ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOKS

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency

Edited by Luca Ferrero

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF AGENCY

One of the most basic and important distinctions we draw is between those entities with the capacity of agency and those without. As humans we enjoy agency in its full-blooded form and therefore a proper understanding of the nature of agency is of great importance to appreciate who we are and what we should expect and demand of our existence.

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency is an outstanding reference source to the key issues, problems, and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising 42 chapters by an international team of contributors, the *Handbook* is divided into eight clear parts:

- The Metaphysics of Agency
- Kinds of Agency
- Agency and Ability
- Agency: Mind, Body, and World
- Agency and Knowledge
- Agency and Moral Psychology
- Agency and Time
- Agency, Reasoning, and Normativity.

A broad range of topics are covered, including the relation of agency to causation, teleology, animal agency, intentionality, planning, skills, disability, practical knowledge, self-knowledge, the will, responsibility, autonomy, identification, emotions, personal identity, reasons, morality, the law, aesthetics, and games.

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency is essential reading for students and researchers within philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of psychology, and ethics.

Luca Ferrero is Professor of Philosophy at UC-Riverside, USA. He works on the nature of diachronic agency and rationality, intentions, constitutivism, and personal identity. He is the editor of the Philosophy of Action section of the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY

Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy are state-of-the-art surveys of emerging, newly refreshed, and important fields in philosophy, providing accessible yet thorough assessments of key problems, themes, thinkers, and recent developments in research.

All chapters for each volume are specially commissioned, and written by leading scholars in the field. Carefully edited and organized, *Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy* provide indispensable reference tools for students and researchers seeking a comprehensive overview of new and exciting topics in philosophy. They are also valuable teaching resources as accompaniments to textbooks, anthologies, and research-orientated publications.

Also available:

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND IMPROVISATION IN THE ARTS
Edited by Alessandro Bertinetto and Marcello Ruta

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF IDEALISM AND IMMATERIALISM
Edited by Joshua Farris and Benedikt Paul Göcke

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS
Edited by Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM
Edited by Thomas Uebel and Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF AGENCY
Edited by Luca Ferrero

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PROPOSITIONS
Edited by Adam Russell Murray and Chris Tillman

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Handbooks-in-Philosophy/book-series/RHP

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF AGENCY

Edited by Luca Ferrero

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

Cover image: © Getty Images

First published 2022
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2022 selection and editorial matter Luca Ferrero; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Luca Ferrero to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Ferrero, Luca, editor.
Title: The Routledge handbook of philosophy of agency / edited by Luca Ferrero.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2022. | Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021034958 (print) | LCCN 2021034959 (ebook) | ISBN 9781138062849 (hbk) | ISBN 9781032182254 (pbk) | ISBN 9780429202131 (ebk)
Subjects: LCSH: Agent (Philosophy) | Act (Philosophy)
Classification: LCC B105.A35 R68 2022 (print) | LCC B105.A35 (ebook) | DDC 128/.4—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021034958
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021034959

ISBN: 978-1-138-06284-9 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-18225-4 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-20213-1 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9780429202131

