clapping[1], 61
 Clara[2], 274, 291
 clarifications[2], 38, 301
 clarified[3], 12, 20, 145
 clarify[1], 288
 clarity[4], 124, 138, 143, 197
 Class[2], 68, 281
 class[6], 23, 38–39, 121, 128, 130
 classes[11], 15, 19, 39, 43, 76, 121, 128,
 130, 273
 Classical[3], 111, 234, 237
 classical[4], 13, 105, 182, 231
 classicist[1], 116
 classics[1], 271
 classless[1], 53
 classroom[1], 76
 clatter[1], 30
 Claudius[1], 21
 Clausewitz[1], 198
 cleaned[2], 76, 182
 cleaning[4], 76, 189–190
 cleanse[1], 212
 Clear[1], 115
 clear[47], 3, 5, 11, 24, 28, 31, 38, 47, 66,
 68, 71, 85, 87, 89, 98, 109, 112–114,
 116, 132, 137, 149, 155, 162, 169, 178,
 180, 182, 189–190, 194, 197, 207, 214,
 217, 242, 272, 277, 282, 293
 cleared[1], 64
 clearer[8], 11, 29, 49, 106, 166, 177, 186,
 261
 clearest[2], 99, 157
 Clearing[2], 246
 clearing[20], 27, 31, 78, 96, 153, 155, 166,
 172, 200, 240, 246–248
 Clearly[3], 27, 142, 146
 clearly[32], 25, 28–29, 44, 53–54, 59, 69,
 71, 73–74, 78, 84, 112, 118–119, 121,
 150, 152–153, 160, 180, 189, 206, 242,
 244, 249, 262, 269, 277
 clears[1], 218
 clergyman[1], 289
 clever[6], 7, 181, 186, 228, 262
 Cliffs[1], 254
 climb[3], 68, 73, 84
 climbing[3], 12, 78, 181
 cling[2], 119, 233
 clinging[1], 88
 clings[2], 88, 196
 clock[1], 95
 Close[1], 119
 close[24], 4–5, 7, 16, 24–25, 48, 58, 72, 85,
 88, 93, 117, 119, 123, 126, 175, 184,
 186, 225, 254, 277
 closed[5], 2, 132, 181, 190, 262
 closedness[1], 147
 closely[8], 44, 144, 149, 192, 231–232, 242,
 287
 closeness[2], 57, 242
 closer[17], 52, 58, 84–85, 112, 116, 122,
 125, 143, 182–183, 259, 261–262
 closest[3], 57, 168, 217
 closing[1], 204
 closure[1], 190
 clothing[1], 129
 clouds[1], 163
 cloudy[2], 35–36
 Club[7], 47, 165, 273, 283, 285–287
 clues[2], 104, 166
 clumsiness[1], 153
 cm[1], 138
 Co[1], 315
 coax[1], 129
 cocoa[1], 17
 code[4], 29, 56, 192
 cogitans[3], 102, 199, 214
 cogito[1], 214
 cognition[13], 191, 202, 208, 211, 215–216,
 251
 cognitionis[1], 192
 cognitions[5], 106, 193, 203, 209
 cognitive[2], 2, 99
 cognize[1], 192
 cognoscenti[1], 39
 Cohen[2], 44
 coherent[2], 126, 202

coincidence[1], 100
 coined[2], 33, 134
 collaboration[2], 72, 84
 collapse[4], 32, 55, 197, 200
 collapsed[1], 200
 Colleague[1], 47
 colleague[1], 102
 Colleagues[1], 3
 colleagues[8], 4, 16, 25, 37, 104, 119, 131, 259
 Collected[3], 20, 45, 92
 collected[13], 2, 8, 10, 52, 73–74, 86, 91, 214, 242, 265, 287
 collecting[2], 8, 37
 Collection[2], 165, 311
 collection[20], 11, 21, 23, 36–37, 52, 71, 92, 113, 124, 139, 203, 242, 264, 273, 302–303
 Collections[2], 303, 311
 collections[10], 2, 8, 10, 19, 24, 52, 74
 collective[10], 2, 35–36, 86, 121, 161, 175
 College[3], 62, 261
 Colloque[5], 48, 73, 107, 286, 291
 Colloquium[5], 93, 130, 259, 285
 colloquium[7], 72, 93, 125, 265, 288, 291
 Colloquiums[6], 42, 72, 265, 288, 308
 Colloquy[1], 267
 Cologne[5], 271, 275–277
 Colonel[1], 15
 color[1], 10
 colored[1], 10
 colossal[1], 52
 Columbus[2], 84, 186
 com[13], 13, 51, 168, 248, 310, 315
 combat[3], 68, 119, 259
 Comburg[2], 290
 come[69], 2, 5, 10–11, 14, 19, 21, 24, 26–27, 29, 31, 50–53, 68, 72, 81, 83–84, 95–96, 98, 102, 106, 112, 114, 116, 127, 129–130, 137, 140, 143–144, 151, 153, 160–161, 169, 172, 179, 182, 186, 188, 195, 200–201, 204, 206–207, 209, 214, 228, 232, 237, 241, 245, 261, 285, 301
 comes[25], 25, 39, 48, 58, 73, 79, 96, 102, 109, 120–121, 135, 155–156, 158, 168, 189, 202, 205, 214, 223, 251, 260, 285, 314
 comfort[1], 113
 comical[1], 202
 coming[23], 3, 11, 16, 20, 25–26, 31, 40, 48, 82, 84, 123, 131, 157, 171–172, 182, 192
 comings[1], 54
 command[1], 81
 Commedia[1], 4
 commemoration[2], 198, 294
 Commemorative[1], 286
 commencement[8], 31, 49, 63–64, 166, 169, 196
 commended[1], 117
 comment[1], 9
 Commentary[1], 276
 commentary[3], 4, 261
 commentators[1], 17
 comments[1], 41
 commitment[2], 136–137
 Committee[1], 95
 Common[2], 118, 211
 common[8], 26, 74, 88, 93, 110, 135, 213, 233
 commonplace[4], 25, 242
 communal[1], 55
 communicate[1], 107
 communicated[1], 86
 Communism[1], 34
 communism[8], 26, 53, 103, 116, 137, 222
 Communist[1], 34
 communist[1], 222
 community[3], 83, 119, 200
 Como[1], 45
 companion[1], 155
 company[2], 8
 comparable[1], 133
 comparative[1], 231
 Compare[9], 7, 92, 100, 110, 116, 142, 150, 177, 254
 compare[3], 120, 131, 176
 Compared[3], 7, 68, 193
 compared[8], 18, 26, 32, 36, 114, 118, 196, 277
 Comparison[1], 207
 comparison[6], 18, 38, 69, 117, 154, 246
 comparisons[1], 32
 compartmentalized[1], 46

competence[1], 259
 competent[1], 144
 compilation[2], 35–36
 compilations[1], 150
 compiled[2], 159, 275
 complain[1], 59
 complained[4], 116, 126, 138, 217
 complains[2], 99, 183
 complaint[1], 186
 complaints[1], 78
 Complete[1], 216
 complete[44], 2, 5, 9, 13, 30, 38, 55, 70, 76, 86–89, 93, 95–96, 99, 115, 143, 145, 148, 157–158, 164, 203, 206, 236, 244, 251–252, 260, 273, 301, 304
 completed[12], 8, 37, 52, 87, 91, 120, 175, 188, 270–272, 286
 completely[26], 4, 21, 37, 46, 57–58, 71, 116, 128, 150, 168, 182, 188, 198, 201, 206, 208, 211, 217, 225–226, 230, 233, 258, 310
 completeness[3], 126, 132, 199
 completes[2], 223, 249
 completing[1], 201
 Completion[1], 31
 completion[13], 31, 49, 58, 87, 89, 102, 134–135, 186, 194, 223, 253
 complex[7], 25, 104, 113, 130, 142, 185, 235
 complexities[1], 70
 complexity[3], 8, 39, 68
 compliant[1], 89
 complicated[4], 54–55, 183, 189
 component[2], 251
 components[3], 133, 190, 193
 compose[2], 210
 composed[1], 166
 composer[1], 286
 composition[3], 90, 172, 174
 compounded[1], 251
 comprehend[1], 14
 comprehended[1], 119
 comprehension[1], 233
 comprehensive[2], 203, 209
 comprenait[1], 9
 comprise[1], 9
 comprised[1], 4
 compulsion[1], 97
 Comte[1], 55
 con[2], 58
 concealed[4], 79, 131, 202, 246
 concealedness[1], 87
 concealing[4], 75, 96, 109, 153
 concealment[2], 246–247
 conceals[1], 75
 conceded[2], 220, 230
 conceive[2], 151, 242
 conceived[7], 78, 151, 158, 201, 240, 246, 271
 conceiving[1], 133
 concentrate[1], 82
 concentrated[1], 283
 concentrating[1], 289
 Concept[9], 37, 53, 102, 139, 235, 253, 274, 288
 concept[61], 34, 45, 55, 70–71, 74, 80, 88, 96, 100–101, 103, 113, 120–121, 140, 142, 153, 191, 193, 198–199, 208, 211–213, 215–216, 218–221, 225, 227, 229–230, 236, 240, 242, 247, 250–252, 255
 Conception[2], 88, 276
 conception[4], 190, 197, 252, 270
 conceptions[2], 63, 227
 Concepts[5], 38, 102–103
 concepts[25], 14, 26, 30, 77, 79, 83, 100, 150, 176, 181, 191, 193, 196, 200, 210, 213, 228, 259, 292
 conceptual[9], 30, 83, 88, 151, 154, 196, 262–263
 conceptualization[1], 97
 conceptually[1], 196
 concern[5], 94, 158, 221–222
 concerned[6], 33, 44, 150, 190, 217, 263
 Concerning[3], 84, 92, 239
 concerning[10], 63, 89, 135, 140, 152, 197–198, 249, 255
 concerns[6], 32, 133, 140, 152, 222, 246
 conclude[5], 64, 83, 141, 183, 222
 concluded[1], 103
 concludes[1], 203
 concluding[4], 146, 203, 290
 Conclusion[8], 73, 115, 142, 161, 171, 180, 185, 209

conclusion[9], *61, 65, 70, 111, 176, 204, 209, 214, 262*
Conclusions[2], *177, 185*
conclusions[7], *80, 177, 181, 186–187*
concocted[1], *159*
concrete[7], *53, 118, 147, 150, 193, 197, 214*
concreteness[1], *109*
condemn[1], *235*
condemnation[1], *191*
condemnations[1], *235*
condense[1], *106*
condenses[1], *12*
Condition[2], *89, 172*
condition[6], *40, 69, 155, 197, 221–222*
conditioned[2], *181, 222*
conditions[4], *220, 222, 247, 253*
conduct[4], *119, 128, 133*
conducted[3], *48, 254, 290*
conducting[1], *128*
Conference[1], *253*
conference[7], *42, 60, 71, 125, 286, 289*
confessed[1], *34*
confesses[1], *63*
Confessiones[2], *278*
Confessions[1], *289*
confident[2], *216*
confines[1], *42*
confirm[1], *277*
confirmed[7], *9–11, 19, 37, 73, 114*
Conflict[1], *316*
conflict[4], *71, 182, 225, 316*
conflicting[3], *63, 133, 316*
conflicts[1], *4*
conformity[1], *38*
confront[2], *59, 140*
Confrontation[1], *45*
confrontation[19], *49, 57, 59, 73, 78, 87, 102, 120, 126, 136, 166, 183, 190, 195, 201, 232*
confrontational[1], *68*
confronted[2], *26, 183*
confronting[1], *26*
confronts[1], *175*
confuse[1], *29*
confusing[1], *186*
confusion[8], *2, 5, 78, 169, 226, 228, 259*
confutation[1], *171*
congratulating[1], *42*
congruity[1], *186*
conjecture[1], *85*
connected[8], *7, 47, 88, 97, 99, 111, 113, 249*
connecting[1], *97*
Connection[2], *262, 288*
connection[7], *16, 47, 89, 216, 250, 284*
Connections[2], *19, 220*
connections[9], *35, 45, 54, 74, 149, 180–181, 242, 288*
Conqueror[1], *237*
conqueror[2], *237, 241*
conquest[1], *159*
Conrad[1], *23*
Conradin[2], *284, 286*
conscience[2], *226, 228*
conscious[5], *122, 133, 222, 238*
consciously[1], *245*
Consciousness[1], *275*
consciousness[5], *13, 109, 195, 248, 251*
consequence[5], *135, 208, 216, 235*
Consequences[2], *53, 189*
consequences[5], *38, 60, 92, 194, 223*
consequently[4], *90, 114, 226, 247*
conservatism[1], *137*
Consider[4], *85, 117, 149, 168*
consider[15], *10, 28, 30, 61, 66, 78, 112, 135, 164, 176, 180, 196, 259*
considerable[1], *72*
considerably[1], *162*
Consideration[2], *106, 114*
consideration[2], *205, 232*
considerations[1], *244*
Considered[1], *43*
considered[14], *25, 43, 46, 49, 54, 59, 133, 154, 159, 186, 212, 228, 236, 273*
considering[7], *12, 69, 85, 181, 186, 190, 262*
consist[1], *77*
consisted[2], *76, 130*
consistent[3], *38, 61, 204*
consists[7], *37, 41, 87, 96, 120, 154, 252*
console[1], *227*

consolidation[2], 136–137
 Constance[3], 15, 62, 286
 constancy[1], 199
 constant[3], 11, 238, 253
 constantly[6], 27, 78, 80, 131, 198, 214
 constellation[1], 84
 constitutes[7], 83, 88, 133, 148, 196, 215, 231
 constitution[3], 145–146
 constitutive[1], 147
 Constrains[1], 100
 constraint[1], 233
 constraints[1], 200
 construct[3], 66, 76, 262
 constructed[3], 134, 148, 157
 constructing[2], 157, 191
 Construction[1], 190
 construction[2], 190–191
 constructions[1], 133
 constructs[1], 100
 Consultation[1], 265
 consulted[1], 62
 consummate[1], 31
 consummates[1], 96
 Consummation[1], 196
 consummation[4], 63, 96, 196, 239
 contact[1], 81
 contacted[1], 105
 contain[9], 70, 102, 168, 185, 188, 261, 264, 273, 280
 contained[5], 9, 102, 214
 container[2], 176
 containing[1], 37
 Contains[2], 165, 281
 contains[10], 71, 81, 97, 102, 154, 198, 215, 280, 284
 contemplative[1], 80
 contemporaneous[1], 68
 contemporaries[3], 25, 40, 106
 Contemporary[1], 238
 contemporary[12], 4, 32, 98, 130, 140, 207, 217, 222, 242
 contend[2], 101, 261
 Content[1], 279
 content[30], 10–12, 20, 41, 44, 52, 90, 103, 147, 150, 154, 172, 174, 190, 204, 209, 219, 230, 244, 250–251, 273, 284
 contention[1], 69
 Contentious[1], 138
 contentious[2], 13, 29
 contents[5], 161, 165, 201, 271
 contestable[4], 66, 77, 115, 183
 contestants[1], 48
 context[31], 2–3, 5, 17, 37, 39, 45, 56, 63, 66, 71, 74, 77, 80, 93, 106–107, 117, 119, 134, 154, 164, 177, 192, 206, 219, 224
 continens[1], 192
 Continental[6], 4, 44–45, 310
 continental[1], 45
 continually[3], 156, 186, 201
 Continue[1], 69
 continue[6], 13, 52, 70, 96, 161, 204
 continued[3], 5, 41, 56
 Continues[1], 107
 continues[13], 13, 42, 51, 107, 123, 131, 150, 152, 231, 245, 263
 continuing[1], 236
 continuities[1], 27
 continuous[1], 66
 continuously[2], 35, 62
 contours[1], 71
 Contra[9], 29, 72, 96, 98, 211, 221, 240, 263
 contra[36], 28, 30, 34, 67, 98, 109, 111, 128, 157, 183, 212, 225, 233, 249–251
 contradict[1], 44
 contradicted[3], 134–135, 226
 contradicting[1], 61
 contradiction[5], 61, 97, 222, 227
 contradictions[2], 61
 contradictory[1], 226
 contradicts[3], 61, 72
 Contrary[1], 137
 contrary[9], 53, 60, 90, 120, 173, 182, 212, 249, 265
 contrast[7], 59, 76, 161, 172, 196, 233, 247
 contrasting[1], 171
 contribute[1], 119
 contributed[1], 287
 Contribution[1], 270
 contribution[2], 248, 271
 Contributions[37], 3, 24, 31, 97, 99, 147, 151–152, 154–155, 157–160, 162–163, 171, 175, 185, 195, 201, 218, 223, 264,

312
 contributions[2], 88, 182
 Contributor[3], 310
 control[5], 97, 114
 controversies[2], 56, 204
 controversy[3], 62, 83, 212
 convenient[1], 191
 Conversation[4], 94, 118, 164, 290
 conversation[19], 29, 39, 42, 45, 70, 83,
 128, 164, 166, 179, 184, 248, 259, 285,
 288, 290
 Conversations[5], 62, 86, 164, 304
 conversations[7], 25, 30, 39, 63, 177, 181
 conversion[1], 66
 conversions[1], 39
 converted[3], 28, 36, 138
 convey[2], 144
 conviction[2], 215, 235
 convince[1], 116
 convinced[4], 81, 141, 178, 180
 convincing[1], 178
 convoluted[1], 160
 cookies[1], 16
 cooling[1], 64
 cooperate[1], 116
 cope[2], 69, 227
 copies[6], 15, 32, 43, 145, 207, 284
 copium[1], 69
 copula[1], 271
 copulas[1], 38
 copy[14], 19, 37, 51, 138–139, 154, 224,
 244, 278, 284
 Copyright[1], 8
 copyright[6], 8, 139, 311
 coquetry[1], 104
 Core[1], 72
 core[30], 3–4, 6, 8, 11, 27–28, 66–67,
 70–71, 83, 99, 106, 112, 134, 151, 183,
 185, 236, 249, 260
 corner[1], 7
 cornered[1], 61
 Corpora[1], 3
 corpore[1], 15
 corps[1], 1
 corpus[1], 66
 correct[12], 1, 4–5, 59, 77, 104, 128, 158,
 162, 181, 261
 corrected[1], 286
 correcting[1], 128
 Correctly[1], 77
 correctly[8], 36, 77, 153, 169, 181, 190,
 247, 262
 correspond[3], 211, 239, 271
 Correspondence[11], 33, 44, 204, 206–207,
 210, 254, 304
 correspondence[13], 44, 124, 244, 250–253
 corresponding[2], 41, 248
 corresponds[2], 108, 167
 corrupt[1], 227
 corrupted[2], 194, 225
 cosmic[1], 7
 cosmologia[1], 103
 cosmopolitan[1], 213
 cosmotheology[2], 192–193
 cost[2], 43
 Costea[1], 254
 Côte[2], 15, 131
 coterie[2], 4, 29
 Cotta[8], 254, 301, 313–314
 cottage[6], 16, 124, 138, 168, 183
 could[49], 9, 11, 18, 31, 35, 37–38, 54, 56,
 62, 73, 76, 80, 84, 92, 94, 97–99, 113,
 117, 124, 126, 129–130, 135, 142, 154,
 165–166, 182, 194, 202, 207, 212, 215,
 218, 221, 223, 230, 238, 258, 277, 289,
 316
 Count[1], 197
 count[1], 70
 counted[2], 102, 223
 counter[5], 33, 70, 119, 171, 175
 counterclaim[1], 225
 counterclaims[1], 112
 countered[1], 105
 Counterexample[3], 35, 129, 161
 counterexample[6], 13, 18, 67, 74, 171, 241
 counterexamples[8], 17–18, 68–69, 171,
 175
 countering[1], 212
 countermovement[5], 57, 102, 109
 countermovements[1], 102
 counterpart[2], 133, 231
 counterposition[1], 249
 counting[1], 141
 countries[2], 4, 144

Country[5], *86, 94, 164*
 country[1], *68*
 countryside[1], *16*
 counts[3], *118, 126, 132*
 County[2], *315*
 couple[5], *38, 78–79, 138, 182*
 couplet[1], *289*
 courage[4], *116, 136–137, 175*
 Course[3], *86, 97, 273*
 course[98], *5–6, 8, 10–12, 14, 17–18, 21, 24, 26, 29–30, 36, 39, 41, 46, 52, 55, 59, 62, 65, 67, 69, 74, 84, 89, 94, 97–99, 102, 106, 111, 118, 120, 122–123, 129–130, 132, 134, 136–137, 139, 145, 149, 151, 153, 155–156, 169, 180, 182, 185–186, 190, 192–193, 207, 209, 212, 214–215, 217, 222, 224, 232, 235–236, 238, 242–243, 249, 253, 259–260, 298, 315*
 courses[18], *14, 42, 48, 57, 121, 126, 130–132, 171, 180, 217, 310*
 court[1], *171*
 Cover[1], *114*
 cover[6], *37–38, 113, 123, 217*
 covering[1], *22*
 covers[3], *3, 123, 215*
 COWGTCNW[1], *311*
 CP[1], *267*
 CPR[19], *56, 89, 193, 203–205, 208*
 craft[5], *67, 108, 113*
 Cratylus[7], *44, 59, 88, 104, 118*
 crayon[1], *279*
 Crazy[1], *74*
 crazy[3], *74*
 Create[2], *71, 185*
 create[10], *19, 69, 77, 107, 137, 157, 180, 202, 209, 279*
 created[11], *3, 36, 54, 86, 88, 97, 103, 116, 144, 161, 227*
 creates[2], *19, 162*
 creating[13], *68, 70, 72, 75, 88, 100, 134, 152, 157, 178–179*
 creation[6], *92, 103, 111*
 creative[1], *197*
 creatively[1], *4*
 Creator[2], *310–311*
 creator[4], *12, 102–103, 199*
 creatum[1], *199*
 credibility[1], *72*
 credible[1], *66*
 credit[2], *240*
 credited[1], *113*
 creed[1], *7*
 creeds[1], *28*
 crescendo[1], *154*
 crime[1], *227*
 crimes[1], *109*
 crippled[1], *99*
 Crisis[6], *95, 97, 178, 235*
 crisis[21], *33, 42, 80, 83–84, 87, 95, 97–98, 100, 102, 106, 179*
 criteria[1], *9*
 criterion[1], *231*
 Critical[3], *192, 212, 249*
 critical[56], *7–8, 24–26, 31–32, 35, 38, 47, 57–58, 60, 70, 73, 103, 105, 118, 121, 124, 134, 139, 143, 145, 183, 198, 203–204, 207–210, 213, 216–217, 231, 238, 242, 244, 259, 316*
 critically[2], *59, 193*
 Criticism[1], *208*
 criticism[5], *4, 47, 99, 123, 206*
 criticisms[3], *53, 116, 208*
 critics[3], *32, 79, 118*
 Critique[51], *28, 44–46, 56, 80, 89, 109, 113, 120, 134, 175, 193–194, 197, 203–205, 207, 211–213, 215–216, 223, 240–241, 270*
 critique[21], *17, 72, 80, 110, 134, 197, 205, 207–209, 211, 270*
 Critiques[1], *79*
 critiques[2], *4, 197*
 crooked[1], *68*
 Cross[1], *43*
 cross[10], *3, 17, 30, 71, 90, 163, 168–169, 231*
 crossed[3], *50, 215–216*
 crosses[1], *164*
 crossing[8], *26, 49–50, 155, 179, 200, 233*
 crossover[1], *30*
 crossroads[1], *42*
 crossword[2], *120, 129*
 crowd[3], *30, 60, 259*
 Crowe[2], *74, 89*

CRP[2], 208
 Crucial[1], 209
 crucial[8], 45, 150, 152, 163, 204, 233, 237, 244
 crucially[1], 14
 crucible[2], 138, 154
 crude[1], 103
 crux[1], 232
 CS[1], 51
 cs[1], 107
 Cuban[2], 97, 106
 cuckoo[1], 17
 Culbertson[1], 288
 culminates[1], 41
 culpability[2], 109, 118
 cultivates[1], 133
 Cultural[2], 60, 281
 cultural[7], 3, 25, 62, 64, 130, 158, 236
 culture[4], 32, 45, 61, 215
 cultures[1], 235
 cum[1], 38
 cunning[1], 142
 Cup[1], 176
 cup[2], 176–177
 cupidity[1], 129
 cure[2], 231–232
 cures[1], 231
 curiosity[1], 113
 curious[1], 135
 currency[1], 106
 Current[2], 261, 310
 current[20], 8, 18, 56, 68, 96, 105, 126, 134, 152, 154, 169, 184, 186, 188–189, 224, 242
 Currently[2], 139, 147
 currently[5], 8, 36, 134, 136, 214
 Curse[9], 225, 227, 229, 233
 curse[1], 227
 cursory[2], 203–204
 curtains[4], 75, 181, 190, 262
 curtly[1], 261
 cut[3], 9, 100, 109
 cuts[1], 232
 Cutting[1], 69
 cutting[1], 96
 Cuvillies[1], 288

cycle[2], 2, 277
 cycles[2], 2
 cynical[1], 208
 Czolbe[1], 33

D

Da[38], 26, 57–58, 75, 145–147, 149–150, 155, 164, 186, 217–218, 250–251, 264, 305–306
 da[2], 174, 235
 Dabei[6], 256, 268, 293
 dabei[1], 108
 dachte[2], 40, 120
 dachten[1], 247
 dächten[1], 247
 dadurch[8], 34, 74, 86, 98, 120, 221, 265–266
 dafür[1], 81
 dagegen[1], 86
 daher[3], 89, 92, 252
 dahin[2], 247, 266
 Dahinter[1], 137
 daily[4], 13, 61, 202–203
 Daktúlios[1], 17
 dam[1], 60
 Damage[1], 114
 Damit[2], 84, 112
 damit[8], 112, 116, 143, 157, 179, 225, 227, 247
 Dämmerung[2], 55–56
 dancing[1], 61
 dandy[1], 238
 danger[8], 25, 29, 84, 88, 113, 147, 269
 dangerous[3], 220, 230
 dangers[1], 25
 Daniel[9], 59–61, 88, 130, 258, 265, 310, 312
 Dank[4], 143, 289–290
 Dankansprache[2], 287, 293
 Danken[1], 163
 danken[2], 49, 169
 Dankeswort[1], 292

Dankrede[3], 289, 293, 313
 Dann[5], 20, 33, 64, 91, 264
 dann[13], 74, 76, 85–86, 114, 120, 142,
 173, 190, 246, 265–266
 Dantisti[1], 4
 Danube[1], 168
 Danziger[1], 124
 Dao[3], 71, 74
 daojiao[1], 74
 Daran[1], 116
 daran[5], 49, 143, 169, 179
 Darauf[1], 266
 darauf[7], 6, 51, 87, 120, 246, 252
 Daraus[1], 141
 daraus[1], 153
 dare[3], 81, 217, 259
 dared[1], 127
 dares[1], 92
 darf[2], 112, 174
 dargestellt[1], 245
 Darin[1], 245
 darin[5], 81, 129, 148–149, 179
 daring[2], 80, 168
 dark[4], 76, 130, 260, 263
 darker[1], 127
 darkness[2], 50, 188
 Darlegung[2], 72, 109
 Darmstadt[5], 165, 284–285
 Darmstädter[1], 285
 darśana[1], 110
 Darshan[2], 105, 110
 darshan[1], 110
 darshana[1], 110
 darstellen[1], 190
 Darstellung[2], 166, 174
 Darum[1], 189
 darum[4], 110, 143–144, 264
 DAS[3], 159, 288
 Das[136], 1, 3, 18, 31, 34, 38, 40, 42, 57,
 63, 70, 74, 80–81, 84, 87–92, 98, 101,
 114, 122, 126, 141, 151–152, 155,
 157–161, 163–165, 171–174, 177, 185,
 193, 219, 221–222, 230, 238, 248,
 251–252, 256–257, 261, 263, 265–266,
 270–271, 275, 278, 281, 283–285,
 288–294, 299, 305, 307–308, 316
 das[261], 20, 24, 26–28, 32, 34, 40, 44,
 48–50, 58–59, 63, 68–70, 75–76, 79, 81,
 84–87, 89, 92–95, 98–100, 107–108,
 112–114, 116, 118, 120, 122–124, 126,
 129, 131, 136–137, 141–144, 146–147,
 149, 152, 156, 158, 160, 165–167,
 169–171, 173–174, 176, 179–181,
 185–186, 190, 193–194, 196, 198,
 200–201, 218–219, 221, 223, 225–226,
 229, 235–236, 245–248, 251–253, 256,
 260, 263–264, 266–268, 274–275,
 277–279, 281, 283–284, 286, 289–291,
 293–294, 296, 299, 305
 DaSein[2], 155, 240
 Dasein[20], 4, 71, 83, 113, 147–148, 158,
 227, 235, 242, 250, 262, 275, 281, 289
 Daseins[6], 48, 141, 177, 235, 277
 dashed[1], 131
 dasjenige[1], 80
 Dass[1], 43
 dass[8], 43, 58, 136, 141, 143, 225
 dasselbe[1], 219
 data[2], 193
 Date[7], 47, 147, 166, 185, 251–252, 301
 date[22], 17, 26, 85, 91, 98, 124, 162, 164,
 166, 216, 242, 245, 252, 265, 284, 291,
 299, 301
 Dated[15], 3, 40, 85, 141, 152, 164, 171,
 173–174, 216, 259, 291
 dated[32], 9, 16, 23, 33–34, 41–42, 47, 62,
 71, 75, 80, 94, 99, 106, 119, 125, 127,
 134, 162, 164–165, 169, 216–217, 244,
 275
 Dates[2], 285, 311
 dates[7], 96, 121, 123, 165, 254, 277, 294
 Dating[1], 7
 dating[2], 60, 217
 Dativ[1], 252
 dative[1], 253
 Datum[5], 266, 281–282, 289–290
 datum[1], 245
 Daughter[1], 315
 daughter[6], 16, 293, 315
 daughters[1], 315
 Daumen[1], 17
 David[13], 73, 135, 143, 182, 203, 208,
 211, 238, 254, 273, 315
 Davis[8], 118–119, 164, 261
 davon[2], 266, 289

Davos[15], 44–45, 47, 60, 224, 278
Dawn[1], 234
dawn[2], 47, 130
dawned[1], 77
day[20], 16, 30, 60, 63, 80, 88, 122, 125,
127, 131, 144, 164, 197, 212, 228, 237,
241, 284, 288
days[9], 18, 36, 48, 55, 74, 164, 276, 286,
289
Dazu[2], 84, 277
dazu[4], 6, 167, 220, 253
Daß[2], 99, 246
daß[36], 44, 51, 57, 70, 77, 81, 89, 99, 108,
111–112, 116, 120, 141, 157, 173, 179,
196, 218, 220, 235, 245–248, 252, 264
De[3], 74, 264
de[19], 1, 9, 29, 39, 51, 68, 82, 100, 132,
141, 252, 255, 283, 290, 310–311
dead[10], 60–61, 126, 130, 158, 227, 240
deadline[1], 205
deal[17], 8–10, 25, 34, 39, 69, 75, 111, 141,
147, 207, 214, 261
Dealers[1], 286
dealing[2], 112, 190
deals[3], 150, 193, 214
dean[2], 144
Deana[1], 50
Dear[5], 33, 113, 124, 258
dear[5], 33, 215, 226, 228
dearly[1], 231
Death[1], 315
death[28], 5, 13, 19, 42, 71, 74, 86, 102,
109, 113, 124, 165, 169, 185, 189, 198,
200, 205, 226, 260, 265, 283, 286, 294
Debatable[1], 176
debatable[1], 154
Debate[6], 60, 62, 224, 249
debate[25], 43–44, 59–63, 69, 72–73, 83,
115, 186, 278
debated[1], 180
Debaters[1], 62
debates[9], 60–61, 197
debating[5], 60–62
debouching[2], 27, 45
debt[1], 180
Debussy[2], 107, 176
debut[1], 9

Dec[2], 281, 315
decade[2], 40, 147
Decadence[1], 32
decades[12], 2, 9–11, 21, 28, 62, 93, 176,
180–181, 261
decay[2], 32, 96
decaying[1], 96
deceitful[1], 227
December[42], 15–17, 47–48, 61, 96,
109–110, 175, 181, 183, 190, 206,
211–212, 233, 249, 262, 275, 277–279,
281, 283, 286, 288, 292, 304, 307–308
Decemeber[1], 276
decent[2], 120, 129
decide[3], 70, 137, 175
decided[13], 9, 12, 20, 46, 74, 79, 124,
145–146, 163, 228
decides[1], 42
deciding[1], 111
decipher[1], 13
deciphered[1], 181
decision[11], 22, 63–64, 73, 97, 106, 109,
163, 237, 241
decisions[2], 186, 196
decisive[14], 33, 45, 79, 119, 136, 158–159,
163, 198, 222, 224, 242, 263
decisively[3], 157, 208, 265
decisiveness[1], 172
Declaration[1], 216
declaration[1], 227
declare[1], 119
declared[2], 260, 266
Decline[1], 32
decline[8], 32, 56, 198, 235
declined[1], 13
decomposable[1], 176
deconstructionism[1], 60
deconstructionist[1], 76
decree[1], 94
decrees[1], 94
Dedicated[2], 188, 262
dedicated[7], 4, 29, 48, 154, 242, 261, 305
Dedication[1], 281
dedication[9], 70, 154, 184, 282
deed[1], 23
deemed[1], 234
deep[17], 2–3, 8, 14, 23, 52–53, 67, 100,

110–111, 175, 177, 180
 deeper[13], 12, 16, 26, 32, 49, 53, 66, 80,
 112, 120, 123, 181, 233
 deepest[4], 27, 157, 228, 249
 deepity[3], 15, 94, 175
 Deeply[1], 259
 deeply[1], 4
 defeat[1], 46
 defeated[2], 62, 164
 defend[2], 97, 184
 defended[3], 79, 270–271
 Defender[6], 60–61
 defender[1], 60
 defending[1], 17
 Defense[1], 32
 defense[2], 54, 176
 defiantly[1], 4
 deficient[1], 252
 define[4], 3, 54, 98, 262
 defined[6], 28, 109, 135, 155, 192
 defines[1], 193
 Defining[1], 95
 defining[2], 30, 202
 definite[1], 83
 definitely[2], 10, 202
 Definition[1], 221
 definition[10], 44, 98, 126, 155, 188, 192,
 198, 219, 230
 Definitions[1], 192
 definitive[1], 231
 deformation[2], 134–135
 degenerated[1], 227
 degraded[1], 172
 Degree[1], 61
 degree[2], 13, 104
 deified[1], 227
 deinós[1], 97
 Deism[1], 212
 deism[1], 193
 Delfosse[1], 139
 delicate[1], 15
 delighted[1], 47
 delimitation[1], 30
 delimits[2], 89–90
 delineate[1], 71
 deliver[2], 46, 227

Delivered[1], 281
 delivered[11], 19, 37, 41, 67, 147, 282,
 288, 291, 299
 delivery[1], 10
 dem[118], 6, 20–21, 37, 41, 51–52, 57–58,
 63, 74–75, 84, 87, 89, 91–92, 95, 98,
 104, 108, 112–113, 116, 136, 138, 144,
 146–148, 150, 158, 161, 164, 166–167,
 173–174, 185, 190, 196, 218, 237, 241,
 245–248, 252–253, 264–265, 276–277,
 279, 286, 291–294, 297, 302, 305–308
 demagogue[1], 175
 demand[9], 24, 96, 100–101, 133, 152, 154,
 202
 demanded[1], 85
 demanding[1], 46
 demands[6], 30, 126, 134, 219, 230
 demeaning[1], 57
 demjengen[1], 108
 democracy[3], 53–54, 96
 democratic[1], 137
 Democritean[1], 25
 Democritus[1], 203
 demolishing[3], 53, 76
 demonstrandum[4], 94, 115, 185–186
 Demonstration[2], 48
 demonstration[2], 58, 198
 Demut[3], 107–108, 257
 Demythologizing[1], 4
 demzufolge[1], 246
 Den[2], 164
 den[138], 17–18, 20, 31, 47, 57–58, 61, 63,
 69, 73–77, 81, 84–87, 89, 95, 97–98,
 101, 107, 113, 116, 120, 126, 136–137,
 139, 141, 143, 146, 148–149, 152–153,
 164–170, 173–174, 185, 196, 201,
 218–220, 237, 241, 245–247, 252, 254,
 256, 264, 266, 268, 271, 274–275, 279,
 281, 283, 289, 291–292, 295, 299,
 305–306, 314
 denen[1], 181
 denial[2], 159, 226
 denied[2], 193, 213
 denies[4], 28, 72, 148, 180
 denigrate[1], 38
 DENKEN[1], 288
 Denken[86], 19, 26–27, 59, 63, 67, 70, 81,

87, 89–90, 92, 104, 142, 154, 157, 163,
 165–166, 168–170, 173–174, 177, 179,
 186, 198, 212, 245, 247–248, 250,
 252–253, 255, 261, 266–268, 283–285,
 288–289, 291–292, 294, 296–297, 299,
 305, 312–314
 denken[11], 58–59, 164, 167, 173, 218,
 246–247, 250
 denkend[1], 196
 Denkende[5], 260, 265–266, 274
 denkende[2], 167, 268
 Denkenden[2], 49, 179
 Denkender[1], 179
 DENKENS[1], 266
 Denkens[77], 34, 63, 75, 81, 84–85, 87,
 91–93, 104, 112–113, 126, 140, 142,
 145, 158, 162–163, 167, 169, 174, 179,
 185, 196, 218, 222, 244, 248–249, 252,
 268, 285–287, 289–292, 294–296, 299,
 313
 Denker[18], 10, 23, 37, 52, 85, 124, 163,
 189, 221, 249, 273, 301–302, 310, 315
 Denkerfahrunen[1], 292
 denkerische[1], 177
 Denkers[1], 157
 Denksplitter[24], 2, 9, 12, 19, 38, 48, 61,
 107–108, 129, 263, 279, 287, 299
 Denkstil[1], 245
 denkt[5], 19, 63, 75, 89, 169
 Denktagebuch[1], 284
 Denkweg[5], 72, 87, 264–265
 Denkwege[1], 70
 Denkweise[1], 81
 Denkweisen[2], 218, 229
 Denn[9], 44, 84, 92, 120, 148, 188, 196,
 262, 264
 denn[5], 92, 129, 156, 186, 252
 dennoch[2], 58, 218
 dense[1], 103
 deny[9], 87, 120, 133, 194, 223, 227, 262
 denying[2], 60
 dePage[1], 190
 depart[1], 112
 Department[1], 276
 departments[3], 15, 35, 42
 departs[1], 164
 departure[8], 4, 90, 92, 112, 172–173
 DePaul[2], 42, 125
 depend[3], 7, 135, 216
 dependence[2], 151, 158
 Depends[1], 15
 depends[3], 13, 79, 127
 depict[1], 135
 depicts[1], 62
 deportments[1], 42
 Depressions[1], 106
 deprived[1], 73
 depth[7], 64, 103, 117, 142, 163, 178, 260
 depths[1], 66
 DER[2], 94, 159
 Der[168], 12–13, 17, 20, 26–27, 33–34, 40,
 42, 48–49, 61, 64, 67, 71–72, 79–81,
 86–88, 91, 98, 101, 106, 108–109, 112,
 114, 122, 134, 144, 146, 160, 164–167,
 169–170, 173–174, 179, 188, 196,
 202–203, 226, 235–236, 245, 253–257,
 262, 266, 268, 274–275, 279, 281–284,
 286–288, 291–292, 296–299, 305, 313,
 316
 der[777], 7, 13, 15, 17–18, 20–21, 23–28,
 32–34, 37–39, 42–46, 48–52, 56–59,
 63–64, 67, 69–72, 74–76, 79–81, 84–87,
 89–93, 95, 97–98, 100–102, 104,
 106–110, 112–114, 116, 118–120, 122,
 124, 126, 129, 134, 136–137, 141, 143,
 146–153, 156–158, 160–167, 169–170,
 172–174, 179–180, 183, 185–186,
 188–190, 193–194, 196, 198, 200–201,
 203–204, 206–207, 212, 215–216,
 218–224, 226, 235–237, 239, 241–242,
 244–253, 255–257, 259, 263–268,
 270–272, 274–299, 302–303, 305–308,
 311, 313–316
 deranged[2], 74
 deren[3], 104, 166, 245
 dergleichen[3], 108, 174, 263
 derivative[1], 68
 derived[4], 34, 154, 192, 225
 derives[5], 72, 101, 197, 201, 236
 Derrida[4], 4, 34, 60, 120
 Derridean[1], 60
 derselben[1], 116
 derSprache[1], 51
 DES[1], 266
 Des[1], 278

des[418], *3, 20–21, 23, 26–27, 31–32, 34, 37, 42, 48–49, 51–52, 58, 63–64, 67, 69, 71–72, 74–75, 81, 84–87, 89–93, 95, 100, 103–104, 112–114, 116, 120, 123, 126–127, 129, 131, 135, 139–143, 145–147, 152–155, 157–158, 162–167, 169, 173–174, 176, 179–181, 185, 189, 193, 196, 200–201, 218–220, 222, 226, 229, 235–237, 241, 244–253, 256, 259, 264–268, 270–271, 273–277, 279–283, 285–287, 289–299, 305–308, 311, 313–314*
 Descartes[16], *11, 55, 78, 91, 99, 102, 190, 195, 212, 214, 282*
 descending[1], *227*
 descent[1], *56*
 Deschner[1], *303*
 describe[2], *73, 222*
 described[3], *100, 178, 231*
 describes[2], *75, 206*
 descript[1], *58*
 Description[5], *304, 313–314*
 description[7], *67, 87, 127, 152, 165–166, 311*
 descriptions[1], *10*
 descriptive[1], *127*
 deserve[1], *212*
 deserves[1], *207*
 Deshalb[1], *245*
 deshalb[4], *112, 148–149, 173*
 desiderata[1], *52*
 designate[2], *168, 258*
 designates[3], *80, 239, 251*
 designating[2], *63, 231*
 designation[2], *185, 264*
 designed[1], *101*
 desire[3], *52, 123, 222*

 desk[6], *16, 48, 272, 292*
 desks[1], *16*
 desmós[1], *5*
 desolated[1], *201*
 despite[3], *125, 195, 201*
 despotic[2], *56, 204*
 dessen[9], *160, 166, 173, 190, 218, 236, 290–291*
 Destination[1], *292*

 destination[1], *206*
 destined[1], *200*
 Destiny[1], *294*
 destiny[5], *26, 49, 63*
 destroyed[4], *18, 56, 151, 153*
 destroying[3], *13, 242*
 Destruction[1], *153*
 destruction[7], *33, 53, 76, 190–191, 194*
 destructive[5], *85, 116, 226, 228, 231*
 Destruktion[1], *153*
 detachment[1], *267*
 detail[1], *67*
 detailed[6], *24, 57, 65, 176, 203, 214*
 Details[3], *15, 260, 283*
 details[20], *15, 20, 32, 37, 76, 103, 112, 116, 155, 310, 312*
 detected[2], *124, 226*
 determinable[2], *215–216*
 Determination[1], *92*
 determination[3], *83, 222, 249*
 determine[5], *5, 94, 136, 168, 223*
 determined[19], *38, 71, 81, 83, 87, 101–103, 117, 120, 133, 167, 193, 198, 238–239, 249*
 determines[8], *89, 96, 99, 141, 172, 177, 202, 265*
 determining[7], *141, 157, 161, 177, 192–193, 231*
 detours[2], *85, 162*
 detractors[1], *5*
 deus[1], *102*
 Deussen[2], *183, 233*
 deutbar[1], *137*
 deuten[2], *185, 264*
 deutlicher[2], *112, 167*
 Deutlichkeit[1], *138*
 Deutsch[7], *255–257, 266*
 deutsch[1], *242*
 Deutsche[5], *106, 202, 277, 301*
 deutsche[5], *279, 281, 297, 311*
 Deutschen[2], *280*
 deutschen[5], *112, 244, 280–281, 298*
 Deutsches[3], *273, 303*
 Deutschland[6], *76, 130, 205, 296, 315*
 Deutungen[2], *185, 264*
 Deußen[1], *32*

devastating[2], *56, 207*
 devastation[3], *95, 168*
 develop[6], *35, 128, 152, 205, 209, 265*
 Developed[1], *43*
 developed[15], *15, 47–48, 69, 121, 133, 169, 175, 180, 197, 203, 207*
 developing[4], *3, 80, 197, 250*
 Development[1], *276*
 development[26], *15, 28, 52, 63, 71, 88, 104, 149, 155, 169, 176, 197, 201–202, 209, 215, 220, 224, 226–227, 232, 253*
 developmental[1], *214*
 developments[4], *46, 64, 213, 288*
 deviation[1], *212*
 devices[1], *158*
 devoted[1], *4*
 devotees[2], *5*
 devoting[1], *78*
 Dewey[2], *23, 254*
 Deyhle[6], *16, 293*
 Dezember[11], *43, 275, 277–278, 280, 283, 288, 290*
 Dg[1], *284*
 Dharamsala[2], *61*
 Dharma[2], *125*
 dharmo[1], *125*
 dhī[1], *110*
 dhyāna[1], *110*
 di[1], *104*
 Dia[1], *201*
 Diadochoi[1], *182*
 diagnosis[1], *32*
 diagnostician[2], *32*
 dialectic[5], *14, 103, 176, 214*
 Dialectical[2], *109, 271*
 dialectical[6], *61, 88, 201, 250, 253*
 dialectically[1], *103*
 Dialectics[3], *61, 130, 285*
 dialectics[6], *14, 102, 201, 246, 250, 293*
 Dialektik[8], *103, 130, 133, 175, 201, 245, 285*
 dialektischen[1], *252*
 Dialogen[1], *271*
 Dialogical[1], *62*
 Dialogue[3], *20, 249*
 dialogue[18], *4, 58, 70, 83, 94, 104, 117–118, 128, 148, 161, 177, 192, 208*
 Dialogues[4], *101, 131, 271, 291*
 dialogues[23], *10, 20, 39, 54, 76, 83, 94, 116–117, 164, 180, 188, 289*
 diamond[1], *194*
 diamonds[1], *57*
 Diary[1], *18*
 diary[2], *18*
 Diasyrmus[1], *186*
 dichotomy[1], *55*
 Dichten[5], *63, 67, 257, 268, 288*
 dichten[2], *34, 98*
 Dichtens[2], *268*
 Dichter[3], *283*
 dichterisch[3], *284–285*
 Dichterlesung[1], *285*
 Dichtung[14], *10, 127, 137, 174, 281–285, 293, 296, 305*
 Dichtungscharakter[1], *268*
 Dick[1], *52*
 Dictionary[1], *29*
 dictionary[2], *59, 73*
 dictum[2], *15, 118*
 dictums[3], *94, 115, 176*
 Did[13], *23, 31, 36, 62, 67, 104, 106, 118, 125, 181, 223, 235, 262*
 did[113], *5, 11–12, 14, 21, 24, 29–31, 35–36, 38–39, 46–47, 49, 55, 59, 62, 67–69, 73–74, 76, 88–89, 105, 109, 111, 113, 116–119, 123, 126, 129–131, 135, 144, 146, 153, 159, 161, 169, 171, 175, 178, 180, 188–190, 194, 196, 198, 200, 203, 205–209, 211, 213–214, 222, 226, 229, 233, 242, 248, 252, 254, 258–259, 262, 271, 289*
 didactic[5], *28, 80, 151, 158*
 didactically[2], *151, 158*
 didacticism[3], *8, 128, 163*
 didaktikos[2], *128, 163*
 didaktikós[1], *151*
 didn[2], *9, 43*
 DIE[2], *159, 288*
 Die[247], *3, 16, 20, 27, 31–32, 37–38, 40, 45, 48, 51, 55–57, 63–64, 67, 69, 71, 74, 76, 84–87, 89, 97, 103–104, 106, 109, 112, 116, 118, 120, 124, 134–136, 138, 147, 150–154, 157–158, 160, 163, 165–166, 169–170, 174, 185, 188, 190,*

195–196, 200–201, 204, 212, 215,
 219–220, 225–226, 235–236, 239–240,
 242, 244, 246–251, 254, 256–257, 259,
 261, 263–268, 273–277, 279–288,
 290–292, 294, 297–299, 302, 305–308,
 311, 313–314
 die[407], 1, 6–7, 16, 20–21, 27, 29, 34, 37,
 40, 42–43, 48–49, 51, 57–58, 63–64, 67,
 69, 72, 74–75, 77–78, 80–81, 84–87, 89,
 91–93, 95, 97, 108–110, 112, 114–116,
 118–120, 122–123, 126, 136–138,
 141–147, 153, 156–158, 160–164,
 166–169, 171, 173–174, 177, 179, 181,
 186, 190, 193, 195–196, 200–201,
 205–206, 218–222, 225–227, 229,
 234–236, 242, 245–248, 250, 252–253,
 256, 259, 261, 264–266, 268, 271–272,
 274–278, 281–282, 286, 288–293,
 296–298, 306, 308, 311
 died[24], 10, 17, 42, 60, 71, 86, 91, 94–95,
 117, 139, 164, 194, 197, 216, 227, 265,
 315
 Diego[1], 43
 Diels[2], 242
 dient[1], 266
 Dierk[1], 315
 Dies[4], 81, 190, 222, 235
 dies[7], 81, 108, 112, 141, 156, 186, 245
 Diese[11], 81, 90, 143, 158, 185, 201, 219,
 235, 252, 264, 267
 diese[14], 84, 108, 147–148, 163, 168–169,
 173, 196, 226, 252, 259, 263–264
 Dieselbe[1], 252
 diesem[6], 108, 173, 220, 246, 248, 268
 diesen[2], 143, 173
 Dieser[5], 169–170, 221, 237, 241
 dieser[20], 57–58, 98, 108, 143–144, 147,
 163, 174, 218, 237, 241, 265–266, 268
 Dieses[5], 108, 122, 247, 266
 dieses[18], 27, 92, 120, 158, 167, 170,
 173–174, 196, 200, 245–246
 Dieter[26], 21, 32, 51, 244–245, 248, 277,
 316
 Diethe[1], 241
 Dietmar[2], 91, 255
 differ[1], 212
 Difference[3], 25, 119, 277
 difference[15], 62, 87, 166–167, 171–172,
 222, 246, 248
 differences[6], 26, 37, 44, 89, 114, 192
 Different[1], 207
 different[67], 3–4, 8, 11, 21, 30, 36, 41–42,
 46–47, 52, 58, 60, 62–63, 73, 81, 86,
 88–89, 95, 105, 111–112, 114, 116, 121,
 123, 130, 136, 141, 154, 158, 160, 168,
 171, 175, 181–183, 206, 225, 238,
 244–245, 248, 261, 272–273, 277, 279,
 281
 differentiation[2], 151, 158
 differently[7], 5, 29, 57, 93, 127, 183, 217
 Differenz[8], 48, 110, 166–167, 247, 286,
 296
 Differenzschrift[5], 123, 131, 293
 differing[1], 198
 differs[1], 191
 difficile[1], 112
 Difficult[1], 110
 difficult[17], 17, 26, 29, 37, 55, 99, 112,
 122, 128, 144, 249, 251, 269
 difficulties[2], 124, 162
 difficulty[2], 114, 196
 Dig[1], 124
 dig[3], 67–68, 124
 digestion[2], 106
 Digging[1], 26
 digging[1], 15
 Digital[1], 314
 digitalebibliothek[1], 311
 dignity[4], 233, 251
 digression[1], 43
 dilemma[1], 160
 dilemmas[1], 102
 dilemmatic[1], 73
 diligent[1], 68
 diligently[1], 180
 Dilthey[36], 23, 59, 83, 98, 123, 133–134,
 140, 147, 149, 182, 196–197, 223–224,
 242, 254, 271, 276
 Diltheys[4], 84, 196, 276
 diluted[1], 106
 dimension[2], 93, 109
 dimensions[2], 142, 202
 Dimitrios[1], 292
 Ding[19], 12, 74, 86, 89, 116, 166–167,
 169, 219, 245, 257, 283–284, 297

Dinge[1], 235
 Dinkler[1], 105
 dinner[3], 39, 205, 291
 dint[1], 121
 Diogenes[4], 49, 54, 233
 Dionysian[3], 128, 242
 Dionysius[1], 128
 Dionysos[1], 56
 Dionysus[1], 242
 diözese[1], 291
 dir[1], 34
 Direct[1], 212
 direct[6], 33, 55, 64, 72, 145, 208
 directed[8], 66, 110, 140, 148–149, 219, 230, 263
 directedness[1], 178
 directing[1], 110
 Direction[1], 99
 direction[13], 10, 24, 33, 47, 61, 72, 78, 89, 99, 147, 156, 204, 236
 directionality[3], 3, 160, 163
 directionem[1], 99
 directions[16], 27, 42, 47, 49, 66–69, 71, 77, 103, 134, 175, 181
 Directives[2], 88, 264
 directly[9], 32, 53, 92, 98, 100, 108, 155, 179
 directs[1], 112
 Direktor[1], 143
 dirt[1], 205
 dis[2], 147, 247
 disagree[2], 51, 224
 disagreements[1], 4
 disappear[2], 76, 130
 disappeared[2], 240, 258
 disappointed[1], 5
 Disappointment[1], 131
 disappointments[2], 96, 106
 disastrous[1], 133
 disc[4], 313–314
 discard[1], 106
 discharged[1], 15
 disciple[1], 116
 disciples[6], 66, 79, 180, 184
 discipline[2], 46, 249
 disciplined[1], 242
 disciplines[1], 123
 disclosed[1], 146
 disclosedness[1], 147
 disclosive[4], 67, 127, 146, 264
 disclosure[2], 146, 149
 disconnected[1], 216
 discontinuities[1], 27
 discovered[2], 218, 230
 discovering[1], 29
 discovery[4], 83, 157, 195, 202
 discs[3], 313
 discuss[3], 13, 207, 288
 discussed[17], 8, 12, 23, 48, 62, 68, 81, 99, 105, 121, 147, 180, 212, 247, 251, 259, 284
 Discusses[1], 114
 discusses[3], 13, 18, 208
 discussing[4], 15, 18, 57, 196
 Discussion[3], 2, 45, 290
 discussion[35], 27, 29, 35, 38, 45, 54, 59, 72, 77, 82, 86, 100, 103, 107, 109, 114, 121, 127, 134–135, 140, 143, 150, 165, 182, 225, 258, 265, 287, 289, 293
 Discussions[1], 9
 discussions[18], 35, 48, 73, 101, 105, 119, 121, 123, 131, 136, 221, 224, 286, 291
 disease[1], 227
 dises[2], 49, 169
 disgrace[1], 231
 disguise[1], 194
 disguised[1], 221
 disintegrating[1], 96
 Disintegration[1], 42
 disjointed[1], 87
 Diskussion[2], 59, 284
 disliked[1], 18
 dismantling[3], 53, 76
 dismiss[1], 43
 dismissed[1], 212
 disorder[1], 11
 disparaged[1], 87
 disparagingly[1], 35
 dispensation[1], 134
 dispensations[1], 160
 dispense[1], 251
 displacement[1], 2
 display[4], 8, 17, 178

disposable[1], 176
disposition[1], 30
dispossession[3], 246
disputandum[1], 72
Disputatio[2], 43, 290
Disputation[6], 60, 277
disputationes[1], 60
Disputations[2], 259, 262
disputations[1], 60
Dispute[1], 5
dispute[4], 60, 73, 184, 212
disputes[1], 213
disreputable[1], 220
dissatisfaction[1], 115
disserere[2], 62, 262
Dissertation[3], 73, 103, 267
dissertation[9], 3, 25, 38, 43, 270–271
dissertations[1], 238
Dissoi[1], 171
dissolution[1], 42
dissolving[1], 250
dissuade[1], 106
distance[3], 87–88, 141
distant[3], 16, 77, 315
distill[1], 76
distinct[6], 8, 70, 175, 183, 216
distinction[15], 40, 54, 56, 110, 135, 159,
172, 231–232, 259
distinctions[4], 109–110, 182
distinctive[1], 69
distinguish[1], 29
distinguishes[4], 107, 176, 218, 229
distinguishing[1], 36
distorted[1], 153
distracted[1], 201
distress[1], 152
distressing[1], 114
ditch[1], 15
divagation[1], 180
divagations[1], 113
dive[4], 2, 79, 95, 180
divergence[1], 45
Diverse[1], 62
diverse[4], 10, 39, 88, 182
dives[1], 181
Divide[2], 44–45
divide[1], 67
divides[2], 150, 214
Divina[1], 4
divine[6], 8, 111, 117, 225, 235
divisio[1], 70
Division[2], 159, 189
division[6], 18, 54–55, 137, 204
divisions[3], 150, 160, 190
divorce[1], 58
dixit[5], 8, 108, 126, 181, 263
DLA[71], 9–10, 12–13, 17, 19–20, 29, 36,
40, 52, 73, 87, 91, 112, 114, 122, 139,
141, 165, 177, 244, 255, 268, 271, 273,
276, 278–279, 281–289, 292–295, 303
dla[1], 255
DM[1], 139
Do[6], 71, 87, 89, 105, 144, 235
do[104], 7–9, 11, 15, 24, 29–30, 32, 36–37,
39, 42, 45, 53–54, 59, 64, 66–68, 73, 76,
78–79, 84, 88, 94, 96, 98, 100–101, 106,
109–112, 115, 118–119, 122–123, 137,
150–152, 156, 158, 166, 171, 176, 181,
186, 189–190, 194, 198, 200, 202, 205,
210, 215, 218, 227, 229, 232–233, 235,
238, 244, 249, 258–262, 267, 269, 316
Doch[2], 173, 289
doch[14], 58, 141–142, 148, 166, 170, 174,
218
docket[1], 7
docs[1], 310
doctoral[4], 35, 178, 238, 271
Doctorate[1], 270
doctorate[3], 270–271, 274
doctrinal[5], 28, 66, 75, 126, 186
Doctrine[10], 57, 73, 102–103, 115, 203,
232, 276
doctrine[51], 28, 56, 58, 66–67, 72, 75, 78,
80–81, 89, 94, 102, 107, 111, 133, 147,
149, 153, 175–176, 178, 180, 185, 188,
194–195, 204–205, 216, 220, 223, 225,
230, 237–238, 240, 242, 249, 262
doctrineless[1], 107
doctrinelessness[1], 107
doctrinelessness[1], 107
Doctrines[1], 126
doctrines[25], 5, 14, 17, 22, 28, 44, 61, 66,
69, 74–76, 115, 125, 127, 176, 180, 194,
223

document[3], 277, 285, 293
Documentation[1], 261
documented[2], 176, 180
documents[5], 2, 12, 91, 261, 301
Does[15], 26, 30, 74, 107, 109–111, 146, 171, 175–176, 212, 223
does[130], 7, 12, 17, 25–28, 30, 35, 38, 40, 44, 48, 53–54, 56, 58, 61–62, 70–72, 74, 76–80, 83–85, 90, 92, 94, 96–99, 101, 104, 106, 110–112, 119, 121, 123, 127–128, 137, 145–146, 151, 155–157, 159, 163, 168, 172–175, 185–186, 188, 190, 193, 196–197, 200, 202–205, 207–209, 212, 215, 221, 223–224, 227–228, 231, 236, 238, 240, 248, 252, 260, 262, 294
doff[1], 49
dogma[2], 226, 228
dogmas[1], 28
dogmata[1], 22
dogmatic[10], 28, 71–72, 109, 153, 207–208, 220, 230
dogmatically[3], 88, 145, 215
dogmatischer[2], 72, 109
Dogmatism[3], 124, 208, 211
dogmatism[11], 28, 56, 99, 124, 153, 203–204, 206, 208, 211, 213
dogmatist[3], 28, 220, 230
dogmatists[4], 56, 204, 207, 216
Dohna[1], 208
DOI[1], 201
doi[1], 249
doing[26], 11, 31, 43, 59, 77, 81, 105, 108–109, 126, 141, 144, 150, 161, 163, 181, 205, 216, 223, 261
Dokumente[2], 301–302
Dolf[1], 304
dollar[1], 15
domain[8], 34, 96, 134, 152, 172, 197, 232, 267
domains[1], 13
dominance[2], 47, 102
dominant[3], 4, 67, 134
dominate[3], 51, 195, 224
dominated[6], 35, 70, 200, 217, 252
dominating[2], 57, 217
domination[1], 220
Domini[1], 233
Dominion[1], 254
dominion[4], 63, 220, 232, 239
Dominique[1], 73
Don[1], 39
don[3], 9, 73, 168
Donald[1], 60
Donatella[1], 104
Donautal[2], 164
done[28], 9, 11, 17, 19, 36, 38, 61, 86, 109, 139–140, 142, 144, 182–183, 200, 205, 215–216, 223, 232–233, 260, 270, 272–273
donkey[2], 54
donkeys[1], 228
Donnerstag[1], 108
door[5], 16, 98, 100, 168
Dordrecht[1], 302
Dorfes[1], 15
Doris[1], 303
Dorothea[4], 19, 155
dort[8], 81, 163, 166, 168, 173, 190, 246
Dortmund[2], 275
Dory[2], 154–155
dotctrinal[1], 285
dots[1], 38
Double[4], 71, 109, 149–150
double[6], 11, 18, 28, 75, 114, 276
doubt[9], 10–11, 98, 215, 219, 230, 237, 242, 260
doubted[2], 132, 155
Doubtful[1], 235
doubts[2], 27, 206
down[35], 2, 8, 21, 24, 28–30, 36, 38, 46, 56, 68, 76, 86–87, 91, 130, 138, 152, 156, 168, 172, 185, 188, 209, 219, 230, 232, 249
Downfall[1], 229
downfall[1], 113
downs[1], 25
downshift[1], 105
downshifting[1], 27
dowry[1], 77
doxographers[1], 18
Doxographic[1], 259
doxographic[1], 7
doxology[1], 77

Dr[41], *17, 20, 46, 61–62, 93, 112, 118, 255–256, 258, 260, 266, 270–271, 273, 286, 289–290, 292, 315*
 Draft[1], *252*
 draft[11], *41, 44, 67–68, 106, 141, 143, 177, 189, 281*
 drafted[1], *15*
 drafting[1], *138*
 drafts[2], *16, 24*
 drag[1], *194*
 Dragomir[2], *178*
 dramatic[1], *18*
 dramatically[1], *35*
 Drang[2], *211*
 drängt[1], *84*
 drauf[2], *118, 261*
 draw[2], *40, 155*
 drawer[1], *281*
 drawing[4], *80, 166, 189*
 drawn[5], *25, 60, 64, 187, 189*
 dreadful[1], *227*
 dream[7], *33, 62, 316*
 dreamers[1], *234*
 dreaming[1], *62*
 dreams[5], *52, 62, 121*
 Drei[2], *270, 288*
 dreierlei[1], *164*
 Dreisam[1], *168*
 Dresden[3], *278–279*
 dressed[1], *129*
 Drew[1], *71*
 drew[1], *181*
 Dreyfus[4], *4, 61*
 drift[1], *45*
 drink[1], *106*
 Drinking[2], *258, 263*
 drinking[2], *15, 124*
 dritten[1], *247*
 drive[2], *79, 97*
 driven[2], *58, 89*
 driver[2], *48, 287*
 drives[2], *155, 157*
 driveway[1], *168*
 driving[5], *29, 66, 71, 235*
 Drogen[1], *18*
 droht[1], *81*
 drop[3], *49, 233, 258*
 dropped[4], *113, 128, 282*
 drops[1], *206*
 drove[1], *243*
 Druckfahne[1], *286*
 Drucktitel[9], *256, 266, 281–283, 286–287, 292*
 Drugs[1], *18*
 drum[1], *111*
 drunkard[1], *238*
 dry[4], *33, 35, 129, 180*
 Du[1], *95*
 du[7], *15, 34, 188, 262*
 dubiety[1], *27*
 dubious[1], *161*
 dubitandum[1], *132*
 due[3], *32, 98, 290*
 dümmsten[1], *77*
 dunkler[1], *76*
 Dünnhaupt[1], *254*
 Duns[4], *73, 103–104*
 duplicitousness[1], *182*
 duration[2], *7*
 Durch[5], *12, 86, 166–167, 169*
 durch[16], *34, 58, 87, 89, 98, 120, 147, 196, 201, 218, 221, 224, 247, 267, 282*
 Durchdenken[1], *167*
 durchfragen[2], *58, 218*
 Durchgesehene[1], *279*
 Durchschlag[1], *283*
 dürfte[2], *34, 98*
 During[11], *16, 33, 44–45, 68, 105, 113, 197, 270–271, 273*
 during[64], *2, 12–13, 15, 18–19, 23–24, 27, 33–34, 36–37, 40–43, 52, 62, 68, 70–71, 73, 93, 99, 102, 104, 106, 114–115, 117–118, 121, 125, 128, 130, 138, 145, 149, 162, 184, 206, 222, 224, 241, 273, 280, 288, 291, 305, 315*
 Durst[1], *254*
 dusk[1], *25*
 dust[2], *35, 40*
 dustbin[1], *130*
 dustbins[2], *52, 126*
 Dutch[2], *277–278*
 duties[1], *61*

duty[2], 83, 212
dweller[4], 16, 167–168
Dwelling[2], 165, 284
dwelling[6], 90, 97, 173, 204–205
dwindling[1], 25
dying[1], 223
dynamic[1], 25
dynamics[3], 126, 132
dynamism[1], 176
dynasty[1], 316
dysphoric[1], 96

E

Each[3], 83, 118, 181
each[20], 10, 13, 30, 47, 87–88, 93, 118,
121, 129, 160, 167, 178, 251, 276
eager[1], 11
eagle[2], 92, 111
eagles[1], 99
ear[1], 81
Earlier[1], 14
earlier[24], 5, 23, 51, 61, 64, 79, 83, 114,
122, 139, 145, 180, 186, 191, 201, 208,
215, 224, 244, 249, 286, 288
Earliest[5], 83, 197–198, 275–276
earliest[8], 33, 64, 73, 80, 91, 123, 130, 310
Early[7], 23, 34, 55, 97, 138, 196, 310
early[74], 5, 10, 17, 21–23, 33–34, 36–37,
42, 46–47, 51, 53–54, 56, 59, 63, 76, 86,
101, 105, 107, 110, 112, 118, 123, 126,
131, 134, 139–140, 142, 149, 151, 153,
155, 180, 182, 194, 203, 205–207, 212,
219, 223–224, 230, 232–233, 238, 254,
260, 286
earth[17], 11, 33, 42, 63, 95, 180, 203, 220,
227, 230, 237, 241
easier[3], 146, 179, 185
easily[7], 24, 84, 161, 172, 208, 211, 214
East[2], 82, 127
Eastern[3], 4, 81, 99
easy[6], 14, 55, 99–100, 137, 191
eaten[1], 204

Ebeling[2], 290
Ebelings[1], 290
eben[2], 76, 196
Ebenso[1], 247
ebenso[3], 77, 237, 241
EBERHARD[1], 302
Eberhard[2], 212, 302
Ebert[1], 16
Ecce[6], 56, 106, 228, 242
echeia[1], 199
Echo[2], 91, 305
echo[2], 85, 217
echoes[3], 77, 155, 180
echte[2], 263
echten[3], 113, 142, 153
Eckard[1], 8
Eckhart[5], 19, 39, 42, 118, 263
eco[1], 64
ecology[1], 4
Economic[1], 95
economic[3], 106, 120, 220
Economy[1], 241
economy[3], 181, 190, 262
ecophenomenologists[1], 104
Ecstatic[2], 111, 236
ecstatic[4], 141, 146, 177
Ed[1], 139
ed[16], 21, 38, 41, 192, 198, 254, 261, 267,
270, 275, 292–293, 299, 301
Eddo[1], 303
edge[1], 194
edification[1], 68
edifice[4], 76, 126, 130, 159
edifices[3], 204, 209
edit[1], 46
Edited[5], 62, 255, 276, 302, 313
edited[19], 21, 29, 46, 59, 88, 130, 139,
167, 205, 214, 217, 244, 269, 271–273,
277, 292, 310
Edith[4], 43, 303
editing[3], 36–37
Edition[2], 44, 216
edition[39], 8–9, 21, 28, 73–74, 86–87, 98,
113, 139, 177, 194, 207, 212, 214, 223,
228, 278, 304, 310
editions[7], 114, 139, 178, 192

editis[1], 35
 Editor[8], 13, 17–18, 20, 36, 92, 159, 166
 editor[11], 13, 18, 20, 37, 46, 86, 91, 107,
 124, 165, 279
 editorial[4], 38, 139, 301
 Editors[1], 91
 editors[18], 2, 9, 11, 13, 36, 52, 86, 159,
 161, 164, 279, 293, 301, 310
 EDMUND[1], 138
 Edmund[17], 23, 31, 45, 48, 121–122,
 138–139, 147, 192, 198, 235, 277, 294,
 302
 edoch[1], 268
 eds[1], 175
 edu[1], 54
 Eduard[5], 32–33, 44, 261, 314
 educated[1], 231
 Education[1], 61
 education[3], 45, 54, 253
 educational[2], 105
 Edwards[2], 143
 eerie[1], 87
 effect[3], 53, 101, 277
 effective[2], 156, 221
 effects[1], 43
 Efficiency[1], 315
 efficiens[1], 101
 effluvium[1], 43
 effort[8], 52, 66, 151, 159, 175, 200, 263
 efforts[3], 4, 200, 207
 Egg[2], 84, 186
 Ego[1], 200
 ego[1], 214
 Egon[3], 154, 303
 Egypt[1], 231
 Egyptians[1], 231
 Ehrenbürgerschaft[2], 289, 313
 eig[2], 156, 186
 Eigene[1], 311
 eigene[1], 84
 eigenen[8], 59, 77, 80, 92, 120, 143, 167,
 299
 Eigenes[1], 6
 eigens[5], 190, 247, 260, 266
 eigentlich[7], 34, 64, 80, 97–98, 148, 167
 Eigentliche[1], 75
 eigentliche[7], 28, 40, 64, 169, 174
 eigentlichen[2], 141, 167
 Eigentlichkeit[1], 171
 Eigentum[2], 91, 171
 Eigentümliche[1], 307
 eight[5], 25, 30, 48, 171, 178
 eighteen[1], 140
 eighth[1], 145
 Eighty[2], 130, 188
 eighty[1], 45
 Eignen[1], 246
 eignen[1], 171
 eignenden[1], 268
 eignes[1], 246
 eignet[1], 163
 eignete[2], 173–174
 Eignis[2], 91, 268
 Eignung[1], 171
 eignung[3], 171
 Ein[12], 104, 113, 270–271, 284, 295,
 307–308, 310, 316
 ein[65], 14, 44, 49, 63, 66–67, 69, 75–76,
 81, 86–87, 89, 92, 97, 101, 106, 108,
 120, 126, 129, 136, 141, 148–150,
 156–157, 163–164, 174, 179–180, 186,
 190, 196, 219–220, 228, 235–236, 245,
 263–265, 267, 281, 289
 Einai[1], 316
 einai[1], 192
 einander[5], 58, 73, 265
 einandersetzung[1], 136
 Einbildungskraft[2], 38
 Einblick[2], 283
 Eindhoven[1], 60
 eindringlicher[1], 160
 Eine[9], 18, 143, 167, 282, 285, 302, 307,
 314
 eine[46], 42, 52, 57, 72, 77, 84–85, 90, 104,
 109–111, 115, 126, 136, 141, 144, 158,
 163–164, 166–168, 181, 183, 190, 196,
 219–220, 225–226, 235, 246, 248, 252,
 264, 266, 276
 einem[34], 27, 39, 42, 52, 89, 108, 114,
 160, 163–164, 166, 173, 180–181, 219,
 245, 266–267, 274, 279, 290, 293, 302
 einen[15], 58, 71, 81, 84, 89, 108, 113,
 126, 142, 185, 218–219, 264

einenb[1], 146
 Einer[3], 273, 280
 einer[38], 48, 77, 87, 91, 99, 104, 107, 120,
 143–144, 146, 148, 153, 158, 163, 169,
 221, 235, 245, 248, 271, 275, 277–278,
 285, 288, 291–292, 294, 314
 Eines[1], 63
 eines[28], 15, 27, 34, 49, 76, 86, 92, 97,
 101, 108, 118, 169, 177, 179, 196, 198,
 200, 264, 268, 273, 277, 286, 288, 291,
 296
 einfach[1], 148
 Einfache[1], 122
 einfache[2], 166, 247
 Einfluss[1], 43
 Einführung[11], 29, 64, 87, 97, 119–120,
 136, 242, 271, 296–297
 eingefallen[1], 264
 eingegangen[1], 144
 eingelöst[1], 247
 eingesetzt[1], 110
 Einheit[8], 64, 160, 185, 252, 264, 267, 287
 einige[1], 245
 einigen[1], 266
 einiger[1], 245
 einigermaßen[1], 164
 einiges[2], 112, 245
 einkehrt[1], 266
 einläßt[1], 63
 Einleitung[12], 63, 67, 75, 78, 122, 137,
 234, 297–298, 311
 Einmal[1], 245
 einmal[6], 40, 92, 146, 156–157, 196
 einmischen[1], 174
 Einräumung[1], 147
 Einrichtung[2], 63, 220
 Einsamkeit[5], 48, 97, 292, 297, 306
 einschließt[1], 268
 Einsicht[3], 100, 235
 einst[3], 148, 237, 241
 Einstein[1], 275
 Einstellungszusammenhang[1], 134
 Einstmals[1], 158
 Eintrag[1], 274
 Einübung[3], 84, 110, 299
 Einweihungs[1], 294
 Einzahl[1], 167
 Einzelne[1], 281
 einzig[3], 48, 50, 86
 einzige[8], 146–147, 169, 196, 225, 263, 265
 einzigen[1], 236
 einziger[1], 228
 Eisgeschichte[2], 291
 either[19], 22, 41–42, 46, 64, 74–75, 96,
 108, 157, 163, 192–193, 203, 207, 236,
 259–260
 Ekel[2], 237, 241
 ekphrasis[1], 169
 ekstatische[1], 266
 ekstatischen[1], 141
 elaborated[1], 38
 elaboration[4], 80, 140, 202, 288
 Elberfeld[2], 275
 Elder[1], 20
 elder[1], 216
 Elea[1], 80
 Eleatic[1], 148
 elected[3], 46, 105
 Electorateo[2], 123, 196
 electric[1], 64
 electricity[1], 168
 elegiacally[1], 9
 Elektronische[1], 216
 Element[1], 252
 element[3], 103, 251, 253
 Elementar[1], 206
 Elemente[1], 249
 elements[2], 59, 233
 elenchi[1], 176
 Elenchus[3], 116–117
 elenchus[3], 83, 188
 elenkhos[3], 116–117
 Eleonore[1], 303
 elephant[4], 181
 elevate[1], 67
 elevates[1], 133
 elevating[1], 74
 eleven[1], 19
 eleventh[2], 118, 260
 Elfride[13], 15–16, 39, 92, 217, 274, 286,
 294, 303
 Elfriede[1], 275
 Elias[3], 315

elicit[1], 185
 elicitation[1], 185
 elicited[2], 123, 131
 eliminate[1], 38
 eliminated[1], 224
 elimination[1], 251
 Elisabeth[7], 24, 128, 168, 301–303
 Elizabeth[2], 76, 130
 elle[1], 9
 Ellul[1], 182
 else[17], 20, 24, 64, 66, 99, 104, 106,
 128–129, 150, 162, 189, 209, 211, 242
 Elsewhere[2], 56, 79
 elsewhere[2], 46, 59
 Eltern[1], 302
 elucidate[1], 55
 elucidates[1], 201
 elucidating[1], 19
 elucidation[2], 152, 271
 Elucidations[4], 10, 192, 281, 293
 Elwert[1], 275
 Emad[5], 101, 126, 131, 283
 email[1], 17
 emancipation[1], 53
 embedded[1], 107
 embraces[2], 196, 231
 embryos[1], 11
 emerge[1], 161
 emerged[3], 178, 219, 230
 emergence[5], 57, 87, 195, 199
 Emergency[1], 97
 emergency[4], 97, 100
 emerges[1], 69
 emerging[1], 32
 emigrate[1], 272
 Emil[3], 17, 44, 293
 Eminent[1], 233
 Emmanuel[4], 45, 65, 182
 emotion[1], 47
 emotions[1], 186
 Empathy[1], 43
 emperors[1], 60
 empfängt[1], 34
 empfinden[1], 220
 Emphasis[2], 219, 230
 emphasis[10], 42, 82, 100, 106, 149–150,
 152, 179, 200
 emphasize[2], 27, 41
 emphasized[1], 200
 emphatically[1], 198
 Empirical[2], 23, 231
 empirical[4], 152, 213, 231, 240
 empiricism[2], 213
 empiricist[2], 203, 208
 empiricists[1], 81
 Empiricus[2], 206, 211
 empirischen[1], 23
 Empiristen[1], 81
 empowering[1], 27
 empty[10], 76, 130, 176, 225, 242, 251
 EN[1], 73
 En[1], 9
 en[7], 3, 9, 73, 199, 248, 288, 310
 enabled[1], 121
 enabling[1], 253
 enact[2], 155, 233
 enacted[1], 77
 enacting[1], 156
 enactment[2], 154, 156
 enclosures[1], 165
 encompass[1], 195
 encompasses[1], 83
 encounter[8], 45, 58, 72, 107, 177, 202,
 217, 238
 encountered[2], 59, 119
 Encountering[1], 39
 Encounters[6], 39, 101, 131, 289, 291
 encounters[8], 18, 58–59, 73, 130, 146
 encrypted[1], 11
 Encyclopaedia[1], 76
 Encyclopedia[1], 214
 encyclopedia[1], 124
 End[11], 27, 34, 58, 194–195, 198, 200,
 222–223, 230, 292
 end[130], 2–3, 10, 13, 15, 25, 35, 44, 47,
 49, 52–54, 56, 63, 69, 71, 73, 76–78, 84,
 87–88, 93–96, 100–101, 103, 106–108,
 110, 117, 119–120, 123, 126, 128, 140,
 142, 145–146, 152–153, 156, 159, 161,
 163–165, 168–169, 171, 175, 177–180,
 186, 188, 196–197, 200, 204–205,
 215–216, 218, 221–222, 224, 230–232,
 236, 240, 242, 245, 248, 260, 285, 289,

