Miguel de Unamuno’s theory of tragic sentiment is central to understanding his unique contributions to religious existential thought, which centers on the production of perhaps the most unavoidable and distinctive kind of human feeling. His writings on the foundational features of tragic feeling are provocative, and his reflective ruminations on the precarious nature of human existence exhort his readers to consider what gives rise to the phenomena and experience of life. Unamuno’s existentialism is rightly attributed with being influenced by the gestational development of ideas from several luminous predecessors, *inter alios*, Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard, and Friedrich Nietzsche, but within these pages I should like to suggest a peculiar kinship between seemingly strange bedfellows, namely, between the Spanish Unamuno (1864–1936) and a German philosopher whom existentialist writers have historically railed against, namely, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).

It would prove rather easy to pore over the many points on which the Lutheran Pietist who extolled the Horacian motto, “Dare to know!” differs from the Roman Catholic “man of flesh and bone” who in essence responded, “No, dare to feel!” So this study instead takes as its point of departure the problems and concerns that have preoccupied both Kant and Unamuno and thus led them to strikingly similar insights about the peculiar significance of feeling for human life. For the Terentian dictum with which Unamuno begins *A Tragic Sense of Life*—which prompts him to reinforce and rearticulate the primacy of concrete existence (“the man of flesh and bones”)—betrays a profound appreciation of that common humanity from
which we become alienated insofar as humanity becomes a mere idea. The problem that drives Unamuno’s inquiry therefore brings him in close affinity with that predecessor who was arguably the first to have postulated humanity as a ground for morality and duty. And we do Kant an injustice if we were to think that humanity is merely an idea or abstraction in his system. For although transcendental idealism mires him in insuperable difficulties, it was Kant’s way of placing the noumenal self beyond the ken of ideation. Appreciation of others’ humanity must be of an entirely different order from how we conceive of things through the senses or through concepts. By focusing on the problems and concerns that motivate their inquiry, we can therefore begin to examine how feeling gets redeemed in Kant and Unamuno, specifically as the only way in which that which must transcend our senses and our intellect can move us.

Since Unamuno’s reception of Kant’s philosophy is often conflicted, ranging from clear indications of influence to expressions of antipathy, it must come as no surprise that there has been relatively little comparative research done on these two thinkers. Moreover, this scant literature has mainly explored connections between Unamuno’s existential thought and Kant’s first two *critiques*. In these works, however, feelings are regarded as inclinations and thus receive no serious consideration. In what follows I therefore juxtapose Unamuno’s analysis of tragic feeling and Kant’s discussion of the feeling of the sublime in the *Critique of Judgment*.

The chapter proceeds in three sections. First, it will explicate the subjective, rather than objective, grounds that both Unamuno and Kant attribute to peculiar, and revelatory, kinds of feeling. Second, it will draw out a resemblance in how they articulate the *poietic* power of feeling, namely, how the subjective apparatuses that create sentiments of beauty, sublimity, and the tragic maintain their constitutive elements in a productive tension that eludes any kind of dialectical overcoming which would cancel out the constant activity that gives rise to such feelings. Finally, the chapter considers how the upshot of feeling that emerges from both Unamuno’s and Kant’s thought is put into relation with a sense of self which, although diverging in important ways, draws from feeling to gesture toward transcendental ideas of God and the immortality of the Soul. Ultimately, by considering how Unamuno and Kant articulate their complicated notions of feeling, whether it is tied to a ubiquitous tragic condition of life or to a unique capacity to sense beauty and sublimity, both thinkers are united not so much in focusing on the objective correlates of feeling but rather in elucidating the peculiar power of feeling to move the agents who experience it.
FEELING IS SUBJECTIVE, NOT OBJECTIVE

