Plato as Teacher of Socrates?

Ferber, Rafael

Abstract: What distinguishes the Socrates of the early from the Socrates of the middle dialogues? According to a well-known opinion, the "dividing line" lies in the difference between the Socratic and the Platonic theory of action. Whereas for the Platonic Socrates of the early dialogues, all desires are good-dependent, for the Platonic Socrates of the middle dialogues, there are good-independent desires. The paper argues first (I) that this "dividing line" is blurred in the "Symposium", and second (II) that we have in the "Symposium" a more distinctive dividing line, namely the introduction of the separate existence of the idea of beauty. This introduction by Diotima/Plato of separate ideas and the lack of (noetic) understanding of separate ideas – here the idea of beauty – by Socrates may have been the limit not only of the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues, but of the historical Socrates as well.

Originally published at:
Ferber, Rafael (2016). Plato as Teacher of Socrates? In: Tulli, Mauro; Erler, Michael. Plato in Symposium : Selected Papers from the tenth Symposium Platonicum. St. Augustin: Academia Verlag, 443-448.

Mauro Tulli / Michael Erler (eds.)

Plato in Symposium

International Plato Studies

Published under the auspices of the International Plato Society

---

Volume 35

PLATO IN SYMPOSIUM

SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
TENTH SYMPOSIUM PLATONICUM

Edited by

MAURO TULLI AND MICHAEL ERLER

Academia Verlag Sankt Augustin

Illustration on the cover by courtesy of the Bodleian Library,
Oxford, MS. Ashmole 304, fol. 31 v.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

ISBN: 978-3-89665-678-0

1. Auflage 2016

Bahnstraße 7, D-53757 Sankt Augustin
Internet: www.academia-verlag.de
E-Mail: info@academia-verlag.de

Printed in Germany

List of contributors

Olga Alieva, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow
Carolina Araújo, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
Francesco Aronadio, Università di Roma Tor Vergata
Ruby Blondell, University of Washington
Sandra Boehringer, Université de Strasbourg
Marcelo D. Boeri, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile
Beatriz Bossi, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Francisco Bravo, Universidad Central de Venezuela
Luc Brisson, CNRS, Villejuif
Giuseppe Cambiano, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
Andrea Capra, Università degli Studi di Milano
Giovanni Casertano, Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II"
Gabriele Cornelli, Universidade de Brasília
Michele Corradi, Aix-Marseille Université
Ivana Costa, Universidad de Buenos Aires
Gabriel Danzig, Bar-Ilan University
Piera De Piano, Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II"
Dino De Sanctis, Università di Pisa
Margherita Erbì, Università di Pisa
Mehmet M. Erginel, Eastern Mediterranean University
Rafael Ferber, Universität Luzern / Universität Zürich
Arianna Fermani, Università di Macerata
Giovanni R.F. Ferrari, University of California, Berkeley
Lloyd P. Gerson, University of Toronto
Christopher Gill, University of Exeter
Stephen Halliwell, University of St Andrews
Edward C. Halper, University of Georgia
Annie Hourcade Sciou, Université de Rouen
Chad Jorgenson, Université de Fribourg
Yahei Kanayama, Nagoya University
Filip Karfík, Université de Fribourg
Christian Keime, Université Paris IV-Sorbonne / University of Cambridge
Manfred Kraus, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen
Yuji Kurihara, Tokyo Gakugei University
Annie Larivée, Carleton University
Aikaterini Lefka, Université de Liège
Francisco L. Lisi, Instituto Lucio Anneo Séneca / Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Arnaud Macé, Université de Franche-Comté
Graciela E. Marcos de Pinotti, Universidad de Buenos Aires – CONICET
Silvio Marino, Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II"
Giusy Maria Margagliotta, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
Irmgard Männlein-Robert, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen

Mariella Menchelli, Università di Pisa
Maurizio Migliori, Università di Macerata
Gerard Naddaf, York University
Hugues-Olivier Ney, Aix-Marseille Université
Noburu Notomi, Keio University, Tokyo
Lidia Palumbo, Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II"
Richard D. Parry, Agnes Scott College
Richard Patterson, Emory University
Federico M. Petrucci, Scuola Normale Superiore / Università di Pisa
Mario Regali, Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro"
Olivier Renaut, Université Paris Ouest – Nanterre La Défense
Nicholas P. Riegel, University of Toronto
Cristina Rossitto, Università di Padova
Christopher Rowe, Durham University
David T. Runia, Queen's College, The University of Melbourne
† *Samuel Scolnicov*, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Richard Stalley, University of Glasgow
Alessandro Stavru, Freie Universität Berlin
Thomas Alexander Szlezák, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen
Ikko Tanaka, Kyoto University
Harold Tarrant, University of Newcastle, Australia
Alonso Tordesillas, Aix-Marseille Université
Álvaro Vallejo Campos, Universidad de Granada
Mario Vegetti, Università degli Studi di Pavia
Matthew D. Walker, Yale-NUS College
Roslyn Weiss, Lehigh University

Table of Contents

Plato as Teacher of Socrates?

Rafael Ferber
Universität Luzern / Universität Zürich

That the historical Socrates did exist is a fact beyond reasonable doubt.[1] It is also a fact that Plato made him the protagonist of his early and middle dialogues, including the *Symposium*. Although Socrates as protagonist has been replaced in the later dialogues by the Eleatic Stranger, Timaeus and the Athenian, even the latter two remain Socratics in at least *one* important point. Both defend again the paradox that nobody does wrong willingly (cf. *Tim*. 86d7-e3; *Leg*. V 731c3-5, IX 860d1-2). If we assume that Plato expresses with the voices of Timaeus and the Athenian *some* of his own views, we may also assume that Plato, too, remains a Socratic (at least in *this* sense) throughout his life. In the following, I concentrate on the Platonic Socrates without discussing the philosophy of the historical Socrates – with the exception of a guess at the end.

I therefore do not enter into the question of what distinguishes the historical Socrates from the Platonic one, but what distinguishes the Socrates of the early from the Socrates of the middle dialogues. According to a well-known opinion, the "dividing line" lies in the difference between the Socratic and the Platonic theory of action. Whereas for the Platonic Socrates of the early dialogues all desires are good-dependent, for the Platonic Socrates of the middle dialogues there are good-independent desires. I argue first (I) that this "dividing line" is blurred in the *Symposium*, and second (II) that we have in the *Symposium* a more distinctive dividing line, namely the introduction of the separate existence of the idea of beauty.

I.

> Socrates – [...] – is fundamentally at odds with Plato on the implications of only one question: a question about psychology of action. This is the question whether it is possible for any actions in that standard group of actions which Aristotle would later call 'voluntary actions' to be the direct result merely of irrational desires taken together with certain beliefs.[2]

Under irrational desires, the authors of this statement – T. Penner and Ch. Rowe – seem to understand blind desires based on "physiological needs".[3] Terminologically we may call these irrational – or *sub*rational – desires "sensations" in distinction from "emotions". Whereas sensations are not directed at intentional objects and are not dependent on some cognition of the good, emotions are directed at and depend on some cognition of the good. Sensations such as hunger or thirst, as simple raw experiences, have not yet fastened on any "objects" in the world. But they also include a degree of conscious experience and qualitative but not yet representational content. In distinction, emotions – such as anger (*thymos*), pleasure (*hedone*), grief (*lype*), love (*eros*) and fear (*phobos*) (cf. *Prot.* 352b7-8) – include repre-

[1] Cf. Kleve (1987).
[2] Penner & Rowe (2005), 295.
[3] Rowe (2005), 216.

sentational and cognitive content. In fact, the Socrates of the *Apology* makes it sound as if fear is just a cognitive condition: "To fear death, gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know" (*Apol.* 29a5-b1, transl. Grube). To use stoic terminology, sensations are pre-emotions or *propatheiai*, whereas emotions are *pathe* based on judgments.[4]

So formulated, the thesis would be that Plato introduced with the *epithymetikon* of his tripartite model of the soul sensations or *propatheiai*. The *epithymetikon* would *then* be a pre-emotion or *propatheia*. Although the doctrine of the tripartite soul may be traced back to the *Apology* (29d8) and the *Gorgias* (493a3-4),[5] we find the *explicit* argument for it only in the *Republic* (cf. 435e-442a).[6] Nevertheless, the tripartite soul *may* also be implied in the *Symposium* when Diotima distinguishes between love for money-making (*chrematismon*), love for sport (*philogymnastia*) and love for wisdom (*philosophia*) (*Symp*. 205d4-5)[7] and between different kinds of immortality: biological, which corresponds to the *epithymetikon*, and meritorious (*Symp.* 208d-210a), which corresponds to the *thymoeides*.[8] Eros is a kind of *epithymia* (cf. *Symp.* 200a2-3)[9] and seems to be itself tripartite, so that each part of the tripartite soul has its own eros, the *epithymetikon*, *e.g*. for money, the *thymoeides* for social recognition and the *logistikon* for wisdom.