301
 Ende[23], 51, 92, 108, 120, 126, 137, 146,
 161, 196, 218–219, 222, 224, 230, 266,
 268, 287, 291–293
 endeavor[2], 178
 endeavors[2], 79, 140
 ended[3], 76, 101, 105
 endgültige[1], 236
 ending[5], 9, 156, 179, 195, 204
 Endless[1], 79
 endless[4], 4, 33, 56, 204
 endlessly[3], 93
 endlich[1], 266
 Endlichkeit[7], 48, 97, 251, 266, 292, 297,
 306
 endowed[1], 220
 ends[3], 53, 216
 endure[2], 87, 120
 endured[2], 90, 173
 Enduring[1], 172
 enduring[21], 87, 90, 171–173
 enemies[4], 119, 140, 142, 183
 enemy[3], 68, 140, 183
 Energeia[1], 199
 energiea[1], 198
 energy[3], 57, 97, 202
 Enframing[1], 200
 enframing[3], 8, 13, 176
 engage[12], 30, 34–35, 49, 52, 57, 104,
 106, 182–183, 190, 259
 Engaged[1], 15
 engaged[15], 3, 15, 23, 26, 31, 43, 45, 61,
 63, 67, 168, 186, 260, 262
 Engagement[1], 189
 engagement[18], 7, 11, 48, 73, 102, 111,
 113, 124, 135, 149, 190, 217, 230–232,
 238
 engagements[2], 4, 181
 engages[1], 175
 engaging[6], 8, 61, 182, 262–263, 287
 engagment[1], 186
 Engelbert[1], 274
 England[3], 219, 230
 englische[1], 81
 English[63], 8, 11, 13, 18, 21, 30–31, 33,
 36, 39, 44, 53, 63–64, 68, 73, 76, 79, 81,
 83, 92, 99, 114, 127, 130, 134, 143–146,

148, 150, 152, 164, 166, 185, 191–192,
 213, 217, 223, 227, 237, 265, 283, 292,
 301, 304, 310, 312
 english[1], 143
 engstem[1], 283
 enhanced[2], 64, 239
 ENI[1], 310
 enigmatic[1], 189
 enjoyable[2], 2, 259
 enjoyed[1], 15
 enken[1], 156
 Enlightenment[1], 234
 enlightenment[2], 53, 213
 ennobling[1], 8
 enormous[6], 11, 42, 116, 220, 225, 230
 enough[27], 10, 24, 26, 70, 72, 84,
 118–119, 133–134, 140, 155, 179, 181,
 183, 202, 224, 228, 233, 242, 247, 249,
 254, 262, 277
 Enowning[4], 24, 154, 157, 223
 enowning[2], 312
 enquiry[1], 140
 enroll[2], 219, 230
 ens[3], 192, 199
 ensouled[1], 88
 ensues[3], 120, 129, 231
 Ent[4], 63, 147, 171, 220
 ent[2], 113, 266
 entangled[1], 119
 entanglement[2], 221, 232
 Entäusserung[1], 103
 entbehrt[1], 174
 entdeckte[1], 219
 Enteignen[1], 246
 enteignenden[1], 247
 Enteignis[4], 122, 246–247
 entelecheia[2], 88, 100
 entelekheia[1], 88
 entelékheia[1], 100
 enter[5], 28, 97, 108, 172, 239
 entered[2], 34, 222
 entering[3], 129, 155
 enterprise[7], 45, 66, 74, 98, 102, 104, 112
 enters[5], 71, 101, 134–135, 202
 Entfachen[1], 146
 entfacht[1], 146
 Entfachten[1], 142

entfalten[1], 141
 entfaltet[1], 169
 Entfremdung[2], 103, 221
 entgegen[1], 167
 entgegengesetzt[3], 58, 218
 Enthält[3], 255–256, 288
 enthält[6], 20, 81, 165, 257
 enthalten[2], 185, 264
 enthralled[1], 26
 enthusiasm[1], 211
 enthýmēma[1], 187
 enthymeme[1], 187
 entia[1], 192
 entire[23], 11, 33, 42, 45, 47, 51, 55, 66,
 69, 99, 106–107, 116, 123, 134, 169,
 195, 201, 222
 entirely[11], 129, 134–135, 148, 186, 196,
 200, 214, 216, 232, 271
 entirety[2], 238, 242
 entities[1], 102
 entitled[14], 7–8, 25, 38, 47, 120, 150, 159,
 227, 242, 275, 283, 314
 entity[1], 185
 entleidet[1], 220
 entnehmen[1], 6
 entrance[4], 49, 100
 Entre[1], 65
 Entretiens[4], 9, 73
 entries[1], 40
 entrusting[1], 79
 entsagt[1], 57
 entscheiden[1], 264
 entscheidend[1], 158
 entscheidende[1], 163
 entscheidenden[1], 136
 entscheidendes[1], 163
 entscheidet[1], 42
 Entscheidung[3], 163, 237, 241
 Entscheidungen[1], 196
 entschieden[2], 146, 264
 Entschiedenheit[1], 174
 Entschließung[1], 147
 Entschlossenheit[1], 147
 entschuldigen[1], 143
 entsprang[2], 153, 201
 Entsprechen[1], 248
 Entsprechens[1], 113
 entspricht[2], 108, 167
 entstanden[1], 219
 Entstehen[1], 57
 Entstehung[1], 299
 Entstehungsort[2], 266, 286
 Entstehungszeit[6], 266, 271, 281,
 286–287, 293
 Enttäuschung[1], 272
 entweder[1], 42
 Entwerfenden[1], 114
 Entwicklung[3], 201, 250, 276
 Entwurf[7], 24, 69, 91, 143, 255, 285
 Entwurfs[2], 114
 Entzug[2], 246–247
 enumeration[1], 31
 enveloped[1], 194
 envoy[1], 233
 Enweckung[1], 212
 Enzyklopädie[1], 249
 Eoghan[2], 12, 91
 épha[4], 8, 108, 126, 181
 Ephesus[1], 168
 Ephraim[3], 67, 138, 211
 epic[5], 10, 27–28, 96, 106
 Epicurean[1], 25
 Epicureans[1], 133
 Epicurus[1], 203
 epideictic[1], 273
 epideiktikós[1], 273
 epigraph[1], 67
 epiphanôn[1], 42
 episode[1], 90
 epistēmē[1], 221
 epistemological[3], 46, 60, 193
 Epistemology[1], 221
 epistemology[6], 45–46, 197, 221
 epitome[1], 92
 epoch[7], 63, 95, 119, 152, 220
 epochalen[1], 266
 Epoche[2], 63, 220
 epochmaking[1], 119
 Époque[1], 15
 equal[2], 39, 289
 equality[1], 226

equally[2], 120, 129
 equation[1], 262
 equilibrium[1], 135
 equivalent[1], 134
 Er[5], 76, 85, 162, 171, 217
 er[31], 34, 43, 52, 57–58, 76, 114, 120,
 146, 163, 168, 173, 189, 193, 201,
 218–221, 237, 241, 252, 291
 Era[6], 7, 42, 46–47
 era[6], 32, 55, 71, 98, 181, 196
 erat[4], 94, 115, 185–186
 Erbauung[1], 69
 Erbe[1], 64
 Erbetene[1], 285
 Erbschaften[1], 77
 Erdballs[1], 95
 Erde[8], 51, 63, 220, 237, 241, 288, 313,
 316
 Erdichtetes[1], 137
 erection[1], 204
 Ereignen[10], 246–248
 ereignet[3], 174, 246
 ereignete[2], 166, 247
 Ereignis[150], 3, 12, 26, 30–31, 51, 53, 58,
 63, 69, 71, 76, 86, 88–90, 97, 99, 101,
 117, 143, 147, 151–152, 154–157,
 159–163, 166–167, 169, 171, 173–175,
 178–180, 184–185, 193, 195, 200–201,
 218, 221, 232–233, 236, 238, 244–249,
 255, 261, 264, 266–267, 283, 298–299,
 305, 307–308, 312
 Ereignisses[8], 166, 173–174, 248, 266
 Ereignungen[2], 166
 erfahrbar[1], 248
 erfahren[1], 196
 Erfahrene[1], 81
 Erfahrung[16], 63, 75, 163, 167, 173, 248,
 264, 268, 289, 296
 Erfahrungsgebrauch[1], 89
 erfolgreicher[1], 144
 Erforschens[1], 173
 Erfragte[2], 149
 Erfragtes[1], 149
 erfreut[1], 144
 ergänzt[1], 266
 Ergänzungen[24], 2, 9, 12, 19, 38, 48, 61,
 107–108, 129, 263, 273, 279–280, 287,
 299
 ergo[1], 115
 ergon[1], 199
 Erhart[2], 49, 302
 Eric[3], 69, 182
 Erich[3], 105, 216, 271
 Erik[3], 105, 190, 290
 Erika[5], 16, 293
 Erinnerung[10], 27, 36, 131, 195, 200, 261,
 272, 293
 Erinnerungen[1], 39
 eristic[1], 68
 erkannt[1], 246
 erkennbar[1], 137
 erkennen[5], 40, 58, 81, 108, 218
 Erkenntnis[7], 107, 153, 158, 221, 298
 Erkenntnisideal[1], 264
 Erkenntnistheorie[2], 45
 Erkenntnisvermögens[1], 206
 Erkenntniß[2], 44, 137
 Erker[2], 291, 314
 erklären[2], 51, 219
 Erklärens[1], 173
 erklärte[2], 219
 Erklärung[1], 216
 erlahmten[1], 99
 Erlangung[2], 270, 274
 erlaubt[1], 51
 erläutern[1], 248
 erläutert[1], 245
 Erläuterung[2], 6, 282
 Erläuterung[1], 180
 Erläuterungen[5], 10, 282, 293, 296
 Erläuterungen[1], 283
 Erlebnisreichtum[1], 104
 erlösen[3], 227, 237, 241
 ermächtigt[1], 84
 Ermächtigung[2], 27, 259
 Erna[1], 105
 Ernest[2], 43, 275
 Ernesto[2], 315
 erneuten[1], 112
 ernötigt[1], 196
 Ernst[60], 8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 23–24, 32–34,
 43–45, 47, 60, 63, 85, 110, 117, 156,
 186, 196, 206, 211, 224, 235, 254, 272,

276–278, 284, 288, 293, 299, 303–304,
 307–308
 ernst[1], 284
 Ernstmachen[1], 158
 eröffnet[1], 120
 Eröffnung[2], 69, 287
 Eröffnung[1], 281
 erörtert[1], 247
 Erörterung[1], 285
 erotic[1], 154
 err[2], 63, 75
 errancy[1], 87
 erreichende[1], 84
 erreicht[2], 34, 174
 erring[2], 67, 113
 erroneous[1], 77
 Error[2], 55, 232
 error[8], 56, 68, 96, 220, 225, 227, 230–231
 Errors[2], 227, 229
 errors[7], 8, 114, 181, 220, 230, 262
 errungenen[1], 92
 Erscheinungsformen[1], 95
 erschien[1], 138
 erschienen[2], 138, 291
 Erschließungscharakter[2], 67, 127
 erschöpft[3], 33, 64, 91
 erspringen[1], 50
 Erst[2], 85, 124
 erst[11], 42, 70, 92, 143, 146, 156, 163,
 227, 246, 252
 Erste[4], 278–279, 284, 306
 erste[7], 20, 49, 114, 165, 253, 256
 ersten[8], 85, 245–246, 264, 279, 314
 erster[1], 248
 Erstes[1], 137
 erstes[1], 163
 erstmal[1], 245
 Erstveröffentlichung[3], 274, 283, 294
 erstwhile[1], 98
 erudite[3], 19, 23, 59
 erudition[1], 163
 Eruditorum[1], 194
 erung[1], 190
 Erwachen[1], 316
 erwartet[1], 115
 erweckt[1], 247
 erweiter[1], 246
 erweiterte[1], 292
 Erz[2], 30, 291
 Erziehung[1], 123
 Es[18], 51, 57, 65, 75, 84, 108, 126, 136,
 146, 168, 219, 246, 263–264, 294
 es[81], 27, 42–43, 57, 59, 63, 71–72, 77,
 81, 84, 86–87, 101, 104, 108–110, 112,
 116, 118, 120, 122–123, 131, 136–137,
 141, 143–144, 148–149, 153, 156, 167,
 169, 174, 190, 196, 219–220, 230, 235,
 245–247, 252, 261, 263–264, 268, 284
 escape[1], 136
 eschatology[1], 26
 Escher[1], 100
 eschews[1], 35
 ese[1], 3
 Esel[2], 54
 Esoteric[1], 312
 esoteric[2], 28, 115
 esôterikós[1], 17
 esöterikós[1], 28
 esp[1], 139
 Especially[1], 141
 especially[25], 26, 42, 45, 55, 66, 79, 81,
 88, 96, 103, 113, 117, 128, 145, 172,
 180, 189, 192, 197, 211, 218, 230, 238,
 289, 315
 esprit[1], 1
 Essay[6], 145, 192, 198, 225, 241, 294
 essay[21], 7, 17, 21, 25, 27, 37, 41, 112,
 155, 193, 200, 207, 212, 232, 237, 254,
 260, 287
 Essays[7], 83, 168, 197–198, 275–276, 283
 essays[11], 13, 24, 33, 68, 71, 180, 254,
 260, 310
 esse[1], 192
 Essence[11], 37, 66, 80, 100, 102, 109,
 143, 271, 278, 288
 essence[49], 47, 56, 58, 63, 78, 84–85, 89,
 94–96, 98, 103, 147, 153, 158–160, 163,
 166, 172, 174, 176, 178, 185, 193, 198,
 201, 222, 228, 231, 238–239, 250, 264,
 267
 essencing[1], 153
 essentia[1], 225
 essentiae[1], 199

essential[48], *10–11, 25, 30, 40, 52, 64, 66, 68, 70, 76, 83, 85, 94, 110–112, 115, 124, 152, 155, 158, 160, 172, 176, 184–185, 187, 192, 195–196, 202, 204, 208, 233, 238, 242, 261, 263*
 essentially[15], *51, 63, 83, 86–87, 90, 111, 137, 149, 173, 191, 219, 224, 230, 238*
 essentials[1], *245*
 est[9], *9, 44, 47, 72, 112, 132, 192, 278*
 establish[2], *25, 231*
 established[10], *38, 60, 66, 72, 90, 108, 112, 172, 216*
 establishing[3], *80, 231*
 establishment[3], *63, 107, 220*
 Estate[1], *20*
 estate[4], *21, 92, 277, 290*
 esteemed[3], *30, 180, 233*
 esti[1], *74*
 estimable[1], *236*
 estimated[3], *10, 219, 230*
 estimates[1], *233*
 estimation[2], *141, 205*
 estimations[1], *110*
 Estoppel[2], *114, 217*
 ET[2], *75, 149*
 Et[1], *206*
 et[48], *9–10, 44, 55, 66, 88, 99, 101, 103, 106, 114, 135, 143, 147, 152, 156, 186, 193, 198, 200, 203–204, 206–209, 211, 216, 232*
 etad[1], *61*
 etais[1], *9*
 etc[32], *4–5, 11, 24, 28, 40, 46, 49, 54, 60, 69, 79, 159, 165, 176–178, 180, 182, 204, 214, 219, 230, 237, 244, 260, 263, 284–285*
 eternal[43], *54, 56, 84, 96, 103, 123, 152–153, 199, 218–220, 222–223, 227–233, 240, 242, 251*
 eternally[1], *56*
 eternal[1], *218*
 Eternity[1], *250*
 eternity[2], *90, 153*
 ethic[1], *72*
 Ethica[1], *275*
 Ethical[1], *270*
 ethical[2], *18, 119*
 Ethics[4], *271, 275*
 ethics[5], *46, 115, 119, 147*
 Ethik[1], *275*
 ethos[1], *62*
 Etudes[1], *305*
 etwas[11], *43, 74, 112, 136–137, 169, 219, 248*
 etymology[2], *226, 259*
 Eugen[17], *13, 25, 45, 48, 105, 282, 285, 292, 303, 305*
 Eugene[1], *287*
 Eulogy[1], *280*
 euphoria[1], *2*
 Eurocentric[2], *81–82*
 Europa[4], *98, 106, 281*
 europäische[2], *81, 298*
 europäischen[1], *81*
 Europe[15], *33, 42, 45, 96, 98, 102, 220, 227, 230, 249*
 European[16], *3, 7, 32, 64, 81, 97, 113, 116, 149, 182, 259*
 Euthyphro[2], *83, 131*
 eva[1], *61*
 evade[2], *113, 116*
 evaluating[1], *149*
 evaluation[2], *126, 133*
 Evangelical[2], *276–277*
 Evangelisch[1], *278*
 evasion[2], *90, 173*
 Even[24], *10, 16, 18, 25, 43, 47, 59, 71, 73, 78, 112, 114, 119, 129, 136, 142, 152, 181–182, 207, 213, 229, 258, 262*
 even[125], *7, 10–11, 14, 17–19, 21, 23–25, 28–29, 31, 33, 52–54, 59, 69–70, 73, 76, 78–79, 81, 88, 92–94, 97–98, 101, 106–107, 110, 113–117, 119–120, 123, 126–128, 130–131, 133, 136–137, 140–142, 145–147, 152–153, 155, 161, 176, 180–183, 189, 191, 193–197, 201, 205–206, 209, 211–213, 221, 223–228, 231–232, 249, 254, 262*
 Evening[2], *20, 164*
 evening[8], *61, 104, 124, 129, 276, 285, 289*
 evenings[3], *16, 104, 270*
 Event[17], *31, 86, 88–90, 151, 158–159, 171, 173–174, 238, 246*
 event[17], *62–63, 88, 167, 172, 227, 238,*

246–248, 285
 Eventing[1], 246
 events[1], 17
 eventual[2], 15, 25
 eventually[8], 3, 28, 54, 76, 88, 141, 189, 211
 Ever[1], 102
 ever[25], 18, 25, 27, 56, 62, 80, 106, 109, 112, 119, 122, 125, 134, 143, 147, 182, 189, 209, 222, 227, 229, 234
 everlasting[1], 234
 Every[10], 62, 87, 106, 110, 122, 125, 149, 209
 every[36], 4, 6, 13, 30, 32, 59, 75, 79–80, 83, 85, 89, 104–105, 112, 122, 124, 128, 131, 135, 145, 149, 153, 195, 203, 227, 231, 233, 260, 267
 everyone[13], 24, 33, 55, 79, 120, 129, 134–135, 148, 218, 230
 Everything[6], 15, 61, 109, 126, 186
 everything[31], 8, 30, 32, 36, 39, 67, 81, 102, 106, 118, 121, 123, 131–132, 134–135, 159, 162, 166, 184, 200, 215, 217–218, 228, 230, 260, 264, 283
 everywhere[8], 89, 96–97, 134, 190, 205, 247
 evidence[19], 24, 66, 70, 72–73, 87, 109, 115, 134, 154, 177–178, 186–187, 240
 evident[3], 64, 145, 238
 evidently[1], 41
 Evil[5], 219, 228–230, 233
 evil[4], 7, 226, 228
 eviscerate[1], 212
 eviscerated[1], 54
 evocation[1], 185
 evocations[1], 136
 evoke[1], 185
 evoked[2], 156, 186
 evoking[3], 66, 185, 263
 Ewald[2], 292–293
 Ewgen[1], 304
 ewig[1], 225
 ewige[1], 135
 ewigen[10], 32, 84, 218, 229
 Ewigkeit[1], 250
 ex[2], 33, 259
 exact[5], 38, 96, 116, 148, 250
 exactement[1], 9
 exactly[8], 9, 24, 30, 121, 134, 153, 254, 261
 exaggeration[2], 33, 60
 exalted[1], 129
 exam[3], 10, 62, 223
 examination[4], 62, 191
 examinationfor[1], 274
 examinations[1], 121
 examine[1], 197
 examined[1], 62
 Example[26], 20, 27–29, 39, 47, 61–62, 65, 74, 98, 105, 111, 114, 126, 134, 139, 171, 177, 181, 185, 192, 212, 273, 296
 example[117], 3–4, 8–9, 12–15, 17–18, 21, 23, 25, 27, 32–34, 36–42, 46, 48, 50, 52–56, 59–60, 67, 75–77, 80, 84–85, 88–89, 98–104, 111, 113–114, 119–121, 123, 130–132, 134, 137, 139, 150, 155–156, 163, 168, 171, 175–177, 181, 183, 185, 206–207, 220–221, 223, 230, 236, 240, 245, 259–260, 262–263
 Examples[6], 18, 44, 48, 90, 105, 287
 examples[31], 10, 15, 21, 26–27, 32, 36, 39, 60, 62, 70, 73, 78, 83, 113–114, 123, 128, 131, 176, 180, 203, 260
 exams[2], 60, 62
 exceed[1], 177
 exceedingly[2], 36, 106
 exceeds[1], 159
 excellence[1], 56
 Excellent[1], 121
 excellent[8], 5, 32, 60, 71, 124, 301
 Except[2], 77, 96
 except[3], 2, 58, 225
 exception[4], 9, 47, 110, 316
 exceptional[1], 128
 exceptionally[2], 13, 242
 Excerpts[1], 91
 excerpts[1], 38
 exchange[15], 25, 45, 72, 118, 125, 131, 254, 259, 265, 272, 302
 exchanges[5], 52, 118, 301
 exciting[2], 12, 127
 exclamation[1], 152
 excluded[2], 17, 147
 exclusively[1], 172

excoriation[1], 11
 excuses[1], 32
 Exegese[1], 275
 exegesis[1], 119
 exegete[1], 74
 Exemplar[4], 51, 283, 311
 exemplar[1], 238
 Exemplare[1], 276
 exercise[5], 8, 27, 106, 110, 284
 exercises[1], 147
 exergue[2], 67, 148
 exhaust[4], 4, 88, 223, 232
 exhausted[4], 33, 64, 91, 183
 exhaustive[1], 67
 exhibition[1], 166
 exhibits[1], 88
 exigency[1], 100
 exigentia[1], 199
 exist[10], 13, 34, 44, 78, 109, 181, 190, 252, 259, 262
 existed[3], 37, 73, 107
 Existence[1], 48
 existence[26], 7, 45, 47, 64, 83, 87, 109, 120, 133, 140–141, 145, 177, 192–193, 212, 227, 231, 233, 235
 existentia[1], 225
 existential[3], 97, 145–146
 Existentialism[6], 3, 47–48
 existentialisme[1], 47
 existentiellanthropologically[1], 147
 Existenz[3], 87, 120, 290
 Existenzbegriffs[1], 282
 esistenziale[1], 250
 Existenzialismus[2], 307–308
 existenziell[1], 147
 Existenzphilosophie[1], 264
 existiert[1], 116
 existing[5], 7, 146, 273
 exists[10], 90, 101, 107, 116, 130, 148–149, 172
 exit[3], 100
 Exordium[1], 66
 exoteric[1], 99
 exotic[1], 194
 Expanded[1], 287
 expanded[2], 92, 290
 expands[3], 88, 103
 expansion[2], 218, 229
 expect[3], 17, 54–55
 expectantly[1], 64
 expectation[2], 98
 expectations[1], 105
 expected[3], 39, 49, 162
 expecting[2], 31, 154
 expects[2], 115, 215
 Experience[1], 224
 experience[26], 39, 84–85, 89, 98–99, 103, 121, 163, 166, 169, 172, 185, 192–193, 208, 211, 222, 248
 experienced[7], 81, 131, 156, 196, 198, 202, 248
 Experiences[1], 238
 experiences[2], 81, 210
 experiencing[1], 200
 expert[1], 233
 explain[12], 32, 51, 86, 94, 116, 163, 171, 181, 218, 224, 230, 259
 explained[6], 218, 230, 245, 248
 explaining[4], 75, 149–150, 190
 explains[2], 17, 51
 explanation[6], 6, 127, 144, 152, 172, 249
 explanations[2], 55, 150
 explanatory[3], 89, 172, 174
 explicated[1], 75
 explicit[2], 36, 149
 explicitly[2], 195
 explodes[1], 13
 exploitation[1], 60
 explores[2], 70, 184
 Exposition[5], 150, 207, 287
 exposition[3], 71, 103, 150
 expresion[1], 155
 express[4], 29, 114, 133, 269
 expressed[10], 29, 39, 62, 95, 107, 145, 176, 182, 215, 269
 expresses[4], 96–97, 120, 148
 expressing[1], 29
 expression[39], 3, 19, 27, 47, 70–71, 73–74, 80–81, 94, 97–98, 100, 103–104, 108, 134, 148, 155, 160, 176, 179, 181, 184, 193, 212, 226, 228, 259
 expressions[6], 27, 64, 69, 105, 148, 181
 expressive[1], 130

expressly[6], *51, 58, 78, 198, 202, 224*
expropriating[1], *247*
extant[4], *36, 75, 149, 273*
extemporaneous[1], *284*
extend[2], *197, 251*
Extended[2], *15, 134*
extended[3], *41, 247, 261*
extending[2], *8, 161*
extensa[2], *102, 214*
extension[1], *189*
Extensive[1], *31*
extensive[18], *10–11, 14, 21, 23, 28, 36, 41, 58, 60, 87, 98, 131, 135, 279*
extensively[4], *12, 16, 18*
Extent[1], *311*
extent[6], *107, 119, 177, 184, 235, 245*
external[4], *52, 102, 150, 180*
externally[1], *52*
Extra[1], *84*
extra[4], *7, 26, 36*
extracted[2], *30, 244*
extractions[3], *244*
Extracts[1], *244*
extracts[2], *244*
extraordinarily[4], *104, 117, 119, 259*
extraordinary[1], *116*
Extreme[3], *111, 236*
extreme[5], *3–4, 135, 224, 232*
extremely[4], *15, 25, 30, 203*
extremes[1], *4*
extrinsically[1], *135*
eye[1], *58*
eyes[6], *14, 84, 110, 200, 226, 233*

F

FABLE[2], *55, 232*
fable[1], *56*
fabulous[2], *16, 221*
face[5], *28, 118, 163, 289*
Facebook[1], *15*
faced[1], *222*
faces[4], *120, 129, 220, 230*

facet[1], *205*
Fachgespräches[1], *291*
Fachschaft[1], *278*
facit[1], *114*
fact[61], *9, 11, 23, 30, 32, 37, 41, 43, 47, 54, 68–70, 76, 79, 82, 105, 107, 109, 127–128, 133–136, 141, 144, 148, 159–160, 175–176, 181, 194, 197, 202–203, 207, 209, 212–213, 215, 219, 222–223, 226, 230, 242, 272, 275*
facti[2], *208, 211*
facticity[1], *23*
facto[4], *79, 141*
factor[2], *88, 202*
Facts[1], *136*
facts[7], *97, 136, 152, 157, 247*
Factum[2], *136*
faculties[1], *229*
Faculty[2], *270*
faculty[11], *99, 144–145, 215–216, 218, 230*
fading[1], *23*
fads[1], *104*
faffing[5], *7, 67, 71, 95, 259*
fail[1], *200*
failed[3], *7, 12, 179*
Failure[1], *85*
failure[1], *159*
faint[1], *175*
fair[1], *24*
fairly[2], *35, 38*
fairy[1], *229*
fairytale[1], *231*
faisait[1], *9*
fait[1], *9*
Faith[3], *211, 225*
faith[19], *90, 173, 194, 211–213, 219, 223, 225, 227, 230, 233*
faithful[1], *227*
Faksimile[32], *51, 255, 307–309*
Faktizität[3], *110, 134, 298*
Fakultät[1], *270*
Fakultat[1], *274*
FALL[1], *293*
Fall[5], *67, 111, 228, 287, 299*
fall[9], *33, 46, 67, 87, 118, 120, 127, 137, 184*
fallacy[1], *60*

fallen[2], 33, 186
 falling[3], 55, 59, 185
 falls[4], 81, 167, 198, 249
 false[6], 44, 79, 87, 160, 238
 falsest[1], 226
 falsifications[2], 37, 114
 faltung[2], 63, 220
 fame[3], 7, 69
 familiar[4], 29, 130, 207, 269
 Family[2], 315
 family[18], 8, 12, 15–16, 18, 22–23, 30, 39, 97, 139, 311, 315
 Famous[2], 23, 260
 famous[70], 3, 7, 13, 15, 17–18, 25, 28, 32, 36, 42–43, 45, 47, 49, 52, 56, 60–61, 68, 75, 81, 83, 96, 99–100, 105, 107, 114, 116–118, 125, 129, 131, 136, 138–139, 142, 147, 168, 175, 177–178, 180, 182, 204, 214, 217, 223–224, 227, 232, 271–272, 278, 284, 315
 famously[3], 17, 80, 136
 fanatical[1], 229
 fanaticism[1], 211
 fanatics[1], 211
 fand[2], 219, 266
 fandango[1], 43
 fang[1], 268
 Fangnetze[1], 259
 fans[1], 31
 fantasies[1], 99
 fantastic[1], 136
 far[53], 7–9, 12–13, 25, 31, 34, 37, 49, 51–52, 63–64, 68, 76, 78, 83, 85, 91, 94, 117, 128, 130, 136, 140, 156, 159, 169, 172, 179, 182, 184, 186, 189, 210, 212, 218, 228–229, 235, 245, 249, 262
 Farewell[1], 9
 farm[1], 16
 farmer[1], 168
 farmers[1], 25
 farrago[2], 4–5
 Farrell[5], 135, 182, 238, 273, 315
 farther[2], 219, 230
 fascinating[1], 145
 fashion[4], 25, 140, 151, 158
 fashionable[1], 79
 fashioned[3], 125, 129
 Fassung[21], 92–93, 244, 255, 265, 268, 274, 279, 284, 291–292, 308
 fast[2], 47, 145
 faster[1], 25
 fatal[1], 231
 fatalism[4], 212
 fatality[1], 233
 fate[3], 34, 46, 98
 Father[3], 42
 father[12], 15, 23, 32, 43, 105, 168, 273, 315
 Fathers[2], 48, 287
 fathers[2], 207
 fathoming[1], 222
 fati[2], 223
 faults[1], 70
 favorably[1], 113
 favorite[8], 15, 33, 62, 100, 188, 219, 262
 faßt[1], 92
 fealty[1], 66
 fear[1], 227
 feared[1], 163
 fearful[1], 97
 fears[1], 212
 feasibility[1], 236
 feast[1], 276
 feature[1], 242
 Feb[1], 293
 Februar[12], 274–275, 281, 284–285, 287–288, 290–292, 294
 February[19], 16, 37, 43, 63, 86, 106, 123, 145, 150–151, 265, 271, 275, 286, 288, 291, 294, 302, 304
 Feburary[4], 275–277, 284
 fed[3], 33, 64, 91
 Feder[1], 207
 Fédier[2], 48, 287
 feel[9], 50, 62, 100, 122, 220, 222, 227, 242, 316
 feet[1], 311
 fehlen[1], 163
 fehlt[1], 181
 Feick[1], 303
 Feier[4], 286, 292, 314
 feier[1], 294
 Feiertage[1], 282
 Feinden[1], 142

feisty[1], 71
 Feld[2], 85, 124
 Feldweg[15], 12, 86, 91, 94, 117, 164,
 166–167, 169, 284, 299, 313
 fell[4], 56, 78, 204, 242
 felled[1], 87
 Fellow[1], 270
 felt[7], 16, 33, 47, 76, 79, 95, 167
 feminism[1], 4
 femme[2], 9
 femsten[1], 58
 Ferienhochschulkurse[1], 277
 fern[1], 235
 Fernsehge[1], 291
 FernsehInterview[1], 261
 fernsten[2], 77, 218
 Ferreira[2], 3, 315
 Ferrer[24], 94, 124–125, 249, 258, 261,
 265, 310, 312, 315
 Ferry[1], 182
 fertig[2], 87, 120
 fertile[1], 57
 Fessard[2], 48, 287
 feste[1], 126
 festgehalten[1], 147
 festgemacht[1], 173
 festgetreten[1], 107
 festigung[2], 136–137
 festive[1], 289
 Festschrift[11], 17, 112, 190, 248, 277,
 285–286, 288, 290, 294
 festsetzen[1], 84
 feststellen[1], 136
 Feststellung[1], 218
 fetching[1], 194
 fetid[1], 119
 Feuerbach[5], 23, 110, 118, 260
 feuilleton[1], 17
 feuilletons[1], 18
 few[66], 2, 7, 11–13, 21, 23–25, 27–30, 34,
 37, 40, 54, 56, 58, 60, 63, 66–70, 74, 86,
 95, 97, 105, 115, 119, 121–123, 131,
 136, 141, 154–155, 157–159, 175–177,
 181, 183, 190, 198, 217, 238, 260–262,
 273, 285
 ff[4], 167, 285, 292
 Fg[1], 257
 FHA[1], 40
 Fiand[3], 275, 311
 Fiche[1], 99
 Fichte[16], 67, 105–106, 112, 119, 183,
 198, 202, 206, 212, 216, 297
 Ficker[4], 289, 301–302
 fiction[9], 126–127, 186, 225–226, 242
 fictional[3], 10, 117, 183
 Fidel[4], 258, 265, 310, 312
 fidelity[1], 122
 field[12], 45, 83–86, 91, 124, 183, 193
 fields[5], 46, 57, 85, 123, 133
 fifteen[1], 144
 fifteenth[1], 215
 Fifth[2], 185, 237
 fifties[1], 285
 fifty[1], 131
 Figal[2], 104, 182
 fight[3], 112, 183, 217
 fighting[2], 59, 228
 figment[1], 100
 figure[5], 66, 100, 200, 222
 figured[1], 171
 figuring[1], 7
 fiir[1], 264
 Fiji[2], 315
 Fiktion[1], 225
 file[2], 41
 fill[4], 109, 177, 209, 273
 filled[4], 11, 36, 203
 Fillibachstraße[1], 16
 filling[1], 182
 fillip[3], 8, 49, 154
 fills[1], 251
 film[3], 62
 fils[1], 9
 Final[10], 2, 5, 161, 177, 185–186, 259
 final[67], 5, 11, 14, 21, 26, 40–41, 46, 49,
 54–56, 61–62, 68, 70, 86, 93–94,
 115–116, 125–127, 132, 134–135, 140,
 152, 155, 157, 164, 169, 171, 175,
 179–180, 183, 186–188, 209, 213–216,
 221, 223, 236, 240, 271–272
 finalis[1], 101
 finalize[1], 203
 FINALLY[2], 55, 232
 Finally[6], 11, 59, 111, 140, 226, 228

finally[22], 3, 12, 26, 29–30, 37, 47, 49, 53,
 59, 77, 97, 102, 106, 136, 140, 145–146,
 189, 212, 217
 finance[1], 95
 financial[1], 316
 find[30], 1, 11, 18, 30, 50, 57, 59, 61,
 76–77, 79, 89, 97–98, 105, 107, 120,
 122, 141, 143, 194, 211–213, 222, 227,
 229, 252, 258
 findaid[1], 311
 finden[3], 89, 143, 252
 finder[1], 18
 findet[3], 93, 141, 268
 finding[3], 21, 99, 214
 findings[1], 70
 finds[8], 3, 62, 89, 93, 134–135, 141, 215
 Fine[4], 284, 288, 294
 fine[3], 30, 40, 116
 finer[1], 56
 finesse[1], 178
 finger[2], 175, 262
 fingers[1], 17
 finish[4], 87, 120, 188, 205
 Finished[2], 61, 316
 finished[13], 46, 61, 101, 116, 132, 145,
 184, 188, 193, 201, 251
 finishing[2], 126, 132
 finite[7], 78, 103, 155, 159, 251
 finitude[2], 45, 251
 Fink[29], 13, 25, 45, 48–49, 101, 105, 282,
 285, 287, 292, 294, 305
 fire[3], 87, 225
 fireplace[1], 168
 Firestine[1], 315
 firm[3], 126, 146, 185
 firmly[2], 196, 234
 First[27], 3–4, 25, 32, 44, 52, 59, 71, 83,
 100, 108, 111, 140, 151, 154, 165, 168,
 183, 225, 231, 274, 278, 283, 286, 288,
 301
 first[157], 3–4, 9–10, 16, 23, 27, 30–31, 33,
 37, 47–49, 61, 63–64, 68, 72–74, 77,
 80–81, 84–85, 87, 89–90, 94, 98–99,
 101–102, 105–107, 111–114, 117,
 119–121, 123–124, 130–131, 133–134,
 137–138, 140–141, 143–145, 147, 150,
 153, 155–156, 163, 165, 168, 176,
 178–180, 183, 193–198, 201–202, 206,
 212–214, 221–224, 226–228, 231–232,
 238–240, 242, 245–246, 253, 263, 265,
 270–271, 273–274, 281, 283, 286,
 288–289
 Fischer[4], 33, 44, 60
 fish[1], 278
 fishing[2], 111, 258
 fit[4], 26, 166, 259, 267
 Fits[1], 31
 fits[2], 231, 277
 Five[4], 183–184, 202, 270
 five[8], 16, 131, 169, 187, 235, 287, 289,
 315
 Fix[1], 114
 fix[3], 78, 98, 159
 fixated[1], 152
 fixed[1], 195
 FkjLngx[1], 51
 flair[2], 64, 117
 flashes[1], 64
 flattening[1], 201
 flaw[1], 140
 flawed[2], 4, 259
 flawless[1], 79
 flee[1], 135
 fleeting[1], 7
 flesh[1], 178
 flickering[1], 7
 flight[3], 80, 90, 173
 flip[2], 90, 236
 flips[1], 240
 flock[1], 92
 floor[2], 16, 138
 flop[1], 236
 Florestan[1], 109
 flourish[1], 85
 flourishes[1], 124
 flourishing[1], 101
 flower[2], 8
 Flowers[1], 101
 flowers[3], 101, 194, 261
 flows[1], 168
 Flucht[1], 174
 fluent[1], 38
 Flügel[n][1], 80
 fluid[1], 4

fluttering[1], 221
 flux[1], 242
 fly[3], 67, 259
 Focus[1], 28
 focus[8], 42, 149–150, 161, 179–181, 198
 fodder[1], 17
 foibles[2], 17, 75
 foisted[1], 133
 Fold[7], 42, 74, 101, 247
 fold[2], 125, 127
 Folder[2], 17, 311
 folder[4], 37, 40
 Földvári[1], 41
 Folge[3], 235, 257
 folgen[1], 164
 folgend[1], 252
 Folgende[1], 190
 folgendes[1], 84
 folgern[1], 222
 folgt[1], 174
 Folies[1], 16
 folkish[1], 78
 Follow[2], 70, 108
 follow[30], 2, 5, 35, 57, 60, 62, 66–67, 77, 79–80, 88, 105–106, 111–112, 145–146, 156, 164, 177, 185, 188, 197, 210, 217, 230, 236, 260
 followed[8], 59, 80, 92, 102, 145–146, 159, 201
 follower[2], 116, 206
 followers[9], 25, 28, 46, 66, 180, 184, 263
 Following[2], 2, 112
 following[55], 13, 15, 21, 27–28, 45–46, 52, 57, 59, 69–70, 74–75, 80, 99, 105, 107, 116–117, 125, 128, 138, 143, 145, 152, 155, 160–161, 163, 171, 177–178, 181, 183–184, 190, 197, 216, 223, 234, 238, 252, 254, 272–273, 302–303, 310
 follows[12], 55, 90, 122, 131, 151, 158, 173, 185, 198, 225
 fool[1], 232
 fooled[1], 186
 foolish[1], 54
 footbridge[4], 164–166
 Footbridges[4], 20, 31, 165, 169
 footbridges[5], 165–166, 179
 footing[1], 94
 Footnote[5], 39, 73, 172, 190
 footnote[9], 12, 20, 62, 114, 130, 145, 166, 266
 Footnoted[1], 258
 footnoted[1], 23
 Footnotes[1], 51
 footnotes[5], 12, 151, 180, 232
 footpath[2], 108
 footsteps[1], 161
 FOR[1], 92
 For[107], 2, 8, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27–29, 31–32, 34, 36, 42, 44–46, 48–49, 53–56, 58–59, 63, 65, 73, 76–77, 84, 90, 94, 98, 105, 109–111, 114, 120, 122–123, 126, 131, 133, 137–138, 148, 150, 154–155, 169, 175–177, 179, 181, 186, 188–189, 193–194, 196, 198, 206, 214, 216, 220, 222–223, 229, 232, 240, 245, 259, 261, 265, 273, 281, 283, 290, 292
 for[772], 2–3, 5, 7–17, 19, 21, 23–32, 34–39, 41–42, 44–50, 52–61, 63–64, 66–88, 90, 92, 94–115, 117–131, 133, 136–137, 139–169, 171–172, 175–186, 189–199, 201–202, 204–218, 220–223, 226–233, 236, 238–240, 242, 244–245, 248–249, 251–252, 254, 256, 258–264, 271–273, 275–277, 279, 282–283, 286–292, 294, 298, 303, 305, 312, 316
 force[12], 53, 64, 74, 79, 95, 99, 156, 189, 196, 202
 forced[5], 30, 51, 184, 202, 224
 forceful[1], 160
 forcefully[1], 73
 forces[3], 120, 197–198
 forcing[1], 233
 forderte[2], 85, 162
 fore[1], 5
 foreclosable[1], 177
 forefront[1], 126
 forego[1], 108
 foreign[2], 59, 81
 foremost[1], 60
 foreseeing[1], 9
 Foreshadowing[1], 57
 Forest[11], 68, 124, 138, 168, 290, 294
 forest[4], 68, 87, 116
 Forêt[1], 39
 forever[5], 11, 140, 156, 216, 234

Foreword[1], 302
 foreword[1], 55
 forgetfulness[1], 167
 forgetting[4], 80, 148, 192, 194
 Forgive[2], 226, 228
 forgo[1], 124
 forgotten[5], 28, 87, 105, 228
 forgottenness[2], 135, 232
 Form[5], 95, 116, 207, 236, 254
 form[44], 13, 24, 40–41, 61, 66, 68, 95,
 101–103, 111, 116, 129, 147–148, 152,
 156, 161, 174, 186, 195, 197, 201, 213,
 215–216, 221, 231, 238–239, 249,
 251–252
 formal[12], 58, 61, 145–146, 149, 197, 219,
 230
 formaler[1], 219
 formalis[1], 101
 formalism[1], 201
 Formalismus[1], 201
 format[3], 31, 273, 296
 formation[2], 103, 197
 formatively[1], 179
 formats[1], 10
 Formen[2], 218, 229
 former[4], 10, 99, 194, 211
 Formey[7], 207
 forms[14], 33, 53–54, 195, 212, 216, 218,
 222, 229, 236, 240, 250
 formula[1], 227
 formulate[2], 152, 198
 formulated[3], 195, 198
 formulating[2], 197–198
 formulation[6], 68, 145, 155, 195, 240
 Formvon[2], 156, 186
 Forschun[2], 43, 275
 Forschung[12], 38, 87, 120, 136, 138–139,
 271, 276, 296
 Forschungsarbeit[5], 84, 196, 276
 Forster[1], 42
 Forsthaus[1], 283
 Fortgeschrittene[1], 38
 forth[15], 4, 28, 31, 38, 61, 79–80, 92, 127,
 140, 145, 186, 206, 209
 Forthcoming[8], 20, 52, 299, 301
 forthcoming[6], 115, 117, 165, 169, 255,
 259
 Fortschritte[1], 205
 Fortsetzung[3], 313
 Fortunately[5], 5, 7, 132, 150, 272
 fortunately[2], 9, 23
 Fortune[2], 218, 230
 fortune[8], 178, 218–219, 229–230
 forum[1], 305
 forums[1], 54
 Forward[1], 66
 forward[21], 47, 54, 67, 70, 72, 78, 85,
 95–96, 106, 151, 159, 170, 183, 186, 205
 Foucault[2], 60
 Foucaultian[1], 60
 fought[1], 134
 found[46], 11–12, 14, 19–21, 37, 56, 83,
 99, 136, 150, 152, 165, 168, 181, 200,
 208, 211, 218–219, 226, 228–230, 242,
 249, 273, 275, 277, 290
 Foundation[1], 270
 foundation[12], 33, 56, 116, 145, 147–148,
 205, 208, 210, 216, 289
 foundational[5], 30, 80, 175, 198, 205
 foundationalism[1], 108
 Foundations[4], 7, 46, 57, 241
 foundations[9], 53, 56, 81, 148, 197,
 202–204
 founded[3], 253, 267, 272
 founder[3], 8, 34, 98
 foundering[2], 28
 Founding[1], 37
 founding[1], 201
 Four[10], 42, 74, 86, 101, 227, 229, 247
 four[14], 3, 10, 28, 55, 61, 69–70, 101, 125,
 127, 167, 244, 315
 fourfold[4], 61, 165, 167, 176
 fourteen[1], 176
 Fourth[3], 71, 185, 203
 fourth[4], 21, 55, 81, 123
 fox[2], 114
 fra[1], 173
 fractured[1], 4
 Frag[1], 120
 frag[1], 316
 Frage[72], 21, 37, 51, 74, 81, 84, 86, 89,
 93, 108, 116, 120, 123, 143, 146–148,
 150, 156, 158, 173, 239, 244–248,
 264–265, 268, 274, 276, 285–286,

291–292, 294, 297, 299, 305
 frage[6], 29, 58, 123, 161, 218, 247
 Frageansatz[1], 218
 Frageansatzes[1], 58
 Fragehaltung[1], 148
 Fragekraft[1], 156
 Fragen[48], 66, 84–85, 89, 92, 118, 120,
 124, 156–157, 161, 172–174, 177,
 185–186, 263–265, 293–294
 fragen[14], 74, 81, 86, 92–93, 131, 156,
 184, 245, 247–248, 265, 268
 fragende[1], 85
 fragenden[3], 85, 108, 157
 Fragender[2], 93, 268
 fragender[5], 74, 84, 86, 265
 Fragens[19], 84–87, 116, 120, 150,
 157–158, 162, 173–174, 265
 Fragesatz[1], 148
 Fraglose[2], 93, 173
 Fragloseste[1], 158
 Fraglosigkeit[4], 156, 158
 Fragment[6], 56, 74, 97, 168, 285, 289
 fragment[1], 130
 Fragmentarisches[1], 36
 Fragmente[4], 218, 230, 236, 242
 Fragments[1], 216
 fragments[2], 97, 285
 fragung[1], 257
 fragwürdig[1], 93
 Fragwürdige[5], 1, 161, 173, 177, 266
 Fragwürdigkeit[5], 90, 173–174, 259
 frame[1], 120
 framework[5], 3, 19, 31, 240
 framing[2], 68, 185
 FRANCE[1], 73
 France[25], 3, 9, 47–48, 73, 107, 128, 131,
 168, 176, 182, 263, 275, 286–287, 291
 Francesco[1], 4
 Francisco[5], 35, 121, 192, 249
 François[5], 48, 73, 109, 287, 303
 Frank[2], 273, 315
 Frankfurt[35], 7–8, 37, 47, 98, 118–119,
 147, 167, 175, 270–272, 275, 277,
 281–282, 290, 292–293, 296, 301–302,
 311
 Frankfurter[1], 305
 Frankly[1], 28
 Franz[13], 13, 18, 23, 36–38, 118, 192, 275,
 302, 304
 Frauen[1], 257
 Frbg[1], 125
 Frédéric[1], 39
 Frederick[5], 32–33, 55, 315
 Free[1], 89
 free[21], 4, 30, 87, 90, 103, 106, 120, 133,
 136–137, 147, 166, 172–173, 184, 237,
 241
 Freedom[6], 80, 100, 133, 143, 199
 freedom[19], 7, 57, 90, 109, 133, 135–136,
 156, 193, 213, 215–217
 freezing[1], 11
 frei[7], 87, 120, 136, 237, 241
 Freiburg[113], 9–10, 13, 15–16, 26, 37, 46,
 48, 61, 71–72, 79, 81–82, 84–86, 89,
 93–94, 96–97, 105, 109–110, 113, 118,
 120, 123–124, 129, 134, 137, 162, 168,
 181, 190, 202, 217, 262, 264, 267, 271,
 274–275, 277–282, 284, 286–292,
 301–302, 307, 309–310, 313
 Freiburger[23], 21–22, 81, 85, 124, 136,
 279–280, 282–283, 291, 299, 302, 311
 Freiburgunder[1], 284
 Freiheit[11], 42, 90, 100–101, 112, 116,
 120, 149, 297
 Freiheitsfrage[2], 58, 218
 Freiherr[3], 52, 198, 206
 freilich[4], 6, 89, 136, 190
 fremd[1], 148
 fremden[1], 81
 French[22], 3–4, 11, 16, 18, 28, 39, 46–48,
 98, 105, 107, 109, 128, 192, 287, 294,
 316
 frenzy[1], 96
 frequent[2], 58, 161
 frequently[1], 200
 Fresh[1], 47
 fresh[4], 47, 66, 180, 182
 Freude[1], 264
 Freund[2], 291, 293
 Freunde[1], 293
 Freundesausgabe[1], 35
 freundlich[1], 144
 freundlicher[1], 314
 Freundschaft[1], 138

Freyheit[1], 257
 Fridolin[1], 39
 Fried[2], 114, 249
 Friedens[1], 32
 Friedländer[5], 104, 115, 271
 Friedman[2], 45
 Friedrich[57], 12–13, 15–16, 18, 23–24, 33, 42, 44–45, 52–53, 55–56, 59, 67, 77, 80, 85, 115–116, 118, 133, 139, 167, 192, 194, 203, 205, 211–213, 216, 222, 227, 254, 273, 283, 292–294, 304, 307–308, 315
 Friedrichsbrücke[1], 168
 FriedrichWilhelm[2], 3, 9
 friend[30], 8, 24, 29, 34, 43, 46–47, 85, 98, 105, 138–139, 175, 188, 205, 211–212, 217, 224, 258, 262, 268, 289, 315
 friendly[1], 46
 Friends[1], 315
 friends[20], 3, 14, 16, 24–27, 30–31, 34, 36, 48–49, 212–213, 217, 254, 284, 315
 friendship[1], 113
 Frings[1], 264
 Fritz[16], 16, 19, 24–25, 28, 33, 94, 117, 175, 254, 276, 302, 311
 frolicsome[3], 39, 134, 175
 From[89], 3, 9–10, 13, 17, 20–21, 24, 29, 32–33, 38, 40, 45, 54, 69, 72–73, 81, 83, 86, 98–99, 102, 106–107, 112, 123, 128, 133, 141, 145, 154, 157, 163, 166, 171, 175, 177, 180, 185, 188, 195, 197–198, 201, 205, 209, 216, 218–219, 222–223, 226–230, 247, 250–251, 262, 264, 269, 275–276, 290, 294, 305
 from[573], 1, 3–30, 32–38, 40–49, 51–58, 60, 62–63, 65–66, 68–69, 71–83, 85–88, 90–92, 94–101, 104, 106–112, 114–115, 117–119, 121, 123, 125–128, 130–131, 133–136, 138, 140–141, 143–148, 150–151, 154–155, 159–168, 171, 175–182, 185–186, 188–189, 191–195, 197–204, 206–208, 211–212, 214–225, 227, 229–232, 234–239, 241, 244–252, 254–255, 258–260, 262–265, 267, 270, 275, 277–279, 281–283, 285, 288–290, 294, 301, 303–304, 307, 310, 312, 315–316
 Fromm[2], 69
 Frommann[1], 139
 Fromme[1], 257
 Frömmigkeit[1], 84
 Front[1], 99
 front[9], 5, 10, 38, 48, 98, 107, 135, 156, 289
 frontal[1], 5
 frontation[2], 58
 froze[1], 7
 frozen[1], 131
 früh[1], 140
 Frühe[9], 21–22, 74, 86, 103–104, 296
 Fruhe[1], 274
 früheren[1], 51
 Frühestens[3], 33, 64, 91
 Frühjahr[2], 137–138
 Frühling[2], 316
 Frühromantik[1], 97
 frühzeitig[1], 51
 fruitful[2], 3–4
 frustration[1], 30
 frustrations[1], 260
 ft[1], 311
 Fuchs[1], 276
 fueled[1], 4
 Fug[1], 89
 Fuge[6], 27, 160, 257
 fügen[1], 252
 fügende[1], 166
 fuges[2], 159, 180
 fugitives[1], 189
 fügsam[2], 89
 Fugsamkeit[1], 160
 fugue[1], 160
 fugues[3], 27, 160
 Fügung[1], 89
 Fügungen[4], 160
 fügungen[1], 27
 Führ[1], 314
 Führers[1], 280
 führt[1], 70
 fulfillment[2], 149
 Full[1], 263
 full[12], 2, 5, 13, 24, 38, 95, 117, 238, 242, 271
 Fulle[1], 104

fullness[4], *103, 126, 132*
 fully[7], *31, 121, 214–216, 251*
 fun[1], *151*
 function[2], *145, 209*
 functions[2], *29, 269*
 Fund[1], *152*
 Fundamental[2], *135, 224*
 fundamental[42], *3, 45, 56, 58, 61, 66–67, 69, 75, 79, 85, 92, 100, 103, 108, 116–117, 121, 133, 140, 145–146, 148–151, 198, 205, 211, 224, 232, 246–247, 249, 253*
 fundamentalen[1], *104*
 fundamentaler[1], *245*
 Fundamentalfrage[1], *146*
 Fundamentally[1], *35*
 fundamentally[1], *77*
 Fundamentalontologie[1], *246*
 Fundamente[1], *206*
 funeral[2], *24, 42*
 Fünf[1], *287*
 Fünfhundertjahrfeier[1], *313*
 fünfundfünfzig[1], *290*
 Für[10], *34, 49, 110, 179, 282, 287, 291–292*
 für[54], *20, 27, 49, 57, 63, 74, 84, 87, 89, 92–93, 98, 108, 112, 120, 123, 126, 138–139, 141, 157, 160, 169, 173, 190, 219–220, 242, 248, 252, 255–256, 259, 263–264, 266, 268, 277, 279, 281, 284–285, 288, 290, 292, 294, 308*
 fur[11], *38, 136, 138, 141, 274–275, 280, 289, 294*
 Further[1], *251*
 further[16], *12, 20, 79, 87, 112, 141, 143–144, 152, 156*
 Furthermore[4], *7, 10, 27, 198*
 furthermore[2], *101–102*
 furthest[2], *57, 217*
 futility[2], *98, 222*
 Futural[1], *95*
 Future[9], *20, 23, 27, 90, 101, 156, 208*
 future[60], *3, 8, 11, 17, 20, 26, 33, 35, 47, 49, 52, 54, 56, 58, 64, 71, 88–91, 102–103, 106, 116, 140, 145, 154, 159–160, 185–186, 203, 216–219, 228–230, 233, 237, 241, 262, 264*
 futurologist[2], *63–64*

Fußweg[2], *108*
 fysika[1], *192*

G

GA[956], *1–3, 6–14, 16–22, 24–31, 33–40, 42–46, 48–59, 61, 63–64, 67–81, 83–99, 101–104, 106–124, 126, 129–132, 134–137, 139–143, 145–171, 173–175, 177–181, 183–186, 188–191, 193, 195–196, 198, 200–202, 215, 218, 220–223, 232–234, 236, 238–239, 242, 244, 249–256, 259–261, 263–268, 271, 273–294, 296–301, 306, 308, 312*
 Gabelsberger[3], *36*
 gaben[1], *20*
 Gabriel[12], *28, 47–48, 73, 107–109, 176, 178, 287*
 Gadamer[57], *14, 17–18, 21, 35, 40–41, 47, 59–60, 75, 98, 105, 112, 119, 121, 129–130, 134, 141, 181, 200–201, 217, 244, 248–249, 271, 288, 293, 302, 307*
 Gadammers[1], *288*
 Gadget[1], *62*
 gain[1], *49*
 gained[1], *120*
 gaining[1], *46*
 gains[3], *197, 233, 251*
 Galatians[1], *276*
 galaxies[1], *7*
 Galerie[1], *291*
 Galiani[3], *218–219, 230*
 Galle[1], *291*
 Gallen[1], *314*
 gallery[5], *181, 190, 262, 289*
 galleys[2], *139–140*
 gallimaufry[1], *4*
 game[6], *24, 120, 129, 225–226, 259*
 games[2], *47, 233*
 gamut[1], *2*
 Gander[3], *104, 281, 310*
 Gandhi[1], *113*
 Gang[13], *14, 50, 101, 113, 146, 157, 164, 169, 236, 252*

gangene[1], 190
 Gans[1], 261
 Ganz[2], 114, 143
 ganz[4], 58, 196, 218
 Ganze[1], 141
 Ganzen[5], 77, 89, 114, 141, 196
 ganzen[1], 169
 gap[3], 144, 203, 209
 gaps[3], 2, 203
 gar[8], 20, 57, 114, 120, 126, 174, 193, 221
 gàr[1], 42
 garage[1], 168
 garden[1], 16
 garment[1], 215
 Garve[2], 203, 212
 Gasset[2], 133, 286
 Gast[1], 174
 Gäste[1], 98
 gather[3], 66, 194, 262
 gathered[1], 201
 gathering[6], 41, 181, 190, 195, 262, 285
 gathers[1], 165
 Gattung[8], 255–257, 266
 gauge[1], 184
 gave[38], 4, 15–16, 21, 26, 42–44, 47–48,
 62, 67–68, 75–76, 92, 110, 130–131,
 176, 180, 190, 242, 270–271, 275,
 277–278, 281–282, 284, 294, 311
 Gay[4], 55, 227
 gaya[4], 55, 227
 Ge[14], 42, 53, 61, 91, 167, 200, 248,
 283–285
 gê[1], 42
 ge[2], 114, 174
 geb[3], 16, 293
 gebannt[1], 147
 geben[3], 6, 108, 263
 Gebild[1], 289
 Gebirge[1], 167
 geblieben[1], 81
 gebracht[1], 75
 Gebrauch[1], 76
 gebraucht[2], 148, 246
 Gebstattel[1], 17
 Geburtstag[20], 41, 122, 277, 281, 283,
 288–294
 Geburtstagsfeier[1], 293
 gedacht[6], 167, 173–174, 246–247
 Gedachte[2], 59, 81
 gedachten[2], 91, 247
 Gedachtes[16], 9, 12, 34, 91–93, 167, 265,
 268, 299, 308
 Gedächtnis[2], 307–308
 Gedächtnisfeier[1], 290
 Gedanke[3], 167, 245
 Gedanken[6], 99–100, 120, 234, 259, 293
 Gedankengang[3], 28, 88, 175
 Gedankengebäudes[1], 76
 gedankenlos[1], 81
 gedeiht[2], 85, 124
 Gedenken[1], 284
 Gedenkrede[2], 314
 Gedicht[6], 285, 288–289, 293
 Gedichte[1], 14
 Gedichten[2], 307, 309
 Gedichtes[1], 285
 gediegenen[2], 85, 124
 Gedrängt[1], 114
 Geeignetheit[1], 171
 Gefahr[8], 113, 147, 283–284
 gefährlich[1], 220
 gefährliche[1], 307
 Gefahrnähern[1], 84
 Gefolge[1], 268
 gefördert[1], 221
 geforscht[1], 146
 Gefragte[2], 149
 Gefragtes[1], 149
 Gefüge[2], 161, 166
 geführten[1], 245
 gefunden[1], 219
 gegeben[2], 57, 248
 Gegebenes[1], 136
 Gegebenheit[3], 20, 165, 256
 Gegen[3], 136, 252
 gegen[6], 99, 108, 174, 219, 221
 gegenseitig[1], 265
 Gegenstand[3], 120, 174, 290
 Gegenstände[2], 112, 116
 Gegenstandes[1], 252
 Gegenständlichkeit[2], 174, 252
 Gegenteil[1], 174

gegenüber[2], *97, 136*
 Gegenwart[1], *288*
 gegenwärtig[2], *245, 252*
 gegenwärtige[1], *84*
 gegenwärtige[4], *196, 276, 281*
 gegenwärtigen[1], *289*
 gegerz[1], *114*
 gegründete[1], *253*
 gehabt[1], *129*
 Gehalt[1], *264*
 Gehalte[1], *201*
 Gehalten[1], *276*
 gehalten[7], *276, 288, 292, 314*
 gehaltene[1], *290*
 gehandelt[1], *248*
 Gehause[2], *148–149*
 Geheimnis[8], *27, 63, 123, 131, 247, 268*
 Geheimnisses[1], *247*
 geheimnisvoll[1], *247*
 Geheimnisvolle[1], *70*
 Geheiß[1], *81*
 gehen[8], *70, 101, 113, 146, 148–149, 169, 236*
 Gehör[1], *264*
 Gehorchen[1], *267*
 gehöre[1], *111*
 Gehören[1], *267*
 gehören[2], *51, 166*
 gehoren[3], *57–58, 218*
 gehörenden[1], *246*
 Gehorsam[1], *267*
 gehört[8], *85, 124, 143, 173, 246, 248*
 gehort[1], *266*
 Gehrig[1], *198*
 geht[5], *143, 164, 173, 196, 219*
 Geist[1], *250*
 Geiste[1], *33*
 Geisterglaube[1], *274*
 Geistes[13], *48, 104, 116, 123, 126, 193, 201, 250, 268, 277, 297*
 Geisteswissenschaften[1], *44*
 Geistliche[1], *257*
 Geivert[2], *246*
 gekommen[3], *69, 148, 245*
 gelange[1], *264*
 gelangen[2], *108, 164*
 gelangt[2], *110, 248*
 Gelassene[1], *40*
 Gelassenheit[17], *19, 42, 100, 176, 181, 286, 313*
 Geläut[1], *257*
 Gelehrsamkeit[1], *163*
 GELEHRTE[1], *94*
 geleistet[1], *69*
 geleiten[1], *166*
 geleitend[1], *166*
 geleitete[1], *104*
 Geleitwort[1], *302*
 geliefert[1], *206*
 gelingt[1], *42*
 Gelockerte[1], *280*
 gemacht[4], *201, 205, 217, 220*
 gemäß[1], *264*
 gemäß[er] [1], *64*
 gemeinen[1], *120*
 gemeint[1], *157*
 gemeinten[1], *147*
 gen[1], *110*
 genauer[2], *42, 108*
 gender[1], *173*
 Genealogie[2], *241*
 Genealogy[4], *224–225, 237, 241*
 Genehmigung[1], *314*
 General[7], *10, 60, 70, 175, 178, 236, 240*
 general[85], *3, 5, 11, 14–15, 24, 33, 43–44, 46, 48, 53–54, 56, 58–59, 70, 82, 86, 91, 94, 96, 101–103, 107, 110–113, 116–117, 123, 129, 132, 134, 139–141, 145–146, 150, 157, 159, 161, 168, 179, 182, 186, 192–194, 198, 201, 206, 211, 214, 220, 223, 226, 231–232, 238, 244, 249, 252, 254, 259, 273*
 Generale[7], *284, 287–290*
 generalization[1], *235*
 Generally[2], *71, 131*
 generally[5], *3, 60, 81, 122, 194*
 Generalversammlung[1], *274*
 generates[1], *99*
 generating[1], *133*
 Generation[2], *8, 43*
 generation[4], *40, 43, 46, 147*
 Generational[1], *18*
 generational[3], *18, 182*

generations[1], 206
generic[1], 94
generosity[1], 145
genesis[2], 4, 141
genius[2], 25, 178
genommenen[1], 174
gentleman[1], 70
gentlemen[2], 144, 229
genug[3], 84, 179, 247
genügend[1], 219
genügenden[1], 163
genugsam[1], 120
genügt[1], 156
genuine[11], 67, 90, 93, 106, 129, 153,
157, 172, 174, 209, 214
genuinely[3], 39, 73, 217
Genuß[1], 219
Georg[47], 10, 14, 18, 21, 24, 35, 47, 49,
59, 75, 85, 105, 115–117, 121, 129–130,
141, 149, 194, 200–201, 211, 217, 244,
254, 257, 271, 277, 285, 288, 293–294,
302–303, 307–308
George[4], 23, 85, 207, 288
Georges[6], 48, 61, 287–288, 291
geortet[1], 266
geprägter[1], 179
geprüft[1], 248
Gerade[3], 75, 141, 190
gerade[7], 136, 141, 169, 174, 196, 201, 221
Gerber[2], 303
Gerechte[1], 257
Gerhard[9], 35, 104, 121, 127, 270, 290, 311
gerichtet[1], 219
Geringe[3], 92, 265, 307
geringes[1], 167
geringste[1], 235
German[137], 2–3, 7, 9–11, 13–16, 19, 21,
32–36, 38–39, 42, 44, 46–48, 52, 54,
58–59, 63, 67–68, 71, 73–74, 76, 81–82,
86, 92–93, 95–97, 99–100, 102, 104–105,
107, 109, 111, 113–114, 118, 120, 127,
131, 134, 139, 143, 145–148, 154,
166–167, 171, 173, 176, 182, 185, 192,
198, 202, 205, 211, 216, 225, 229,
231–232, 237–238, 249, 259, 267, 270,
273, 281, 287, 303–304, 310, 312, 316
Germanien[4], 106, 170, 188, 297
Germans[5], 31, 46, 64, 194, 225
Germany[73], 3, 8, 10, 12, 16, 32–33, 35,
37, 42–47, 52, 59–60, 62, 71, 76, 86,
94–96, 99, 102, 106, 109, 117–118, 124,
130, 138, 148, 165, 182, 190, 193,
205–206, 224, 272–274, 283–285, 292,
296, 303, 315
gern[1], 173
Gernot[1], 293
Gerock[3], 315
Gerta[1], 292
Gertrud[2], 281
gerungen[1], 221
gesagt[5], 84, 89, 112, 166, 173
Gesammelte[2], 23, 44
Gesammelten[1], 216
Gesamtausgabe[56], 2, 8–13, 19, 21–22,
28, 35–36, 38, 40, 52, 73–74, 86, 91,
121, 139, 156, 161, 177, 261, 265, 278,
296, 305, 310, 312
gesch[1], 92
geschafften[1], 144
geschätzten[1], 219
Gesche[1], 315
geschehen[1], 114
Geschehens[1], 95
gescheutesten[1], 77
Geschichte[40], 27, 31, 33, 41, 49, 57, 64,
71, 85, 91, 139–140, 153–154, 174, 196,
200, 204, 219, 236, 256, 279, 282,
297–298, 311
geschichtliche[1], 218
geschichtlichen[5], 58, 163, 174, 218
Geschichtlichkeit[1], 272
Geschichtscharakter[1], 89
Geschichtslosigkeit[1], 64
Geschichtsphilosophie[1], 201
Geschichtswissenschaft[3], 274–275
Geschick[4], 26, 91, 266
geschicklos[1], 266
Geschlecht[1], 257
geschlichtet[1], 146
Geschlossenheit[1], 245
geschrieben[2], 245, 294
Geschriebenen[1], 167
geschult[1], 219
Gesellen[4], 274

Gesellschaft[13], 3, 43, 87, 91, 161, 255,
 275, 281, 288, 291, 307
 gesellschaft[3], 283, 301, 310
 gesendet[1], 291
 Gesetz[2], 165, 295
 Gesetzgebung[2], 218, 229
 Gesetzt[1], 226
 gesetzt[3], 89, 111, 173
 Geshe[1], 61
 Gesicht[2], 289
 Gesichtspunkte[1], 204
 Gesichtspunktes[1], 111
 Gesinnung[1], 253
 gespannten[1], 76
 GESPRÄCH[3], 33, 49, 169
 Gespräch[13], 39, 49, 104, 118, 169, 179,
 247, 286–288, 293, 305, 313
 Gespräch[1], 167
 Gespräche[10], 20, 86, 91, 94, 117, 120,
 164, 286, 299
 Gesprache[1], 264
 gesprochen[1], 52
 Gestalt[7], 64, 92, 116, 179, 254, 292
 Gestalten[1], 266
 Gestecktes[1], 137
 Gestell[3], 8, 176, 200
 GeStells[1], 248
 gestellt[2], 248, 264
 gestern[1], 108
 gestimmt[1], 264
 gestorben[1], 283
 Gesuchen[1], 149
 Get[3], 66, 125, 167
 get[58], 2, 5, 11, 16–17, 24–25, 30–31, 39,
 47–50, 64, 71, 75, 83, 93, 95, 98, 100,
 111–112, 119, 123, 127, 131, 143, 156,
 160, 164, 179–180, 184, 186, 202, 244,
 258–260, 262
 getrieben[1], 89
 gets[6], 114, 116, 120, 129, 147, 222
 Getting[5], 75, 104, 120, 261
 getting[27], 4–5, 27, 53, 69, 78, 87, 95,
 104, 110, 112, 121, 123, 125, 131, 152,
 182, 185, 205, 259
 GeViert[1], 91
 Geviert[9], 42, 74, 101, 167, 176, 247
 gewahrt[2], 163, 246

gewährtes[1], 166
 gewaltigsten[1], 104
 Gewandtheit[1], 109
 Gewesende[2], 173
 gewichen[1], 153
 gewinnen[1], 100
 Wirktheit[1], 174
 gewissen[2], 87, 120
 Gewißheit[6], 248, 252–253
 Gewohnheit[4], 93, 219, 268
 Gewohnheiten[1], 219
 gewöhnlich[1], 51
 gewollt[1], 163
 geworden[2], 93, 112
 gezwungen[1], 51
 Gianni[1], 224
 gibt[14], 27, 72, 75, 86, 101, 107–109,
 148–149, 168, 263
 giebt[2], 136
 giengen[1], 219
 gift[11], 15, 49, 67, 69, 73, 77, 182, 192,
 246
 gifted[2], 124, 260
 gifts[1], 262
 gigantic[2], 81, 239
 gilt[7], 84, 89, 122–123, 131, 146, 236
 Giordano[1], 133
 Giorgio[1], 224
 Gipfel[3], 106, 170, 188
 girl[1], 16
 gist[4], 11, 66, 171, 183
 Gitā[1], 62
 Give[2], 237
 give[27], 4, 29, 31, 43, 53, 61, 78, 94,
 99–100, 102, 110, 127, 132, 146, 154,
 163, 208–209, 233, 238, 262, 269, 289
 Given[7], 17, 98, 190, 272, 286, 290
 given[84], 4, 7, 10–13, 17, 19, 23, 32, 47,
 49, 51, 59, 61, 67–70, 72, 83–84, 100,
 106, 114, 117, 120, 123, 136, 138, 150,
 153, 163, 169, 176, 179, 192, 196, 202,
 209, 222, 224–226, 245, 248, 259, 267,
 273–278, 280–287, 289–291, 293
 Giverts[1], 246
 gives[39], 13, 25, 32, 35, 37, 49, 57, 68, 71,
 77–81, 86–87, 94, 100, 157, 181, 186,
 188, 198, 205, 209, 230, 236–237,