Typeset in Bembo Std
by codeMantra

CONTENTS

Contributors *x*

An introduction to the philosophy of agency 1
Luca Ferrero

PART 1
The metaphysics of agency **19**

Introduction to Part 1 19
Luca Ferrero

1 Agency and causation 27
Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff

2 Agency, function, and teleology 37
Scott Sehon

3 Agency, events, and processes 47
Matthias Haase

4 Negative agency 59
Randolph Clarke

5 Bounded agency 68
Elijah Millgram

6 Agency and games 77
C. Thi Nguyen

PART 2
Kinds of agency **87**

Introduction to Part 2 87
Luca Ferrero

7 Minimal agency 91
Hans van Hateren

8 Animal agency 101
Helen Steward

9 Intentional agency 109
Lilian O'Brien

10 Rational agency 118
Eric Marcus

PART 3
Agency and ability **125**

Introduction to Part 3 125
Luca Ferrero

11 Agency, powers, and skills 130
Will Small

12 Expert agency 139
Barbara Gail Montero

13 Agency and mistakes 149
Santiago Amaya

14 Agency and disability 159
Kevin Timpe

15 Pathologies of agency 169
Lubomira Radoilska

PART 4
Agency: mind, body, and world **179**

Introduction to Part 4 179
Luca Ferrero

16 Mental agency 183
Matthew Soteriou

17 Agency and the body 192
Hong Yu Wong

18 Agency, consciousness, and attention 201
Wayne Wu

19 Material agency 211
Matthew Noah Smith

PART 5
Agency and knowledge **221**

Introduction to Part 5 221
Luca Ferrero

20 Epistemic agency 226
David Hunter

21 Agency and practical knowledge 234
Kim Frost

22 Agency and evidence 244
Berislav Marušić and John Schwenkler

23 Agency and self-knowledge 253
Brie Gertler

PART 6
Agency and moral psychology **263**

Introduction to Part 6 263
Luca Ferrero

24 Agency, will, and freedom 270
Thomas Pink

25 Agency and responsibility 279
Pamela Hieronymi

26 Agency and identification 288
Agnieszka Jaworska

27 Agency and autonomy 298
Andrea C. Westlund

28 Agency and (the limits of) volitional conflict 307
Sarah Buss

29 Agency and the emotions 317
Carla Bagnoli

PART 7
Agency and time **329**

Introduction to Part 7 329
Luca Ferrero

30 Diachronic agency 336
Luca Ferrero

31 Planning agency 348
Michael E. Bratman

32 Agency, time, and rationality 357
Chrisoula Andreou

33 Artificial and machine agency 366
Richmond H. Thomason and John Horty

34 Agency and personal identity 376
Marya Schechtman

35 Agency, narrative, and mortality 385
Roman Altshuler

PART 8
Agency, reasoning, and normativity **395**

Introduction to Part 8 395
Luca Ferrero

36 Agency, reasons and rationality 403
Maria Alvarez

37 Agency and practical reasoning 412
Jules Salomone-Sehr and Jennifer M. Morton

38 Agency and normativity 421
Kenneth Walden

39 The aim of agency 430
Kathryn Lindeman

40 Agency and morality 440
Christine M. Korsgaard

41 Agency in the law 448
Gideon Yaffe

42 Aesthetic agency 456
Keren Gorodeisky

Index *467*

CONTRIBUTORS

Jesús H. Aguilar is Professor of Philosophy at the Rochester Institute of Technology in Rochester, New York, USA. His research and publications are mainly on action theory; recently, he has been working on a human-rights based educational model to be implemented in northern Mexico, his native country.

Roman Altshuler is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Kutztown University of Pennsylvania. In his free time, he thinks about exercising free will and overcoming mortality. In his unfree time, he complains about lack of free will and the constraints of mortality. He has written a few papers about each of these, and co-edited (with Michael Sigrist) a book about the role time plays in agency: *Time and the Philosophy of Action* (2016). He is currently working on a book on the relation between nationalism, identity, and meaning in life.

Maria Alvarez is Professor of Philosophy at King's College London. She's the author of *Kinds of Reasons: an Essay in the Philosophy of Action* and works mainly on philosophy of action, reasons, and normativity and is currently working on a monograph on agency, choice, and moral responsibility. She is also a co-editor of *Philosophy*.

Santiago Amaya is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá and works primarily in action theory and moral psychology. His articles have appeared in *Noûs*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Synthese*, and elsewhere.

Chrisoula Andreou is a Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Utah and an Executive Editor of the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*. Her current research projects lie in the areas of practical reasoning, action theory, ethical theory, and applied ethics.

Carla Bagnoli is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Modena & Reggio Emilia, and Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. She specializes in rational agency, practical reasoning, and meta-ethics. She is the author of *Ethical Constructivism* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) and the editor of *Morality and the Emotions* (Oxford University Press) and *Constructivism in Ethics* (Cambridge University Press). Her essays appear in journals such as *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Synthese, Theoria,*

and *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy*. She is currently working on a dynamic account of responsibility, focused on rational and emotional self-governance.

Michael E. Bratman is U. G. and Abbie Birch Durfee Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University, USA. He is the author of *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987), Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (1999), Structures of Agency: Essays (2007), Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (2014), Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality* (2018), and *Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization* (forthcoming).

Andrei A. Buckareff is Professor of Philosophy and Co-Director of the Cognitive Science Program at Marist College in Poughkeepsie, New York, USA. His recent work has focused chiefly on applying an ontology of causal powers to problems in the metaphysics of agency, causation, and philosophical theology. His work on agency has appeared in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophical Explorations, Philosophical Issues, Philosophical Studies, Synthese,* and elsewhere.