Central to my comparative study of Unamuno and Kant is the view that predicates such as “the tragic” (el trágico), “the beautiful” (das Schöne) and “the sublime” (das Erhabene) are not properties that refer to events and objects, but rather are felt by human subjects who are receptive to such feelings via a special kind of non-rational attunement. For example, in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, which considers the grounds and possibility for aesthetic and teleological judgment, beauty is tied to feeling insofar as it is the pleasure one receives in forming a judgment of taste. What is interesting and innovative in Kant’s theory is that when he uses the term “feeling” (Gefühl) to describe the derivation of beauty, he is not referring to any of the body’s five sensory modalities: “If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation, then this expression means something entirely different” (KdU 5:206). “Feeling” is thus a technical term with a connotation very different than “an objective representation of the senses” (KdU 5:206). Instead, Kant proceeds to argue that “feeling” is the reflective satisfaction that grounds a judgment of taste (KdU 5:209), which is facilitated a priori by the constituents of the “imagination to combine the manifold of intuition, and understanding to provide the unity of the concept uniting the [component] presentations” (KdU 5:217). Kant calls this harmonious interaction between imagination and understanding the “free play of the faculties of cognition” (KdU 5:218) which takes place within a judging subject and provides the grounds for a feeling of beauty.

Subsequently, in Kant’s theory of taste a feeling of beauty is not based on either sensuous or rational sources, both of which would draw from either agreeable sensations or determinate concepts. For example, the statements “This rose is red” and “This rose is beautiful” are different judgments: the former draws from determinate concepts; the latter draws from the free-play. A feeling of beauty is thus a reflective judgment: one that emerges from, and refers to, the subject (and ranges, possibly, over the entire community of judging subjects endowed with similar cognitive attunements).

This very special aesthetic feeling, the subject’s capacity to form a judgment of taste, has important ramifications for how we are to understand its objective correlate (e.g., a scene from nature, or perhaps a painting, that is called “beautiful”). A judgment of taste, even though grounded in feeling, is not a free-floating pronouncement without consideration of some object; however, with regard to whether objects actually possess beauty, Kant argues that a judgment of taste functions in an analogical sense, that is, as if the quality of beauty were a real, objective property of the object being judged (KdU 5:212). The important result here is that in Kant’s aesthetic theory, no
object is beautiful in itself because beauty is not a property of objects; rather, if beauty is to be “found” anywhere, it will be within the judging subject, namely, in her own production of the feeling of beauty.

Similarly, while there are important divergences from his theory of beauty, when Kant turns to explicate his theory of sublime feeling, i.e., a sensation of the absolutely great (schlechthin groß) (KdU 5:248), he argues similarly that rather than being a characteristic of objects in the world, the sublime is also constituted by a special sense: “[N]othing that can be an object of the senses is to be called sublime. . . . Hence what is to be called sublime is not an object, but the attunement that the intellect [gets] through a certain presentation that occupies reflective judgment” (KdU 5:250). Here Kant argues that no sensible object, neither active volcanoes nor powerful hurricanes (KdU 5:261), is truly sublime. Instead, such objects may be called “sublime” only nominally (or indirectly) insofar as they arouse in us a feeling of a supersensible power. “[T]rue sublimity,” Kant writes, “must be sought only in the mind of the judging person and not in the natural object, the judging of which prompts this mental attunement” (KdU 5:256).

Subsequently, to predicate something as “sublime” requires an act of substitution between our feeling of sublimity and the objects eliciting this experience, namely, the act of substituting or replacing a sense of awe (Achtung) for an object with respect for our subjective vocation (KdU 5:257), i.e., for our free and unique capacity to form such awesome feelings of the sublime. Therefore, just like we noted in the as if, analogical predicate of beauty in an object, it would be incorrect to call some natural object or event sublime, for “we can say no more than that the object serves for the presentation of a sublimity that can be found in the mind” (KdU 5:245).

What I find interesting in this brief explication of these two famous elements of Kant’s aesthetic theory is that one very significant consequence of Unamuno’s The Tragic Sense of Life seems to be, just as with the putative pronouncements of beauty and sublimity, that the predicate of “tragic” does not affix itself to an object or event, but rather inheres in feelings from which the ultimate intelligibility of tragedy is gleaned. For Unamuno, what is deemed tragic is not a property of objects or events, rather it is also a peculiar kind of feeling (sentimiento); namely, a feeling which emerges from a tension that is constituted and maintained by the faculties of sensation and reason, i.e., by the essential faculties of the “heart” and of the “head” (STV, 13–14). Consequently, Unamuno argues that what is to be understood by the term ‘tragic’ is not an objective predicate with application to things in the world, but instead is a subjective predicate established by nonpropositional contents, namely, by a feeling that is aroused by the constant opposition and struggle of those essential polar faculties—the conflict between the heart and the head. Unamuno’s aim is to help clarify the meaning of tragedy, and the main insight that he offers in his understanding of the tragic element of
human existence relies on a felt hermeneutic toward lived experience, that is to say, our feeling of tragedy emerges out of this conflict in the form of a demand of trying to make sense out of another complicated sense; senses which are not equivocal and seem to be at odds with each other.