240–241, 245, 248–249, 262, 274
 Giving[1], 181
 giving[24], 12–13, 30, 39, 46, 62, 73, 100,
 105, 107, 109, 123, 127, 129, 152, 163,
 169, 176, 179, 194, 203, 262
 glacial[1], 11
 glad[1], 265
 glance[2], 204, 231
 glass[1], 36
 glasses[1], 15
 Glaube[3], 211, 219, 289
 glaube[4], 34, 43, 98, 141
 Glauben[7], 174, 194, 219, 223, 278
 glauben[4], 218, 227, 229, 235
 Glaubens[1], 235
 glaubten[1], 148
 gleich[1], 114
 Gleichen[1], 135
 Gleichgültigste[1], 158
 gleichsam[1], 247
 gleichviel[1], 236
 Gleichwohl[1], 166
 gleichzeitig[1], 138
 Glenn[4], 147, 185, 189, 251
 glimmer[1], 95
 glimpsed[1], 95
 global[1], 220
 globe[1], 95
 Glockenschlag[2], 237, 241
 gloom[1], 87
 glücklich[1], 219
 GM[1], 241
 Gneisenau[1], 198
 gnostic[1], 3
 go[35], 42, 58–59, 61, 68, 70, 73, 78, 89,
 99, 101, 105, 109, 112–113, 119, 148,
 151, 156, 160, 162, 169, 179, 194, 197,
 207, 226, 235–236
 Goal[2], 157, 174
 goal[25], 4, 56, 61, 83, 103, 107, 116, 137,
 145, 149, 152, 157, 170, 219, 230, 236
 Goalless[1], 111
 Goallessness[1], 111
 goallessness[5], 111, 170, 236
 goalposts[2], 2, 83
 goals[20], 14, 101, 111, 135, 137, 157, 170,
 236

God[76], 5, 15, 24, 48, 88, 95, 103, 150,
 159–160, 175, 179, 193–194, 211–212,
 214–215, 223, 225–229, 233, 237,
 240–241, 259
 god[7], 78, 168–169, 227
 Gödel[2], 188, 224
 godless[1], 225
 godly[1], 227
 godmother[1], 16
 gods[4], 90, 159, 173, 238
 Goes[1], 120
 goes[12], 4, 29, 45, 82, 111, 143, 164, 172,
 206, 208, 238
 Goesser[1], 304
 Goethe[6], 35, 134, 198, 211, 241
 Göggingen[1], 15
 Going[1], 44
 going[38], 8, 10–11, 13–14, 28, 47, 53,
 56–58, 66–68, 72, 83, 95, 99, 101, 115,
 117, 129, 146, 157, 161, 164, 172, 190,
 199, 204, 227, 232, 236, 260–261
 gold[4], 57, 194, 231
 Goldmann[2], 48, 287
 Goldwasser[1], 124
 Goller[1], 280
 gone[9], 92, 99, 112, 116, 150, 178, 206,
 283
 Gonzalez[5], 35, 121, 249
 Good[9], 68, 106, 177, 219, 228–230, 233,
 236
 good[20], 13, 24, 36, 62, 109, 114, 120,
 129, 159, 177–178, 183, 186, 206, 209,
 218, 220, 230, 261
 Göppingen[1], 287
 Gordian[1], 5
 Górdios[1], 5
 Gordon[2], 44–45
 Gorgias[1], 83
 Gorky[1], 238
 Gorres[1], 134
 Görresgesellschaft[1], 15
 Gorresgesellschaft[1], 274
 Gospel[1], 105
 gossip[1], 17
 got[31], 12, 14–16, 30–31, 48, 68, 73, 78,
 105, 113–114, 116, 121, 142, 144, 184,
 205, 244–245, 261–262, 282

GOTT[1], 159
 Gott[9], 49, 160, 179, 227–228, 250, 282
 gotten[8], 80, 123, 131, 143, 147, 183, 294
 Götter[1], 174
 Gottes[5], 48, 226, 237, 241, 268
 Gottfried[5], 26, 35, 117, 194, 206
 Gottheit[2], 307–308
 Gotthold[4], 67, 78, 138, 211
 Göttingen[1], 21
 Gottingen[1], 21
 Gottinnigkeit[1], 104
 göttlich[1], 235
 Gottlieb[2], 192, 206
 Gottlob[3], 105, 206, 211
 Götzen[2], 55–56
 GötzenDämmerung[1], 227
 government[1], 272
 Governor[1], 43
 GP[1], 194
 Grabenkämpfen[1], 18
 Grabrede[1], 280
 grace[1], 238
 gradual[1], 154
 gradually[1], 224
 Graduate[1], 270
 graduate[3], 114, 161, 290
 graduated[1], 271
 Graduates[1], 15
 Graeca[8], 104–105, 270
 Graecum[2], 104, 270
 Grah[1], 292
 grammar[3], 105, 160, 227
 grammatically[1], 160
 grand[6], 43, 53, 80, 152
 grandchildren[1], 16
 granddaughter[1], 293
 grandeur[1], 152
 grandfather[4], 66, 225, 262, 315
 Grandmaster[1], 7
 grandson[2], 66, 262
 Grant[2], 13, 56
 grant[1], 209
 Granted[2], 2, 233
 granted[5], 106, 121, 166, 209
 grants[1], 134
 grapes[1], 261
 grasp[8], 114, 140, 159, 194, 196–197, 234
 grasped[8], 36, 96, 119, 151, 158, 183, 195
 grasping[6], 36, 92, 110, 147, 182, 196
 grasps[1], 92
 Gratifying[1], 37
 gratitude[2], 56, 294
 gravitating[1], 147
 Gray[1], 189
 Great[5], 60, 62, 140, 183, 251
 great[98], 2, 8–11, 13, 15, 23, 25, 31–32, 34, 39, 43, 48–49, 52–54, 56–57, 59–60, 63, 65–67, 69, 75–77, 80, 87, 93, 96, 100, 103, 105, 109, 111–113, 118, 122, 130, 141, 147, 169, 171, 175, 179, 181, 183, 188–190, 198, 206–207, 214, 218–219, 224, 228, 230–231, 233, 237–238, 240–242, 262, 264, 283, 286, 315
 greater[12], 57, 62, 99, 109, 117, 226, 249, 251, 258
 greatest[24], 7, 28–29, 31, 47, 61, 65, 82, 99, 115, 127, 136, 138, 179, 196, 200, 221, 227, 259, 269
 greatly[7], 16, 23, 46, 63, 75
 greatness[9], 31, 49, 52, 169, 179, 189, 200–202
 Greece[3], 8, 16, 106
 Greek[89], 3, 7, 13–15, 19, 25, 36, 46–47, 49, 56, 59, 68, 71, 82, 97, 100, 104–105, 110, 113, 115–116, 122, 128, 131, 134, 148, 154, 171, 176, 182, 192, 196, 206–207, 214, 219, 221, 230, 232, 242–243, 247–248, 316
 Greeks[22], 14, 25, 35, 42, 52–53, 99, 111, 156, 196, 214, 225, 233, 242, 253, 312
 greet[1], 144
 greeting[1], 93
 Greetings[4], 72, 93, 125, 265
 greetings[9], 42, 72, 125, 259, 265
 Gregorian[1], 15
 Gregory[3], 62, 114, 249
 greifen[1], 196
 Greiner[6], 16, 293
 Grenzen[3], 208, 212, 264
 grésste[1], 264
 Gretel[1], 15
 Grey[3], 147, 185, 251
 grey[2], 25

Griechen[3], 288
 Griechenlandreisen[2], 282, 299
 griechisch[4], 59, 242, 247
 griechische[1], 263
 griechischer[1], 59
 Grimm[1], 13
 Grimme[1], 303
 grips[2], 188, 201
 GroBen[1], 75
 Grober[1], 23
 Grondin[1], 302
 Groothoff[1], 303
 gropes[1], 260
 Gropius[1], 289
 Gross[3], 59, 88, 130
 grosse[1], 144
 grossen[5], 104, 237, 241
 grosste[1], 136
 grösste[2], 138
 Groth[4], 273, 289, 310, 315
 Ground[1], 109
 ground[23], 1, 4, 46, 57, 63, 88, 102, 128, 147, 155, 172, 188, 204–205, 217, 223, 226, 252, 258
 grounded[7], 4, 58, 145–146, 193, 195
 grounding[10], 68, 96, 147, 152–153, 160, 172, 190, 233, 253
 grounds[2], 83, 145
 Group[3], 46, 286, 289
 group[31], 17, 21, 23, 27, 31, 33, 40, 63, 67, 105, 165, 182, 237, 261, 263, 275, 286–287, 289
 groups[2], 44, 103
 Grove[1], 18
 grow[2], 86, 122
 growing[6], 3, 35, 60, 122, 125
 grown[2], 25, 138
 grows[2], 234, 261
 growth[1], 197
 groß[7], 49, 63, 75, 179
 größ[1], 57
 Große[2], 49, 179
 Großen[1], 51
 großen[2], 43, 291
 größer[1], 109
 großer[2], 219, 281
 Großes[1], 43
 großgezogenen[1], 235
 Großman[1], 175
 Großmann[1], 302
 größte[1], 179
 Grumach[1], 276
 Grund[10], 34, 43, 58, 173, 202, 218, 252, 287, 296
 grund[3], 50, 173–174
 Grundbegriffe[14], 17–18, 28, 38, 48, 97, 126, 292, 296–298, 306, 311
 Grunde[3], 141, 147
 gründende[1], 69
 Grunderfahrung[1], 85
 Grundes[1], 143
 gründet[1], 267
 Grundfrage[4], 29, 147, 306
 Grundfragen[6], 84, 95, 118, 152, 298
 Grundhaltung[1], 157
 Grundhestimmung[1], 282
 Grundjener[1], 221
 Grundlegung[2], 277, 314
 Gründlichsten[2], 218, 229
 Grundlinien[1], 130
 Grundprobleme[11], 46, 134, 151, 153, 190, 201, 215, 263, 297–298, 311
 Grundriss[1], 310
 Grundsätze[7], 23, 81, 85, 279, 287
 Grundsätze[2], 287
 Grundsätzen[3], 74, 89, 116
 Grundstellung[1], 297
 Grundstellungen[1], 299
 Grundstellungfür[1], 143
 Grundstimmung[1], 30
 Grundtendenzen[1], 104
 Gründung[2], 160, 173
 Grundworte[5], 12, 20
 Gruppe[1], 137
 Gruß[2], 42, 72
 grüße[1], 265
 grüßen[1], 265
 Grußwort[3], 265, 308
 guard[1], 84
 Guercio[1], 4
 guessing[3], 104, 120, 129
 guest[1], 205

guesthouses[2], *90, 173*
 guests[3], *98, 121, 289*
 Gúgou[1], *17*
 guidance[2], *31, 179*
 Guide[3], *94, 311*
 guide[10], *12, 49, 55, 69, 74, 79, 86, 181, 265*
 guided[5], *31, 86, 103, 149*
 guideline[2], *2, 145*
 guidelines[2], *9, 13*
 guides[1], *168*
 guiding[14], *68, 79, 99, 106, 151, 154, 158, 195, 233*
 guidingjoining[1], *166*
 Guido[4], *182, 273, 280*
 guilty[1], *114*
 Guitton[1], *287*
 gulags[1], *96*
 Gundert[2], *105*
 Gundrisse[1], *241*
 Günter[2], *104, 182*
 Gunther[2], *15, 272*
 Günther[9], *17, 46, 105, 182, 261, 273, 313, 315*
 Gus[1], *315*
 Gustav[6], *294, 303–304, 316*
 Gustie[1], *315*
 Gut[1], *305*
 gut[2], *144, 183*
 Gutachten[2], *38, 271*
 Gutedel[1], *15*
 Guyer[2], *89, 216*
 Guzzoni[11], *260, 266–267, 290*
 Gyges[1], *17*
 Gymnasium[6], *15, 23, 62, 286, 294*
 gymnasium[2], *15*
 Gymnasiums[1], *286*
 gymnastics[1], *233*
 gypsy[1], *238*

H

Haas[1], *249*

Haase[1], *292*
 habe[9], *51, 57, 108, 111, 129, 245–246*
 haben[16], *33–34, 57, 64, 69, 81, 91, 98, 118, 136, 181, 183, 190, 219, 235, 261*
 Häberlin[2], *302*
 Habermas[7], *7, 71, 118, 182, 224*
 Habilitation[5], *73, 103, 175, 270*
 habilitation[7], *270–272*
 Habilitations[1], *270*
 Habilitationsschrift[4], *270–271*
 habit[5], *93, 218, 230*
 habits[2], *218, 230*
 Had[1], *277*
 had[168], *2–3, 7, 9–10, 12–14, 16–19, 23–25, 28–30, 33, 35–39, 42–43, 45–46, 48, 53–54, 56–57, 59–61, 67, 69, 71, 76–78, 80, 82–83, 86, 88, 91, 95–96, 99, 105, 109, 116, 119, 121, 123, 129–131, 138, 140, 142, 144, 153–154, 159–162, 178–182, 186, 189, 193–194, 197–198, 200–201, 203, 205–208, 212, 217, 222–224, 226, 228, 241, 253, 260, 262, 265, 270, 275, 279–280, 288–289, 294, 315–316*
 hagiography[1], *15*
 Hague[1], *258*
 Hahn[2], *15, 41*
 Haiku[1], *52*
 half[8], *4, 87, 94, 133, 140, 145, 181, 262*
 Halicarnassus[1], *128*
 Hall[3], *43, 290–291*
 hall[2], *286*
 Halle[6], *38, 139, 147, 192, 275*
 hallmark[1], *54*
 haltbar[2], *14, 115*
 halten[1], *17*
 hältnis[1], *257*
 hältst[1], *34*
 Haltung[2], *84, 221*
 Hamann[5], *13, 88, 211–212*
 Hamburg[5], *43, 45–46, 275, 292*
 Hamburgischen[2], *43, 275*
 Hammer[10], *55, 225, 227, 229, 231–232*
 Hand[3], *8, 12, 74*
 hand[50], *2, 5, 8–9, 11–13, 30, 33, 35, 38, 40, 43, 53, 57, 69, 80, 82, 86, 95, 100, 106, 116–118, 124, 128, 136, 138–140,*

157, 196–197, 209, 222, 233, 240, 244,
 316
 Handbuch[3], 106, 139, 310
 handed[4], 28, 37, 76, 130
 Handeln[1], 118
 handelt[6], 84, 110, 190, 247, 264, 268
 Handexemplaren[1], 274
 handful[1], 28
 handing[1], 122
 handle[3], 71, 109, 114
 Hands[1], 61
 hands[3], 11–12, 177
 handschriften[1], 255
 handschriftlich[1], 74
 handschriftlichen[3], 255, 283, 295
 Handwerk[3], 108, 113
 handwriting[8], 19, 36–37, 42, 128, 139,
 294
 Handwritten[1], 16
 handwritten[17], 10, 16, 28, 36–37, 40–41,
 75, 139, 151, 154, 166, 216, 279, 284,
 293
 handwrote[1], 74
 Hang[1], 89
 hang[1], 183
 hängt[1], 196
 Hannah[34], 9, 19, 46, 52, 63, 78, 86, 96,
 104, 119, 121–122, 130, 188, 261, 276,
 284, 301, 304, 315
 Hans[43], 14, 18, 23, 35, 46–47, 59, 75,
 104–105, 121, 129–130, 141, 167, 182,
 200–201, 217, 244, 271–272, 281, 285,
 288, 293, 302–303, 307, 310, 316
 HansGeorg[1], 21
 happen[7], 15, 35, 49, 59, 73, 75, 281
 happened[5], 9, 73, 208, 211, 232
 happening[8], 83, 246, 248
 happens[3], 63, 114, 246
 happiness[1], 278
 happy[2], 218, 230
 Harbou[1], 303
 Harcourt[2], 129, 304
 Hard[1], 47
 hard[9], 10–11, 32, 43, 47, 70, 78, 155, 244
 Hardenberg[1], 198
 harder[2], 104, 221
 hardly[9], 4, 16, 33, 129, 140, 167, 176,
 190, 289
 harm[1], 119
 harmed[1], 207
 harmful[2], 227–228
 harmony[1], 133
 Harnburg[1], 292
 Harper[1], 145
 Harris[1], 119
 härter[1], 221
 Hartmann[17], 23, 32–33, 102, 105, 108,
 129–130, 144, 158, 192, 270–271
 Hartmut[6], 36, 67, 113, 281, 287, 313
 Harvard[2], 3, 62
 Has[2], 48, 72
 has[296], 2, 4–5, 7–8, 10–12, 14, 16–21,
 24–27, 29–33, 35–36, 38, 42–43, 45, 51,
 53–58, 60–64, 67–72, 75, 78–80, 83–84,
 86, 89, 92, 95–101, 103, 105–106, 109,
 112–119, 121, 124–128, 130–131,
 134–136, 140–141, 143–156, 159–161,
 164, 166, 170–173, 175–177, 180–184,
 186, 189–190, 192–193, 196–197,
 200–202, 204–207, 209, 211, 213–217,
 219–223, 225–228, 230–233, 238, 240,
 244–251, 255, 258, 261–262, 277, 281
 Hassler[1], 289
 hasty[1], 87
 hat[20], 45, 63, 84, 104, 110, 137, 143,
 170, 173, 196, 205, 217, 219, 221, 245,
 248, 266, 292
 hating[1], 4
 hatte[2], 76, 291
 Hau[1], 97
 haughty[1], 7
 Hauptmomente[1], 244
 Hauptschrift[1], 143
 Hauptschritte[2], 58, 218
 Haupttitel[13], 165, 255–257, 266, 271,
 276, 286–287, 293
 Hauptvorlesungen[1], 277
 Hauptwerk[1], 28
 Haus[4], 26, 288–290
 haus[1], 174
 Hausbaden[1], 17
 Hause[1], 292
 Hausen[4], 164, 274, 283
 Hausfreund[2], 256, 287

have[410], 2–13, 16–19, 21–26, 28–40, 42, 45, 47, 49, 51, 56–65, 67–69, 71–72, 74–79, 81, 83, 86, 88–89, 91, 93–94, 97–98, 100, 102, 104–108, 110–113, 115–120, 122, 124–125, 127–129, 131, 135, 138–141, 143–148, 150–151, 154–157, 159, 161, 163–166, 168, 171–172, 174–178, 180–183, 186, 188, 194, 197–200, 203, 205, 208–210, 212, 214–215, 217, 219–220, 224, 226–228, 230–231, 233–235, 237, 242, 244–245, 249, 254, 258–263, 265, 269, 272–273, 277, 283, 289, 316
 haven[1], 11
 Having[1], 288
 having[21], 10–11, 15, 30, 47, 62, 94, 104, 107, 110, 113, 118, 136, 139–140, 172, 176, 215, 217, 288
 havruta[1], 62
 Hawking[1], 117
 Haym[2], 33
 Haymon[1], 302
 hazards[1], 54
 He[100], 5, 8–10, 12–13, 15, 17, 19, 23, 25–26, 28–31, 35, 37, 39, 42, 45, 52–53, 56, 58–59, 62–64, 68, 70–71, 73–76, 80, 85–86, 91, 94, 102, 105, 107, 119, 128, 130, 175–181, 184–185, 198, 200, 202, 204–205, 208, 217, 244, 262, 265, 270–272, 294, 315
 he[505], 2–3, 5, 8–19, 21, 23–32, 34–37, 39–40, 42–48, 52–59, 61–64, 67–71, 73–77, 80–83, 85–86, 89, 92, 94–109, 111–117, 120–121, 123, 125–131, 133–134, 137–138, 140–141, 144, 146, 150–154, 156, 158–159, 163–164, 168–169, 171, 175–182, 184, 186, 188–190, 192–193, 196, 200–209, 211, 213, 216–218, 220–224, 228–233, 236–238, 241–242, 244–245, 249, 253–254, 259–263, 265–266, 269–272, 277–278, 280, 282, 293–294, 310, 315–316
 head[1], 222
 Headed[1], 44
 headed[4], 44, 78, 89, 194
 heading[1], 203
 headings[2], 150, 204
 heads[1], 33
 health[2], 87, 91
 hear[11], 8, 59–60, 69, 87, 99, 108, 144, 179, 184, 316
 heard[16], 9, 23, 29, 39, 45, 47, 62, 77, 107, 176, 178, 262, 277
 hearing[2], 15, 264
 heart[2], 220, 230
 heartiest[1], 229
 heat[1], 168
 heated[1], 121
 heathens[1], 54
 heating[1], 64
 Hebbel[2], 289
 Hebel[9], 14, 256, 286–287, 289
 Hebelgedenkpreises[1], 289
 Hebels[1], 287
 Hebeltag[1], 287
 Hebeltages[1], 287
 hebephrenic[1], 55
 Hebrew[1], 105
 heed[1], 135
 heedfulness[2], 172
 heel[1], 114
 Hefte[72], 11–12, 18–19, 26–27, 33, 35, 40, 43, 50, 53–54, 63–64, 69, 74–75, 78, 81, 85–86, 91, 96, 107, 109, 111, 114–115, 126, 129, 141–142, 153, 159, 166–167, 169, 177, 181, 183, 195, 254, 299–300, 312
 Hegel[335], 11, 13–14, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25–26, 30–31, 34–36, 38–42, 44, 48–49, 52–55, 57–59, 63, 67, 69, 71, 73–74, 76, 78–80, 88–89, 95, 99–106, 109, 112, 115–116, 119, 121, 123, 126, 131, 133–134, 140, 142, 150, 152, 157, 176, 180, 182–184, 189, 192–196, 198–202, 207, 212, 214–215, 217, 222, 232, 242, 244, 246, 249–253, 260, 263, 268, 272, 278, 285, 287–289, 293, 297–299
 Hegelian[17], 31, 39, 102, 194, 197, 200, 202, 214, 222, 249–250
 Hegelianism[1], 60
 Hegelianismus[1], 244
 Hegelians[5], 46, 182
 Hegelkritik[1], 244
 Hegels[13], 34, 58, 104, 123, 126, 193, 201, 218, 245, 272, 277, 293, 297
 Hegel's[10], 250–251

Hegt[1], 218
 Heide[1], 289
 HEIDEGGER[7], 33, 49, 73, 167, 169, 258, 261
 Heidegger[2980], 1–316
 heidegger[3], 283, 310
 HeideggerBibliographie[1], 280
 HeideggerEsotericIndex[1], 312
 HeideggerGA[3], 312
 HeideggerGesellschaft[2], 91
 HeideggerGreeksIndex[1], 312
 Heideggerian[42], 3–4, 14, 17, 30, 57, 68, 73, 76, 104, 107–108, 110, 115, 119, 176, 182, 259–261, 263, 273
 Heideggeriana[3], 3, 272, 311
 Heideggerians[41], 2–5, 11, 19, 29–31, 68–70, 104, 138, 177, 181–183, 186, 261
 Heideggeriennes[1], 305
 Heideggers[22], 51, 72, 108, 139, 267, 284, 287, 289, 291–292, 301–302, 307–308, 311, 314
 Heideggersche[5], 107–108, 263
 HeideggerSchwarzeBlackNotebooksIndex [1], 312
 Heidelberg[14], 41, 44, 47, 60, 131, 201, 244, 253, 275, 280, 287–289, 313
 Heidelberger[9], 244, 280, 287–288, 291–292
 height[5], 98–99, 140, 204, 222
 heilige[1], 9
 Heiliger[1], 291
 heiliger[1], 268
 Heim[1], 7
 Heimat[8], 32, 98, 166, 289, 292
 Heimatabend[1], 290
 Heimatliche[2], 32, 98
 Heimatlosigkeit[1], 97
 Heimatstadt[1], 290
 Heimkunft[1], 282
 Heimo[1], 272
 Heimweh[1], 97
 Heinemann[2], 118, 303
 Heinrich[29], 10, 12, 39, 44, 62, 67, 69, 105, 134, 139, 211–213, 238, 275, 285–286, 289, 291, 302–303, 307–308
 Heinz[3], 37, 285, 303
 heir[1], 64
 Heisenberg[4], 52, 286, 304
 heisst[2], 169
 heißt[19], 40, 68, 81, 86, 92, 146, 168–169, 173, 196, 212, 229, 248, 285, 296, 313
 Held[7], 10, 12, 19–20, 31, 117
 held[16], 11, 37, 48, 60, 77–79, 148, 237, 241, 267, 286, 289, 292
 Helene[7], 37–38, 121, 139, 304, 311
 Heliaina[1], 171
 Hellenbach[1], 32
 heller[1], 84
 Helmholtz[1], 44
 Helmut[2], 198, 304
 Helmuth[4], 104, 281, 310
 help[13], 12–13, 17, 28, 46, 49, 92, 100, 139, 163, 175, 244, 261
 helped[9], 10, 21, 29, 48, 86, 125, 207, 268, 292
 helper[1], 13
 helpful[3], 29, 181, 204
 helping[4], 69, 179, 181, 217
 helpless[1], 201
 hemeneutische[2], 17, 112
 Hemmerde[1], 192
 Hemming[1], 254
 Hèn[2], 76, 189
 Hen[1], 199
 hen[1], 199
 Hence[7], 17, 62, 106, 113, 209, 232
 hence[22], 11, 27–28, 31, 47, 55, 78, 100, 110–111, 116, 120, 155, 181, 188, 198, 209, 219, 232, 240
 Henceforth[1], 229
 henceforth[2], 195, 229
 Hendrik[2], 277–278
 Henology[2], 110, 160
 Henri[1], 285
 Henrietta[1], 62
 her[29], 15, 30, 43, 56, 62, 78, 80–81, 91–92, 147, 166, 168, 173–174, 204, 245–247, 252, 264, 284, 315
 hera[1], 136
 herabgesetzt[1], 173
 Heraclites[1], 49
 Heraclitus[15], 49, 56, 74, 225, 242, 289
 Heraclius[1], 168
 Herakleitos[1], 74

Heraklit[7], 48, 225, 285, 298, 305
 Heraklits[2], 285
 Heraklitspruches[1], 283
 heraus[1], 74
 Herausforderung[1], 185
 Herausgeber[1], 11
 Herausgegeben[13], 301–302
 herausgeben[2], 139, 302
 herausgegebenen[1], 138
 herausreifen[2], 87, 120
 herausstellt[1], 136
 Herbert[29], 26, 33, 36–37, 42–43, 47, 93, 105, 118, 131, 182, 260, 272, 277–278, 282, 303, 311
 Herbst[4], 228, 236, 290, 294
 Herder[6], 13, 40, 198, 211, 302
 Herdergesellschaft[1], 277
 Here[29], 8, 27, 37, 71, 77–78, 89, 92–93, 99, 114, 123, 125, 130, 140, 149, 195–196, 201–202, 205, 218, 220–221, 230, 238, 246
 here[69], 5–6, 24, 27, 31–34, 38, 43, 51, 62, 64, 69, 71, 81, 83, 96–97, 101, 103–104, 106, 121, 126–128, 135, 146, 149–152, 154, 156, 159, 161, 171, 177, 183–184, 186, 190, 195, 197, 204, 208, 211–212, 214, 228, 238, 245, 248, 258, 275, 283, 285, 294
 heredity[2], 218, 230
 hergestellt[1], 291
 Hergestelltheit[1], 174
 Heribert[1], 150
 herkömmlich[1], 25
 Herkunft[4], 271, 292, 307–308
 Hermann[31], 9, 12, 16, 21–22, 26, 38, 44, 73, 105, 108, 145, 168, 192, 242, 273, 286, 292, 303
 Hermeneutic[1], 21
 hermeneutic[1], 145
 Hermeneutical[3], 3, 17, 112
 hermeneutical[7], 32, 47, 63, 68–69, 112, 120
 hermeneutics[2], 10, 59
 Hermeneutik[3], 110, 134, 298
 hermeneutische[2], 17, 112
 Hermogenes[1], 104
 Herne[2], 308
 Hernn[1], 207
 hero[2], 233, 241
 Herr[5], 49, 108, 124, 169
 Herren[1], 212
 Herrmann[13], 3, 9, 12–13, 18, 53, 73, 139, 273, 283
 Herrn[2], 143, 206
 Herrschaft[3], 63, 220, 254
 herrscht[1], 245
 Hersch[2], 48, 287
 Hertziana[1], 281
 Hervorbringung[2], 85, 124
 hervorruft[2], 156, 186
 hervorzubringen[1], 252
 hervorzurufen[4], 66, 185, 263
 Herwig[1], 105
 Herz[5], 36, 75, 80, 180, 204
 Herzen[1], 293
 hesitate[2], 152, 217
 Hesperus[1], 294
 Hesse[3], 123, 196, 289
 Heterotopias[1], 176
 Heuberger[8], 273–274
 Heutagogy[2], 128–129
 heute[10], 89, 112, 152, 156, 179, 186, 219, 221, 245, 290
 Heutige[2], 49, 179
 heutige[2], 277
 heutigen[5], 59, 81, 164, 285, 290
 Hey[1], 176
 Hg[3], 97, 302, 314
 HGA[7], 8–9, 11, 19, 121, 296
 hidden[19], 2–3, 14, 28, 75, 97, 104, 121, 126, 132, 163, 182, 189, 202, 236, 246
 hide[1], 176
 hiding[2], 114, 248
 Hier[2], 219, 245
 hier[8], 81, 84, 113, 126, 161, 169, 245, 248
 hierarchy[2], 111, 231
 hieraus[1], 201
 Hierdurch[1], 190
 Hierzu[1], 146
 High[2], 168, 294
 high[12], 54–55, 62, 69, 106, 121, 138, 194, 231, 235, 240
 higher[7], 7, 31, 53, 102, 125, 160, 221

highest[23], *7, 31, 89, 103–104, 111, 120, 133, 154, 157–158, 168, 171, 228, 235–236, 250*
 Highlands[1], *310*
 highlighted[1], *172*
 highly[2], *260, 272*
 highway[1], *30*
 hike[1], *75*
 hilarity[3], *39, 120, 175*
 Hildegard[1], *303*
 Hilfe[1], *283*
 hilft[1], *163*
 hill[4], *68, 138, 168*
 Hillard[3], *294, 303*
 hills[3], *16, 124, 168*
 him[89], *3–4, 15–16, 21, 23, 25–27, 29–31, 33, 39, 42–43, 48–49, 56, 62, 69, 71, 73, 76–77, 82, 92, 112, 114–116, 118–121, 128, 130–131, 151, 155, 157, 161, 169, 177–178, 180, 184, 186, 205, 207, 212, 217, 220–222, 227–229, 234, 240, 249, 254, 262, 292, 316*
 Himmel[3], *51, 288, 313*
 himself[65], *2, 8, 11–12, 20, 24, 26–27, 29–30, 37, 51, 53, 55, 62, 66, 72, 75, 80, 83, 98, 102, 107–110, 115, 120, 126, 138, 141, 176, 181, 186, 189, 194, 200, 204, 206–207, 222, 224, 226, 229, 233, 235, 263, 269*
 hin[1], *91*
 hinaus[2], *164, 170*
 hinauszu gehen[1], *89*
 Hinblick[2], *174, 248*
 Hindenburg[1], *95*
 Hindi[1], *4*
 hindrance[1], *215*
 hindsight[1], *114*
 hinfällig[1], *174*
 Hinfalligkeit[2], *174*
 Hinführung[2], *85, 166*
 hingesetzt[1], *148*
 hingewiesen[1], *246*
 Hinrich[1], *315*
 hinstellen[1], *77*
 Hint[1], *106*
 hint[2], *97, 188*
 hinter[5], *40, 137, 219, 235*
 Hinterlassenschaft[1], *40*
 hinteruns[1], *218*
 hints[8], *53, 71, 77, 105, 123, 171, 181, 186*
 Hinübergehende[1], *164*
 hinübergeht[1], *164*
 hinweg[1], *247*
 Hinweis[4], *81, 185, 264, 283*
 Hinweise[1], *165*
 Hinzeigen[1], *67*
 Hinzu[1], *137*
 hinzugelogen[1], *225*
 hinzugerechnet[1], *235*
 hinzuweisen[1], *246*
 Hippel[1], *182*
 Hippias[1], *123*
 Hipponensis[1], *2*
 Hirt[1], *26*
 His[41], *8–9, 14–15, 23, 29–30, 38, 42, 45, 48, 55, 69, 73, 75–76, 92, 109, 116, 118, 125, 128, 130–131, 155, 160, 180, 186, 259, 262–263, 269–271, 292, 315*
 his[906], *2–5, 7–19, 21–49, 51–64, 66–77, 79–83, 85–88, 91–96, 98–110, 112–134, 136, 138–143, 145–146, 148–152, 154–156, 159–161, 163–164, 167–169, 171, 175–186, 188–190, 192–198, 200–209, 211–218, 222–225, 230–233, 235–238, 241–245, 248–249, 251, 253–254, 258–263, 265, 269–273, 277–281, 285, 288, 292–294, 302, 304–305, 310, 315–316*
 Hisamatsu[4], *267, 288*
 historian[3], *3, 59, 105*
 historians[1], *242*
 Historical[13], *19, 43, 52, 64, 69, 117, 123, 164, 192, 196–197, 238, 276*
 historical[75], *2–3, 14, 17, 19, 24–26, 36, 45, 53, 55, 57, 63–64, 77, 83, 88–90, 102–103, 106, 113, 120, 140, 142, 150, 161, 163, 190–191, 195, 197, 209, 211, 217–218, 222, 224, 237–238, 259, 273*
 historicity[1], *178*
 Historically[1], *43*
 historically[6], *18, 135, 202, 209, 236*
 historicism[1], *60*
 Historicity[1], *272*
 historicity[1], *64*

Historie[4], *95, 207, 218, 229*
 Historiker[1], *244*
 historiographically[1], *202*
 historische[6], *84, 196, 218, 276*
 historischen[2], *64, 104*
 History[29], *20, 31, 37, 55, 58, 64, 85, 117, 130, 139, 154, 191, 194, 196, 198, 201, 203, 207, 214, 218–219, 229–230, 232, 274*
 history[197], *2, 7, 25, 27, 31–34, 37, 45–47, 49, 52–58, 63–64, 68–69, 72, 75, 80, 83, 87, 89–91, 95–96, 98, 103, 105–106, 113–114, 116–117, 126, 130, 142, 151, 153, 155, 157–159, 172–173, 181, 183, 189–191, 194–198, 200–201, 203–204, 206–209, 214, 218, 222, 226–227, 232, 238, 240, 250–251, 253, 262, 267, 275*
 hit[1], *240*
 Hitherto[1], *77*
 hitherto[8], *51, 118, 204, 220, 230, 238, 251, 260*
 hits[3], *31, 54, 194*
 Hitzige[1], *142*
 hl[1], *278*
 Hobbes[3], *17, 47, 282*
 Hoch[1], *105*
 Hochschule[1], *84*
 Hochschulkurse[1], *275*
 Hochshwarzwald[1], *168*
 Höchst[1], *289*
 höchste[2], *168–169*
 höchsten[5], *104, 120, 158, 235–236*
 höchstwerthigen[1], *220*
 Hochzeitstag[2], *276, 293*
 hodgepodge[2], *4, 81*
 hodós[1], *161*
 Hoeller[1], *293*
 hoffen[1], *169*
 Hoffnung[4], *169, 237, 241*
 Hofgeismar[1], *286*
 Hofmann[1], *18*
 Hofmeister[1], *272*
 Hofstadter[2], *165, 191*
 Hohen[1], *270*
 hohen[2], *163, 235*
 Hohenzollernstrasse[1], *15*
 Hohenzuges[1], *75*
 Höhlengleichnis[2], *137, 297*
 Hohlengleichnis[2], *278*
 Höhlengleichnisses[1], *282*
 hoi[2], *29, 54*
 hold[2], *147, 229*
 holder[1], *285*
 Holderlin[2], *10, 167*
 Hölderlin[29], *10, 24, 40, 42, 51–52, 55, 106, 154, 166–167, 188, 242, 262, 281–283, 288, 293, 299, 314*
 Hölderlins[17], *10, 34, 51, 67, 106, 170, 188, 282, 288, 293, 296–298, 313*
 holdings[2], *36, 157*
 holds[2], *49, 90*
 hole[1], *100*
 holes[1], *203*
 Holger[7], *52, 273, 301, 310, 315*
 Holist[1], *187*
 Holoka[1], *3*
 Holstein[1], *289*
 Holthusen[1], *303*
 holy[1], *9*
 Holzboog[1], *139*
 Holzweg[3], *87–88*
 Holzwege[17], *6, 10, 37, 68, 86, 157, 196, 245–246, 281–283, 296*
 Holzwegen[1], *281*
 home[15], *9, 16–17, 32, 44, 97, 104, 166, 177, 270, 278, 292*
 homeland[6], *98, 166, 222, 292, 315*
 homeless[2], *97–98*
 Homelessness[1], *98*
 homelessness[7], *97–98, 222*
 homeliness[1], *98*
 Homer[1], *105*
 homes[2], *64, 105*
 homesickness[2], *97*
 hometown[3], *15, 53, 168*
 homework[2], *13, 121*
 homine[1], *290*
 hominem[6], *43, 54, 60, 119, 183*
 homines[1], *105*
 Homo[5], *56, 106, 228, 242*
 homo[5], *234, 240, 242*
 Homolka[1], *302*
 honesty[1], *119*

honey[1], 194
 honeymoon[1], 229
 Hönigswald[1], 271
 Honor[1], 283
 honor[6], 92, 118, 145, 277, 293
 honorary[1], 42
 honourable[1], 186
 Hoop[1], 303
 Hoover[1], 33
 hope[20], 11, 17, 35, 52, 56, 64, 69, 71,
 168, 171, 200, 212, 237, 241, 259, 301
 hopefully[1], 3
 hopeless[1], 96
 hopes[1], 227
 hoping[2], 34, 159
 hopium[2], 11, 69
 hör[1], 316
 horáō[1], 110
 Horch[1], 316
 Hören[1], 267
 hören[3], 81, 108, 144
 hörenden[1], 113
 Hörern[1], 76
 Horismos[1], 94
 horizon[8], 24, 141, 145–146, 177, 206, 232
 horizons[1], 30
 Horizontes[1], 141
 Horkheimer[4], 110, 175, 182
 horrendum[1], 229
 horrible[1], 97
 horror[1], 90
 hors[1], 68
 horses[1], 15
 Hörverlag[2], 286, 313
 Hoseki[1], 267
 hospitable[1], 124
 hospital[1], 294
 host[3], 3, 33, 180
 hostile[2], 226, 228
 hot[1], 142
 Hotel[4], 44, 48, 278, 292
 hóti[2], 76, 189
 hour[3], 93, 168, 238
 hours[7], 39, 48, 61, 109, 275–276
 House[1], 42
 house[17], 10, 12, 16–17, 26, 39, 109, 116,
 131, 138, 144–145, 204, 281, 284, 290
 housing[2], 148
 Houston[1], 135
 HOW[2], 55, 232
 How[32], 30, 50, 55–56, 60, 71, 75, 97,
 106, 109, 144, 146, 155, 160, 166, 206,
 209, 220, 225, 227–229, 231–232, 242
 how[90], 8–9, 11–13, 15–16, 20, 23, 26,
 34–36, 46–47, 54, 56, 58, 66, 68, 73, 76,
 85, 88, 90, 98, 100, 111, 114, 117,
 122–125, 127, 130, 133, 140, 144, 150,
 155, 157–159, 162, 166, 172, 174, 181,
 183–184, 190–191, 197–198, 204, 206,
 208, 211–212, 214, 221, 227, 231,
 233–234, 242, 244, 249
 However[28], 8, 12, 31, 36, 52–54, 59–60,
 62, 95, 108, 135, 157, 207–209, 221,
 231–232, 240, 254, 259
 however[25], 4, 25, 36, 51, 59, 79, 90, 98,
 112–113, 145, 148, 173, 198, 209, 214,
 216, 222, 238, 245, 271–272
 Hrsg[1], 275
 hrsg[2], 52, 301
 HS[18], 91, 255–257, 266, 273, 276, 283,
 288, 293, 295
 hs[2], 284, 286
 Hsiao[1], 74
 html[2], 216, 310
 http[1], 216
 https[32], 51, 168, 248, 252, 255, 283, 293,
 310–312, 315
 Huber[3], 166–167, 169
 Hubert[1], 4
 Hübner[1], 271
 hubris[3], 114, 180
 húbris[1], 181
 huge[1], 71
 Hugo[1], 23
 Human[9], 80, 100, 121–122, 143, 270
 human[38], 7, 17, 27, 32, 44–45, 69, 78,
 83, 97, 119, 147–148, 153, 155, 172–173,
 178, 195, 197, 200, 206, 215, 219, 228,
 230, 234, 238, 240
 humanae[1], 192
 Humanism[12], 47–48, 51, 95, 98, 111,
 222, 245
 humanism[1], 47
 Humanismus[4], 47, 95, 98, 305

Humanismusbrief[1], 245
 Humanities[1], 310
 humanities[1], 56
 Humanity[2], 241, 293
 humanity[29], 27, 49, 56, 63, 71, 97, 111,
 133, 155, 157, 185, 195, 200, 224, 226,
 228, 231, 233, 236, 238–239, 241
 humanly[1], 95
 Humans[1], 155
 humans[19], 13, 15, 66, 68, 90, 122, 133,
 155, 157, 173, 176, 190, 240
 humanus[1], 234
 humble[2], 218, 230
 Humboldt[3], 13, 134, 198
 Hume[16], 203, 206, 208, 211, 213,
 218–219, 230
 Humean[1], 208
 humility[2], 107–108
 humor[1], 61
 Hundred[1], 101
 hundred[10], 9, 26, 64, 73, 101, 121, 169,
 261
 hundreds[2], 26, 139
 hung[1], 232
 hurry[2], 88
 Hürtgen[2], 68
 Hürtgenwald[2], 68
 husband[1], 294
 HUSSERL[1], 138
 Husserl[94], 23, 25, 31, 35–36, 40, 43–45,
 48, 55, 67, 73–75, 97, 110, 112,
 121–122, 128, 130, 138–139, 141–142,
 144–145, 147–149, 175, 180, 182, 184,
 192, 198, 200, 223–224, 235, 254, 277,
 292, 294, 302
 HusserlHeidegger[1], 55
 Husserliana[3], 9, 23, 302
 Husserls[1], 141
 hut[5], 131, 168
 Hütte[10], 16, 124, 131, 138, 168, 272
 Hymne[5], 34, 67, 298
 Hymnen[4], 106, 170, 188, 297
 Hyparchein[1], 199
 hyper[1], 316
 hyperhuman[2], 237
 hyperhumanity[2], 237
 hyperinflation[1], 15

hypernymous[1], 177
 hyphenated[2], 58, 73
 hypnotized[1], 229
 Hypokeimenon[1], 199
 hypophora[1], 129
 Hypothese[1], 137
 hypothesis[4], 70, 73, 127, 136

I

Iain[1], 261
 Ian[5], 4, 20, 140, 255
 Ibn[1], 192
 Ich[16], 34, 98, 112, 120, 126, 141, 144,
 156, 186, 194, 220, 223, 247, 316
 ich[58], 34, 43, 51, 84–85, 98–99, 108,
 111–112, 114–116, 126, 129, 136, 141,
 143–144, 156, 162, 167, 179, 186, 228,
 235, 245–247, 263, 265, 316
 ichi[2], 267, 288
 Icking[3], 12, 283–284
 ID[2], 287
 Idea[5], 32, 53, 103, 130, 199
 idea[35], 3, 26, 28, 30, 42, 54–55, 79, 129,
 133, 145–146, 154, 166, 182, 186, 198,
 200–201, 221, 226, 229, 236, 240,
 249–250
 Ideal[3], 129, 237, 241
 ideal[12], 129, 133, 228–229, 231, 236–237,
 241
 Idealism[12], 100, 131, 133, 201–202,
 207–208, 212
 idealism[19], 45, 200–201, 204, 208–209,
 212, 214–215, 222
 Idealismus[7], 106, 112, 202, 277, 297–298
 idealist[1], 117
 idealistically[1], 253
 idealistisch[1], 253
 idealists[1], 55
 ideality[2], 212, 216
 ideals[3], 133, 135, 228
 Ideas[3], 54
 ideas[22], 3, 12, 31, 41, 54, 69, 76, 99, 102,

111, 130, 154, 180, 186, 201, 210, 225,
 232, 238
 Idee[3], 32, 146, 305
 identical[3], 212, 214, 253
 identified[3], 107, 176, 234
 Identität[13], 48, 110, 245–246, 279,
 286–287, 296, 313
 Identitat[1], 287
 Identitätsprinzip[1], 244
 Identity[2], 245–246
 identity[2], 33, 246
 ideological[2], 119, 175
 ideologies[3], 69, 75, 180
 ideologist[4], 70, 75, 175, 180
 ideology[2], 175, 182
 Ideōn[1], 54
 idiom[1], 32
 idiosyncrasies[1], 75
 idiosyncratic[1], 29
 idiotism[2], 64
 Idiotismus[1], 64
 IDJpvg[1], 51
 idle[1], 30
 idol[2], 71, 185
 Idols[12], 55, 225, 227, 229, 231–232, 236
 If[33], 5, 12–13, 18, 30, 32, 35, 59, 61, 67,
 75, 79, 90, 92, 94, 97, 100, 115, 129,
 140, 142, 144, 161, 167, 172, 174, 187,
 198, 227, 236, 259
 if[83], 5, 8, 15, 21, 26, 28–29, 31, 37–38,
 45, 55, 69, 71, 73–74, 77–78, 83–84, 88,
 92, 94, 99–100, 107–108, 112–113, 120,
 123, 128–129, 131, 141, 145, 147, 157,
 159, 164–165, 167, 170, 172, 176, 183,
 185–186, 190, 194, 196, 200–202, 205,
 215–216, 221, 223–225, 228, 234–235,
 247, 259, 263, 265, 269, 272, 293, 316
 Ignaz[1], 302
 ignoratio[1], 176
 ignoring[1], 70
 Ihere[1], 246
 ihm[7], 52, 173–174, 220, 237, 241, 245
 ihn[5], 81, 120, 173, 220, 316
 Ihnen[4], 49, 143, 169
 ihnen[5], 77, 81, 95, 163, 248
 Ihr[1], 107
 ihr[16], 44, 64, 87, 92, 120, 136, 148, 172,
 174, 237, 241, 247
 ihre[3], 99, 253, 268
 ihrem[2], 57, 167
 ihren[2], 104, 116
 ihrer[6], 6, 57, 89, 185, 264, 306
 Ihres[1], 108
 ihres[3], 89, 141, 264
 II[93], 1, 12, 18, 24, 27–28, 34, 36, 42, 48,
 52, 54, 68–69, 71, 74–75, 78, 82, 86,
 94–95, 106–107, 110–111, 114, 130,
 140, 142, 150, 153, 159, 161, 163,
 166–167, 169, 177, 180–183, 189, 193,
 195, 198, 200, 226, 228, 241, 261–262,
 264, 268, 276, 282, 284–285, 287, 296,
 298–301, 307, 309
 III[26], 19, 28, 33, 44, 57, 80, 87, 92, 96,
 107, 122, 161, 165, 177, 194, 196, 221,
 250, 268, 273, 279, 285–286
 Iing[1], 61
 IIV[1], 43
 il[4], 9
 III[1], 287
 ill[1], 142
 illicit[1], 226
 illness[1], 73
 illuminate[5], 77, 79, 145–146, 181
 illuminated[3], 181, 190, 262
 illuminates[1], 172
 Illusion[1], 284
 illusion[1], 284
 illustrate[1], 19
 Illustrated[1], 128
 illustrated[1], 129
 illustrious[1], 42
 Im[13], 91, 123, 131, 141, 156, 174, 219,
 246, 252, 268, 291
 im[155], 7, 13, 16, 27, 33, 40, 45, 51,
 68–71, 76–77, 80, 84, 86, 89, 92,
 109–110, 113, 118, 120, 136, 141, 147,
 150, 157–158, 162, 164–169, 173–174,
 196, 198, 212, 219, 230, 236, 244–250,
 252, 265–267, 271–272, 274–277,
 279–280, 282–283, 285–294, 297, 302,
 305, 307–308, 311, 313, 316
 image[33], 8, 19, 50, 56, 70–71, 76, 78,
 85–86, 103, 114, 134–135, 163–164,
 169–170, 179, 184, 204–205, 262, 289
 images[1], 204

Imagination[1], 38
 imagination[2], 38, 100
 imagine[2], 47, 197
 imaginings[1], 228
 imitatio[2], 128
 imitation[1], 54
 Imma[2], 52, 301
 immanent[4], 252–253
 immanente[1], 250
 Immanuel[16], 11, 14, 56, 59, 77, 80, 106, 120, 133, 192–194, 212, 216, 223
 Immatrikulation[1], 279
 immediate[4], 28, 180, 215, 278
 immediately[8], 44, 98, 107, 129, 144, 176, 225, 247
 immensely[1], 4
 immer[16], 74, 85, 89, 92, 99, 107, 112–113, 120, 124, 138, 143, 245, 265–266
 immigrant[1], 131
 immorality[1], 233
 immortality[4], 193, 215, 233–234
 impact[11], 23, 39, 42, 76, 99, 111, 116, 131, 182, 217, 249
 impacted[1], 16
 impartial[1], 62
 impede[1], 84
 impenetrable[1], 29
 imperative[2], 216
 Imperfect[2], 111, 236
 impetus[2], 156, 233
 impetuses[1], 140
 implications[3], 11, 60, 155
 implicit[1], 149
 Implying[1], 37
 importance[10], 25, 39, 55, 113, 134, 147, 159, 207, 215, 231
 important[55], 2, 8, 10–11, 29, 36, 45, 59, 61, 66, 72, 85, 87–88, 94, 103, 113, 120, 131, 133–135, 141, 144–145, 151–152, 155–158, 161, 172, 179, 181, 186, 189–190, 201, 204, 217, 228, 242, 246, 254, 262, 271
 importantly[5], 35, 69, 100, 204, 272
 impositions[1], 85
 impossibility[1], 224
 impossible[3], 87, 102, 228
 impressed[2], 24, 254
 impressible[1], 5
 impression[10], 16, 29, 109, 128, 167, 181, 193, 238, 248, 269
 impressive[1], 102
 imprimatur[4], 11, 71, 109, 149
 improve[2], 71, 185
 improved[1], 207
 improvement[1], 83
 Improvers[1], 236
 Impudent[1], 78
 impulses[2], 197
 impure[1], 119
 imputed[1], 247
 imstande[1], 84
 In[391], 2, 5, 7–9, 11–18, 20–21, 23–26, 28–31, 33–34, 36–49, 51–53, 57–63, 66, 68–70, 73–74, 76–77, 80–84, 86, 89–90, 92–95, 100–102, 104, 106–107, 110–116, 119–123, 127–128, 131–133, 135, 138–145, 147–152, 154, 156–164, 166–168, 172–173, 175, 178, 180–182, 186, 190, 192–194, 196–198, 200–201, 203–209, 212–214, 216–219, 223–227, 229–231, 238–239, 242, 246, 248–249, 252–253, 258–261, 263, 265–266, 270–272, 274–295, 302
 in[2846], 2–81, 83–209, 211–240, 242, 244–294, 296–299, 301–303, 305–306, 308, 310–311, 313–316
 inability[2], 97, 142
 inadequacy[2], 232, 258
 Inadequate[1], 145
 inadequately[1], 114
 inappropriate[1], 200
 Inauguration[1], 294
 incapable[3], 119, 186, 267
 Inception[6], 20, 31, 49, 165, 170
 inception[9], 31, 49, 71, 120, 165–166, 242
 inceptions[2], 169, 196
 inceptive[1], 64
 Inceptual[1], 172
 inceptual[11], 63, 90, 154, 157, 159, 172, 174, 195
 incessant[1], 167
 incidentally[1], 69
 INCIPIT[1], 231

inclination[2], 99, 212
 inclined[1], 229
 include[16], 10, 20, 37, 44, 60, 121, 189,
 196, 223, 255, 275, 285, 301
 Included[1], 133
 included[20], 12–13, 28, 47, 73, 105, 114,
 118, 121, 139, 147, 157, 165, 196, 211,
 244, 249, 277
 Includes[2], 304, 311
 includes[11], 64, 99, 116, 143, 154, 165,
 215, 238, 246, 249
 Including[2], 102
 including[8], 4, 20, 24, 37, 54, 128, 200, 305
 income[1], 15
 incommensurable[1], 135
 incomparable[3], 18, 75, 149
 Incomplete[1], 236
 incomplete[5], 2, 4, 24, 182, 236
 incompleteHeideggerians[1], 5
 incompleteness[1], 188
 inconcussum[1], 188
 inconsistencies[1], 194
 inconsistent[2], 160, 262
 inconsolable[2], 208, 211
 inconspicuous[2], 110, 159
 incorporate[1], 38
 incorporated[1], 38
 incorrect[2], 58, 169
 incorrigible[1], 54
 increase[3], 64, 154, 157
 increasing[6], 13, 60, 72, 143, 147, 154
 increasingly[1], 62
 incredible[1], 233
 Incredibly[1], 145
 Indeed[9], 12, 83, 91, 95, 109, 117, 154,
 188
 indeed[25], 2, 25–26, 29, 31, 33, 40, 49,
 68, 75, 78, 80, 90, 109, 117, 127, 148,
 173, 181, 193–194, 263
 indefinable[1], 198
 indem[9], 34, 76, 98, 120, 126, 201, 265
 indemonstrable[2], 215–216
 Indentität[1], 245
 independent[4], 9, 35, 39, 118
 Inder[2], 81
 indeterminacy[1], 61
 indeterminate[1], 252
 Index[15], 242, 312
 index[2], 312
 indexes[1], 12
 indexing[1], 242
 India[8], 60–62, 81, 105, 118
 Indian[7], 61, 105, 110, 122, 125
 Indiana[4], 14, 315
 Indianapolis[4], 315
 Indians[3], 81, 188
 indicate[1], 103
 indicated[3], 38, 88, 145
 Indication[1], 21
 indication[3], 13, 185, 264
 indications[1], 179
 indicator[4], 71, 85, 184, 189
 indictments[1], 118
 Indien[1], 81
 indifferent[1], 158
 indigence[2], 238
 indirect[1], 32
 indirectly[2], 32, 85
 indispensable[1], 216
 indisputable[1], 224
 Individual[1], 270
 individual[7], 10, 88, 134, 182, 197, 241
 individualism[1], 53
 individuals[5], 118, 134–135, 235
 Individuuminder[1], 270
 indubitable[2], 215–216
 industrialization[1], 53
 industry[3], 95, 183, 207
 ineffable[1], 159
 ineluctable[3], 177, 185, 187
 inescapable[1], 177
 inevitable[2], 153, 186
 inevitably[2], 189, 216
 inexhaustibility[1], 11
 inexhaustible[1], 203
 inexorability[1], 116
 inexperienced[1], 153
 inexplicable[2], 215–216
 inexpressible[1], 71
 infallible[1], 220
 infinita[2], 102, 214
 infinite[2], 103, 207
 infinitely[1], 242

Infinity[1], 250
 inflamed[1], 225
 inflation[1], 106
 influence[11], 32–33, 35, 43, 56, 96, 98,
 147, 222
 influenced[4], 23, 25, 33, 46
 influences[3], 25, 224
 influential[1], 32
 Informal[1], 275
 informal[1], 286
 information[6], 16–17, 128, 245, 285
 infused[1], 238
 infusion[1], 142
 ing[4], 111, 236
 Ingarden[3], 25, 43
 Inge[2], 290, 302
 Ingeborg[1], 289
 ingenii[1], 99
 ingenious[1], 77
 Ingrid[1], 304
 Inhalt[2], 44, 219
 Inhalte[1], 52
 Inhaltsangabe[7], 20, 165, 256–257, 293
 inherently[1], 233
 inherit[1], 15
 inherited[1], 234
 initial[4], 21, 166, 174
 Initially[1], 231
 initially[2], 47, 108
 initiation[1], 231
 initiative[1], 112
 initiatives[1], 197
 initium[1], 112
 ink[4], 30, 40, 160
 inner[13], 17, 28, 58, 79, 126, 132, 150,
 155, 157, 212, 263
 inneren[1], 264
 innerhalb[3], 158, 212, 245
 innerlich[1], 201
 innermost[1], 114
 innerste[2], 114, 264
 Innigkeit[1], 267
 innocent[3], 221, 229, 249
 innovation[1], 25
 innovative[1], 66
 Innsbruck[2], 289, 302
 innumerable[2], 7, 186
 inperson[1], 109
 inquire[3], 145–146, 156
 inquiries[2], 83, 119
 inquiring[1], 77
 inquiry[10], 77, 79, 83, 90, 172, 174, 197,
 219, 230, 289
 ins[5], 42, 84, 92, 107, 167
 insane[1], 74
 inscribed[1], 164
 Insel[1], 302
 inseparable[1], 193
 inserting[1], 38
 Insgleichen[1], 246
 inside[10], 28, 52, 59, 67, 100, 176
 Insight[1], 283
 insight[11], 64, 100, 111, 131, 182, 190,
 208, 215, 235, 243
 insights[12], 3, 14, 32, 46–47, 67, 81,
 175–176, 182
 insinuate[2], 29, 269
 insinuates[1], 173
 insist[2], 84, 209
 insisting[1], 6
 insonderheit[1], 104
 inspiration[2], 46, 65
 inspired[4], 4, 65, 119, 141
 instance[6], 4, 8, 18, 27, 90, 101
 inständige[1], 174
 inständiger[1], 174
 Instant[2], 120, 175
 Instanz[1], 114
 Instead[3], 76, 258, 294
 instead[22], 8, 29, 37–38, 54, 57, 62, 94,
 117, 147, 159–160, 172, 217, 227, 259,
 262, 265, 316
 instinct[3], 218, 225, 230
 instincts[5], 124, 218, 227–228, 230
 instinctualists[2], 219, 230
 Instinkt[1], 219
 Instinkten[1], 219
 Instinktvisten[1], 219
 Institute[5], 45, 61, 270, 281
 Institutio[1], 128
 institutions[1], 229
 instruction[2], 11, 67

instructional[1], 76
 instructions[2], 163, 279
 instrument[1], 54
 insufferable[1], 220
 insufficient[3], 90, 153, 172
 insurrection[1], 216
 intellect[1], 60
 intellectual[27], 3, 7, 17, 24, 32, 34–35, 45–49, 54–55, 68, 100–101, 119, 124, 203, 218, 229–230, 254, 287
 intellectuals[20], 3, 25, 31–33, 39, 43, 46, 48, 105, 107, 117, 165, 217, 263, 287
 intellectus[1], 44
 intellektuale[1], 219
 intelligence[2], 109, 226
 intelligent[2], 109
 intelligentsia[1], 285
 Intelligenz[1], 109
 intelligibility[1], 135
 intend[1], 231
 intended[8], 28, 74, 122, 149, 165, 190, 216, 265
 intending[1], 62
 intends[1], 184
 intense[6], 39, 62, 70, 121, 171, 184
 intensive[1], 182
 intent[2], 14, 81
 intention[12], 30, 70, 98, 120, 134, 146, 149, 155, 184–185, 222
 intentionally[2], 29, 269
 Intentionen[1], 141
 intentions[13], 33, 66–69, 113, 119, 141, 175, 223, 262
 inter[2], 60, 180
 interacted[1], 128
 interactions[1], 177
 interactive[1], 121
 interconnected[2], 160, 185
 interconnection[2], 12, 147
 intercourse[1], 231
 interessiere[2], 108, 263
 interest[10], 17, 33, 72, 78, 104, 193, 207, 316
 interested[10], 28, 73, 105, 107–108, 202, 254, 263
 Interesting[5], 26, 48, 55, 166, 181
 interesting[20], 9, 12–13, 15, 17, 89, 147, 151, 171, 203, 206, 208–209, 216, 238, 259, 277
 Interestingly[3], 133–134, 224
 interestingly[1], 224
 interlocutors[1], 121
 internal[1], 88
 International[1], 304
 international[2], 7, 144
 internationalen[1], 144
 Internationalism[1], 137
 internet[3], 270, 305, 307
 Interplay[1], 163
 interplay[1], 160
 interpolations[1], 37
 interpret[2], 116, 147
 interpretable[1], 136
 Interpretation[9], 34, 79–80, 137, 146, 271, 275, 297
 interpretation[61], 3–4, 14, 25, 34–35, 45–46, 48, 59, 65, 72, 79–81, 105, 115–117, 119, 121, 131, 136, 145–146, 151, 178, 183, 186–187, 190, 195–196, 202, 232–233, 245, 263, 270, 283, 285, 305
 Interpretationen[5], 21, 136, 271, 298
 Interpretations[3], 21, 271
 interpretations[27], 2, 4–5, 14, 45, 47, 54, 67, 79, 105, 115, 121, 136, 171, 180, 182–183, 185, 214, 264
 interpretationsversuch[1], 245
 interpretative[1], 2
 Interpreted[1], 240
 interpreted[9], 118, 126, 132, 146, 185, 200, 249, 260, 264
 Interpretieren[1], 137
 interpreter[1], 136
 interpreters[1], 11
 interpretiert[3], 19, 118, 261
 Interpreting[1], 276
 interpreting[4], 5, 118, 223, 248
 interprets[2], 19, 110
 interrelation[1], 161
 interrogated[3], 83
 interrogation[4], 90, 172, 201
 interrogative[7], 66–67, 112, 136
 interrogatives[1], 121
 Interrogator[331], 1–316

interrogator[14], *66–68, 70, 77, 115, 125, 127, 137, 176, 178, 184, 186–187*
 intervals[1], *62*
 intervening[1], *88*
 intervention[1], *144*
 Interview[2], *117, 179*
 interview[24], *9, 33, 49, 71, 73, 81, 101, 118, 130, 169, 179, 261, 290, 293*
 Interviewed[2], *59, 130*
 interviewer[1], *65*
 interviews[2], *39, 180*
 interweaving[1], *183*
 interwoven[1], *183*
 intimacy[2], *103, 267*
 intimate[1], *124*
 Intimations[1], *264*
 Into[1], *283*
 into[205], *2–4, 7, 9–10, 12, 14, 29–34, 36, 38, 42, 45–47, 49, 52–53, 55–59, 61, 63–64, 67–68, 71, 77, 79, 81, 84–85, 87–90, 92, 95, 97–98, 101, 103, 107–110, 114, 117, 120–122, 129, 131, 133, 135, 137–138, 143–148, 153–159, 161, 166–168, 172–174, 176, 180–185, 189–190, 193, 195–196, 198, 200–202, 204–205, 207–208, 211, 214–218, 221–222, 227–230, 232–233, 236, 239–240, 242–243, 246, 250–251, 253, 259, 269, 277, 316*
 intonation[1], *10*
 Intoxication[1], *18*
 intrinsic[1], *202*
 intrinsically[2], *191, 215*
 introduces[1], *52*
 Introduction[21], *26, 37, 64, 66, 75, 84, 87, 96, 111, 114, 117, 119, 122, 137, 150, 205, 215, 238, 242*
 introduction[16], *86–87, 91, 101, 129, 145, 157, 160–162, 166, 198, 210, 236, 265*
 introductory[2], *271, 287*
 intuition[7], *83, 100, 216, 218, 225, 229–230*
 Intuitionisten[1], *219*
 intuitionists[2], *219, 230*
 intuitions[2], *210, 216*
 invation[1], *276*
 invent[2], *226, 229*
 invented[3], *7, 136, 226*
 invention[2], *220, 230*
 inventiveness[2], *25, 104*
 inventor[1], *18*
 inventory[1], *36*
 inversion[5], *34, 90, 222, 232*
 invert[1], *232*
 inverted[3], *219, 230, 236*
 inverts[1], *231*
 investigates[1], *134*
 investigating[1], *95*
 Investigation[1], *150*
 investigation[15], *24, 72, 75, 99, 133, 145–146, 149, 191, 208, 211, 262*
 Investigations[3], *99, 141, 259*
 investigations[18], *5, 10, 29, 59, 69–70, 112, 146, 149, 151, 153, 176, 180–181, 185*
 invisible[2], *13, 86*
 invitation[4], *13, 17, 270, 275*
 INVITED[1], *258*
 Invited[2], *277–278*
 invited[3], *43, 46, 121*
 inviting[1], *83*
 involve[1], *60*
 involved[5], *21, 53, 119, 134, 242*
 involvement[1], *4*
 involves[1], *231*
 inwardly[1], *201*
 inzwischen[2], *144, 245*
 ipsa[1], *8*
 Ipse[5], *8, 108, 126, 181, 263*
 ipsissima[1], *2*
 ipso[2], *79*
 irgend[5], *44, 77, 166, 219*
 irgendeinem[1], *264*
 irgendwie[2], *220, 247*
 irrationalism[3], *207, 234*
 irredentism[1], *95*
 irrelevant[2], *131, 176*
 irren[2], *63, 75*
 irreparable[1], *45*
 irresistible[1], *216*
 irretrievably[1], *21*
 Irrnis[2], *87, 307*
 Irrtümer[1], *181*
 Irrweg[1], *113*

Irrwege[1], 68
 IS[1], 93
 Is[39], 18, 28, 57, 61, 67, 76, 80–81, 83, 88,
 100, 106, 109, 136, 146–147, 159, 163,
 169–170, 176, 178, 185, 188, 207, 223,
 234, 242, 251, 259, 283
 is[2199], 1–21, 23–41, 43–142, 144–161,
 163–198, 200–209, 211–240, 242–255,
 258–269, 271–273, 275, 277, 282–285,
 293–294, 301, 304–305, 316
 Isaac[1], 258
 Isaak[2], 188, 262
 ISBN[5], 313–314
 Isidor[1], 62
 Islam[1], 118
 Islands[1], 315
 Ism[1], 312
 isolated[1], 238
 isolation[2], 134, 213
 isos[1], 20
 Issue[5], 148, 251
 issue[16], 1, 4, 77, 89, 123, 127–128, 136,
 147, 150, 203, 207–208, 220, 242, 244
 issued[1], 286
 issues[39], 18, 23, 28, 33, 53–54, 56, 58,
 60, 67, 69, 76, 89, 98, 109, 111, 114,
 116–118, 160, 170, 176, 182, 189, 203,
 212, 244, 254, 272, 282, 316
 Ist[2], 137, 247
 ist[226], 1, 27, 34, 43, 48–51, 58–59, 63–64,
 67, 69–70, 74–75, 81, 84, 87, 89–90,
 92–95, 97, 100, 108–109, 113–114, 116,
 118, 120, 122, 126, 136–137, 141, 144,
 146–149, 152–153, 157–158, 161,
 163–170, 172–174, 177, 179, 181, 185,
 189–190, 196, 200–201, 203, 218–221,
 225–226, 229–230, 235–236, 242,
 245–252, 263–268, 277, 282–283, 286,
 292, 294, 305, 316
 Ister[2], 34, 298
 istfragender[1], 173
 Isthmian[1], 233
 It[115], 4, 7, 9, 11–12, 14, 17, 19, 23–24,
 28, 30, 32–33, 37, 40, 45, 47–49, 53–54,
 57, 59, 62, 66, 72–73, 78–79, 81, 85, 89,
 93, 95–98, 100, 102–103, 106, 108–110,
 112, 114, 118–119, 124–125, 129–130,
 133, 136–137, 151, 154, 162, 172,
 179–180, 186, 189–190, 193, 197–198,
 201–204, 215–217, 219, 222, 224–225,
 228–232, 238, 246, 248, 251, 254,
 259–260, 262, 265, 271, 277, 283, 285,
 289, 293
 it[584], 1–14, 17–21, 24, 26–30, 32–38, 41,
 43–47, 51–52, 54–59, 61–63, 66, 69–79,
 81, 83–84, 86–89, 91–92, 94, 96–104,
 106–113, 116–126, 128–131, 133–137,
 140–142, 144–146, 148–153, 155–157,
 159–160, 162, 164–169, 171–177, 181,
 183–186, 189–192, 194–197, 200–202,
 204–216, 218–223, 225–231, 235–237,
 239–242, 244–252, 260–263, 265, 269,
 271–272, 277, 279, 288, 293, 316
 Italian[2], 4, 281
 italicized[2], 152, 279
 italicizes[2], 53, 189
 Italics[2], 31, 74
 italics[7], 53, 58, 153, 189, 236, 245–246
 Italy[2], 45, 106
 item[1], 311
 iteration[1], 29
 Its[5], 107, 116, 150, 181, 271
 its[186], 5–7, 11, 24–25, 30–33, 38, 41, 44,
 49, 51–52, 54–58, 64, 70–71, 78–80,
 83–84, 87–93, 96–97, 101, 103–104,
 106, 118–121, 126, 133–135, 140–141,
 145, 147–148, 150–151, 153, 155, 158,
 161–162, 164–166, 172–173, 177, 179,
 182, 189, 191, 194–198, 200–202,
 204–205, 207, 209, 214–216, 221–222,
 224–227, 231–232, 237–239, 241–242,
 245–246, 248–253, 263–265, 270–271,
 289
 Itself[2], 107, 255
 itself[126], 1, 8, 24, 27, 29, 33, 40, 44, 46,
 63–64, 79, 83, 88–92, 99–100, 103, 136,
 140, 145–146, 150, 152–153, 156–158,
 161, 164–165, 167, 170, 172–173, 175,
 177–178, 185, 195–197, 199–201, 206,
 214, 219–224, 226, 228–230, 235, 239,
 245–246, 248–249, 251–253, 265, 285
 IV[24], 26, 28, 35, 40, 58, 74–75, 79, 81,
 99, 110–111, 115, 122, 125, 141, 161,
 177, 234, 276, 287, 300
 IX[5], 9, 29, 124, 297, 300
 Izzy[1], 62

J

- ja[2], 201, 226
jackasses[2], 54, 228
jacket[1], 129
Jacob[5], 13, 19, 206, 303, 315
Jacobi[5], 67, 211–213
Jacobsthal[1], 104
Jacques[5], 34, 48, 120, 182, 287
Jaensch[1], 271
Jahr[1], 314
Jahrbuch[12], 38, 138–139, 144–145, 284–285, 289, 310
Jahre[8], 87, 95, 120, 267, 281, 283, 290
Jahren[2], 292, 305
Jahresgabe[6], 87, 91, 161, 255
Jahresgaben[1], 307
jahresgaben[1], 283
Jahrhunderts[1], 219
jährigen[1], 286
Jahrtausende[1], 228
Jain[2], 181
Jainism[1], 181
Jake[1], 315
Jakob[3], 209, 211–212
James[6], 3, 74, 89, 230–231, 315
jamming[1], 76
Jan[3], 205, 303, 315
Janicaud[1], 73
Janiger[1], 49
Jantzen[2], 285, 293
Januar[7], 252, 280–281, 289, 291
January[18], 15–16, 43–44, 55, 62, 78, 134, 140, 143, 205, 277, 281, 288, 290, 313, 315
Janurary[3], 276–277, 281
Janus[1], 222
Japan[6], 42, 60, 81, 106, 182
Japaner[1], 81
Japanese[9], 11, 18, 30, 70, 81–82, 127, 262
Jäsche[2], 105–106
Jasper[4], 16, 46, 134
JASPERS[1], 167
Jaspers[21], 16, 46–47, 134, 138, 140–141, 153, 167, 175, 181, 190, 254, 262, 277, 302
Jaspert[1], 275
Je[3], 9, 57, 84
je[7], 114, 160, 190, 219, 230, 236
Jean[20], 47–48, 73, 107, 109, 182, 192, 224, 287, 289, 291, 302–303, 306
Jeanne[2], 48, 287
Jeannine[1], 302
Jede[1], 6
jede[4], 87, 120, 173
Jeder[1], 87
jeder[3], 89, 136, 160
jedes[2], 85, 124
jedesmal[2], 50, 167
Jedi[1], 7
jedoch[4], 113, 148, 174, 245
jedochnicht[1], 190
Jeffery[1], 64
jejune[1], 29
Jemandem[1], 17
Jena[9], 78, 97, 119, 206, 212, 214, 270, 289
Jenaer[1], 97
jene[2], 51, 81
Jenem[1], 266
jener[2], 129, 290
jenes[2], 85, 124
Jens[1], 302
Jenseits[1], 235
jeopardizes[1], 92
jeremiads[3], 5, 78, 91
Jersey[1], 71
Jesuit[1], 15
Jetzt[4], 167, 263, 284
jetzt[6], 143, 148, 158, 246
Jetzte[1], 266
jeweils[2], 160, 276
Jewish[3], 62, 105
Jews[3], 54, 231
Jhg[1], 42
Jing[2], 74
Joachim[2], 45, 301
Joan[10], 39, 80, 90, 100, 143, 145–146, 195, 198, 200

job[2], 26, 30
 jobs[1], 21
 Johann[19], 14, 35, 40, 88, 138, 207,
 211–212, 286–287, 289, 315
 Johanna[1], 15
 Johannes[4], 33, 105, 238
 John[20], 3–4, 23, 56, 103, 105, 115, 129,
 203–204, 213, 254, 273, 275–276, 310,
 315
 Join[1], 112
 join[1], 26
 Joinability[1], 160
 joined[2], 15, 64
 joining[1], 89
 joinings[1], 27
 jointly[1], 289
 joints[1], 27
 joke[2], 39, 108
 jokes[2], 104, 175
 Jonas[2], 23, 182
 Jones[1], 315
 Joni[1], 16
 Jörg[2], 96, 290
 Jörgensen[1], 238
 José[1], 133
 Josef[2], 21, 275
 Joseph[4], 15, 80, 116, 118
 Josephus[2], 277–278
 Josiah[1], 44
 jotted[1], 275
 Journal[7], 148, 198, 201, 207, 290, 292–293
 journal[8], 3, 8, 10, 39, 180, 194, 242, 305
 journals[1], 51
 Journey[1], 152
 journey[6], 16, 67, 69, 150, 180, 265
 journeys[1], 113
 Jovanovich[1], 129
 joy[3], 122, 125
 jstor[1], 293
 Judaism[1], 20
 judge[1], 215
 judged[1], 231
 judgement[3], 11, 102, 118
 judgements[2], 66, 140
 judging[1], 17
 Judgment[3], 134, 175, 270
 judgment[6], 13, 38, 145, 203, 233, 270
 jug[5], 176–177
 Jugs[1], 177
 juice[2], 258, 263
 Juli[25], 218, 226, 229, 244, 274, 278–279,
 283, 289–294, 307, 309
 Julius[3], 32, 305, 315
 July[34], 15–16, 21, 40–41, 62, 67, 92, 119,
 123, 127, 212, 226, 229, 274–277, 280,
 284–285, 288–290, 315
 jump[4], 50, 235
 jumped[2], 145, 251
 jundamentum[1], 188
 JUNE[1], 231
 June[36], 7, 25, 37, 52, 77, 95, 99, 118,
 127, 147, 207, 217, 219, 224, 226,
 228–230, 245, 251, 272, 276, 280,
 282–284, 286–287, 313, 315
 junge[1], 43
 JÜNGEL[1], 302
 Jungel[1], 302
 jungen[3], 113, 219, 286
 Jünger[54], 8, 10, 18, 21, 24, 32–34, 85,
 110, 117, 156, 186, 196, 235, 254,
 293–294, 299, 304, 307–308
 Jüngere[1], 164
 Jüngeren[1], 164
 Jünglingsverein[4], 274
 Juni[26], 113, 218, 226, 229–230, 280, 282,
 284, 288
 junior[1], 315
 Junkerund[1], 254
 junky[1], 209
 Jürgen[6], 7, 33, 71, 118, 182, 224
 juridial[1], 275
 jurist[1], 105
 Just[11], 4–5, 26, 39, 43, 107, 118, 183,
 258, 260
 just[137], 2, 8, 11, 14–19, 26–27, 30,
 32–36, 38–39, 48–49, 52, 59–61, 64, 69,
 71, 74–77, 79–80, 88, 90, 93, 95–96,
 100–101, 104–107, 109–111, 113–114,
 116–121, 129, 132, 139, 150, 152, 155,
 157–160, 163–164, 167–169, 176–177,
 183, 187, 191, 198, 205–207, 209–210,
 212, 217, 220, 222, 225–226, 228, 230,
 232, 236–237, 240–241, 246, 259, 262,
 283–284, 288

justice[2], *200, 212*
justifiable[1], *78*
justification[2], *99, 220*
justified[3], *151, 153, 158*
justify[1], *70*
justly[1], *59*