Sarah Buss is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. She is the author of articles on autonomy, moral responsibility, practical rationality, and respect for persons. Her current projects address the normative significance of formal principles of practical rationality, the nature of reasons for action, the will's contribution to action, and the moral implications of self-love.

Randolph Clarke is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will* (2003) and *Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility* (2014), and co-editor (with Michael McKenna and Angela M. Smith) of *The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays* (2015).

Luca Ferrero is Professor of Philosophy at UC-Riverside. He works on the nature of diachronic agency and rationality, intentions, constitutivism, and personal identity. He is the editor of the Philosophy of Action section of the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Kim Frost is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at UC-Riverside. He works primarily on philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and the metaphysics of powers.

Brie Gertler is Commonwealth Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia. Her work lies at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. She has written on self-knowledge, the mind-body problem, mental content, and the self.

Keren Gorodeisky is Jane Dickson Lanier Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University. She works on the rational character of aesthetic judgment and feelings, on the nature of aesthetic value and agency, on emotions, pleasure, and on Kant. She is currently writing a book on aesthetic value, defending a neglected alternative between contemporary aesthetic hedonism and its non-affective denial.

Matthias Haase is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago. His research is focused on foundational topics at the intersection of ethics and philosophy of mind. He has a central historical interest in the tradition of German Idealism, especially aspects tied

to Aristotle. He has also written on Wittgenstein and Frege. His current research project is devoted to the question whether there are specifically practical species of knowledge, reason, and truth—and what this means for the philosophical account of our fundamental concepts of ethics like good, ought, justice as well as action, character, and will.

Pamela Hieronymi is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles. Her research stands at the intersection of the subfields of ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action. She is currently working on a manuscript seeking to unwind the traditional problem of free will and moral responsibility.

John Horty is the author of a number of books and articles on logic, philosophy, and computer science. He teaches at the University of Maryland.

David Hunter is Professor of Philosophy at Ryerson University in Toronto. He works mostly on the nature of belief and epistemic agency but has research interests in desire and the varieties of goodness. His book *On Believing: being right in a world of possibilities* is forthcoming with Oxford University Press.

Agnieszka Jaworska is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. Her research lies at the intersection of ethical theory, medical ethics, and moral psychology. She is working on a book on the ethics of treatment of individuals whose status as moral agents and persons seems compromised or uncertain such as patients with dementia, addicts, psychopaths, and young children.

Christine M. Korsgaard is the Arthur Kingsley Research Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard. She is the author of *The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge University Press 1996), *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge University Press 1996), *The Constitution of Agency* (Oxford University Press 2008), *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity* (Oxford University Press 2009), and *Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals* (Oxford University Press 2018).

Kathryn Lindeman is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Carolina. Her main interests are in ethics, meta-ethics, and the philosophy of law, with an emphasis on questions about the source, content, and authority of normative standards.

Eric Marcus works chiefly in the philosophy of mind and action, but also has active research interests in epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language. He is the author of numerous articles and a pair of books, *Rational Causation* (Harvard University Press 2012) and *Belief, Inference and the Self-Conscious Mind* (Oxford University Press 2021). He is Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University.

Berislav Marušić is Senior Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of *Evidence and Agency* (Oxford University Press 2015), 'Do Reasons Expire?—An Essay on Grief' (*Philosophers' Imprint* 2018), and *On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). He works on the relation between practical and theoretical reason, interpersonal epistemology, the temporality of emotions, and the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre.

Elijah Millgram is E. E. Ericksen Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. His research interests are centered on theory of rationality, and overlap ethics, metaphysics, and theory of agency. His most recent book is *John Stuart Mill and the Meaning of Life*.

Barbara Gail Montero is Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York and a former professional ballet dancer. Her 2016 book, *Thought in Action: Expertise and the Conscious Mind* (Oxford University Press), explores how the body and mind intertwine in highly skilled actions.

Jennifer M. Morton is Presidential Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. She is the author of *Moving Up Without Losing Your Way: The Ethical Costs of Upward Mobility* (Princeton University Press, 2019) and of several articles in philosophy of action, philosophy of education, and moral and political philosophy.