Broadly speaking, Unamuno’s starting point for all forms of philosophical reflection is human subjectivity or consciousness (STV, 13), but a consciousness made intelligible “with all the body and all the soul, with the blood, with the marrow of the bones,” i.e., with life (STV, 14). As Unamuno continues to develop the theme of a starting point for his philosophy of tragedy, he expands his thoughts to touch on the fundamental discord between the irrational and rational aspects of lived experience—what he takes to constitute the tension between life and reason. “The senses” Unamuno avers, “are devoted to the service of the instinct of preservation” (STV, 151)—that is, to ongoing life, but, he adds, “reason confronts our longing for personal immortality and contradicts it. And the truth is, in all strictness, that reason is the enemy of life” (STV, 90). This conflict, in which reason brings into sharp relief the limits of life, its fragility and finitude, accounts for the tragic need of having to reconcile the heart and the head, and, moreover, that “the tragic history of human thought is simply the history of a struggle between reason and life” (STV, 115).

Note that while Unamuno wonders why human beings have not been “defined as an affective or feeling animal” (STV, 3), the capacity of reason itself cannot be divorced from his visionary account of tragedy: “The reader who follows me further is now aware that I am about to carry him into the region of the imagination, of imagination not destitute of reason, for without reason nothing subsists, but of imagination founded on feeling” (STV, 131).

Unamuno’s series of self-reflections on the inexorable struggle between the heart and the head press his readers to imagine what I call the necessity of tragic feeling. As we have briefly touched on, the conflict between life and reason, between the heart and the head, demands some attempt at resolution, even though a harmonious rapprochement is unattainable. Subsequently, the necessity of tragic feeling arises from a painful incongruity. It is “necessary” insofar as it is the inescapable product of existential awareness over our vulnerability to suffering and mortality, which life (the heart) tells us ought to be tragic, but, as memorably illustrated by Unamuno in the tearful wisdom of Solon’s grief, reason (the head) reveals that it is not. In this remarkable sketch, gainfully introduced to the reader just before his thesis presentation to offer “the tragic sense of life, which carries with it a whole conception of life itself and of the universe” (STV, 17), Unamuno presents a powerful contrast, and pointed portrait, of what he means by the tragic sense:
A pedant who beheld Solon weeping for the death of a son said to him, "Why do you weep thus, if weeping avails nothing?" And the sage answered him, "Precisely for that reason—because it does not avail." It is manifest that weeping avails something, even if only the alleviation of distress; but the deep sense of Solon's reply to the impertinent questioner is plainly seen. . . . Yes, we must learn to weep! Perhaps that is the supreme wisdom. Why? Ask Solon (Loc. cit.).

What is plainly seen is precisely the incompatibility between "the ought to be" and the "is not" that gives birth to the tragic sense, for as much as the heart cries "why?" to all manner of sorrows and agonies, the head responds, "why not?" The untimely death of a loved one ought to be tragic, but suffering and death are part and parcel of human existence (STV, 207): a Silenian insight from which no one is exempt. The profundity of Solon's reply frames the anguished contrast between the "ought" and the "is" because he knew his tears were of no use, and that the real meaning of tragedy is that no object or event, however unbearable, is truly tragic, for tragedy, like the predicates of beauty and sublimity in Kant's philosophy, is a feeling.

