Thiemo Breyer
Marco Cavallaro
Rodrigo Y. Sandoval (eds.)

Phenomenology of Phantasy and Emotion

wbg Academic

Schriften zur
Phänomenologie
und Anthropologie 1

Thiemo Breyer, Marco Cavallaro, Rodrigo Y. Sandoval (eds.)

Phenomenology of Phantasy and Emotion

Schriften zur Phänomenologie und Anthropologie

Band 1

Thiemo Breyer, Marco Cavallaro, Rodrigo Y. Sandoval (eds.)

Phenomenology of Phantasy and Emotion

wbg Academic

Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)
Projektnummer 57444011
SFB 806

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation
in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische
Daten sind im Internet über www.dnb.de abrufbar

wbg Academic ist ein Imprint der wbg

Die Herausgabe des Werkes wurde durch die
Vereinsmitglieder der wbg ermöglicht.
Satz und eBook: Satzweiss.com Print, Web, Software GmbH
Gedruckt auf säurefreiem und
alterungsbeständigem Papier
Printed in Germany

Besuchen Sie uns im Internet: www.wbg-wissenverbindet.de

ISBN 978-3-534-40621-0

Elektronisch ist folgende Ausgabe erhältlich:
eBook (PDF): 978-3-534-40622-7

Table of Contents

Sham Emotions, Quasi-Emotions, or Non-Genuine Emotions?

Fictional Emotions and Their Qualitative Feel

Íngrid Vendrell Ferran

Abstract: Contemporary accounts of fictional emotions, i.e., emotions experienced towards objects we know to be fictional, are mainly concerned with explaining their rationality or lack thereof. In this context dominated by an interest in the role of belief, questions regarding their phenomenal quality have received far less attention: it is often assumed that they feel 'similar' to emotions that target real objects. Against this background, this paper focuses on the possible specificities of the qualitative feel of fictional emotions. It starts by presenting what I call the 'phenomenological question' about the qualitative feel of fictional emotions (section 1) and by showing that this is irreducible to questions about their cognitive, intentional, evaluative, and embodied nature (section 2). Drawing on some insights from early phenomenologists, the next two sections elaborate criteria for distinguishing between real and sham emotions on the one hand (section 3), and between genuine and non-genuine emotions, on the other (section 4). Finally, I apply this orthogonal distinction to the particular case of fictional emotions (section 5). The paper argues that fictional emotions are neither sham emotions nor quasi-emotions, but full-fledged emotional experiences, despite them displaying the distinctive phenomenology of emotions experienced as non-genuine. In the particular case of fictional emotions, they are non-genuine, because our psychology is in fact in a state dominated by aesthetic enjoyment.

Keywords: Sham Emotions, Quasi-emotions, (Non-)Genuine Emotions, (In)authentic Emotions, Fictional Emotions, Qualitative Feel, Imagination

1 Fictional Emotions: The Cognitive and the Phenomenological Question

Contemporary accounts on fictional emotions, i.e., emotions we experience towards objects we know to be fictional, have mainly sought to explain their rationality or lack thereof. Already Colin Radford's paper "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?" (1975) provocatively described fictional emotions as paradoxical and as a blatant case of doxastic and practical irrationality. This intervention prompted a prolific debate on what is known as "the paradox of fiction" (for an overview, Konrad et al. 2018). The discussions around this paradox, mostly of analytical provenance, were concerned with understanding how it is possible to react emotionally towards something we know to be fictional. The debate was largely dominated by a cognitivist view of the emotions typical of early analytical accounts, according to which emotions require beliefs to take place or are themselves a form of belief.[1] Over time, the cognitivist paradigm has been rejected and substituted by cognitive approaches that acknowledge the function of states other than belief, such as perceptions or imaginings, as constitutive elements of the emotions. As a result, the view that fictional emotions are paradoxical has also been challenged, leading to the conclusion that the paradox is obsolete and even a fiction in itself (Moyal-Sharrock 2009, 169). If emotion does not require belief, then there is nothing odd about reacting emotionally to objects that we know do not exist. Yet, this verdict on the paradox does not necessarily imply that we have already explained everything about our emotional reactions towards fiction. What remains to be clarified, and indeed what comprises the main focus of this paper, is the entanglement between emotion and imagination in responding to fiction.[2] In particular, I will be considering how fictional emotions feel: Do the lack of belief and the influence of imagination have an impact on how fictional emotions are experienced?

---

1 For the idea that emotions require belief, see Kenny (1963, 193f.); and for the idea that emotions are a form of judgment, Solomon (1993, 126).

2 The paradox of fiction might be grounded on false premises about emotions, but thinking about fictional emotions is still instructive for understanding our engagement with art. For a similar view, see Stecker (2011, 296).

This question has been rather neglected and trivialized in contemporary philosophy. In a context that is largely dominated by cognitivist and cognitive accounts of emotions, it became natural to focus on aspects of emotions' cognitive structure, which appeared to be problematic (primarily their lack of belief in the existence of the targeted object). Thus, philosophers were preoccupied with what I call 'the cognitive question,' i.e., the question about the role of rational belief in fictional emotions. Against this background, questions regarding the phenomenal quality of fictional emotions received far less attention. Either it was considered a question of secondary importance, or it was tacitly or implicitly assumed that their phenomenology (often reduced to their somatic elements) is similar to that of emotions targeting objects known to be real. Kendall Walton can be seen as a representative of this view. As is well known, Walton claims that unlike emotions towards real objects, fictional emotions are neither based on beliefs nor do they motivate actions and that, as a result, they are quasi-emotions rather than full-fledged emotional experiences.[3] However, when it comes to their phenomenology, he considers this to be *similar* to emotions directed towards real objects. As he puts it, Charles, a cinemagoer who claims to be afraid of the green slime, is in a *similar* condition to that of a person fearing a real disaster: "[h]is muscles are tensed, he clutches his chair, his pulse quickens, his adrenaline flows" (Walton 1990, 196). Walton's 'similarity hypothesis' (as I call it) entails, in fact, two claims: first, the assumption that fictional emotions and emotions towards real objects feel alike; and second, that their phenomenology can be explained in terms of their physiology. Both theses have been typical of a whole generation of approaches to fictional emotions that continue to circulate in current research.

Should we take the similarity hypothesis for granted? – I think not. It cannot be naively assumed that fictional emotions feel similar to emotions targeting real objects, nor can it be taken for granted that the phenomenology of an emotion (fictional or not) can be reduced to its physiology. The question of 'what it is like' to experience a fictional emotion still has to be posed in the current debate. It is precisely this question, which I call 'the phenomenological question,' that forms the central concern of this paper.

[3] The term 'quasi-emotion' was employed by Meinong at the beginning of the 20th century in a similar sense. However, Meinong (1977, 310) claimed that the phenomenal quality of 'quasi-emotions' is different from the phenomenal quality of emotions towards real objects. This was a topic of dispute with Witasek, for whom both are felt alike (see Vendrell Ferran 2010).