This tripartite model of the soul has been treated in Plato scholarship separately from other models of the soul. But we gain additional intelligibility of this model if we supplement it with the tripartite model introduced by Descartes and repeated by F. Brentano. Descartes distinguishes (a) ideas (in his sense),[10] (b) judgments and (c) acts of will,[11] and Brentano distinguishes (a) representations, (b) judgments and (c) acts of will, which he also calls motions of the soul, interests, or acts of love and hate.[12] This model may go back to Aristotle, insofar as right desire (*orexis orthe*) presupposes true thinking or judgment (*logos alethes*) (cf. *EN* VI 2, 1139a21-26) and thinking images (*phantasmata*) (cf. *An.* III 7, 431a14-16). Because "acts of will" in the broad sense of desires (*epithymiai*) are based on a belief, it partially even goes back to the early dialogues of Plato (cf. *Prot.* 358c6-d2, *Gorg.* 468b1-2). According to this model, consciousness has different levels. The lowest is that of (a) ideas or representations, the second of (b) judgments and the third of (c) acts of will. Judgments require ideas or representations; acts of will require both judgments and representations. Without representations, I cannot regard anything as either true or false, or desire anything as good or bad. Likewise, without judgment, that is, without evaluating something as good or bad, I cannot desire

---

[4] Cf. for this distinction, *e.g.*, Seneca, *De ira* II 2: [...] *Omnes enim motus qui non uoluntate nostra fiunt inuicti et ineuitabiles sunt, ut horror frigida adspersis, ad quosdam tactus aspernatio; ad peiores nuntios surriguntur pili et rubor ad inproba uerba suffunditur sequiturque uertigo praerupta cernentis: quorum quia nihil in nostra potestate est, nulla quominus fiant ratio persuadet. Ira praeceptis fugatur; est enim uoluntarium animi uitium, non ex his quae condicione quadam humanae sortis eueniunt ideoque etiam sapientissimis accidunt, inter quae et primus ille ictus animi ponendus est qui nos post opinionem iniuriae mouet*. I owe the reference to stoic terminology to Anthony Price.

[5] Cf. Burnet (1924), *ad* 29d8: "This enumeration [*sophia, ischys, chremata*] implies the doctrine of the 'tripartite soul'; for it gives the objects of *to epithymetikon*, *to thymoeides*, and *to logistikon*". Slings (1994), 137 n. 33: "*tês* [...] *psychês touto en hôi epithumiai eisi*. This implies the existence of *to epithymetikon*; it certainly is much more definitive than the popular distinction between 'reason and impulse' [Dodds *ad loc*.]".

[6] Cf. Ferber (2013), 233-236, with further literature.

[7] So Vallejo-Campos (2013), 196.

[8] Cf. Hobbs (2000), 251, and Nehamas (2004), both quoted in Sheffield (2006), 228.

[9] This has been brought out by Sheffield (2012), 213-215.

[10] Descartes (1641), 160.

[11] Descartes (1996), Meditation 3, Section 5.

[12] Psychology II (1973), ch. 6, § 3.

it as good or reject it as bad. As a rule, we do not desire or avoid "blindly" but "see" because our response is based on judgment. But this judgment need not always be explicit or pronounced. We sometimes find certain people appealing or unappealing, pleasant or unpleasant "at first sight". As Shakespeare put it: "Who ever lov'd, that lov'd not at first sight?" (*As You like It*, Act III, Scene 5). The point is that desires are based on a certain belief.

If we put these two tripartite models of the soul together, they do not contradict each other. On the contrary, the Cartesian/Brentanonian model functions well as the foundation of the tripartite Platonic one. So we have the following "quinquepartite" model:

a) ideas, representations (*phantasmata*)
b) judgments
c) acts of will in the broad sense, or first-order desires corresponding to the desires of the *epithymetikon*
d) acts of will in a more narrow sense, or second-order desires corresponding to the desires of the *thymoeides*
e) acts of reason corresponding to the *logistikon*.