C. Thi Nguyen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. He has written on aesthetics, games, porn, trust, and echo chambers. He is interested in the way that technologies and social structures can shape our agency and rationality. His first book is *Games: Agency as Art* (Oxford University Press).

Lilian O'Brien is a fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies and a docent at Practical Philosophy, University of Helsinki. She is working on the second edition of *Philosophy of Action* (Palgrave 2014) and has written several articles on the philosophy of agency.

Thomas Pink is Professor of Philosophy at King's College, London. He is the author of *Self-Determination* (Oxford University Press 2017) (the first of two volumes on *The Ethics of Action*), of *Free Will: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press 2004), and of many articles on ethics and moral psychology and on the history of these subjects.

Lubomira Radoilska is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Kent, UK and a Senior Research Associate, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg. She works on issues at the intersection of philosophy of action, ethics, and epistemology. Radoilska is the author of *Addiction and Weakness of Will* (Oxford University Press 2013) and editor of *Autonomy and Mental Disorder* (Oxford University Press 2012).

Jules Salomone-Sehr is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique and is affiliated with McGill University. He works in ethics, philosophy of action, and social philosophy. His doctoral dissertation explores the nature of cooperation and shared agency. The first chapter, "Cooperation: With or Without Shared Intentions," is forthcoming in *Ethics*.

Marya Schechtman is LAS Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Chicago, where she is also affiliated with the Laboratory of Integrative Neuroscience. She is the author of *The Constitution of Selves* (Cornell University Press 1996) and *Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life* (Oxford University Press 2017).

John Schwenkler is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of *Anscombe's Intention*: *A Guide* (Oxford University Press 2019). His research concerns a number of topics in philosophical psychology, including perceptual experience, intention and intentional action, self-knowledge, and the linguistic expression of basic conceptual categories.

Scott Sehon (PhD, Princeton, 1994) is Professor of Philosophy at Bowdoin College. He is the author of *Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation* (MIT Press 2005) and *Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account* (Oxford University Press 2016), as well as numerous articles.

Will Small is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He works in the philosophy of action, and on related topics in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind. He has special interests in the topics of skill and practical knowledge, in the metaphysics of intentional action, and in the works of Elizabeth Anscombe and Gilbert Ryle.

Matthew Noah Smith is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Northeastern University. His primary areas of research are in political philosophy and philosophy of action. He recently co-authored *The Spatial Contract: A New Politics of Provision for an Urbanized Planet* (Manchester University Press 2020).

Matthew Soteriou is Professor in Philosophy at King's College London. He is the author of *Disjunctivism* (Routledge 2016) and *The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action* (Oxford University Press 2013), and co-editor (with Lucy O'Brien) of *Mental Actions* (Oxford University Press 2009).

Helen Steward is Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Action at the University of Leeds. She is the author of *The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes and States* (Oxford University Press 1997) and *A Metaphysics for Freedom* (Oxford University Press 2012) as well as many papers on free will, the philosophy of mind and action, ontology, and metaphysics.

Richmond H. Thomason is a philosopher and logician who has also worked in linguistics and computer science. He teaches at the University of Michigan.

Kevin Timpe currently holds the William H. Jellema Chair at Calvin University. He is the author of, among others, *The Virtues: A Very Short Introduction* (with Craig Boyd, Oxford University Press 2021) and *Free Will in Philosophical Theology* (Bloomsbury 2013). He's edited a number of books, including the *Routledge Companion to Free Will* (with Meghan Griffith and Neil Levy, Routledge 2017). His research focuses on free will, philosophy of religion, philosophy of disability, and virtue ethics.

Hans van Hateren is Senior Lecturer in the Institute for Mathematics, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands). A biophysicist by training, he has done experimental and theoretical research on the neurobiology of vision. His current work focuses on mechanisms that can produce agency, intentionality, and consciousness.

Kenneth Walden is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College. He works on ethics, moral psychology, and aesthetics.

Andrea C. Westlund is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University, and the author of various papers on personal autonomy, narrative self-understanding, and the moral emotions involved in blame, forgiveness, and grief.

Hong Yu Wong is Professor of Philosophy and Head of the CIN Philosophy of Neuroscience Group at the University of Tübingen, Germany. His research interests center around action, perception, and the body.

Wayne Wu is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Neuroscience Institute at Carnegie Mellon University. He works on attention, agency, perception, and related topics with special emphasis on integrating neuroscience and psychology with philosophical theory.