K

kai[1], *316*
kairological[6], *95, 156, 169, 180, 184, 188*
Kairos[1], *95*
Kaiser[1], *281*
Kaiserstuhl[2], *67–68*
Kakihara[2], *44, 252*
Kalary[1], *126*
kali[1], *188*
kam[4], *52, 153, 167, 246*
Kampf[7], *73, 84, 98, 196, 276*
kampf[1], *59*
kämpfen[1], *183*
Kangra[1], *61*
kann[20], *34, 43–44, 49, 92, 116, 129, 146, 148–149, 158, 163, 170, 179, 246, 248*
Kant[370], *11, 14, 17, 24, 26, 28, 33, 36, 38, 42–46, 48, 56–60, 67, 74–77, 79–81, 88–89, 94, 99–100, 104–106, 108–109, 113, 118–121, 133–134, 161, 167, 175, 183, 189–190, 192–194, 196–199, 202–213, 215–219, 221, 223, 226, 230, 232, 238, 240, 260–261, 270, 275–278, 286, 292, 296–297, 299*
Kantbook[1], *79*
KantGesellschaft[1], *277*
Kantgesellschaft[3], *147, 277*
Kanti[1], *105*
Kantian[26], *35, 45–46, 55, 75, 80–81, 99, 193–194, 203–204, 206, 209, 211, 223, 270*
Kantianer[1], *81*
Kantianism[8], *44, 46–47, 60, 180, 207*
Kantians[16], *33, 35, 43–46, 120, 197, 203*
Kantischen[1], *270*
Kants[15], *58, 74, 89, 106, 116, 190, 216, 218, 270, 276–277, 290, 297*
Kapitel[1], *137*
kaput[2], *217*
kaputt[1], *217*
kaputtgemacht[1], *217*
Karel[2], *93, 260*
Karen[1], *201*
KARL[1], *167*
Karl[93], *13, 18, 23, 25–26, 28, 34, 37–38, 41, 47, 75–76, 98, 103, 105, 109–110, 116, 118–122, 124–125, 129–131, 134, 138–141, 151, 167, 181–182, 190, 196, 200, 207, 214, 217, 222, 241, 260, 262, 270–271, 275, 281, 285, 301–304, 310*
Karlheinz[1], *303*
Karlsruhe[5], *198, 277–278*
Karma[1], *105*
Kaschnitz[1], *15*
kaścid[1], *125*
Kashmiri[1], *105*
Kassel[9], *37, 122–123, 196, 276*
Kasseler[2], *83, 276*
Kästner[2], *49, 302*
kasyacit[1], *125*
katalog[1], *255*
Käte[1], *271*
Kategorien[2], *103–104*
Kategorienlehre[1], *104*
Kathederspropheten[1], *43*
Katholischen[6], *274, 291*
kaum[1], *190*
Keep[1], *7*
keep[6], *5, 12, 40, 146, 185*
keeping[2], *150, 204*
keeps[1], *189*
Kehre[22], *4, 27, 42, 87, 91, 110, 173, 283–284, 307–308*
Keidel[1], *303*
Keil[1], *303*
Keiling[1], *288*
Kein[1], *221*
kein[12], *63, 108, 136, 148–149, 174, 179, 246*
keine[13], *44, 57, 75, 84, 108, 168, 218, 229, 263*
keinen[1], *137*

keiner[2], 129, 221
Keith[4], 176–177, 293
Kellerer[2], 37
Kemmann[5], 59, 88, 130
Kempff[1], 15
ken[1], 218
Kennedy[2], 59, 130
kennen[6], 14, 101, 157, 236
Kenneth[1], 126
kennt[1], 265
kénnte[1], 264
Kenntnisse[1], 78
kennzeichnen[1], 174
Kennzeichnung[4], 174, 185, 264
Kentucky[3], 315
kerfuffle[1], 107
kerfuffles[1], 79
kernels[1], 66
Kett[1], 314
key[7], 27, 117, 153, 178–179, 215, 316
KGWB[25], 51, 98, 137, 218, 220, 222–224, 226, 228–231, 233, 236, 241
Khichdi[1], 4
Khitt[1], 315
kicked[1], 30
Kiel[9], 190, 271, 280, 290–292
Kierkegaard[5], 3, 195, 202, 291
kill[2], 68, 226
killed[3], 68, 99, 227
killing[1], 68
Kind[1], 10
kind[61], 3, 16–18, 25, 28–31, 34, 38, 54, 63, 66, 69, 71, 78, 89, 92, 94, 101, 117, 127, 135, 137, 151–152, 159, 161, 163, 165, 176, 179–180, 183, 186, 200–203, 205, 211, 220–223, 230, 236, 240, 248, 269
kindle[1], 142
kindled[1], 87
kindlier[1], 4
kindling[1], 262
kindly[1], 144
kinds[10], 3, 8, 10, 15, 36, 39, 90, 182
King[3], 76, 81, 130
king[1], 121
Kingdom[1], 106
KingG[1], 310
Kirchstraße[1], 10
Kisiel[11], 4, 23–24, 37, 139–141, 273, 275, 310
klar[1], 293
Klassenkampf[1], 53
Klassentreffen[1], 281
Klaus[10], 19–20, 37, 91, 117, 255, 270, 289, 293
Klee[8], 15, 287–289, 306
Kleiber[2], 48, 287
Klein[7], 71, 100, 259
kleiner[1], 76
kleineren[1], 291
Klett[7], 254, 301, 313–314
KlettCotta[1], 301
klingt[2], 57, 247
Klopstock[1], 198
Klostermann[19], 8–9, 73, 167, 271, 292–293, 296, 301–302
klostermann[1], 51
klug[1], 228
Kluwer[1], 302
knew[24], 5, 11–13, 26, 52, 74, 76, 89, 103, 105, 120–121, 128–130, 137, 148, 169, 249, 259
knock[2], 31, 56
Knot[2], 5, 100
knots[2], 100, 233
knout[2], 175, 201
know[76], 2, 9–11, 14–16, 18, 21, 35, 37, 42–43, 56, 60, 64, 68–70, 73, 76, 78–79, 101, 112, 120, 128–129, 131, 143–144, 156–157, 160, 177, 181–182, 186, 189, 193, 198, 200, 211, 213–215, 221–222, 225, 227, 236, 242, 244, 249, 259–260, 262
knowing[8], 78, 103, 105, 114, 163, 182, 200, 261
Knowledge[2], 191, 221
knowledge[59], 7, 12, 28, 36, 41, 44–45, 53, 75, 78, 83, 107, 115–116, 136, 149, 191, 193–195, 197–199, 201–202, 205–206, 219, 221, 223, 226, 228, 230–231, 246, 251–253
known[49], 9, 12–13, 15, 17, 23, 26, 28, 31, 35–37, 39, 43–44, 47, 60, 62–63, 72, 80, 93, 104, 125, 128, 147, 155, 175, 182, 209, 212, 220–221, 233, 239, 241,

262, 265, 273, 282, 293, 303
 knows[8], 21, 35–36, 70, 122, 150, 184
 knüftigen[2], 185, 264
 Koch[2], 91, 255
 Kohlhammer[1], 41
 Kohrs[1], 304
 Kojève[1], 214
 Kojirna[1], 96
 Kollegiengebäude[1], 48
 Kolloquium[4], 264, 293
 Köln[5], 275–276, 314
 Koln[1], 275
 Kommen[3], 40, 173
 kommen[5], 112, 163, 237, 241, 268
 Kommerell[7], 283–284, 290, 302–303
 kommt[5], 20, 87, 95, 98, 120
 kömmt[2], 118, 261
 kompetente[1], 144
 König[1], 21
 Königstein[1], 267
 können[12], 49, 70, 80, 108, 116, 136, 164,
 169, 179, 252
 konnte[1], 99
 könnte[3], 126, 173, 268
 könnten[1], 84
 konnten[1], 104
 Konradihaus[1], 15
 Konradin[3], 286, 314
 Konstanz[6], 281, 286, 288
 Kontroverse[1], 278
 Konvolut[3], 165, 257, 288
 kooky[1], 74
 Kopie[3], 271, 276, 278
 korpora[1], 216
 Korrektur[1], 286
 Kösel[1], 127
 Kosik[2], 93, 260
 Kostas[4], 48, 73, 287
 KOTTE[2], 244
 kotte[1], 248
 Koyré[1], 214
 Kraft[4], 104, 163, 181, 297
 kraft[1], 158
 kraken[2], 52
 Kränzchen[6], 61, 276, 279, 282
 Kranzchen[1], 279
 Kratylos[3], 59, 104, 118
 Krebs[1], 274
 Kreenheinstetten[2], 168, 274
 Kreis[2], 89, 283
 kreis[1], 236
 Kreise[1], 291
 Kreises[1], 89
 Krell[5], 135, 182, 238, 273, 315
 Kreutzer[4], 284, 286, 314
 Kreuzer[1], 286
 Kreuzfahrt[1], 292
 Krieg[1], 254
 Krieger[1], 254
 kriegsführenden[1], 274
 Kriegsgefangenenlager[1], 164
 Kriegsnotsemester[1], 298
 Krisis[6], 95, 106, 178–179
 Kritik[17], 44–45, 80, 183, 194, 203, 223,
 241, 244, 270–271, 274, 277, 297
 KRITIKE[1], 231
 kritische[1], 203
 kritischen[1], 57
 Kritisches[1], 207
 Krohn[2], 281, 303
 Kruger[3], 104, 270
 Krüger[4], 121, 270
 Krummer[1], 290
 Krumsiek[1], 303
 KSA[2], 222, 226
 Kuhn[2], 3, 315
 Kulturgut[1], 158
 Kulturwerte[1], 236
 kulturwissenschaftlichen[1], 276
 künftig[1], 89
 künftige[2], 26, 281
 KÜNFTIGEN[1], 159
 Kuno[2], 33, 44
 KUNST[1], 288
 Kunst[16], 40, 98, 114, 267, 271, 285,
 290–292, 294, 297, 299, 306, 314
 Kunste[1], 284
 Künste[2], 289, 292
 Künsten[1], 285
 Kunsthalle[1], 289
 künstlerischen[1], 51
 künstliche[1], 126

Kunstwerkes[3], *281, 305*
Kunstwerks[2], *306*
Kunstwissenschaftlichen[1], *281*
Kurt[6], *188, 271, 282, 302–303*
kurz[1], *84*
Kurze[1], *293*
Kurzgefassete[1], *207*
Kusch[1], *153*
kva[1], *125*

L

La[2], *15, 109*
la[10], *9, 32, 39, 48, 55, 227, 286*
labeled[1], *10*
labor[4], *100, 249*
labors[2], *197, 204*
labyrinth[1], *259*
Lacan[2], *4, 29*
Lacanand[2], *48, 287*
Laches[4], *83, 131*
lack[8], *80, 97, 118, 152, 156, 221, 236*
lacked[1], *119*
lacking[7], *30, 64, 66, 82, 127, 163, 186*
lacks[1], *172*
Lacunae[1], *38*
lacunae[2], *2, 11*
ladder[4], *68, 102, 111*
lady[4], *14–15, 24*
Laërtius[1], *54*
Laertius[3], *233*
Lafont[1], *153*
lag[2], *143, 219*
Lage[2], *158, 281*
laid[2], *31, 103*
läingst[1], *181*
Lake[1], *45*
Lakoff[1], *85*
lam[1], *60*
lamentation[1], *78*
laments[1], *129*
Lamont[1], *120*

land[3], *19, 95, 179*
Ländern[1], *143*
Landern[1], *274*
Landgrafenhaus[1], *286*
landing[2], *15, 189*
Landkreis[1], *315*
Landmesser[2], *175, 302*
landscape[2], *35, 168*
Landschaft[2], *169, 281*
lane[1], *47*
lang[1], *95*
Lange[1], *44*
lange[2], *148, 169*
Langemarck[1], *18*
länger[2], *85, 162*
längeren[1], *245*
LANGUAGE[1], *288*
Language[4], *86, 165, 290*
language[73], *3, 8, 12–14, 26, 28–31, 34, 39, 42, 51, 59, 70–71, 104, 127–128, 144, 166, 182, 184, 186, 194, 213, 221, 226–227, 238, 244–245, 260, 269, 288*
languages[7], *7, 30, 60, 71, 82, 127, 194*
langwierigen[1], *143*
Lanham[1], *304*
lantern[1], *49*
Lao[2], *81*
Laotse[2], *81*
Lappenberg[1], *315*
lapse[1], *114*
large[11], *8, 13–14, 46, 54, 69, 168, 188, 259, 261, 286*
largely[1], *141*
larger[5], *40, 128, 168, 198, 238*
largescale[1], *87*
largest[1], *233*
Laruelle[1], *109*
laser[1], *180*
Lask[1], *44*
Laslowski[2], *16, 303*
lassen[6], *40, 76–77, 246*
Last[3], *62, 87, 237*
last[103], *4, 8–9, 11–13, 15, 18, 21, 23, 26, 31–32, 38, 40, 42–43, 45, 48, 52, 55, 71–74, 86, 91, 94–96, 98, 103, 111, 113, 115, 125, 130, 139, 141, 144, 146–147, 150, 159–160, 162, 177–180, 185, 188,*

196, 201, 203–204, 207, 215, 218,
 222–223, 228, 230, 235, 240, 253,
 259–260, 263, 265, 276, 285, 294
 lasted[2], 109, 289
 Lasting[1], 33
 lasting[5], 70, 106, 182, 209, 259
 Late[1], 138
 late[25], 3, 17, 27, 32–33, 74, 85, 89,
 105–106, 117, 152, 154, 156, 161, 163,
 166, 175, 177, 180–181, 203, 224, 228,
 233
 Later[17], 18, 35, 43–45, 131, 134, 140,
 151–153, 226, 271–272, 276, 281
 later[121], 8–10, 12, 15–16, 18–19, 23–24,
 27, 30–32, 34, 37, 41–42, 44, 47, 50–51,
 53, 56–58, 62–63, 70–71, 73, 75, 78–79,
 84, 86, 89, 95–96, 98, 100, 104–105,
 113–114, 121–122, 127, 129, 131, 134,
 138, 143–145, 149–151, 154–155,
 157–158, 161, 169–170, 176–177,
 179–181, 184, 195, 212, 216–217, 222,
 224, 244–245, 252, 258–259, 271, 277,
 282, 288, 294
 Latest[1], 207
 latest[5], 11, 19, 60, 104, 157
 Latin[21], 8, 10, 14, 59, 69, 100, 108, 126,
 134, 181, 192, 263, 316
 Latinized[2], 14
 Latsis[1], 292
 latter[8], 4, 30, 151, 158, 195, 215, 249
 laude[1], 38
 Laufende[3], 77, 92, 143
 Läufer[1], 40
 läuft[1], 108
 Laufzeit[1], 311
 laugh[3], 39, 134, 175
 laughs[1], 39
 Laughter[1], 39
 laughter[2], 39, 129
 launch[1], 43
 laureate[1], 62
 Laurence[1], 254
 lautet[1], 263
 Law[2], 118, 165
 law[7], 123, 131, 149, 201, 218, 229, 294
 Lawrence[3], 59, 130, 249
 laws[3], 161, 275
 lay[7], 99, 181, 190, 198, 218, 230, 262
 layers[1], 36
 laying[5], 79, 100, 148, 205
 layout[2], 68, 101
 lays[2], 121, 196
 Lazar[1], 32
 läßt[12], 26, 40, 50, 146, 166, 169, 185,
 247, 264, 267–268
 LBI[1], 216
 Le[8], 26, 34, 43, 100, 123, 128, 131, 294
 le[1], 9
 lead[13], 54, 60, 76, 87, 89, 117, 131, 166,
 174–175, 197, 240
 leader[2], 63, 106
 leadership[1], 95
 Leading[1], 153
 leading[13], 35, 46, 55, 67, 83, 85, 89, 91,
 146, 224, 240
 Leads[1], 293
 leads[15], 70, 83, 99, 102, 113, 132, 142,
 155, 174, 203, 208, 212, 232–233
 leap[6], 42, 70, 153, 160, 168, 195
 leaping[1], 49
 leaps[6], 70, 163, 184
 learn[29], 28, 35, 59, 62, 67, 106, 113, 117,
 123–124, 126, 128–130, 161, 164, 209,
 220, 259–260
 learned[8], 25, 65, 106, 117, 128, 134, 207,
 209
 Learners[2], 123, 131
 Learning[1], 125
 learning[10], 128–129, 228, 262
 learns[3], 115, 123, 131
 Leary[1], 49
 least[44], 3, 12, 15–16, 19, 21, 30, 32, 36,
 38–40, 47, 59, 69, 71, 90, 95, 113–114,
 118, 121, 137, 171, 179, 185, 190,
 192–193, 206, 211, 214, 222–223, 231,
 233, 235, 281
 leave[12], 26, 35, 61, 63, 76, 87, 100, 124,
 135, 157, 188
 leaves[9], 40, 56, 61, 83, 105, 118, 134,
 206, 232
 leaving[4], 40, 90, 130, 222
 Lebannon[1], 315
 Lebanon[1], 315
 Leben[7], 42, 76, 130, 201, 219, 230, 310

lebendig[3], 198, 219, 291
 lebendigen[1], 104
 Lebens[3], 34, 236, 298
 Lebensführung[1], 133
 Lebensweges[10], 86, 97, 101, 118, 177,
 198, 273, 277, 286, 296
 Lebenswürdigung[1], 133
 LECTURE[1], 258
 Lecture[12], 124, 133, 202, 207, 245,
 284–286, 289–291
 lecture[177], 10, 13–14, 16–17, 21, 24, 26,
 29, 35–39, 41, 43, 46, 48, 51, 57, 60–61,
 67–68, 74–77, 81, 84–85, 87, 89–90, 95,
 97–98, 101, 106, 108, 114, 118, 120,
 123, 126–127, 129–130, 132, 134, 137,
 139, 146–147, 150–153, 157, 163–165,
 167–168, 181, 190, 196, 201, 207–208,
 217, 221–223, 244–245, 249, 262–263,
 270, 273–275, 277–294, 311
 lectured[5], 14, 59, 98, 214, 286
 lecturers[2], 78
 Lectures[26], 7, 25, 106, 123–124, 168,
 196, 206–209, 211, 214, 273, 277
 lectures[91], 11–14, 21–22, 24, 29–30, 32,
 36–42, 44, 46, 53, 59, 67, 69, 71, 76, 79,
 84–85, 96, 98, 105, 110, 114, 121–123,
 126, 131, 147–148, 168, 175, 180, 193,
 196, 198, 206–207, 211–212, 214, 217,
 222, 238, 248, 271, 273, 277–278, 281,
 287–288, 292
 lecutre[1], 277
 led[9], 2, 4, 24, 27, 63, 169, 231, 288
 lediglich[1], 263
 Leere[4], 33, 64, 91, 246
 leere[1], 225
 Leeren[3], 76
 Leergelassenheit[1], 176
 leeway[1], 162
 left[43], 3–5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 20, 26, 35, 40,
 43, 45, 47, 56, 71, 75–76, 86, 104, 114,
 119, 158, 182, 203, 206, 209, 218, 259,
 261, 272, 284
 legacies[1], 77
 LEGACY[1], 92
 Legacy[10], 26, 71, 86, 91–93, 180, 185,
 265
 legacy[10], 10, 26, 40, 49, 63, 67, 72, 182,
 261
 legal[1], 37
 lege[5], 2, 5, 10, 69, 72
 Legendi[1], 270
 legendi[1], 274
 Léger[2], 48, 287
 legitimate[1], 248
 legt[1], 247
 Lehre[13], 74–75, 89, 107, 113, 116, 221,
 270, 276, 282, 285, 298
 Lehrer[4], 67, 129, 164, 180
 Lehrers[1], 129
 Lehrstück[1], 190
 lehrt[1], 164
 leibhafte[1], 235
 Leibnitz[8], 218–219, 229–230
 Leibnitzischen[2], 218, 229
 Leibniz[34], 7, 17, 26, 35, 45–46, 57,
 99–100, 117, 121, 193–195, 202–203,
 205–207, 217, 251, 287, 297, 299
 Leibnizens[3], 58, 205, 218
 Leibregiment[1], 18
 leicht[2], 84, 173
 Leim[1], 15
 Leipzig[5], 60, 110, 194, 274, 281
 Leitgedanken[1], 299
 leitmotif[1], 66
 leitmotifs[4], 72, 183
 Leitspruch[4], 57, 74, 86
 Leitwort[1], 285
 lektischen[1], 201
 length[4], 8, 114, 171, 238
 lengthy[9], 36, 61, 86, 91, 118, 144, 244,
 265, 279
 Lenin[1], 254
 Leo[2], 127, 217
 Leonhard[1], 207
 lernen[4], 113, 126, 129, 220
 lernend[1], 164
 Les[2], 39
 Lesern[1], 51
 less[22], 2, 14, 29, 48, 86, 104, 109–110,
 128, 152–153, 180–181, 190, 194, 222,
 227, 231–232, 260–262
 Lesser[1], 123
 Lessing[4], 67, 138, 211
 lessnessing[1], 236
 lesson[1], 190

lessons[1], 129
 lest[1], 29
 Lesung[1], 291
 Let[10], 24, 40, 47, 149, 177, 203, 220, 230, 261, 263
 let[16], 8, 29, 52, 63, 78, 83, 92, 128, 200, 233, 258–259, 261
 lethality[1], 68
 lets[2], 50, 128
 Letter[47], 16, 33, 36, 46–48, 51, 67, 75, 78, 80, 96, 98, 105, 110–111, 122, 129, 143, 151, 156, 162, 168, 183, 186, 203–204, 209, 217, 222, 233, 245, 250, 264–265, 272, 306
 letter[131], 2, 9–11, 13, 15–16, 18–19, 23, 25, 27–28, 32, 43, 46–48, 51–52, 59, 62, 71, 74–76, 78, 80, 93–94, 96, 99, 105–106, 110, 113, 117–118, 120, 122, 124, 127–129, 131, 134, 141, 143, 151, 153, 156, 164, 175, 181, 186, 190, 194, 205–207, 212, 217, 244–245, 247, 249–251, 259–260, 262, 275, 277, 285, 294, 301–303
 Letters[15], 9, 19, 52, 62–63, 78, 86, 96, 270, 301–302, 304
 letters[39], 8, 10–12, 15–17, 33, 71–72, 74, 104, 113, 118, 123–124, 162, 181, 207, 216, 254, 259, 275–276, 302–304
 letting[1], 101
 LETZTE[1], 159
 letzte[2], 95, 160
 letzten[6], 77, 235, 252, 264, 268, 293
 letzter[3], 8, 12, 74
 leuchten[1], 84
 leugnen[2], 227
 Level[2], 237, 311
 level[8], 7, 67, 79, 89, 125, 142, 147, 174
 levels[6], 27, 171, 182, 186, 259
 Leviathan[3], 17, 47, 282
 Levinas[5], 4, 45, 65, 182
 lex[1], 232
 lexica[1], 29
 Lexicon[1], 29
 lexicon[1], 3
 LH[2], 51, 92
 Lharampa[1], 61
 LHP[1], 214
 Li[1], 316
 lib[2], 278
 liberal[3], 4, 75, 152
 liberalism[1], 137
 liberation[1], 131
 libraries[2], 10, 19
 Library[2], 14, 281
 library[6], 11, 13, 16, 113, 272, 278
 Lichte[1], 173
 lichtendes[1], 166
 lichtet[1], 173
 Lichtgang[1], 287
 Lichtung[15], 27, 153, 173, 246–248
 lie[6], 7, 199, 225, 227, 238
 Liebe[2], 104, 116
 Liebeserklärung[1], 288
 Liebmann[2], 33, 44
 Lied[1], 316
 lied[1], 225
 Liederhalle[1], 289
 liegt[4], 107, 114, 147, 245
 Lies[1], 238
 lies[15], 53, 96, 119, 131, 147, 178, 189, 195–196, 199, 202, 218, 228, 246
 Liesel[2], 33, 276
 liess[1], 76
 liest[1], 314
 Life[7], 86, 97, 121, 238, 273, 275
 life[67], 2, 5, 8, 10, 13, 17–18, 23–25, 34, 42, 45–46, 48, 52, 54, 62, 64, 66, 71, 73, 76–77, 93–94, 104, 111, 116, 129–130, 133–134, 147, 168–169, 180, 184, 188–189, 203, 216, 219, 227–228, 230, 234–236, 238–239, 254
 lifelike[1], 100
 lifelong[3], 122, 175, 225
 lifetime[10], 61, 102, 105, 114, 143, 149, 156, 186, 305
 lifted[1], 103
 lifting[1], 52
 light[18], 2, 28, 72, 79, 83, 88, 90, 97, 116, 143, 145, 158, 172, 181, 183, 194, 202, 205
 Liiceanu[1], 178
 Like[11], 30, 33–34, 56, 70, 80, 113, 184, 188, 214, 221
 like[99], 3, 5, 10, 13–15, 18, 26–28, 30–32,

42, 46, 52–53, 56, 58, 60, 62, 66, 68–69,
 71, 73–74, 76, 80, 94, 97, 100–101,
 103–106, 108, 110, 113–114, 116, 119,
 124, 127, 129, 140, 142, 144, 146–147,
 157, 173, 180–181, 183–185, 188–189,
 194, 203, 206, 215, 223–224, 231, 233,
 247, 259, 316
 liked[3], 16, 30, 113
 likely[8], 16, 62, 100, 105, 128–129, 169,
 177
 likes[1], 110
 Likewise[1], 123
 likewise[1], 190
 Lilly[2], 14, 202
 limitation[2], 232
 limitations[1], 232
 limited[13], 9, 13, 18, 36, 60, 73–74, 140,
 197, 213, 232, 259
 limitee[1], 9
 limits[2], 159, 265
 Linder[1], 303
 Lindner[1], 32
 Lindstrom[2], 315
 line[9], 2, 4, 50, 66, 100, 142, 192, 260
 lineage[1], 56
 linear[1], 311
 lines[11], 28, 75, 79–80, 123, 131, 176,
 203, 252
 linguist[1], 105
 linguistic[1], 104
 Linie[3], 156, 186, 248
 Link[1], 175
 link[1], 71
 linked[3], 178, 200
 links[6], 118, 155, 183, 192, 242
 Lippitz[1], 311
 liquefied[1], 106
 List[2], 273, 310
 list[23], 3, 14, 26, 43, 52, 58, 75, 82, 91,
 118, 165, 182, 272–273, 277, 301, 304
 Listed[2], 244, 293
 listed[17], 20, 48, 92, 118, 130, 165, 238,
 244, 256, 265–266, 275, 285, 289, 304,
 310
 Listen[1], 316
 listen[4], 15, 81, 123, 131
 listener[1], 63
 listeners[2], 76, 130
 listening[5], 105, 267, 291
 Listige[1], 142
 listing[1], 310
 lists[1], 17
 literally[1], 217
 Literary[2], 20, 37
 literary[3], 4, 109, 283
 Literaturarchiv[3], 273, 303
 Literature[4], 92, 154, 273, 303
 literature[10], 13, 18, 106, 110, 128, 244,
 277, 285
 little[27], 15, 35, 47, 56, 59, 63, 67, 75,
 83–84, 86, 105, 110, 117, 119–121, 130,
 152, 159, 177, 205–206, 260
 Littlefield[2], 304
 live[3], 85, 125, 222
 lived[6], 15–16, 25, 182, 213
 lively[1], 25
 Lives[1], 233
 lives[6], 16, 29, 39, 240, 269
 living[15], 7, 14, 18, 45, 52, 64, 76, 103,
 121, 128, 158, 240, 254
 ll[2], 25, 34
 Inzwischen[1], 69
 loaf[2], 43
 local[2], 23, 273
 locate[1], 4
 locates[1], 135
 Location[6], 44, 47–48, 278, 284, 289
 location[3], 165, 204
 locations[1], 273
 Locke[9], 56, 203–204, 207–208, 211, 213
 locked[1], 222
 loco[1], 144
 loftiness[1], 238
 Lofty[1], 118
 lofty[1], 259
 logging[2], 68
 Logic[63], 7, 41, 44, 46, 84, 88, 99,
 102–104, 106, 116, 121, 150, 152,
 193–194, 207–209, 214, 249, 251, 274,
 287
 logic[27], 31, 44, 46, 56, 62, 102–103, 105,
 152, 193–194, 202, 214–215, 235,
 249–251
 Logical[1], 141

logical[16], *44, 60–61, 145–146, 152, 157, 192, 200, 225, 240*
 Logico[1], *68*
 Logik[34], *7, 21, 37–38, 45, 51, 84, 95, 106, 118, 152, 226, 235, 249–252, 285, 297–298, 311*
 Logische[3], *130, 141, 224*
 logische[1], *287*
 logischer[1], *146*
 logistics[1], *202*
 logographos[1], *43*
 Logoi[1], *171*
 Logos[4], *199, 285, 287*
 logos[2], *199, 221*
 λόγος[4], *81*
 logs[1], *168*
 logy[4], *193, 195, 312*
 Lohmann[1], *105*
 London[1], *143*
 lonely[1], *78*
 Long[2], *233, 259*
 long[30], *2–3, 10–11, 21, 30, 44, 54, 64, 79, 93, 96, 105–107, 117, 131, 148, 165, 168, 176, 181, 196, 203, 226, 228–229, 244, 259*
 longer[49], *3, 9, 14, 18, 24, 28–29, 52, 75, 77, 81, 84–85, 96–98, 105, 111, 115, 118, 133, 141, 162, 172, 188, 197, 231, 236, 244–248, 260, 266, 270, 273*
 longest[2], *225, 231*
 longhidden[1], *95*
 longing[1], *229*
 longstanding[1], *80*
 longtime[1], *47*
 look[17], *19, 32, 49, 58, 72, 90, 108, 127, 145–146, 149, 161, 172, 174, 204–205*
 looked[2], *109, 208*
 Looking[4], *49, 86, 260, 263*
 looking[17], *16, 25, 52, 57–58, 92, 94, 96, 184, 191, 202–203, 218, 230, 262*
 looks[2], *208, 247*
 looms[1], *147*
 loosely[1], *7*
 loosening[3], *181, 190, 262*
 Loquaciousness[1], *63*
 loquitur[1], *8*
 Lorettohöhe[1], *18*
 Lörrach[1], *287*
 Lorrach[1], *287*
 Los[1], *104*
 Lose[3], *150, 166, 265*
 lose[1], *40*
 losen[1], *167*
 losing[1], *44*
 loss[1], *99*
 Lost[1], *292*
 lost[22], *18–19, 21–23, 36, 57, 68, 113, 118, 140, 194, 205–206, 226, 233, 260, 273, 279, 294*
 lot[12], *14, 30–31, 67, 94, 103, 138, 151, 154, 161, 259, 261*
 Lots[1], *261*
 lots[8], *19, 67, 69, 117, 131, 150, 160, 261*
 Lotze[6], *44, 108, 274*
 Lou[1], *224*
 loud[1], *278*
 loudness[1], *154*
 Louis[2], *315*
 love[8], *70, 103, 110, 116, 184, 199*
 loved[1], *168*
 lovers[1], *15*
 Lovitt[2], *123, 131*
 low[2], *53, 227*
 Lower[1], *315*
 lower[3], *29, 111, 160*
 Löwith[50], *18, 23, 25, 28, 39, 41, 75–76, 98, 110, 120–122, 124–125, 129–131, 139, 151, 182, 217, 260, 270, 275, 281, 302, 304*
 Loyola[1], *311*
 LP[3], *15, 286*
 LSD[1], *18*
 lt[1], *91*
 Ltd[1], *143*
 Luc[2], *182, 224*
 Lucien[2], *48, 287*
 luck[1], *17*
 Lücke[1], *144*
 Lucknow[1], *105*
 lucky[1], *100*
 Luczak[1], *302*
 Ludwig[15], *23, 33–34, 68, 92, 98, 110, 214, 289, 292, 301–302*
 Ludwigs[3], *46, 48, 217*

Ludz[1], 301
Luft[2], 85, 124
Luise[3], 15, 281, 303
LuluMax[1], 315
luminosity[1], 3
lumped[1], 146
lumper[1], 39
lurch[1], 167
Lust[1], 271
Luther[6], 60, 275–276, 290
Luthers[1], 290
Lütterfelds[1], 272
Lyceum[3], 113, 128
lying[1], 119
Lykeion[1], 128
lyrics[1], 177
Lysimachus[1], 83

M

ma[1], 9
Macdonald[1], 261
Mach[3], 224
Machbarkeit[1], 236
machen[8], 58, 77, 80, 92, 160, 218, 220, 245
Machenschaft[2], 220
Machiavelli[2], 231–232
machinal[1], 220
Machination[4], 8, 200, 220
machination[2], 97, 220
machine[3], 220
machines[1], 202
Macht[7], 40, 98, 114, 221, 226, 297–298
macht[3], 237, 241
mad[1], 74
Made[4], 42, 99, 193, 205
made[54], 7, 9, 11, 19, 21, 23, 32, 36–38, 62, 69, 73, 88, 101, 104, 109–110, 113–114, 119, 128, 130, 138–139, 145–146, 150, 155–156, 178, 182, 184, 198, 206, 209, 215, 220, 231, 251, 262
Madison[1], 71

Madman[1], 227
madman[1], 74
madness[1], 59
mag[5], 33, 64, 91, 190, 236
magazine[1], 49
magazines[1], 10
magic[3], 75, 218, 230
magician[2], 75, 130
magis[2], 258
magisterial[1], 12
magnanimous[1], 73
magnificent[3], 16, 55, 167
magnified[1], 239
Magnifizenz[1], 280
magnifying[1], 36
magnum[6], 16, 42, 109, 130, 138, 200
magnus[1], 224
Magrini[2], 230–231
Maha[2], 101, 290
Mahabhashya[1], 105
mahavihara[1], 60
Mahler[1], 316
Mai[28], 42, 72, 165, 179, 190, 265, 279–281, 284–292, 308, 313
Maimonides[1], 192
Main[22], 8, 47, 70, 167, 184, 271–272, 277, 281–282, 290, 292, 296, 301–302, 311
main[17], 7, 10, 13, 36, 38–39, 48, 56–57, 76, 144, 192, 217, 250, 254
Mainländer[2], 19, 32
mainline[1], 4
mainstream[1], 4
maintain[1], 189
maintained[2], 107, 176
Maintenant[1], 47
mais[1], 9
Major[2], 42, 316
major[30], 11, 23, 28, 30, 46, 54, 60, 65, 68, 70–71, 80, 82, 94, 119, 148, 151–152, 179, 181, 183, 192, 214, 217, 224, 238, 250, 261, 271
majority[10], 2, 4, 19, 21, 28, 61, 123, 150, 186, 254
Make[1], 4
make[50], 2, 5, 8, 10, 12, 18, 26–27, 29, 38, 51, 54–55, 57, 59, 74, 76–77, 89,

116, 130, 140, 146, 156, 159–160, 165, 175–176, 178, 182, 194, 197, 215, 217, 220, 222–223, 228, 245, 269
makes[28], *3, 5, 7–8, 28, 32, 37, 39, 64, 78, 89, 97, 106, 111, 116, 136, 140, 146, 152, 158, 176, 184, 202, 217, 237, 241, 259*
Making[3], *5, 92, 122*
making[11], *8, 37, 53, 60, 62, 85, 146, 149–150*
Makkreel[1], *182*
Mal[1], *114*
Malebranche[1], *207*
malfeasance[1], *179*
malingering[1], *17*
Mallisena[1], *181*
Maly[1], *126*
Man[16], *29, 111, 115, 155, 164, 226, 237, 239–240, 265, 269*
man[74], *27, 32, 34, 56, 63, 72, 74–78, 96–98, 112, 119, 130–131, 141, 152, 157–158, 164, 181, 186, 189, 195, 200, 216, 219–222, 228, 233, 235, 237–242, 248, 270, 294*
manage[1], *31*
management[1], *5*
Manchester[1], *68*
mand[1], *110*
Manessier[1], *289*
Manfred[2], *264, 304*
Mani[2], *101, 290*
manifest[1], *24*
manifestations[1], *95*
manifested[1], *60*
manifestly[1], *148*
Manifesto[1], *34*
manifesto[1], *4*
manifold[1], *181*
manipulator[1], *114*
Mankind[1], *236*
mankind[2], *13, 216*
Mann[2], *76, 285*
Manner[3], *274*
manner[18], *36, 72, 80, 123, 125–126, 131–132, 134, 157, 196–197, 202, 251, 265*
Mannheim[2], *244*
mannigfachen[1], *23*
mantle[1], *35*
manual[1], *11*
Manuscript[1], *303*
manuscript[33], *12, 17, 21, 37–38, 40, 56, 87, 91, 112, 138–139, 144, 151, 154, 166, 205, 272–273, 275, 277, 284, 294*
Manuscripts[3], *9, 95–96*
manuscripts[48], *9–10, 12–13, 17, 19–21, 28, 36, 40, 44, 52, 92, 114, 165, 205, 273, 278–279, 282, 303, 311*
Manuskript[21], *87, 91, 161, 307–308*
Manuskripte[8], *95, 255–257, 266*
Manuskripttitel[23], *17, 20, 91, 255–257, 266, 271, 273, 276, 283–284, 286–287, 290–291, 293–294*
Many[19], *6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 25, 27, 47, 116, 128, 179, 182, 186, 213, 259, 262, 273*
many[152], *2–5, 7–8, 10–11, 13, 15–19, 21–26, 30–32, 36–38, 42–43, 48, 52, 54, 60, 62–63, 65–71, 73, 79, 82–83, 85, 87, 89, 94, 96, 101, 105, 108, 112–114, 123, 128, 130–131, 133, 136–137, 139, 147, 154–155, 161–162, 169, 177, 179–182, 186, 192, 195, 206, 209, 215, 220, 224, 226, 232, 235, 244, 259–262, 273, 280, 301*
Mao[2], *101*
Mappe[4], *16, 91, 291*
Mappen[2], *91, 266*
mapping[1], *30*
Marbach[18], *9, 12, 19–20, 36–37, 52, 112, 117, 154, 273, 276, 293–294, 301, 303*
marbach[1], *255*
MarbachBericht[1], *19*
Marble[1], *254*
Marburg[54], *16, 21, 24, 28, 35, 38, 44, 46, 85, 104–105, 115, 120–121, 123, 129, 131, 138, 141, 144, 190, 197, 270–271, 275–278, 286*
Marburger[8], *85, 276, 311*
Marburgers[1], *289*
Marburgian[1], *44*
Marcel[12], *28, 47–48, 73, 107–109, 176, 287, 303*
March[40], *15, 17–19, 35, 39, 43, 45, 47–48, 60, 71, 93, 99, 101–102, 109, 112, 140, 226, 260, 275–278, 281, 285,*

290, 292, 301, 315
 Marcus[3], 75, 80, 204
 Marcuse[51], 26, 36–37, 42–43, 47, 93, 95,
 110, 118, 131, 182, 260, 262, 272,
 277–278, 282, 311
 Margherita[1], 285
 margin[3], 45
 Marginal[2], 89, 172
 marginal[1], 41
 MARGINALIA[1], 21
 Marginalia[1], 10
 marginalia[10], 10, 21, 139, 141, 272, 311
 Marginalien[2], 51
 Marguerite[1], 15
 Marie[1], 15
 Marion[2], 37, 315
 Mark[10], 15, 17, 20, 107, 112, 299, 301
 mark[6], 26, 43, 99, 227, 254
 marked[2], 45, 232
 market[1], 144
 marketplaces[1], 78
 Markgräfler[1], 15
 marking[1], 10
 markings[1], 10
 marks[5], 43, 66, 69, 217, 232
 Marlin[2], 51, 179
 Marly[2], 285
 Marmorklippen[1], 254
 marriage[1], 315
 married[8], 15–16, 39, 271, 315
 marry[1], 39
 Marshall[1], 62
 marshalled[2], 66, 115
 Marten[6], 18, 38–39, 121, 185
 martial[1], 61
 MARTIN[4], 33, 49, 167, 169
 Martin[603], 1–316
 MartinHeidegger[1], 312
 Martinus[1], 258
 Marwitz[1], 18
 Marx[34], 13, 23, 25–26, 34, 49, 95,
 102–103, 109, 116, 118–119, 196, 200,
 222, 240–241, 260
 Marxian[1], 222
 Marxism[5], 7, 53–54, 75, 118
 Marxist[5], 32, 95–96, 119, 131
 Marz[4], 274, 283, 288
 März[7], 277, 281–282, 288
 Maschine[1], 220
 Maschinen[1], 220
 Masken[1], 270
 Mass[1], 286
 mass[1], 36
 Massachusetts[1], 261
 Master[2], 263, 310
 master[13], 46, 96–97, 108, 126, 128, 177,
 179, 197, 229
 masterpiece[1], 214
 masters[1], 200
 Mastery[1], 10
 match[1], 233
 material[7], 101, 110, 197, 251–252
 Materialien[1], 289
 materialis[1], 101
 materialism[6], 33, 102, 119, 222
 materialistically[1], 119
 Materials[1], 192
 materials[20], 12–13, 20–21, 23, 30, 46, 68,
 190, 204–205, 255, 272–273
 mathematical[3], 100, 197
 mathematician[2], 43, 148
 Matter[6], 1, 85, 92, 161, 177, 291
 matter[34], 4, 6, 26, 72, 83, 101, 110,
 112–113, 124, 129, 136, 142, 149–150,
 158, 179, 183, 192, 198, 212, 215, 219,
 225, 230, 236, 247–248, 252, 265
 matters[9], 18, 73, 120, 150, 193, 204, 206,
 214, 264
 Mattie[2], 315
 mature[2], 87, 120
 matured[1], 148
 maturing[1], 24
 maturity[3], 87, 120, 224
 Maurice[2], 182
 Max[39], 16, 23, 25, 32, 34, 38, 43, 46, 77,
 105, 110–111, 113, 133, 138–139,
 144–145, 147, 175, 182, 223, 275–276,
 283–285, 290, 301–303
 Maxim[1], 238
 Maxime[1], 306
 maximum[1], 177
 MAY[2], 258, 261
 May[49], 9, 12, 17, 20, 23–24, 33, 37, 42,

47, 61, 72, 75, 80–81, 86, 91, 93–94, 96,
 125, 138–141, 159, 164, 168, 204, 216,
 265, 267, 272, 276, 285–286, 288, 315
 may[58], 3, 8, 12, 17, 20, 26, 29, 33, 36,
 52, 59, 64, 86, 91, 98, 100, 113, 117,
 120, 135, 138, 145–146, 153, 155, 168,
 176–178, 181–182, 189–190, 209, 212,
 223, 228, 236, 238–239, 244, 247,
 254–255, 262, 269, 272–273, 277, 285,
 289
 Maya[1], 29
 Maybe[19], 5, 17–18, 29, 31–32, 48, 69, 74,
 78, 89, 110, 119, 127, 139, 176, 238,
 245, 262
 maybe[21], 11, 15, 17, 26, 30–31, 52, 67,
 77, 90–91, 100, 116, 121, 165, 200, 255,
 259, 279, 288
 Mayr[1], 304
 Maß[1], 167
 MB[1], 284
 McNeil[2], 137, 253
 McNeill[3], 64, 86, 161
 Mdohysische[1], 7
 me[69], 8, 13, 16, 24, 34–35, 39, 61–62, 65,
 83, 86, 98, 110, 112, 114, 116, 121, 124,
 131, 138, 140–141, 143–144, 162,
 166–167, 178, 181, 183, 190, 208, 217,
 223, 226, 228, 231, 242, 245–246,
 258–259, 262–263, 290
 Mean[2], 212
 mean[31], 27, 40, 53–54, 59, 71, 76–78, 92,
 97, 99, 104, 109–111, 127, 148, 156,
 169, 180, 197, 209, 218, 224, 229, 238,
 240, 245–246, 248
 Meaning[4], 149–150, 276
 meaning[44], 5, 26, 29, 38, 40, 46, 61, 76,
 96, 100, 105, 122–123, 136, 140,
 146–147, 149–150, 152, 154–155, 163,
 185, 200, 221–222, 225, 227, 233,
 247–248, 262, 271, 273
 meaningless[2], 64, 93
 Meaninglessness[2], 96
 meaninglessness[4], 96, 236
 meanings[7], 5, 26, 93, 134, 136
 means[49], 2, 12, 31, 38, 49, 68, 71–72,
 75–78, 80–81, 88, 102, 106, 108, 114,
 118, 123, 134–135, 145–146, 149, 152,
 155, 159, 161, 169, 176, 196, 208,
 214–216, 222, 226, 228, 236, 249, 253,
 301
 meant[8], 2, 28, 44, 132, 151, 157, 259
 meantime[9], 9, 19, 46, 51, 144, 171, 182,
 197, 245
 Meanwhile[2], 68, 144
 measure[5], 124, 134–135, 167, 216
 measured[5], 79, 123, 131, 152, 231
 measures[1], 133
 mechanical[1], 251
 mechanically[1], 220
 mechanism[1], 216
 Medal[1], 68
 Medard[16], 13, 62, 105–106, 119, 121,
 127, 162, 217, 301, 304
 Media[1], 288
 media[2], 15, 119
 mediation[1], 88
 medical[4], 17, 52, 121
 Mediennummer[11], 255–257, 266, 273,
 276, 283, 295
 Medieval[1], 60
 medieval[6], 52, 60, 116, 126, 181, 214
 meditating[1], 77
 meditation[3], 157, 159, 163
 meditative[1], 100
 meet[7], 3, 24, 82, 178, 224, 254
 MEETING[1], 258
 meeting[7], 9, 73, 105, 109, 272
 meetings[2], 147, 289
 meets[1], 48
 Megiston[2], 12, 20
 megiston[1], 20
 mehr[20], 14, 77, 81, 84, 115, 141, 156,
 174, 186, 219, 226, 246, 248, 260, 266
 mehrdeutigen[3], 86, 150, 265
 Mehrdeutigkeit[1], 27
 mehrGriechisches[1], 248
 Mehta[2], 59, 129
 Meier[1], 194
 Mein[8], 54, 76, 85, 130, 145, 162, 291
 mein[2], 245
 Meine[2], 219, 230
 meine[9], 34, 98–99, 111, 144, 181, 245
 meinem[1], 247
 meinen[5], 143, 246, 264–265
 meiner[3], 51, 143, 245

meines[2], 16, 291
 meint[4], 111, 148, 219, 268
 meinte[1], 219
 Meinung[2], 126, 136
 meist[1], 150
 meisten[1], 221
 Meister[3], 39, 42, 118
 melee[2], 59, 112
 Melville[1], 52
 Melvin[1], 62
 member[5], 88, 105, 287
 members[4], 44, 118
 memory[2], 41, 284
 men[15], 3, 42, 72, 78, 105, 125, 181, 195,
 212, 238, 259, 265, 288, 291
 mendacious[1], 7
 mended[1], 19
 Mendelssohn[2], 211, 213
 Menno[1], 53
 Mennonitengemeinde[1], 53
 mens[3], 15, 114
 Mensch[8], 237, 241, 270, 284–285, 305
 Menschen[27], 27, 63, 123, 157, 163–164,
 173–174, 190, 200, 220, 236–237, 241,
 248, 268, 274, 290, 293–294, 305,
 307–308
 menschen[1], 251
 menschentümllich[1], 95
 Menschentums[2], 27, 200
 Menschenwelt[1], 270
 menschliche[1], 289
 menschlichen[11], 27, 100–101, 112, 116,
 120, 149, 200, 297
 mental[2], 17, 217
 mention[6], 23–24, 37, 154, 219, 229
 mentioned[21], 12, 17, 29, 38, 41, 70, 80,
 88, 98, 130, 160, 164, 184, 222, 245,
 254, 260, 262, 269, 284
 mentioning[1], 148
 mentions[16], 8, 12, 16–17, 20, 26, 30, 43,
 112, 127, 130, 192, 206, 254, 285
 mere[13], 58–59, 114, 145, 147, 165, 193,
 200, 205, 219, 228, 236, 252
 merely[16], 40, 59, 69, 97, 102, 128, 133,
 193, 202, 204, 215–216, 227, 231, 261
 merging[1], 193
 merit[1], 127
 meritless[2], 127, 183
 merits[1], 70
 merke[1], 120
 Merkur[1], 285
 Merleau[1], 182
 message[10], 5–6, 8, 30, 93, 179
 Messenger[1], 39
 messages[2], 171, 179
 Messkirch[3], 87, 124, 127
 Messner[1], 241
 Met[1], 279
 met[7], 20, 39, 45, 105, 129, 262
 Meta[2], 20, 256
 meta[6], 112, 159, 165, 192, 222, 277
 metacritique[1], 88
 Metahistory[24], 55–56, 192, 194, 202,
 204–209, 214, 250
 metahistory[8], 52, 54, 56–57, 71, 190,
 231–232
 metalevel[1], 112
 metaphilosophy[1], 78
 metaphor[7], 80, 84–85, 99, 112, 209
 metaphorical[2], 77, 128
 Metaphors[1], 85
 metaphors[1], 163
 metaphysics[1], 223
 Metaphysic[5], 21, 38, 64, 119, 161
 metaphysic[15], 31, 34, 56–57, 69, 89, 91,
 113, 117, 137, 193, 201–202, 240
 Metaphysica[2], 192
 Metaphysical[5], 7, 46, 57, 223, 231
 metaphysical[86], 8, 30–31, 34, 49, 51–53,
 57–58, 70–71, 74, 76, 83, 88–90, 96,
 99–100, 103, 111, 116–117, 152–153,
 155–157, 172, 174, 176, 184–186,
 192–194, 203, 205, 209, 222–225, 228,
 230–231, 240, 244, 271, 316
 metaphysically[4], 96, 195, 202, 225
 Metaphysician[1], 223
 metaphysician[12], 196, 222–223, 229, 240
 metaphysicians[10], 102, 226, 228–229,
 233
 Metaphysics[53], 26–27, 29, 33, 37, 44,
 58–59, 79–80, 83–84, 96, 99, 109, 111,
 114, 117, 122, 135, 192–193, 195–196,
 198, 200, 205–206, 208–209, 211,
 221–222, 269, 284

metaphysics[261], 31–34, 45, 49, 51–58, 63, 65, 70–71, 75–76, 80–81, 90–91, 94, 96, 98–100, 102, 104, 107, 109–111, 113, 116–117, 119, 127, 134–135, 137, 151–152, 157–159, 166, 169, 172, 174, 179, 184, 189–190, 192–196, 198, 200–206, 208, 210–213, 215–218, 221–225, 231–233, 238, 240, 242, 244–245, 247–251, 253–254, 277
 Metaphysik[78], 24, 27, 29, 34, 44, 48, 57, 63–64, 67, 79–80, 97, 102, 111–112, 119, 167, 169, 172, 174, 193–196, 200, 205, 208, 218, 220–221, 224, 242, 245, 247–248, 250, 253, 277–279, 282, 287, 292, 296–299, 305–306, 311
 metaphysisch[1], 51
 Metaphysische[3], 45, 57, 297
 metaphysische[1], 297
 metaphysischen[3], 173, 271, 299
 meters[1], 138
 Methagl[1], 302
 Method[3], 150, 203, 271
 method[32], 58–59, 88, 99, 102, 116, 128, 140, 149–150, 161–162, 188, 190, 200, 203–204, 209, 250, 289
 Methode[4], 203–204, 250, 271
 Methoden[2], 86, 112
 methodical[1], 42
 methodischen[1], 42
 methodological[5], 8, 140, 160, 162
 Methodology[2], 128, 162
 methodology[46], 2–3, 11, 59, 68–69, 73, 79, 83, 85, 95, 102–104, 112, 116–117, 122, 142, 149, 157, 159–162, 179–180, 188, 203–204, 260
 methods[4], 43, 86, 112, 161
 meticulous[2], 4–5
 metontology[1], 113
 metonym[1], 71
 metonymies[1], 163
 Mette[1], 315
 Meyer[3], 33, 293
 Meßkirch[41], 10, 12, 15–16, 24, 42, 53, 75, 94, 130, 168, 274, 284, 286, 289–291, 293–294, 313–314
 mh[1], 312
 mich[8], 108, 110, 112, 141, 217, 263–264
 Michael[4], 7, 45, 106
 Michalsk[8], 17, 20, 112, 299, 301
 Michalski[1], 107
 Michel[1], 60
 Michele[1], 120
 Michelet[1], 214
 microgroove[1], 313
 mid[7], 3, 33, 46, 89, 95, 98, 109
 Midday[1], 55
 midday[3], 237, 241
 Middle[5], 61, 125, 128, 214, 312
 middle[13], 27, 42, 63, 125, 161, 163, 171, 208–209, 217, 224, 312
 might[39], 4, 11–13, 16, 19–21, 26–31, 38, 54–55, 61, 64, 69, 74, 94, 109, 125, 133, 139, 159, 166, 188, 205–206, 209, 228, 240, 242, 259–260, 273
 mighty[1], 202
 Miiller[1], 315
 Mikaela[1], 292
 Mikhail[1], 23
 Miles[3], 273, 310, 315
 miles[4], 15, 168
 milieu[1], 68
 Militarism[1], 32
 militarism[1], 32
 military[1], 271
 milk[1], 152
 millennia[1], 97
 millennium[1], 65
 Miller[2], 103, 293
 mimesis[1], 128
 min[1], 313
 Mind[1], 99
 mind[25], 2, 4, 32, 59, 69–71, 103, 113–114, 116, 178, 180, 186, 217, 221, 253, 261–262
 minded[1], 78
 mindedly[1], 261
 mindedness[1], 84
 Mindfulness[12], 14, 24, 101, 107, 113, 126, 132, 135, 157, 236
 Mindfulness[10], 31, 75, 77, 107, 132, 134, 149, 152, 154
 minds[4], 54, 60, 77, 114
 mine[1], 194
 mined[1], 30
 Minerva[1], 25

minimum[1], 88
 Ministry[1], 32
 ministry[3], 144–145
 Minor[1], 97
 minor[1], 60
 mins[5], 39, 313–314
 Minsky[1], 2
 minute[3], 7, 129
 minutes[2], 285, 290
 Mir[1], 316
 mir[12], 34, 110, 116, 129, 138, 143, 167,
 245–246, 264, 266
 miracle[1], 129
 mired[1], 109
 mirror[2], 16, 167
 mirrors[1], 2
 Misch[3], 21, 149, 277
 Mischmasch[2], 71, 81
 misconception[1], 184
 misconceptions[1], 68
 miserable[1], 231
 misery[1], 113
 misguided[1], 45
 mishmash[3], 4, 71, 81
 misinterpretation[2], 128, 147
 misinterpreted[1], 249
 misinterpreting[1], 147
 misleading[2], 172–173
 misled[1], 45
 misreading[1], 117
 misrepresentation[1], 113
 Miss[1], 39
 missdeuten[1], 147
 Missdeutung[1], 147
 missed[3], 5, 38, 179
 misses[2], 24, 46
 Missile[1], 97
 missile[1], 106
 Missing[1], 114
 missing[8], 2, 10, 18, 38, 154, 163, 181
 Mission[1], 261
 mission[4], 5, 49, 66, 261
 Missouri[3], 315
 mistake[2], 4, 114
 Mistaken[2], 49, 169
 mistakenly[1], 37
 mistrust[4], 123, 131, 206, 209
 misunderstanding[3], 90, 109, 172
 misunderstandings[2], 84, 119
 misunderstood[2], 36, 88
 MIT[3], 33, 49, 169
 Mit[11], 20, 34, 75, 122, 144, 255–256, 274,
 283, 302
 mit[63], 39, 45, 58, 63, 74, 84, 87, 92, 98,
 104, 108, 120, 136, 143–144, 146, 148,
 152, 158, 164, 167, 169, 179, 218–220,
 245, 247, 252–253, 255, 265, 276, 279,
 283–284, 286–287, 289–291, 295,
 301–302, 305, 313–314
 Mitarbeit[1], 84
 Mitchell[3], 16, 51, 245
 Mitgift[1], 77
 mithin[1], 44
 Mitmenschen[1], 270
 Mitredenden[1], 114
 Mittags[2], 237, 241
 Mitteilung[1], 107
 Mittel[1], 264
 mittelbar[1], 85
 Mitteln[1], 146
 Mitternacht[2], 307, 309
 Mittwoch[3], 108, 263
 mitzuarbeiten[1], 116
 mitzufragen[3], 74, 86, 265
 mixed[3], 53, 67, 106
 mixes[1], 213
 mißdeutenden[1], 174
 Mißverstand[1], 174
 Mißverständnisse[1], 84
 MMK[1], 125
 mn[3], 313–314
 Mnemosyne[1], 282
 mobile[1], 64
 Mobilization[2], 254
 Mobilmachung[2], 254
 Möbius[3], 100
 Moby[1], 52
 Mocha[1], 315
 möchte[3], 108, 143, 247
 Modalitäten[1], 58
 modalities[2], 57, 217
 Modalitäten[1], 218
 mode[11], 7, 32, 66, 80, 99, 103, 146, 191

Model[1], 17
 model[2], 105, 234
 MODERN[2], 93, 125
 Modern[4], 37, 98, 197, 289
 modern[30], 33, 49, 54–55, 58, 81, 96–97, 111, 123, 134–135, 197, 200, 202, 214, 221, 223, 233, 239–240, 253, 271
 moderne[6], 42, 72, 125, 308
 modernen[1], 271
 moderner[1], 274
 Modernism[1], 53
 Modernismus[1], 274
 Modernist[1], 53
 modernist[1], 53
 Modernity[1], 7
 modernity[4], 32–33, 53, 96
 Modersohn[1], 15
 modes[3], 86, 226, 228
 modesty[1], 134
 modification[1], 179
 Modifications[1], 207
 modified[1], 84
 Modiset[3], 315
 Moellendorff[1], 115
 Moerbeke[1], 192
 möglich[2], 170, 247
 mögliche[1], 48
 Möglichkeit[4], 34, 146, 246, 284
 Moglichkeit[2], 136
 möglichst[5], 87, 120, 220
 Mohr[3], 175, 302
 mojo[1], 57
 molds[1], 202
 Moleschott[1], 33
 Moment[1], 136
 moment[8], 7, 9, 55, 76, 88, 130, 136, 231
 momentous[2], 53, 116
 moments[7], 64, 103, 149–150, 251, 265
 Monad[1], 199
 monad[1], 198
 monas[5], 57–58, 199, 217–218
 monasteries[1], 61
 monastery[3], 218, 230, 278
 monastic[1], 60
 Monatsschrift[1], 212
 Monday[2], 124, 276
 Monist[1], 201
 monist[1], 201
 Monk[2], 61, 290
 monk[2], 61, 101
 monks[2], 61, 98
 mono[3], 314
 monographies[1], 70
 monographs[1], 33
 monosemy[5], 5, 26, 29, 262
 Monroe[2], 315
 monstrosity[1], 33
 monstrous[2], 226, 228
 Montgomery[1], 304
 month[1], 20
 months[7], 13, 42, 86, 95, 124, 181, 205
 monumental[1], 73
 Moods[1], 273
 moon[1], 15
 Moore[6], 4, 20, 140, 255, 315
 Moral[10], 193, 219, 235, 241, 270
 moral[13], 7, 32, 115, 119, 147, 216, 218, 225, 230, 233–235
 moralisch[1], 147
 moralische[1], 235
 moralischen[2], 234–235
 moralisches[1], 219
 moralism[1], 31
 Morality[2], 237, 270
 morality[14], 72, 147, 213, 216, 219, 230–233, 235
 morally[2], 215–216
 Morals[3], 224–225, 241
 morals[2], 80
 Mörchen[9], 38, 303
 More[20], 2, 5, 12, 14, 17, 20, 28, 34, 49, 59, 66, 72–73, 75, 86–87, 104, 139, 157
 more[246], 2–5, 10–11, 13, 17–21, 23–33, 35–37, 40–42, 47, 52–55, 57–59, 63–64, 66, 69, 72–74, 76–78, 81, 84, 86–87, 90–91, 93–94, 96, 98–100, 102, 104, 107–114, 116–117, 119, 121–125, 127–128, 133, 139–142, 147, 149–158, 160–162, 171–173, 175–177, 179, 181–182, 184–186, 189–190, 192, 194–197, 202, 204, 207–209, 214, 218–219, 221, 223–226, 228, 230, 234–236, 238, 242, 246, 249, 254,

259–262, 265, 269, 272, 277, 285
 Morel[2], 48, 287
 Moreover[1], 227
 moreover[4], 73, 88, 218, 230
 Morgan[1], 95
 Morgen[2], 307, 309
 morgen[1], 245
 Morgenfeier[1], 288
 Morgenröte[1], 234
 Morgige[1], 280
 Mörikes[2], 307, 309
 morning[1], 130
 mortals[1], 9
 MORTEM[1], 238
 Morton[3], 315
 Mortonville[2], 315
 Moser[4], 24, 139, 311
 Moses[1], 211
 Most[10], 16, 21, 62, 69, 106, 119, 123,
 227, 277, 303
 most[118], 2–3, 7, 9–13, 17, 21, 23, 28–29,
 31–32, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 54, 56, 60,
 63–64, 66, 75, 77, 83, 94, 98–99,
 102–103, 112, 114, 119, 123–126, 131,
 133, 137, 140, 150, 152, 157–158, 177,
 180–182, 198, 208, 211–212, 214,
 217–218, 220–221, 226–233, 242, 249,
 251, 262–263, 268, 271, 289
 Mostly[2], 17, 47
 mostly[16], 32, 36, 46–47, 49, 68, 82–83,
 150, 155, 169, 171, 175, 177, 182
 Mother[1], 15
 mother[8], 16, 19, 62, 315
 motif[2], 5, 179
 motifs[1], 161
 Motion[1], 121
 motion[1], 206
 Motivation[1], 69
 motivation[1], 28
 motive[1], 74
 motives[3], 28, 103, 171
 Motto[4], 57, 74, 86, 148
 motto[4], 67, 73–74, 86
 Mottos[1], 1
 mountain[14], 12, 16, 78, 84, 89, 167–168,
 181
 mountains[1], 263
 move[15], 48, 68, 88, 103, 106, 111, 159,
 183, 197, 231, 253, 292
 moved[9], 27, 47, 64, 71, 89, 211, 270–272
 Movement[1], 101
 movement[32], 11, 35, 44, 47, 57, 88, 100,
 102–103, 109, 118–119, 129, 147, 194,
 202, 206, 211, 219, 223, 229–230, 246,
 249, 251, 253
 movements[7], 3, 61, 102, 118, 211, 229
 moves[6], 15, 56, 58, 89, 109, 198
 moviegoers[1], 64
 Movies[1], 62
 movies[1], 241
 moving[5], 46, 54, 102, 175, 294
 Mozart[3], 15–16
 Mp[12], 51, 137, 218, 224, 226, 229
 Mr[5], 62, 67, 108, 113, 152
 Mrongovius[1], 208
 Mrs[1], 16
 MS[1], 121
 Much[1], 127
 much[66], 4–5, 7, 11–12, 15, 19, 23, 30–31,
 36, 46, 48–50, 52, 59, 63–66, 70–71, 81,
 104, 109–110, 116, 118–119, 121–122,
 134, 141–142, 155, 158, 160, 168, 182,
 184, 186, 194, 208, 211, 222, 224, 240,
 242, 261, 263, 285, 294
 mud[2], 194
 muddled[1], 186
 Muggenbrunn[2], 130, 285
 Mughal[1], 60
 Mühe[1], 143
 mühen[2], 49, 169
 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā[1], 61
 Mūlamadhyamakakārikāhttps[1], 125
 Mulhouse[1], 168
 Müller[7], 105, 284–285, 292, 301
 multi[1], 5
 multidimensionality[1], 180
 multifarious[2], 57, 217
 multiple[2], 4, 224
 multitude[1], 69
 Multitudes[1], 261
 multitudes[3], 101, 188, 261
 multitudinous[2], 124, 260
 mummies[2], 215, 262
 München[13], 84, 127, 285–286, 288, 302,

310, 313
 Munchen[1], 167
 mündlich[1], 291
 Munich[11], 166, 270, 284, 286, 288, 294
 Munier[1], 110
 Münsingen[2], 16, 293
 Münster[2], 270, 314
 Munzer[1], 16
 murderers[2], 227
 murky[2], 36, 55
 Murthy[1], 118
 muse[1], 8
 Museum[2], 10, 242
 Museums[1], 280
 mush[1], 11
 Music[2], 50, 316
 music[5], 15, 154, 159
 Muslim[1], 60
 muss[9], 112, 138, 142, 177, 179, 187, 237, 241
 müssen[5], 63, 74, 77, 164, 246
 musste[2], 237, 241
 must[109], 5–6, 16, 24, 27, 31, 35–36, 39, 57, 59, 63–64, 68, 74–75, 79, 83, 86, 90, 92, 96, 99, 106, 112, 116, 118–119, 122–123, 128, 131–132, 134–135, 138, 140, 143–146, 154, 156, 163, 167, 169, 172–173, 176, 182, 187, 189–190, 196, 200–203, 205–207, 209, 215–218, 220, 226, 230, 235, 237, 239, 241, 246, 249, 252, 258–259, 261
 mutable[1], 189
 mutilate[2], 29, 269
 mutilated[1], 194
 Mütter[1], 257
 mutual[2], 149, 190
 muß[15], 6, 51, 57, 63, 65, 69, 75, 163, 174, 201, 219–220
 mußte[2], 194, 223
 My[18], 2, 5, 39, 62, 76, 85, 127, 130, 145, 175, 219, 230–232, 291, 315
 my[99], 9, 13, 16, 23, 28, 34–38, 41, 50–51, 59, 62, 66, 72–73, 79, 84, 98–100, 111, 113, 116, 122, 124–125, 128–129, 131, 134, 144–145, 152, 171, 175, 177–178, 181, 183, 203–204, 208, 212, 217, 223–224, 226–228, 231–233, 245, 247, 249, 258–259, 261–263, 265, 294, 315

myopia[1], 4
 Myself[2], 188, 261
 myself[18], 23, 79, 115–116, 120, 124, 129, 141, 194, 204, 212, 223, 226, 228, 249
 mysterious[3], 70, 84, 247
 mystery[6], 27, 247, 249, 285
 mystic[3], 39, 42, 263
 mystical[2], 247, 263
 mysticism[3], 118, 211
 Mystik[2], 244, 248
 Mystisches[1], 247
 Myth[1], 100
 myth[3], 63, 214
 Mythe[1], 100
 mythology[2], 226
 Mythos[3], 63, 244, 248
 mythos[1], 25
 myths[1], 68

N

na[2], 61, 125
 Nach[11], 40, 146, 190, 274, 280
 nach[67], 21, 23, 37, 51, 74, 76, 84, 89, 92–93, 116, 130, 143, 146–147, 150, 158, 174, 185, 219, 239, 244, 246, 248, 252, 264, 271, 274–276, 281, 285–286, 291–294, 297, 299, 305–306
 Nachdem[1], 143
 Nachdenken[1], 100
 Nacheinander[1], 266
 Nachgelassene[3], 218, 230, 236
 nachgelassene[1], 287
 nachgelassenen[1], 306
 nachher[1], 136
 Nachlass[1], 311
 Nachlaß[34], 39–40, 216, 276, 293, 302, 307–308, 311
 Nachschrift[11], 278, 305, 311
 Nachschriften[1], 311
 Nächsten[2], 58, 218
 nachvollziehen[2], 58, 218
 Nāgārjuna[2], 61, 125

Nagel[1], 289
 nah[2], 93, 268
 Nähe[1], 165
 nahe[2], 147, 247
 nahergekommen[1], 112
 näherkomme[1], 116
 nähern[1], 220
 nahm[1], 219
 naiva[1], 61

 naivety[2], 153
 Naivität[2], 153
 Nalanda[1], 60
 Name[4], 63, 157, 220, 312
 name[32], 7, 12, 15, 23, 55–56, 63, 75, 80,
 96, 113, 116, 121, 128, 145, 157, 202,
 206, 211, 220, 224, 238–239, 249, 251,
 293, 315
 named[12], 13, 16, 20, 105, 121, 125, 148,
 168, 181, 249
 Namely[4], 100, 116, 129, 203
 namely[49], 5–6, 30, 35, 53, 55–56, 58, 60,
 69–70, 79, 85, 92, 94, 100, 103–105,
 121, 124, 127, 139–140, 142, 150, 161,
 175, 184, 188, 193, 198, 204–206, 211,
 214, 219–220, 230
 Namen[2], 116, 268
 names[13], 17, 73, 94, 99, 148, 160, 167,
 202, 211, 217, 254
 nämlich[1], 219
 Nancy[1], 224
 Naomi[1], 315
 Napoleon[2], 111
 narrative[1], 53
 narratives[2], 53
 narrow[9], 42, 45, 49, 108, 169, 179
 narrowness[1], 200
 narrows[1], 24
 nascent[1], 176
 nation[1], 33
 National[3], 118, 133, 137
 national[1], 95
 Nationalsozialistische[1], 280
 nationalsozialistischen[1], 280
 nations[2], 222, 235
 Natorp[9], 35, 44, 54, 141, 254, 270–271
 Natorps[1], 141

 Natur[5], 41, 80, 89, 271, 311
 NATURAL[2], 93, 125
 natural[9], 36, 59, 99, 197, 203, 215
 Naturalism[1], 133
 naturalism[1], 60
 naturalistic[1], 203
 NATURE[1], 288
 Nature[15], 25, 37, 102–103, 128, 133, 150,
 178, 193, 214, 253, 271
 nature[59], 7–8, 12, 28, 30, 34, 59, 61,
 66–67, 70–71, 80, 88–89, 96–97, 99–100,
 102–103, 111, 123, 125, 133, 152,
 155–156, 158, 164, 166, 181, 184, 187,
 193, 204, 206, 214, 216, 227, 250, 261
 natures[2], 228, 231
 natürliche[1], 99
 Naturwissenschaft[6], 42, 72, 125, 308
 nausea[4], 48, 237, 241
 Naval[1], 95
 navigate[2], 179, 206
 Nazis[1], 4
 Nazism[2], 4, 20
 Naßlaß[1], 308
 nd[7], 28, 68, 125, 207, 212, 217, 284
 ne[3], 9
 Neapolitan[1], 241
 Near[2], 56, 145
 near[10], 11, 15, 20, 67–68, 168, 206, 220,
 274, 286
 nearby[1], 168
 nearly[1], 29
 nearness[1], 189
 necessarily[11], 59, 64, 72, 78–79, 103,
 157, 190, 221, 236, 239
 necessary[19], 24, 58, 108, 124, 126, 136,
 147, 166, 184, 193, 197, 201, 215, 220,
 228, 246, 260
 necessitates[1], 196
 necessities[2], 150, 263
 Necessity[1], 150
 necessity[10], 78–79, 149, 157–158, 201,
 226
 neck[1], 100
 Neckar[3], 273, 301, 303
 née[2], 16, 293
 need[62], 2–3, 5, 8, 10, 25, 27, 29, 40,
 45–47, 53–54, 60, 64, 66–68, 76, 78, 83,