Where is eros in the *Symposium* located in this scheme? Surely eros is not merely something like a sexual itch, a sensation or *propatheia*. Eros is cognitively more advanced, an emotion or a desire (*epithymia*): "The main point is this: every desire (*epithymia*) for good things or for happiness is the 'supreme and treacherous *love* (*doleros eros*) in everyone'" (*Symp.* 205d1-3, transl. Nehamas & Woodruff). "Treacherous love" surely involves a cognitive component, a (perhaps erroneous) judgment on what is good (cf. *Symp.* 206a1, 206a11-12).[13] Eros in the *Symposium* is dependent on some cognition of the good or good-dependent. The psychology of eros in the *Symposium* is in this respect not different from emotions like *eros* in the *Protagoras* (cf. *Prot.* 352b7-8), which are not blind, but involve a cognitive component.[14] Concerning the *Symposium*, we may say: instead of a sharp difference between the Socrates of the early dialogues and of the *Symposium*, we have continuity concerning the treatment of emotions like *eros*, since *eros* as a form of *epithymia* involves a cognitive component. The theory of Eros is not a "dividing line" between the Socrates of the early dialogues and of the *Symposium*.[15]

II.

Nevertheless Plato, the author of the *Symposium*, must have been aware of deviating from the Socrates of his early dialogues when he lets him report the teaching of Diotima. As the author of the *Apology*, Plato refers to the Pythia to give Socrates' mission divine authority (*Apol.* 21a6); thus, as the author of the *Symposium*, Plato lets Socrates refer to "a woman of Mantinea, Diotima, who was wise both in these things and in much else" (*Symp.* 201d2-3) to give Socrates' theory of Love the authority of a "seer". Later Diotima is called "wisest" (*Symp.* 208b8) and even the "most perfect sophist" (*Symp.* 208c1-2). She seems to have already reached the level of the philosopher-kings and queens in the *Republic* and may even be superior to them who are wise (cf. *Resp.* 546a8) by having supernatural powers (cf. *Symp.* 201d3-5). Although love is the only thing Socrates confesses to know (*Symp.* 177d7-8; cf. *Theag.* 128b2-4, *Lysis* 204c1-2), Diotima seems to realize that Socrates has not yet reached

---

[13] These three passages have been treated in Sheffield (2006), 229-230.
[14] Cf. Ferber (1991), esp. 54-55, and Rowe (2006).
[15] Cf. for the *Symposium* as a Socratic dialogue Rowe (2006). *Pace* Rowe the psychology of action is in my opinion also not the "dividing" line between the Socrates of the early dialogues and of the *Republic*, cf. Ferber (2013), esp. 233-236.

the ultimate knowledge of the object of love (*Symp.* 209e5-210a3, transl. Rowe, small modifications by Rafael Ferber):

> [S_1] Into these aspects of love, probably, Socrates, you too could be initiated (*myetheies)*;
>
> [S_2] but as for those aspects relating to the final revelation *(ta de teleia kai epoptika)*, the ones for the sake of which I have taught you the rest, if one approaches these correctly – I don't know whether you would be capable of being initiated into *them*.
>
> [S_3] Well, she said, I'll tell you this next part, and spare no effort in doing so;
>
> [S_4] and you must try to follow, if you can.

The first sentence [S_1] says that Socrates could be initiated into these "aspects of love", that is, the elenctic instruction in the passage 201d1-209e3. Although Diotima here is already using the expression *myeo,* which means "initiate into the mysteries", she refers to the instruction she gave to Socrates by applying the Socratic method of elenchos to Socrates himself. These are the "lower" mysteries.

The second sentence [S_2] mentions *ta de teleia kai epoptika*, that is, the final things to be seen – terminology which remembers again that of the mysteries.[16] Since with *ta de teleia kai epoptika*, the idea of beauty is meant, the introduction into this idea is something analogous to an introduction into the "higher" mysteries. But Diotima expresses doubt that Socrates is able to follow her. Socrates is in a similar position to Diotima as Glaukon is to Socrates in the *Republic* (cf. *Resp.* 533a1-5). As Socrates in the *Republic* indicates the intellectual limits of Glaucon, so Diotima mentions the limits of Socrates. Since Diotima's speech is an invention of Plato, the author of the *Symposium*, Plato, is indicating the intellectual limits of Socrates. The passage has been interpreted in this way by most interpreters.[17]

In the third sentence [S_3], Diotima behaves again toward Socrates as Socrates does toward Glaucon (*Resp.* 533a2), since neither spares any willingness (*prothymia*) to share their knowledge. So the fault is not Diotima's if Socrates cannot follow, just as it is not Socrates' fault that Glaucon cannot follow.