Unamuno relates that the subject's feeling of tragedy is thereby constituted in the perpetual contradiction between the heart and head—the intensely felt pain that what her tragic sense presents is the absence of tragedy, conventionally conceived. Life is inherently tragic because no horror, no misfortune, no catastrophe is eo ipso tragic. Subsequently, because the tragic does not append itself to external events and objects, if it is to be "found" anywhere it will be within the feeling subject as the painful upshot of a fundamental and seemingly incompatible conflict of the heart and the head, of life and reason, which offers no resolution: "For it is on this rock that every philosophy that pretends to resolve the eternal and tragic contradiction, the basis of our existence, breaks to pieces" (STV, 15–16).

**THE POIETIC CONSTITUTION OF FEELING**

We have seen how Unamuno and Kant exhibit similarities in their theories of tragedy, beauty, and the sublime, each of which locates its peculiar predicates in the subject, and not in objects or events. Moreover, Unamuno and Kant share the view that the foundation of feeling in their theories suggests a special human capacity that is actively constructive rather than passively receptive. In Kant's aesthetic theory, the subjective apparatuses attached to beauty and sublimity imply freedom from sensuous and rational sources in our making certain kinds of aesthetic judgments, and Unamuno's account of the interminable struggle between life and reason points us to a poietic or creative extrarational power which is also able to transcend both purely sensuous and rational bases of meaning.
For both Unamuno and Kant, the constitutive elements which produce these feelings are held together in a productive tension that eludes any kind of dialectical overcoming which would annul the constant antagonism that gives rise to such feeling. In Unamuno’s philosophy, the tragic sense is both chronic and acute because the conflict between the heart and the head remains locked without any chance for compromise or reconciliation. Similarly, in Kant’s theory of the sublime, the nature of sublime feeling is also characterized by its constituent faculties of sensation and reason being held together in conflict, e.g., as simultaneously repulsive and attractive. Subsequently, our understanding of the Kantian sublime recognizes a resemblance with Unamuno’s construction of the interminable conflict of the head and the heart insofar as emphasis is placed on recognizing the adjoined relation between opposite modes of experience, rather than by focusing on the polarities themselves; and it would be a mistake to privilege one mode above the other.

Sublime feeling shows the form of a necessary conjunction (e.g., sublimity is felt as threatening and soothing), rather than as an equivocation of feeling which calls for us to choose between a disjunction, e.g., as either painful or pleasurable. Whereas an equivocation of feeling would force a choice between conjuncts, if we view the Kantian sublime as being characterized by its conjuncts being held in constant opposition (e.g., sorrowful and joyful), the true character of sublimity is revealed to the human subject. While the subject finds her experience of the sublime constituted by moments of a first conjunct, say, pain, she ultimately finds herself awash in feelings of the second conjunct, e.g., pleasure. However, the contradictory structure of the Kantian sublime is not one that begs for some kind of dialectical resolution; for the two sides of the sublime experience are not cancelled (Aufgehoben) and raised to a higher level. This constant antagonism, however, is appreciated by different capacities, i.e., the faculties of sensation and reason, and hence do not cancel each other out. For example, while the sublime object is repulsive to the perceptual part of the mind (in sensation), it is attractive to the contemplative side of the mind (in reason).

Readings of the Kantian sublime that take it as exhibiting equivocation or a dialectical relation can perhaps be attributed to Kant’s writing that sublimity is “a pleasure that is possible only by means of a displeasure” (KdU 5:260), or as described by Jean-François Lyotard, “in [the sublime] pleasure proceeds from pain.” The pleasure accompanying the sublime is what Kant calls a “negative pleasure” insofar as “the mind is not just attracted by the object but is alternately always repelled as well, the liking for the sublime contains not so much a positive pleasure as rather admiration and respect” (KdU 5:245). Feelings of the sublime, then, are neither equivocal nor in a dialectical relation which is raised toward a sublated third term, but are rather
in the relation of *isotension*, wherein the antagonistic constituents of, e.g.,
pain and pleasure are kept in constant combination, thereby producing
sublimity.