90, 97–99, 105–107, 110, 114, 119, 145,
 151–152, 155, 158, 162, 169, 183, 186,
 192, 194, 196–197, 209, 228, 252,
 260–261
 Needed[1], 29
 needed[14], 14, 47, 59, 66, 78, 80, 100,
 113–114, 119, 133, 179–180
 needing[4], 14, 26, 33, 115
 Needless[3], 79, 160, 238
 needs[15], 52, 67, 80, 105–106, 113, 118,
 123, 131, 145–146, 163, 205, 236
 Neffen[1], 286
 negantem[1], 72
 negated[1], 56
 negation[3], 76, 110, 191
 negations[1], 235
 negativ[1], 263
 Negative[3], 20, 165, 256
 negative[8], 34, 54, 88, 99, 145, 175, 226,
 228
 negatively[1], 194
 Negativität[1], 251
 negativity[1], 103
 Neige[1], 257
 neighborhood[1], 64
 neighbors[2], 168
 Neigung[1], 99
 nein[1], 136
 Neither[2], 52, 196
 neither[13], 3, 27, 40, 55, 61, 78, 97, 107,
 195, 200, 205, 227
 Nelson[1], 182
 nennen[1], 80
 nennend[1], 268
 nennt[3], 160, 167, 221
 Neo[2], 44, 113
 neo[32], 7, 28, 33, 35, 43–47, 60, 75, 120,
 180, 197, 203
 neoHeideggerianism[1], 60
 neoKantian[1], 271
 neoKantianism[4], 33, 35, 46, 60
 neoKantians[2], 3, 35
 Nephew[1], 286
 Neske[14], 15, 36, 131, 261, 272, 285–286,
 313–314
 ness[1], 64
 Nesselhauf[1], 105
 nest[2], 30–31
 Netherlands[2], 60, 182
 nets[1], 259
 Nette[1], 303
 network[1], 119
 neu[1], 264
 Neuausgaben[1], 139
 Neue[2], 102, 285
 neue[2], 143, 266
 Neuedition[1], 297
 Neuen[5], 280, 289
 neuen[2], 27, 280
 neuer[1], 228
 Neugebauer[2], 91, 255
 Neumann[4], 17, 46, 273, 315
 Neumeier[1], 311
 Neunzig[1], 267
 neuren[1], 313
 Neutestamentlichen[1], 275
 Neuzeit[1], 305
 Neuzeitliche[6], 42, 72, 125, 308
 neuzeitliche[1], 253
 neuzeitlichen[2], 282
 neuzeitlicher[1], 221
 Never[2], 123, 131
 never[66], 24, 30–31, 51–52, 66, 70–71, 73,
 77–78, 90, 96, 98–99, 101–102, 105,
 110, 116–117, 119, 126, 129, 131–132,
 142, 145–146, 148–149, 151, 154, 163,
 165, 170, 173, 178, 184, 200, 203,
 215–216, 222, 242, 245, 262, 285
 Nevertheless[10], 161, 166, 169, 176, 205,
 215–216, 231, 272
 nevertheless[6], 7, 46, 56–57, 83, 193
 New[16], 62, 71, 102, 105, 145–146, 175,
 192, 231, 254, 276, 304, 310, 314
 new[95], 2, 7, 12, 21, 24, 27–29, 31, 36,
 43, 45–49, 53, 55, 57, 69–72, 78, 80,
 88–89, 91, 93, 95, 106, 111, 115,
 128–129, 131, 140, 143, 147, 154–155,
 175–176, 178–180, 182, 184, 192, 194,
 198, 202, 213, 222, 228, 231–233, 288
 newest[1], 288
 Newly[1], 20
 newly[7], 11, 21, 30, 97, 159
 news[2], 36, 68
 newspaper[7], 26, 45, 47, 273, 280, 282

newspapers[1], 147
 Newton[1], 258
 Next[5], 87, 102, 108, 219, 230
 next[16], 16, 18, 49, 53, 70, 95, 101, 109,
 113, 126, 159, 169, 190, 235, 245
 NF[18], 51, 77, 98, 137, 218–220, 222–224,
 226, 228, 230–231, 236
 Nichol[1], 105
 Nicht[8], 91, 126, 136, 174, 248, 290
 nicht[114], 6, 14, 43, 57, 69, 72, 74, 77, 81,
 86–87, 91–93, 101, 107–109, 111–112,
 114–115, 120, 129, 136, 141, 146–149,
 153, 156–157, 163, 166–169, 173–174,
 186, 193, 196, 218–219, 221, 228–229,
 235–236, 246–248, 252, 260, 262–264,
 266, 268
 Nichten[1], 122
 Nichtigc[1], 107
 nichtphilosophischen[1], 276
 Nichts[5], 42, 237, 241
 nichts[5], 45, 108, 120, 122, 136
 Nichtsein[1], 225
 Nicias[1], 83
 nickname[3], 15, 75, 130
 Nicolai[9], 23, 102, 129, 144, 192, 270–271
 Nicolas[1], 194
 Nicomachea[1], 275
 Nicomachean[2], 271, 275
 nie[14], 77, 101, 108, 110, 146, 148–149,
 170, 174, 245, 264
 niece[1], 16
 Niedersachsen[1], 315
 Niemand[1], 19
 Niemeyer[8], 38, 138–139, 144–145
 Niethammer[1], 250
 Nietzsche[391], 5, 7, 17, 23, 25–27, 29,
 31–34, 39–40, 42, 44, 48–49, 51–59, 63,
 67–68, 70–71, 77, 91–92, 96–100, 106,
 109–112, 114, 135–136, 149, 161, 164,
 168–169, 171, 183–184, 189, 194–196,
 198–200, 217–227, 229–243, 249, 260,
 267, 271, 274, 289, 296–299, 316
 Nietzschean[2], 231, 270
 Nietzscheanism[1], 60
 Nietzsches[17], 63, 67, 111, 165, 169,
 220–221, 236, 282, 286, 297–298
 night[3], 53, 62, 68
 nightmare[1], 60
 Nihilimus[1], 235
 Nihilism[25], 98, 111, 224, 235–237
 nihilism[13], 98, 114, 212, 223, 231, 235,
 237, 241
 Nihilismus[8], 98, 235, 237, 241, 298
 Nihilist[1], 111
 nihilist[2], 237, 241
 nihilistic[2], 114
 Nijhoff[1], 258
 Nikolaus[1], 211
 nimmt[1], 63
 nine[5], 76, 131, 143, 205
 nineteenth[5], 102, 133, 140, 197, 221
 Nirwana[4], 51, 244–245, 248
 nisi[2], 35, 114
 No[46], 2, 7, 9, 11, 16–17, 25, 27–28, 54,
 59, 66, 73, 75, 87, 109, 111, 115, 119,
 125–126, 136, 138, 146, 168, 180, 186,
 202, 215, 221–222, 253, 259, 261, 263,
 293
 no[266], 3–5, 7–10, 14, 17–18, 22, 24,
 27–31, 33, 38, 40, 44, 47, 49, 53, 56–57,
 59–60, 66–68, 70–73, 75–78, 80–84, 87,
 94–98, 100–101, 105–111, 113, 115,
 117–119, 122–123, 126–127, 129,
 133–136, 141, 153–155, 157, 161–162,
 168, 171–172, 175–176, 178–180, 182,
 184, 186, 188, 195–198, 202, 205–206,
 209, 212, 216, 218, 221–222, 226–228,
 231–233, 236, 240, 244, 246–250,
 258–260, 262–263, 266, 270, 273, 277,
 279, 282, 285, 316
 Noack[1], 286
 Noam[1], 60
 Nobel[1], 62
 nobility[1], 238
 Noble[1], 52
 noble[2], 125, 233
 nobler[1], 231
 noblest[1], 216
 Nobody[2], 19, 223
 Noch[2], 163, 246
 noch[40], 27, 49, 57, 59, 69, 76, 81, 84,
 109, 112, 137, 146, 153, 158, 163, 166,
 169–170, 173, 179, 181, 190, 200–201,
 203, 219, 221, 245–248
 Noire[1], 39

noire[2], 118, 183
 noise[1], 138
 nomic[1], 64
 nominative[1], 96
 Non[2], 9, 192
 non[18], 4, 9, 28, 35, 49, 71–72, 75, 91, 109, 113–114, 176, 234
 nonanthropocentrism[1], 212
 nonChristian[1], 111
 None[2], 165, 227
 none[6], 57, 71, 129, 165, 261, 304
 nonetheless[2], 107, 176
 nonsense[7], 66, 69, 75, 115, 136, 176, 187
 nonthinking[2], 90, 173
 nonwilling[1], 91
 noologists[1], 203
 Noon[1], 231
 Nor[3], 94, 108, 122
 nor[35], 3, 8, 27, 40, 55, 61, 72, 78–79, 84, 94, 100, 107, 116, 127, 152, 165, 184, 195–196, 200, 205, 221, 227, 254, 259, 261
 Norbert[1], 272
 norm[2], 195
 normal[3], 25, 27, 194
 Normally[1], 13
 normally[2], 138, 171
 Norman[1], 198
 Normandy[2], 48, 286
 North[3], 88, 102, 232
 north[1], 168
 northern[4], 67–68, 165, 213
 Northwestern[2], 254, 304
 nose[3], 56
 nostrums[1], 32
 Not[49], 8, 17, 30–31, 54, 58, 67, 75, 77, 83, 85, 90, 95, 97, 100, 112–113, 116, 120, 126, 128–129, 136, 145–146, 157–159, 179, 196, 199, 229, 273, 282–283, 290, 299, 306
 not[758], 2, 4–15, 17–19, 21–24, 26–40, 44, 46–49, 52–64, 66–80, 83–84, 86–96, 98–116, 118–123, 125–127, 129–137, 139–157, 159–163, 165–166, 168–191, 193–198, 200–218, 220–222, 225–242, 244, 246–249, 252, 254, 256, 258–260, 262–263, 267, 269, 271–273, 277–279, 281, 285, 288–289, 293, 301, 304, 316
 Nota[2], 44, 137
 nota[1], 2
 notable[3], 37, 89, 100
 Notably[5], 10, 54, 91, 177, 221
 notably[2], 95
 Notation[1], 216
 notations[1], 275
 NOTE[1], 174
 Note[111], 8, 11, 13–14, 16, 23, 30, 34, 38, 41, 43, 46–49, 51, 54, 59, 62, 68, 79, 85, 90, 94–99, 101, 105, 111–112, 117, 121, 124, 130, 134, 140, 149–150, 152–156, 159–160, 162, 165–167, 171–172, 178, 184–186, 192, 196, 200, 202–204, 212, 219, 221–224, 228, 230, 237, 244, 249, 259–260, 262, 274, 277–278, 282, 287–288, 299, 301–302, 310, 315–316
 note[77], 5, 8–9, 12, 17–20, 26, 29–31, 36, 44–45, 47, 51, 54, 60, 67, 69–70, 73–75, 77, 85, 87, 89, 101, 110–111, 117, 120, 122, 131, 134, 140, 143, 146, 152, 159–160, 164, 176, 178–180, 189, 192, 196, 203, 207, 209, 216, 226, 236, 238, 254, 258, 273, 278, 284
 Notebook[12], 77, 218, 223, 226, 228–230, 233
 notebook[7], 107, 224–225
 Notebooks[20], 11–12, 18–19, 27, 34, 53–54, 66, 74, 78, 86, 133, 140–141, 178, 183, 262, 264
 notebooks[7], 53, 75, 140, 194, 235, 241
 Noted[5], 33, 48, 101, 287, 292
 noted[36], 18–21, 36, 43, 58–59, 71, 78, 81, 93, 109, 113, 121–122, 124, 128, 135, 137, 139–140, 149, 154, 182, 184, 194, 196, 212, 232, 254, 261–262
 Notes[15], 79, 124–125, 139, 165, 167, 192, 215–216, 254, 267, 272
 notes[87], 12, 14, 17, 19, 21, 24, 30, 36–38, 40–41, 49, 53, 61, 67–68, 75, 79, 86–87, 90–92, 95, 104, 112, 114, 120, 134, 139–140, 143, 153, 159–160, 175, 186, 207–208, 216, 225, 230, 234, 247, 249, 254–255, 258, 266, 273, 275, 279, 284, 286, 293, 301, 311
 notetaking[2], 36, 38
 noth[1], 220

nöthig[1], 137
Nothing[2], 75, 101
nothing[46], 9, 11–12, 20, 45, 54, 73,
75–76, 78, 88, 99, 117, 122, 128, 152,
156, 182, 189, 204, 208–209, 225–226,
231–232, 238, 251, 261, 316
Nothingness[1], 192
nothingness[11], 42, 225, 227, 236–237,
241
Nothsigkeit[2], 158
noticeably[3], 75, 242, 259
noticing[1], 202
nötig[1], 108
notig[1], 167
Noting[1], 39
noting[2], 109, 123
Notion[1], 103
notion[12], 3, 53, 80, 88, 100, 103, 110,
113, 133–135, 155
notions[1], 238
Notizen[17], 17, 20, 165, 255–257,
287–288, 290, 293–294, 306
Notlosigkeit[2], 97, 152
Notstandsarbeiter[1], 281
Notturmo[4], 1, 161, 177, 300
notwendig[1], 126
notwendige[2], 201, 245
Notwendigkeit[5], 158, 281, 306
Notwendigkeiten[1], 264
noun[2], 107, 161
Nous[1], 65
Nov[6], 16, 86, 120, 129, 281
Novalis[4], 55, 97
novel[1], 254
novelists[1], 10
November[33], 15, 37, 43, 47, 84, 101,
123, 226, 231, 264, 273, 277–278,
280–281, 284–286, 289–290, 315
Novemberrevolution[1], 43
Novermber[2], 277, 281
novit[2], 35
Now[27], 2–3, 5, 7, 22, 60, 64, 83, 93, 102,
118, 140, 144, 166, 177, 183, 193, 197,
203, 205, 215–216, 231, 261
now[118], 2, 4–5, 7–8, 10–13, 15–19, 21,
23–24, 26, 28, 30, 35, 39, 42, 49, 52, 55,
63, 69, 72, 74–76, 78–79, 83, 115, 122,
128–129, 141, 144–145, 148, 151, 155,
158, 171, 181–182, 187, 194–195, 197,
208, 210, 218, 220, 224, 226–227,
236–238, 240–241, 246–247, 254,
262–263, 279, 285, 292, 294
Nowadays[1], 148
nowhere[2], 5, 61
Nr[10], 20, 42, 274, 291
ntgegen[1], 120
nuances[1], 70
nuclear[3], 8, 62, 97
nucleus[1], 88
nullity[2], 107, 111
NUMBER[1], 231
Number[3], 99, 218, 229
number[48], 8, 10, 12, 15–17, 20–21, 23,
29–30, 36, 39, 52, 60, 64, 68, 76, 91,
105, 107, 115–116, 130, 146, 156, 165,
171, 186, 190, 221, 238, 259, 276, 284,
288–289, 291, 294, 304
numbering[2], 6, 273
numbers[3], 60, 155, 296
numerous[2], 10, 55
nun[2], 169, 263
nuns[1], 61
Nur[4], 49, 179, 264, 289
nur[69], 6, 14, 19, 27, 34, 43, 50, 52, 67,
77, 81, 85–86, 89, 98, 100–101, 104,
107–108, 118, 120, 136, 141–142, 148,
157–158, 160, 163, 167–168, 172–174,
181, 190, 196, 200, 218, 221, 225, 229,
236, 245–246, 248, 259, 261, 264,
267–268
Nuremberg[1], 250
Nürnberg[2], 99, 102
nurphilosophische[1], 99
nutty[1], 74
nutzbar[2], 220
Nutzen[1], 190
Nye[1], 95
NZZ[1], 293

O

- oac[1], 311
Oath[2], 53
oath[1], 53
oaths[1], 66
Ob[4], 40, 146, 168, 264
ob[6], 63, 81, 169, 248, 316
Obama[1], 43
obdurate[1], 118
obedience[1], 267
Obemuland[1], 289
oben[1], 245
Ober[1], 130
oberflächlich[1], 25
Obergang[1], 69
Obergangsarbeit[1], 141
obeying[1], 267
Obituary[1], 283
Object[1], 44
object[24], 44, 55–56, 75, 77, 83, 133, 149, 173, 191–193, 202–203, 211, 251–252, 260, 266
objectification[3], 90, 172, 174
Objection[2], 140, 183
objection[3], 171, 215, 227
Objective[3], 103, 133, 214
objective[8], 52, 55, 200, 214
objectively[1], 193
Objectivity[1], 199
objectivity[5], 42, 45, 133, 198, 252
objects[5], 193, 215–216
objektive[1], 52
obligated[1], 224
oblivion[3], 53, 167, 247
obscure[3], 69, 207, 285
observation[2], 68, 133
observational[1], 68
observations[2], 143, 260
observed[1], 114
observer[1], 99
observes[2], 51, 64
obsessed[1], 152
obstante[1], 176
obtain[1], 125
obviate[1], 84
obvious[5], 38, 76, 104, 119, 228
Obviously[7], 4, 42, 55, 69, 102, 114, 262
obviously[5], 117, 156, 186, 207, 217
occasion[8], 35, 38, 92, 145, 191, 275, 287, 289
Occasional[1], 310
occasionally[1], 261
occasions[1], 16
Occidental[1], 20
occidental[2], 81, 158
occupation[1], 134
occupied[2], 4, 215
occupies[2], 79, 131
occurrence[1], 172
occurrences[1], 95
occurring[1], 240
occurs[4], 83, 87, 157, 247
ocean[4], 16, 167–168
Ochsnern[1], 285
Ochsner[1], 275
Ockham[1], 232
Oct[2], 109, 284
October[21], 21, 36, 47–48, 60, 92, 97, 107, 128, 180, 231, 250, 264, 276, 278, 286–287, 289, 291
odd[1], 12
oddly[1], 26
ode[1], 154
Odebrecht[1], 79
Odenwalt[1], 289
oder[18], 40, 42, 95, 120, 126, 146, 169, 198, 206, 235, 245, 248, 252, 263, 291
ödeste[1], 64
Odysseus[1], 113
OF[3], 92, 258, 288
Of[31], 5–6, 14, 24, 36, 52, 62, 74, 117, 120, 137, 145, 149, 151, 153, 156, 158, 180, 186, 192, 214–215, 217, 232, 235, 243, 259–260
of[5475], 1–316
Off[3], 25, 68, 86
off[30], 10, 12, 24, 27–28, 30, 39, 46, 49–50, 67–68, 71, 83, 95, 113, 126–127, 132, 134–135, 137, 154, 182, 186, 193, 214, 233

offen[1], 203
 offenbar[1], 148
 Offenbarung[1], 257
 offenbleiben[1], 126
 Offene[1], 92
 offene[1], 246
 Offenen[1], 92
 Offener[1], 282
 Offenheit[2], 27, 147
 öffentlich[2], 51
 offer[4], 5, 8, 134, 145
 offered[4], 41, 46, 197
 offic[2], 277
 official[3], 20, 129, 182
 Often[1], 55
 often[50], 4, 10, 16–17, 21, 23–24, 27–28, 36–38, 48, 55, 59, 61, 64, 68, 71, 76, 80–81, 105, 107, 110, 112, 117, 123–124, 128, 140, 150, 161, 168, 179–180, 194, 204, 207, 230, 254, 261, 272–273
 oh[2], 74, 227
 ohne[8], 6, 44, 59, 146, 158, 164, 167, 246
 ohnedies[1], 247
 ohnehin[1], 52
 Ohnmacht[1], 27
 Ohr[1], 81
 oída[4], 76, 189
 oinoglossia[1], 3
 Ok[2], 100, 158
 ok[3], 15, 40, 180
 Ökonomie[1], 241
 Ökonomisch[1], 95
 ökonomische[1], 220
 Oktober[17], 274, 278, 280, 284–285, 287, 290–292
 Old[3], 168, 289, 315
 old[47], 15, 25, 30, 32–33, 35–36, 46, 52, 56–57, 62, 71–73, 80, 83, 86, 88, 93, 121–122, 124–125, 129, 131, 181–183, 204, 213, 219, 225, 227–228, 230, 233, 236, 241, 258, 289, 294
 Older[1], 164
 older[5], 6, 36, 97, 182
 oldest[4], 96, 226, 315
 Olga[1], 32
 Olten[1], 302
 Oltmanns[1], 271
 omega[1], 156
 ominous[1], 33
 ominously[2], 64, 154
 omission[2], 82, 127
 omitted[2], 38, 216
 omne[1], 112
 omnibus[1], 132
 On[81], 3–4, 7–8, 13, 16, 19–20, 23–24, 26, 29, 31, 33, 37–38, 43, 47, 53–54, 57, 59, 65, 69, 79–80, 82, 85, 90, 92, 95, 97, 100, 104, 109, 115–118, 128–130, 139, 141, 144–145, 156, 164, 173, 185–186, 192, 201, 207, 222, 237, 241, 244, 254, 260, 274, 276, 280, 285–291, 294, 310
 on[758], 2–21, 23–35, 37–56, 58, 60–63, 67–75, 77, 79–92, 94–101, 103–109, 111–114, 116–119, 121–131, 133–135, 138, 140–143, 145, 147–168, 170–171, 173, 175–185, 189–194, 196–198, 200, 202–209, 211–217, 220–225, 227, 229, 232–233, 235–238, 240, 242, 244–245, 248–252, 254, 258–259, 261–263, 265, 267, 270–272, 274–277, 280–284, 286–294, 311–312, 315–316
 Once[7], 15, 66, 116, 158, 177, 189, 227
 once[16], 7, 24, 35, 40, 51, 62, 102, 129, 159, 178, 197, 245, 251, 260, 265
 Oncken[1], 275
 ONE[1], 231
 One[71], 3–4, 15–16, 18, 24–25, 28–31, 37, 40, 42–45, 48, 53, 55, 57, 60–61, 63, 67–68, 73, 75, 85–86, 91, 94, 102, 104, 106, 111, 115, 119, 125, 129, 133, 150, 154, 188, 199, 207, 221, 224, 242, 259–260, 262, 265, 268, 271
 one[285], 2–4, 7, 9–10, 12, 14–21, 23–24, 26–28, 31–34, 36–39, 43, 48–49, 52–53, 55–57, 61–62, 65–66, 68–69, 71–80, 83, 86–89, 93, 95–96, 98–103, 105–108, 110–112, 115–117, 120–125, 129–131, 133–137, 139–141, 144–147, 151–153, 155, 157–158, 160, 163, 166–167, 169, 171, 176, 178–180, 185–186, 189, 192–194, 196, 198, 200–203, 206–209, 215, 217, 222, 224–228, 231–232, 235–238, 240–242, 249, 251, 253, 258–261, 264–265, 271, 275, 289, 315–316
 oneday[1], 288

ones[17], *36, 38, 58, 75, 87, 107, 154, 159–160, 163, 207, 215, 220*
 Oneself[2], *212*
 oneself[4], *87, 120, 221–222*
 onesidedness[1], *135*
 ongoing[2], *27, 217*
 Online[1], *303*
 online[16], *3, 10, 21, 27, 36, 40, 122, 141, 165, 216, 244, 247, 273, 285*
 Only[11], *18, 48, 71, 79, 85, 102, 119, 169, 202, 247, 289*
 only[250], *2–3, 5–7, 9–10, 12, 14, 17, 19–20, 23–28, 30, 32, 34–36, 38, 40, 43–44, 50–53, 59, 67, 69–70, 74, 76–77, 80–81, 83–87, 89–90, 92–95, 98–104, 106–110, 112–113, 115–118, 120–121, 123–124, 126–129, 133–134, 136, 139–142, 144–147, 149–155, 157–160, 165–166, 168, 172, 174, 176, 178–182, 184–185, 190, 192–193, 195–197, 200–205, 208–211, 213, 217–218, 221, 225–229, 236, 238, 240, 242, 244–249, 251, 253, 259–260, 262, 264, 267, 278, 285, 289*
 onslaught[1], *97*
 ontic[8], *109, 122, 145, 150, 152, 176*
 ontically[1], *27*
 onto[7], *96, 192–193, 240, 287*
 ontologia[1], *103*
 ontological[28], *27, 67, 70, 109, 117, 122, 145–146, 150–153, 156–158, 176, 184, 192, 222, 225–226, 248, 263*
 ontologically[3], *145, 202, 253*
 Ontologie[12], *21, 23, 102, 110, 133–134, 175, 263–264, 272, 298*
 ontologies[1], *30*
 ontologisch[1], *253*
 ontologische[1], *226*
 ontologischen[3], *146, 153, 247*
 ontologist[1], *150*
 Ontology[6], *102, 192, 206, 250, 272*
 ontology[33], *71, 102, 108–109, 125, 140, 145, 150, 158, 174, 176, 180, 185, 192–193, 208, 210, 225, 247, 249–250, 263*
 ontotheological[1], *193*
 Ontotheologie[1], *193*
 ontotheologie[1], *193*
 ontotheologische[1], *250*
 ontotheology[2], *193*
 onward[1], *88*
 opacity[1], *35*
 Open[6], *128, 184, 251*
 open[29], *3, 5, 13, 31, 47, 67–69, 92, 109, 112, 124, 126, 152, 155, 157–158, 186, 203, 209, 240, 246, 264*
 opened[5], *107, 176, 181, 190, 262*
 opening[9], *27, 68, 95, 120, 155, 158*
 openness[6], *25, 27, 92, 147, 155*
 opens[2], *200*
 operate[1], *231*
 ophen[2], *310*
 opinion[7], *126, 134–136, 200, 212*
 opinionated[1], *74*
 opinions[4], *144, 198, 212, 216*
 opponent[14], *8, 34, 73, 103, 130, 183, 232–233*
 opponents[4], *34, 142, 183, 194*
 opportunities[1], *16*
 opportunity[3], *95, 106, 288*
 oppose[1], *73*
 opposed[5], *117, 163, 208, 228, 249*
 opposes[1], *148*
 opposing[4], *137, 171, 226, 228*
 opposite[11], *14, 52, 57–58, 76, 100, 148, 217, 233, 250*
 opposites[1], *206*
 opposition[14], *25, 58, 73, 124–125, 153, 225, 232, 242*
 optimism[2], *11, 33*
 optimistic[1], *33*
 options[2], *8, 139*
 Opus[2], *203*
 opus[7], *16, 42, 109, 130, 138, 200, 224*
 Or[36], *11–12, 15, 17, 19, 26–27, 32, 34, 43, 61, 75, 85, 88, 95, 97, 110, 120, 122, 127, 129–131, 163, 176, 185, 188, 193, 204, 250, 258–259*
 or[503], *2–5, 7–12, 14, 16–22, 24, 26–29, 31–33, 36–44, 46, 48–49, 52–56, 58–59, 61–81, 83, 87–91, 93–106, 108, 110–112, 114–122, 125–130, 133–134, 137, 139, 142, 145–148, 150–155, 157–161, 163, 165, 168–171, 174–188, 190–194, 197, 200–209, 211–216, 219, 222–223, 225,*

227–233, 235–238, 240, 242, 245,
 248–249, 251–252, 254–255, 258–263,
 272–273, 275, 284, 288, 291–293, 296
 oral[3], 17, 61, 274
 Oratoria[1], 128
 orchestra[2], 154, 159
 ordentlichen[1], 84
 order[33], 5, 10, 29, 44, 64, 75, 79, 95,
 106, 108, 111, 131, 166, 194, 199–200,
 206, 215, 223, 239, 244, 251–252, 260,
 269, 273, 283, 310
 ordered[2], 67–68
 ordering[1], 13
 ordinarily[1], 239
 ordinary[6], 26, 84, 93, 120, 251
 Ordnerbeschriftung[1], 91
 Ordnung[1], 290
 Ordnungsgattung[7], 255–257, 266
 ore[1], 30
 org[18], 3, 216, 249, 252, 293, 310–312
 organise[2], 251, 291
 Organization[1], 200
 organization[3], 64, 96, 251
 organized[1], 289
 Orient[2], 212
 orient[1], 265
 orientation[5], 27, 135, 200, 212, 249
 orientieren[2], 212
 Origin[2], 114, 253
 origin[6], 87, 145–146, 203, 249, 271
 Original[4], 21, 114, 148, 282
 original[13], 21, 77, 83, 109, 130, 138, 147,
 154, 184, 192, 233, 270
 originality[2], 25, 79
 originally[4], 19, 121, 143, 184
 Originalmanuskript[1], 297
 originarily[2], 195
 ordinary[1], 195
 originate[1], 153
 originated[1], 81
 originates[1], 239
 origins[2], 58, 115
 orphaned[1], 16
 Ortega[2], 133, 286
 Ortes[1], 127
 orthodox[2], 3–4
 Ortschaft[8], 127, 168, 268, 305
 Ortsgruppe[3], 43, 275, 277
 Oscar[2], 49, 238
 Oskar[1], 23
 ossuary[1], 14
 ostensibly[1], 2
 Oswald[4], 32, 235, 275
 Other[16], 34, 46, 50, 65, 86, 97, 105, 115,
 156, 170, 200, 232, 273, 275–276
 other[187], 3–4, 7–9, 11–13, 15, 18–19, 21,
 24, 29–33, 36, 38, 40–41, 43, 47, 49–50,
 52–54, 57–60, 62–64, 66–71, 73, 75,
 80–82, 86–87, 90–91, 93–94, 96, 98–101,
 105, 107–108, 112–119, 123, 128–129,
 131–132, 134, 137, 139–140, 147, 149,
 151, 155–156, 161, 163, 165, 168–169,
 171, 175, 180–182, 185, 190–191, 194,
 196, 200–201, 203–206, 208, 212, 216,
 221–224, 227, 232–235, 244–245, 251,
 254, 258–260, 262, 264, 272, 277, 282,
 293, 301, 316
 Others[1], 310
 others[36], 6, 8, 12–13, 21, 26, 29–30, 32,
 36, 39–40, 43, 62, 66–67, 69, 75, 79, 95,
 123, 130–131, 154, 157, 165, 177, 194,
 206, 215, 220, 223, 228, 273
 Otherwise[1], 87
 otherwise[5], 5, 159, 198, 221, 228
 Ott[1], 23
 Otte[1], 303
 Otto[18], 28, 31, 33, 44–45, 72–73, 88, 114,
 217, 273, 301, 315
 oudèn[2], 76, 189
 ought[1], 99
 Our[7], 83, 96, 145, 157–158
 our[80], 3, 7, 11–14, 19, 26, 28, 33, 35, 49,
 54–55, 59, 63, 67–70, 73–74, 77, 80–81,
 83–84, 88, 98, 105, 123, 131, 134, 145,
 152, 157–158, 164, 169, 171, 179, 181,
 188, 196, 198, 203, 207, 211–212, 215,
 224–225, 228, 235, 251, 259, 284
 ourselves[13], 16, 74, 78, 81, 83, 95, 97,
 194, 197, 202, 227, 261
 Ousia[1], 199
 ousia[1], 199
 Out[5], 77, 91, 150, 156, 260
 out[237], 3–5, 7–11, 15, 17, 19–20, 23–24,
 26–31, 34–35, 38, 43, 48–49, 52–53,
 55–57, 61–63, 66–67, 69–72, 74–75,

79–82, 87, 89–90, 92, 95–96, 98–103,
 105–106, 109–112, 114, 117–118,
 120–124, 127, 129–131, 134, 136, 139,
 143–145, 147–148, 152–155, 159, 163,
 171–172, 174, 176–187, 189–191,
 193–194, 196–198, 201, 203, 205, 212,
 214–218, 222, 224–225, 228–230, 232,
 234, 239–240, 242, 244, 246–248,
 258–262, 269, 278, 284–285, 301,
 315–316
 outcome[2], 34, 83
 outdated[1], 182
 Outline[2], 24, 150
 outline[19], 12, 26, 57, 69, 76, 102, 116,
 118, 153, 160, 183, 190, 199, 203, 208,
 214, 217, 236
 outlines[4], 90, 150, 195, 242
 outlook[1], 213
 outposts[1], 159
 output[1], 273
 outrageous[1], 131
 outright[1], 48
 outset[6], 4, 28, 54, 123, 189, 249
 outside[18], 15, 19, 28–29, 42, 52, 78, 90,
 100, 166, 175, 180, 213, 251
 outsiders[1], 24
 outstanding[1], 26
 Over[3], 45, 109, 262
 over[103], 1–2, 4, 10–12, 16–18, 23, 26,
 30, 35–36, 39–40, 42–43, 46, 49, 59–61,
 63, 67–68, 70–71, 75, 79–81, 86, 90, 94,
 102, 109, 113–114, 117, 126, 130–131,
 134, 145, 147, 154, 169, 171–172, 176,
 178–182, 186, 201, 203, 207–208, 211,
 214, 220, 222, 227, 229, 237, 239, 244,
 251, 259, 261–262, 271
 overabundance[4], 2, 24, 154, 187
 Overall[2], 49, 184
 overall[48], 2, 5, 11–12, 19, 28, 30–32,
 55–56, 61, 66, 69–70, 86, 99, 102, 112,
 137, 140, 154, 171, 178–179, 183, 186,
 188, 190, 200, 208, 216, 222, 230, 232,
 236, 260
 overcame[1], 222
 overcome[19], 3, 11, 26, 54, 57, 59, 135,
 174, 184, 193, 200, 203, 217, 221–223,
 230, 240
 Overcoming[2], 174, 284
 overcoming[18], 90, 135, 137, 147, 172,
 200–201, 215, 221, 224, 231, 244,
 247–248
 overgrown[2], 24, 87
 overhead[1], 100
 overlapping[1], 80
 overlooked[4], 23, 150
 overly[3], 47, 71, 118
 Overman[13], 237–240
 overman[17], 56, 164, 223, 227, 237–240
 overnight[1], 97
 overpower[2], 97
 overseer[4], 181, 190, 262
 overstep[1], 159
 overthrown[2], 208–209
 overtime[1], 214
 Overton[1], 315
 overtone[1], 240
 overtures[1], 27
 Overturn[1], 224
 overturn[1], 230
 Overturning[1], 57
 overturning[5], 90, 102, 231–232
 Overview[2], 133–134
 overview[6], 13, 57, 60, 102, 150
 overzealous[1], 78
 owe[1], 231
 owes[1], 197
 owl[1], 25
 Own[1], 92
 own[129], 2–3, 5–6, 11–13, 17–18, 21,
 24–25, 28–30, 32–33, 35–37, 39, 41, 44,
 48–49, 51, 54–56, 62, 64, 67, 73, 76,
 79–80, 84, 88, 91, 96–97, 100, 104–106,
 110, 112, 115, 117–121, 126, 129,
 134–135, 143, 151–152, 158–159, 161,
 164–166, 171, 175, 179–180, 182, 189,
 191, 196–197, 200, 204–205, 209, 214,
 219, 222, 233, 242, 244–245, 248, 251,
 262, 272, 316
 owner[1], 8
 owners[2], 8, 139
 ownership[1], 64

P

- PA[1], 315
pa[1], 60
pablums[1], 16
pacesetter[1], 64
Pacifism[1], 32
pack[1], 103
packing[1], 106
Pädagogische[2], 307, 309
Page[336], 1–189, 191–316
page[139], 7, 9, 12–13, 19–20, 24–25, 27, 29, 33–34, 37–39, 41, 44–45, 53, 55, 58, 62, 64–66, 72–75, 78–80, 83–84, 86–88, 90, 96–101, 103, 106–107, 110–111, 113–115, 117, 119, 122, 124, 127–129, 131, 135, 140–141, 145–147, 150, 155–156, 160, 164–165, 180, 185, 189, 191, 200, 203, 206, 211, 216, 221–223, 225, 227, 229, 237, 244–246, 250–253, 285, 289, 294, 296
Pages[14], 59, 130, 197, 202, 254–255, 283, 302, 304, 311
pages[77], 2–3, 8–12, 17–18, 22, 24, 30, 38, 40, 46–47, 52, 66–67, 69, 79, 88, 90–92, 112–114, 121, 171, 177–178, 182, 226, 244, 248, 254, 259, 261–262, 264–265, 272, 278, 282–283, 289–295, 310–311
pagination[1], 270
paid[1], 231
paidagōgia[1], 68
paideia[1], 105
paideía[1], 105
Pain[4], 8, 254–255
pain[14], 8, 20, 90, 122, 165, 172–173, 203, 212, 228
painful[2], 97, 172
paint[2], 55, 221
painted[1], 169
painting[4], 169, 289
paints[1], 25
pale[2], 2, 229
paler[1], 229
palest[1], 229
palímpsēstos[1], 139
palimpsests[1], 139
Palmer[2], 39, 148
paltriness[1], 16
pandemonium[1], 39
Pandey[1], 105
panic[1], 2
Pankow[1], 281
Pantheism[1], 211
pantheism[4], 212
Pantheismusstreit[2], 67, 212
pants[1], 129
Papal[1], 42
paper[2], 139, 258
papers[3], 41, 259, 284
par[2], 56, 291
parable[5], 181, 278
paradeigma[1], 62
Paradigm[8], 2–3, 5, 28, 187, 259
paradigm[14], 4–5, 11, 66, 70, 72, 104, 125, 171, 182–183, 188
paradigms[4], 2, 4, 11, 182
paradox[4], 29, 61, 188, 202
paradoxes[1], 292
Paradoxically[2], 104, 115
Paragraph[1], 99
paragraph[8], 44, 73, 99, 103, 114, 120, 146
paragraphs[2], 146–147
paramour[1], 104
paraphrase[2], 71, 102
paraphrased[2], 76, 189
parataxis[1], 34
paratos[1], 105
pareidolia[1], 163
Paremenides[1], 285
parenthesis[1], 143
Pareto[1], 315
Paris[15], 16, 34, 47, 60, 96, 182, 194, 282, 289, 291
parle[1], 9
Parmenides[25], 49, 79–80, 91, 116, 130, 180, 192, 214, 225, 242, 282, 285, 298, 305
Parrhesia[1], 258
parroting[1], 29
parsimoniae[1], 232

Part[19], 53, 59, 73, 92, 159, 183, 190, 214,
 273, 283, 287, 296, 301, 305, 307, 316
 part[80], 9, 12–14, 16, 18, 23, 29–30,
 37–38, 41, 49, 53–57, 61, 63, 67–69, 71,
 77, 84, 89, 91–92, 94–95, 99, 102, 109,
 111, 113, 115, 117, 130, 135, 140, 147,
 150, 153, 169, 180, 203, 205, 207,
 209–210, 213–214, 223–224, 243, 245,
 251–252, 263, 275–277, 282, 290
 partem[2], 62, 262
 Partial[3], 102, 177, 244
 partial[8], 2, 37, 158, 180, 186, 244
 partially[6], 8, 17, 43, 95, 173, 290
 participant[2], 104, 270
 participants[7], 72, 93–94, 124–125, 265,
 289
 participating[1], 287
 participation[2], 128
 particular[6], 8, 47, 76, 144, 168, 198
 particularly[3], 114, 144, 238
 parties[1], 60
 parting[1], 45
 partisan[1], 5
 partitio[1], 70
 partly[4], 153, 165, 289, 291
 Parts[1], 24
 parts[28], 11, 16, 38, 41–42, 46, 67, 70, 91,
 102, 106, 110, 138, 150, 180, 209, 214,
 240, 244, 251, 265, 273
 Party[1], 34
 party[1], 177
 Parvis[3], 126, 283
 pas[2], 9
 pâsa[1], 42
 Pascal[1], 287
 pasi[1], 74
 pass[1], 123
 Passage[1], 196
 passage[30], 18, 23, 50, 86, 88, 108, 118,
 145, 147, 150–152, 158, 160, 169, 178,
 190, 207–208, 237, 242, 245, 261–262
 Passages[1], 20
 passages[9], 36, 114–115, 133, 145, 155,
 171, 245, 263
 passed[2], 30, 274
 passer[1], 164
 passing[5], 13, 23, 191, 203, 242
 passion[6], 70, 79, 83, 116, 120, 184
 passionately[1], 80
 Past[1], 12
 past[39], 2, 5, 8, 11, 18, 31, 34, 46, 52, 62,
 64, 75, 97–98, 112, 114, 126, 130, 143,
 181, 183, 190, 198, 202, 204–205, 208,
 215, 217, 219, 259
 pasted[1], 9
 pastor[1], 225
 pastoral[1], 168
 Pater[3], 18, 27, 110
 Path[5], 86, 94, 164
 path[71], 2, 24–25, 27–29, 33, 51, 67–70,
 75, 85–87, 89, 91, 96–97, 108–109, 111,
 113, 125–126, 137, 150, 152–155,
 161–162, 166, 168, 176–177, 179–180,
 183, 185–186, 203–204, 212, 217,
 239–240, 265
 pathland[1], 9
 Pathmarks[5], 83, 86, 111, 156, 186
 Pathopoeia[1], 186
 pathopoía[1], 186
 Pathos[1], 186
 pathos[1], 122
 Paths[3], 31, 165, 255
 paths[25], 5, 27, 64, 67–68, 77, 80, 85–88,
 108, 110, 126, 162, 186, 197
 pathway[7], 28, 68, 88, 94, 155–156, 175
 Pathways[1], 156
 pathways[10], 27, 66, 69, 78, 112–113,
 152, 179, 262
 patience[1], 234
 Patmos[1], 106
 pattern[1], 190
 Paul[41], 3, 32, 34–35, 43–44, 47–48, 54,
 74, 89, 104, 109, 115, 119, 141,
 182–183, 192, 216, 233, 238, 254, 264,
 270–271, 275, 287–289, 302–303
 Paula[1], 15
 Paulo[1], 16
 Paulsen[1], 33
 Paulus[1], 275
 paused[2], 130, 180
 pay[2], 80, 190
 Pazifismus[1], 32
 Peace[2], 32–33
 peace[3], 33, 89

peak[1], 145
 peaks[3], 106, 170, 188
 peculiar[1], 38
 pedagogy[1], 68
 peer[1], 305
 Peloponnesian[1], 105
 pen[2], 30, 41
 pencil[1], 137
 Penelope[3], 30, 80
 Pēnelópē[2], 30, 80
 Pennsylvania[2], 315
 pensait[1], 9
 Pentecost[2], 18, 276
 penultimate[1], 188
 People[2], 24, 140
 people[42], 10, 13, 16, 21, 25, 36, 39, 47,
 49, 54, 60, 68–69, 74, 77, 80, 95, 98,
 119, 125, 129, 131, 140, 156, 159, 186,
 189, 194, 207, 212, 222, 232–233, 238,
 259, 265, 277, 291, 303
 Pépin[2], 48, 287
 PER[1], 238
 per[3], 165, 262, 279
 perceivability[1], 199
 perceive[3], 134–135, 206
 perceiving[1], 202
 perceptio[1], 199
 Perception[1], 199
 perception[2], 199, 233
 perceptions[1], 240
 Perdue[2], 60–61
 perennis[1], 194
 perfect[2], 229, 240
 Perfection[1], 85
 perfection[2], 226, 228
 Perfektion[1], 85
 perform[1], 83
 performance[1], 61
 Perhaps[38], 2, 13–14, 26, 55, 60, 64,
 67–68, 76, 88, 96, 100, 104, 114, 117,
 128, 157, 160, 170, 176–177, 179,
 181–182, 184, 207, 228, 244, 260, 316
 perhaps[36], 4, 20, 49, 55, 65, 74, 76, 95,
 109, 112, 114, 127, 130, 136, 140, 143,
 169, 171, 183, 185, 188, 201, 208, 217,
 227–228, 231–233, 259, 261–262
 Peri[1], 54

Period[2], 231, 312
 period[41], 19, 22–23, 27, 31, 42, 46, 48,
 54, 58, 63–64, 72, 90, 106, 113, 130,
 133, 163, 171, 183, 186, 188, 190, 197,
 202, 214, 216, 224, 229, 234, 272–273,
 280, 316
 periods[9], 42, 55, 69, 80, 106, 214, 216,
 224
 peripatetic[2], 113, 117
 peripatētikós[2], 113, 117
 periphery[2], 88
 permanent[2], 83, 207
 permeated[1], 55
 permit[1], 147
 permitted[1], 112
 peroratio[1], 177
 peroration[1], 277
 Perpetual[1], 32
 perpetual[1], 33
 perplexed[5], 40, 83, 131, 148, 180
 perplexing[1], 15
 perplexity[2], 27, 83
 persiflage[1], 39
 persist[1], 172
 persistently[3], 72, 125, 265
 Person[11], 255–257, 266, 271, 276
 person[18], 8, 17, 21, 24, 39–40, 54,
 111–112, 155, 163, 196, 223, 237, 244,
 254, 272
 Personal[1], 3
 personal[28], 2, 16–17, 32, 39–40, 52,
 54–55, 74, 85, 114, 118–119, 121,
 134–135, 140, 152, 183, 211–212, 267
 personality[1], 25
 personally[5], 3, 23, 47, 124, 235
 persons[4], 184, 228, 237, 302
 perspective[10], 32, 66, 110, 118–119, 147,
 180, 182, 212, 281
 perspectivism[4], 136–137
 Perspektivismus[2], 136–137
 perspicacious[3], 16, 47, 190
 persuade[1], 77
 persuaded[1], 73
 persuasion[1], 67
 pertain[1], 260
 pertaining[1], 152
 pertains[1], 172

pertinence[1], 190
 Peru[1], 82
 pervasion[1], 60
 pervasively[2], 122, 202
 pervasiveness[1], 208
 perverted[1], 87
 Pessimism[2], 33
 pessimism[6], 32–33, 235
 Pessimismus[1], 235
 Pessimismusstreit[1], 33
 pessimist[1], 32
 pessimists[1], 32
 Pete[2], 3, 315
 Peter[19], 14, 20–21, 44–45, 155, 166, 182, 233, 272–273, 286–287, 289–290, 303, 315
 Peterson[1], 60
 Petri[2], 15
 Pettigrew[1], 73
 petulance[1], 186
 Petzet[14], 12, 39, 96, 101, 131, 281, 289, 291, 294, 302–303, 307–308
 Pfad[2], 108, 167
 Pfänder[2], 253
 Pferde[1], 274
 Pfingsten[2], 278, 286
 Pfullingen[11], 36, 131, 261, 272, 285–286, 313–314
 Ph[3], 3, 23, 25
 Phaedo[3], 30, 117, 240
 Phaedrus[1], 128
 Phänomen[1], 136
 Phänomenologie[44], 46, 48, 85, 87, 91, 116, 123, 126, 134, 141, 145, 151, 153, 161–162, 190, 193, 198, 201, 215, 250, 263, 268, 275–277, 291, 294, 297–298, 307, 311, 314
 Phänomenologische[6], 21, 38, 271, 297–298
 phänomenologische[1], 38
 phänomenologische[10], 87, 120, 136, 138–139, 271, 296
 phänomenologischen[4], 43, 110, 271, 276
 phänomenologischenn[1], 275
 Phantastisches[1], 136
 phantasy[1], 260
 phases[3], 201
 phenomena[2], 83, 152
 Phenomenological[9], 21, 87, 95, 148, 192, 271, 275–276
 phenomenological[17], 24, 43, 68, 70, 110, 145, 147, 149–150, 153, 163, 184, 190–191, 198, 270
 Phenomenologically[1], 43
 phenomenologists[1], 46
 Phenomenology[31], 45–46, 48, 85, 97, 100, 102–103, 109–110, 123, 126, 142, 145, 147–148, 150–151, 191, 198, 223, 251, 258, 263, 275, 291–292
 phenomenology[20], 23, 42, 91, 95, 110, 112, 124, 140–142, 147–148, 180, 224
 phenomenon[2], 136, 228
 phil[1], 270
 Philebos[1], 271
 Philebus[2], 271
 Philipp[2], 19, 32
 Philipps[18], 16, 24, 35, 44, 46, 105, 115, 120–121, 123, 190, 270–271
 PhilippsUniversität[4], 21, 28, 38, 141
 philo[1], 110
 philologi[1], 59
 philological[15], 3, 5, 14, 27, 77, 104, 115, 176, 182, 209, 259–260
 Philologie[1], 242
 Philologisches[1], 139
 philologist[1], 105
 philologists[2], 105, 130
 philology[19], 3, 10, 59, 104–105, 161, 242, 261
 Philonenko[2], 48, 287
 Philosoph[1], 244
 Philosophen[4], 77, 118, 157, 261
 philosopher[79], 7–8, 17–19, 23–25, 28, 31–32, 34, 44, 47–49, 54, 56–57, 59, 61, 65, 76–77, 79, 88, 92, 94, 98, 106, 109–110, 125, 133–134, 141, 155, 157–158, 175, 180, 186, 188, 192, 194, 196, 209, 221, 223–224, 233, 242, 254, 259–260, 270, 277–278, 294
 Philosophers[10], 26, 67, 102, 105, 114, 118, 210, 233, 260–261
 philosophers[140], 2–4, 7, 10–11, 14, 17, 23, 25–28, 31, 34–35, 42, 46–49, 52–58, 65–67, 73–74, 76–79, 85, 88, 100, 104, 107, 109–110, 112, 115, 117–119, 130,

137, 140, 147, 151, 154–155, 157–158,
 175, 177, 180–182, 201, 203, 207–209,
 211–212, 214, 218, 221, 232–233, 242,
 249, 254, 261–262, 271, 287
 philosophia[4], 140, 194, 207, 211
 Philosophic[1], 38
 Philosophical[15], 29, 44, 76, 95, 99–100,
 119, 150, 193, 209, 214, 236, 250, 259,
 290
 philosophical[170], 2–3, 5, 7–8, 14, 23–24,
 26, 28, 31–32, 35, 39, 43–48, 52, 57–60,
 66–67, 69–70, 75–76, 78–79, 85, 88–89,
 93–94, 98–106, 111–112, 114–116, 118,
 120–122, 124, 128, 132–133, 135–136,
 140, 142, 144–145, 147, 149, 152, 154,
 156–157, 175–176, 178, 181–184,
 186–187, 190–191, 194–195, 197–198,
 201–203, 207–209, 211, 213, 218–219,
 222–224, 230, 232–233, 243, 249, 260,
 316
 philosophically[2], 201–202
 Philosophicus[1], 68
 PHILOSOPHIE[1], 137
 Philosophie[187], 3, 17–18, 23, 28, 30–31,
 34, 38, 40, 42, 48, 52–53, 56–58, 67, 69,
 72, 74–80, 84, 86, 89, 92–93, 95, 97–98,
 101, 104, 107–109, 111, 115–118, 120,
 122, 126, 130, 137–139, 143, 147–149,
 151–152, 154–155, 157–158, 161, 163,
 171, 175, 178–180, 184–185, 190, 195,
 200–201, 206–207, 218–219, 222,
 229–230, 232–234, 236, 249–250, 253,
 263–264, 270, 274, 276–277, 281, 286,
 291–292, 296–298, 305, 308, 311–312
 philosophie[2], 9, 75
 Philosophieren[6], 75, 84, 122, 278
 philosophieren[1], 74
 philosophierenden[1], 89
 philosophies[3], 4, 215
 philosophisch[1], 52
 Philosophische[3], 112, 116, 277
 philosophische[5], 58, 95, 267, 274, 299
 Philosophischen[1], 270
 philosophischen[6], 58, 104, 136, 249, 274,
 291
 Philosophisches[1], 139
 Philosophize[10], 55, 225, 227, 229,
 231–232
 philosophize[7], 63, 74, 78, 261
 philosophized[2], 78, 159
 Philosophizing[4], 26, 75, 84, 278
 philosophizing[19], 5, 47, 77–78, 80, 116,
 121–122, 152, 159, 181, 190, 253, 262
 Philosophy[130], 3, 13, 23–25, 27, 33–34,
 38, 40, 52–53, 56, 58, 70, 76, 80, 84,
 97–99, 102–103, 106–107, 110, 119–120,
 122–123, 126, 130, 132, 134–135, 137,
 145, 147, 150–152, 154–160, 162–163,
 171, 175, 184–185, 195, 197–198,
 200–201, 204, 207, 209, 214, 218,
 222–223, 225, 227, 238, 249, 251, 261,
 263–264, 270, 292–293, 310
 philosophy[547], 3–5, 7, 9, 11, 13–15, 17,
 19, 23, 25–26, 28, 30–35, 40, 42–43,
 45–48, 52–57, 59, 62–64, 66–82, 84, 86,
 88–90, 92–95, 97–113, 115–124,
 126–127, 130–131, 133–137, 140, 145,
 147–159, 161, 175–176, 178–182,
 184–186, 189–192, 194, 196–198,
 200–209, 211–216, 218–222, 224–225,
 228–233, 236, 239, 242–244, 249–251,
 253, 259–264, 270–272, 312
 Philosophie[2], 63, 67
 philosopher[1], 68
 phone[5], 16–17, 259
 Photo[1], 16
 photocopy[1], 37
 phrase[3], 153, 178, 246
 phrases[2], 38, 216
 phroneein[1], 74
 phusikes[1], 192
 psychologia[1], 103
 physica[1], 192
 physical[1], 159
 physically[1], 233
 physician[1], 32
 physicist[1], 117
 physics[6], 52, 62, 165, 203, 205
 Physik[5], 20, 256, 292
 physiological[1], 231
 Physis[1], 199
 Piccola[1], 17
 Picht[4], 116–117, 303
 pick[3], 48, 133, 179
 picked[1], 179
 picking[1], 191

picks[1], 30
 Picture[2], 37, 114
 picture[9], 5, 32, 133–134, 181–182, 190, 205, 262
 pictures[1], 133
 piece[1], 121
 Pieger[2], 301
 Pierre[1], 182
 piety[2], 84–85
 pile[2], 36, 76
 pillage[1], 80
 pin[1], 8
 pincers[1], 96
 Pindar[1], 154
 pinnacle[1], 231
 pious[3], 226, 228–229
 piquant[1], 106
 Pirahã[1], 127
 pitiful[1], 227
 pity[2], 186, 228
 Pius[3], 53, 168, 283
 pivotal[7], 3, 27, 31, 68, 154
 pivoting[1], 27
 pivots[1], 28
 pizzicato[2], 27, 160
 place[46], 4, 10, 25, 31, 52–53, 56, 71, 78–79, 81, 94, 97, 100, 106, 109–110, 129, 136, 141, 154, 159, 168–169, 179, 189, 197, 203, 221–222, 224, 231, 236, 240, 251, 264, 270, 275, 285, 289–290
 placed[4], 83, 159, 215, 281
 places[22], 24–25, 38, 88, 90, 117, 121, 133, 151, 156, 158, 173, 181, 186, 192, 221, 251, 260, 263, 290
 plain[2], 4, 162
 plainly[1], 150
 plan[3], 90, 210, 235
 Plane[1], 235
 planet[13], 7, 13, 25, 30, 32–33, 95, 106, 122, 182, 222, 237
 planetarianism[2], 64
 planetarisch[2], 81
 Planetarism[1], 95
 Planetarismus[2], 64, 95
 planetary[2], 64, 81
 planks[1], 49
 planned[9], 24, 49, 86, 91, 153, 224, 265
 planning[1], 22
 plans[5], 11, 19, 28, 127, 277
 plants[1], 67
 Plastik[1], 291
 Plato[109], 14, 17, 30, 33, 35, 44, 53–56, 59, 68, 76, 83, 88, 94, 104–105, 109, 111, 113, 115–118, 122–123, 128, 131, 148, 183, 188–189, 192, 195, 198, 203, 207, 214, 219–222, 225–226, 230–233, 236, 240, 249, 253, 258, 271
 Platon[7], 67, 75, 148, 253, 296, 299, 311
 Platonic[11], 25, 34, 54, 116, 201, 214, 218, 223, 229, 231
 PlatonicJudeo[1], 71
 Platoniker[1], 232
 Platonischen[3], 218, 229, 271
 platonischen[1], 271
 Platonism[49], 34, 55, 57, 109, 113, 117, 184, 194, 201, 219–220, 222, 224, 230–233, 240, 243
 Platonismus[3], 34, 219, 230
 Platonist[6], 219, 231–233
 Platonists[1], 46
 Platons[4], 113, 137, 282, 297
 Platte[1], 15
 Platz[2], 194, 223
 plausible[1], 21
 Play[1], 48
 play[5], 26, 97, 109, 147, 225
 played[5], 15, 35, 38, 197, 262
 player[1], 16
 playful[1], 259
 playing[1], 183
 plays[1], 114
 pleasant[2], 51, 224
 Please[4], 5, 54, 62, 261
 please[5], 104, 110, 119, 186
 pleased[2], 78, 144
 Pleasure[1], 271
 pleasure[3], 86, 219, 230
 Plenty[2], 15, 39
 plenty[17], 11, 32, 36, 60, 68–69, 76, 98, 110, 177, 180–182, 260, 316
 pliable[1], 252
 plot[1], 186
 plucking[1], 159
 Plümacher[1], 32

plunge[1], 57
 plural[1], 70
 plurality[1], 5
 Plus[22], 7, 14, 19, 21–23, 32, 39, 48, 61,
 67–68, 119, 139, 155, 171, 206, 218,
 255, 273
 plus[7], 9, 32, 73–74, 131, 151, 261
 plutt[1], 9
 pochen[1], 6
 pockets[1], 43
 Poem[1], 293
 poem[12], 9, 80, 101, 157, 188, 200, 236,
 262, 285, 288–289, 316
 poeme[1], 294
 POEMS[1], 92
 Poems[3], 12, 91, 93
 poems[8], 10, 12, 16, 70, 92, 180, 254, 265
 Poesie[1], 308
 poet[5], 14, 24, 34, 52, 283
 poetic[1], 261
 Poetry[4], 10, 165, 281, 293
 poetry[10], 13, 34, 57, 90, 98, 136, 173, 198
 poets[5], 10, 47–48, 107
 Pöggeler[18], 9, 28, 31, 72–73, 88, 114,
 181, 217, 273, 301, 315
 point[104], 5, 8, 10, 14–15, 18, 21, 24, 31,
 45, 47, 54–55, 60–61, 64, 66–67, 80, 83,
 88–89, 92, 96–98, 101–102, 104, 106,
 109–113, 116–119, 121, 125–127, 135,
 145, 148, 150, 152, 154–157, 183, 185,
 192, 194, 200, 204–206, 208–209, 214,
 217, 221–222, 230–232, 235, 237, 240,
 244, 246, 260, 285
 pointed[6], 19, 56, 69, 96, 244, 246
 Pointing[1], 262
 pointing[14], 67, 73, 90–91, 106, 112, 118,
 127, 152, 176, 219, 222, 262
 points[25], 27, 36, 55, 58, 60–61, 64, 71,
 89, 108, 111, 117–118, 150, 154,
 157–158, 205, 208, 232, 237, 242
 Poland[1], 106
 polemic[3], 58, 71, 202
 Pólemos[1], 73
 pólemos[2], 59
 polemos[2], 73, 114
 poles[1], 149
 police[1], 212
 policy[1], 101
 polish[1], 114
 Politeia[1], 282
 Political[1], 241
 political[17], 30, 46, 72, 78, 93, 95, 115,
 118–119, 175, 182, 198, 259, 272
 Politics[1], 43
 politics[4], 88, 114, 119, 233
 Politik[1], 43
 Politischen[1], 241
 Polity[1], 304
 pollen[1], 8
 polloi[2], 29, 54
 POLT[1], 258
 Polt[17], 1, 4, 17, 51, 54, 64, 79, 92, 96–97,
 134, 154, 244, 249, 258, 273, 315
 poltical[1], 282
 Polus[2], 83
 polymorphous[1], 10
 Polysemy[1], 71
 polysemy[11], 5, 26, 29, 97, 176, 259, 262
 Ponder[2], 28, 107
 ponder[8], 5, 8, 64, 84, 88, 156, 186, 188
 pondered[1], 12
 pondering[2], 78, 186
 Ponderings[20], 33–34, 64, 78, 91, 96, 140,
 159, 183, 195, 261–262, 264
 Pont[1], 95
 Ponty[1], 182
 pool[2], 15, 100
 pools[1], 15
 poor[1], 283
 Pope[2], 43, 53
 popular[7], 35, 45, 52, 117, 123, 193, 196
 popularity[1], 181
 popularization[1], 207
 populating[1], 13
 populum[2], 60, 66
 Porthcurno[1], 68
 portions[1], 79
 portrayed[1], 207
 Pos[2], 277–278
 pose[6], 47, 120–121, 129, 198, 260
 posed[6], 38, 83, 120, 129, 195
 poses[1], 55
 posing[5], 72, 116, 125, 259, 265

posited[1], 157
 positing[4], 111, 157, 228
 Position[1], 199
 position[37], 4, 34, 45, 53, 58, 83, 98, 143, 147–148, 150, 152, 157, 159, 175, 185–186, 189, 197, 202, 204, 208, 219, 223, 231–232, 249, 263, 265, 270
 positionality[1], 283
 Positionen[1], 302
 positions[9], 4, 33, 72, 159, 175, 209, 235, 238, 249
 Positive[1], 212
 positive[3], 191, 197, 276
 positively[2], 201, 271
 Positivism[1], 231
 positivism[22], 31, 53, 55, 60, 136–137, 196, 221, 224, 231
 Positivismus[4], 136, 196, 221
 positivist[1], 224
 positivity[1], 175
 positum[1], 231
 possess[2], 35, 64
 possesses[3], 88, 107, 176
 possessing[1], 84
 possession[4], 19, 196, 201, 247
 Possibilities[1], 158
 possibilities[9], 88, 151, 158, 161–162, 171, 223, 232, 263
 possibility[20], 13, 34, 58, 72, 78, 82, 89, 127, 136, 145–146, 159, 161, 172, 197, 222, 247, 284
 Possible[1], 48
 possible[38], 13, 38, 57, 70, 86–87, 106, 120, 133–135, 140, 145–146, 158, 170–172, 183, 193, 200–201, 209, 215, 220, 226, 228, 231, 247, 254, 265
 possibly[2], 36, 135
 post[13], 7, 34, 42, 53–54, 58, 60, 68, 71, 91, 179
 Posten[1], 18
 posterior[1], 41
 posthumously[1], 26
 Postmetaphysical[3], 70, 184, 224
 postmetaphysicians[1], 224
 Postmodernity[1], 7
 postPlatonic[1], 221
 posts[1], 116
 postscript[1], 21
 postscripts[2], 35
 poststructuralism[1], 60
 postumum[2], 203
 posture[1], 157
 postwar[2], 114, 285
 potent[1], 128
 Potentially[1], 212
 potentiation[1], 247
 Potenzierung[1], 246
 pour[1], 52
 poured[3], 7, 160, 182
 Poverty[2], 283
 Powell[1], 64
 Power[13], 38, 67, 91, 100, 111, 198–199, 222–224
 power[53], 13, 27, 34, 54, 64–65, 79, 84, 90, 95–97, 100, 104, 111, 121–122, 130, 142, 145, 163, 177, 181, 202, 215, 218, 223, 225–226, 230, 238–240, 264
 powered[1], 202
 powerful[2], 103, 182
 powerless[1], 27
 PowerPoints[1], 121
 Pp[1], 302
 pp[31], 59, 139–140, 143, 145, 198, 244, 254, 275, 278, 282, 284–286, 290, 293, 311
 Practical[1], 175
 practical[16], 34, 60, 134, 193, 199, 213, 215–216, 239
 Practice[2], 67, 113
 practice[4], 67, 84, 113, 129
 practices[2], 208, 211
 practicing[1], 84
 Pragmatism[2], 53, 189
 pragmatism[5], 4, 32, 60, 137, 200
 pragmatist[1], 60
 Pragung[1], 266
 praise[1], 208
 praised[1], 207
 Praises[1], 124
 praises[1], 55
 praktische[1], 34
 Prälat[1], 280
 prattle[2], 124–125
 praxis[2], 119

pre[8], 10, 14, 23, 25, 121, 201, 248
 precarious[1], 15
 precautionary[1], 133
 preceded[2], 214–215
 precedence[1], 64
 precedes[4], 47, 80
 preceding[1], 40
 precise[1], 197
 Precisely[1], 75
 precisely[19], 24, 36, 38, 42, 79, 90, 97–98,
 101, 108, 124, 134, 152, 172, 191, 194,
 196, 201, 225
 precision[1], 178
 predicament[1], 100
 predicating[1], 64
 predict[1], 169
 predicts[1], 64
 preeminence[1], 135
 Preface[18], 25, 28, 52, 55, 57, 102–103,
 110, 115–116, 119, 194, 204, 219, 223,
 230, 251
 preface[16], 27, 48, 52, 71, 86, 99–100,
 105, 119, 161, 193–194
 prefer[1], 224
 preference[3], 201, 231–232
 preferred[2], 83, 271
 prefigures[1], 198
 prehistory[2], 248
 Preisgabe[1], 288
 prejudice[12], 133, 136, 221
 prejudices[2], 88, 234
 Prelate[1], 42
 Preliminaries[1], 2
 preliminarily[1], 124
 preliminary[6], 31, 80, 146, 150, 154
 Prelude[5], 219, 228–230, 233
 premature[3], 87, 120, 222
 premise[2], 60
 premises[1], 80
 preoccupation[1], 84
 Preparation[1], 165
 preparation[10], 78, 145–146, 163, 166,
 195, 289
 preparations[1], 143
 Preparatory[1], 24
 preparatory[5], 26, 41, 87, 106
 prepare[7], 9, 37, 55, 72, 162, 194
 prepared[9], 49, 81, 97, 103, 105, 179, 195,
 267, 289
 prepares[1], 251
 Preparing[2], 70, 184
 preparing[8], 31, 58, 68, 70, 72, 119, 184,
 186
 preponderance[1], 177
 prerequisite[1], 289
 prerequisites[1], 92
 Presence[1], 199
 presence[7], 84, 92, 202, 233, 246
 presencing[4], 195, 199
 Present[2], 123, 196
 present[25], 16, 29, 36, 41, 59, 77, 87, 130,
 144, 149, 164, 186, 199, 202, 224,
 239–240, 246, 251, 253, 269, 276
 presentation[14], 90, 107, 109, 114, 121,
 124, 134, 151, 158, 173, 176, 231, 286
 presentations[2], 3, 114
 presented[13], 36, 51, 70, 76, 130, 187,
 245, 270, 280, 283, 288
 presenting[2], 76, 130
 presently[1], 13
 presents[2], 15, 204
 preserve[4], 79, 84, 122
 Preserved[1], 121
 preserved[4], 38, 163, 246, 267
 preservers[1], 157
 preserves[2], 246, 289
 preserving[1], 76
 president[1], 33
 Press[9], 101, 131, 143, 254, 275–276, 304,
 310
 press[1], 92
 pressed[1], 180
 presses[1], 102
 pressing[2], 197, 246
 pressure[2], 97, 100
 prestigious[1], 242
 Presumably[1], 117
 presumably[3], 87, 184, 258
 presumed[1], 130
 presumption[1], 124
 presumptuous[2], 68, 77
 Presupposed[1], 251
 presupposed[1], 251
 presupposes[1], 154

presupposition[1], 197
 presuppositionlessness[1], 78
 pretend[1], 231
 pretty[1], 112
 prevail[1], 97
 prevailing[1], 147
 prevails[1], 246
 prevalence[1], 32
 previewed[1], 105
 previous[20], 4, 11, 38, 81, 90, 99,
 158–159, 164, 166, 172, 177–178, 185,
 187, 215, 258, 264
 previously[4], 103, 145, 233, 249
 prey[4], 33, 55, 59, 242
 priest[1], 16
 priests[1], 218
 prima[3], 140, 192, 199
 primacy[1], 98
 primarily[4], 79–80, 248
 primary[8], 32, 67, 69, 83, 103, 150–151,
 205
 Primiz[1], 286
 primordial[6], 145–146, 153
 Princeton[1], 45
 principal[1], 81
 Principe[2], 231–232
 principia[2], 72, 192
 Principle[1], 202
 principle[13], 48, 68, 99, 119, 133, 175,
 194, 202, 208, 212, 251
 Principles[2], 23, 124
 principles[4], 38, 72, 89
 prindpium[1], 202
 print[1], 144
 printed[6], 18, 139–140, 144, 281, 284
 printing[1], 201
 prinziellen[1], 104
 prior[3], 135, 224, 253
 priori[1], 193
 Priority[1], 150
 priority[1], 207
 Prisoner[1], 164
 prisoner[2], 117, 164
 Privatdozent[1], 270
 private[7], 10, 13, 15, 24, 28, 30, 275
 privatissime[1], 284
 privilege[1], 61
 privileging[1], 231
 privy[1], 181
 Prize[3], 14, 52, 289
 prize[2], 205
 probably[7], 4, 9, 21, 41, 64, 231, 285
 Probe[1], 248
 Probevorlesung[1], 274
 Probevortrag[1], 274
 Problem[24], 24, 38, 43–44, 59, 79, 114,
 130, 161, 205, 235, 264, 275, 277–278,
 296
 problem[39], 11, 19, 26, 29, 35, 38, 45,
 58–59, 69, 73, 81, 95, 97, 100, 104,
 118–119, 145, 150, 153, 158, 162, 193,
 197–198, 202, 262–263, 275, 287
 problematic[3], 26, 53, 67
 Probleme[7], 84, 95, 118, 152, 270, 298
 Problemen[1], 173
 Problemlage[2], 277
 Problem motive[1], 104
 Problems[13], 33, 46, 79, 84, 151–152,
 191, 238, 263–264, 270, 287
 problems[17], 21, 36, 46, 69, 75, 83, 95,
 103, 114, 126, 140, 159, 172, 201, 212
 Procatalepsis[2], 171, 175
 procedure[6], 86, 92, 141, 161, 177, 196
 procedures[2], 76, 86
 proceed[8], 3–4, 34, 67, 88, 117, 162
 proceeded[2], 76, 130
 proceeding[6], 54, 126, 132–133, 140, 147
 Process[1], 102
 process[29], 4, 8, 27, 30, 34, 36, 52, 58,
 76, 85, 88, 107, 111–112, 138, 155, 157,
 176, 198, 205–207, 258
 processes[2], 34, 62
 proclaim[1], 26
 proclaimed[1], 236
 proclaiming[1], 84
 proclamation[1], 84
 procurement[1], 128
 prodigious[1], 75
 produce[1], 126
 produced[7], 88, 176, 207, 214, 216
 produces[2], 25, 128
 product[2], 208, 215
 Production[1], 200

production[8], *34, 37, 85, 90, 124, 172, 174*
 Produktion[1], *34*
 Produktionsprozeß[1], *34*
 Prof[4], *280, 284, 290*
 Professor[26], *5, 13, 46, 49, 60–62, 118, 144, 169, 176, 179, 182, 206, 258, 261, 271, 293*
 professor[19], *13, 16, 25, 30, 46, 67, 129, 177–178, 180, 254, 259, 262, 271–272*
 professors[2], *23, 74*
 professorship[1], *24*
 profit[1], *2*
 profits[1], *95*
 profound[8], *64, 68, 74, 98, 101, 114, 202*
 profoundly[1], *57*
 Profundity[1], *27*
 progeny[1], *32*
 program[15], *5, 20–21, 49, 55, 71, 105, 109, 171, 178, 186, 240, 290*
 programs[1], *119*
 Progress[8], *99, 193, 205–206, 214*
 progress[13], *14, 53, 101, 111, 141, 206, 209, 215, 236*
 progressed[2], *214–215*
 progression[2], *53*
 progresslessness[1], *111*
 Project[1], *143*
 project[89], *2, 7–8, 11, 14, 24, 26–30, 71–76, 86, 90–91, 98, 102, 111–112, 116, 121–123, 140, 144, 146, 149–152, 154–157, 161, 169, 180, 182–183, 185, 188, 202–203, 205, 208–209, 236, 258–261, 265*
 projected[1], *136*
 projecting[1], *152*
 projection[2], *96*
 projective[1], *96*
 Projects[1], *312*
 projects[3], *64, 142, 152*
 Prolegomena[7], *139–140, 208, 297, 311*
 prolegomena[1], *205*
 proliferation[1], *231*
 prólogos[1], *7*
 Prologue[1], *7*
 prologue[1], *7*
 prolonged[1], *78*
 prominence[1], *100*
 promise[1], *56*
 promised[1], *203*
 promises[2], *60, 215*
 promote[1], *101*
 promoted[3], *180, 221*
 promoting[2], *133, 305*
 promotion[1], *24*
 prompt[1], *83*
 promptly[1], *62*
 promulgates[1], *133*
 pronounced[1], *203*
 pronouncing[1], *167*
 proof[9], *58, 144–145, 152, 154, 157, 225–226*
 proofs[2], *152, 212*
 propädeutisch[1], *80*
 propaedeutic[4], *80, 205*
 propagandist[1], *53*
 propagate[3], *66, 180, 262*
 propels[1], *88*
 propensity[2], *89, 216*
 proper[15], *29, 40, 78, 80, 94, 99, 110, 136, 151, 173, 215, 260, 263, 266, 269*
 properly[9], *72, 77, 87, 128, 169, 181, 189–190, 262*
 property[1], *35*
 Prophecy[1], *54*
 prophesy[1], *215*
 prophesying[1], *56*
 prophet[2], *63*
 Prophetic[1], *32*
 prophets[2], *43, 54*
 proportions[1], *239*
 proposal[1], *144*
 propose[2], *130, 210*
 proposed[3], *105, 144, 153*
 propositions[7], *28, 79, 154, 171, 252*
 Prosa[10], *255–256, 266, 281–282, 287, 291–292, 294*
 Prosopography[1], *259*
 prosopography[1], *159*
 prospect[1], *64*
 prospects[1], *215*
 Protagoras[4], *70, 171, 282*
 protected[1], *144*
 Protestant[3], *225, 278, 286*

protested[1], 129
 protests[1], 118
 Protocol[2], 128, 286
 protocol[3], 38, 252, 260
 Protocols[4], 13, 62, 121, 304
 protocols[8], 13, 37–39, 121
 Protokoll[13], 38–39, 44, 121, 260, 266–267, 288, 290
 protokoll[1], 150
 Protokolle[2], 275, 301
 Protokolls[2], 152, 266
 protreptic[1], 67
 proud[2], 183, 233
 prove[3], 216, 227, 233
 proved[1], 154
 proven[1], 45
 provenance[1], 292
 Provence[5], 13, 128, 131, 288
 proves[5], 215–216, 225, 253
 Provide[1], 75
 provide[7], 3, 24, 52–53, 135, 142, 161
 provided[6], 2, 38, 89, 145, 172, 197
 provides[6], 56, 106, 177, 186, 191, 305
 providing[9], 12, 89, 100, 111–112, 129, 161, 208, 240
 proving[3], 77, 154
 Provinz[1], 281
 provisional[2], 108
 provisionally[2], 51, 245
 provocation[1], 185
 provocative[2], 66, 180
 provoke[2], 181, 185
 provoking[6], 14, 64–65, 76, 186, 259
 Proximity[1], 165
 proximity[1], 242
 Prozeß[1], 34
 Prüfen[2], 248
 prüfend[1], 113
 Prüfung[2], 248
 Prussia[1], 213
 Prussian[1], 198
 pseudepigrapha[1], 17
 pseudo[2], 78, 80
 pseudoproblems[1], 49
 PSEUDOS[1], 279
 Psychiater[1], 292
 psychiatrist[1], 92
 psychiatrists[1], 10
 Psychological[1], 45
 psychological[1], 60
 psychologically[1], 193
 Psychologie[4], 23, 134, 141, 275
 psychologism[1], 148
 Psychology[4], 23, 32, 134
 psychology[2], 140–141
 Public[1], 202
 public[30], 7, 10–11, 17, 28, 33, 35, 39, 42–43, 45, 54–55, 61, 71, 107, 114, 129, 135, 144, 155, 168, 186, 273
 Publication[2], 7, 299
 publication[47], 9–12, 17, 20–21, 24, 28, 35, 41, 47, 80, 84, 96, 101, 113–114, 122, 130, 141, 143, 145, 151–152, 154, 177, 179, 205, 231, 242, 246, 273, 305
 Publications[3], 31, 92, 154
 publications[29], 2, 7–8, 11, 18, 21, 30, 35, 37, 51, 68, 113–114, 180–182, 238, 245
 publicizing[1], 100
 publicly[5], 10, 51, 224
 publicness[2], 134–135
 Publikation[1], 245
 publish[7], 10, 22, 37, 73–74, 144, 203
 Published[13], 6, 18, 20, 39, 71, 80, 83, 193, 283–285, 296
 published[196], 2, 7–13, 17–25, 28, 30–35, 37–40, 46–47, 49, 52, 55, 61, 68–69, 71, 74–76, 79–81, 87, 91, 95, 102, 105–107, 109, 113–114, 116–121, 129, 131, 134, 140, 143–145, 149, 151, 154, 156, 159, 168–169, 171, 179–182, 186, 190–191, 202, 205, 217, 223–225, 228, 241–242, 244, 254, 260, 262, 265, 270–271, 273, 275, 277, 282–283, 288, 299, 305, 311, 316
 Publisher[4], 139, 267, 271, 301
 publisher[7], 11, 13, 21, 40, 141, 145, 255
 Publishers[3], 118, 143, 302
 publishers[2], 15, 19
 Publishing[1], 254
 publishing[7], 2, 8, 36, 42, 71, 144–145
 Publizist[1], 244
 pudendum[1], 229
 pudicity[1], 39

puffs[1], 17
 puisse[1], 9
 pull[3], 89, 157
 pulled[1], 223
 pulverized[1], 187
 punctuation[2], 38, 152
 Punkte[1], 108
 pupils[2], 123, 131
 purblind[1], 47
 purchased[1], 17
 Pure[44], 28, 44–46, 56, 80, 89, 113, 120,
 126, 186, 193–194, 197, 203–205, 207,
 211–213, 215–216, 223
 pure[49], 99, 102–103, 127, 129–130, 140,
 172, 187, 192, 203–206, 208–211,
 214–216, 220, 225–226, 229–230, 249
 purely[8], 51, 119, 167, 175, 219, 230, 245,
 265
 purest[5], 35, 102, 117, 183, 189
 purging[1], 68
 purified[1], 117
 purify[4], 53, 76–77
 purifying[6], 53, 76, 189
 purist[2], 117, 243
 purists[1], 209
 Purpose[1], 85
 purpose[29], 5, 11, 25, 28–29, 32, 69–70,
 83, 86, 114–115, 132, 137, 140, 150,
 155–156, 180, 184, 220, 237, 241
 purposes[4], 94, 216, 239, 273
 pursue[1], 110
 pursuit[1], 225
 push[2], 226, 261
 Pushed[1], 31
 pushed[1], 221
 pushes[1], 201
 pushing[6], 74, 103, 128, 154, 180
 Put[1], 226
 put[28], 4, 25, 28, 43, 55, 61, 74, 89, 97,
 118, 127, 136, 141, 143, 148, 153, 159,
 175, 180, 186, 214, 221, 248–249, 277,
 285
 puts[5], 58, 92, 100, 218, 222
 Putsch[1], 43
 Putting[1], 100
 puzzle[3], 120, 129, 160
 puzzlement[3], 76, 148

puzzling[1], 122
 Pyrrho[2], 206, 211
 Pyrrhonism[1], 61

Q

QED[4], 94, 115, 185–186
 qouZC[1], 51
 qu[1], 9
 Quaker[1], 118
 Qualität[1], 226
 quality[5], 38, 55, 107, 176, 226
 Quand[1], 9
 quantity[2], 123, 131
 quarry[2], 78, 155
 quarter[1], 99
 quarters[2], 119, 144
 quatsch[1], 176
 Quellen[1], 208
 Quest[1], 42
 quest[1], 186
 Question[29], 5, 26, 71, 84, 86, 91–92, 109,
 117–118, 132, 150, 154, 156, 180–181,
 185–186, 198, 239, 259, 265, 274, 276,
 294
 question[297], 4–5, 12–14, 17, 19, 24,
 26–27, 30–31, 45, 55, 57–58, 61–63,
 65–66, 70–72, 74, 77, 79, 81, 83–84, 86,
 88–90, 93–94, 99, 104, 107–109, 111,
 117, 120, 123, 125, 128–129, 131, 133,
 140–141, 143, 145–159, 162, 164, 172,
 176–177, 184–186, 188, 193, 195,
 197–198, 201, 205, 214, 217, 221, 224,
 231, 233, 236, 239, 242, 246–249, 251,
 254, 258–259, 261–263, 265
 questionability[1], 259
 questionable[4], 1, 161, 177, 285
 Questioned[1], 62
 questioned[6], 83, 99, 117, 159, 212
 questioner[13], 5, 23, 57, 60, 70, 83,
 93–94, 155, 184, 187
 questioners[1], 69
 Questioning[15], 83–84, 89–90, 118, 149,
 152, 159, 161, 172, 174, 178, 185

questioning[251], *5, 11, 24–26, 28, 30, 39, 57, 62, 64–67, 69–72, 74–76, 79, 83–90, 92, 94–95, 100, 108, 110, 112–113, 116–118, 120–127, 130, 132, 134, 136–137, 145, 149, 151–152, 155–159, 162, 171–180, 184–186, 197, 201, 217, 249, 262, 264–265*

questioningly[1], *84*

questionlessness[4], *90, 158, 172, 174*

Questions[9], *84, 92, 117, 150, 152, 176, 258, 265, 294*

questions[143], *3, 5, 11, 19, 27, 30–31, 38–39, 45, 47, 62–63, 66–67, 69, 71–72, 76, 80, 82–84, 88–89, 92–94, 103, 105, 107–109, 112, 116–117, 119–127, 129, 131, 145–146, 150, 155–158, 174–175, 177–178, 180, 184, 186, 192, 211, 217, 235, 244–245, 251, 259–262, 265, 293*