Let me start by mentioning two reasons for stressing the significance of this unexplored area of research. Both reasons indicate a possible difference in the phenomenology of fictional emotions compared to that of our emotions towards real objects. First, we know from first-person experience that despite being very intense, our emotions towards fictional objects are experienced as being more superficial and as not having the same weight on our psychology. Certainly, Anna Karenina can make us cry, but the sadness we experience while reading this novel has something hollow about it when compared to the sadness towards a friend in a similar situation. In addition, like Walton's cinemagoer Charles, we can also feel afraid of the green slime in the movie. If my physiological reaction were measured, my fear would probably show similar patterns as my fear towards a real-life danger. However, these physiological similarities would not suffice to prevent us from claiming that our fictional fear is coreless compared to the fear we might experience towards a real threat: we feel the impulse to protect ourselves from the slime, but, ultimately, we remain seated in the cinema and even enjoy the experience. However, if the green slime were real and situated in my room right now, I would definitively run away.

The second reason originates from some historical considerations. There is a long tradition in aesthetics holding that emotions experienced under the influence of imagination show a distinctive phenomenology. One of the most prominent proponents of this view is Hume. In *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739/40), he develops a cognitive theory of emotions, but he acknowledges that fictional emotions do not require belief (in fact, he treats fictions as lies) and describes the phenomenology of fictional emotions in the following terms:

> A passion, which is disagreeable in real life, may afford the highest entertainment in a tragedy, or epic poem. In the latter case it lies not with that weight upon us: It feels less firm and solid: And has no other than the agreeable effect of exciting the spirits, and rouzing the attention. The difference in the passions is a clear proof of a like difference in those ideas, from which the passions are derived. (Hume 2008, 85)

In Hume's view, the differences on the phenomenological level (which he takes for granted) are derived from differences on the cognitive level. In short: the fact that we do not believe that the object of our emotion exists (and, thus, the protagonist does not really suffer, etc.), but merely imagine it, leads us to experience such

emotions as distant and less solid. It is precisely because of this distance that we are able to enjoy emotions that would be unpleasant when experienced in real life.

Hume's view was echoed by the main representatives of German aesthetics in the late 19th and early 20th century. In *Das Wesen der Kunst*, Lange (1901, 100, 105) describes fictional emotions as "dulled, moderate and as stuck half-way." In "Das Problem der ästhetischen Scheingefühle", Geiger (1914, 191f.) depicts them as being of shorter duration, less influential, and distant. By virtue of their sham character they are as-if experiences; they lack weight and cannot be taken seriously. Meinong (1902, 313), in *Über Annahmen*, describes them as being "*uneingentlich verspürt*" (experienced as non-genuine). Though offering different explanations of the phenomenon, these authors endorse the view that their felt quality differs from the felt quality of our emotions towards objects known to be real.

In contemporary philosophy, there are only very scattered discussions about the possibility that the imagination (by engaging in idiosyncratic phantasies or engaging with fictions) influences the way in which we experience our emotions (Kenny 1963, 49; Ryle 1963, 103; Budd 1985, 128; Pugmire 2005, 36). But this phenomenon has rarely been the focus of research due to the predominance of cognitive models mainly interested in the role of belief and not in how emotions under the influence of the imagination are felt.

The phenomenological question is not irrelevant. Analyzing it can lead to a better understanding of how imagination enables, transforms, influences, and even distorts our emotional life. To approach this question, I will turn to the tradition in which much has been done to describe the phenomenal aspects of emotional experience: phenomenology.[4] In particular, I will explore some of the efforts of early phenomenologists to describe and analyze the phenomenal nature of emotions. These efforts can enrich our language, which would otherwise remain too limited to grasp the subtle and complex nuances of our affective life. In the works of Scheler, Geiger, Voigtländer, Haas, and Pfänder, among others, we can find inspiring insights which, once refined in the light of more recent developments in emotion theory, can be fruitfully applied to the question of the phenomenal character of emotions in general and of fictional emotions in particular. Of special interest for the

[4] I will focus here on the question of the qualitative feel, but phenomenology can be applied fruitfully to other aspects of our emotional reactions to fiction. See Cavallaro (2019) for a phenomenological account focusing on the subject's perspective engaging with fiction.

purposes of this paper is an orthogonal distinction, which is mentioned – though not fully developed – in these authors' works: The distinction is between real and sham emotions (cases in which we imagine having an emotion), on the one hand, and between genuine and non-genuine emotions (cases of emotions experienced as out of tune with the rest of our psychology), on the other.

The paper is structured in five main sections. Having introduced the phenomenological question (section 1), I argue for its irreducibility to other questions regarding the cognitive, intentional, evaluative, or embodied nature of emotions (section 2). Drawing on early phenomenology, the next two sections elaborate criteria for distinguishing between real and sham emotions (section 3), and between genuine and non-genuine emotions (section 4). Finally, I apply this distinction to the particular case of fictional emotions (section 5). My thesis is that fictional emotions are neither sham emotions nor quasi-emotions, but full-fledged emotional experiences, though they display the phenomenology that is distinctive of non-genuine emotions. In the particular case of fictional emotions, they are non-genuine, because our psychology is in fact in a state dominated by aesthetic enjoyment.

2 The Irreducibility of the Phenomenological Question

I begin with what I consider to be a necessary refinement of 'the phenomenological question.' This refinement will take place, first, by showing how the qualitative feel of emotions cannot be reduced to any of their other dimensions and, second, by unpacking the elements involved in what I call 'their qualitative feel.' I start by distinguishing five moments of emotional experience. These moments are experienced as unified, but I will treat them separately for analytical purposes. Discussing them will enable me to narrow the phenomenological question down to its essential points.

2.1 Cognitive Dimension

An important aspect of emotions is that they are based and depend on cognitions. They are what phenomenologists call 'founded' states: founded states require other

states in order to occur. In particular, emotions require cognitions which present them with the objects towards which they are directed. The cognitive bases of emotions are a logical (but not temporal) presupposition for an emotion. What counts as a cognitive basis? As mentioned in the introduction, early analytical theories of emotions were mainly cognitivist theories: they attributed a central role to beliefs. However, these accounts offered no explanation of those emotions that are not based on beliefs but on imagining and entertaining, such as disgust targeting a perceived bad smell, fear of an imagined scenario, or hope based on the expectation that a desired state of affairs will happen, as well as fictional emotions. Recent developments have come closer to the view, previously endorsed by early phenomenologists, that states other than belief serve as cognitive bases for emotions (Stocker 1987, 59–69; Elster 1999, 250; Goldie 2000, 145). In this paper, I will consider not only beliefs but also perceptions, sensory imaginings, memories, suppositions and its relatives (such as imagining that something is the case or merely entertaining a thought) as possible cognitive bases of the emotions.