Gideon Yaffe is the Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, and Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at Yale University. He has written books and articles on a variety of topics in the philosophy of law, and especially the philosophy of criminal law, including *Attempts: In the Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law* (Oxford University Press 2010) and *The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility* (Oxford University Press 2018).

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF AGENCY

Luca Ferrero

1 A basic distinction

Much of what happens, from the motions of the galaxies to the interactions of subatomic particles, is the mere product of the causal forces that operate in the universe—seemingly, these events have no point and they aren't anybody's doing: they just happen. But once in a while, especially closer home, some of the things that happen appear to have a distinctive character: they seem to unfold 'with a view' to some destination, to have a point to them, and be the doings of someone (or at least of something): a hummingbird drinking nectar from a flower, a dog chasing a ball, you reading this introduction, the clown making some children laugh, and your national soccer team celebrating their victory at the World Cup—just to give some examples.

A similar distinction is also especially noticeable about yourself. Some things just happen to you—being knocked to the ground by a gust of wind, spontaneously bleeding from your nose, or falling asleep—but many other things you *do*: you get up (or at least try to) when you are knocked down, jump in celebration when your team scores, play the Hammerklavier Sonata, converse with your friends, build a house, and turn your head to admire the starry heavens above you—just to give some examples (not to mention the things that that you might be able to do, even if you are never going to do, such as, hopefully, knocking someone to the ground or punching someone so hard to make their nose bleed).

For the most part, it seems that we can easily classify the things that happen, both in the universe at large and around us, between those that *merely* happen, with no point or purpose, and those that are *done by* someone or something, with some kind of point or purpose. Sure, there are going to be some ambiguous or borderline cases—when the children laugh at the clown, when you sneeze, or when you are in the grip of some compulsion, for instance. But the reason why we find these cases somewhat difficult to classify is that they seem to partake of some of the special features of the straightforward and uncontroversial examples of 'doings'—or what we also refer to as acts, actions, or activities.

The distinction between mere happenings versus doings is something that matters a lot to us. Whenever you are dealing with someitem (an object, a situation, or an occurrence)—whether by interacting with it, trying to explain it, or appraising it—you first need to determine where that item falls in the basic distinction between mere happenings and doings. Are

DOI: 10.4324/9780429202131-1

you dealing with something that is just happening, or has no capacity to do anything, or is just suffering the effects of someone else's doing? Or are you dealing with something that is a doing, or has the capacity to do things and possibly actively exercising this capacity? The very character and nature of your interactions, explanations, and appraisals—the category to which they belong—is affected by the preliminary classification of their objects into the two basic categories: mere happenings versus doings.

Simply put, you would not try to make sense of a mere happening as 'intelligible' in its unfolding in terms of some of its own goals or purposes; you would not hold a mere happening or its source to any standards of success or appropriateness, and certainly not to any kind of responsibility. It would be both a category and a practical mistake to try avoiding a dog chasing you as if it were a flying ball, and vice versa. These differences become even more marked and significant when they bear on our relationship with fellow human beings (and with ourselves). This is because the explanation and assessment of, and interaction with the doings of human beings can be framed not just in purposive and teleological terms—that is, in terms of their goals or aims—but also, and much more importantly, in terms of such notions as 'reasons,' 'rationality,' 'justification,' 'responsibility,' and 'morality.'

A dog chasing you might have some reasons to do so but it would not be cognizant of them as such. Hence, it would in principle be impossible to ask the dog for a justification of its action, and inappropriate to hold the dog accountable for it. But a human being chasing you is, in principle, expected to 'respond' for this action of theirs: they are in principle under a demand to offer some plausible reason in support of their behavior. If this subject were unable to provide such reasons, they *should* stop engaging in it or, if it is too late, they *should* be held accountable for that performance and its consequences (and the use of the modal 'should' is a major element of what is ultimately at stake here).

This is not to say that everything we do is appraised and 'held' to such standards and expectations. But when it is not, it is because our conduct should somehow be exempted, exonerated, or excused—that is, a special dispensation is to be made against the default expectation that we are dealing with ordinary *purposive* and *intentional* conduct, with its full range of normative, legal, and moral implications.

2 Agency and philosophy

The distinction between the different kinds of occurrences that I have just sketched is a fairly intuitive and familiar one. But matters get more complicated and controversial once we look at what philosophy has to tell us about this distinction.