Qui[1], *35*

quick[1], *87*

quickly[6], *42, 87, 95, 112, 120, 144*

Quid[2], *278*

quiet[1], *16*

quietism[4], *118*

quietists[1], *118*

quietly[1], *19*

Quine[2], *193, 224*

Quinn[2], *254, 304*

quip[1], *128*

quirky[1], *29*

quit[1], *15*

quite[9], *7, 9, 25, 60, 73, 162, 191*

quod[4], *94, 115, 185–186*

quotation[1], *289*

Quote[3], *31, 87, 115*

quote[28], *30, 35, 56, 74, 80, 97, 107, 114, 135, 138, 149, 152, 168, 188, 196, 219, 227, 230, 238, 258, 260, 263, 266*

Quoted[2], *249, 258*

quoted[7], *106–107, 155, 230, 238, 244*

Quotes[1], *263*

quotes[17], *8, 25, 36, 40, 70, 92, 97, 118, 134, 136, 188, 238, 260–262*

Quv[1], *168*

R

Rabi[3], *62*

race[4], *142, 219, 230, 238*

racism[1], *54*

radical[16], *11, 89, 95, 109, 118–119, 140, 155, 197–198, 202, 231, 235, 242*

Radically[1], *52*

radically[1], *156*

radikale[1], *235*

radikaler[1], *242*

Radio[4], *3, 285, 291*

radio[4], *97, 106, 109*

Raffoul[1], *73*

raging[2], *218, 230*

Rah[1], *291*

Rahmen[2], *275, 280*

Rahner[1], *303*

Rainer[7], *18, 38–39, 121, 139, 185*

raise[6], *66, 126, 140, 150, 185, 197*

raised[1], *235*

raises[3], *134–135, 171*

raising[4], *83, 134, 150, 197*

ramifications[1], *195*

Rand[1], *261*

Randbemerkungen[1], *274*

randomly[3], *181, 190, 262*

range[6], *24, 40, 47, 83–84, 167*

ranging[1], *85*

Ranicki[1], *303*

rank[3], *18, 156, 195*

Ranke[1], *134*

ranking[6], *7, 47, 111, 137*

rankings[1], *236*

rapid[1], *25*

Rapp[5], *315*

rare[8], *29, 39, 54, 61, 64, 69, 154, 159*

rarely[2], *128, 134*

rasch[1], *20*

Rast[1], *15*

rate[3], *49, 52, 301*

rated[1], *214*

Rather[4], *80–81, 84, 231*

rather[92], *3, 5, 9, 34, 36, 51, 66, 69–70,*

73, 75–78, 83, 85, 93–95, 99, 102, 104,
 107–108, 110, 112–113, 117, 120, 126,
 132, 136–137, 150–158, 166, 168–169,
 176, 181, 184, 187, 196–198, 200,
 204–205, 208, 211, 216–217, 221, 237,
 245, 248, 252, 263–264, 316
 ratio[1], 207
 rational[9], 53, 155, 193, 203, 211–213
 rationale[10], 20, 155, 165, 234, 240, 256
 rationalis[4], 103, 211
 Rationalism[1], 212
 rationalism[8], 206, 208–209, 213, 234
 rationis[1], 202
 Rätsel[2], 76
 Raum[4], 20, 285, 291, 314
 Raumes[3], 68–69, 147
 Rausch[1], 18
 razor[1], 232
 rd[2], 45, 192
 re[49], 2, 4–5, 8, 11, 17, 29–30, 36–37, 45,
 53, 57, 93, 105, 114, 127, 139–141, 149,
 159, 169, 181–183, 186–187, 192, 217,
 233, 236, 242, 259–261
 rea[2], 114
 reach[3], 54, 83, 193
 reached[5], 34, 75, 82, 140, 223
 reaches[5], 31, 71, 110, 166, 194
 reaching[6], 49, 64, 169, 179
 reacted[3], 9, 73, 131
 reacting[1], 100
 reaction[2], 9, 118
 Read[3], 190, 282, 291
 read[88], 2, 4–5, 10–11, 16, 18, 21, 25,
 28–31, 35–36, 38, 43–44, 47, 49, 53–54,
 57, 69, 72, 76, 83–84, 94, 99, 105–106,
 110–111, 113, 115, 123–124, 129, 131,
 166, 169, 180–184, 186–187, 189–190,
 192, 207, 212, 238, 254, 260–262, 272,
 278, 284, 294
 readable[1], 38
 Reader[1], 237
 reader[4], 110, 150, 238
 readers[9], 4–5, 11, 14, 51, 88, 180, 224
 readiness[3], 87, 120
 Reading[1], 231
 reading[80], 2, 4–5, 7, 13, 18, 24, 26, 30,
 37, 40, 42, 45–46, 53, 59–60, 67, 69, 77,
 79, 95, 106, 110, 115, 117, 123,
 126–127, 141, 171, 177, 179–180, 182,
 186–187, 189–190, 193–194, 209,
 223–224, 232–233, 238, 249, 254,
 260–262, 273, 284–285, 291
 readings[11], 2, 5, 23, 31, 46, 105, 182,
 221, 249, 261
 reads[4], 67, 114, 143, 182
 ready[11], 49, 78, 95, 105, 128, 144, 179,
 205, 239, 251
 Reagan[1], 43
 reagi[1], 9
 Real[3], 99, 193, 205
 real[45], 2, 4, 10, 13, 40, 54, 62, 66, 69, 72,
 75, 80, 100, 102, 104, 111, 113, 116,
 118–120, 123, 128, 131, 139, 142, 158,
 161, 169, 199, 205–206, 221, 226, 228,
 232, 251, 253, 262
 Realismus[1], 277
 realist[2], 117
 Realität[1], 226
 realities[1], 228
 Reality[1], 102
 reality[24], 45, 83, 88, 102, 110, 197, 199,
 201, 205, 215–216, 226, 228, 231–232,
 238–239
 realization[6], 127, 135, 153, 158
 realize[4], 27, 57, 100, 217
 realized[4], 135, 141, 159
 realizing[1], 77
 really[22], 29, 34, 43, 54, 79, 91, 94, 110,
 133, 149, 152, 159, 197–198, 204, 212,
 228, 262–263, 269, 289
 realm[14], 33, 55, 85, 87, 97, 103, 160,
 185, 198, 200, 231–232
 reappeared[1], 62
 rearguard[1], 159
 Reason[50], 28, 44–46, 56, 80, 89, 109,
 113, 120, 193–194, 197, 203–205, 207,
 209, 211–213, 215–216, 223, 225, 227
 reason[84], 53, 60, 67, 80, 89, 99, 103,
 123, 129, 131, 154–155, 169, 193, 195,
 199–209, 211, 213–216, 227–228,
 231–232, 240, 251–252
 reasonably[1], 164
 reasoning[2], 89, 155
 reasonlessness[1], 207
 Reasons[1], 13

reasons[9], *36–37, 87, 91, 105, 180, 202, 242*
 Reavis[2], *315*
 Rebecca[2], *315*
 rebellious[1], *164*
 Rebholz[1], *292*
 rebuild[1], *95*
 rebuilding[1], *106*
 recalls[3], *41, 123, 131*
 recasting[2], *195*
 receive[3], *35, 61, 190*
 received[6], *19, 23, 47, 144, 197, 271*
 receives[3], *34, 140, 195*
 receiving[2], *239, 270*
 Recent[3], *18, 21, 62*
 recent[18], *5, 20, 32, 57, 88, 93, 102, 139, 158, 207, 217, 224, 227, 275, 292*
 Recently[3], *17, 60, 277*
 recently[16], *10, 16, 21, 38, 41, 48, 61, 96, 150, 157, 182, 214, 277, 293*
 rechne[1], *141*
 Rechnens[1], *173*
 Recht[2], *225, 235*
 rechte[4], *84, 136–137, 146*
 rechten[1], *84*
 Rechtfertigung[1], *220*
 Rechts[2], *52, 201*
 Rechtslehre[1], *57*
 reckoning[1], *111*
 recognition[3], *97, 226*
 recognizable[4], *81, 107, 136, 176*
 recognize[4], *40, 108, 200, 233*
 recognized[6], *7, 221–222, 232, 247*
 recognizer[1], *221*
 recognizes[1], *235*
 recognizing[2], *164, 226*
 Recollection[2], *27, 200*
 Recollections[3], *27, 195, 200*
 Reconstruction[2], *244*
 reconstruction[3], *38, 71, 216*
 record[11], *15–16, 20, 38, 106, 271, 285, 293–294*
 recorded[4], *39, 121, 286*
 recorders[1], *36*
 recording[3], *26, 39, 286*
 Recordings[2], *39, 313*
 records[8], *10, 45, 54, 165, 255*
 recovered[1], *294*
 recovery[2], *231, 233*
 recreation[1], *232*
 Rector[5], *46, 105*
 rector[1], *44*
 rectorate[2], *111, 114*
 rectorial[1], *280*
 recurred[1], *62*
 recurrence[3], *96, 199, 242*
 recurring[4], *52, 62*
 recursion[1], *191*
 Red[2], *176–177*
 red[3], *40, 176*
 reddendae[1], *202*
 reddest[1], *131*
 Rede[14], *173–174, 246–247, 275, 280, 282, 287, 290, 292, 294*
 redeem[2], *237, 241*
 redeemed[1], *247*
 Reden[19], *86, 97, 101, 118, 177, 198, 256, 273, 277, 281–282, 286–287, 291–292, 294, 296*
 reden[1], *84*
 redete[1], *120*
 reduce[3], *5, 13, 130*
 reduces[1], *88*
 reduction[1], *190*
 Rees[1], *283*
 Reesam[1], *290*
 Reeve[1], *88*
 refathom[1], *66*
 refer[1], *246*
 Reference[1], *18*
 reference[6], *9, 12–13, 81, 238, 275*
 References[3], *139, 255, 310*
 references[7], *12, 52, 109, 154, 175, 238, 254*
 referred[2], *192, 248*
 referring[1], *81*
 refers[8], *27, 31, 41, 62, 149, 154, 204, 207*
 reflect[4], *8, 33, 63, 196*
 reflected[4], *35, 88, 132*
 reflecting[3], *2, 51, 214*
 Reflection[2], *286–287*
 reflection[10], *9, 47, 84, 97, 150, 158, 162,*

176, 197
 reflections[1], 143
 reflex[1], 72
 reform[2], 105, 147
 reformer[1], 3
 refrain[2], 168, 207
 refresh[1], 186
 refrigerator[1], 168
 refuge[1], 189
 refusal[3], 242, 246
 refusing[1], 83
 refutatio[1], 171
 Refutation[3], 171, 208, 212
 refutation[4], 58, 76, 83, 171
 refute[2], 78–79
 refuted[3], 69, 77–78
 regained[1], 113
 regard[24], 2–3, 47, 52, 72, 74, 80, 99, 104,
 128, 151, 158, 186, 189–190, 203,
 205–206, 238, 248
 Regarding[1], 216
 regarding[9], 7, 17, 63, 69, 103, 117, 149,
 162
 regards[1], 202
 Regehly[2], 272, 311
 Reginald[1], 202
 region[2], 168, 213
 regional[1], 30
 regress[1], 207
 Regulae[1], 99
 regular[1], 104
 regularly[1], 105
 regulating[1], 38
 rei[1], 44
 Reich[5], 280, 303
 reichenden[4], 49, 169, 179
 reicht[1], 166
 Reid[2], 74, 89
 Reife[2], 87, 120
 reigning[1], 62
 Reihe[2], 308
 rein[5], 167, 189, 245, 249, 264
 reine[3], 173, 250
 reinen[11], 44–45, 80, 183, 194, 203–204,
 223, 277, 297
 Reiner[2], 39, 263
 reiner[2], 219, 230
 Reinhold[4], 206–207, 241
 reinigen[2], 77
 Reinigung[4], 53, 76, 189
 reject[6], 35, 53, 59, 72, 76
 rejected[6], 47, 117, 119, 144, 213, 225
 Rejecting[1], 133
 rejecting[1], 110
 Rejection[9], 225–226, 228–230, 233
 rejection[10], 32, 44, 57, 194, 196, 221,
 223, 225, 242
 rejectionist[1], 4
 Rejections[1], 225
 rejects[4], 48, 70, 151, 184
 rejoinder[1], 129
 Rektorats[1], 114
 Rektoratsrede[1], 111
 Rektors[1], 280
 rela[1], 146
 relate[1], 166
 Related[2], 192, 287
 related[19], 17, 23, 29–30, 41, 100, 109,
 146, 148, 154, 189, 228, 231–233, 238,
 242, 251
 relatedness[1], 149
 Relating[1], 271
 relating[2], 157, 178
 Relation[1], 172
 relation[18], 8, 27, 44, 90, 101, 129, 133,
 145, 157, 172–173, 195, 200, 208, 215,
 228
 Relationship[1], 207
 relationship[23], 18, 25–26, 55, 84, 108,
 113–114, 130, 143, 145, 155, 158, 198,
 232, 242–243
 relative[1], 226
 relatively[1], 20
 Relativism[2], 153
 relativism[2], 153
 relativist[1], 153
 relaxing[1], 85
 Release[1], 301
 released[2], 18, 107
 releasing[2], 31, 52
 relegate[1], 40
 relegated[1], 38
 relentlessness[1], 116

relevance[1], 177
 reliability[1], 145
 reliable[2], 3, 35
 reliance[1], 39
 relied[1], 116
 relief[1], 67
 Religion[6], 205, 212, 275
 religion[5], 103, 124, 175, 201, 225
 religions[1], 105
 Religionsphilosophie[1], 201
 Religiösen[1], 275
 religiösen[2], 275, 298
 Religious[1], 275
 religious[4], 60, 124, 175
 remain[20], 4, 17, 78, 93, 96, 122, 125–126,
 146, 185, 188–189, 201, 209, 215–216,
 227, 262
 remained[8], 59, 72, 81, 150, 181, 197, 231
 remaining[1], 88
 remains[38], 13, 33, 40, 59, 63–64, 71, 83,
 88, 92, 102, 109, 120, 145–146, 152–154,
 167, 178, 193, 195, 202, 209, 221–223,
 227, 231–232, 245, 249, 253, 283, 285
 Remark[2], 149, 261
 remark[40], 7, 25, 35, 54, 67, 75, 78, 84,
 88–89, 104, 107, 116, 123, 129, 134,
 136, 145–146, 153, 156, 169, 172, 188,
 201, 206, 208–209, 217, 221, 225–226,
 242, 245, 250, 259–260
 remarkable[4], 62, 88, 141, 145
 remarkably[5], 5, 12, 58, 171, 216
 remarked[8], 30–31, 77, 80, 88, 99, 170,
 207
 Remarks[6], 35, 59, 109, 151, 165, 282
 remarks[71], 3, 5, 8–9, 16, 24, 26–28,
 32–33, 35, 37–38, 41, 52–55, 73, 79, 81,
 85, 97–99, 101, 107, 109, 116–117, 128,
 132, 134–135, 140, 143, 147, 160–161,
 165–166, 169, 177, 192, 201, 207–208,
 221, 240, 252
 Rembrandt[1], 289
 Remember[18], 3, 26, 30, 42, 46, 67–68,
 74, 106, 121, 152, 156, 169, 180, 188,
 195, 220
 remember[3], 36, 86, 181
 remembered[1], 275
 remembering[1], 168
 remembers[2], 41, 62
 remembrance[1], 219
 remind[1], 150
 reminiscences[4], 39
 Remond[1], 194
 remote[2], 7, 175
 remove[3], 55, 111, 150
 removes[1], 217
 removing[2], 55, 231
 Renaissance[2], 53, 111
 Renaut[1], 182
 render[2], 24, 202
 rendered[1], 202
 René[7], 11, 48, 99, 287, 294, 308
 Rene[2], 212, 291
 renew[1], 94
 Renewal[1], 8
 renewal[2], 154
 renewing[2], 150, 263
 renounce[3], 194, 226, 228
 renounced[2], 57, 228
 renowned[1], 23
 rented[1], 138
 renunciation[2], 99–100
 repeat[2], 231, 273
 repeated[6], 24, 93, 242, 282, 286, 290
 repeatedly[3], 138, 200, 249
 repeater[1], 137
 repeating[2], 30, 93
 repent[1], 233
 Repetitions[1], 38
 replace[1], 150
 replaced[3], 33, 95, 106
 replied[2], 128, 261
 replies[1], 258
 Report[5], 10, 12, 19–20, 117
 report[11], 20, 47, 76, 105, 107, 130–131,
 200, 275, 282
 Reportable[1], 39
 reportable[1], 15
 Reported[7], 16, 42, 72, 182, 282, 286–287
 reported[17], 14, 17, 20, 29, 62, 73, 75, 86,
 101, 105, 112, 273, 281, 294
 Reportedly[1], 281
 reportedly[1], 85
 Reports[2], 121, 275

reports[6], *37, 39, 105, 109, 117*
 reprehensible[1], *54*
 represent[1], *281*
 Representation[1], *240*
 representation[6], *34, 90, 172, 174, 211*
 representational[1], *159*
 representationalist[1], *4*
 representations[3], *202, 211, 226*
 represented[5], *107, 133, 159*
 representedness[1], *199*
 representing[2], *117, 152*
 represents[9], *4, 33, 87, 134–135, 154, 227*
 Reprint[1], *41*
 Reprinted[3], *285–286*
 reproducing[1], *129*
 Republic[1], *15*
 republics[1], *137*
 Republished[1], *270*
 repudiation[2], *242*
 reputation[4], *15, 46, 118, 120*
 requested[1], *212*
 require[1], *102*
 Required[1], *10*
 required[5], *58, 66, 101, 162, 211*
 requirement[1], *183*
 requirements[1], *20*
 requires[10], *9, 67, 113, 135, 141, 148, 177, 226, 228, 254*
 requiring[2], *253, 267*
 Res[1], *8*
 res[5], *102, 199, 214*
 rescue[2], *23*
 rescued[1], *97*
 Research[9], *87, 113, 123, 196–197, 275–276, 290*
 research[24], *3, 7, 19, 21, 23–24, 27–28, 43, 70, 121, 133, 140, 153, 172, 182, 184, 197–198, 242, 254*
 researchers[2], *10, 83*
 resemble[1], *180*
 Reserve[1], *15*
 reservedness[1], *24*
 reside[1], *202*
 residence[1], *294*
 Residenz[1], *288*
 resides[1], *172*
 resigned[1], *46*
 resisting[1], *119*
 Resolutions[1], *188*
 Resolve[2], *102, 188*
 resolve[1], *147*
 resolved[2], *60, 114*
 resolves[1], *116*
 resonating[1], *160*
 resources[4], *3, 104, 182*
 Respect[2], *8, 21*
 respect[16], *75, 79, 90, 149, 153, 172, 193, 212, 215–216*
 responded[2], *107, 207*
 responding[4], *100, 106, 244*
 responds[1], *49*
 RESPONSE[2], *258*
 Response[1], *260*
 response[9], *38, 41, 80, 107, 205, 212, 243–244, 293*
 responses[2], *61, 121*
 responsibility[1], *227*
 responsible[1], *13*
 rest[21], *12, 24, 30, 34, 45, 48–49, 54, 56, 104, 116, 148, 155, 177, 180, 182, 254, 260*
 restatements[1], *178*
 restating[1], *207*
 rested[1], *251*
 restoration[1], *95*
 restrained[1], *116*
 restrict[1], *166*
 Restricted[1], *88*
 restricted[1], *30*
 rests[5], *90, 173, 216, 225, 289*
 Result[1], *235*
 result[7], *116, 124, 154, 195, 214–215, 240*
 Resultat[1], *235*
 resulted[1], *181*
 results[29], *3, 35, 49, 52–53, 67–69, 99, 115, 119, 123, 132, 134–135, 157, 178, 182, 197*
 resurrected[1], *215*
 retain[1], *172*
 retained[4], *122, 125, 145, 242*
 retains[2], *231, 311*
 rethink[1], *106*
 Rethinking[1], *158*

rethinking[2], 1, 4
 reticence[1], 24
 retire[1], 148
 retired[1], 271
 retirement[1], 16
 retold[1], 39
 retract[1], 5
 retreat[1], 197
 retrieval[2], 194, 233
 retrospectively[1], 249
 retten[3], 49, 179, 201
 Rettende[1], 84
 Rettung[1], 290
 return[17], 35, 47, 56, 72, 124, 138, 197,
 215, 217, 220, 223, 231, 236, 240, 242
 returned[1], 145
 returning[2], 88
 returns[3], 145, 177, 228
 reum[1], 114
 reunion[2], 9, 281
 reuse[1], 67
 Reuter[1], 288
 revaluation[6], 111, 223, 231, 236
 reveal[2], 146, 152
 revealed[3], 11, 18, 141
 Revealing[1], 199
 revealingly[1], 249
 reveals[1], 228
 revelation[2], 211, 213
 revelations[2], 4, 236
 reverberations[1], 77
 revered[1], 227
 reverent[1], 103
 reversal[6], 98, 148, 194, 222, 240
 reversals[1], 27
 reverse[2], 153, 191
 reversed[3], 34, 145, 222
 reversing[2], 231, 240
 Review[3], 45, 148, 310
 review[9], 21, 24, 37, 42, 45, 149, 207, 242
 reviewed[5], 12, 37, 207, 305
 reviewing[1], 114
 reviews[5], 19, 25, 79, 194, 223
 Revised[3], 139, 286, 293
 revised[2], 77, 310
 revision[1], 83
 revisions[1], 252
 revolt[1], 110
 revolting[1], 238
 Revolution[2], 43, 119
 revolution[6], 57–58, 98, 118–119
 revolutionary[1], 119
 Revolutions[1], 3
 revolutions[1], 203
 reward[3], 69, 231
 Rewording[1], 114
 rewrite[1], 262
 Rewriting[3], 258, 261
 rewriting[4], 114, 258, 260
 Reyna[1], 82
 Rezeption[1], 267
 Rhein[6], 106, 170, 188, 262, 297
 Rheinbrücke[1], 168
 Rheinisches[1], 242
 Rhetor[2], 59, 130
 Rhetoric[3], 88, 186
 rhetoric[7], 59, 61–62, 88, 128, 130
 rhetorical[3], 64, 80, 207
 Rhine[5], 15, 67–68, 168
 Rhodes[1], 192
 Rhône[1], 15
 rich[7], 16, 66, 70, 80, 229, 283
 RICHARD[1], 258
 Richard[51], 1, 4, 7–8, 15–16, 27, 38–39,
 51, 53–54, 60, 64, 70, 79, 81, 84, 88–90,
 92, 96–98, 117–118, 126, 134, 148, 173,
 184, 189, 244, 249, 259, 261, 271, 273,
 293, 313, 315
 Richardson[14], 18, 27, 29, 110, 130, 179,
 258, 265, 273
 richly[1], 71
 richten[1], 264
 Richter[2], 292–293
 richtig[1], 247
 Richtigkeiten[1], 181
 Richtpunkte[1], 104
 Richtung[3], 99, 147, 236
 Rickert[11], 10, 44, 69, 134, 197, 238, 274,
 302
 Rickerts[2], 123, 274
 Ricoeur[3], 34, 48, 287
 rid[2], 49, 125
 riddle[4], 56, 76, 100, 130

riddler[2], 48, 242
 riddles[3], 76
 ride[2], 16, 167
 ridged[1], 2
 Riedel[1], 41
 Riehl[1], 33
 rien[1], 9
 riesigen[2], 71, 81
 Riga[8], 16, 167, 277
 Right[9], 25, 29, 52, 57, 182, 261, 270
 right[58], 3–5, 10, 15, 26, 65, 77–78, 83–84,
 94–95, 97, 104, 106, 119–120, 127,
 135–137, 145–146, 156, 161, 169, 175,
 180, 182, 188–189, 202, 225, 235, 259,
 261
 rightful[1], 208
 rigid[1], 128
 rigidity[1], 2
 rigs[1], 60
 Rilke[2], 40, 200
 Rilkes[1], 283
 Ring[3], 17, 26
 ring[1], 31
 Ringier[1], 14
 ringing[1], 19
 rings[1], 180
 Rink[2], 193, 205
 rip[1], 51
 ripe[1], 95
 ripened[1], 55
 ripping[1], 59
 Rise[1], 165
 rise[2], 53, 64
 Rishi[2], 110, 156
 risible[1], 39
 risk[2], 79, 151
 risks[1], 67
 rite[1], 101
 Ritter[1], 45
 Ritu[1], 312
 River[1], 168
 river[3], 163, 168
 road[6], 5, 30, 113, 119, 156, 161
 roads[2], 3, 108
 roam[2], 147, 185
 Robert[4], 119, 149
 rock[2], 78, 155
 rocking[1], 107
 Rockmore[2], 182
 Roderick[1], 103
 Roger[1], 110
 Rohen[1], 75
 Rojcewicz[9], 38, 64, 84, 88–90, 126, 173
 Role[1], 270
 role[13], 32, 35, 38, 55, 64, 98, 110, 114,
 181, 190, 262
 roles[1], 61
 Rolle[1], 270
 rolls[1], 25
 Roma[1], 221
 Roman[5], 14, 25, 43, 221
 romance[1], 229
 Romanian[1], 178
 Romanticism[1], 198
 Romantics[2], 97
 Romantik[1], 97
 Rōmānus[1], 221
 Rome[4], 16, 281
 Ronald[1], 43
 ROnoBqgDEn[1], 51
 room[9], 2, 37, 48, 53, 110, 138, 194, 223,
 263
 Root[1], 61
 root[3], 97, 202, 231
 rooted[1], 194
 rootless[1], 96
 Rorty[8], 7, 53, 60, 189, 259
 Rosen[1], 150
 Rötebuck[3], 16, 48, 292
 Rötebuckweg[2], 16, 292
 Rothaus[1], 294
 rough[2], 38, 75
 roughly[1], 103
 Rousseau[1], 46
 Routledge[1], 310
 roving[1], 79
 Row[1], 145
 Rowman[2], 304
 Royal[2], 205, 207
 Royce[1], 44
 rpm[5], 313–314
 Rubicon[1], 163

rückwärts[1], 70
rückwärtsgerichtete[1], 90
Rückweg[2], 307–308
Rudolf[18], 14, 33, 45, 49, 104, 175, 182,
224, 270–271, 275, 284, 302–303
Ruf[1], 281
rufend[1], 268
Ruhe[5], 89, 148–149, 219, 293
ruhig[1], 158
Ruhr[4], 275
rühren[1], 81
rührt[1], 166
ruht[1], 289
Ruinen[2], 56, 204
ruins[18], 56, 99, 106, 204–205, 208–209
rule[5], 38, 56, 105, 204, 222
Rules[1], 99
rules[3], 10, 122, 199
Ruling[1], 122
Rumänian[1], 18
ruminations[1], 33
Rumors[1], 138
run[5], 2, 50, 101, 189, 236
Rundfunk[1], 285
Rundfunks[1], 314
rungs[1], 111
running[4], 3, 13, 40, 259
runs[5], 8, 23, 88, 139
rupture[1], 45
rush[3], 87–88, 180
Rushd[1], 192
rushed[3], 24, 203
Russell[4], 23, 68, 193, 254
Russia[4], 96, 106, 164
Russian[3], 96, 272, 294
Russianism[1], 33
Russland[1], 164
rustic[1], 168
Ruth[1], 315
Rütte[1], 16
Ryle[1], 148

S

Sa[1], 9
sa[1], 9
Saal[1], 289
Saale[1], 38
Sabbasava[1], 125
SACHE[1], 266
Sache[40], 1, 6, 29, 34, 85, 93, 104, 112,
136, 140, 142, 145, 161–162, 177, 179,
219, 244, 248, 264, 285–286, 289–292,
294, 296, 313
sachem[1], 142
Sachen[5], 73, 87, 120, 306
Sachgellalt[1], 264
Sachgemässe[1], 275
sachliche[2], 72, 183
Sachlichkeit[1], 42
Sachverhalte[2], 247
Säckingen[2], 17, 285
Sackler[1], 62
sacrificial[1], 101
SACRORUM[1], 53
sad[2], 88
Sadly[1], 17
Safranski[1], 285
Saga[1], 42
saga[1], 246
Sage[7], 34, 91, 174, 246, 268, 287
sage[2], 34, 64
Sagen[9], 20, 87, 91, 267–268, 307
sagen[3], 112, 136, 160
Sagens[2], 87, 256
sages[1], 188
sagt[5], 136, 167, 193, 221, 252
sagte[4], 34, 98, 108, 219
sah[2], 43, 167
said[122], 5, 8, 14–15, 21, 23–26, 28–29,
31, 33, 35, 40, 52–53, 61, 63–64, 66–67,
71, 78, 81, 84, 86, 88–89, 91, 96, 101,
103, 105–106, 108, 112, 115–116, 118,
123–124, 126, 128, 130–131, 134, 137,
144, 146–147, 152, 156, 160, 166, 181,
183, 186, 188, 193, 200, 202–208, 211,
214, 217–218, 223, 230, 232, 242,

249–251, 253, 259–260, 263, 269, 275,
 277, 285, 294, 316
 sailing[1], 47
 Saint[7], 15, 43, 186, 192, 273
 sais[1], 9
 Salacious[1], 119
 sale[2], 16, 244
 Sales[1], 179
 sales[2], 144, 179
 Salle[2], 48, 286
 Sallis[3], 115, 273, 315
 Salomé[1], 224
 salvation[2], 9, 95
 Same[3], 240, 244, 280
 same[72], 13–15, 42–44, 54, 56, 59, 62,
 76–77, 81, 83–84, 88, 90, 96–97, 99,
 101–103, 114–115, 118, 121, 127, 131,
 139, 148, 152, 155, 160, 167, 185–186,
 190–191, 193, 196, 198–200, 202–206,
 208, 216, 220–221, 223, 226, 234–235,
 238, 242, 249, 252, 261
 Sammlung[2], 280, 283
 Sämtliche[1], 110
 sample[2], 40, 141
 Sämtliche[2], 254, 270
 San[1], 43
 sana[1], 15
 Sancta[1], 274
 sanctified[1], 227
 sandbox[1], 80
 Saner[2], 167, 302
 sang[1], 16
 sanguine[1], 4
 sank[2], 208, 211
 sano[1], 15
 Sanskrit[10], 61, 105, 110, 122, 156, 192
 Santa[1], 291
 Santayana[1], 23
 São[1], 16
 Sapienz[1], 15
 Sapir[1], 127
 Sarah[2], 109, 315
 Sartre[27], 47–48, 108–109, 158, 182, 192,
 254
 Sat[1], 192
 sat[1], 192
 satisfactory[1], 208
 satisfied[1], 129
 satisfy[1], 216
 sattva[1], 192
 Saturday[1], 294
 Saturdays[2], 105
 satya[1], 192
 Satz[17], 61, 202, 245–246, 279, 287, 296,
 313
 Sätzen[1], 252
 Satzes[2], 279
 sauce[2], 258
 save[4], 95, 169, 201
 saved[1], 98
 saving[2], 84, 246
 saw[22], 40, 43, 46–47, 55, 71, 75, 98, 114,
 129, 134, 166, 169, 186, 194, 199–200,
 207, 223, 285
 Saxony[1], 315
 say[60], 10, 12, 16, 26, 28, 30, 44, 59, 62,
 69, 76–77, 79–81, 84–86, 106, 112–113,
 116, 119–120, 128–130, 136, 156–157,
 160, 167, 177, 179, 186, 190, 193, 202,
 204, 209, 211, 217, 221, 224–225, 228,
 238, 240, 244, 259
 Saying[2], 25, 91
 saying[27], 5, 11, 19, 24, 34, 64, 74, 77, 79,
 98, 112, 131, 143, 156, 166, 172–173,
 186, 192, 204, 206, 208, 232, 242, 283
 sayings[1], 15
 says[119], 8, 12, 14, 17, 19–20, 24, 27, 31,
 42, 44–46, 55, 58, 61, 63–64, 71, 76,
 79–80, 83–84, 86, 88, 92, 99–103, 106,
 109–112, 115–116, 119, 122–123, 125,
 130–131, 133, 136, 140, 148, 150–153,
 157, 159, 164–165, 167, 175, 186, 194,
 198, 200–202, 204, 206–209, 214,
 216–217, 220, 223–224, 231–232, 236,
 240, 252, 263, 277, 285, 287
 scandalous[1], 4
 scantily[1], 38
 scape[1], 3
 scapegoat[1], 113
 scary[2], 91, 96
 scene[1], 7
 Scepsis[3], 219, 230
 scepsis[2], 219, 230
 Schadewaldt[1], 304

Schäf[1], 15
 Schaffen[2], 92
 schaffen[2], 45, 77
 Schalow[2], 273, 315
 schärfen[1], 266
 Scharnhorst[1], 198
 Schatten[1], 251
 Schätzbare[1], 236
 Schatzkästlein[1], 287
 Schauinsland[2], 286
 schehen[1], 114
 Scheidung[2], 58
 Schein[3], 170, 219, 230
 scheinbare[1], 225
 scheint[1], 84
 Scheler[17], 23, 25, 32, 34, 77, 111, 113,
 147–148, 223, 254, 275–276
 Schelling[67], 18, 26, 30, 36, 39, 44, 55,
 57–58, 63, 67, 78, 80, 92, 100–101,
 104–106, 112, 116–120, 134, 143,
 148–150, 156, 189, 196, 198–199,
 201–202, 217–219, 229–230, 249–250,
 252, 262, 285, 297, 299
 Schellings[2], 58, 218
 schema[1], 133
 schemata[1], 30
 Schematism[1], 276
 Schematismus[1], 276
 scheme[1], 56
 schemes[1], 226
 schen[3], 72, 97, 109
 schenken[1], 77
 Scherz[1], 108
 Schicken[1], 246
 Schickende[1], 266
 Schicksal[1], 63
 schickt[2], 246, 266
 Schickung[1], 246
 Schiller[11], 17, 26, 46, 121, 123, 133, 198,
 211, 299, 301
 Schillers[1], 123
 Schillersaal[1], 280
 schism[1], 35
 schisms[1], 4
 Schlacht[1], 68
 schlagende[1], 163
 Schlageter[2], 280
 schlecht[1], 219
 Schlegel[1], 55
 Schleier[1], 26
 Schleiermacher[4], 52, 134, 198, 275
 Schleiermachers[2], 275
 Schlier[1], 105
 schliesse[1], 141
 schließe[1], 126
 schließt[1], 291
 Schloss[2], 17, 284
 schlossenheit[1], 147
 Schloß[2], 164
 Schluck[1], 285
 Schlusstück[1], 283
 Schluß[2], 248, 295
 schmale[1], 108
 schmalen[5], 49, 108, 169, 179
 Schmerz[39], 20, 122, 165, 173, 254–257,
 264
 Schmerzes[6], 20, 165, 174, 256
 Schmidt[2], 59, 130
 Schmitt[2], 59
 Schnädelbach[1], 33
 Schneeberger[8], 182, 273, 279–280
 schnell[2], 87, 120
 Scholar[3], 94
 scholar[6], 9, 19, 114, 118, 175, 242
 scholarch[1], 128
 scholarchēs[1], 128
 scholarly[7], 4, 59, 62, 64, 124, 244, 277
 scholars[32], 4, 10–11, 14, 17, 21, 23,
 27–28, 37, 39–40, 59, 105, 135, 151,
 175, 177, 179–180, 182–183, 244,
 261–262, 273, 277
 Scholarship[1], 18
 scholarship[5], 4, 35, 37, 201, 261
 scholarships[1], 63
 Scholastic[1], 130
 scholastischen[1], 130
 Schon[1], 137
 schon[17], 112, 136, 141, 146, 148,
 163–164, 170, 173–174, 219, 245–247,
 316
 Schöne[1], 285
 Schonen[1], 284
 schöner[2], 219, 230
 Schönheit[1], 138

School[13], *7, 44, 118–119, 294*
 school[13], *3, 44, 46–47, 62, 118, 121, 158, 197, 231, 290*
 schoolhouse[1], *46*
 Schools[1], *110*
 schools[14], *4, 35–36, 43, 46, 101, 105, 182, 194, 207, 261*
 Schopenhauer[23], *23, 26, 31–33, 35, 183, 219, 228, 230, 240*
 Schöpferische[1], *281*
 Schott[1], *39*
 Schrag[1], *3*
 Schrecken[3], *90, 196*
 schreibe[2], *156, 186*
 schreiben[1], *99*
 Schreiber[2], *276*
 schreibt[1], *252*
 Schrey[1], *36*
 Schrift[2], *52, 167*
 Schriften[13], *23, 51, 74, 86, 97, 103–104, 120, 270, 274, 296*
 Schriftenverzeichnis[2], *310*
 schriftliche[1], *291*
 schriftstellerische[1], *109*
 Schritt[5], *81, 90–91, 169, 201*
 Schritten[1], *169*
 Schrittmacher[2], *64*
 Schröter[1], *304*
 Schroth[2], *289–290*
 Schuber[16], *10, 17, 112, 165, 255–257, 273, 294–295*
 Schubers[2], *20, 256*
 Schubert[1], *15*
 Schuchhardt[1], *105*
 Schuhmann[2], *302*
 Schüler[2], *129, 302*
 Schulphilosophie[1], *60*
 Schulungskurse[1], *281*
 Schulze[6], *206–207, 211*
 Schürmann[2], *39, 263*
 Schuwer[1], *84*
 Schwabe[1], *302*
 Schwäbische[1], *290*
 Schwagers[1], *294*
 Schwanallee[2], *16, 138*
 schwankend[1], *206*
 Schwärmerei[1], *211*
 Schwarze[60], *11–12, 18–19, 26–27, 33, 35, 40, 43, 50, 53–54, 63–64, 69, 74–75, 78, 81, 85, 91, 96, 107, 109, 111, 114–115, 126, 129, 141–142, 153, 159, 177, 181, 183, 195, 254, 299–300, 312*
 Schwarzwald[5], *68, 138, 168, 266, 294*
 Schweitzer[2], *109, 168*
 Schweizer[3], *283, 289, 292*
 Schweizerischen[2], *291*
 schwer[2], *144*
 schwersten[1], *196*
 Schwester[2], *257, 302*
 SCIENCE[2], *93, 125*
 Science[44], *44, 55, 88, 99, 102–103, 116, 121, 123, 150, 193–194, 196, 214, 227, 246, 251, 274, 286–287*
 science[40], *17, 33, 53, 83, 89–90, 99, 101–102, 116, 133, 140, 148, 150, 172, 174, 191, 193–194, 197, 203, 205–206, 212, 214, 218, 221, 223, 225–226, 229, 253, 292*
 Sciences[5], *76, 97, 205, 207, 253*
 sciences[16], *36, 44, 86, 102, 134, 168, 175, 197, 287*
 scientia[1], *192*
 Scientific[1], *3*
 scientific[19], *13, 52, 83, 100, 102, 116, 140, 144, 149, 172, 191, 203–204, 221, 275*
 Scientist[2], *94*
 scientist[2], *62*
 scientists[1], *10*
 scienza[4], *55, 227*
 scions[1], *202*
 scission[3], *58, 110*
 sclerotic[1], *2*
 SCM[1], *143*
 scope[3], *14, 143, 190*
 Scotland[1], *96*
 Scotus[4], *73, 103–104*
 scraps[1], *56*
 scratch[2], *11, 106*
 scribbling[2], *120, 129*
 script[4], *29, 36, 128*
 scriptorium[2], *10, 16*
 scrupulously[1], *5*

scrutinize[1], 242
 scrutiny[1], 118
 scuppered[5], 5, 11, 187, 258, 277
 SD[1], 221
 se[3], 97, 165, 199
 Sea[2], 16, 168
 sea[13], 16, 167, 206, 209, 277
 sealed[1], 34
 seals[1], 11
 Sean[2], 254, 304
 Search[1], 303
 search[7], 45, 83, 87–88, 99, 152, 261
 searched[1], 110
 searching[4], 117, 152, 180, 273
 seas[1], 47
 seat[2], 95
 Sebastian[1], 15
 sechs[4], 160, 266
 sechzigsten[2], 283, 292
 Second[9], 3, 56, 70, 99, 184, 244, 247,
 276–277
 second[47], 16, 28, 31, 44, 49, 74, 83, 92,
 99, 102, 109, 113, 133, 137, 140, 146,
 150, 154, 156, 161, 165, 170, 179, 187,
 193–194, 200, 204, 206–207, 223, 232,
 237, 244, 247, 298
 Secondly[1], 245
 secondly[1], 222
 secret[24], 2, 16–18, 28, 54, 63, 66, 75, 97,
 123, 131–132, 189, 247, 262
 secretary[1], 207
 secrets[8], 17, 21, 28, 75–76
 SECTION[2], 203, 205
 Section[57], 31, 42, 55, 57, 59, 62–64, 85,
 92, 107, 152, 154–159, 162–163, 171,
 174, 179, 195–196, 207–208, 217–218,
 225, 227–229, 231–234, 236, 241, 283
 section[74], 9, 16, 30, 32, 34, 50–52, 55,
 57, 71, 73, 76, 80, 86, 94, 102–103, 106,
 112, 117, 120, 122, 126, 137, 141, 146,
 150, 153, 155, 158–160, 166, 171, 178,
 184, 200, 203–204, 225, 227, 229,
 232–233, 236, 241–242, 249–250, 253,
 260, 262, 277, 284, 293
 sections[7], 9, 112, 150, 159, 178, 180, 244
 secularized[1], 23
 secure[2], 145–146
 secured[1], 216
 See[88], 8–9, 12–14, 23, 25, 29–30, 32–34,
 39, 44–45, 48, 51, 54, 58–59, 61, 71, 73,
 86, 91, 97, 99–101, 103, 116–118,
 121–123, 127, 130, 137, 139, 148, 153,
 155, 157, 165, 169, 188, 194, 212, 223,
 244, 249–251, 255, 274–279, 281–282,
 284, 287, 289, 294, 302
 see[120], 3, 8, 10, 13–14, 17, 20, 25–27,
 30, 32, 35, 39, 46, 50, 52–53, 57–58, 66,
 69, 71, 73–75, 78, 80–81, 86, 88, 97–98,
 100, 103, 107–110, 112, 114, 121, 123,
 125, 131, 133, 140–141, 151–152, 156,
 159, 163, 165, 169, 175, 179, 181, 184,
 186, 190–191, 198, 205–206, 209,
 212–213, 231–232, 236, 238, 240, 244,
 247, 251, 254, 260–263, 272, 276, 281,
 283, 286, 291, 301, 316
 seed[2], 103
 seeing[21], 25, 68–70, 95, 110, 112, 147,
 150, 163, 179, 184, 196, 232, 238
 seek[4], 1, 4, 189, 228
 seeker[2], 152, 261
 seekers[1], 261
 Seeking[2], 152
 seeking[21], 3, 8, 54, 149, 152, 155, 157
 seeks[4], 88, 152, 231
 Seelen[2], 218, 229
 seem[7], 29, 122, 146, 171, 185, 228
 seemed[4], 38, 119, 129, 140
 seemingly[3], 126, 132–133
 seems[20], 29–30, 73, 84, 116, 149, 160,
 176, 181, 190, 194, 207, 219, 223,
 230–231, 262
 seen[24], 10, 23, 28, 47, 71, 88, 95–96,
 113, 118, 139, 161, 165, 178, 181–182,
 194, 197, 201, 208–209, 230, 277
 seer[3], 64, 110, 156
 seers[1], 188
 sees[16], 13, 80, 118, 157, 159, 181, 194,
 204–205, 222, 232, 240, 250
 sehe[3], 141, 156, 186
 Sehen[1], 110
 sehen[3], 147, 179, 247
 sehr[2], 108, 143
 sei[12], 81, 84, 112, 120, 170, 174, 235,
 246, 252, 263–264, 316
 seid[1], 148

Seidemann[1], 37
 seiend[2], 148
 Seiende[3], 94, 174, 192
 Seienden[16], 23, 27, 69, 157–158, 174, 196, 200, 219, 230, 246, 253, 263
 seigneur[1], 43
 Sein[143], 4, 23–24, 26–27, 30, 34, 42, 53, 55–56, 58, 75–77, 79, 92, 102, 109, 112–114, 134, 138–139, 141–143, 146–150, 155, 157–158, 173–175, 178, 185–186, 190, 192, 200, 225–226, 239–240, 242, 245–251, 257–258, 260, 262–264, 266–267, 290, 293, 296–297, 305–306, 312–313
 sein[49], 33, 57–58, 64, 75, 84, 87, 91, 97, 116, 120, 126, 129, 145–147, 149–150, 155, 163–164, 167, 170, 217–219, 226, 250, 264, 275, 305
 seine[9], 74, 173–174, 179, 237, 241, 264, 291, 302
 seinem[7], 51, 74, 173, 248, 274, 284, 302
 seinen[8], 43, 77, 120, 167, 179, 190, 302
 seiner[11], 33, 64, 76, 90–91, 120, 126, 174, 219, 248, 252
 seines[5], 43, 76, 108, 268, 285
 Seinfrage[2], 93, 268
 seinlos[1], 162
 Seinlosigkeit[1], 162
 Seins[25], 26–27, 91, 146, 153, 161, 176, 236, 246, 252–253, 259, 266, 268, 276, 295, 305
 seins[2], 147, 306
 Seinsauce[1], 263
 Seinsbegriffs[1], 34
 Seinsentwurf[1], 141
 Seinsfrage[51], 26–27, 58, 71, 86–87, 91–93, 141, 150, 156–157, 161, 180, 185–186, 193, 198, 217–218, 221, 254, 259, 264–265, 288, 291, 294, 305, 307
 Seinsgeschichte[5], 27, 200, 266
 seinsgeschichtliche[1], 266
 Seinsgeschick[1], 49
 Seinsvergessenheit[4], 80, 148, 192, 305
 Seinsverlassenheit[3], 80, 148, 192
 SeinZeitBeingTimeIndex[1], 312
 seit[3], 190, 205, 245
 Seite[2], 168, 252
 Seiten[2], 144, 302
 seiten[1], 114
 Seither[1], 153
 Selbe[4], 160, 167
 selber[5], 129, 141, 167, 246, 248
 selbst[2], 248
 selbst[47], 1, 20, 26–27, 29, 73, 75–76, 89, 92–93, 112, 115, 120, 136, 141–142, 152, 158, 161, 164–165, 173–174, 177, 196, 200–201, 221, 235, 245, 248, 256, 266–268, 306
 Selbstbehauptung[1], 280
 selbstsüchtig[1], 57
 seldom[2], 36, 80
 select[3], 9, 28, 31
 SELECTED[1], 21
 Selected[4], 84, 86, 152, 192
 selected[18], 2, 9–12, 21, 35, 302
 selection[5], 9, 13, 21
 selections[1], 12
 self[20], 2, 4, 9, 19, 29, 39, 89, 96, 100, 102–103, 121–122, 134–135, 201, 214, 253, 316
 selfish[1], 57
 Selfreflection[1], 3
 sellschaft[1], 291
 semblance[1], 54
 semer[1], 104
 Semester[43], 13, 17–18, 21, 24, 26, 28, 34, 38, 46, 56, 64, 67, 75, 79–80, 84, 89, 110, 118–120, 123, 134–135, 137, 139, 149, 152, 201, 238, 242, 276–277, 284, 287
 semester[100], 13, 17, 25, 35, 41, 46, 63, 67, 70, 74–75, 79, 95–98, 101, 111–112, 114, 116, 121, 123, 126, 131, 133–134, 136–137, 140, 144–145, 148–149, 151–153, 168, 184, 193, 215, 220, 234, 263, 271, 285, 290, 292, 296–299
 Semesterbeginn[1], 280
 Semesters[1], 97
 Seminar[35], 13, 26, 34, 38, 43, 48, 86, 104, 118, 123, 131, 261, 266–267, 274–275, 288–290, 292–293, 299, 305
 seminar[55], 17, 24, 37, 47–49, 86, 108, 112, 121, 123–124, 128, 130–132, 152, 162, 196, 254, 262, 267, 274–276, 282, 285, 287, 289–290
 Seminararbeit[1], 293

Seminare[34], *17, 34, 39, 44, 46, 48, 63, 70, 86, 104, 110, 121, 123, 131, 150, 153, 160, 184, 196, 252, 285, 293, 296, 299, 301*
 Seminaren[1], *275*
 Seminarprotokolle[2], *121*
 SEMINARS[1], *62*
 Seminars[14], *13, 17, 30, 106, 119, 121, 123, 131, 252, 266, 287, 292, 304*
 seminars[13], *22, 42, 49, 104, 121, 124, 128, 131, 180, 224, 270, 286*
 Seminarsitzungen[2], *275, 290*
 seminary[1], *128*
 semiocapitalism[1], *176*
 Semitism[4], *53–54*
 Semmelweis[1], *72*
 send[9], *5, 71–72, 96, 125, 205, 207, 265*
 Sendedatum[1], *291*
 Sendereihe[1], *291*
 sending[2], *246*
 sends[1], *246*
 Sense[1], *5*
 sense[61], *5, 7–8, 27–28, 30, 35, 38, 59, 71, 78, 80, 83, 89–90, 100, 102, 116, 134, 136, 157, 159, 172, 174, 190–191, 197–198, 202, 205, 211, 213, 218, 228, 230–231, 236, 240, 242, 245, 258, 261*
 sensed[1], *258*
 senselessness[1], *235*
 Senses[2], *23, 192*
 senses[2], *89, 231*
 sensibility[1], *216*
 sensible[6], *54, 193, 215–216*
 sensory[2], *193, 270*
 sensual[2], *203, 231*
 sensuous[12], *56, 231–232, 240*
 Sensuousness[1], *231*
 sent[11], *5, 15, 18, 37, 105, 145, 224, 244, 303*
 sentence[9], *45, 50, 53, 72, 141, 148, 154, 189*
 sentences[4], *38, 198, 217, 244*
 separate[4], *86, 100, 145, 194*
 separated[1], *45*
 separates[2], *218, 229*
 separation[4], *54, 58, 133, 251*
 Sept[4], *130, 152, 250, 285*
 September[61], *13, 16–17, 24, 33, 45–46, 48–49, 55, 71, 73, 81, 86, 96, 98, 101, 105, 107–108, 118, 129, 141, 160, 162, 167, 169, 176, 179–180, 203, 210, 266–267, 273, 277, 286, 289–291, 293–294, 304, 307, 309, 314–315*
 Sequence[2], *31, 154*
 sequence[6], *31, 126, 132, 150, 154, 201*
 serial[1], *17*
 seriatim[1], *31*
 Series[1], *301*
 series[53], *10, 13, 31–32, 35–37, 46–47, 52, 60, 67–68, 75, 77, 81, 90, 98, 121, 123, 134, 147, 149, 151–153, 155, 168, 190, 196, 201, 217, 221, 232, 273, 287, 301, 310*
 serious[1], *119*
 seriously[4], *79, 93, 158, 228*
 seriousness[3], *63, 114, 231*
 servant[3], *96*
 serve[1], *129*
 served[1], *41*
 serves[1], *113*
 service[1], *271*
 serving[1], *11*
 servitatem[1], *105*
 Sesquipedalianism[1], *93*
 session[7], *41, 48, 107, 121, 176, 267*
 sessions[7], *37, 48, 121, 276, 290*
 set[19], *2, 7, 10, 29, 38, 48, 61, 80, 96, 116, 182, 217, 222, 227, 289*
 sets[6], *3, 72, 118, 195–196*
 Setting[5], *48, 52–53, 145, 171*
 setting[6], *7, 58, 63, 69, 73*
 settled[3], *98, 145–146*
 settling[1], *98*
 setzen[4], *97, 137, 148–149*
 setzt[2], *92, 196*
 setzung[6], *58, 73*
 setzungen[1], *92*
 Seubold[1], *306*
 Sevelen[1], *168*
 Seven[2], *165*
 seven[5], *27, 80, 171, 241*
 seventeen[1], *41*
 Seventh[1], *105*
 seventh[2], *113, 139*

seventies[1], 87
 seventieth[2], 121–122
 Several[4], 23, 42, 192, 216
 several[8], 39, 60, 114, 153, 180, 224, 273, 286
 severest[1], 134
 sexton[1], 23
 Sextus[2], 206, 211
 SEYN[2], 159
 Seyn[22], 26, 50, 80, 147–148, 152, 156, 158, 173–174, 192, 225, 263, 267, 305
 Seyns[50], 26–27, 31, 64, 68–69, 71, 85, 90, 143, 147, 154–155, 173–174, 196, 236, 264, 267–268, 298
 seyns[1], 174
 Seynsfrage[2], 92, 265
 Seynsgefüge[1], 267
 seyns geschichtliche[2], 87, 89
 seyns geschichtlichen[2], 174
 seyns geschichtliches[1], 90
 Seyns geschickes[1], 63
 Shade[1], 101
 Shades[1], 36
 shadow[3], 56, 135, 231
 shadows[2], 194, 227
 Shaivism[1], 105
 shaken[2], 208–209
 shall[4], 86, 126, 148, 261
 shame[2], 113, 229
 shameless[1], 234
 shape[3], 25, 64, 101
 shaped[1], 32
 shapes[1], 235
 Share[1], 62
 share[4], 5, 31, 148, 245
 shared[4], 2, 44, 78, 180
 Sharma[1], 312
 sharp[3], 40, 242
 Shâstra[2], 105, 110
 shattering[1], 11
 shatters[1], 116
 She[5], 16, 37, 62, 315
 she[8], 9, 16, 46, 62, 73, 217, 315
 sheds[1], 143
 Sheehan[42], 3–5, 8, 21, 23, 28–29, 60, 71, 113–114, 139, 149, 155, 176, 182–183, 198, 225, 258, 260, 263, 266, 269, 273, 275, 310, 315
 sheep[3], 92, 99, 111
 sheer[2], 84
 sheets[9], 9, 41, 86, 144, 165, 287
 shelf[2], 28, 117
 Shepard[1], 26
 shepherd[1], 92
 Shields[7], 9, 19, 63, 86, 96, 304
 Shift[1], 5
 shift[3], 3, 27
 shifted[1], 106
 shifting[2], 2, 181
 shifts[3], 3, 28, 104
 Shih[1], 74
 Shin[2], 267, 288
 shine[2], 53, 84
 shines[1], 79
 Shinichi[1], 288
 ship[1], 206
 shock[1], 90
 Shocking[1], 33
 shocking[1], 179
 shocks[1], 97
 shoot[2], 134–135
 shore[2], 45, 163
 Short[2], 16, 222
 short[16], 12, 27, 33, 54, 74–75, 87, 141–142, 175, 182, 200, 204, 210, 249, 259
 shortage[1], 95
 shortcomings[2], 58, 161
 shortcuts[1], 2
 shortened[1], 101
 shorthand[4], 36
 shorthanded[1], 68
 Shortly[2], 37, 116
 shortly[2], 205, 265
 Should[5], 68, 106, 118, 188, 280
 should[54], 3, 13, 17–18, 24, 29, 34, 60, 62, 67, 70, 76, 79, 81, 83, 88, 105–106, 108, 113, 123, 131, 135, 137, 147–148, 154–155, 159, 180, 183, 209–210, 215, 222, 225–226, 228, 232, 238, 248, 254, 263, 315
 shoulder[2], 50, 71
 shout[3], 61, 85, 315
 shouts[2], 61, 85

show[17], 33, 66, 69, 86, 94, 114, 124, 140,
 144–145, 179, 183, 208, 212, 217, 255,
 259
 showed[2], 151, 289
 showing[7], 36, 67–68, 70, 94, 118, 181
 shown[9], 20, 46, 83, 117–118, 126, 136,
 201, 259
 shows[16], 30, 46, 74, 80, 84–85, 94, 131,
 149, 168, 190, 208, 215, 224, 233
 shut[1], 84
 shy[1], 77
 sich[74], 33, 40, 51, 63–64, 70, 72, 77, 80,
 84, 86–87, 89, 91–92, 104, 109–110,
 120, 136–137, 143, 146, 148–150, 158,
 160, 166, 169–170, 173–174, 185, 190,
 201, 212, 219, 235–236, 246–248, 252,
 264–268
 sicheren[1], 146
 Sicherung[1], 248
 sichtbar[2], 58, 218
 Sichverbergens[2], 246, 248
 sick[3], 55, 227–228
 Side[8], 8, 28, 44, 49–50, 60, 85, 238
 side[37], 16, 19, 26, 29, 40, 50, 52, 59, 71,
 85, 95–96, 98, 100, 109, 115, 118–119,
 123, 129, 136, 153, 155, 163, 168, 175,
 206, 233, 315
 sided[2], 16, 167
 sidedness[3], 135, 181
 Sidenote[1], 157
 sides[5], 25, 43, 62, 70, 171
 sidewalks[1], 168
 Sidonie[2], 37
 Sie[19], 108, 113, 126, 141, 143–144, 166,
 174, 183, 247–248, 265, 267
 sie[47], 6, 40, 44, 51, 57, 70, 77, 99, 118,
 120, 126, 137, 142, 146, 148, 164,
 166–167, 174, 196, 201, 218–219, 226,
 229, 236, 246–247, 252, 261, 264–265
 Siebeck[2], 175, 302
 sieben[2], 165
 siebenzigsten[1], 122
 siebzogsten[2], 277, 292
 Siegfried[2], 39, 292
 sieht[1], 246
 Siewert[1], 304
 Sigel[8], 255–257, 273, 295
 sight[3], 110, 140
 Sigismund[3], 206, 211–212
 sign[9], 32, 57, 100, 107, 118, 126, 137,
 169, 233
 signals[1], 171
 signature[2], 54, 165
 Signed[1], 93
 signed[1], 95
 significance[2], 45, 76
 significant[3], 2, 35, 38
 Signification[2], 73, 103
 signifies[1], 191
 signposts[4], 3, 35, 54, 85
 signs[1], 56
 Silence[1], 294
 silence[3], 10, 24, 125
 Silver[1], 68
 silver[1], 101
 silversmith[1], 101
 Silvio[2], 15, 19
 similar[16], 8, 17, 31, 35, 44, 52, 55, 62,
 68, 80–81, 136, 208, 211
 similarities[1], 26
 Similarly[3], 200, 246–247
 similarly[1], 118
 simile[1], 289
 Simon[5], 24, 44, 139, 159, 311
 Simons[1], 53
 Simple[3], 45, 71, 125
 simple[29], 5, 27, 63–64, 76, 88, 90,
 101–104, 114, 118, 121–122, 125, 166,
 169, 180, 183, 198, 247
 simpler[2], 122, 249
 simplicity[2], 145, 251
 simplistic[1], 234
 simply[17], 5, 32, 59, 134–135, 148, 154,
 156, 184, 198, 212, 232, 234, 237, 260,
 296
 Simulacrum[1], 54
 simulacrum[3], 2, 54, 221
 simultaneously[2], 239, 253
 Sin[2], 228, 275
 sin[4], 227–228
 Since[14], 11, 38, 78, 99, 119, 152–153,
 164, 181, 190, 193, 201, 205, 262
 since[64], 3–5, 12, 15–16, 21, 24, 27, 31,
 33, 35, 47–48, 53, 62, 74, 78, 80,

99–100, 102, 105–106, 109, 113–114,
 117, 120, 133, 135, 139, 150, 152,
 154–155, 157, 159, 173, 178, 182, 198,
 201, 206–207, 209, 214–215, 221, 227,
 242, 244–246, 249, 251, 258, 260
 Sinclair[2], 188, 262
 Sind[3], 166, 259
 sind[17], 14, 51, 85, 95, 101, 112, 143–144,
 148, 157, 163–164, 166, 205, 235–236
 sinful[1], 238
 singing[2], 229, 316
 single[29], 5, 26, 29, 48, 55, 66–67, 70, 72,
 83, 99, 120, 125, 129, 141, 150, 153,
 155, 157, 178, 182, 197, 228, 236,
 261–262, 265
 singt[1], 316
 singular[3], 55, 71, 167
 singulare[1], 71
 sinister[1], 98
 sinking[1], 187
 sinks[1], 209
 Sinn[50], 5, 26, 32, 51, 71, 136–137, 147,
 149–150, 155, 157, 190, 222, 244–248,
 276, 316
 Sinne[5], 136–137, 157, 174, 250
 Sinnesaffektion[1], 270
 Sinnliche[1], 193
 Sinnlichkeit[1], 130
 Sinnlosigkeit[4], 235–236
 Sinope[1], 49
 Sister[1], 311
 Sisyphe[1], 100
 Sisyphus[1], 100
 sit[1], 114
 site[6], 13, 64, 68, 165, 315
 Sitten[2], 57, 80
 sitting[2], 30, 118
 situated[1], 118
 situating[1], 204
 Situation[3], 3, 21, 248
 situation[16], 7, 32, 63, 68, 71, 80, 96, 156,
 158, 169, 180, 184, 248, 261
 situations[1], 120
 Sitzung[3], 150, 152, 290
 Sitzungen[1], 266
 Six[2], 55, 160
 six[16], 3, 22–23, 27, 55, 89, 109, 160, 176,
 180, 182, 267, 290
 sixteenth[1], 215
 sixth[5], 3, 113, 139, 171
 sixties[1], 140
 Sixtieth[2], 48, 292
 sixty[2], 23, 63
 size[2], 9, 13
 sizes[1], 54
 SJGGGOFCKC[1], 311
 skepsis[2], 219, 230
 Skeptic[1], 206
 skeptical[6], 54, 207, 211, 219, 230
 Skepticism[1], 207
 skepticism[19], 99, 153, 203, 206–208,
 211–213, 219, 230
 skeptics[1], 206
 skeptisch[1], 219
 Sketches[2], 198, 249
 sketches[1], 217
 Ski[1], 168
 ski[2], 129
 skiagraphically[1], 56
 skiing[3], 129
 skill[3], 109
 skillful[1], 54
 skips[1], 160
 Skjold[1], 292
 Skulptureausstellung[1], 291
 slander[1], 227
 slandered[1], 119
 slang[1], 4
 slaps[2], 56, 78
 slaves[2], 105
 slaving[1], 122
 slight[3], 9, 294
 slightest[2], 212, 235
 Slightly[1], 84
 slightly[1], 272
 slipcases[3], 10
 slipped[2], 125, 233
 slogan[4], 2, 35, 74
 slogans[1], 49
 slopes[3], 129, 168
 slowly[1], 25
 slumber[1], 208
 smack[1], 177

small[18], 8–9, 13, 15, 20, 36, 38, 43, 49,
 76, 78, 130, 154, 167, 203, 254, 283, 286
 smallness[1], 186
 smart[4], 194, 228, 262
 smashes[1], 238
 smattering[1], 4
 smell[2], 56, 119
 Smith[1], 65
 smoking[1], 15
 So[57], 7–9, 12–13, 16, 20–21, 23, 26–27,
 29–31, 40, 48, 52, 62, 65, 71, 73, 81, 88,
 91, 94, 103, 106, 110, 112, 117, 119,
 125, 149, 151, 156, 160, 166, 171, 175,
 182, 184–186, 203–204, 206, 211, 213,
 242, 261, 263, 285, 294
 so[151], 4–5, 7–13, 16–18, 21, 24, 26,
 28–29, 31, 38, 42, 46–49, 52–55, 57, 59,
 65–71, 76, 79–81, 83–84, 86–88, 92–93,
 97, 105–106, 108, 112–113, 116, 119,
 134–137, 142–144, 146–147, 152–153,
 164, 166–167, 169–170, 173, 176–177,
 179, 181–182, 184–185, 188–190, 194,
 196, 200, 202, 209, 215, 217, 219, 222,
 226, 228–231, 234–235, 245–247, 254,
 262–263, 269, 275, 277
 soccer[1], 15
 social[5], 3, 15, 103, 119, 261
 Socialism[5], 32, 54, 118, 133, 137
 socialism[2], 114, 116
 societies[1], 235
 Society[9], 123, 148, 196, 224, 275, 277,
 289, 292
 society[1], 53
 sociological[1], 120
 sociologist[1], 46
 sociology[2], 120
 sock[2], 19
 Socrateanism[1], 28
 Socrates[25], 11, 76, 83, 102, 104, 113,
 116–117, 123, 131, 171, 183, 187–189,
 243
 Socratic[3], 117, 128–129
 Socratics[2], 248
 Soden[2], 46, 105
 Sofern[2], 114, 173
 sofern[2], 107, 266
 sogar[3], 70, 120, 141
 sogleich[1], 264
 soil[2], 75, 201
 Sojourn[1], 8
 sojourns[2], 67, 77
 sol[1], 114
 solar[1], 7
 Solche[1], 113
 solche[3], 92–93, 111
 solchem[1], 246
 solchen[5], 85, 124, 173, 219, 248
 solcher[1], 247
 solches[7], 173, 190, 246–248
 sold[9], 10, 17, 21, 32, 40–41, 43, 139, 293
 solders[1], 99
 soldiers[1], 198
 sole[10], 145–146, 150–152, 155–156, 169,
 263
 Solely[1], 196
 solely[3], 127, 145–146
 solemn[1], 228
 solid[3], 85, 102, 124
 solitary[5], 78, 134–135
 solitude[1], 78
 Soll[1], 52
 soll[11], 71, 74, 86, 109, 126, 148–149, 190,
 252, 265
 sollen[2], 108, 126
 sollte[3], 108, 226, 263
 sollten[1], 81
 Solo[1], 176
 solo[2], 176–177
 solution[7], 5, 7, 45, 71, 102, 106, 272
 solutions[2], 53, 83
 solved[1], 69
 solving[2], 120, 129
 Some[61], 4, 10–11, 16, 18, 21, 26, 28–29,
 32, 36–37, 39, 54, 59, 63, 67–68, 73, 78,
 86, 92, 94, 100, 105, 113, 117–118, 129,
 140, 143, 147, 159, 163, 179–181, 183,
 186, 224, 254, 263, 265, 272, 275, 301
 some[238], 2–5, 7, 9–18, 20, 23, 25–31, 33,
 35–39, 41–44, 46–49, 52–57, 60, 62–63,
 66, 69, 71–72, 74, 76–78, 80, 87, 94, 98,
 102, 104–105, 107, 109, 112–114, 117,
 119, 121, 127–129, 131–133, 138–139,
 141, 143, 145, 147, 151–152, 154,
 159–161, 163, 165–166, 168–169, 171,
 174–175, 177, 179–180, 182–183, 186,

188, 190–191, 194, 198, 203, 205,
 211–213, 216–217, 219, 221–224, 226,
 230, 232, 235, 238, 242, 244–245, 250,
 252, 254, 259–260, 262, 269, 277, 282,
 287–288, 290, 294, 301–302
 somehow[6], 78, 101, 155, 182, 209, 247
 Someone[2], 43, 261
 someone[7], 28, 76, 88, 106, 151, 209, 255
 Something[5], 37, 146, 208, 211, 221
 something[61], 6, 8, 10–11, 26, 31, 38,
 43–44, 46, 60, 68, 71, 74, 78, 83, 97,
 100, 105, 120, 124, 128–129, 131, 133,
 136, 143–144, 152, 165, 167–169, 175,
 180, 194, 218, 222, 228–230, 240, 246,
 248, 251
 somethings[1], 66
 Sometime[2], 186, 203
 sometime[6], 19, 68–69, 111, 160, 282
 Sometimes[11], 58, 66, 69–70, 73, 83,
 113–114, 125, 175, 184
 sometimes[17], 11, 18, 58, 63, 67–68, 73,
 93, 100, 110, 114, 120, 180, 262
 somewhat[2], 16, 261
 Somewhere[1], 78
 somewhere[3], 61, 87, 205
 somit[3], 185, 235, 264
 Sommer[5], 51, 167, 224, 273, 315
 Sommersemester[3], 58, 287
 son[11], 8–9, 73, 96, 149, 168, 233, 315
 Sonata[1], 7
 Sonderdruck[3], 138–139
 sondern[31], 77, 85, 87, 93, 108, 120, 126,
 136–137, 146, 148, 167–168, 173, 196,
 218, 221, 245, 248, 252, 263–264, 266,
 268
 Song[2], 188, 261
 song[3], 176–177
 Sonnabend[1], 152
 Sonne[1], 251
 Sonntag[1], 129
 Sonnwendfeier[1], 280
 sons[4], 117, 131, 138, 315
 sonstigen[1], 235
 soon[8], 17, 51, 99, 140, 224, 229, 271, 288
 sooner[1], 215
 sophia[1], 110
 Sophie[2], 43, 303
 Sophist[8], 44, 123, 131, 148, 192, 198
 Sophistes[5], 67, 75, 148, 296, 311
 sophistication[1], 54
 sophists[1], 68
 Sorbonne[1], 60
 Sort[1], 74
 sort[10], 42, 78, 166, 172, 194, 202, 216,
 219, 224, 230
 sorte[1], 9
 sorted[1], 30
 Sortimenter[1], 286
 sorting[2], 27, 30
 sorts[3], 10, 31–32
 soteriology[1], 95
 sought[7], 149, 201, 229, 249
 soul[3], 157, 228, 250
 Souls[1], 273
 souls[2], 218, 229
 Sound[2], 39, 61
 sound[13], 12, 26, 28, 74, 155, 159, 313–314
 Sounds[2], 96, 119
 sounds[6], 57, 77, 94, 105, 206, 247
 source[7], 166, 213, 244, 247, 316
 sourcebook[1], 179
 Sources[3], 95, 244, 270
 sources[14], 14, 35–36, 66, 104, 109, 199,
 205–206, 208–209, 244, 273, 294
 South[2], 13, 39
 south[2], 125, 168
 Southern[1], 62
 southern[1], 14
 Southwest[4], 44
 southwest[1], 44
 Southwestern[3], 44, 198, 293
 Souvenirs[1], 39
 Soviet[3], 109
 Soweit[1], 137
 soweit[5], 156, 186, 218, 220, 229
 sowie[1], 20
 sowohl[2], 80, 120
 Soz[1], 36
 Sozialismus[1], 274
 space[14], 3–4, 20, 68, 147, 153, 165, 176,
 210, 212, 216
 Spain[1], 60
 Spanish[2], 11, 18