2.2 Object Directedness

The cognitive bases are responsible for presenting us with the objects towards which the emotions are directed. Emotions have a relational structure: they target objects in the world. When referring to this object directedness, contemporary research uses the term 'intentionality.' It has become customary to speak of the objects targeted by the emotions as "material objects," but as used in this debate (and this is the use I will adopt here), the term "object" encompasses not only things, but also animals, persons, situations, and states of affairs (Kenny 1963, 195).[5]

2.3 Evaluative Presentation

That emotions are intentional implies not only that they target objects, but also that when an object (in the broad sense stated above) is targeted, then it is targeted in a particular way. The specific way in which emotions target their objects consists in

[5] A similar claim can be found in early phenomenology (Pfänder 1913, 340; Stein 1989, 101).

presenting them as having a certain evaluative light, aspectual shape or axiological character. My fear of the dog indicates that the dog is dangerous to me. To refer to this evaluative dimension of emotions, it has become usual to speak of the "formal object" (de Sousa 1987, xv, 45) of the emotion. Evaluative properties (also called axiological properties or values) are the formal objects of emotions.[6] I can fear many different things (the material objects of emotions are subject to individual, social, historical, and cultural variations), but fear always indicates that the feared object is threatening for me (emotions have restricted formal objects). According to this view, when we have an emotion, the targeted object is presented as having a certain evaluative property. Note that this idea does not necessarily imply that emotions are perceptions of such evaluative properties (as some proponents of the perceptual model have claimed). It implies only that emotions indicate that the targeted object has such a property. In this paper, I will work with a model of emotions as responses to evaluative qualities previously given to us in a feeling.[7]

2.4 Embodied Nature

Emotions are not just mental states; they are also embodied. Emotions are linked to a wide range of bodily changes and reactions: sensations, arousal, responses in the nervous and visceral system, etc. (e.g., in shame our pulse accelerates, we blush, sweat, etc.). Each emotion also has a repertoire of typical expressions involving facial and bodily changes (e.g., in shame we avoid eye contact, etc.) and is linked to action tendencies (e.g., shame is associated with the tendency to abandon the situation) (Scheler 1973a, 234; Elster 1999, 246).

2.5 Qualitative Feel

Now we reach the central concern of this paper: each emotion has its own peculiar quality of feeling. The colour of sadness differs from the colour of joy. The interesting

[6] For this view in early phenomenology, see Scheler (1973a, 256) and Stein (1989, 98f.).

[7] This view can be found in Scheler (1973a, 259), Reinach (1989, 295, 493), Mulligan (2004, 177–225), and Vendrell Ferran (2008).

point here is not only that emotions differ in their characteristic or typical "colours" (and also in the way in which each emotion colours the world), but also that each emotion might be accompanied by a feeling of the emotion. Emotions are felt and this feeling of the emotion is an important part of the qualitative feel of our emotions, i.e., of the way in which we experience them. Thus, what we call the qualitative feel involves several elements.

Let me unpack some of the elements involved in the qualitative feel of emotions. Sadness has a specific phenomenal quality which makes it different from joy, but sadness is not always experienced in the same way: sadness can be felt as hollow and superficial, or as solid and deep; it might be intensely or calmly experienced; it might be felt as touching or as leaving us indifferent, etc.

A first distinction has to be made between the *typical phenomenology* for each emotion (the feel of sadness differs from the feel of joy) and some *properties* of the phenomenology typical for each emotion (properties we can also feel). The properties of emotions include: duration (emotions have a temporal extension, a beginning and an end, and a course of development); intensity (they might be more or less strong); subjection to the will (some emotions are better controlled than others); valence (they are felt as pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent). This list is not exhaustive, but it indicates a key aspect that is often overlooked in contemporary research: namely that emotions have properties.

Second, some of these elements belonging to the qualitative feel refer to the somatic or sensory phenomenology of emotions: emotions are felt as pleasant, unpleasant, or hedonically neutral; the involved sensations and bodily changes can also be felt; as well as its force to move us or to bind us to inaction. However, other elements refer to their psychological phenomenology: emotions are felt as deep or superficial, central or peripheral, solid or coreless, dense or light, dull or bright, etc. They are felt as being ours or as being of others (as in empathy), as fitting with the rest of our psychology or as unfitting, etc. Unlike the former descriptions that refer to sensory elements, the latter adjectives are metaphorically used to refer to a qualitative dimension of the emotional experience that is not a mere register of physiological changes. The former are feelings of sensory aspects of emotions, while the latter refer to the psychological quality of emotional experience. This dimension of emotions is something that Stocker (1983) calls "psychic feeling"; early

phenomenologists developed an accurate language to describe and explain this aspect of emotions concerning their felt quality.[8]

In addition, we can adopt different attitudes towards the same emotional state: sadness like pain is *per se* unpleasant, but sadness like pain might be enjoyed, suffered, stoically accepted, etc.[9] In the context of fiction, for instance, sadness, as well as fear, or pity, or a considerable amount of emotions otherwise deemed to be negative, are not just tolerated, but enjoyed. These different attitudes also belong to the realm of how an emotion is felt.

Can non-sensory or psychological phenomenology be explained in terms of sensory phenomenology? This is controversial. The adjectives that describe psychological phenomenology are different from those employed to describe sensory phenomenology, but many of them are analogous: we use the language of the senses to describe them and speak of them via metaphors of space, limit, weight, etc. One could claim that this analogy indicates the reduction of the psychological dimension to the sensory one, but one could also claim that the fact that these metaphors resort to the language of the senses indicates that the richness and fine-grainedness of what we feel cannot be easily grasped with our existing psychological vocabulary. I cannot discuss this controversy at length here, since my aim in the remainder of the paper is to examine the qualitative feel of fictional emotion, and this involves both its sensory and its non-sensory phenomenology.

A word needs to be said against possible attempts to reduce the phenomenological question to one of the other moments of the emotions presented above. First, the intentionality of emotions, which involves their object-directedness, and the presentation of the object as having a certain evaluative property might be related to their specific phenomenology (that one dimension cannot be reduced to the other does not exclude the possibility that both dimensions are closely related). But both aspects belong to different moments of the emotional experience: one refers to the objects targeted; the other to the way in which we experience the emotional state. The cognitive question and the phenomenological question approach the emotional experience from two different perspectives: the perspective of the

[8] For instance, as can be found in Pfänder (1913/1916) and Scheler (1973a; 1973b; 1973c).

[9] For the different possibilities of feeling emotional states, see Scheler (1973a, 256).

object, on the one hand, and the perspective of the first-personal experience, on the other.

Second, the qualitative feel of an emotion cannot be reduced to its embodied nature. The embodied nature of emotions refers to their capacity to affect our body, but it leaves aside the question of how they 'feel.' An emotion's physiology, which includes its concomitant manifestations, its arousal, its mimicry, etc., are aspects that can be felt. However, that an emotion appears linked with such reactions is an aspect that must be distinguished from the feeling of such reactions. My pulse might accelerate and my muscles might tighten while fearing a fiction, and this might constitute the embodied dimension of my fear, but the dimension of the qualitative feel focuses on something different: namely, that I can also feel such changes and reactions as completely overwhelming or as distant; I can suffer or enjoy them.