In the fourth sentence [S_4], Diotima commands Socrates to follow if he can follow, and so Diotima is reinforcing her doubt concerning the intellectual limit of her pupil. Socrates' limit is exactly indicated: the limit to pass from the agreement or the *homologia* he has reached with Diotima on the topic of eros to see the reality of the object of love, the idea of beauty.

Nevertheless, a minority of scholars think otherwise. I mention Alfred Edward Taylor:

> It has even been seriously argued that Plato is here guilty of the arrogance of professing that he has reached philosophical heights to which the "historical" Socrates could not ascend. Everything becomes simple if we remember that the actual person speaking is Socrates, reporting the words of Diotima. Socrates […] as a modest man, cannot say anything that would imply that he has already "attained perfection" or is assured of "final perseverance".[18]

It is right that Socrates is reporting Diotima. But since Plato invented this report and put it into the mouth of Socrates, the image of Socrates in the *Symposium* would be very different from that in the *Republic.* Then Socrates would have really seen, that is, understood, the idea of beauty, something he denies explicitly concerning the idea of the Good in the *Republic*. He says only that he would insist that "something like" (*toiouton ti*) "the truth itself" (*auto to*

16 Cf. Riedweg (1987), 20-29.
17 Cf. the authors mentioned in Bury (1932), 123; Sier (1997), 273 n. 225.
18 Taylor (1936), 229 n. 1.

alethes) is finally to be seen (*idein*) (*Resp.* 533a3-5). He never says that *he* has seen the "truth itself". Socrates would then himself be on the level of the imagined philosopher-kings.

Of course, we find the theory of ideas already in the *Euthyphron* 6d-e. But what we do not find is the characterization of the ideas in the Parmenidean predicates of the *Symposium*: the idea of beauty (a) is always and neither comes into being nor perishes, neither increases nor decreases (210e6-211a2); (b) is absolutely beautiful (211a2-5); (c) is incorporeal (211a5-7); (d) is placeless (211a6b1); (e) is identical with itself and one (211b1); and (f) is not affected by the changing things (211b3-5).[19]

That in the introduction of separate ideas lies the "dividing line" between Socrates and Plato is confirmed by Plato's first interpreter, Aristotle: "But Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart; his successors, however, gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas" (*Metaph.* M 4 1078a29-32). Aristotle is speaking of the historical Socrates. Since all other primary sources of the historical Socrates – Aristophanes (*Nub.* 740 ff.) and Xenophon (*Mem.* IV 5, 11)[20] – attest, like Plato in the early dialogues, that Socrates has dialectic power, we may guess that the introduction of the separate or quasi-parmenidean existence of ideas is the "dividing line" between the Socrates of the early and the middle dialogues.

In the terminology of the divided line in the *Republic*, we may formulate the epistemological counterpart to the introduction of separate ideas in the following way: just as the geometrical propositions express a dianoetic, but not yet a noetic knowledge (cf. *Resp.* 533d5), in the same vein the knowledge of Socrates is "dianoetic" knowledge of love since he gets *homologoumena* with Diotima, but does not have "noetic" understanding of the final object of love, namely beauty.[21] This also makes sense of the following statement: "My [wisdom], I guess, will be an inferior sort of wisdom, or even a debatable one, existing as if in a dream" (*Symp.* 175e2-3). Socrates' wisdom is an inferior one existing like that of the mathematicians as if in a dream (*Resp.* 533b6-c3) because *homologoumena* may correspond with reality or not, as a dream may correspond with reality or not. Only "noetic" understanding of the object of love, in Diotima's or Plato's view the vision of the idea of beauty, gives correspondence.

I conclude with a guess on the philosophy of the historical Socrates: the separation of ideas and lack of (noetic) understanding of these ideas may have been the limit of the philosophy of the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues *and* the historical Socrates. But since it would have been immodest if *Plato*, the pupil of Socrates, had overtly played the teacher of Socrates, he put his teaching into the mouth of Diotima.

Nevertheless, also this guess, based on the *homologia* between Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle, is still "an inferior sort of wisdom, or even a debatable one, existing as in a dream" since none of us has immediate knowledge of the philosophy of the historical Socrates.[22]

*

Brentano, F., *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, London 1973 (Transl. A. C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrelland, L. L. McAlister) = Brentano (1973).