As we have seen, the incessant, uneasy tension between constitutive ele-
ments of feeling, e.g., between life and reason, is also at the heart of Unamu-
no’s philosophy, and serves as the agitated fount from which springs the
tragic sense: “How, then, shall reason open its portals to the revelation of
life? It is a tragic combat—it is the very essence of tragedy—this combat of
life with reason” (STV, 90). Like the relation between sensation and reason
in the Kantian sublime, the battle between the heart and the head is the
*conditio sine qua non* of tragic feeling because of the unremitting and unre-
solvable way the contradictory drives of life and reason are locked in a
“perpetual struggle, without victory or the hope of victory” (STV, 14). Sub-
sequently, just as with the Kantian sublime, the Unamunian tragic sense is
neither equivocal nor in a dialectical relation which is raised to a higher level,
for life and reason are also in the irreconcilable relation of *isotension*. José
Ferrater Mora rightly articulates the error of applying the notion of a re-
conciling dialectic to Unamuno’s philosophy:

Unamuno’s emphasis on opposition, tension, and contradiction is obviously
related to that type of thinking which since Hegel has been customarily called
“dialectical.” . . . But in Unamuno’s world, animated by the principle of
perpetual civil war and unending strife, there is no place for any final harmo-
ny—and still less, any identity—which would be, in his opinion, the equiva-
ient of death.18

Ferrater Mora relates how in trying to understand Unamuno’s philosophy, it
would be a mistake to grant pride of place to one constituent over the other
(e.g., to the heart or to the head, to life or to reason); with regard to producing
the tragic sense, both are essentially interdependent. For example, when Un-
amuno turns to consider the association between faith, life, and reason, he
states that they have

mutual need of one another. . . . Reason and faith are two enemies, neither of
which can maintain itself without the other. . . . They are compelled to seek
mutual support and association. But association in struggle, for struggle is a
mode of association. (STV, 111)

Instead of revealing truth as the overcoming of opposites, the perpetual strug-
gle between faith and reason reveals that “truth” is an irremediable contradic-
tion. The idea that our encounter with “truth” (tragic or otherwise) is a
product from having to interact with co-existing contradictions can be traced
to Unamuno’s early, pre-tragic, works. For example, we find this Unamunian
caveat to the reader in his 1895 *En torno al casticismo*:
Truth is often sought in the golden mean... by excluding the extremes... but in this way one arrives only at a shadow of the truth. Cold and unclear. It is preferable to follow a different method: the method of the affirmation of contraries; it is preferable to make the force of the extremes stand out in the soul of the reader where the mean can come to life, which, itself, is the result of struggle. 19

The upshot of this struggle is productive, for, like the production of sublimity in Kant’s aesthetics, the constant tension between contraries carries with it a creative potency. The tragic sense is neither inert nor a fatal resignation, and, in common with Kant’s theory of the sublime, feeling has the power to serve as a signpost which points toward transcendental ideas of God and the immortality of the Soul.

GENERATED BY STRUGGLE: GOD AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

Feeling has been shown to be constituted by a peculiar sense of conflict, and we have noted how, respectively, for Unamuno and Kant, the constant agonism between contrasting faculties generates feelings of the tragic, of beauty, and of the sublime. In Kant’s theory of taste, a feeling of beauty emerges from a constant, combinatory activity from the free play of the imagination which, although acting harmoniously with the understanding, still resists settling on any fixed or determinate concept. In Kant’s theory of the sublime, a feeling of the sublime arises from the “vibration” (KdU 5:258) of contradictory modes of sensation and reason, which produces feelings which are simultaneously attractive and repulsive. And in Unamuno’s existential philosophy, life and reason are locked in the irremediable mode of “tragic combat” from which springs the tragic sense. However, although these feelings are regarded as being in opposition, this very opposition is what engenders a phenomenology of transcendence.