3 Real Emotions and Sham Emotions

In this section, I introduce a distinction between real emotions and emotion-like states which, despite all semblances, are not emotions: sham emotions. As my point of departure, I consider some claims about mental reality developed by Geiger in "Fragment über den Begriff des Unbewussten und die psychische Realität" (1921) and Scheler in "Idols of Self-Knowledge" (1912) and "Realism and Idealism" (1928). According to both authors, in outer as well as in inner perception, delusions and illusions are possible. This idea, which is based on an analogy between outer and inner perception, presupposes (against Descartes and Brentano, but in line with Husserl) that there is no evidence of inner perception. The existence of an emotion does not guarantee its being felt (we can have an emotion and not be conscious of it), we can also have a failed or misleading perception of our emotions (we can think that we love the environment and thus we do not fly, but in fact this love is a disguised fear of flying), and we can experience an emotion without having one (I have the phantasy of being in love and end up experiencing a love-like state). In this last-mentioned case, we have a sham emotion. In the phenomenological field, sham emotions are given different names: "imagined emotions" (*vorgestellte Gefühle*)

(Haas 1910, 14; Pfänder 1916), emotional illusions (*Gefühlsillusionen*), sham emotions (*Scheingefühle*), and emotional phantasies (*Gefühlsphantasien*).[10]

The very idea of a sham emotion might seem puzzling: if someone claims to have an emotional experience, then why should we cast doubt on this? The possibility of experiencing something like an emotion without really having one is the result of seeing inner and outer perception as analogous. In outer perception, it is possible to have the illusion of perceiving a tree without there being a tree to be perceived, and analogically in inner perception it is possible to have the illusion of perceiving an emotion without having one.[11]

The idea that we can experience an emotion-like state which actually is not an emotion implies a normative view about what counts as a real emotion. In general terms, Geiger and Scheler argue that when an object of outer or inner perception is real, it exhibits two features: resistance (*Widerstand*) and effectivity (*Wirksamkeit*). Real objects from outer and inner perception resist being changed at will and are effective in relation to other objects connected with them. As a result, for the particular case of the emotions (which are the object of inner perception) we can extract the following two conditions that must be fulfilled in order to count as real emotions:

3.1 Resistance

Real emotions resist being changed at will. My envy cannot be easily manipulated, though I can adopt a stance towards it and try to change it into admiration. This is partly because emotions are embedded in constellations of cognitions and desires. When trying to manipulate my envy, the thought that I should also possess my neighbour's car reinforces my envy, in the same sense that it does my desire to possess the same car. In many cases, however, even when the desire for the car has disappeared and I no longer believe that I should also have that car, my envy for

[10] The last three expressions can be found in other parts of Scheler's work, where he discusses phantasy-remorse, shame illusions, and automatic simulations. For an overview, see Vendrell Ferran (2008, chapter 3).

[11] There is a running thread in phenomenology according to which not all that is felt is felt as belonging to the same plane of existence. This claim was also made by Merleau-Ponty in his *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945).

the neighbour might persist since it has become a habituality of my emotional life. Emotions have their own inertia and they defy attempts to be changed, controlled, and 'managed.'

3.2 Effectiveness

Emotions not only resist being changed, they also have efficacy over our whole psychology. Within the constellation of cognitions, desires, motivations, and also that of other emotions in which they are embedded, they have psychic force and influence the other states that appear to be linked with them. Thus, my envy will motivate certain thoughts about my neighbour (he does not deserve the car) and myself (I am the one who deserves the car); it appears linked with desires (I want the car); it motivates actions (to defame him or to scratch his car), and it influences existing emotions (envy might reinforce hatred, aversion, etc.).

According to both conditions, a distinction can be traced between real emotions and sham emotions. In "Idols of Self-Knowledge," Scheler (1973b, 65) writes: "The young girl in love does not project her experiences into Isolde or Juliet; she projects the feelings of these poetic figures into her own small experiences." This description points to a specific case in which we adopt the emotions depicted in a novel as if they were our own. Similar references can be found in "Idealism and Realism," where Scheler (1973c, 324) writes:

> […] it is necessary to maintain that, in addition to real feelings which are combined with fantasy-*images*, there are also fantasies of feeling; that in addition to real volitions, there are also the semblances of volition (*Scheinwollungen*) which one really does not will; in addition to real motives, there are also the semblances of motives. Here, too, the phenomenal experience of mental reality is one of resistance. The objective reality of the mental, however, it is its efficacy (*Wirksamkeit*) in the mental context.

According to this, some mental states such as emotions, volitions, and desires have counterparts which, despite all semblances, lack the two aforementioned conditions that need to be met in order to be real: they are not resistant to being modified at will and they do not have psychic force.

Let me extract some important conclusions from these paragraphs, conclusions which in section 5 will be applied to the case of fictional emotions. Take Scheler's example of the person who thinks she is in love after reading a romantic novel. In my view, the example does not seek to characterize what usually happens when we engage with fiction. Instead, it describes a hypothetical scenario in which we end up experiencing an emotion after having exercised our imagination. The descriptions of emotions in novels, our putting ourselves in the depicted situation and in the lives of protagonists, and maybe also our desire to experience certain emotions might lead us to vivid imaginings, such that we end up experiencing an emotional illusion. We are led to feel a love-like state similar to the one described in the novel. This does not always happen when we engage with fiction; we are not always so fatally infected by the emotions represented in the novel that we end up thinking that these emotions are ours, but nevertheless it is a possibility, if only a remote one.

The emotional illusion described by Scheler is not confined to fictional contexts. Emotional illusions might very well be induced by our own willingness to feel, our attitude of sensation-seeking, our search for an emotional high as well as our sentimentalist attitude. Imagine the following case which, employing an expression of Ortega y Gasset (2012, 28), I will denominate the 'lover of love':[12] a person wants to fall in love, she knows very well how it feels to be in love (because she has already experienced such feelings or because she knows by testimony how it feels to be in love), she desires to experience this intense and agreeable emotion and imagines how nice it would be to have this feeling. One day, she projects this arsenal of powerful and intense desires and phantasies onto another person, claims to be in love and enjoys the feeling. Now suppose that the loved one needs help, and the lover is not really motivated to support him, she does not have time or energy for this. We would be suspicious about the reality of this love. Or suppose that one day, A, who claims to be in love with B, meets C and then the love for B turns pale and vanishes, appears to be superficial and not really affecting the person's core so that A feels no resistance to move her love from B to C. A will claim that the love for B was not real and that, guided by the desire to fall in love, she fabricated the emotion. Now that she is in love with C, she knows that her previous love for B was just a fabrication.

These cases illustrate the possibility of a 'hyperactivity of the mind' (again, I take this expression from Ortega y Gasset) in which our imagination, guided by our

[12] Else Voigtländer (1910) also has some references to the phenomenon.

desires to feel a certain emotion, ends up producing an emotion-like state. The case is not limited to love since we can also experience false remorse or false shame: we want to feel these emotions because this would be morally, socially, psychologically appropriate and convenient for us, and then we end up feeling them. However, sham emotions (as I employ the term) lack both of the conditions needed for an emotion to be real: they do not resist attempts at changing them and they lack psychic force. The pseudo-love depicted above vanishes when the lover finds a better suited object for her love, and it does not display efficacy: the lover does not support the loved one, does not feel motivated to action associated with love, etc.[13]

These phenomenological descriptions are instructive, but they do not offer an explanation of sham emotions. So, in what follows, my aim is to unveil how sham emotions function and to offer an explanation of them. I will argue that sham emotions are closer to imaginings than emotions. They are – as I shall argue – a subclass of imaginings. I begin my argument by showing that sham emotions are built upon imaginings: we imagine how nice it is to be in love, we imagine that feeling remorse would be appropriate, etc. These imaginings are, for different reasons, convenient for us. They involve a positive output in our emotional economy: they are pleasant and edifying, they lead to a positive self-image, etc.

Now, my claim is not only that sham emotions are built on imaginings, but that they are themselves a form of imagining. In fact, sham emotions seem to be a follow-up imagining built on these imaginings. Let me explicate this by introducing two arguments and a hypothesis. The first argument is based on a feature that has been attributed to imagination, but not to emotion: imaginings are subjected to the will, while emotions are something that happens to us. Like imaginings, but unlike real emotions, sham emotions are subjected to our will, they are easy to control and to 'manage.'