Sparen[1], 246
 Spätburgunder[1], 15
 später[1], 245
 Spätere[2], 308
 speak[22], 3, 8, 29, 40, 46, 51–52, 59, 83, 106, 130, 175, 194, 209, 224, 227, 245, 247, 275, 277
 speaker[2], 129, 171
 speakers[1], 275
 speaking[11], 2, 29, 87, 144, 150, 153, 172, 197, 202, 213, 269
 Speaks[1], 11
 speaks[11], 8, 23, 40, 83, 98, 143, 179, 198, 200, 202, 245
 Special[1], 311
 special[15], 12, 28, 34, 38, 63, 84, 129, 144, 155, 190, 192, 204–205, 213, 245
 specially[1], 10
 specie[1], 229
 Specific[1], 10
 specific[6], 60, 116, 124, 180, 191, 244
 specifically[13], 2, 5, 12, 14, 17, 20, 23, 28, 34, 66, 86, 147, 248
 specifies[1], 140
 spectators[3], 181, 190, 262
 spectral[1], 259
 spectrum[2], 3–4
 speculation[5], 18, 175, 208, 211
 Speculative[1], 251
 speculative[9], 99–100, 119, 193–194, 250
 Speculatively[1], 69
 Speech[6], 286, 290, 292–294
 speech[15], 16, 38, 43, 61, 79, 109, 111, 120, 273, 277, 293–294
 Speeches[4], 86, 97, 273
 speeches[7], 10, 24, 26, 69, 83, 180, 273
 speeches[1], 280
 speed[3], 13, 147, 154
 spell[3], 76, 78, 130
 spellbound[2], 76, 130
 spelled[1], 62
 spells[1], 103
 spend[3], 23, 105, 124
 Spengler[8], 32, 197, 200, 235, 275
 spent[7], 62, 110, 124, 131, 168, 181
 sphere[2], 57, 217
 spheres[1], 140
 spider[4], 227, 229
 SPIEGEL[4], 33, 49, 169, 179
 Spiegel[12], 13, 33, 49, 71, 81, 169, 179
 Spiegelung[1], 288
 Spiel[4], 48, 68–69, 92
 Spießer[1], 119
 spinning[1], 220
 Spinoza[7], 67, 133, 211–212
 Spinozae[1], 229
 Spinozism[5], 212
 Spinozismusstreit[1], 212
 spins[1], 229
 Spirit[23], 100, 102–103, 126, 142, 150, 193, 198–199, 214–215, 251, 263
 spirit[28], 1, 32, 102–103, 124, 187, 200–201, 214, 216, 220–221, 226–227, 229–230, 251, 253
 Spiritismus[1], 274
 spirits[1], 233
 spiritual[5], 32, 56, 88, 102, 283
 Spirt[2], 48, 123
 spite[2], 102, 109
 splendid[1], 76
 splendor[1], 178
 split[2], 5, 242
 splits[1], 240
 splitter[1], 2
 splitters[2], 40
 spoil[1], 194
 Spoke[2], 227, 316
 spoke[6], 9, 16, 73, 76, 115, 120
 spoken[4], 56, 66, 212, 228
 spooky[1], 98
 spots[1], 38
 Sprach[1], 287
 Sprache[52], 13, 21, 35, 37, 59, 70, 85–86, 127, 140, 144, 166, 224, 245, 255–257, 266, 268, 284–285, 287–290, 296–297, 299, 313
 spräche[1], 301
 spread[4], 3, 131, 144, 180
 spreading[1], 201
 spreads[1], 25
 spreche[1], 245
 sprechen[1], 51
 sprechenden[1], 143
 Sprechstunde[2], 178

spricht[2], 179, 245
 Spring[1], 229
 spring[6], 8, 45, 278, 316
 Springer[1], 283
 springer[1], 13
 Spruch[5], 67, 166, 282, 299
 Sprung[4], 42, 50, 160, 168
 spun[2], 229
 Spur[2], 9, 167
 Spuren[1], 105
 spurs[1], 33
 Square[1], 143
 squarely[1], 121
 squeeze[1], 131
 Sr[1], 280
 Srinivasa[1], 118
 SS[5], 46, 190
 St[3], 275, 291, 314
 st[9], 45, 49, 93, 107, 176, 211, 304
 Staat[2], 280
 staatlichen[1], 289
 stability[1], 199
 stable[1], 293
 Stadelmann[1], 284
 Stadt[6], 272, 281, 284, 289, 311, 313
 Stadthalle[1], 287
 Stage[2], 52
 stage[27], 4, 10–11, 22, 28, 30, 35, 42, 46,
 48, 52, 63, 70, 89, 91, 95, 99, 135, 171,
 179, 196, 206, 222
 Stages[1], 111
 stages[15], 11, 53, 99, 103, 105, 111, 206,
 215, 235
 stagnation[1], 28
 Staiger[2], 251, 293
 stain[1], 46
 Stalin[1], 109
 Stambaugh[10], 39, 80, 90, 100, 143,
 145–146, 195, 198, 200
 stammenden[1], 34
 stamp[3], 74, 109, 124
 stance[33], 5, 19, 30–31, 59, 61, 66–67,
 69–70, 76, 112–113, 117, 121–122, 132,
 134, 156–157, 175, 178, 184–185, 190,
 194, 217, 223
 stances[1], 235
 stand[28], 2, 4, 7, 29, 42, 52–53, 95, 101,
 103–104, 110, 118, 145–146, 160, 189,
 198, 200, 202, 223, 240, 251, 269, 289
 standalone[2], 9, 159
 Standard[1], 192
 standard[13], 28, 59, 64, 72–73, 110, 112,
 118, 145, 182, 231
 standards[5], 24–25, 118, 122, 125
 stande[2], 252
 standing[7], 56, 61, 79, 141, 173, 177, 192
 Standort[6], 255–257, 267
 Standpoint[1], 23
 standpoint[35], 52, 66, 80, 102, 107, 109,
 112, 117, 133, 135–137, 148, 178, 193,
 250
 standpointlessness[5], 66, 133, 135, 178
 standpoints[8], 133, 135
 Standpunkt[3], 52, 107, 126
 Standpunkte[1], 23
 Standpunktseinsatz[2], 136–137
 Standpunktsfreiheit[1], 136
 Standpunktsmut[2], 136–137
 Standpunktsphilosophien[2], 135–136
 Standpunktswahl[2], 136–137
 stands[17], 3–4, 15, 34, 53–54, 67, 79, 90,
 97–98, 117, 188, 211, 217, 252
 Stanley[2], 129, 150
 Stanzas[1], 125
 Star[1], 155
 star[2], 7
 Stärke[1], 104
 stars[1], 104
 Start[2], 57, 148
 start[33], 5, 8, 10, 23, 25, 46–47, 53, 57,
 73, 75, 78, 96, 100, 106, 110, 113, 122,
 130, 140, 154, 156, 158, 182, 186, 196,
 199, 205, 228, 249, 251, 261
 started[25], 3, 10, 24, 42, 48, 55–56, 67,
 70, 74, 95, 145–146, 156, 159, 171, 180,
 184, 196, 204, 214, 236, 240, 254, 303
 Starting[7], 1, 3–4, 57, 214, 245, 263
 starting[22], 13, 39, 49, 55, 61, 76, 88, 92,
 95, 112, 122, 154, 180, 182, 194, 214,
 222, 235
 starts[20], 30–31, 47–48, 54, 74, 80, 84, 91,
 95, 120, 129, 190, 203
 State[4], 37, 146, 276
 state[14], 5, 19, 37, 63, 69–70, 83, 107,

131, 134–135, 152, 206, 259
Stated[3], 5, 93, 127
stated[8], 17, 53, 59, 73, 107, 112, 189
statement[26], 17, 49, 67, 69, 71, 74–75,
84, 100, 107, 109–110, 115, 131, 145,
149, 152, 169, 176, 179, 186, 218, 242
statements[8], 29, 60, 81, 152, 156, 184,
186, 217
States[2], 131, 272
states[7], 23, 40, 62, 101, 106, 208, 316
statesmen[1], 198
Statt[1], 294
statt[5], 58, 147, 218, 264, 266
stattfand[1], 293
status[4], 12, 122, 176, 234
Stay[4], 8, 67, 113, 258
stay[4], 45, 96, 108, 164
stayed[1], 48
Staying[2], 122, 125
ste[1], 189
steadfast[4], 90, 125, 173
steam[1], 220
stecken[4], 43, 193, 221, 235
steeper[1], 56
steers[1], 168
Stefan[2], 288
Steffen[1], 311
Steg[7], 20, 164–165, 167, 169, 256
Stege[22], 3, 20, 31, 86, 165–166, 169,
273, 299
Stegen[6], 49, 165, 169, 179
Steges[2], 167
Stegmaier[1], 272
stehen[5], 42, 120, 136, 160, 173
Stehende[1], 158
stehenden[1], 141
steht[8], 58, 98, 104, 146, 218, 252, 266
Stein[4], 43, 198
Steinbomer[2], 294
Stell[5], 200, 248, 284
stell[6], 42, 53, 283, 285
stelle[1], 108
Stellen[1], 266
stellen[3], 76, 89, 265
stellnis[1], 91
stellt[4], 89, 92, 193, 221

Stellung[2], 34, 98
stenographic[1], 38
Stenzel[1], 305
Step[1], 81
step[19], 5, 66, 73, 90, 96, 110, 112, 117,
119, 122, 160, 169, 184, 200–201, 215
Stephen[1], 117
stepped[2], 68, 95
stepping[2], 47, 55
steps[14], 9, 52, 57, 112, 119, 126, 129,
132, 169, 195, 206, 217, 220
sterile[2], 35, 60
Sternberger[1], 304
stets[6], 169, 174, 190, 245–246
Stettin[2], 16, 167
stewards[1], 157
Stewart[2], 103, 135
Stichweh[2], 37, 270
stick[2], 35, 233
sticking[1], 205
Stifter[1], 16
Stifters[2], 291
stiftet[1], 19
Stifts[1], 219
Still[4], 14, 99, 163, 247
still[121], 3, 5, 7, 10–12, 18, 23–24, 26–27,
33, 42, 46, 50, 52, 55–57, 59, 62, 64, 71,
77–79, 86, 88, 92, 95–98, 102, 106, 112,
116, 119, 121, 127–129, 135–136, 140,
143, 145–146, 149–151, 153, 158–159,
162–163, 166, 168, 170, 172, 176–178,
181, 183, 188–190, 193, 195, 198,
202–203, 208–209, 213–214, 217,
222–223, 225–229, 232, 238, 245–247,
261
Stillen[1], 219
stillness[1], 157
Stimme[4], 114, 264
Stimmung[3], 20, 264, 289
stimulating[2], 26, 128
stimulus[1], 215
stink[1], 32
Stipendium[1], 15
stir[1], 119
Stirb[1], 18
stirred[1], 81
stock[3], 19, 157, 197

Stolze[1], 36
 Stonehill[1], 261
 stood[5], 54, 74, 116, 186, 287
 Stop[1], 115
 stop[7], 4, 43, 72, 77, 172, 214, 217
 stopped[4], 30, 42, 129, 214
 stopping[1], 120
 stops[5], 30, 85, 136, 162, 261
 Storck[2], 128, 301
 store[3], 128, 152, 216
 stored[1], 12
 stories[3], 15, 119, 272
 Storm[1], 211
 storm[2], 15, 142
 story[24], 2, 5, 7, 15–16, 18, 23, 54, 56, 66,
 73, 113, 171, 179–180, 183, 188, 204,
 263
 Storz[1], 127
 stove[1], 168
 Stöße[1], 97
 straight[3], 5, 55, 224
 straightened[1], 80
 strain[1], 119
 strait[1], 56
 strand[1], 224
 strange[5], 122, 133, 141, 145, 148
 Stranger[1], 148
 stratagem[3], 176, 186
 Strauss[1], 217
 Straße[1], 16
 Straßen[1], 108
 stream[1], 168
 Street[1], 95
 street[3], 7, 261
 Streit[1], 146
 Streites[1], 146
 Streng[1], 173
 streng[1], 174
 Strenge[1], 268
 strenggenommen[1], 153
 strength[9], 26, 65–66, 90, 94, 104, 118,
 202, 204
 strengthen[1], 171
 strengthening[1], 156
 stress[1], 211
 Strict[1], 182
 strict[9], 4–5, 13, 90, 172, 174
 stricter[1], 233
 strictly[3], 150, 153, 228
 strictures[1], 38
 strife[5], 19, 145–146
 strikes[2], 16, 167
 Striking[1], 59
 string[1], 15
 strings[2], 69, 159
 strip[3], 100
 striped[1], 129
 stripped[1], 93
 Strohschneider[1], 304
 Stroke[1], 237
 stroke[6], 237, 241, 270, 294
 strokes[1], 55
 Strom[1], 20
 Strong[1], 95
 strong[5], 150, 182, 186, 189, 233
 stronger[3], 147, 272, 277
 strongest[4], 44, 194, 223, 261
 Strongly[2], 135, 273
 strongly[2], 189, 208
 strove[1], 59
 Strube[1], 21
 structural[1], 149
 Structure[2], 3, 150
 structure[18], 55, 112, 116–117, 149, 151,
 159, 161, 166, 179–180, 231, 263
 structured[3], 27, 160
 structures[1], 145
 Struggle[4], 123, 196–197, 276
 struggle[13], 49, 59, 71, 73, 98, 169, 179,
 197, 217
 struggled[2], 80, 221
 struggles[1], 71
 Stubenbach[1], 168
 Stuck[1], 263
 stuck[13], 31, 34, 67, 91, 97, 100, 136, 193,
 217, 221, 223, 232–233
 Student[2], 275, 279
 student[59], 13–14, 21, 24–25, 35–39, 48,
 67, 78, 82, 104, 113, 118–119, 121,
 123–124, 128, 131, 139, 177–178, 196,
 205, 211, 217, 224, 270–271, 277
 Studenten[1], 113
 Studentenschaft[6], 279–280

Students[1], 3
 students[101], 10–11, 13–14, 16, 18, 21, 25, 28–31, 36–38, 42, 45–46, 59–60, 62, 67, 75–76, 82–83, 96, 106, 112, 114, 119–121, 123–124, 128–131, 146, 161, 175, 177, 180, 207, 217, 259, 262–263, 271–273, 289
 studied[10], 44, 62, 69, 104–105, 115, 175, 233, 270–271
 Studien[2], 283, 305
 studieren[1], 141
 Studies[10], 3, 272, 283, 285, 287, 292, 305, 311
 studies[7], 3–4, 10, 23, 54, 145, 310
 Studium[7], 284, 287–290
 Study[5], 32, 45–46, 128, 286
 study[18], 23, 25, 29, 78, 95, 107, 123, 129, 138, 141, 144, 182, 208, 211, 217, 271
 studying[3], 29, 104, 110
 stuff[2], 36, 83
 Stunde[1], 265
 stunned[1], 178
 stupid[1], 77
 sturdy[3], 204–205
 Sturm[3], 142, 211
 Stuttgart[15], 41, 139, 254, 270, 284, 288, 301, 313–314
 Stuttgarter[1], 51
 style[26], 24, 26, 28, 31, 38, 53, 75, 80, 107, 117, 129–130, 151, 158, 175–176, 180, 194, 246
 styles[2], 176, 194
 stylistic[1], 38
 Suárez[1], 192
 sub[2], 4, 229
 subcontinent[1], 13
 subdivided[1], 214
 Subiectitat[1], 223
 Subiectum[1], 199
 subject[19], 12, 54–55, 108, 120, 133, 136, 149–150, 179, 192–193, 198, 202, 214, 225–226, 265, 285
 subjectivity[1], 223
 subjectite[1], 29
 Subjective[4], 102–103, 133, 214
 subjective[13], 52, 55, 111, 136, 153, 155, 193, 200, 214, 216, 252
 subjectively[5], 52, 106, 209
 subjectivism[2], 55
 subjectivity[7], 55, 90, 200, 202, 223, 249
 subjects[1], 52
 Subjekt[1], 136
 subjektiv[2], 52, 136
 subjektive[1], 252
 Subjektivität[2], 223, 282
 subjektivite[1], 29
 submersion[1], 242
 submission[3], 205, 219, 230
 submit[4], 97, 144, 205, 252
 submitted[1], 272
 subordinate[2], 193, 248
 subsection[2], 76, 204
 subsequent[2], 200, 202
 Subsequently[1], 249
 subsequently[2], 136, 205
 subsided[1], 197
 subsisting[1], 89
 Substance[1], 199
 substance[4], 93, 102, 119, 226
 substantia[3], 102, 199, 214
 substantial[8], 2, 10–11, 29, 35, 72, 249
 substantially[2], 4, 13
 subsumed[1], 55
 subtitle[2], 76, 150
 suburb[2], 16, 292
 succeed[1], 109
 succeeded[1], 97
 succeeds[1], 42
 success[2], 285, 288
 successful[1], 144
 successfully[1], 215
 succession[1], 201
 successor[1], 144
 successors[1], 182
 succulently[1], 61
 Such[8], 33, 64, 79, 97, 106, 157, 205, 224
 such[82], 17, 32, 37–38, 46, 51, 54, 67, 71–72, 78–79, 83–85, 87–88, 92, 97, 101, 103, 106–109, 113, 124–125, 134–135, 147, 149, 156, 165, 172, 178, 183, 189, 193, 195, 197, 201, 206–207, 212, 214, 218, 221, 224, 228, 230–231, 233, 245–248, 253, 260–261, 263

Suchen[3], 149, 152
suchen[1], 146
suchten[1], 219
Sudden[2], 39, 116
suddenly[3], 87, 128, 130
suffered[2], 78, 294
suffering[4], 61, 122, 228
sufficient[6], 99, 127, 156, 202, 251
sufficientis[1], 202
sufficiently[3], 120, 219, 230
suggest[5], 19, 82, 129, 208, 294
suggested[3], 91, 223–224
suggesting[2], 63, 151
suggestion[2], 29, 210
suggests[2], 67, 248
Suhr[3], 273, 280
suit[1], 129
suitable[1], 97
suitably[1], 117
suitcase[1], 311
Sulzer[1], 211
sum[3], 70, 214, 221
summa[2], 27, 38
summaries[1], 30
summarize[2], 56, 209
summarized[5], 34, 98, 102, 208, 214
summarizes[1], 238
Summary[8], 126, 132, 137, 153, 159, 165, 240
summary[9], 13, 21, 30, 38, 100, 126, 178, 182, 215
summas[1], 116
Summer[81], 13, 17–18, 21, 24, 26, 28, 34, 38, 46, 64, 67, 79–80, 84, 96–97, 101, 110, 112, 119, 126, 134–135, 139–140, 149, 151, 153, 194, 201, 215, 223–225, 229, 242, 249, 263, 276–277, 284, 296–299
summer[24], 17, 31, 41, 47, 67–68, 70, 79, 96, 110, 133, 148, 166, 184, 218, 223–224, 228–229, 282, 285, 287
summum[1], 115
sumptuous[2], 8, 301
sun[1], 55
Sünde[2], 275
sundry[2], 33, 222
sunk[3], 5, 187, 249
SUNY[1], 275
Super[1], 241
super[9], 56, 185, 231, 240
supercilious[1], 181
superficial[2], 25, 102
superhuman[2], 237
superior[2], 12, 27
Superiority[1], 136
superman[4], 56, 237, 241
superordinate[1], 102
superseded[1], 197
Supersensible[1], 215
supersensible[9], 54, 193, 215–216, 218, 229
supersensuous[8], 193, 229, 232
supervision[1], 270
supplementary[1], 20
supplemented[3], 37–38, 290
Supplements[6], 83, 197–198, 275–276, 310
supplied[1], 36
supply[1], 100
supplying[1], 37
Support[1], 48
support[4], 123, 131, 154, 187
supporting[1], 194
supports[3], 109, 164, 202
supposed[4], 44, 148, 242, 251
Supposedly[3], 8, 164, 291
supposedly[4], 118, 147–148, 242
supra[1], 237
supreme[2], 251
supremely[1], 109
sure[26], 9, 13, 32, 73, 78, 94, 123, 131, 163, 165, 183, 204, 233, 240, 242, 244, 259–261, 283
surely[4], 121, 153, 220, 230
surface[3], 52, 69, 262
surfeit[4], 2, 24, 154, 186
surpass[1], 200
surpassed[1], 242
surpasses[3], 238
surprise[2], 107, 176
surprised[3], 21, 115, 131
surprising[2], 32, 124
Surrogate[2], 87, 120
surrogates[2], 87, 120

survive[1], 171
 survived[3], 12, 15, 68
 surviving[1], 285
 Susanne[1], 294
 Suso[3], 62, 286
 suspect[1], 19
 suspected[1], 85
 suspicion[1], 212
 sustain[1], 89
 sustainable[2], 14, 115
 sustained[1], 27
 Sutta[1], 125
 Sütterlin[1], 36
 Sütterlinschrift[1], 36
 SuZ[9], 73, 138, 142, 149, 177–178, 262
 Swabian[6], 16, 181, 262
 swamp[1], 189
 sway[2], 77, 129
 swayingness[1], 24
 sweeping[1], 233
 sweeps[2], 114, 188
 swimming[2], 15
 swinging[3], 206, 209
 Swiss[3], 92, 287–288
 Switzerland[9], 44–45, 47, 60, 168, 272, 278
 SWR[3], 313
 swung[1], 206
 syādvāda[1], 181
 Syādvādamanjari[1], 181
 sycophantic[1], 26
 Syer[1], 302
 sykophántēs[1], 26
 Symbol[1], 48
 symbol[2], 71, 185
 symbolic[1], 61
 symperasma[1], 178
 Symposion[1], 289
 Symposium[3], 259, 264–265
 symposium[1], 265
 Symposiums[2], 264
 symptoms[1], 119
 syncategorematic[1], 101
 synecdoche[4], 71, 86, 151, 185
 synekdochí[2], 71, 185
 synistemi[1], 205
 synonymous[1], 206

synonyms[1], 176
 synthesis[2], 60, 76
 syrupy[1], 11
 SYSTEM[1], 108
 System[14], 53, 57, 76, 102–104, 108, 116,
 119, 245–246
 system[105], 28, 36, 57, 66, 70, 72, 74–76,
 83, 88–89, 99–103, 105, 107–108, 110,
 115–116, 119, 126, 128, 132, 152, 157,
 161, 175–176, 179–180, 184, 186, 200,
 202–203, 205, 209–210, 214, 216, 222,
 231, 249, 262
 systema[2], 205, 207
 systematic[9], 5, 27, 32, 89, 197, 209, 249,
 290
 systematically[2], 99, 251
 systematics[3], 57, 161, 217
 Systematik[2], 58, 218
 systematischen[1], 89
 Systematisches[1], 290
 Systeme[2], 69, 249
 Systems[1], 212
 systems[25], 7, 27–28, 56, 68–69, 99, 110,
 116, 119, 126, 152, 157, 183, 205,
 208–209, 249
 SZ[4], 24, 258
 szientifische[3], 204–205
 szientifischen[1], 204
 Szilasi[2], 139, 304
 Særtr[1], 139

T

ta[2], 192
 Table[3], 279, 286, 291
 table[11], 7, 24, 53, 56, 95, 137, 161, 218,
 273, 275
 tables[1], 182
 tablet[1], 111
 Tag[5], 108, 129, 263
 tag[1], 202
 Tage[2], 74, 244
 Tagebuch[1], 274

Tages[2], *63, 268*
 Tagung[1], *288*
 tail[1], *114*
 tailored[2], *134–135*
 Take[2], *93, 277*
 take[53], *2, 5–6, 10, 19, 21, 32, 36, 48–49, 56, 68–69, 72–74, 78, 80, 86, 102, 104, 106, 108, 114–115, 133, 145–146, 152–153, 157, 161, 178, 185–186, 205, 207, 225–226, 236, 258, 262, 265, 272*
 Takehiko[1], *96*
 taken[20], *17, 27, 59, 79, 87, 90, 93, 114, 144–145, 171–172, 174, 192, 201, 206, 246, 262, 273, 275*
 takeover[1], *202*
 takes[11], *10, 63, 87, 90, 92, 136, 159, 168, 185, 195–196*
 Taking[1], *113*
 taking[14], *2, 5, 9, 12, 45, 49, 53, 76, 118, 133, 158, 196, 200, 232*
 Tal[1], *274*
 Talbert[1], *32*
 tale[1], *32*
 talent[1], *212*
 Talk[4], *177, 275–276, 291*
 talk[28], *3, 24, 28, 33, 63, 92, 102, 109–111, 113, 118, 122, 158, 172–173, 200, 206, 246, 249, 275, 280, 291*
 talked[13], *30, 33, 35, 39, 58, 110, 112, 128, 141, 188, 194, 203*
 talker[1], *29*
 talking[7], *33, 39, 76, 80, 121, 203, 207*
 talks[14], *18, 32, 59, 76, 110–111, 151, 175, 185, 203–204, 207, 221, 223*
 Tang[1], *316*
 tangential[1], *70*
 tangible[1], *135*
 tangled[1], *243*
 tantalizing[1], *27*
 Tantalus[1], *203*
 Tante[1], *281*
 tantum[1], *71*
 Tao[3], *71, 74, 81*
 Taoism[2], *71, 74*
 tape[1], *36*
 táphos[1], *42*
 tard[1], *9*
 Tasche[1], *43*
 Task[5], *34, 150, 222, 283, 292*
 task[37], *6–7, 23, 25, 57, 67, 84, 102–104, 111–113, 115, 120, 126, 136–137, 140, 155, 157, 197–198, 217, 220, 226, 228, 232, 261, 264*
 Tasks[2], *43, 275*
 taste[1], *57*
 tasteless[1], *238*
 tathyam[1], *61*
 tatters[1], *118*
 Tattvarthaslokavatika[1], *181*
 tatvollen[1], *104*
 taufte[1], *219*
 Taught[1], *65*
 taught[18], *14–15, 24, 36, 46, 56, 125, 129–130, 180, 190, 242, 270–271, 310*
 Taureck[1], *272*
 Tawny[1], *21*
 taxes[1], *15*
 Te[2], *74, 81*
 te[1], *291*
 tea[1], *261*
 Teach[1], *270*
 teach[9], *24, 68, 123, 125, 131, 180, 254, 259, 272*
 teachable[1], *128*
 teacher[30], *15, 25, 39, 44, 56, 121, 123, 128–131, 134, 164, 180, 190, 206*
 teachers[5], *35, 62, 69, 83, 180*
 teaches[2], *164, 181*
 Teaching[4], *128, 178*
 teaching[37], *3, 6, 28, 42, 48, 61, 67, 74–76, 78, 99, 123, 126, 128–130, 132, 151, 153, 171, 177, 180, 191–192, 270, 284*
 teachings[4], *17, 63, 98, 182*
 teacup[1], *261*
 team[9], *20, 62, 177, 181–182*
 teapot[1], *260*
 tear[2], *76, 130*
 technical[1], *248*
 Technically[1], *63*
 Technik[19], *42, 72, 76, 84–85, 95, 125, 239, 248, 271, 285–286, 308*
 technique[7], *54, 60, 76, 130, 160*

Technische[2], 84, 290
 technische[1], 290
 technischen[1], 248
 Technological[1], 290
 technological[5], 8, 13, 64, 81, 176
 technologization[1], 220
 TECHNOLOGY[2], 93, 125
 Technology[4], 60, 84–85, 239
 technology[20], 42, 53, 72, 84–85, 95–97, 189, 220, 248, 271
 tedious[2], 220, 230
 Teflon[1], 175
 Teil[50], 61, 123, 274–279, 281–286, 288–292, 302, 305, 311
 teil[1], 275
 Teile[1], 302
 teile[1], 245
 Teilen[1], 57
 Teiles[1], 271
 Teilnehmer[5], 42, 72, 265, 308
 teils[1], 245
 teilweise[5], 20, 256, 301–302
 Telefunken[2], 286, 314
 telegram[1], 38
 television[2], 118, 293
 Tell[4], 8–9, 34
 tell[13], 8, 19, 32, 34, 38, 96, 100, 104, 120, 129
 telling[4], 147, 175, 242, 247
 tells[4], 29, 56, 164, 204
 Telos[1], 254
 telos[1], 199
 temper[1], 142
 tempest[1], 260
 temporal[1], 206
 Temporalität[2], 153, 305
 Temporality[1], 153
 temporality[8], 141, 146, 150, 153, 177, 262
 temporalize[1], 145
 temporalizing[2], 146
 temporalizingspatializing[1], 147
 Temps[1], 39
 tempus[2], 278
 ten[6], 37, 112, 123, 144, 169, 196
 tenable[1], 115
 tendencies[7], 3–4, 103, 134, 140, 197
 tendency[3], 3–4, 202
 tenderly[1], 196
 tenets[4], 66, 175–176
 Tennessee[1], 263
 tensions[1], 194
 tenth[4], 72, 93, 125, 265
 Teresa[1], 43
 tergiversation[1], 43
 term[26], 33, 47, 54, 59, 63, 68, 71, 85, 88, 110–111, 114, 125, 131, 158, 168, 176, 192, 198, 212, 225, 227, 254–255, 258
 terminology[3], 30, 105, 176
 terms[39], 30, 44, 46, 51, 53, 71, 89–90, 123, 131, 145, 155, 158, 172, 184, 188–189, 198, 200–201, 205, 207, 218–219, 222, 226, 229–230, 238, 245, 248, 259, 316
 terrain[1], 161
 terrible[3], 97, 179, 229
 terrifying[1], 196
 terror[1], 90
 test[3], 62, 248
 Testament[3], 105, 175, 276
 tested[3], 123, 131, 248
 testifies[2], 39, 97
 testify[1], 154
 Testimonies[3], 86, 97, 273
 testing[2], 248
 Tetens[1], 211
 Teutonic[1], 260
 Texas[1], 62
 Text[6], 6, 167, 266, 291–292
 text[71], 2, 5–6, 8, 11–12, 17, 20, 27, 37–38, 40, 46, 48, 51, 59, 62, 67, 87, 101, 113, 117, 123, 131, 139, 145–146, 150, 152, 156, 171, 173, 179, 204, 216, 236, 244–246, 276, 281–283, 289–290, 293
 textbooks[1], 14
 Textes[1], 291
 Texts[2], 310
 texts[45], 2, 4, 12, 18, 20, 25, 28, 40, 48, 59, 67, 79, 86, 92, 99, 105, 114, 123, 131, 154, 181, 186–187, 192, 217, 251, 273, 277, 280, 282, 289
 Textstudium[1], 139
 textual[1], 70

TH[1], 258
 th[53], 3, 9, 24, 32–33, 45–46, 49, 55, 60, 62, 92, 98, 115, 118, 123, 131, 138, 181, 190, 192, 198, 217, 254, 277, 281, 283, 286–291, 293–294, 313
 Thailand[1], 101
 Thales[1], 14
 than[104], 5, 11, 19, 21, 23–24, 27, 29, 31–32, 36, 47–48, 53, 56, 59, 66–67, 85–87, 90, 94, 98–99, 102, 104, 109, 112, 116–117, 120–121, 123, 128–129, 139, 141, 146, 151, 155–156, 158, 162, 171–173, 175–177, 181–182, 185–186, 189, 194, 202, 207–208, 215, 221–222, 225–226, 228, 234–235, 242, 244, 249, 254, 260
 Thank[4], 16–17, 70, 177
 thank[6], 11, 49, 124, 169, 179, 316
 thankful[2], 122, 125
 thanking[1], 163
 thanks[4], 11, 144, 192
 Thanksgiving[1], 293
 That[31], 38, 54, 62, 72, 79, 84, 117, 122–123, 131, 145, 164, 177, 201, 205, 214, 219, 228, 242, 245, 247–249, 260–261, 283
 that[1050], 1–41, 43–54, 56–59, 61–64, 66–131, 133–169, 172–173, 175–186, 188–190, 192–198, 200–209, 211–212, 214–249, 251–255, 258–263, 265–267, 269–270, 272–273, 275, 277, 280–282, 286–287, 289, 292, 294, 302–303, 305, 310, 316
 Thatsachen[2], 136
 thaumazein[3], 122
 THE[7], 55, 92, 232, 258, 263, 288
 The[832], 1–13, 15–21, 23–28, 30–50, 52–64, 66–74, 76–80, 83–103, 105–107, 109–121, 123–134, 136–141, 144–161, 163–191, 193–198, 200–210, 212, 214–217, 219–233, 235–242, 244, 246, 248–249, 251–254, 258–259, 261–263, 265–266, 270–275, 277–278, 281–285, 288–290, 292–294, 310–311, 315–316
 the[6564], 1–255, 258–295, 298, 301–305, 307, 310–312, 314–316
 Theaetetus[1], 148
 theaomai[1], 110
 Theatatus[1], 122
 Theater[1], 288
 Theätet[2], 137, 297
 theatre[1], 61
 Their[6], 61, 67, 109, 181, 228, 272
 their[126], 2, 11, 16, 18, 21, 25–26, 29–31, 33, 35–40, 42, 45, 47, 49, 54–55, 57, 61–62, 66–67, 69–70, 78, 83, 90, 99, 102, 104–105, 107, 112, 114, 118–125, 128–129, 131–133, 161, 166, 171–172, 174, 177, 180, 182–183, 185–186, 189–190, 195, 197, 201, 216, 226–227, 229, 231, 233, 235, 242, 248, 264, 275, 302–303, 310, 315
 theirs[1], 129
 Theism[1], 212
 theism[1], 193
 them[85], 5, 8, 12, 18, 21, 25, 28, 30–32, 36, 38–39, 46–47, 51, 53, 56, 60, 62, 64, 67, 69–70, 77–79, 87, 93, 95, 99–100, 111, 113, 121–122, 128–130, 135, 150, 152, 160, 175, 178, 180, 182, 186, 189, 203, 217, 224, 227, 248, 251, 254
 Thema[9], 41, 108, 167, 263, 277, 293
 thematic[2], 140, 145
 thematischen[1], 279
 theme[13], 31, 66, 69–71, 83, 112, 149, 151, 191, 225, 263
 themes[16], 14, 23, 48, 69–70, 101, 106, 159, 161, 166, 179, 183
 themselves[23], 64, 72–73, 98, 119, 122, 124, 133–135, 160, 183, 197, 201, 216, 221, 232–233
 Then[9], 33, 39, 64, 84, 91, 144, 197, 206, 284
 then[161], 3–5, 11–13, 15, 17, 20–21, 24–25, 27–28, 30–34, 36–37, 39, 42–43, 46–50, 53, 56, 59–60, 63, 66–67, 70, 74–76, 78–80, 83, 85–88, 90, 98–100, 105–106, 110–113, 115, 119–120, 123, 129–131, 134, 140, 142, 150, 152–153, 155, 157, 160–161, 172, 174, 176, 181–182, 187–188, 190, 192, 194–196, 198, 203–209, 215–216, 222–224, 227–228, 233, 238, 240, 246, 251, 254, 262, 270, 272, 274–276, 290
 Theo[1], 250
 theo[7], 31, 192–193, 195, 240, 287

Theodor[4], *43, 133, 175, 182*
 Theodore[7], *4, 23, 37, 141, 273, 310*
 Theodorus[1], *11*
 theoego[1], *193*
 Theologen[2], *219*
 Theologenschaft[1], *275*
 theologia[1], *103*
 theologian[4], *23, 175, 225*
 Theologians[1], *277*
 theologians[5], *218–219, 229–230*
 Theological[2], *278, 289*
 theological[2], *60, 213*
 Theologie[3], *276–277*
 theologischen[1], *278*
 theologist[1], *23*
 Theology[3], *109, 175, 276*
 theology[15], *103–104, 116, 131, 175, 192–193, 195, 250, 270*
 Theophil[1], *283*
 Theorem[2], *245–246*
 theorems[1], *188*
 Theoretical[1], *175*
 theoretical[11], *99, 119, 149, 151, 215–216, 263*
 Theorie[1], *272*
 theories[3], *18, 44, 153*
 theorizing[1], *133*
 Theory[6], *44, 54, 270, 272*
 theory[19], *13, 44–45, 54, 79, 103, 119, 175, 180, 194, 197, 202, 250, 252*
 There[144], *2–3, 5, 7–10, 13, 17–20, 25–26, 28, 31, 38–40, 44, 47–50, 59–60, 62–63, 66–67, 69–70, 73, 75–76, 78, 81, 87, 91, 94, 99, 101, 105, 107–109, 113–115, 118–119, 121, 123, 126–127, 129–130, 136, 139, 149, 151, 153–154, 157, 160, 165, 168, 175–176, 178, 180–184, 186, 192–193, 203–204, 206, 215, 221, 235, 244, 250, 259–261, 263, 272, 279, 281–282, 285–286, 303*
 there[248], *3, 5, 7–8, 10–12, 14, 16–20, 22–25, 27, 30–33, 36–37, 39–40, 42–43, 45, 47–48, 52–53, 56–57, 59, 61, 64, 66–72, 76, 79–81, 83–84, 86–88, 90–91, 94–95, 98, 100–101, 104–108, 110–111, 113–115, 117, 119, 121, 123, 126, 129, 134–136, 139, 141, 145–146, 154–155, 157–159, 165–166, 168, 171–172, 176, 178–180, 182, 184, 186–187, 193, 196, 198, 203–206, 209, 221, 226–227, 232–233, 235–236, 238–240, 242, 244, 246, 249–250, 258, 260, 262–263, 265, 270, 272, 281, 285–288, 291, 293, 304, 316*
 thereafter[2], *37, 107*
 thereby[7], *72, 86, 96, 131, 193, 200, 251*
 Therefore[36], *9, 12, 19, 22, 58, 65, 72, 75–77, 83, 94, 96, 101–102, 108, 149, 151, 162, 169–170, 174, 194, 202, 204–205, 223, 237, 239, 247, 258, 264–265*
 therefore[32], *11, 31, 44, 63, 70, 89, 92, 94, 103, 111, 115, 128–129, 144, 148–150, 153, 157, 172, 175, 179, 184–186, 189, 212, 215, 240, 252*
 therein[1], *178*
 These[49], *9–10, 15, 20, 27–29, 33, 38, 46, 53, 56, 60–61, 69–70, 72, 75, 87, 102, 114, 118, 124, 135, 143, 147, 159, 165–166, 180, 190, 192, 204, 212, 217, 238, 244, 255, 273, 289–290*
 these[170], *2–5, 8–10, 12, 15, 17–22, 24, 27–32, 36–38, 44, 46–49, 53–56, 62, 69, 71–73, 79–80, 84, 87–92, 103, 105, 112, 114, 116–118, 121, 123–124, 131, 133–135, 140, 143–144, 146–147, 149, 154, 159–161, 164–165, 169, 171, 175–176, 179–180, 183, 185–186, 192–194, 197–198, 200, 204, 206, 208, 210–212, 216–217, 224–226, 228, 232, 235, 238, 242, 244, 251, 255, 259, 261, 273, 277, 294*
 Thesen[2], *72, 109*
 Theses[1], *184*
 theses[14], *5, 24, 66, 69–71, 107, 109, 171, 175, 183–185, 187*
 Thesis[6], *118, 183, 260–261, 267*
 thesis[31], *3, 23, 35, 57, 60–61, 69–71, 73, 109, 115, 118, 145, 150, 178, 184–185, 250–251, 260, 270–271*
 They[23], *11, 25, 28–29, 36, 41, 45–46, 78, 107, 118, 125, 131, 150, 166, 177, 179, 186, 194, 211, 229, 254, 315*
 they[122], *3–5, 9, 11–15, 18, 20, 24, 26–29, 31, 35–36, 38–41, 45–49, 51–55, 61, 66, 68–69, 77–79, 81, 87, 93, 99, 102, 120, 122–123, 128–131, 142, 144–145, 150,*

154, 159, 166, 176–177, 179–180, 183,
 186, 215, 217, 219, 224, 227–230, 234,
 238, 246, 248, 251, 254, 267, 271, 273
Thing[4], 86, 245, 283–284
thing[53], 2, 8, 17, 29, 42, 51, 70–71, 76,
 80, 89, 102, 106, 108, 112, 116,
 122–123, 131, 135, 141, 149, 152, 160,
 165, 167, 189, 203, 205, 219, 221,
 226–230, 260, 263
things[53], 8, 15, 25–26, 42, 46, 73, 86–88,
 90, 94, 115, 117, 119, 122, 125,
 130–131, 143, 147, 150, 154, 164, 168,
 172, 174, 176, 181, 183, 190–191, 198,
 207, 219, 221–222, 230–231, 234–235,
 237, 241–242, 259–260, 262, 265, 316
Think[9], 7, 54, 96–97, 122, 125, 234, 254,
 262
think[58], 11, 24, 29, 34, 36, 49–50, 57, 59,
 64, 66, 68, 72, 76, 87, 92, 98–99, 101,
 111, 116, 128, 130, 137, 142, 148, 152,
 156, 158, 164, 166, 176, 181, 193,
 205–206, 217, 228, 230, 240, 245, 248,
 258–259, 262–263, 269
thinkable[1], 125
Thinker[2], 29, 269
thinker[37], 7, 29–30, 34, 49, 59, 70, 75,
 80–82, 102, 105–106, 110, 117, 130,
 157, 169, 179, 183, 187–189, 196, 209,
 221, 223, 243, 259, 269
Thinkers[2], 64, 93
thinkers[18], 44–45, 55, 58–59, 65, 85, 104,
 113, 122, 157–158, 163, 189, 195
THINKING[1], 92
Thinking[40], 7, 19, 29, 34, 64–65, 70, 74,
 81, 85–86, 89, 92, 97, 117, 124, 130,
 147, 157–158, 165, 169, 177, 184–185,
 189, 196, 198, 212, 222, 224, 251,
 283–285, 288, 291–292
thinking[280], 3–4, 9–10, 13–14, 16–17, 19,
 21, 24–28, 30, 33–34, 39, 44, 51, 55,
 58–59, 61, 63–71, 75–78, 81, 85, 87–88,
 90–92, 96, 98, 100–101, 104, 106,
 110–113, 116–117, 119, 122, 126, 129,
 132, 135, 137–138, 142, 145–146,
 150–159, 161, 163, 166–170, 172,
 174–180, 182, 184–189, 192–194,
 201–202, 206, 208–209, 211, 214–215,
 218, 221–223, 226, 228–229, 232,
 239–240, 242, 245–249, 251, 253–254,
 258, 261, 263, 285, 288
thinks[22], 19, 63, 75, 89, 101–102, 111,
 151, 168, 170, 192, 194, 200, 206, 218,
 230, 239–240, 250, 310
thinner[1], 229
Third[3], 70, 184, 225
third[16], 5, 16–18, 60, 92, 99, 134, 153,
 206, 214, 247, 279, 281, 284
thirteen[2], 48, 114
Thirties[1], 97
thirty[2], 4, 80
This[275], 1, 3, 5, 7–8, 11–12, 14–15, 17,
 21, 23–24, 26–27, 29–31, 33–34, 36–38,
 43, 45–47, 49, 53–55, 59–61, 63–64,
 66–67, 70–71, 73–74, 77, 81, 83–85,
 87–92, 94–97, 99–100, 102–111,
 113–114, 116–118, 121–122, 126, 128,
 131–136, 139, 141, 143, 145–146,
 149–152, 154–159, 162–163, 165,
 168–171, 177, 179–181, 183–186,
 188–190, 194, 198, 200–201, 203–209,
 211, 214–216, 219, 221, 223, 225, 227,
 230, 232, 234–235, 237–238, 241–242,
 244, 246, 248–249, 253–254, 260, 264,
 267, 273–274, 277, 280, 282–285,
 293–294, 301, 304, 314
this[737], 3–5, 7–13, 17–34, 37–39, 41–64,
 66–81, 83–84, 86–90, 92–112, 114–124,
 128–131, 133–136, 138, 140–160, 163,
 165–172, 175–194, 196–209, 211–217,
 220–233, 235, 237–246, 248–254,
 259–263, 265, 272–273, 275, 277,
 279–285, 288–290, 294, 301, 310
Thomä[3], 21, 277
Thomas[49], 3, 5, 8, 17, 21, 23, 28–29, 44,
 47, 56, 71, 113, 126, 139, 149, 155, 183,
 186, 192, 198, 225, 227–229, 258, 263,
 266, 269, 272–273, 275, 282, 297,
 310–311, 315
Thor[8], 26, 34, 43, 118, 123, 128, 131, 261
thorough[3], 36, 289, 305
thoroughly[5], 25, 218, 226, 229, 231
thoroughness[1], 145
Those[5], 36, 129, 233, 244
those[57], 1–2, 5, 12, 16, 28, 35, 37, 39–41,
 45, 53–54, 57, 64, 78, 81, 83–84, 92,
 107, 113, 119, 122, 128, 135, 142,
 145–146, 152, 163–164, 180–183, 189,
 195, 197, 201, 203, 212, 225, 227, 231,

233, 241, 254
 though[12], 18, 47, 119, 135, 181, 189,
 208–209, 211, 213, 224
 THOUGHT[1], 92
 Thought[10], 12, 76, 91–93, 110, 165, 258,
 292
 thought[167], 3–4, 7, 9–10, 12, 23, 25–27,
 29, 33, 40–42, 44–45, 50–57, 59, 64–67,
 69–70, 73, 77–78, 81, 84–85, 89, 91–92,
 94–96, 99–101, 103, 107, 114, 120, 142,
 149–151, 154, 156–158, 166–167, 172,
 176, 181–183, 185–187, 194, 196–198,
 200, 202, 212, 214, 216–223, 225, 230,
 235, 240, 242, 246–247, 251–253,
 259–261, 265–266, 269, 305
 Thoughtful[4], 72, 125, 259, 265
 thoughtful[6], 13, 58, 161, 181, 208, 261
 thoughtfully[1], 196
 thoughtfulness[1], 189
 thoughtless[1], 81
 Thoughts[2], 234, 238
 thoughts[41], 2–3, 5, 8, 11–12, 14, 16, 18,
 25, 27, 29–30, 35, 52–53, 56, 59, 66, 73,
 75, 88, 90, 99–100, 102, 120, 124–125,
 170, 215, 226, 228, 259, 261, 283
 thousand[4], 182, 214, 225, 228
 thousands[4], 30, 188, 233, 259
 thread[2], 5, 70
 threads[1], 5
 threat[1], 106
 threatened[1], 226
 threatening[2], 58, 161
 threatens[1], 81
 THREE[1], 231
 Three[5], 11, 92, 114, 161, 198
 three[42], 15–17, 20, 27, 38, 44, 47, 61, 91,
 99, 102, 114, 133, 149, 164, 190,
 192–193, 197, 203, 205–206, 214–215,
 224–225, 250, 254, 278, 281, 288, 315
 threw[1], 52
 throat[1], 96
 Through[6], 86, 102, 110, 190, 233, 258
 through[68], 3, 15, 23, 28, 37, 46, 66, 69,
 71, 79, 86–87, 96–99, 102, 105, 110,
 113–114, 123, 129, 131, 135, 137,
 149–150, 152, 155, 166–167, 171,
 180–181, 188–189, 192–193, 195, 202,
 206–209, 215–217, 224, 232, 235, 239,
 248–249, 254, 305
 Throughout[2], 33, 222
 throughout[7], 12, 15, 25, 61, 177, 192, 198
 Throw[2], 5, 187
 throw[2], 49, 177
 thrown[1], 115
 thrust[6], 10, 24, 68, 130, 198, 200
 thrusts[1], 163
 Thucydides[6], 105, 231–232
 thunderbolt[2], 168
 Thür[1], 98
 Thursday[1], 104
 Thus[25], 12, 26, 28, 38, 83–84, 99, 111,
 123, 125, 131, 145, 194, 197, 201, 204,
 206, 213, 223, 227, 289, 316
 thus[21], 12, 56, 58, 153, 157, 164,
 184–185, 200–201, 215, 221, 226, 235,
 239, 246–247, 264
 thut[1], 220
 thwarted[1], 200
 tiber[1], 264
 Tibetan[10], 60–61
 Tibetans[2], 61
 tide[1], 145
 tie[2], 129, 233
 tied[7], 70, 74, 88, 111, 155, 184, 190
 Tiefe[2], 104, 163
 tiefer[1], 57
 tierische[1], 274
 ties[3], 152, 155, 240
 Tietjen[2], 281, 313
 tilgt[1], 250
 till[3], 181, 237, 241
 Tillich[1], 3
 Timber[3], 86–87
 timber[8], 27, 87–88, 113
 Time[131], 4, 16, 18, 23–24, 26–27, 31–32,
 42–43, 75, 81, 83, 92, 96–97, 99, 109,
 112, 114, 117, 121–122, 127, 130–131,
 138–154, 158, 160, 177–178, 180, 190,
 193, 197–198, 201, 205, 238, 240, 247,
 250, 262, 274–276, 290, 292, 312, 316
 time[202], 2–3, 7, 9–11, 15–16, 18, 23,
 25–26, 30, 32–33, 35, 37, 42–47, 61–64,
 68–69, 72–73, 77, 83–84, 88, 95–98,
 103, 105–106, 109–112, 114–115,
 117–118, 121–122, 126–127, 129, 131,

133–134, 138–139, 145–148, 152–153,
 155–156, 158, 162, 167–169, 179–180,
 183, 186, 188, 190–191, 193–196, 198,
 200–202, 205–207, 210, 212–213,
 216–217, 221, 224–226, 231–232, 238,
 242, 245–246, 249–250, 259, 261–262,
 272–273, 275, 283, 288, 290, 310
 timeline[4], 26, 79, 216
 timelines[1], 216
 Times[1], 62
 times[27], 25, 30, 43, 61, 66, 79, 106, 112,
 119, 133–134, 167, 170, 188, 191, 194,
 207, 215, 224–226, 228, 233, 259, 275
 Timothy[3], 49, 254, 304
 tind[1], 289
 tiny[1], 138
 tion[1], 146
 Tischrede[3], 286, 291, 294
 Titel[11], 20, 165, 170, 190, 236, 256–257,
 265–266, 292
 Titelblatt[1], 74
 TitelWissenschaft[1], 286
 Titilia[1], 315
 Title[6], 164, 244, 246, 270, 273, 283
 title[39], 2, 5, 18, 20, 37, 43, 49, 68, 87, 93,
 130, 155, 165, 169–170, 179, 190,
 205–206, 224, 241, 247, 251, 255, 271,
 274–276, 278, 293
 titled[8], 17, 40–41, 92, 112, 123, 175, 211
 Titles[1], 313
 titles[12], 12, 20, 27, 31–32, 85–86, 236,
 254
 TN[2], 73
 TO[3], 167, 258, 279
 To[45], 13–14, 32, 44, 46, 50, 56–57, 59,
 67, 71–73, 78, 84, 96, 107, 111, 113,
 116, 138, 146, 152, 165, 175, 179,
 184–185, 187–188, 192, 196, 209,
 217–219, 222, 227, 234–235, 242, 246,
 262
 to[2407], 2–169, 171–242, 244–255,
 258–262, 264–265, 267, 269–273,
 275–279, 281, 283–294, 301–306,
 310–312, 315–316
 Tobias[1], 288
 Toby[1], 176
 Tod[5], 20, 42, 74, 256
 Today[4], 127, 155, 198, 221
 today[31], 47, 49, 62, 81, 88–89, 96, 99,
 112, 124, 131, 133–135, 140, 143, 149,
 156, 169, 179, 183, 186, 197, 202, 218,
 225, 230, 246
 Todestag[1], 283
 todt[1], 282
 Todtnauberg[17], 16, 62, 76, 122, 124,
 138, 167–168, 266–267, 272, 284, 287,
 290
 Todtnauberger[1], 280
 together[18], 5, 69–70, 89, 105, 152–153,
 155, 183, 190, 198, 206, 216, 246–247,
 259, 288
 Tokuya[2], 44, 252
 told[18], 28–29, 39, 59, 65, 67, 105, 119,
 121, 162, 177–178, 263, 272
 tolerance[1], 168
 Tolle[5], 2, 5, 10, 69, 72
 Tolson[1], 62
 Tom[2], 182
 tomb[1], 42
 tomorrow[3], 88, 246
 tone[1], 72
 Too[1], 118
 too[58], 12, 15–16, 24, 27, 29, 31–33, 36,
 48–49, 54, 59, 62–63, 69, 75, 77, 110,
 113, 117, 122, 129, 139–140, 151, 155,
 158–159, 169, 172, 176–177, 179–180,
 184, 186, 189, 212, 216, 240, 247, 249,
 259–260, 262
 took[19], 15, 36, 38, 43, 47, 71, 89, 102,
 112, 116, 131, 197, 205, 270, 285, 290,
 310
 tools[1], 260
 top[1], 47
 Topic[1], 293
 topic[23], 17, 33, 46–47, 52, 54, 60, 70,
 112, 135, 160, 168, 184, 209, 238, 260,
 263, 276, 279, 282, 288
 topics[15], 3, 10, 13, 39, 53–54, 67, 69, 73,
 179, 244
 topographically[1], 168
 topological[1], 176
 Topologie[6], 176, 267–268
 topology[1], 26
 tormented[1], 55
 torn[2], 19
 tornness[1], 293

Toronto[1], 60
 toros[3], 3, 89, 171
 torpor[1], 283
 torso[1], 27
 Tortosa[1], 60
 tot[3], 198, 282, 291
 Total[2], 254
 total[7], 10, 13, 123, 156, 171, 177
 Totale[1], 254
 totale[1], 254
 totalities[1], 111
 totality[4], 45, 88, 121, 146
 Totally[1], 127
 touch[2], 81, 108
 touched[3], 45, 108, 181
 touches[1], 166
 touching[1], 216
 touchstones[1], 209
 Tough[1], 43
 touted[3], 7, 259
 Toward[2], 217, 247
 toward[44], 27, 56, 66, 71, 73, 85, 89–91, 93, 95, 112, 132, 140, 147, 149, 152, 154, 157–159, 163, 169, 175, 179, 186, 188, 216, 221, 224, 232, 262–263, 265, 270
 towards[3], 7, 108, 231
 Towarnicki[1], 39
 town[5], 16, 67, 138, 273, 303
 toy[2], 228
 Trace[1], 263
 trace[7], 64, 134, 167, 206, 209, 212
 traced[1], 155
 traces[3], 105, 114, 194
 Track[3], 25, 68, 86
 track[7], 27, 42, 71, 127, 180, 186
 tracking[2], 141, 150
 tracks[2], 69, 86
 Tractatus[1], 68
 Tradition[1], 245
 tradition[74], 31, 34, 44–46, 51–53, 57, 60–62, 65, 71, 76, 79–80, 88, 97, 99–102, 109–110, 116–117, 120–122, 128, 181, 183, 190–192, 194, 211, 219, 222–223, 245, 249, 262, 288
 Traditional[2], 30, 290
 traditional[16], 76, 108, 118, 130, 183, 191, 193, 196, 200, 214, 223, 240, 251–252
 traditionellen[2], 108, 252
 traditions[2], 13, 35
 trag[1], 173
 Tragedy[1], 242
 tragen[1], 268
 Tragic[2], 225
 tragic[2], 98, 233
 tragische[1], 98
 trägliche[1], 291
 trägt[2], 87, 164
 Trail[1], 310
 trail[18], 9, 19, 25, 33, 62, 72, 85, 87, 105, 111, 123, 133, 153, 164, 176, 193
 Trailblazers[1], 86
 trails[10], 87–88, 113
 trained[2], 218, 230
 Trakl[4], 10, 257, 285
 TraklMarginalia[1], 21
 trans[3], 101, 129, 131
 transcendent[3], 193, 215–216
 Transcendental[8], 38, 45, 97, 192, 200, 203–204, 208
 transcendental[22], 35, 57, 81, 89, 108, 148, 193, 204, 208–209, 215–217, 219, 230, 247
 transcends[2], 55, 140
 transcribed[2], 267, 288
 transcribing[2], 38
 Transcript[2], 39, 267
 transcript[10], 13, 24, 41, 117, 128, 275, 277, 284, 293
 transcription[7], 38, 45, 83
 transcriptions[4], 37–38, 121
 Transcripts[1], 285
 transcripts[25], 12–13, 21, 35–37, 39, 121, 128, 139
 transfiguration[1], 227
 transfigured[1], 229
 transfixing[1], 153
 Transform[1], 122
 transform[1], 122
 transformation[6], 14, 66, 104, 112, 121, 148
 transformations[1], 198
 transformed[3], 32, 72, 224
 Transforming[1], 123

transforming[1], 123
transforms[1], 228
transgression[1], 236
tranhistorical[1], 237
transience[1], 7
Transition[1], 203
transition[21], 49, 68, 90, 141, 163–164,
169–170, 172, 179, 185, 193, 203, 245,
264
transitional[6], 96, 117, 156, 160, 163–164
transitions[1], 168
Transkription[1], 255
translate[4], 29, 59, 73, 269
Translated[26], 38, 59, 64, 68, 73, 84,
88–90, 118, 123, 126, 130–131, 140,
148, 164–165, 198, 201–202, 249, 265
translated[33], 9, 12, 19, 27, 30, 36, 59,
63, 73, 76, 86–87, 91, 96, 103, 109, 111,
129–130, 166, 171, 185, 195, 200, 247,
254, 304, 316
translates[1], 54
Translating[1], 310
translating[2], 14, 34
Translation[35], 12, 65, 88–89, 91–92, 98,
100–101, 103, 119, 137, 147, 161, 173,
179, 185, 189, 191–192, 195, 200, 216,
225, 227–229, 236, 251, 254, 283, 292
translation[61], 7–8, 11, 13–15, 24, 30, 34,
51, 56, 64, 74, 79–81, 86, 92, 96–97,
103, 105, 114, 143–146, 148, 150, 152,
154, 164, 166, 182, 191, 198, 223,
236–237, 241, 245, 252, 265, 278, 292,
304
Translations[6], 29, 106, 135, 219, 253, 310
translations[17], 4, 7–8, 15, 18, 30, 39, 52,
66–67, 74, 114, 301, 310, 316
Translator[4], 64, 216, 304
translator[3], 134, 160, 198
translators[5], 10–11, 29, 74, 143
transmission[2], 97, 190
transmitted[2], 28, 66
transparency[2], 197
transported[1], 87
transporting[1], 153
transposing[1], 36
Transzendente[1], 305
transzendente[1], 276
transzendentale[7], 58, 74, 89, 116, 204,
218, 246
TRAP[1], 263
trap[1], 118
trapped[5], 174, 205, 222, 232, 240
traps[1], 100
trash[1], 26
Träubleskuchen[1], 181
Traum[1], 316
Trauma[1], 97
trauma[1], 97
travailler[1], 9
travel[4], 8, 10, 180, 213
traveled[2], 30, 271
traveling[1], 124
traverses[1], 87
Trawny[8], 12, 20, 155, 182, 273, 315
treasures[1], 130
treat[1], 190
treated[2], 39, 130
Treatise[5], 80, 100, 116, 143
treatise[5], 116, 180, 204, 275
treatises[1], 27
treatment[3], 17, 52, 198
tree[2], 103, 316
trees[2], 68
treffend[1], 248
Trefoil[1], 100
treibt[2], 142, 235
Trek[1], 155
Tremezzo[1], 45
trench[1], 18
trenches[2], 67–68
trend[3], 47, 147, 249
Trendelenburg[3], 60, 192, 203
Trends[1], 130
trends[2], 53, 232
trepidation[1], 5
treue[1], 283
Triadic[1], 94
trial[2], 118, 171
Triangle[1], 240
tributary[1], 168
tribute[2], 118, 293
tricks[1], 75
Trieb[1], 97

tried[11], 43, 72, 99, 102, 116, 119, 125,
 129, 193, 201, 265
 trifft[1], 190
 Trimester[2], 112, 298
 trimester[1], 298
 Trinity[1], 62
 trip[10], 3, 48, 78, 96, 160, 167, 277–278,
 286, 294
 trips[2], 16
 trivialities[1], 130
 trodden[1], 24
 Troeltsch[1], 197
 tromerós[1], 97
 troops[1], 275
 trope[3], 26, 70, 169
 tropes[1], 93
 tropos[4], 42, 70, 93, 169
 trouble[3], 96, 144, 158
 troubled[1], 111
 TRUE[2], 55, 232
 True[4], 66, 100, 110, 231
 true[42], 4, 28, 44, 46, 56, 79, 102–103,
 110, 116, 141, 145, 147, 183, 207,
 214–215, 219, 223, 225, 228, 230–233,
 240, 242, 275
 truest[1], 183
 truly[7], 47, 56, 88, 120, 197, 231
 Trump[1], 60
 Trunkene[1], 316
 trust[11], 48, 206–209
 trusted[3], 29, 77, 268
 trusts[1], 206
 Truth[23], 7, 44, 66, 79, 115, 134, 181,
 194, 231–232, 238, 249, 252–253, 271,
 278
 truth[112], 1, 4, 24, 26, 44–45, 53, 55,
 58–59, 64, 68, 71, 77, 79–80, 84, 90, 96,
 99–100, 102–103, 115–117, 121–122,
 126, 135, 143, 147, 149–150, 152–158,
 163, 166, 172–173, 181, 192, 194–196,
 201, 213, 222, 225–226, 228, 231–233,
 247, 250–253, 258, 267
 truthful[1], 192
 truthfulness[1], 235
 truthless[1], 236
 truthlessness[2], 96
 truths[11], 5, 8, 84, 123, 125–126, 132,
 153, 181
 Truwant[1], 44
 Try[1], 27
 try[16], 52, 75, 94, 100, 135, 152, 175–176,
 193, 209–210, 233, 258, 260
 trying[15], 3, 5, 30, 43, 77, 80, 93–94, 116,
 161, 163, 185, 220–221, 261
 Tsa[2], 61
 Tse[1], 101
 tse[2], 81
 tthat[1], 68
 Tübingen[16], 23, 138, 145, 218, 230, 270,
 272, 275–276, 280, 288, 302
 Tübingen[2], 229, 277
 Tübinger[1], 219
 tue[1], 143
 Tuesday[1], 104
 Tugend[1], 220
 Tugenden[1], 220
 Tugendhat[2], 272, 304
 tum[1], 145
 tumultuous[1], 25
 tune[1], 49
 tuned[1], 8
 Tung[1], 101
 Tunisian[1], 60
 turbid[1], 119
 turbulent[1], 15
 turgid[1], 29
 Turn[2], 49, 217
 turn[6], 69, 95, 110, 178, 222, 249
 turned[7], 18, 21, 36, 46, 107, 131, 288
 Turning[1], 91
 turning[10], 18, 27, 30, 91, 136, 161, 172,
 175, 235, 272
 turns[11], 18, 27–28, 42, 56, 80, 130, 136,
 156, 161
 TV[2], 3, 290
 TW[1], 215
 twelve[2], 111, 121
 twentieth[1], 45
 twenty[3], 23, 25, 288
 twice[1], 205
 Twilight[12], 55, 225, 227, 229, 231–232,
 236
 twist[3], 30, 81, 111
 Twisting[2], 90–91

twisting[9], *71, 89–90, 137, 172–173*
 twists[1], *172*
 twitter[1], *15*
 Two[15], *61, 79, 102, 123, 145, 188, 190, 227, 238, 240, 244, 274, 277–278*
 two[77], *3–4, 12, 19–20, 25, 27, 30–32, 35, 37, 41, 48, 52, 54–56, 60–61, 64, 71, 78, 86, 88–89, 97, 102, 104–106, 108–109, 117, 124, 131, 138, 144–147, 149–150, 152, 154, 159, 162, 185, 204, 206–207, 217, 225–226, 228, 232, 240, 251, 264, 275–276, 279, 288–290, 294, 315*
 Type[2], *174, 266*
 type[4], *7, 19, 30, 227*
 typed[13], *19, 28, 36–37, 40–41, 275, 277–279, 293*
 types[1], *133*
 typescript[6], *21, 89, 151, 172, 277*
 typewriters[2], *15, 17*
 typewritten[1], *284*
 typical[1], *133*
 typing[1], *19*
 typo[2], *247–248*
 typology[3], *133, 171, 175*
 Typoskript[2], *266, 283*
 Tzu[1], *289*

U

UA[1], *311*
 Übelwollenden[1], *142*
 ÜBER[1], *257*
 Über[42], *20, 31, 47, 63, 95, 98, 153, 156, 165, 169–170, 186, 198, 201, 254, 256, 274–277, 279, 282, 284, 289, 291, 293–294, 299, 306*
 über[46], *38, 42, 63, 84, 89, 91–92, 108, 112, 116, 120, 123, 126, 130, 144, 160, 163–164, 169–170, 173, 190, 206, 220, 234, 247, 252, 266, 271–272, 274–275, 278, 285, 289–290, 293, 305, 311*
 überall[4], *89, 97, 190, 247*
 Überarbeitung[1], *278*
 überdies[1], *219*

Überdruß[3], *33, 64, 91*
 Übereignung[1], *171*
 Übereinstimmung[9], *251–253*
 Übergabe[1], *279*
 Übergang[7], *164, 173, 185, 245, 264*
 Überganges[7], *49, 169, 179*
 Übergangs[1], *163*
 Übergehende[2], *164*
 überhaupt[9], *42, 81, 137, 146, 157, 201, 264*
 überhistorischen[1], *237*
 überladen[1], *181*
 überlassen[1], *158*
 Überlegenheit[1], *136*
 Überlegungen[39], *18–19, 27–28, 33, 50, 64, 69, 74, 85, 88, 91, 96, 107, 111, 114, 153, 159, 175, 181, 183, 195, 254, 299–300, 312*
 Überlief[1], *190*
 Überlieferte[2], *290*
 Überlieferung[1], *190*
 Übermacht[1], *27*
 Übermensch[5], *56, 164, 237*
 Übermenschen[1], *164*
 übermitteln[2], *143*
 Übernahme[1], *114*
 Übernommene[8], *255–257, 273, 295*
 überprüft[1], *266*
 überreden[1], *77*
 Übersetzen[1], *34*
 übersetzen[1], *166*
 Übersetzung[6], *143–144, 236*
 Übersicht[1], *272*
 Übersicht[1], *311*
 Übersieht[1], *150*
 übersinnlich[2], *54, 215*
 Übersinnliche[1], *219*
 Übersinnlichen[4], *218, 229, 232*
 Überwinden[1], *90*
 überwinden[2], *58, 218*
 Überwindug[1], *147*
 Überwindung[7], *102, 173, 201, 224, 247–248*
 Überwindung[1], *306*
 überwunden[2], *173, 221*
 überzeugt[1], *141*

Überzeugung[1], 235
 üblichen[2], 141, 248
 übrig[1], 40
 Übung[2], 113
 Übungen[2], 38, 123
 Uchronia[1], 183
 udk[1], 139
 Ufer[1], 163
 Uferpfad[1], 20
 ühren[1], 108
 Ullrich[1], 292
 Ulmer[2], 271
 Ulrich[2], 115, 273
 ultimate[6], 45, 56, 117, 175, 179
 Ultimately[6], 21, 53, 74, 180, 185, 188
 ultimately[3], 127, 135, 237
 ultra[1], 3
 Um[3], 236, 307, 309
 um[41], 33, 57, 64, 72, 75–76, 81, 84, 91,
 108–109, 112, 142–143, 158, 160, 164,
 190, 194, 196, 219, 221, 223, 230, 235,
 247, 252, 264, 268, 276, 278, 282
 Umbruch[2], 307–308
 Umdruck[28], 307–309
 Umfang[19], 17, 91, 165, 255–257, 266,
 271, 276, 278, 283, 286–287, 289,
 293–294
 umgearbeitet[1], 279
 umgedrehter[3], 34, 219, 230
 umgekehrt[3], 147, 253, 266
 umgerührt[1], 81
 Umkehrung[4], 34, 90, 222, 232
 Umkreis[4], 57–58, 218, 279
 Umwälzung[1], 57
 Umwandlung[1], 148
 Umwege[2], 85, 162
 Umwertung[2], 111, 236
 Un[1], 39
 un[3], 39, 47, 113
 unabated[1], 70
 unablässig[2], 156, 186
 unablassig[1], 167
 Unablässige[1], 26
 unable[4], 98, 119, 175, 222
 unabridged[1], 2
 unaccomplished[1], 147
 Unaided[1], 205
 unambiguous[1], 178
 unanswerable[1], 125
 unanswered[1], 93
 Unattainable[1], 188
 unattainable[2], 38, 56
 unaufhaltbaren[1], 201
 unavailing[1], 127
 unavoidable[3], 90, 177, 188
 unaware[1], 79
 unbedingte[1], 253
 unbeholfen[1], 166
 unbelief[1], 226
 unbelievable[2], 225, 227
 Unbenutzte[1], 306
 unbestimmte[1], 251
 Unbewältigte[1], 147
 unbewiltzt[1], 249
 unbiased[1], 62
 unblended[1], 24
 unbounded[3], 206, 208
 unbridled[1], 232
 uncanniness[1], 97
 uncanny[3], 97–98
 unceasingly[2], 123, 131
 uncertain[1], 127
 uncertainty[3], 45, 87, 120
 unchained[1], 96
 unchanged[1], 154
 unchristian[1], 54
 unclear[1], 116
 Uncollected[1], 310
 UncollectedTexts[1], 310
 uncompleted[1], 203
 uncomplicated[1], 102
 unconcealedness[1], 199
 Unconcealment[1], 97
 unconcealment[2], 97, 199
 unconceptual[1], 146
 unconditional[5], 64, 221, 226, 242, 253
 unconditionally[1], 232
 unconditioned[5], 193, 221, 226, 228
 unconvincing[1], 127
 uncover[1], 66
 uncovering[1], 75
 uncritical[2], 133