The simplest way for a philosopher to explain this intuitive distinction is in terms of the concept of 'agency.' The philosopher would say: some entities—agents—are capable of agency, whereas non-agents aren't. For this to be informative, however, we would need to know more about the nature of the capacity of agency. If we just say that agency is the capacity to act or to do things, we have hardly explained anything. What we are looking for, after all, is an account of those distinctive modes of behaving that we call 'acting' or 'doing.'

Things might not look much better if we consider some of the standard ways in which the concept of agency is introduced by philosophers, such as agency as the capacity to 'make things happen,' 'make a difference,' or 'cause some kind of change.' The trouble is that these characterizations can be used in ways that appear too broad. These expressions might refer, after all, to such things as the sun causing sunburn or the vinegar curdling the milk in the paneer.

So, any quick characterization of the capacity of agency seems either uninformative or too broad. Can we do better? I suspect not, at least not at this stage. But we should not despair. As Pamela Hieronymi correctly says at the opening of 'Agency and responsibility' (Chapter 25), "'Agency' is a term of art. Its meaning and use might be discovered by reading and studying this volume." This is indeed the spirit in which we should approach our philosophical investigation: by reading and reflecting on the topics discussed in this handbook, we should be able to better *articulate* the various features, dimensions, and implications of the capacity of agency. In doing so, we could temporarily rely on a rough-and-ready definition—agency as the capacity to do things or to make things happen, say—but any such definition should only be used as a stand-in for the capacity that will eventually be shown to account for the intuitive distinction between purposive (and possibly intentional) conduct and mere happenings.

This is why this introduction is not going to offer a definition of agency (and why you won't find any chapter in this handbook with such title as 'What is agency?' or 'The nature of agency'—but only chapters with titles such as 'Agency and x' or some qualification of agency, say 'Animal agency' or 'Aesthetic agency'). So the best I can do in this introduction is to point to a cluster of questions and issues that arise when discussing the differences between doing and mere happening, between making things happen rather than having things happen to you, between being active rather than passive, and so forth—with an understanding that these are just intuitive distinctions in need of further refinement as we proceed with our philosophical investigation. I will continue to use 'agency' unapologetically but always with the implicit understanding that it refers to what we are trying to explicate in raising these various philosophical questions.

3 The exercises of agency

3.1 Agency as a capacity

Agency is a *capacity*: it can be possessed without being exercised or manifested (e.g., when we are temporarily unconscious, we possess the capacity but we are not exercising it). Those who possess this capacity are 'agents' (as opposed to non-agents), but they are not playing the *role* of agents when they are not exercising it (at those times, agents are rather playing the role of patients). For instance, if my arm moves because of a spasm or because someone has grabbed my arm and moved it, I am not *the* agent (as role) of that movement, even if I am still *an* agent (as a kind of being). (The distinction is in principle straightforward but there are cases where the exercise of one's agency is partly under the control of someone else's agency, as it might happen when someone is under the spell or the authority of another agent. In these cases, which role is one playing? Agent, patient, or a mix of both? The problem arises because, in these cases, one's agency does not appear to be entirely bypassed but only severely constrained in its exercise.)

To begin articulating the notion of 'agency,' one might start by looking at some paradigmatic exercises of this capacity. A common suggestion is to look at intentional bodily movements, such as raising one's arm or crossing the street. Here are some typical features of these cases: (a) the movements are goal-directed; (b) the goals cannot be immediately achieved, (c) one *directly* engages in these activities (i.e., one does not make these movements by doing something else that results in them), and (d) the movements are 'productive,' that is, they make a difference to the world (both in their unfolding—the rising of the arm as I am raising it—and when they reach their completion—the arm being raised once I have raised it). Let's briefly consider these features in turn. What do they tell us about agency? Should they be considered paradigmatic of it? If not, why not?

3.2 Goal-directedness

A goal-directed movement has a certain 'direction' or 'orientation' toward the goal in question, which means that only some of the ways in which the agent might behave would make her attain the goal or at least move her closer to attaining it. When the agent is acting, she is behaving in ways that take her closer to reaching her goal (or at least that she believes would take her closer to it). Additionally, she is ready to attempt some compensations or adjustments if she encounters obstacles, interferences, or set-backs in her progression toward her goal. The pursuit of a goal seems to require some minimal persistence: the agent does not necessarily and immediately give up the pursuit in the face of any interference or perturbation. When she encounters some obstacles, she is normally expected to try to get around them. Relatedly, once the agent has attained the goal, she is supposed to stop the movement that was conducive to it.