The second argument derives from another feature attributed to the imagination: compared to other forms of consciousness of objects, such as emotions that respond to properties experienced as objective properties of an object, we have a relative freedom to constitute the object of our imaginings and its properties. In this respect, sham emotions are closer to imaginings: rather than responding to an objective

[13] A real love might turn into hatred, but as long as it is love, it resists to vanish and has mental force. This is a crucial difference with sham love which from the very beginning lacks both properties.

property of their objects, they are projections of desired properties onto objects of our choice. These objects are chosen because they fit our needs and desires. Thus, in the case of a sham emotion, rather than reacting to some evaluative properties of these objects, we project onto the targeted objects evaluative properties of our convenience (the other appears to me attractive because I want to fall in love and because I know that in love it is expected that the other appears attractive to me).

Hence, sham emotions are not only induced by imaginings (imagining being in love, being a better person, etc.), but, according to the two arguments above, they function like imaginings rather than emotions. It is not just that the content towards which sham emotions are directed is presented by imaginings, but also that the mode in which sham emotions target this content is quite similar to the mode in which imaginings target the imagined objects: the objects of our imaginings are subjected to the will, its qualities are freely chosen by us and we are free to project onto these objects the qualities that we want.

One possible objection at this point is that sham emotions are embodied states associated with a specific physiology and phenomenology typical of emotions. In the case of sham love presented above, the 'lover of love' claims to undergo the typical bodily sensations and expressions as well as the typical phenomenology associated with love. This is certainly true and incontestable. Thus, rather than arguing against this possible objection, I will offer a hypothesis to explain how it comes to be that sham emotions are felt.

As mentioned above, motivated by sentimentalism, by sensation-seeking, by wanting to be a better person, etc., we are the ones who fabricate a sham emotion. Such emotions are not only convenient for us, they also presuppose that we already know how they feel. In fact, we are unable to experience sham emotions if we do not know in advance (either first-hand or through testimony of others) what their real counterparts feel like.

Here is where my hypothesis comes into play. This hypothesis indicates a similarity in the phenomenology of sham emotions and a specific sort of imaginings. In sham emotions, we not only *imagine that* we experience an emotion, but we *imagine having* an emotion. The first case is one of propositional imaginings: you imagine that you are in love, you imagine yourself from an external perspective and attribute to your imagined self the specific sensations, expressions, physiology, etc., as well as a specific qualitative feel that you know to be typical of love. The second case, where you imagine having an emotion, is a case of experiential or sensory

imagining, where you imagine yourself being in love from an internal perspective. You not only attribute to your imagined self a set of sensations, expressions, etc., and a specific phenomenology, but you also imagine feeling them. Such sensory imaginings seem to have the power to leave the subject of such imaginings in a similar state.[14] In this respect, sham emotions function like sensory imaginings: because we imagine ourselves to be in a certain emotional state, we tend to find ourselves in a similar condition.

Two conclusions can be drawn now. First, the two arguments and the hypothesis show that sham emotions are closer to sensory imaginings than to real emotions. Perhaps they have a hybrid nature that combines elements of emotions and of imaginings.[15] I will come back to this conclusion in section 5 to reject all those approaches which claim that fictional emotions are sham or pretend emotions, cases of emotions that arise from imagining from the inside.

Second: the difference between sham and real emotions pertains to their reality as mental states (sham emotions are not emotions but real imaginings), but this difference also implies a difference in the quality in which an emotion is felt. Sham emotions – probably by virtue of their imaginary nature – have a peculiar qualitative feel: they are experienced as thin, coreless, light, and superficial. However, these features which affect their phenomenology are also shared by some of their real counterparts; for instance, a real sadness can also be experienced as thin, coreless, light, and superficial. Thus, we need to look elsewhere to explain these differences regarding how we experience a mental state.

---

[14] I base my argumentation here on an idea put forward by Wollheim (1984, 70), who argues the following with regard to iconic mental states: "That iconic mental states have a tendency to leave the person in a residual condition appropriate to what they represent, […] is probably the most important single fact about them as far as their contribution to the way in which we lead our lives is concerned." The case that I describe would be a case of "central imagining" (ibid., 79f.) in Wollheim's terminology. According to him, central imaginings have a point of view (they are imagined from the perspective of the character), they have 'plenitude' (when we imagine the character doing something, we tend to imagine his thinking, experiencing, feeling, etc.) and 'cogency' (when we imagine the protagonist thinking, experiencing, feeling, we tend to find ourselves in the same condition in which the mental states that I imagine would leave me if I were to have them).

[15] The idea that such emotions have a hybrid character can be found in Meinong (1977, 312). It was also defended by Saxinger (1908, 411) and Schwarz (1906, 84). These authors, however, describe fictional emotions in terms of quasi-emotions.

4 Genuine and Non-Genuine Emotions

Regarding how emotions are felt, early phenomenologists distinguished genuine from non-genuine emotions (used synonymously with the couple authentic/inauthentic). This distinction is not to be conflated with that between real and sham emotions, though they might in certain circumstances overlap. In order to elaborate specific criteria for this distinction, I first discuss three descriptions of this phenomenon as found in Voigtländer, Pfänder, and Haas.

In *Vom Selbstgefühl*, Voigtländer (1910, 94f.) claims that non-genuine (*uneigentlich*) feelings "are experienced in all cases of attitudinizing, acting, presenting oneself, pretending, boasting, also in fantasized experiences, in self-deception and sham existence." Those emotions, which have their origin in experiencing ourselves from a third-person perspective and in playing a role, also count as non-genuine. The nature of non-genuine emotions is playful, airy, and less solid than the nature of our genuine ones (Haas 1910, 97). They are experienced as distant, as having their origins outside the self (in artworks and in the intersubjective sphere). Similar descriptions can be found in Pfänder's *Psychologie der Gesinnungen*. For Pfänder, not only emotions, but also sentiments as well as thoughts can be authentic (*echt*) or inauthentic (*unecht*). Inauthentic states have a "pale," "schematic," "hollow," "airy," "coreless," and "insubstantial" nature (Pfänder 1913, 58).

In *Über Echtheit und Unechtheit von Gefühlen*, Haas (1910, 24) uses the distinction to refer to how an emotion is felt at a certain moment according to our own attitude or stance towards it. According to Haas, an emotion is inauthentic (*unecht*) when, at the moment of being felt, there is an underlying dominant emotion that contradicts it. In his view, we then experience this contradiction in a feeling. There is a "feeling of depth" (ibid., 23) when we experience both emotions as being in tune with one another, and the lack of this feeling points to a contradiction between the two emotional states.

In contemporary research, there is a tendency to conflate the question of the genuineness – or authenticity – of an emotion with the question of its reality (Mulligan 2009), and that of whether emotions fit in with the character of a person.[16] In contrast, early phenomenologists make clear that the distinction between genuineness

[16] Pugmire (2005, 36, 185) speaks of real emotions and "factitious emotions." Real emotions are, for Pugmire, emotions characteristic of a person, while factitious emotions are

and non-genuineness (authenticity and inauthenticity) is neither a question of the reality of an emotion nor one of how the emotion fits in with a person's character; rather, it concerns exclusively *how an emotion is felt at a specific moment*. In what follows, I will extract some findings from the phenomenological view in order to develop my own account of non-genuineness.