In Kant, for example, because what constitutes the sublime is not an external object (which, as we have seen, is merely an indirect object of sublimity), “but [rather] the attunement that the intellect [receives]” (KdU 5:250 and 5:264), it is, to employ an expression of Kenley Dove’s, an example of minded-ness 20 (which is the direct object of sublimity). Using the dynamical sublime as an example, the “minded” nature of the sublime is the subject’s supersensible experience of pleasure that results from her perceiving extremely large and powerful natural objects. I draw attention to dynamical sublimity because it shares a theme that Unamuno believes continues to preoccupy modern philosophers, viz. the transcendence of finitude and the craving for immortality (STV, 13).
We have seen that a feeling of the Kantian sublime consists in the relationship between sensibility and reason. Kant takes this relationship in the dynamical sublime to be excited by experiences of extremely powerful natural objects or nature considered as might (KdU 5:260). Because each of these natural phenomena is capable of harming an individual, e.g., threatening storms, lightening, volcanoes, and hurricanes (KdU 5:261), Kant qualifies the dynamical sublime not only as powerful, but also as provoking fear. Unfortunately, Kant does not make explicit what this fear is, but his subsequent introduction of God in §28 suggest that the possible consequences of having direct contact with the power of might does not preclude the fear of physical harm up to and including death. The sublime operates in the subject when she is on the edge of danger but not in harm’s way; indeed, as Kant puts it, she is “seized by amazement bordering on terror . . . but, since [the spectator] knows he is safe, this is not actual fear” (KdU 5:269). As a result, the dynamical sublime recalls our finitude as human beings. Before the awesome might of nature, we realize that we are mortal, but this awareness also leads to its transcendence—a kind of immortality.

Subsequently, while one’s death is not imminent in sublimity (because one is in a position of physical safety), its ultimate certainty, i.e., one’s mortality, is called to mind. The power of nature considered in the dynamical sublime makes us acutely aware of our finitude, but it also, Kant argues, has the capacity to lead us to reflect on “supersensible” ideas “containing a higher purposiveness” (KdU 5:246), e.g., ideas of God and the soul. Moreover, the mere fact that we can formulate these supersensible ideas situates us within a domain that is above mere nature, and it is this aspect of human feeling that defeats finitude.

Both Kant and Unamuno agree that reason alone is incapable of showing us the existence of God or the immortality of the soul, but reason, as a constituent of feeling (tragic and sublime) nevertheless contributes to producing feelings of transcendence. However, as with any parallel analysis, one can only go so far. Subsequently, with regard to how these kinds of feelings generate movement toward transcendence, Unamuno and Kant differ in important ways, and our comparison of these two must end. For example, rather than attribute to reason, as Kant does, a capacity to usher supersensible feelings of a kind of immortality, recall that Unamuno’s rendering of the head versus the heart had the former frustrating any notions of transcendence. And yet, as much as the head resists adopting reasons to accept ideas of God, immortality, and the soul, the desire for transcendence by the heart is felt more acutely. Unamuno was especially interested in the problems posed by this yearning, and also recognized it as a challenge that was very much at the heart of Kant’s philosophy: “[Kant] was a man much preoccupied with
the problem—I mean the only real vital problem, the problem that strikes at
the very root of our being, the problem of our individual and personal desti-
nny, of the immortality of the soul” (STV, 4).

Just as we noted how the head revealed the absence of tragedy in Solon’s
grief, the revelation did not defeat, but only exacerbated, the feeling of trage-
dy itself; in other words, reason’s refusal to accept ideas of transcendence
only served to amplify its need. The story of Solon’s tears showed that
although nothing and no event is truly tragic, the lack or absence of tragedy
brought on a boomerang effect insofar as it returned more acute and intense
feelings of the tragic; and we can see the same kind of response in Unamu-
no’s stance toward God and immortality. For example, we note this effect in
the analogy Unamuno draws using the notion of ether as merely a “hypothet-
ic entity”:

And in the same way God Himself, not the idea of God, may become a reality
that is immediately felt; and even though the idea of Him does not enable us to
explain either the existence or the essence of the Universe, we have at times
the direct feeling of God, above all in moments of spiritual suffocation. And
this feeling—mark it well, for all that is tragic in it and the whole tragic sense
of life is founded upon this—this feeling is a feeling of hunger for God, of the
lack of God. (STV, 168)

As with tragedy, reason, whether for or against the existence of God, will not
have the final say: “I do not submit to reason, and I rebel against it, and I
persist in creating by the energy of faith my immortalizing God” (STV, 50).
As we have already noted, however, reason, while resisted by Unamuno, is
still a necessary constituent insofar as it is locked in that most inimical
confrontation with life, rendered here as faith. Just as in Kant’s theory, the
constant struggle between reason and sensibility produces the feeling of sub-
limity that ultimately leads to supersensible ideas, the perpetual combat be-
tween the head and heart works to simultaneously deny and affirm feelings
of God, immortality, and the soul.