The insistence on the goal-directed or purposive character of paradigmatic examples of agency seems correct. If there is an issue here, it is with the proper characterization of the expected adjustments and compensations, since we might want to exclude from purposiveness the simple behavior of physical systems that are naturally tending toward some equilibrium (and thus might seem to 'persist' in their behavior as if they were genuinely aiming toward that condition). This raises the question of whether goal-directedness could be characterized exclusively in 'extrovert' terms, that is, just in terms of patterns of observable external behavior, or it should appeal to some internal representation of the goal. Either way, some kind of purposiveness seems indeed a necessary and distinctive feature of agency.

3.3 Agency as a productive power

Let's now consider the suggestion that agency is paradigmatically *productive*, that is, that it is a matter of interventions that make a difference in the world. This suggestion has some intuitive appeal but it seems to exclude witting or intentional omissions and refraining—an exclusion that might seem unwarranted. (See 'Negative agency,' Chapter 4.) Regardless of how this question is ultimately resolved, notice that even in standard exercises of agency of the productive sort, there might often be moments of 'negative' agency, where an agent takes advantage, at least temporarily, of already favorable conditions. That is, an agent might just let the events unfold naturally without any intervention for as long as this unfolding is getting her closer to her goal. One might just go with the flow, roll downhill, or let the wind blow in one's sails. At these times, agency is not exercised by antagonistic and effortful interventions (including bodily movements) but simply by monitoring and supervising the unfolding of the events, while being able and ready to intervene in case the natural course of events might need to be nudged or corrected. So it seems plausible that agential guidance and control need not necessarily (and maybe not even paradigmatically) take the form of continuous, sustained, antagonistic, and productive interventions. At times, all that one must do to exercise one's agency is to coast or drift.

Relatedly, one should be careful about picturing the exercise of agency as being always or paradigmatically about 'initiating' some motion or change, as if acting were modeled on such scenarios as getting our inert and slouching bodies off the couch. By contrast, many (if not most) exercises of agency seem to take place against the background of the directionless restlessness of the world (a restlessness that can also take place inside our bodies). The basic job of agency might thus be better characterized as giving some direction and shape to these underlying motions—something that can be done in a variety of forms, from pugnacious antagonistic interventions to hands-off supervision.

In addition, an agent might often be aiming at the *maintenance* of some state or condition, including one's own health and existence, rather than at the creation of some novel items or conditions. In such a case, the agent's busyness with antagonistic interventions is not constitutive of agency as such but it is only forced on the agent by the need to counter the (possibly constant) perturbations to her desired stasis or equilibrium.

3.4 Telic and atelic goals

The distinction between production and maintenance also relates to the paradigmatic structure of the agent's goals. A tempting picture of standard action is one in which we reach for or move toward some object, condition, or state of affairs that is at some spatial and temporal distance from us—so that there is necessarily an interval in which one is pursuing a distal goal which has not yet been achieved. In these cases, the action concludes only when the goal has been reached. However, there are many pursuits in which the end is achieved *at the same time as* one successfully engages in them. For instance, when one is leisurely strolling—walking 'aimlessly'—one succeeds at strolling at the very same time as one is taking the appropriate steps. As one strolls one has thereby strolled. And this success does not necessarily call for the termination of that activity, though it might propel its continuation.

Some maintenance activities might have a similar temporal character. The agent might make repeated and possibly continuous adjustments that make her succeed at maintaining a given condition right at the time when she makes the adjustment. But her stasis or equilibrium might be immediately and continually perturbed, hence calling for continuous and potentially indefinite maintenance (the activity of keeping oneself biological alive or healthy, for instance, might have this temporal profile, which is very different from the profile of raising one's arm or crossing the street). (See 'Agency, events, and processes' Chapter 3, and 'Diachronic agency' Chapter 30.)