UND[2], *137, 288*
 Und[17], *50, 70, 101, 129, 146, 148–149, 163, 196, 219, 236, 244, 248*
 und[637], *2, 9, 12, 14, 18–21, 24–25, 27, 30–32, 34, 38, 40–44, 48–49, 51–53, 55–58, 61, 63–64, 67, 70, 72, 74–77, 79–81, 84–86, 89, 92, 95, 97, 100–104, 106–108, 110, 112–114, 116, 118, 120, 122–127, 129–130, 133–134, 136–139, 141–143, 146–149, 152–154, 157–158, 161–170, 172–175, 177–179, 185, 188, 190, 196, 198, 200–201, 205, 208, 211, 217–222, 228–229, 236–237, 239–242, 245–250, 252–254, 256–257, 259, 262–268, 270–302, 305–314*
 undamaged[1], *87*
 undated[1], *112*
 undecipherable[1], *181*
 undelivered[1], *298*
 Under[1], *211*
 under[34], *14, 36–37, 43–44, 55, 61, 69, 77–79, 93, 96–97, 114–115, 149, 204, 222, 245, 258, 270–272, 278, 293*
 underestimate[1], *233*
 undergoing[1], *62*
 undergraduate[1], *123*
 Underground[1], *178*
 underlined[1], *279*
 underlines[2], *45, 245*
 underling[1], *53*
 underlying[3], *53, 225, 240*
 underneath[1], *102*
 underpinning[1], *316*
 understand[30], *12–13, 17, 26, 29, 49, 75, 92, 104, 112, 120, 126, 128, 140–141, 150, 156, 158, 171, 183, 186, 192, 204, 207, 218, 242, 244, 260–261*
 Understandable[1], *186*
 understandable[8], *3, 29, 51, 92, 196, 245, 269*
 understandably[1], *8*
 understander[1], *154*
 Understanding[2], *198, 231*
 understanding[41], *3, 5, 8, 11–13, 19, 26, 43, 45, 54–55, 58, 66, 80, 88, 99, 104, 112, 120–121, 123, 135, 146–147, 171, 176, 188–190, 200, 215–216, 219, 233, 242, 261–262, 305*
 understands[4], *104, 146, 175*
 understood[25], *4, 9, 26, 47, 73, 86, 88, 96, 98, 103, 120, 122, 148, 188, 196–197, 217, 225, 240, 248*
 undertaking[2], *69, 231*
 undertook[1], *180*
 Underway[1], *262*
 underway[15], *101, 106, 145–146, 156, 179, 185, 207, 262*
 undisturbed[1], *113*
 une[1], *9*
 uneducated[1], *58*
 Unendlichkeit[1], *250*
 Unerbittlichkeit[1], *116*
 Unerfahrenen[1], *153*
 unergründliche[2], *58, 218*
 Unesco[1], *291*
 unfair[1], *4*
 unfathomably[2], *57, 217*
 unfehlbaren[1], *220*
 unfettered[1], *94*
 unfinishable[4], *100, 132, 188*
 unfinished[3], *100, 132, 188*
 unflattering[1], *26*
 unfold[2], *159, 239*
 unfolded[3], *2, 97, 176*
 unfolding[7], *24, 66, 76, 88, 141, 176–177*
 unfoldings[1], *153*
 unfolds[4], *53, 76, 169, 181*
 unforgettable[1], *39*
 Unfortunately[1], *179*
 unfortunately[2], *104, 175*
 Ungefragte[2], *158*
 ungehörte[1], *85*
 ungeschichtlich[1], *266*
 Ungeschicklichkeit[1], *153*
 Ungewöhnliches[1], *120*
 ungraspable[1], *64*
 ungrateful[2], *220, 230*
 unhaltbar[1], *51*
 Unhaltbarkeit[1], *235*
 Unheimi[1], *97*
 Unheimischen[2], *97*
 Unheimlichkeit[3], *97*
 unheimlichste[2], *98*
 unhistorically[1], *135*

unholy[1], 96
 unico[1], 144
 unification[2], 70, 94
 unifications[1], 160
 unified[1], 5
 unifies[1], 69
 unifying[2], 69–70
 unimportant[3], 16, 36, 167
 uninformed[1], 131
 Union[3], 109
 unique[22], 14, 17, 25, 28, 52, 67, 71, 78, 80, 87, 89, 96, 107, 129, 152, 154–155, 157, 176, 192, 204
 uniquely[1], 204
 uniqueness[1], 25
 unitary[1], 191
 United[3], 106, 131, 272
 united[2], 78, 214
 units[1], 155
 unity[14], 28, 64, 66, 99, 160, 185, 201, 246, 252, 264, 287
 univerisites[1], 273
 universal[2], 145, 198
 Universalität[1], 108
 universality[2], 108, 140
 universe[4], 7, 117, 123
 Universität[21], 46, 48, 217, 270–271, 279–282, 284, 287–288, 313
 Universitat[9], 274, 280–281, 287, 289
 Universitätsarchiv[1], 284
 Universitätsbibliothek[2], 272, 311
 Universitätsführer[1], 280
 Universiteit[2], 277–278
 universities[3], 15, 44, 120
 UNIVERSITY[1], 258
 University[65], 3, 13–14, 16, 21, 23–24, 35, 41–44, 46–48, 60, 62, 68, 71, 79, 101, 105, 115, 120–121, 123, 125, 129, 131, 146, 175, 190, 201–202, 212, 217, 254, 264, 267, 270–272, 276, 280, 282, 287–288, 290, 304, 311
 university[15], 3, 15, 29, 35, 46, 67, 130, 180, 254, 262, 284, 289
 Unknown[7], 284, 294, 299, 301
 unknown[24], 3, 11, 17, 36–37, 44, 74, 87, 147, 166, 185, 244–245, 255, 277–278, 284–285
 Unkraft[1], 118
 unleashed[2], 52, 197
 Unless[1], 99
 unless[5], 66, 139, 209, 225, 244
 Unlike[2], 17, 175
 unlike[4], 4, 68, 94, 177
 unlocked[2], 11, 29
 unmastered[1], 249
 unmistakably[1], 233
 unmittelbar[1], 179
 Unmittelbare[1], 251
 unnachlässig[2], 123, 131
 unnatural[1], 231
 unnecessary[1], 54
 unopened[1], 215
 unpacked[1], 106
 unpaid[1], 203
 unphilosophical[2], 85, 183
 unprethinkable[1], 69
 Unpublished[1], 121
 unpublished[10], 3, 12, 18, 25, 40, 112, 193, 203, 284
 unquestionable[2], 158
 unquestionableness[2], 158
 unquestioned[4], 92, 158
 unremittingly[1], 215
 unrest[2], 19
 unrestfulness[1], 19
 unrestrained[2], 232–233
 Unruh[1], 18
 Unruhe[1], 19
 uns[25], 43, 49, 70, 74, 81, 84, 98, 168–169, 179, 190, 218, 229, 237, 241, 267
 unsaid[1], 79
 unselected[1], 12
 unser[3], 81, 307–308
 Unserem[1], 59
 unserem[2], 281
 unseren[1], 164
 unserer[2], 77, 81
 unseres[1], 294
 unsettled[1], 83
 unshakable[1], 188
 Unsicherheit[2], 87, 120
 Unsinn[3], 136, 176

unsolvable[1], 46
 unspeakable[1], 9
 unspeculative[1], 194
 unstoppable[1], 201
 unsuccessful[1], 175
 unsuitability[4], 90, 173
 unsuitable[2], 90, 172
 unsurprisingly[1], 30
 unswerving[1], 67
 unten[1], 252
 untenability[1], 235
 untenable[2], 51, 224
 untenured[1], 78
 unter[5], 169, 174, 245, 265, 292
 Unteraufnahme[3], 256, 266, 293
 unterbringt[1], 141
 Untergang[4], 194, 256–257, 275
 untergängliche[1], 173
 unterlassen[1], 169
 unterrichtet[1], 190
 Unterscheidung[1], 173
 Unterschied[8], 166–167, 173, 245–246, 268
 Unterschiedes[3], 167
 unterschiedlichen[1], 276
 Unterschieds[4], 87, 173
 unterstellt[2], 174, 247
 unterstreicht[1], 245
 Untersuchung[1], 146
 Untersuchungen[4], 112, 116, 130, 141
 Unterwegs[14], 35, 59, 70, 85–86, 140,
 150, 265, 284–285, 288, 296
 unterwegs[3], 146
 Unterwerfung[1], 219
 unterzogen[1], 143
 unterzulegen[1], 248
 unthought[1], 72
 untied[1], 100
 Until[2], 200, 244
 until[28], 15, 24, 32–33, 35, 37, 44, 46, 48,
 55, 60, 71, 93, 106, 109, 124, 168–169,
 180, 183, 185, 214, 238, 241, 246, 254,
 270–271
 untimely[1], 64
 untranslatable[3], 71, 260
 Untranslatables[1], 29
 untranslated[1], 63
 Untrue[1], 242
 untrue[2], 242
 Unumgänglichkeit[1], 306
 unusual[3], 25, 120, 180
 unveiled[2], 103, 193
 unverändert[1], 283
 Unverborgenheit[3], 97, 199
 Unverhohlenheit[1], 199
 unvermeidliche[1], 153
 unvermerkt[1], 6
 Unvermögen[1], 142
 Unveröffentlicht[2], 87, 161
 Unveröffentlicher[2], 307, 309
 Unveröffentlichtes[17], 307–308
 Unvordenkliche[1], 70
 Unwiderlegbarkeit[1], 114
 unwillingness[1], 176
 unwritten[1], 22
 unzählige[1], 137
 Unzeitgemäßen[1], 32
 Unzeitgemäßer[1], 298
 unzureichend[1], 174
 Up[2], 79, 208
 up[139], 1–2, 4–5, 9–13, 17–18, 21, 23, 27,
 29, 31, 33, 35–37, 46, 48–54, 56, 59–60,
 63–64, 66, 69–70, 72, 74, 76, 78–79, 81,
 83, 86, 88–89, 91, 93, 95, 100–104,
 110–111, 114, 116–117, 119, 122–124,
 126–127, 130–132, 147, 150, 154–156,
 159, 165, 177, 181–182, 185, 188,
 190–193, 204, 208, 212, 214, 216–217,
 224–226, 232, 235, 237–238, 241–242,
 249, 261–262, 264–265, 269, 272, 316
 upbeat[1], 49
 Update[2], 17, 258
 update[2], 71, 107
 updating[1], 214
 upheaval[1], 58
 uplifting[3], 52, 76, 214
 upon[13], 7, 33, 45, 88, 92, 108, 135, 158,
 197, 212, 239, 283
 uprising[1], 164
 ups[1], 25
 upset[2], 106, 207
 upsets[1], 106
 upshifting[1], 27
 upside[6], 30, 46, 188, 219, 230

upward[1], 19
 Ur[1], 75
 Urania[1], 17
 urbanization[1], 53
 Urbino[1], 244
 Urfassung[2], 21, 277
 Urge[1], 211
 Urged[1], 114
 urgency[3], 97, 100, 152
 urgent[2], 45, 133
 Urgrossvaters[1], 16
 Urgroßvaters[1], 291
 Ursprung[6], 146, 281, 305–306
 ursprünglicher[1], 184
 Ursula[7], 16, 293, 301
 Urteil[3], 123, 274
 Urteile[1], 144
 Urteilstkraft[2], 271
 us[231], 2, 5–9, 12–13, 19, 24–25, 29–32,
 35–37, 40, 43, 49, 52–57, 61, 63, 66–71,
 73–81, 83–85, 87, 89–91, 93–97, 99–100,
 103–106, 112, 114, 120, 123, 125, 127,
 131, 135–136, 147, 149–150, 154,
 163–164, 168–169, 171, 175–177,
 179–186, 188, 190, 192–193, 198,
 202–205, 208–209, 214–215, 218, 220,
 222, 227–230, 232, 236–237, 241, 244,
 259–263, 267–269, 283
 USA[10], 11, 33, 43, 45, 49, 95, 106, 182,
 272
 usage[2], 75, 134
 usages[2], 181, 264
 USD[1], 15
 use[57], 13–14, 19, 27, 36, 38, 40, 49, 53,
 59, 61, 69, 71, 73, 75–77, 79, 84–85, 87,
 89, 99, 102, 124, 127, 129, 148, 152,
 155, 159, 163, 165, 169, 176, 204, 208,
 214, 216, 222, 225, 236, 244, 260
 used[62], 9–10, 13, 15, 19, 21, 27, 35–37,
 40, 47, 49, 54–56, 59, 68, 70–71, 79, 81,
 100, 110–111, 114, 119, 128, 134, 139,
 148, 150, 158, 168, 175–176, 181, 184,
 192, 199, 206, 212, 220, 225, 237, 247,
 273, 288, 316
 useful[5], 128, 190, 194, 220
 useless[1], 54
 uses[30], 21, 58–59, 63, 70, 73, 76, 80–81,
 85, 94, 99, 103, 112–113, 131, 152, 160,

176, 179, 184, 192–193, 201, 204, 212,
 245
 using[12], 27, 60, 62, 74, 90, 150, 155, 160,
 163, 169, 192
 usual[4], 129, 141, 189, 248
 Usually[1], 106
 usually[3], 46, 51, 224
 usw[1], 219
 utmost[2], 34, 66
 utopia[3], 103, 116, 136
 utopian[1], 116
 Utopie[2], 136, 268
 utramque[2], 62, 262
 utterances[1], 30
 utterly[1], 54
 uttermost[1], 222

V

VA[8], 284–286
 vā[1], 61
 vacation[1], 45
 vacillation[1], 206
 vacuousness[3], 33, 64, 91
 vagabond[1], 238
 Vagenas[1], 316
 vainglorious[2], 55, 147
 valid[1], 134
 validation[1], 231
 Valley[1], 61
 valley[1], 275
 Valor[1], 68
 valuable[4], 4, 124, 220, 233
 valuation[1], 236
 Value[1], 111
 value[11], 76, 110–111, 150, 152, 225, 228,
 231, 233, 236
 valuelessness[2], 235–236
 Values[2], 111, 236
 values[48], 71, 110–111, 137, 156, 188,
 218, 223, 229, 231, 233, 235–236
 valueslnessness[1], 111
 Van[1], 4

van[8], *23, 103, 275–276, 290, 303, 310*
 vanity[1], *78*
 vantage[1], *200*
 var[1], *266*
 Variation[2], *165, 273*
 Variationen[1], *165*
 Variations[1], *4*
 varies[1], *13*
 variety[2], *180, 206*
 various[25], *4–5, 10, 18, 20, 30, 42, 54, 114, 118, 129, 133–134, 139, 144, 162, 181–182, 198, 212, 244, 260, 272, 293*
 Vasa[1], *315*
 vast[17], *2–4, 10, 19, 21, 23, 28, 30, 68, 82, 116, 168, 181, 186, 190*
 vastly[5], *8, 47, 85, 141, 175*
 vastness[2], *16, 167*
 Vattimo[1], *224*
 vault[1], *12*
 ve[2], *16, 50*
 Vedanta[2], *220, 230*
 Veg[1], *162*
 veil[1], *26*
 veiled[3], *145, 189, 196*
 Vemehmenkonnens[1], *289*
 veneration[1], *56*
 Venia[1], *270*
 venia[1], *274*
 venture[1], *156*
 ventured[2], *140, 200*
 Ver[2], *171, 257*
 ver[2], *190, 266*
 verändern[2], *118, 261*
 veranlasste[1], *143*
 veranstaltet[1], *275*
 veranstalteten[1], *305*
 Verantwortlichkeit[1], *227*
 verb[1], *107*
 verba[1], *2*
 verbatim[1], *36*
 Verbergung[2], *246–247*
 verborgen[1], *245*
 verborgenen[1], *163*
 Verborgenheit[1], *39*
 verbreitet[1], *143*
 verbum[1], *2*
 verdanken[1], *266*
 Verden[3], *315*
 verdeutlichen[1], *266*
 veredicto[1], *176*
 verehrenden[1], *104*
 Verehrung[1], *138*
 vereignet[1], *166*
 Verein[3], *274*
 Vereinigung[2], *275, 277*
 Vereinzelt[1], *9*
 Vererbung[1], *219*
 Verfahrensweisen[2], *86*
 verfallen[1], *59*
 verfänglich[1], *174*
 Verfasser[11], *120, 255–257, 266, 271*
 Verfassung[2], *250, 287*
 verflatternde[1], *221*
 Vergangenes[1], *112*
 verge[1], *232*
 Vergessenheit[4], *167, 247, 283*
 Vergleich[1], *245*
 Vergleichung[1], *120*
 Vergote[2], *48, 287*
 verhalten[1], *166*
 Verhältnis[2], *84, 268*
 Verhältnis[1], *290*
 verhindern[1], *84*
 verhüllt[1], *196*
 Veritas[1], *44*
 veritas[2], *258*
 verkleinerlich[1], *57*
 verkünden[1], *264*
 verkündet[1], *84*
 Verlag[16], *8, 127, 138–139, 167, 254, 261, 275, 296, 301–302, 310, 314*
 Verlagsanstalt[1], *285*
 Verlaine[1], *238*
 verlangt[3], *113, 126, 141*
 Verlassenheit[1], *167*
 Verlauf[1], *274*
 Verlegenheit[1], *148*
 Verleihung[3], *289, 313*
 Verlesung[2], *152, 291*
 verlöre[1], *44*
 Verlorener[1], *18*
 Verlust[1], *292*

Vermächtn[2], *93, 268*
 Vermächtnis[26], *26, 71, 86–87, 91–92, 161, 180, 185, 259, 265, 268, 307*
 Vermachtnis[1], *87*
 vermag[2], *156, 186*
 vermeide[1], *247*
 Vermerk[1], *279*
 Vermerken[1], *295*
 vermieden[2], *71, 109*
 Vermögen[6], *219*
 Vermutens[2], *85, 124*
 vermutete[2], *85, 162*
 Verneinung[1], *196*
 Verneinungen[1], *235*
 Vernunft[16], *44–45, 56, 80, 89, 183, 194, 203–204, 212, 223, 252, 277, 297*
 Vernunfterkennnisse[1], *203*
 Vernunftglaube[1], *212*
 Verödung[1], *201*
 veroffentlicht[1], *285*
 veröffentlicht[6], *291, 301–302*
 Veröffentlichung[2], *266, 314*
 Veröffentlichungen[7], *59, 77, 92, 143, 245, 291, 299*
 Verrechenbare[1], *236*
 Verrücktes[4], *74*
 verrufen[1], *220*
 versa[1], *253*
 versagen[2], *87, 120*
 versammelt[1], *268*
 verschieden[3], *118, 144, 261*
 verschiedene[1], *86*
 verschiedenen[1], *266*
 Verschiedenes[11], *255–257, 266, 293*
 verschleiert[1], *221*
 verschweigt[1], *75*
 verschwinden[1], *76*
 verschwommene[1], *221*
 Verse[2], *12, 91*
 verse[2], *188, 262*
 Verses[1], *61*
 Version[4], *278*
 version[55], *2, 5, 21, 37, 41, 48–49, 55, 71, 75, 93, 99–100, 102, 104, 110, 128, 139, 141, 151, 153–154, 163, 177, 180, 211–213, 222, 225, 232, 258, 264, 276–279, 281, 284, 286–287, 293*
 versions[10], *5, 19, 21, 56, 114, 277, 279, 281*
 Verstand[1], *130*
 verstand[2], *76, 120*
 Verstande[1], *80*
 verständlich[1], *245*
 verstärkt[1], *147*
 versteckte[2], *95, 236*
 verstehen[6], *75, 120, 126, 141, 148, 247*
 versteift[1], *174*
 Verstoßung[1], *236*
 Versuch[5], *108, 169, 174, 245, 271*
 versuche[2], *220, 265*
 Versuchen[1], *174*
 Versuches[1], *108*
 versucht[2], *160, 170*
 versuchte[2], *99, 201*
 Versuchten[1], *112*
 versuchten[1], *85*
 Versus[2], *5, 156*
 versus[12], *7, 11, 14, 44, 59, 79, 104, 111, 119, 222*
 verträgt[1], *52*
 Vertrauen[1], *206*
 vertraut[1], *148*
 vertraute[1], *77*
 vertreten[1], *107*
 verunglückten[1], *268*
 verursachende[1], *253*
 verurtheilen[1], *235*
 Verurtheilungen[1], *235*
 verwahrt[1], *246*
 Verwandlung[1], *121*
 Verwandten[1], *282*
 Verweigerung[1], *246*
 verwendet[1], *245*
 verwindet[1], *173*
 Verwindung[8], *89–91, 173–174, 268*
 verwirklichen[1], *264*
 verwundenen[1], *264*
 Verwüstung[2], *95, 169*
 very[67], *3–4, 10, 12, 14, 19, 32, 40, 44, 49, 56, 59, 65, 68, 74, 83–84, 93–95, 99, 101, 103, 107–108, 114, 119, 125, 134–135, 144, 147, 149, 153, 155, 157, 168–169, 178–179, 182, 194–196, 198, 203–204, 206–207, 215–216, 242, 265*

verzichte[1], 126
 verzichten[1], 108
 vessel[2], 15, 179
 Vetter[1], 310
 Vezin[1], 3
 Vgl[2], 92, 253
 vgl[4], 163, 196, 253, 268
 VI[28], 18, 27, 34, 43, 45, 69, 74, 78, 107,
 111, 114, 130, 140, 153, 159, 166, 181,
 183, 195, 261–262, 264, 299–300
 via[2], 63, 240
 vice[1], 253
 vicious[1], 233
 vicissitudes[2], 32, 54
 victor[1], 45
 victory[1], 164
 video[2], 118, 168
 videos[3], 16, 39, 70
 Vidyanandi[1], 181
 viel[1], 143
 viele[3], 85, 108, 162
 vielen[1], 169
 vielfach[2], 81, 147
 Vielgestaltigkeit[2], 58, 218
 Vielleicht[1], 181
 vielleicht[6], 49, 112, 136, 169, 179
 Vielmehr[2], 81, 84
 vielmehr[2], 252, 264
 Vielzahl[1], 259
 Vienna[5], 224, 272, 288
 Vier[13], 12, 86, 166–167, 169, 283, 300
 Vieren[1], 167
 Viermal[1], 167
 Vierter[1], 9
 Vierung[1], 257
 Vietta[9], 15, 19, 154–155
 View[1], 125
 view[48], 5, 51, 53–54, 57, 79, 83, 110,
 112, 120, 126, 134–135, 147–148, 183,
 196, 198, 204–205, 207–209, 212–213,
 217, 221, 223, 226, 228, 230–231, 246,
 252
 viewing[1], 110
 viewpoint[3], 110–111, 195
 viewpoints[2], 78, 181
 Views[1], 133
 views[16], 34, 51–52, 57, 119, 129,
 133–135, 185, 207, 212, 224
 Vigiliae[4], 1, 161, 177, 300
 vignettes[1], 163
 vigorously[1], 128
 VII[13], 28, 78, 85, 88, 159, 167, 175, 254,
 282, 300
 VIII[4], 80, 138–139
 Viktor[2], 17, 52
 Viktoria[2], 48, 292
 vile[1], 43
 village[1], 168
 villain[1], 113
 violated[1], 161
 violence[5], 59, 79, 260
 violent[1], 113
 VIPs[1], 62
 virtue[5], 85, 88, 158, 220, 228
 virtues[1], 220
 virulence[1], 55
 Vis[1], 199
 vis[2], 249
 visible[4], 57, 202, 206, 217
 vision[7], 4–5, 45, 47, 55, 179
 visit[1], 96
 visited[3], 39, 109, 287
 visiting[1], 37
 visitor[2], 104, 270
 visitors[1], 82
 visits[1], 48
 visual[1], 61
 vital[1], 83
 vitality[1], 25
 VITAM[1], 238
 Vittorio[10], 8–9, 73, 167, 296, 302
 Vivaldi[2], 15
 viz[4], 29, 96, 149, 269
 Vlastos[1], 62
 VII[1], 104
 Vo[1], 55
 vocabulary[1], 258
 Vocation[1], 43
 Vogel[1], 316
 Vogelflug[1], 257
 Vogelsang[2], 315
 Vogt[1], 33
 Voice[1], 310

voice[7], 8, 45, 114, 223, 261, 264, 267
 voiced[1], 115
 voices[2], 29, 39
 void[3], 3, 76, 246
 Vol[30], 110, 148, 293, 305–306, 311
 vol[4], 73, 139, 165, 310
 Volkelt[2], 33
 Volkmann[1], 285
 Volksblatt[8], 273–274
 Volksstrum[1], 67
 Volkssturm[1], 15
 Vollendet[1], 120
 vollendet[1], 236
 vollendete[1], 236
 Vollendung[4], 49, 89, 196, 253
 völlig[1], 168
 volligen[1], 148
 völlig[2], 156, 158
 Vollkommenheit[1], 226
 Vollpensionierung[1], 284
 vollständig[1], 164
 vollziehen[1], 236
 vollzieht[2], 136, 248
 vollzogen[5], 34, 63, 163, 247
 Vollzug[1], 84
 Voltaire[1], 1
 VOLUME[1], 231
 Volume[10], 21, 33, 44–45, 201, 221, 296, 312
 volume[34], 3, 10–13, 18–21, 23, 25–26, 38, 40, 43, 68, 102, 109, 121, 140–141, 145–146, 168, 171, 177, 217, 271, 273, 288
 Volumes[1], 296
 volumes[33], 2, 9, 11–12, 19–21, 23, 31–32, 35–36, 38, 52, 73–74, 114–115, 123, 214, 217, 261, 274, 277–278, 301
 Vom[79], 3, 13, 23, 30–31, 53, 58, 69, 76, 91, 97, 99–101, 117, 120, 136–137, 143, 147, 149, 151–152, 154–155, 157, 159–163, 171, 175, 178–180, 184–185, 195, 200–201, 218, 232–233, 236, 249, 264, 276, 278–279, 281, 297–299, 306, 312
 vom[59], 23, 34, 39, 42, 61, 72, 81, 91, 121, 146, 150, 173–174, 202, 219, 221, 230, 235, 237, 241, 245–247, 252, 263, 265–266, 274–276, 279–280, 285, 287, 290, 292, 296, 298, 306, 308
 VON[9], 255–257, 266, 271, 276
 Von[12], 23, 39, 41, 206, 282–283, 285–286, 289, 297, 313
 von[177], 3, 7, 9, 12–13, 17–18, 32–35, 39, 44, 46, 52–53, 64, 73–74, 81, 84, 89, 95, 104–105, 107, 112–113, 115–116, 118, 134, 136, 138–139, 141–144, 147, 150, 152, 156, 163–168, 173–174, 181, 185, 188, 198, 206–207, 211, 218, 229, 237, 241, 244–248, 252, 257, 262, 264, 266–267, 270–271, 273, 275–276, 281–285, 289–293, 297–298, 301–304, 306, 311, 314, 316
 Vor[1], 40
 vor[27], 27, 57, 74, 76, 86, 98, 104, 130, 167, 179, 201, 246, 265, 268, 274, 277–278, 280, 282, 285–286
 Vorarbeit[1], 278
 Vorarbeiten[4], 31, 143, 154, 306
 Voraus[1], 92
 Vorausge[1], 40
 vorausgegangen[1], 104
 Vorausgesetzt[1], 92
 Voraussetzungen[1], 92
 vorbei[2], 69, 249
 Vorbemerkung[3], 270, 282, 285
 Vorbemerkungen[1], 289
 vorbereitend[1], 166
 Vorbereitung[3], 119, 163, 165
 voreilig[1], 222
 Vorenthalt[3], 91, 246, 268
 vorenthaltenes[1], 246
 Vorfahren[1], 77
 Vorgehen[2], 92, 141
 vorgelegt[1], 270
 Vorgeschichte[2], 248
 vorgesehen[5], 20, 255–256, 279
 vorgesetzt[1], 116
 Vorgestelltheit[1], 174
 vorgetragen[1], 91
 vorgezeigt[1], 76
 vorhanden[1], 252
 Vorher[1], 43
 vorher[1], 136
 vorhergeht[1], 80

vorigen[1], 219
Vorläufige[1], 108
vorläufiger[1], 108
Vorläufiges[16], 26, 40, 43, 74–75, 81, 115,
141, 177, 300
Vorlesung[16], 58, 67, 84, 267, 279, 293,
306, 311
Vorlesungen[11], 21–22, 58, 76, 85, 106,
130, 136, 218, 311
vorliegende[1], 146
vorliegt[1], 19
Vormacht[1], 220
vornehmlich[1], 80
Vorrede[2], 48, 277
Vorriss[1], 208
Vorsokratiker[4], 130, 242, 247, 288
Vorsokratikern[1], 247
Vorspiel[1], 165
Vorstellung[2], 34, 240
Vorstellungen[1], 226
Vortrag[145], 43, 123, 165, 167, 244–245,
266, 273–293, 307, 309, 313–314
Vorträge[89], 22, 61, 67, 81, 83–85,
101–102, 113, 123–124, 165, 168, 239,
248, 256, 273–279, 281–292, 294, 296,
299
Vorträgen[1], 305
Vortrages[2], 108
Vortrags[8], 51, 76, 266, 279, 281–282,
289–290
Vortragsfassung[2], 279
Vortragsnachschrift[1], 276
vorübend[1], 80
Vorurteil[4], 136
Vorurteile[1], 234
Vorurteilen[1], 136
Vorurteilslosigkeit[1], 136
vorwärts[2], 70
Vorwärtsskippung[1], 90
Vorwort[2], 52, 110
vorzeitige[2], 87, 120
vorzulegen[2], 144
votaries[2], 66, 180
vote[1], 188
voulait[1], 9
Vrije[2], 277–278
vs[5], 26, 29, 212, 251, 262

Vsg[1], 51
vulnerable[1], 128

W

wach[1], 190
wachsen[2], 237, 241
Wacht[1], 109
wacky[1], 74
wagen[5], 58, 81, 169, 218, 267
wagenden[1], 80
Wagner[5], 8, 27, 82, 121
wagt[1], 92
Wahre[1], 100
wahre[2], 116, 225
während[2], 170, 247
wahrhaft[3], 120, 219, 230
Wahrhaftigkeit[1], 235
Wahrheit[59], 44, 56, 58, 69, 79, 102,
113–114, 116, 134, 136–137, 143, 147,
158, 166, 173–174, 181, 196, 201, 249,
252–253, 267–268, 271, 276, 278–279,
282, 297, 305
Wahrheiten[1], 84
wahrheitlosen[1], 236
Wahrheitserfahrung[1], 163
Wahrheitsfrage[1], 158
Wahrheitsvortrag[1], 247
Wahrsein[2], 275
wahrt[1], 289
Wait[1], 272
wait[8], 11, 17, 19, 159, 164, 207
Waiting[1], 164
waiting[11], 11, 31, 42, 74, 87, 140, 226,
228
wake[1], 316
waking[1], 62
Walchen[1], 284
Wäldchen[2], 18
walk[8], 45, 86, 101, 113, 116, 169, 236
walked[1], 141
walking[2], 45, 113
walks[1], 117

walkway[2], 50, 113
 Wall[1], 95
 Walls[2], 12, 91
 Walt[2], 188, 261
 waltenden[1], 147
 Walter[38], 9–10, 29, 37, 41, 48, 73, 83,
 119, 128–129, 140, 167, 260, 268–271,
 276, 278, 285, 287, 291–292, 302–303
 wandelnden[3], 86, 150, 265
 wander[2], 220, 230
 wandering[2], 113, 180
 Wanderung[1], 75
 want[36], 5, 9, 17, 39, 51–52, 59, 69, 71,
 73–74, 76, 78–79, 91–92, 113, 122,
 136–137, 141, 176, 180, 185, 198, 224,
 233–234, 259–261
 wanted[28], 32, 37, 49, 51, 69, 73, 76, 89,
 114, 116, 121, 126–128, 157, 180, 184,
 194, 200, 205, 212–213, 223, 232, 245
 wanting[2], 74, 260
 wants[19], 31, 34, 39, 49, 53, 55–57, 94,
 111, 156, 179, 186, 221, 232
 War[34], 12, 15, 18, 31–33, 35–36, 44, 46,
 48, 52, 68, 82, 94–95, 105–106, 117,
 130, 163–164, 180, 182
 war[17], 18, 59, 73, 76, 108, 116–117, 141,
 158, 164, 167, 219, 227, 242, 290
 warden[4], 51, 65, 177, 248
 wäre[2], 179, 222
 ware[1], 264
 waren[2], 77, 81
 warfare[1], 18
 warmer[1], 242
 warning[1], 35
 warp[1], 185
 Warren[1], 11
 wars[1], 106
 Warten[1], 164
 Wartenden[1], 164
 Warum[3], 174, 228, 281
 warum[1], 226
 Was[44], 16, 18–19, 32, 40, 48, 58, 68, 75,
 77, 85, 89, 92, 94, 104, 114, 120,
 168–169, 173–174, 177, 212, 218, 223,
 229, 248, 259, 268, 277, 285–286, 296,
 305, 313, 316
 was[789], 2–3, 7–19, 21–40, 42–49, 53–57,
 59–63, 66–71, 73–76, 78, 80, 87, 89–101,
 103–118, 120–121, 123–135, 137–145,
 147–149, 151, 153–156, 158–170,
 173–178, 180–182, 184–187, 190, 194,
 196–198, 200–201, 203–209, 211–238,
 241–244, 246, 248, 254, 260–263, 268,
 270–272, 274–277, 279, 281–286,
 288–294, 315–316
 Wasenweiler[1], 15
 Wasserfallsteig[1], 168
 wasteland[1], 64
 Watch[1], 109
 watch[9], 51, 106, 168
 watching[1], 60
 watchword[1], 133
 water[4], 106, 155, 227
 watered[1], 40
 waterfall[1], 168
 waters[1], 111
 Watts[1], 49
 wave[2], 2, 88
 wavering[1], 206
 Waxmann[2], 314
 Way[6], 61, 85–86, 113, 145, 291
 way[209], 5, 13–14, 19, 24–25, 29–32, 37,
 40, 43, 47, 51–55, 57, 60, 68–70, 72, 74,
 76–79, 81, 83–89, 91, 94–95, 97–98,
 100–104, 106, 109, 111, 113, 117, 119,
 124, 128–130, 132–134, 138–140,
 145–149, 153–154, 157–159, 161, 165,
 169–170, 172, 175–176, 178–179, 181,
 184–186, 189, 192–193, 195–198, 201,
 207–209, 217, 220–223, 226, 232,
 239–240, 242, 245, 249–250, 258, 262,
 265, 269, 294
 Wayfield[1], 91
 Wayne[6], 56, 225, 227–229
 Ways[5], 74, 86, 102, 192, 275
 ways[38], 8, 45, 56, 58, 62, 68, 70–71, 77,
 84, 86, 101, 104, 111–113, 118, 126,
 129, 133, 135, 145, 149, 153, 162, 185,
 194, 226, 228, 233, 258, 260–262, 264
 Wderhall[1], 85
 WDR[2], 314
 We[143], 2–5, 8, 10–12, 14–15, 19, 21,
 26–27, 32, 35–37, 40, 42, 49, 54, 57,
 63–64, 67–71, 74–79, 83, 90, 97, 101,
 104–105, 107, 114–115, 123, 128, 130,

136, 139, 145–146, 148, 151–152, 154,
 156–158, 160–161, 163–164, 169, 175,
 180, 182–183, 185–186, 194, 197–198,
 202, 209, 217, 220, 227, 235–236, 240,
 252, 259, 261, 263, 316
 we[450], 2–11, 13–19, 21–36, 38–39, 42,
 45–49, 52–54, 56–57, 59–60, 63–64,
 66–71, 73–81, 83–86, 88–89, 93–100,
 103, 105–107, 109–112, 115–120,
 122–123, 128–129, 131, 135–136, 138,
 140–141, 145–161, 164–166, 168–172,
 174–175, 177–186, 188–190, 192–194,
 196–198, 200, 202–205, 207–209, 211,
 214–215, 218, 224–227, 229, 231, 233,
 235–236, 240, 244, 258–262, 269, 272,
 283, 289, 301
 weak[1], 79
 weakened[1], 194
 Weakness[1], 119
 weakness[2], 116, 118
 wealth[1], 103
 wears[1], 15
 weather[1], 124
 weatherman[1], 68
 weaving[4], 12, 30, 80, 185
 web[4], 13, 68, 232, 315
 Weber[3], 43, 46, 133
 webs[1], 229
 website[1], 244
 Wechselseitige[1], 288
 wedding[7], 16, 276, 290, 292–293
 weder[3], 27, 84, 200
 Wednesday[2], 275, 289
 week[3], 205, 275, 288
 weeks[7], 17, 47, 105, 124, 131, 224
 weft[1], 185
 Weg[31], 54, 70, 85, 87, 94, 101, 108, 113,
 145–146, 148–149, 162, 179, 203, 288,
 291
 weg[2], 87, 141
 Wege[11], 43, 74, 84, 86, 102, 108, 113,
 262, 275
 Weges[1], 74
 Wegfeld[6], 86–87, 91, 150, 185, 265
 weggeht[1], 164
 Wegkreuzung[1], 42
 Wegmarken[19], 21, 67–68, 71–72, 83, 86,
 109, 156, 186, 190, 268, 276–279, 290,
 296
 wegt[1], 113
 wägung[1], 85
 Wehr[1], 97
 weige[1], 92
 weight[2], 50, 71
 Weil[1], 148
 weil[8], 112, 146, 173–174, 247, 252
 weirdest[1], 98
 Weise[4], 221, 245, 266, 268
 Weisen[1], 86
 Weisgerber[1], 127
 Weiss[7], 37–38, 121, 139, 304, 311
 weiss[2], 144
 weit[7], 49, 140, 169, 179, 245
 Weite[3], 27, 104, 257
 weiter[5], 112, 122, 141, 219, 230
 Weitere[4], 255, 257, 266, 286
 weiteren[1], 283
 weiterer[1], 144
 weitergekommen[1], 112
 weiterzuzwingen[1], 99
 weiteste[2], 218, 229
 weitesten[1], 104
 weitgehend[1], 141
 Weizsäcker[6], 52, 292, 304
 weiß[1], 112
 welche[5], 51, 57, 80, 120, 266
 welchem[2], 85, 124
 welchen[1], 220
 welcher[5], 77, 116, 136, 219, 236
 Welches[1], 205
 welches[2], 104, 167
 Welcome[1], 262
 Well[3], 11, 95, 110
 well[67], 4, 12, 14, 18, 20–21, 23, 29, 32,
 34–36, 39–40, 44, 54–55, 61, 79, 82, 85,
 103, 105–106, 109, 114, 118–120, 126,
 129, 144, 146–147, 150, 154, 159, 175,
 182, 189–190, 200, 204, 206, 215–216,
 221, 244, 249, 259–260, 262, 282, 301
 Wellingsbüttel[5], 292
 Wells[2], 23, 62
 Welt[25], 12, 19, 42, 48, 77, 81, 86, 97,
 118, 137, 166–167, 169, 219, 225, 227,
 240, 261, 292, 297, 306
 Weltalter[3], 63, 220, 289

WELTANSCHAUUNG[1], 137
 Weltanschauung[11], 84, 104, 134, 137, 196, 276, 281
 Weltanschauungen[2], 133–134
 Weltanschauungslehre[1], 133
 Weltanschauungsproblem[1], 305
 Weltbegriff[1], 137
 Weltbild[2], 133, 228
 Weltbildes[5], 37, 157, 282
 Welte[8], 42, 285, 293, 301, 311
 Welten[1], 81
 Weltschmerz[1], 33
 Weltsymbol[1], 48
 wench[1], 227
 Wendung[3], 27, 90, 246
 wenig[5], 49, 84, 169, 179
 Wenige[1], 141
 wenige[1], 74
 wenigsten[1], 190
 Weninger[1], 15
 Wenn[6], 108, 143, 173, 236, 245, 266
 wenn[16], 92, 99, 108, 120, 141, 147–148, 164, 167, 173, 190, 201, 235, 263–264, 282
 wengleich[2], 147, 196
 went[12], 9, 30, 35, 45, 62, 114, 159, 218, 224, 230–231, 271
 Wer[5], 51, 63, 75, 165, 286
 wer[4], 34, 148–149, 219
 Werde[1], 18
 werde[1], 108
 werden[32], 52, 71, 75, 81, 84, 87, 104, 109, 113, 120, 138, 141–142, 146, 148, 163–164, 173–174, 179, 187, 190, 201, 220, 236, 246, 268
 were[189], 2, 9–16, 18–22, 24–26, 28, 30, 32–39, 42–49, 53, 59–60, 62, 69–71, 74, 77, 79, 81, 86, 95–96, 99–100, 103–106, 111, 113–114, 118–119, 121, 123, 126, 128, 131, 139–141, 145, 147, 151, 165, 171, 179–180, 183–184, 191, 196–197, 207, 212, 214–216, 221, 224, 227, 229, 232, 242, 248, 254, 265, 279, 282–283, 285–288, 291, 303
 werfen[1], 108
 Werk[3], 126, 275, 310
 Werke[14], 44, 74, 86, 88, 110, 144, 193, 214, 216, 250, 254, 262
 werke[3], 24, 126, 153
 Werkes[3], 85, 124
 Werkstatt[1], 108
 Werkstattaufzeichnungen[2], 19, 53
 Werner[4], 52, 272, 304
 Werte[4], 111, 236
 Werten[1], 236
 werth[1], 226
 Werthe[3], 218, 229, 235
 Wertheim[1], 43
 Werthen[1], 235
 Werthlosigkeit[2], 235
 Werthungen[1], 235
 Werthurtheile[1], 235
 Wesen[51], 13, 21, 37, 51, 58, 100–101, 112, 116, 120, 136–137, 143, 149, 155, 158, 167, 173, 185, 253, 264, 271, 275–276, 278–279, 281, 288, 297, 299, 305, 307–308
 wesenhafte[3], 27, 85, 124
 Wesens[4], 163, 167, 173, 268
 Wesensbereich[2], 160
 Wesensgestalt[1], 69
 Wesensselbigkeit[1], 95
 wesentlich[4], 63, 174, 196, 219
 Wesentliche[1], 112
 wesentliche[4], 158, 160, 245
 Wesentlichen[2], 51, 158
 Wesentliches[1], 69
 wesentliches[3], 66, 185, 263
 weshalb[1], 108
 Wesselburen[2], 289
 West[5], 32, 117, 189, 223
 west[3], 45, 168, 266
 Westdeutsche[1], 314
 Western[33], 31, 33, 49, 54, 56, 80–81, 97, 102, 117, 150, 155, 189, 196, 201, 214–215, 218, 221, 232–233, 235, 240, 249, 251, 253, 263
 western[64], 5, 7, 31–32, 46, 52–54, 56–58, 65, 69–71, 76, 79–81, 89, 99, 102, 109, 113, 116, 121–122, 128, 183–184, 189–190, 192–194, 196, 198, 214, 217–218, 222–223, 232, 236, 240
 Westerner[1], 61
 Wesung[1], 173

WF[1], 194
 What[157], 3, 6–8, 11, 14–15, 19–21, 27, 29, 35, 40, 42, 45–46, 53, 58, 63, 66–69, 71, 75–77, 79–80, 83, 85, 88–89, 91–92, 94, 99, 101–102, 104, 106, 109–112, 117, 120–123, 126–130, 132, 145–147, 155–157, 160, 162, 169, 171–172, 175–177, 183, 185–186, 188–189, 192–193, 195, 197, 203, 205, 212, 218, 220–221, 223–224, 226, 228–229, 231, 242, 248–249, 251, 261–262, 277, 285, 316
 what[239], 2–3, 5, 7–9, 11, 15–16, 18, 20–21, 24–25, 27, 29–31, 34–37, 39, 41, 44, 49, 54, 56, 58–61, 63–64, 66–69, 71, 74–77, 79–81, 83, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 102, 105–106, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116–117, 119–121, 123–124, 126–131, 134, 136, 141, 148–150, 152, 154–160, 163, 165, 172, 174, 176–177, 181, 183, 186, 188–190, 193, 195–199, 201–202, 214–216, 218, 221, 227–230, 234–236, 239, 244, 248–249, 251, 259–264, 269, 281, 285
 whatever[5], 68, 85, 124, 148, 239
 whatsoever[1], 117
 wheel[1], 25
 wheeling[1], 4
 wheels[3], 76–77, 220
 When[19], 9, 21–22, 35, 37, 61, 73, 80, 98, 108, 115, 156, 197, 202, 206, 236, 315
 when[82], 2, 7, 9–10, 14–15, 21, 23, 25, 27, 37, 39–40, 42, 58, 60, 62, 68, 71, 78, 80, 83, 88–89, 95–96, 103, 106, 117, 119–120, 124, 129, 131, 134, 139, 141, 148, 157, 169, 180, 188, 194, 204, 215, 218, 221, 225, 228–230, 236, 238, 245–246, 251, 260, 263, 270–271, 277, 284, 287, 289, 316
 whence[4], 90, 172, 174
 Whenever[1], 189
 Where[20], 7, 43, 60–61, 75, 77, 101, 112, 140, 145–146, 155, 168–169, 174, 200, 202
 where[79], 9, 11–13, 16–17, 19, 26, 29, 37, 40, 53–54, 59, 73–74, 78, 81, 83, 89–90, 92, 94–95, 98–100, 104, 106, 110, 115, 117, 124, 128–129, 134–135, 145–146, 152, 158, 163, 166, 169, 172, 176, 181, 189–190, 195–196, 201, 203–204, 206–208, 211, 214, 221, 234, 242, 249, 259–260, 262, 271, 277, 284, 286, 294
 whereabouts[1], 294
 Whereas[3], 25, 49, 250
 whereas[5], 36, 45, 59–60, 247
 whereby[3], 96, 173, 195
 wherein[3], 134–135, 153
 Whether[8], 12, 18, 20, 40, 145–146, 168, 215
 whether[20], 31, 38, 63, 77, 79, 81, 154, 168, 175, 193, 211, 248, 261, 272
 Which[5], 30, 78, 113, 197, 283
 which[344], 2–4, 7–10, 12–13, 17, 23–30, 32, 34, 36–38, 40, 42, 44, 46–47, 49, 51–52, 54–56, 58, 60, 62, 66–69, 71–72, 76, 78–81, 83–90, 92, 97, 99–104, 109, 115–116, 120–122, 124–126, 128–131, 133–140, 143–159, 161, 163–164, 166–169, 172–175, 178, 180–181, 184, 188, 190–207, 209, 211–212, 215–217, 219–221, 224–226, 228–231, 233–242, 245–246, 251, 254, 258, 262, 265, 271, 274–275, 284, 286–287, 289, 294
 While[3], 32, 107, 176
 while[16], 15, 42, 44–45, 53, 59, 88, 100, 130–131, 170, 206, 211, 238, 260
 whipped[1], 212
 whipping[1], 33
 white[1], 129
 Whitehead[3], 88, 102, 232
 whither[3], 90, 172, 174
 Whitman[2], 188, 261
 Whitsun[1], 286
 Who[10], 3, 28, 34, 36, 40, 43, 104, 179, 221, 316
 who[133], 3, 8–9, 19, 22–23, 25–26, 28, 31–32, 34–36, 38–40, 42–43, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 62–64, 69, 72, 75–78, 80, 84, 88, 93, 98, 105–107, 110, 113–115, 117–123, 128–131, 134–135, 141, 144, 148, 151, 159, 164, 169, 179–181, 189–190, 192, 195–197, 200, 202–203, 206–207, 209, 217–218, 224, 226–228, 230, 232, 239–240, 260, 262, 285, 287
 Whoever[3], 110, 121, 152
 Whole[1], 283
 whole[76], 2–3, 10, 23, 28, 31, 33, 35,

42–43, 45, 53, 55–56, 63, 66, 70, 72, 77,
 80, 83, 86, 89–91, 95–98, 100, 123,
 131–132, 135, 141, 144, 150–151, 155,
 159–160, 169, 176, 180, 186–187,
 189–190, 195–196, 198, 201–202, 204,
 208, 222, 225, 229, 251, 259, 285, 305
 wholly[1], 127
 whom[5], 23, 133, 207, 238, 260
 Whorf[1], 127
 whose[10], 4, 64, 75, 83, 135, 201–202,
 206, 239, 242
 Why[16], 18, 30, 94, 106, 110, 117, 204,
 225, 228, 254, 316
 why[39], 13, 28, 32, 38, 57, 63, 69, 83, 90,
 108, 116–117, 120, 122–123, 128, 131,
 148, 172, 174, 177, 189, 205, 222,
 225–226, 242, 245, 259, 261
 wichtiger[1], 141
 wicked[1], 229
 wide[5], 7, 40, 81, 180
 widely[1], 271
 Wider[1], 142
 wider[3], 108, 206, 211
 widerlegbar[1], 77
 Widerlegen[1], 114
 widersprechen[2], 44, 51
 Widerspruch[7], 61, 279
 Widerspruchs[1], 279
 Widerstreit[1], 302
 widespread[3], 4, 194, 207
 widest[1], 104
 Widmung[1], 283
 Widrige[3], 20, 165, 256
 Wie[6], 166, 188, 242, 262, 282
 wie[12], 77, 93, 104, 144, 174, 245, 263,
 268, 316
 wieder[8], 33, 64, 76, 91, 219, 237, 241
 Wiederholt[1], 288
 wiederholt[2], 282–283
 Wiederholung[2], 194, 282
 Wiederkehr[1], 135
 wiefern[1], 235
 Wiegand[7], 12, 39, 289, 291, 303, 307–308
 Wien[3], 287–288
 Wiesbaden[3], 275
 Wiesengrund[4], 43, 133, 175
 Wife[1], 304
 wife[16], 9, 15, 43, 52, 73, 92, 99, 154, 217,
 251, 315
 Wigand[1], 110
 Wihelm[1], 33
 wiki[2], 3, 252
 Wikipedia[12], 5, 26, 28–30, 43, 53, 61, 95,
 133, 181, 270
 wikipedia[2], 3, 252
 Wilamowitz[1], 115
 Wild[1], 3
 wild[1], 175
 Wilde[1], 238
 Wildenstein[1], 283
 wilderness[1], 2
 wildest[2], 208, 211
 Wiley[3], 62
 Wilhelm[46], 12–13, 16, 18, 23, 26, 35, 42,
 44, 53, 59, 80–81, 84, 115–118, 123,
 133–134, 139, 147, 149, 194, 196–197,
 203, 206, 223, 242, 272–273, 276, 281,
 283, 290, 304
 Will[20], 10, 67, 91, 100, 104, 111, 198–200,
 222–224, 240
 will[152], 3–5, 8–11, 13, 17–21, 24, 27, 29,
 33–35, 46, 51–52, 54, 57, 61, 63–64, 66,
 69, 78, 80, 91, 96, 99–100, 102,
 107–108, 111–112, 122–123, 131, 133,
 141, 149–151, 165, 171, 179, 186, 188,
 190, 197–200, 204, 211–212, 215–216,
 219, 222–228, 230–241, 251, 258, 260,
 262, 269
 Wille[7], 40, 98, 114, 226, 240, 267, 297
 willed[2], 135, 200
 Willen[9], 219, 221, 235, 237, 241, 298
 Willenslosigkeit[1], 176
 William[15], 18, 27, 29, 64, 86, 110, 123,
 131, 137, 161, 179, 192, 253, 258, 273
 willing[13], 47, 91, 200, 226, 228, 238–240
 willingness[1], 176
 Willkür[1], 59
 wind[1], 188
 Windelband[4], 33, 44, 197, 203
 windows[3], 181, 190, 262
 winds[3], 31, 95, 273
 Wine[2], 15, 182
 wine[2], 3, 15
 wines[1], 15

wing[7], 4, 15, 26, 43, 119
 wings[1], 25
 Winke[3], 18, 107, 300
 winner[1], 52
 Winter[54], 38, 56, 67, 74–75, 89, 95,
 97–98, 114, 116, 118, 120–121, 123,
 126, 134, 136–137, 148, 152, 193, 224,
 234, 238, 271, 287, 292, 296–298
 winter[20], 13, 17, 25, 35, 46, 63, 78, 97,
 111–112, 144, 168, 214, 220, 241, 254,
 284, 290
 Wintersemester[6], 48, 87, 136, 280, 293,
 306
 Wiplingers[1], 39
 Wir[15], 14, 42, 49, 74, 101, 136, 157, 169,
 179, 227, 236, 263
 wir[33], 49, 70, 80–81, 84, 89, 148, 164,
 169, 173, 190, 218, 227, 229, 235, 252,
 263, 281
 wird[39], 33–34, 57, 63–64, 81, 89, 91, 107,
 112, 120, 126, 147, 160, 173–174, 196,
 219, 225, 237, 241–242, 246–248, 264,
 266, 268, 284
 wires[1], 20
 Wirken[2], 118, 291
 Wirkendes[1], 291
 Wirklichen[2], 253
 wirklichchen[3], 84, 158, 205
 wirkliches[3], 116
 Wirklichkeit[3], 201, 284, 297
 wirksamer[1], 221
 Wirkungen[1], 43
 wirst[2], 188, 262
 Wirtschaftswunder[1], 96
 wisdom[3], 110, 116
 wish[5], 5, 59, 122, 144, 210
 wished[2], 107, 316
 wishers[1], 142
 wishes[1], 193
 Wissen[11], 116, 194, 219, 221, 223,
 251–252
 Wissens[2], 245, 282
 Wissenschaft[42], 88, 99, 116, 172, 174,
 204–205, 218, 221, 229, 245, 249–252,
 263–264, 274, 276, 280–282, 286, 305
 Wissenschaften[7], 86, 168, 249, 276, 287,
 292
 wissenschaftliche[3], 52, 100, 116
 Wissenschaftlichen[1], 275
 wissenschaftlichen[2], 173, 277
 wissenschaftlicher[2], 144, 286
 Wissenschaftslagers[1], 280
 Wissenschaftslehre[2], 216
 Wissenslosigkeit[1], 221
 Wissensschulung[1], 280
 Wissener[11], 70, 117–118, 184, 261, 293, 313
 wit[3], 175, 179, 187
 WITH[1], 258
 With[34], 3, 30, 34, 38, 41, 43, 45, 47,
 52–53, 80, 88, 103, 106, 112, 123, 140,
 144, 179, 194, 197–198, 203, 212,
 222–223, 231, 249, 289
 with[637], 2–5, 7, 9–14, 16–21, 23, 25–36,
 38–49, 52–60, 64, 66, 68–78, 80–82, 84,
 87–88, 90–91, 93, 96–131, 133–137,
 139–140, 142–148, 150, 152–153,
 155–159, 161–164, 166, 168–172,
 175–184, 186, 188–190, 192–198,
 200–201, 204–208, 210–212, 214–220,
 222, 224–227, 229–234, 236, 238–240,
 242–244, 246–249, 251–254, 258–263,
 265, 267–268, 270–272, 276, 282,
 284–286, 288–291, 293, 296, 303, 310,
 314–315
 withdrawal[4], 189, 195, 246–247
 withdraws[3], 189
 withdrew[1], 275
 withheld[1], 246
 withholding[1], 246
 Within[1], 204
 within[60], 4–5, 15, 17, 31–32, 40, 45–46,
 52, 56–57, 61, 64, 79, 83, 93, 98, 101,
 103, 109, 122, 134, 137, 151–152,
 158–159, 176, 194, 202, 204–206, 212,
 222, 231–232, 238, 246, 253, 261
 Without[5], 85, 181, 190, 237, 262
 without[66], 5–6, 11, 13, 31–32, 36–37, 44,
 47, 49, 59, 61–62, 79, 93, 97, 99, 107,
 117, 121–122, 124, 126–127, 135,
 145–146, 148, 155, 158, 160, 163–164,
 167, 170, 176, 181, 186, 190, 192–193,
 200, 202, 206, 210, 215, 218, 221–222,
 226, 233, 236, 240, 246, 251, 259, 262,
 272
 withstand[1], 118

witht[1], 275
witness[2], 61, 84
witnessed[1], 4
Wittgenstein[13], 4, 33–34, 68, 98–99, 118, 224, 254
Wittgensteinianism[1], 118
Wo[1], 146
wo[3], 164, 173, 190
wobei[2], 75, 174
Woche[1], 275
Wocke[1], 304
Wodurch[1], 174
Woher[1], 173
woher[1], 98
Wohin[1], 168
wohin[1], 164
wohl[1], 64
Wohnen[6], 165, 284, 294, 314
wohnet[3], 284–285
Wohnhauses[1], 279
Wohnstatt[1], 174
Wokart[1], 272
Wolf[7], 105, 119, 166–167, 169, 190, 290
Wolfenbüttel[2], 67, 315
Wolff[15], 28, 49, 99, 192–194, 203, 205–206, 211, 213
Wolffian[2], 207, 211
Wolffs[1], 205
Wolffus[1], 207
Wolfgang[4], 35, 211, 304
Wollen[1], 91
wollen[2], 136
wollte[1], 245
Wolzendorf[1], 275
Wolzogen[1], 141
women[2], 224, 294
won[4], 68, 100, 124
Wonder[3], 122, 156
wonder[10], 122, 156
wonderful[3], 16, 77, 124
wondering[2], 156
wondrous[1], 77
wont[1], 172
Wood[1], 89
wood[2], 68, 87
Wooden[1], 168
wooden[1], 168
Woodford[2], 315
woods[2], 68, 87
woody[1], 168
Woraus[1], 174
Word[1], 2
word[54], 2, 5, 23–24, 26, 29, 53–54, 58–59, 66, 73–74, 76–77, 80, 87, 91, 97, 99–100, 105, 107, 110–111, 134, 136, 148, 152, 166, 173, 185–186, 192, 204, 211–212, 223, 237, 258, 262
worden[2], 141, 166
wordplay[2], 260
Words[2], 40, 279
words[55], 9, 12, 14–15, 20–21, 29–30, 32, 36, 38, 59, 63–64, 66, 74, 77, 79, 93, 101, 105, 115, 127–128, 132, 134, 144, 149, 156, 170, 179, 182, 192–193, 201, 204–206, 214, 218, 221, 226, 230, 259, 293
worin[3], 81, 169, 246
Work[5], 14, 114, 123, 196, 270
work[108], 3–4, 9, 11, 13, 18, 23–24, 27–28, 38, 40, 42, 45–46, 52, 57, 61, 68–70, 73, 77, 79–80, 85–87, 101, 103, 106, 119, 123–124, 126, 131, 134, 136, 140–141, 144–145, 150, 152, 156, 169, 175, 180–181, 188, 190, 192, 197, 203, 205, 207, 209, 212, 214, 217, 222, 224–225, 238, 242, 250, 253, 259, 262–263, 270–271, 288, 305
worked[20], 9, 12, 17, 52, 73–74, 93, 96, 130, 138–139, 147, 186, 198, 214, 261, 271–272
Worker[1], 254
Working[2], 150, 289
working[20], 13, 27, 30, 32, 94, 96, 116, 123, 131, 158, 168, 203–205, 208, 217, 262, 272
workness[1], 199
Works[3], 20, 45, 92
works[37], 2, 9–10, 13, 26, 31, 35, 40, 74, 86, 117–118, 123, 126, 132, 144, 152, 154, 156, 181, 190, 203, 207, 209, 220, 262, 287, 305, 310
workshop[6], 19, 30, 53, 69, 108
workshops[1], 16
WORLD[2], 55, 232

World[43], 12, 15, 18, 31–33, 35–37, 44,
 46, 48, 52, 55, 68, 82, 86, 94–95, 106,
 114, 130, 133–135, 163, 180, 182, 215,
 240, 270
 world[135], 7, 13, 15, 19, 30, 34, 36, 42,
 45–46, 53, 56, 59, 61, 63, 72, 77, 81–82,
 88, 95, 97–98, 100, 103, 106–107, 110,
 116, 118, 127, 133–136, 138, 146, 152,
 155, 157, 164, 167, 178, 180, 192, 197,
 213, 217–218, 220–222, 225–232, 251,
 260–262, 264
 Worldliness[1], 55
 worldly[2], 147, 227
 worlds[7], 54–56, 81, 232
 Worldview[4], 123, 196–197, 276
 worldview[30], 32, 66, 103, 110, 133–135,
 137, 152, 157, 175, 178, 197, 213, 261
 Worldviews[3], 130, 134
 worldviews[5], 69, 133, 137
 Worldwide[1], 7
 worldwide[2], 66, 81
 worm[1], 204
 wormeaten[1], 56
 worn[1], 130
 worried[1], 22
 worries[3], 11, 16, 95
 worry[3], 77, 90, 194
 worst[4], 26, 113, 220, 230
 Wort[15], 137, 174, 180, 256, 279, 282,
 288–289, 291, 293
 wort[2], 42, 72
 Worte[2], 259, 268
 Worten[1], 219
 Wörter[1], 259
 Wortes[1], 166
 worth[2], 12, 226
 worthiest[1], 120
 worthiness[7], 90, 93, 172
 worthless[1], 191
 worthy[9], 19, 92, 120, 155, 157, 172, 212
 would[118], 5, 11, 16–17, 19, 21–22, 26–29,
 31, 46–47, 54, 61–62, 69, 71–73, 75,
 77–79, 83, 89, 96, 99–102, 104–109,
 113, 120–121, 124, 127–131, 136, 140,
 142, 144, 146–147, 155, 158–159, 161,
 163, 165, 169, 177, 183, 185, 189, 194,
 196, 200, 205, 209–210, 216, 221–222,
 227, 231, 233, 238, 247, 249, 259, 265,
 272–273, 277
 wound[1], 88
 Wozu[2], 174, 283
 WP[1], 200
 wrap[3], 126, 132, 192
 wrestled[1], 233
 wrestler[2], 233
 wrestling[1], 233
 wretchedness[1], 238
 Write[1], 106
 write[27], 5, 11, 24, 29–30, 36, 55, 79, 86,
 91, 98–99, 125, 160, 189, 224, 259–260,
 262, 265, 272, 278
 writer[1], 88
 Writers[1], 176
 writers[2], 18, 47
 writes[43], 8, 16, 24–25, 37, 40, 45, 48, 51,
 70, 72, 77, 79, 107, 119–120, 128,
 133–134, 140, 153, 161, 163, 177–178,
 194, 198, 221, 224, 226, 232, 237–238,
 240, 245, 249, 251, 253, 285
 Writing[2], 222, 274
 writing[87], 2–3, 5, 8–12, 14, 16, 23–24,
 26, 29–31, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 53, 67–69,
 72–73, 86, 91, 94, 101, 105, 114, 117,
 141, 152, 154, 156, 159, 161, 167–169,
 171, 175, 177–178, 180, 183, 186, 205,
 222, 238, 259–261, 292
 Writings[4], 98, 222, 310, 312
 writings[159], 2–3, 5, 8–13, 17–18, 21,
 24–25, 27–31, 35–36, 39–40, 51–52, 56,
 60, 63–66, 68–71, 73–74, 76, 80, 82, 86,
 89–91, 100, 113, 119–121, 129, 133,
 143, 151, 154, 159, 161, 163, 170–171,
 175, 177, 179–182, 184–185, 188, 192,
 194, 196, 198, 201, 203, 209, 223–225,
 261, 265, 273, 277, 305, 311, 316
 Written[3], 18, 39, 168
 written[69], 3, 8, 10–11, 16–18, 25–26, 29,
 37–39, 41, 53–55, 60, 66–67, 72, 77, 79,
 83, 86–87, 95, 97, 106, 112, 118, 128,
 140–141, 143, 145, 159, 166–168, 177,
 182, 188, 198, 203, 217, 226, 228, 238,
 241, 244, 260, 262, 279, 284, 288, 294,
 316
 wrong[15], 25, 65, 68, 77, 83, 111, 113,
 157, 162, 194, 260, 263
 wrongly[1], 36

wrongness[1], 77
wrote[150], 3, 7–10, 12, 18–19, 21, 23–25, 29, 31–34, 36, 38, 42–43, 45, 48, 53, 56–57, 59, 63, 67–69, 72, 74–75, 85–86, 88, 91–94, 96, 98–101, 103, 105–106, 109–110, 116–117, 119–120, 122, 124–125, 130–131, 138, 144, 146, 150–151, 154, 156, 159, 161–164, 180–182, 184, 189, 193–194, 197, 205, 207, 211–212, 215, 218, 222–225, 229, 233, 235, 238, 241–242, 244–245, 249, 254, 259–260, 262–263, 265, 283, 290, 302, 316
WS[4], 58, 78, 123, 290
Wunder[1], 77
wunderbaren[1], 77
Wundlacken[1], 208
Wunsche[1], 144
Würde[1], 173
wurde[14], 85, 89, 129, 144, 162, 174, 221, 266, 301–302
würde[1], 136
würden[2], 99, 142
würdige[1], 120
Würdigste[1], 120
Wurm[1], 304
Württemberg[1], 16
wusste[1], 43
wüthete[1], 219
wUvYIU[1], 168
WW[3], 47, 92, 99
WWII[1], 96
www[19], 51, 54, 168, 216, 248, 255, 283, 293, 310–311, 315

X

Xaver[2], 36, 118
XI[14], 28, 38, 78, 85, 88, 98, 159, 175, 217, 254, 278, 300
XII[16], 19, 33, 50, 64, 91, 96, 285, 300, 312
xiii[1], 138
XIV[7], 33, 51, 64, 91, 139, 224
xml[1], 51

XV[17], 19, 33, 50, 64, 91, 96, 218, 226, 229, 300, 312
XVI[6], 218, 226, 229
XVII[2], 137, 161
xx[1], 58
XXIV[2], 151, 159
XXVI[1], 284
xxvi[1], 302
xynon[1], 74

Y

yard[1], 15
yards[1], 168
Yasgur[1], 16
yea[1], 227
Yeager[5], 315
Year[3], 313–314
year[48], 8, 15, 18, 21, 33, 42, 45–46, 49, 51, 55, 64, 71, 87, 91, 93, 109–110, 124, 131, 139, 145, 175, 185, 194, 198, 208, 217, 219, 225, 238, 240, 262, 265, 273, 277, 310
years[133], 3–4, 7–8, 10–11, 13–15, 17–18, 21, 23–24, 26–31, 34, 36, 39–40, 42, 45, 47, 53–54, 56, 62–64, 67–71, 75–76, 80, 87, 92, 94–95, 98–99, 103–106, 109, 111, 113–114, 118–121, 124, 127, 130–131, 133, 136, 139, 141, 143–144, 151, 153, 158, 168–169, 171, 176–178, 180–182, 186, 188, 190–191, 205, 207, 214, 217, 220, 224, 228, 238, 259, 261, 270, 273, 277, 282, 288
yellow[2], 40
Yes[21], 10, 17, 24–26, 39, 76–78, 93, 113, 115–116, 121, 127, 158, 223, 236, 242, 251
yes[11], 31, 52, 67, 70, 73, 78, 82, 87, 171, 178
yesterday[1], 108
Yet[10], 29, 84, 90, 135, 165, 172, 195, 197, 269
yet[68], 3, 7–8, 11–12, 19–20, 24, 26, 29–31, 54, 56–57, 67–68, 70, 84, 87–88,

92, 98, 101, 106, 113, 145–146, 152–153,
160, 163–164, 166, 171, 176, 179, 184,
189, 196–198, 200, 202, 209, 213, 215,
217, 238, 248, 269, 299
yi[1], 74
yield[1], 215
yields[1], 135
Yorck[1], 197
York[8], 62, 145–146, 254, 276, 304, 310,
314
You[16], 2, 35, 64, 100, 108, 176, 183, 212,
228, 247, 259, 261–262
you[151], 5, 8–9, 13, 15–17, 33–34, 39,
46–47, 49, 54–55, 59–60, 62, 66–67, 72,
78, 80, 83, 88, 92–94, 96, 100, 103, 106,
108–109, 116, 121, 124–127, 129, 136,
141, 144, 148, 157, 162, 169, 171, 177,
179, 181, 188, 194, 209–210, 212, 223,
225, 227–229, 231, 234, 238, 244, 248,
258–262, 265
Young[1], 106
young[18], 14, 18, 25, 32, 35, 43, 61, 120,
131, 133, 138, 148, 182, 211, 218,
229–230
Younger[2], 164
younger[2], 85, 147
Your[3], 61, 258, 260
your[37], 2, 8, 17, 47–48, 76, 88, 96, 100,
108, 124, 129, 133, 157, 186, 209, 212,
246, 258–261, 263
Yours[1], 113
yours[3], 9, 124, 265
yourself[3], 34, 129, 234
youth[4], 15, 53, 62, 105
youthful[1], 229
YouTube[4], 16, 51, 60, 118
youtube[8], 51, 168
yuga[1], 188

Z

Zaborowski[7], 52, 273, 301, 310, 315
zagelloseste[1], 232
Zähringen[7], 16, 48, 86, 152, 286, 292
Zähringen[2], 130, 290
Zangerle[1], 302
ZARATHUSTRA[1], 231
Zarathustra[10], 55–56, 164–165, 227, 242,
286, 316
Zauber[1], 219
zaubern[1], 76
Zaun[1], 146
ZBAGLHTVYOI[1], 311
ZDF[1], 313
zealots[1], 43
Zedong[1], 101
Zehn[1], 283
zehnmal[1], 112
zehnten[3], 42, 72, 265
Zeichen[2], 118, 126
Zeichnung[1], 167
zeigen[1], 86
zeigt[2], 85, 266
Zeit[88], 20, 24, 30, 37, 42, 51, 53, 55,
68–69, 75–77, 92, 106, 112–114,
138–139, 141–143, 146–149, 157, 170,
178, 188, 221, 245–247, 249–250, 256,
262, 266–267, 274–275, 278, 282, 290,
293, 296, 298, 305, 312–313
zeit[1], 144
Zeitalter[4], 98, 156, 181, 248
Zeitalters[2], 158, 196
Zeitbegriff[2], 274–275
Zeitbegriffs[6], 139–140, 297, 311
Zeitdiagnose[1], 32
Zeiten[1], 205
zeitgeist[2], 46, 48
Zeitgenossen[1], 40
zeitigende[1], 147
Zeitlichkeit[5], 141, 153, 177, 266
Zeitschrift[4], 274, 277, 284–285
ZeitSpiel[1], 147
Zeitverständnis[3], 198, 291, 294
Zeller[1], 44
Zellman[2], 78
Zen[4], 71, 81, 259, 288
Zeno[1], 285
Zenon[1], 292
Zentrum[3], 274
Zerklüftung[1], 305
zero[1], 68

zes[1], 218
 zetesis[1], 83
 Zeuge[1], 267
 Zeugnisse[11], 86, 97, 101, 118, 177, 198,
 273, 277, 286, 296, 301
 Zeus[1], 168
 Zhuangzi[1], 278
 Ziel[7], 107, 152, 219, 230, 237, 241
 Ziele[8], 14, 101, 116, 157, 236
 Zielformen[1], 236
 Ziellosigkeit[1], 111
 zigzagging[1], 183
 Zinn[2], 21, 277
 Zirkel[4], 17, 112
 Zivilisationskritiker[1], 32
 Žižek[1], 60
 ZOLLIKON[1], 62
 Zollikon[6], 13, 17, 30, 106, 119, 304
 Zollikoner[6], 70, 121, 160, 184, 299, 301
 ZS[1], 127
 zs[1], 82
 ZSD[1], 290
 Zsgest[1], 306
 ZU[1], 159
 Zu[34], 18, 21, 24, 59, 73–74, 77, 89, 92,
 116, 137, 143, 166, 217, 246, 254, 266,
 273, 275, 280, 282, 288, 297, 299,
 305–307, 309
 zu[182], 6, 10, 12, 20–21, 34, 41, 45, 48–49,
 51–52, 57, 59, 74–77, 81, 84, 86–87, 89,
 91–92, 97–98, 100, 106, 108, 113, 116,
 118, 120, 122–123, 129, 131, 136–137,
 139–140, 142–144, 146–148, 153, 156,
 160, 163–167, 169, 173–174, 179–180,
 184, 186, 190, 194, 196, 201, 219–223,
 244, 246–248, 257, 260–261, 264–268,
 270–271, 277, 282–291, 293, 296, 298,
 305, 310
 Zueignung[1], 171
 Zuerst[2], 108, 138
 zuerst[2], 138, 245
 zufolge[2], 172, 174
 Zug[1], 89
 Zugangsnummer[15], 91, 255–257, 266,
 273, 283, 287, 290, 294
 zuge[1], 266
 zugeeignet[1], 138
 Zugehören[1], 267
 Zugehörigkeit[2], 267–268
 zugleich[5], 44, 148, 152, 174, 196
 Zuhörer[1], 76
 Zukunft[4], 23, 218, 237, 241
 Zukünftige[1], 95
 Zukünftigen[1], 160
 zuletzt[2], 77, 137
 Zum[24], 20, 76, 166–167, 235, 245, 255,
 261, 276–277, 280–281, 283, 292, 299,
 305, 312, 314
 zum[66], 27, 41, 50, 69, 91, 95, 110, 116,
 118, 122, 138–139, 142, 157, 166, 168,
 173–174, 194, 196, 200, 223, 235, 237,
 241, 245–246, 248, 266–267, 277, 281,
 283, 287–294
 Zumutungen[1], 85
 zunächst[2], 108, 246
 ZUR[1], 266
 Zur[45], 17, 34, 42, 58, 85, 93, 112, 140,
 145, 156, 162, 186, 241, 244, 247–248,
 254, 257, 279, 281–282, 285, 290–294,
 296, 298–299, 306
 zur[113], 3, 30–31, 34–35, 40, 53, 58–59,
 69–70, 75–76, 85–87, 91, 97–98, 101,
 114, 117, 124, 139–140, 143, 146–149,
 151–152, 154–155, 157, 161, 163, 166,
 171, 175, 178–180, 184–185, 195,
 200–201, 218, 221, 226, 232–233, 236,
 245–246, 248–249, 264, 267–268,
 270–271, 274, 277, 279, 282, 284–288,
 290, 296–299, 305–307, 311–313
 zuranthropologisierungderethischen[1], 270
 Zürich[6], 281, 286, 290–291
 Zurück[1], 40
 zurück[6], 40, 70, 81, 90–91, 173
 zurückgebracht[1], 268
 zurückgegangen[8], 51, 65, 138, 142, 177,
 179, 187
 zurückgenommen[1], 246
 zuruckgenommen[1], 266
 zurückgiebt[2], 237, 241
 Zurufe[1], 85
 Zurüstung[1], 146
 zusammen[1], 74
 Zusammenarbeit[1], 314
 zusammendenken[2], 246–247
 zusammengedacht[1], 246

zusammengefasst[2], *34, 98*
Zusammengehörigkeit[1], *268*
zusammengetreten[1], *107*
Zusammenhang[1], *279*
Zusammenhänge[1], *147*
zusammenhängenden[2], *112, 116*
Zusatz[3], *282, 284, 286*
Zusätzen[1], *283*
Zuspiel[3], *57, 160, 163*
Zustände[1], *220*
zutragen[1], *81*
zuvor[2], *81, 148*
Zuwendung[1], *27*
zwanzigsten[1], *283*
zwar[7], *101, 148–149, 245, 252*
Zwecke[1], *220*
Zwei[3], *228, 281, 291*
zwei[2], *57, 108*
Zweite[4], *92, 139, 265, 279*
zweite[2], *165, 275*
zweiten[3], *51, 92, 279*
ZWEITER[1], *137*
Zweiter[1], *305*
zweiter[1], *275*
zwiefach[2], *185, 264*
Zwiege[1], *301*
zwingt[2], *120, 196*
Zwischen[2], *166, 264*
zwischen[4], *147, 164, 277, 288*

Æ

œuvre[6], *2, 5, 8, 39, 69*

A

Αγχιβασίη[1], *94*

αινικτή[2], *48, 242*

αλεπού[1], *119*

αλήθεια[1], *199*

ἀλήθεια[2], *247*

αχιλλειος[1], *114*

B

βασιλεύς[1], *42*

βούλεσθε[1], *148*

Γ

γάρ[1], 148

γινώσκετε[1], 148

Γόρδιος[1], 5

Γύγου[1], 17

Δ

Δακτύλιος[1], 17

δέ[1], 148

δεινός[1], 97

δεσμός[1], 5

δήλον[1], 148

Διάδοχοι[1], 182

διδακτικός[3], 128, 151, 163

Διογένης[1], 233

Διονύσιος[1], 128

Διόνυσος[1], 56

δν[1], 148

δόγματα[1], 22

Ε

Ζ

ζήτησις[1], 83

Η

ήμεις[1], 148

ήπορήκαμεν[1], 148

Θ

θαυμάζειν[2], 122

θεάομαι[1], 110

Ι

Κ

Καιρός[1], 106
καιρός[1], 95
Κεραυνός[2], 168
Κοινόν[4], 71, 196, 236
Κρατύλος[3], 59, 104, 118
κρίσις[2], 97, 106

Λ

Λαέρτιος[1], 233
λεγομενον[1], 267
λογογράφος[1], 43
λόγοι[1], 171
Λόγος[2], 264, 285
λόγος[2], 195, 221
Λύκειον[3], 113, 128

Μ

μέν[2], 148
μένειν[1], 88

Ν

νοεῖν[1], 195
νῦν[1], 148

Ξ

ξυνόν[1], 74

Ο

ον[1], 267

όποταν[1], 148

Π

παθοποιία[1], 186
πάθος[1], 186
παιδαγωγία[1], 68
πάλαι[1], 148

παλίμψηστος[1], 139
πάντα[2], 88, 168
παραδειγμα[1], 62
Παρμενίδης[1], 192

περιπατητικός[2], 113, 117
Πηνελόπη[2], 30, 80
Πλάτων[1], 54
Ποίησις[1], 305
Πόλεμος[3], 59, 73
πολλαχως[1], 267
πολλοί[2], 29, 54

ποτε[1], 148

πρό[1], 148
πρόλογος[1], 7
πτέρνα[1], 114

P

Σ

σημαίνει[1], 148
σκέψεις[2], 219, 230
συκοφάντης[1], 26
συμπέρασμα[1], 178
συνεκδοχή[2], 71, 185
συνίστημι[1], 205
σχολάρχης[1], 128
Σωκράτης[2], 83, 188

T

ταῦτα[1], 148
τάφος[1], 42
τε[1], 88

τί[1], 148

τού[1], 148

τρομερός[1], 97
τρόπος[4], 42, 70, 93, 169

Υ

ὕμεις[1], 148

Φ

φθέγγησθε[1], 148
φιλολογία[1], 59
Φιλοσοφία[1], 305
φιλοσοφία[1], 110
φόμεθα[1], 148
φρονέειν[1], 74
φυσικά[1], 192

Φύσις[1], 29
φύσις[1], 288

X

χρόνος[1], 106

Ψ

Ω

ὡς[1], 148

ב

רב[1], 62

ת

את[1], 62