Consequently, Unamuno’s philosophy depicts the eternal clash between
life and reason as manifesting in an act of double defiance: not only must the
head defy the heart, but the heart must remain steadfast. The tragic combat-
ants remain unmoved, but theirs is a necessary and productive conflict; one
which makes constructive use of our contradictory natures and elicits a fун-
damental sense that is defiantly unyielding in hope and yearning rather than
resigning to despair.
NOTES


3. See, e.g., Unamuno’s conviction that “we should solve many things if we all went out into the streets and uncovered our grief . . . A miserere sung in common by a multitude tormented by destiny has as much value as a philosophy” (STV, 17).

4. The Terentian dictum comes from the play *The Self-Tormenter* and states, “*Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto.*” [I am a human being; I consider nothing which is human alien to me.] See *Hecaton Timorumenos* in Terence: *The Comedies*, trans. Peter Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 104. Unamuno modifies the saying to place emphasis on other concrete human beings not being alien to him rather than the abstract quality of being human: “Nullum hominem a me alienum puto: I am a man; no other man do I deem a stranger” (STV, 1).

5. We see this, for example, in Unamuno’s criticism of Kant’s “significant somersault . . . that leap, that immortal somersault, from one Critique to the other” (STV, 3–4). Whereas Unamuno is sympathetic to Kant’s argument in the first *Critique* that knowledge of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are inaccessible to human reason, he takes issue with how Kant nevertheless smuggles in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul as postulates of pure practical reason in his second critique. However, with regard to this “somersault,” I should like to point out that in the first *Critique*’s “Canon of Pure Reason” Kant already argued from morality to God insofar as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are necessary postulates of pure practical reason (KrV A809–15/B837–43). See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, eds. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Henceforth KrV. Note, esp. (KrV A811/B839): “Thus God and a future life are two presuppositions that are not to be separated from the obligation that pure reason imposes on us in accordance with principles of that very same reason.”


8. Judgments or pronouncements of “beauty” and “taste” are interchangeably accepted and used throughout this section.


11. Unamuno's reference to "life" is broadly construed to include notions of self-preservation, the corporeal and emotional senses, the irrational, immortality, and faith.

12. The Wisdom of Silenus states that not to be born is the best thing for human beings, and that death is the next best thing. See Plutarch's fragment from Aristotle's *Eudemus* in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, quoted in Anton-Hermann Chroust, *Aristotle: New Light on His Life and Some of His Lost Works*, Vol. 2 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973) and also more famously in Section 3 of Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*.


14. Kant's theory of sublimity discusses two kinds of sublime feeling. Kant calls "the mathematical sublime," the sublimity of infinite size, and "the dynamical sublime," the sublimity of power.

15. That this is similar (though, of course, not identical) to Aristotle's distinction between the perceptive and thinking faculties in human beings is hard to overlook. In *De Anima*, Aristotle notes the limits of sensitive receptivity as exhibited through its vulnerability to extreme sense objects, which makes one less able to sense. The opposite, however, occurs in thinking, as the thinking of intense objects of thought, he argues, makes one more able to think. See Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans. R. D. Hicks (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1991), esp., Book II.12: 424a–24b.

16. Suzanne Guerlac argues that there is a dialectical aspect to the Kantian sublime. She describes the inherent tensions of Kant's sublime as follows: "As the terms 'positive' and 'negative' sublime suggest, the negative sublime is dialectically related to the positive one. [The sublime's] internal structure or economy is also dialectical." See Suzanne Guerlac, *The Impersonal Sublime: Hugo, Baudelaire, Lautréamont* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 190.


19. My translation from Miguel de Unamuno, *En torno al casticismo* (1895) in *Obras Completas III* (Madrid: Afrodísio Aguado, 1958), 171: "Suele buscarse la verdad completa en el justo medio por el método de remoción, via remotionis, por exclusión de los extremos, que con su juego y acción mutual engendran el ritmo de la vida, y así solo se llega a una sombra de verdad, fría y nebulosa. Es preferable hacer resaltar la fuerza de los extremos en el alma del lector para que el medio tome en ella vida, que es resultant de lucha."