First, to be genuine or non-genuine is a *mode* of experiencing an emotion, i.e., it refers to how the emotion is felt. What is different is not the emotion and its properties (valence, duration, intensity, etc.), but the way in which I relate to it. Thus, to be genuine or non-genuine is not a property of the emotion. Properties such as intensity or duration belong to the nature of the emotion, but to be genuine or non-genuine concerns a form in which the emotion is experienced.

Second, to be genuine or non-genuine refers to the *stance* of the subject towards its own emotion. Emotions felt as non-genuine are experienced as *subjectively not belonging to us* in the same sense that genuine emotions do. Thus, to be genuine or non-genuine is a mode of experiencing an emotion *in relation to our psychology*. Given that this relation can change, the same emotion might be felt as genuine at one time and as non-genuine at another.

Third, it refers to how we experience an emotion *at a certain moment*. Thus, an emotion might be non-genuine and nevertheless fit the character of a person. For instance, a melancholic person might be prone to experience all emotions as distant, as not really touching him. Genuine and non-genuine emotions are subjected to transformation in accordance with how the rest of our psychology changes. An emotion which is felt as non-genuine might transform into a genuine one (and vice versa). A child loves her new sister because he has internalized this emotion from his environment, but this love can be non-genuine because of an underlying ambivalence towards the newborn. This non-genuine love might turn into a genuine one when the deeper ambivalence disappears.

Finally, these concepts are employed by the phenomenologists with a *descriptive* purpose. No pejorative connotation is involved. They describe how we experience our emotions in relation to the rest of our psychology at a given moment. Used in this descriptive sense, genuineness and non-genuineness are not normative

emotions that arise via mimicry or medicaments. De Sousa (1987, 12) also discusses the extent to which authentic emotions are dependent on the character of a person.

concepts, i.e., they do not refer to how we should feel in certain circumstances, but rather to how we actually experience our emotions at a given moment.

These four claims provide the foundation on which to develop accurate criteria for distinguishing genuine from non-genuine emotions, criteria that I will use in the next section to explain the distinctive phenomenology of fictional emotions. Like Haas, I will propose what might be dubbed a 'coherence model.'[17] According to this model, non-genuine emotions presuppose the simultaneous existence of two emotional states (1. simultaneity). But unlike Haas, I do not locate the force of my explanation in the existence of contradictory feelings. In fact, I do not think that the simultaneous emotions must contradict each other. Instead my model argues that the simultaneous emotions must be of a different type (not necessarily contradicting each other) (2. typological difference). What makes an emotion genuine or non-genuine is the way in which the subject relates to it (3. subjective stance).

The genuine emotion is genuine because the subject feels involved in it, while he feels not involved in the non-genuine (3.1. subjective involvement). Moreover, genuine emotions are experienced as fitting with significant elements of the momentary psychology, while non-genuine emotions are experienced as unfitting with these significant elements (3.2. subjective fittingness). A genuine emotion is experienced as fitting (independently of whether it is really fitting) in with our cognitive (beliefs, perceptions, imaginings, memories, etc.), motivational (desires, wishes, volitions), emotional (emotions, moods, sentiments), etc., structure. Non-genuine emotions might be experienced as fitting, but only within a restricted subsystem of our momentary psychology and not within our momentary psychology as a whole. Thus the subject feels the genuine emotion as coherent compared to the non-genuine emotion (3.3. comparative fittingness).

According to this view, the non-genuine emotion is felt as unfitting in our psychology because at the time of being felt, our psychology is dominated by a different emotional state that is experienced as fitting. In my view, it is because it is experienced as unfitting that we describe them as coreless, light, thin, less solid, etc. It refers to how you experience the emotion at a certain moment as not having the weight with which we might experience the same emotion on other occasions.

[17] The model differs from the model offered by Salmela (2005), who argues for a reconciliation of normative and descriptive perspectives on authenticity and offers a coherence model according to which emotions are coherent with values and beliefs.

Let me clarify this model with an example. I call it the 'Sadness 1' example: Imagine that you enjoy having been promoted, but at the same time you feel sad because your colleague's promotion was rejected. Your sadness is real, you care about your colleague and you think that he deserves a promotion: it cannot be manipulated at will and it has efficacy (it motivates you to hug him, to comfort him, to encourage him to apply again, etc.). However, this sadness is felt as non-genuine. You experience this sadness simultaneously with joy. Both emotions are of different types: the joy is felt as concerning you more than the sadness, it is supported by the rest of your psychology (you desired to be promoted, you believed that you deserved it, the promotion is of value to you, you hoped to be promoted, etc.), while the sadness is embedded in a subsystem existing within (you appreciate your colleague and this benevolence towards him is supported by beliefs about him, motivations to help him and positive emotions towards him, but his desires, beliefs, values, and hopes are not yours). Moreover, you feel the joy as fitting and the sadness as lacking coherence.

Now consider the hypothetical case of 'Sadness 2.' Imagine that for a moment you are overwhelmed by the reactions of your colleague, the joy loses its preponderance and the sadness towards him becomes dominant. Now, the sadness is experienced as genuine, and the joy as non-genuine. Still, you experience two emotions of a different type simultaneously, but you have taken a stance towards the sadness, you are more involved in the sadness than in the joy, the former is felt as being coherent with the rest of your psychology, while the joy is felt as less coherent (now what counts is not your personal purposes, but the values that you endorse; and you cannot tolerate unfairness). The sadness is felt as comparatively more fitting in the momentary state of your psychology than the non-genuine joy. However, both emotions are real, both are resistant to being changed at will and both have efficacy (my joy in this case continues to motivate me, influencing my thoughts, etc., but now it operates in a subsystem that is much more restricted than the sadness that has become dominant within my psychology).

There are two important results of this process. First, the non-genuine sadness (Sadness 1) has transformed into a genuine one (Sadness 2), whose impact on our mental and motivational life has a wider scope than that of the non-genuine one. However, Sadness 1 and Sadness 2 are the same sadness. What has changed is how we experience the emotions according to our subjective stance towards them. Thus, the difference is a psychological difference, not a structural one. Second, and as

a corollary of the first result, real emotions might be genuine or non-genuine according to how we experience them. Genuine and non-genuine emotions are real emotions: they show resistance to being modified at will and exhibit psychological force by influencing our thoughts and actions.

5 Fictional Emotions and Their Qualitative Feel

A long tradition in aesthetics claims that fictional emotions are what I called sham emotions above. In fact, for Lange, Geiger, and Meinong, fictional emotions have a distinctive phenomenology because they are not emotions, but rather emotion-like states. Lange (1901, 104) holds that the emotions of the audience, actors, and artists are "emotional imaginings, emotional illusions or sham emotions [*Gefühlsvorstellungen, Illusiongsgefühle oder Scheingefühle*]" (we are not victims of self-deception, since we know that we are reacting to something fictional). According to Geiger (1914, 191f.), sham emotions (*Scheingefühle*) are of a shorter duration, bound to specific situations, less influential than our real emotions, and we can enjoy them despite them being unpleasant. In a similar vein, Meinong (1977, 310) argues that fictional emotions are quasi-emotions because they are based on suppositions, they lack motivational force, and they have a different phenomenology.