---

[19] This has been fully developed in the contribution of Kraus. Cf. also Ferber (1989[2]), 38-48; Sier (1997), 11, 284.

[20] Cf. Philippson (1932).

[21] Cf. Ferber (2007).

[22] My thanks go to Lesley Brown, Francisco Gonzalez, Anthony Price and Nicholas Smith for some helpful remarks.

Burnet, J. (ed.), *Plato.* Euthyphro*,* Apology of Socrates*,* Crito, ed. with notes by J. Burnet, Oxford 1924 = Burnet (1924).
Descartes, R., *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, Paris 1641 = Descartes (1641).
Descartes, R., *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Cambridge 1996 = Descartes (1996).
Ferber, R., *Platos Idee des Guten*, St. Augustin 1989[2] (1984) = Ferber (1989[2]).
Ferber, R., "Sokrates: Tugend ist Wissen", *Elenchos* 11 (1991) 39-66 = Ferber (1991).
Ferber, R., "What Did Socrates Know and How Did He Know It?" in M. Erler & L. Brisson (eds.), *Gorgias-Meno. Selected Papers from the Seventh Symposium Platonicum,* Sankt Augustin 2007, 263-267 (enlarged German version in: *Elenchos* 28 [2007], 5-39) = Ferber (2007).
Ferber, R., *"Ho de diokei men hapasa psyche kai toutou heneka panta prattei"* in N. Notomi & L. Brisson (eds.), *Dialogues on Plato's* Politeia *(*Republic*). Selected Papers from the Ninth Symposium Platonicum*. Sankt Augustin 2013, 233-241 (enlarged German version in: *Elenchos* 34 [2013], 5-31) = Ferber (2013).
Hobbs, A., *Plato and the Hero*, Cambridge 2000 = Hobbs (2000).
Kleve, K., "Did Socrates Exist?" *Grazer Beiträge* 14 (1987), 123-137 = Kleve (1987)
Nehamas, A., "Only on the Contemplation of Beauty is Life Worth Living (Plato, *Symposium* 211d)", part of the *Gray Lectures*, Cambridge 2004 (unpub.), quoted in Sheffield (2006) = Nehamas (2004).
Penner, T., & Rowe, Ch., *Plato's* Lysis, Cambridge 2005 = Penner & Rowe (2005).
Philippson, R., "Sokrates' Dialektik in Aristophanes *Wolken*", *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 81 (1932), 30-38 = Philippson (1932).
Riedweg, Ch., *Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon und Klemens von Alexandrien*, Berlin 1987 = Riedweg (1987)
Rowe, Ch., "Les parties de l'âme et le désir du bien dans la *République*" in M. Dixsaut (avec la collaboration de F. Teisserenc) (ed.), *Études sur la République de Platon. 2. De la science, du bien et des mythes,* Paris 2005, 209-223 = Rowe (2005).
Rowe, Ch., "The *Symposium* as a Socratic Dialogue" in J. Lesher, D. Nails & F.C.C. Sheffield (eds.), *Plato's* Symposium*: Issues in Interpretation and Reception*, Cambridge 2006, 9-22 = Rowe (2006).
Sheffield, F.C.C., "Eros Before and After Tripartition" in R. Barney, T. Brennan & C. Brennan (eds.), *Plato and the Divided Self*, Cambridge 2012 = Sheffield (2012).
Sier, K., *Die Rede der Diotima. Untersuchungen zum platonischen* Symposion, Stuttgart/Leipzig 1997 = Sier (1997).
Slings, S.R., *Plato's* Apology of Socrates. *A Literary and Philosophical Study With a Running Commentary,* Leiden 1994 = Slings (1994).
Sheffield, F.C.C., *Plato's* Symposium*: The Ethics of Desire*, Oxford 2006 = Sheffield (2006).
Taylor, A.E., *Plato. The Man and His Work*, London & New York 1936 = Taylor (1932).
Vallejo-Campos, A., "The Theory of Conflict in Plato's *Republic*" in N. Notomi & L. Brisson (eds.), *Dialogues on Plato's* Politeia *(*Republic*). Selected Papers from the Ninth Symposium Platonicum*, Sankt Augustin 2013, 192-198 = Vallejo-Campos (2013).