Unlike these accounts, contemporary approaches take for granted that the phenomenology of emotions towards real objects and fictional emotions is similar, but they come to the same conclusion. Walton defines the latter 'quasi-emotions' (or 'make-believe emotions') as imagined emotions that emerge by 'imagining from the inside.' Such emotions emerge when we imagine ourselves to be in a fictional situation. We have a 'quasi-emotion' when we are at the cinema and we imagine being the film's protagonist. About his hypothetical cinemagoer, Walton (1993, 242) claims: "Charles is participating psychologically in his game of make-believe. It is not true but fictional that he fears the slime. […] It is fictional that he is afraid, and it is fictional that he says he is." This quasi-fear is structurally similar to the quasi-fear of the child playing a game of make-believe. The child acts as if he is afraid, even though he knows that there is no real danger just as the cinemagoer pretends to be afraid. Mulligan (2006) takes fictional emotions to be quasi-emotions or as-if emotions, a phenomenon that he distinguishes from imagining that one has an emotion.

In his view, quasi-emotions are experienced as having the sensations that are typical of their real counterparts, but they are subjected to the will.

Employing the criteria developed in the preceding two sections, I will argue against the view that fictional emotions are a product of the imagination. However, acknowledging the influence of the imagination on them, I will defend the view that despite them being *real emotions*, fictional emotions are felt as *non-genuine*. Fictional emotions display all five aspects typical of emotions, though they exhibit specificities in each of these features, meaning that we can speak of them as constituting a specific subclass.

5.1 Cognitive Bases

In fictional emotions, we do not believe that the targeted object exists. This is not a problem once we endorse a broad cognitivism according to which states other than belief can be bases for the emotions. Fictional emotions are based on cognitions, but in them perceptions, imaginings, and suppositions might play a more significant role than beliefs.[18] Charles fears the slime and his fear is based on the perception of some moving image, his imaginings about the situation, and the thought that the presented state of affairs is true in the fictional world in which he imaginatively participates.

The lack of belief is typical not just of fictional emotions, but of many emotions based on imaginings. My hope to win the lottery does not entail the belief that I will win the lottery; rather, it is based on a desired state of affairs that is merely entertained as a future (but uncertain) possibility. My fear of a ghost in the cellar does not entail the belief that there is a ghost in the cellar, but instead is based on an imagining that this could be the case. Thus, in terms of their cognitive structure, fictional emotions are not substantially different from our emotions towards non-fictional objects. (Henceforth, once we abandon the cognitivist paradigm of emotions, the so-called 'paradox of fiction' vanishes.) However, there is a specific feature in the case of fictional emotions. Their cognitive bases have been accurately prepared and designed by filmmakers, artists, and poets to trigger certain emotions.

[18] This broad cognitivism has also been endorsed by Matravers (2006, 254).

5.2 Object Directedness

Moreover, the fact that the targeted objects of fictional emotions are non-existent objects is a feature that is also shared by other emotions targeting hypothetical scenarios (hope), objects belonging to the past (remorse), or imaginary objects (enjoying a daydream) (see Moran 1994). However, on this point, fictional emotions are unique insofar as their objects pertain to a fictional world. The world of fiction is a human artefact, a product that is developed within the institution "fiction" and that can be experienced in a similar way by others.

5.3 Evaluative Character

If we react to fictional objects, then we do so because the targeted objects are presented as having certain evaluative properties and as demanding from us a specific response. In this respect, emotions towards fictional objects have this feature in common with emotions towards real objects. The specificity in relation to fictional emotions is that these evaluative properties have been arranged by the fiction-makers using the tools offered by language, rhythm, light, etc., so that certain objects appear to the audience as embodying a certain property.

5.4 Embodied Dimension

Fictional emotions also have an embodied dimension. In this regard, they are associated with the same features as emotions towards real objects. They appear linked with specific sensations, expressions, etc. They make us cry and laugh, they make us tremble and feel excited.

5.5 Qualitative Feel

Against the similarity hypothesis, I mentioned in section 2 that fictional emotions are experienced as being coreless, thin, superficial, less solid, etc. This feature is not unique to them, since, as stated in section 4, many of our emotions towards real

objects are also experienced in similar terms. Their phenomenology can thus be explained by applying the coherence model developed before. A fictional emotion is experienced simultaneously with another emotion; this fictional emotion is of a different kind, and the way in which we relate to it is different: we are less involved in it and we feel it as not fitting within the whole of our current psychology. What is specific to fictional emotions is that the predominant emotion when we engage with fiction is one of aesthetic enjoyment.[19] It is this underlying aesthetic enjoyment, or pleasure, that explains why fictional emotions, though structurally the same as emotions towards real objects, are experienced with a different psychological quality.

Consider Charles again: Charles is afraid of the slime, but simultaneously enjoys the film. Fear is different from aesthetic enjoyment. Charles' attitude is closer to enjoyment than fear. Fear is experienced as contextual (he went to the cinema to enjoy the cinematic experience). His aesthetic enjoyment is supported by his thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc., the fear has a much more limited scope, and it is embedded within a much more restricted subsystem of his current psychology, which is dominated at this moment by aesthetic enjoyment. Charles fears the perceived slime in the movie, but he does not believe that the slime can attack him, his perceptual field is only partially supporting the idea that there is a slime, once he looks to his side he sees the other cinemagoer enjoying the fear-inducing monster. His fear can motivate him to cover his eyes or to scream, but he remains seated (only when Charles stops enjoying this fear will he leave the cinema, but this would be an indicator that his non-genuine fear has turned into a genuine one). If one were to ask him: 'Are you truly afraid?,' he would answer: 'Not really.' But the 'really' here does not mean that he just imagines feeling afraid; it means only that he feels the lack of coherence of his fear within the whole of his psychology. In short, Charles' fear is non-genuine: he is not only afraid, he is also in a state of aesthetic enjoyment. It is precisely their lack of genuineness that makes non-genuine emotions feel the way they feel: superficial, less solid, coreless, etc.

Proponents of the quasi-emotion view might object that what Charles is really doing is imagining that he is afraid without being afraid. Walton (1997, 247) reminds us that: "Charles does not imagine merely *that* he is afraid; he imagines *being* afraid,

[19] Drawing on Kant, Seel (2013, 222) has argued that fictional emotions are a case of "mixed feelings." Like my approach, he points to the simultaneity of emotions while engaging with art; however, my model argues that the emotions experienced while engaging with art take place on two different levels, namely the aesthetic pleasure or displeasure that is dominant compared to the fictional emotions.

and he imagines this *from the inside*." Charles imagines that he is scared and then he feels as if he were part of the fictive world. For Walton, fictional emotions are a form of make-believe.

Against this possible reply, it could be argued that fictional emotions display not only all the features characteristic of emotions (rather than the features characteristic of imaginings), but also that they resist being changed at will and show efficacy within the psychology of the individual experiencing them. Regarding the condition of resistance, Charles cannot manipulate his fear. His fear resists attempts to be changed at will. Certainly, we can convince ourselves that the slime is not there, and this might calm us, but Charles' experience is not a case of pretending to have an emotion. When I pretend to have an emotion and I act as if I had one, I can cease pretending whenever I want; I can configure the situation at will, and I am aware that I am acting as if I had an emotion. None of this happens when I experience a fictional emotion: I cannot decide to stop my feeling when I want, I cannot configure the situation at will because I am participating in a fiction accepting the conditions set by an artist and the artwork, and I am not aware of pretending to experience an emotion because I do not pretend to be afraid – I am really afraid.

Fictional emotions also exhibit effectiveness. Unlike Walton, who writes that "[f]ear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all" (ibid., 202), Moran (1994) and Goldie (2003) have shown that many emotions about non-existent objects do not motivate actions. They can motivate, but it is not necessary that they do so. For example, I can imagine myself in a hypothetical situation that is precarious and then feel fear, but this fear does not motivate any action. This would be a case of emotion towards a non-existent object that does not motivate action. Yet, some emotions about non-existent objects might motivate action: for instance, when I read a historical book about slavery, the pity I feel might motivate me to donate to a charity. Such emotions towards non-existent objects might motivate action and they might also influence our thoughts or change our beliefs so that they might have the same psychological force as our emotions towards real objects.

6 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have argued that fictional emotions are neither sham emotions nor quasi-emotions, but real emotions experienced as non-genuine. They are

non-genuine because, in this particular case, they are experienced simultaneously with a dominant emotion of aesthetic enjoyment. I have mentioned different possible ways in which the imagination can influence our emotions. First, it is possible that we imagine feeling an emotion and end up in an emotion-like state. Second, we can react emotionally towards imaginary objects, fictional objects being a subclass of imaginary objects. Furthermore, we can have emotional experiences towards fictions by imaginatively participating in the fictional universe and the characters' psychology. Finally, emotions that arise in the context of art objects tend to be felt as non-genuine, because what is genuine is our aesthetic enjoyment.[20]

References

Budd, M. (1985). *Music and The Emotions: The Philosophical Theories*. London: Routledge.

Cavallaro, M. (2019). Towards a Phenomenological Analysis of Fictional Emotions. *Phainomenon. Journal of Phenomenological Philosophy* 29, 57–81.

de Sousa, R. (1987). *The Rationality of Emotion*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Elster, J. (1999). *Alchemies of the Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Geiger, M. (1914). Das Problem der ästhetischen Scheingefühle. *Bericht des Kongresses für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, Berlin 7.–9. Oktober 1913, 191–195.

Geiger, M. (1921). Fragment über den Begriff des Unbewussten und die psychische Realität. *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* 4, 1–137.

Goldie, P. (2000). *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldie, P. (2003). Narrative, Emotion and Perspective. In: M. Kieran & D. McIver Lopes (Eds.), *Imagination, Philosophy, and the Arts*. London: Routledge, 54–69.

Haas, W. (1910). Über Echtheit und Unechtheit von Gefühlen. Nurnberg: Benedikt Hilz.

Hume, D. (2008). *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kenny, A. (1963). *Action, Emotion and Will.* London: Routledge.

Konrad, E.-M., Petraschka, T. & Werner, C. (2018). The Paradox of Fiction – A Brief Introduction into Recent Developments, Open Questions, and Current Areas of Research, including a Comprehensive Bibliography from 1975 to 2018. *Journal of Literary Theory* 12(2), 193–203.

[20] I want to thank the editors of this volume for their insightful comments on a previous version of this paper, Christoph Johanssen for having discussed with me the early phenomenological account on sham emotions and emotional illusions, and Simon Mussell for proofreading this article.

Lange, K. (1901). *Das Wesen der Kunst I.* Berlin: Grote.

Matravers, D. (2006). The Challenge of Irrationalism, and How Not to Meet It. In: M. Kieran (Ed.), *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Meinong, A. (1977). Über Annahmen. *Gesamtausgabe IV*. Edited by R. Haller, R. Kindinger and R. M. Chisholm. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt.

Moran, R. (1994). The Expression of Feeling in Imagination. *Philosophical Review* 103(1), 75–106.

Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2009). The Fiction of the Paradox: Really Feeling for Anna Karenina. In: Y. Gustafsson, C. Kronqvist & M. McEachrane (Eds.), *Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 165–184.

Mulligan, K. (2004). Husserl on the "Logics" of Valuing, Values and Norms. In: B. Centi & G. Gigliotti (Eds.), *Fenomenologia della Ragione Pratica. L'Etica di Edmund Husserl.* Naples: Bibliopolis, 177–225.

Mulligan, K. (2006). Was sind und was sollen die unechten Gefühle? In: U. Amrein (Ed.), *Das Authentische. Zur Konstruktion von Wahrheit in der säkularen Welt*. Zürich: Chronos.

Ortega y Gasset, J. (2012). *On Love: Aspects of a Single Theme*. Eastford: Martino Fine Books.

Pfänder, A. (1913/16). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen. *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* 1 (1913), 325–404, and 3 (1916), 1–125.

Pugmire, D. (2005). *Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Radford, C. (1975). How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina? *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supp. Vol. 49, 67–80.

Reinach, A. (1989). Die Überlegung; ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung (1912/1913). *Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe* 1 + 2. Edited by K. Schuhmann and B. Smith. Munich: Philosophia, 279–311.

Salmela, M. (2005). What is Emotional Authenticity? *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 35(3), 209–230.

Saxinger, R. (1908). Gefühlssuggestion und Phantasiegefühl. *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* 46, 401–428.

Scheler, M. (1973a*). Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Scheler, M. (1973b). The Idols of Self-Knowledge. *Selected Philosophical Essays*. Edited by D. R. Lachterman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 3–97.

Scheler, M. (1973c). Idealism and Realism. *Selected Philosophical Essays*. Edited by D. R. Lachterman. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 288–355.

Schwarz, E. (1906). Über Phantasiegefühle. *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* 12, 84–103.

Seel, M. (2013). *Die Künste des Kinos*. Frankfurt: Fischer.

Solomon, R. C. (1993). *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

Stecker, R. (2011). Should we Still Care about the Paradox of Fiction? *British Journal of Aesthetics* 51(3), 295–308.

Stein, E. (1989). *On the Problem of Empathy: The Collected Works of Edith Stein*. Washington, DC: ICS Publications.

Stocker, M. (1983). Psychic Feelings: Their Importance and Irreducibility. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61(1), 5–26.

Stocker, M. (1987). Emotional Thoughts. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24(1), 59–69.

Vendrell Ferran, Í. (2008). *Die Emotionen. Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie.* Berlin: Akademie.

Vendrell Ferran, Í. (2010). Ästhetische Erfahrung und Quasi-Gefühle. In: V. Raspa (Ed.), Meinong Studien IV / *Meinong Studies IV. The Aesthetics of the Graz School.* Heusenstamm: Ontos, 129–168.

Voigtländer, E. (1910). *Vom Selbstgefühl*. Leipzig: Voigtländer.

Walton, K. L. (1993). *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wollheim, R. (1984). *The Thread of Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

This book confronts a topic largely neglected in research on phantasy: the relationship between fictional events and the emotions of the subject having a phantasy experience. What is the nature of an emotional response to fiction? Are emotions indifferent to the existence of what causes them? How do fictional emotions relate to their real counterparts? The volume gathers ten innovative essays tackling these questions from a phenomenological perspective.

Thiemo Breyer is Professor for Phenomenology and Anthropology at the Department of Philosophy and Director of the Husserl Archives at the University of Cologne.

Marco Cavallaro is Research Associate at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Koblenz-Landau, Campus Landau.

Rodrigo Y. Sandoval is PhD Scholarship Holder of ANID-Chile at the University of Cologne and the Universidad Alberto Hurtado (Chile).

www.wbg-wissenverbindet.de
ISBN 978-3-534-40621-0

wbg Academic