3.5 Agency and embodiment

Let's now consider the role of the body. Does all agency necessarily or paradigmatically involve the body? As physical beings, it is unsurprising that much of what we do involves our bodies. But this should not entail that there couldn't be any mental agency. (See 'Mental agency,' Chapter 16.) A lot of our mental life, after all, appears to be active in recognizable ways: there are times where we form beliefs and intentions, engage in reasoning, direct our attention to certain matters, and so forth. These mental episodes seem to be correctly described as intentional, deliberate, or voluntary, and we might be held accountable and responsible for their occurrences and consequences (although it is still an open question whether there is a distinctive kind of *epistemic* agency, see 'Epistemic agency,' Chapter 20.)

In addition, an important part of our mental and affective life is a matter of our being (defeasibly) responsive to reasons. It could be plausibly argued that this responsiveness is also a manifestation of agency (maybe even the primary manifestation of our distinctive kind of agency). If that is correct, the 'at will' character of voluntary bodily movements might offer a misleading model of reason-responsiveness, with its insistence on discretionary choice rather than on the conformity of our conduct to reasons. (See 'Rational agency,' Chapter 10, and 'Aesthetic agency,' Chapter 42.)

Regardless of where one stands on the issue of mental agency, there are still questions about the role of the body in paradigmatic modes of agency. In particular, one might wonder whether agency might not be *directly* realized and exercised in other physical but

non-biological forms, such as various technologies, and what implications this might have for the individuation of the realizations of agency, including its social and political dimensions. (See 'Material agency,' Chapter 19.)

3.6 Agency and intentionality

The last element of the allegedly paradigmatic model of action is the 'intentional' qualification of productive bodily movements. The term 'intentional' can be read in at least two ways. According to a weak reading, it just stands for a generic kind of purposiveness or goal-directedness (possibly the one that requires at least a mental representation of the goal). As such, it can be applied to a variety of agents, including nonhuman animals. According to a stronger reading, it refers to the much more demanding form of agency that is characteristic of human beings—a form which includes such things as the understanding of goals as goals, a distinctive kind of self-knowledge about one's goals and actions, planning abilities, and a willingness to offer and ask for reasons for action (for more on this, see the discussion of full-blooded agency in this introduction below).

Both uses of 'intentional' and cognate expressions are legitimate but, when using this term in the philosophical investigation of agency, one needs to make clear whether one is trying to characterize a notion of agency that has broader application across a variety of entities, including various organisms and possibly some artifacts, or one is primarily focused on the distinctive properties of human agency.

4 Kinds of agency

4.1 The varieties of agency

Unless one is skeptical about the existence of any genuine agency at all, there is a general philosophical agreement that normally developed human beings possess agency. But what about other animals, plants, and unicellular organisms? What about artifacts such as robots, or supernatural beings such as angels, demons, and gods? There are also important philosophical questions about the presence of genuine (and non-derivative) agency in sub-personal systems or functional components (say, the digestive system, the heart, a single cell in a multicellular organism) and in super-personal entities, such as social groups and institutions.

Part of what is at stake in addressing these questions is whether there are different levels or degrees of agency. It might be that some dimensions of agency could be attributed only to more complex organisms but not to simpler ones. If so, what are these dimensions? How are they related to each other? What are the normative implications of these attributions? (See Part 2, Chapters 7–10.)

Even when there is some agreement on the different levels or degrees of agency, there is still one additional methodological issue: what is the relation between the various kinds of agency? Are they set along an additive sequence, so that one can go from one level to another by simply adding some powers or capacities to the simpler forms (thereby retaining the basic operations of the lower/simpler levels)? Or are the various kinds different species of the same genus, so that possessing some different capacities has a 'transformative' rather than a merely 'additive' effect on the various capacities and powers? (See 'Rational agency,' Chapter 10.)

Relatedly, there is a question whether some of the more complex forms of agency might be taken to be *better* along some evaluative dimension, and whether agents might be under

a demand to acquire and exercise better forms of agency, when they have the option to do so. One might also wonder whether there are any normative pressures to relate differently toward simpler forms of agency. Concerns of this sort become particularly poignant in the case of human agency. Human agency exhibits various dimensions and layers of complexity, which are acquired as we grow up, and that we might lose or fail to develop and cultivate. How should we both conceptualize and relate to those instances of human agency that do not exhibit the standard combination of powers and capacities? (See Part 2, Chapters 7–10; 'Agency and disability,' Chapter 14; and 'Pathologies of agency,' Chapter 15.)

4.2 Full-blooded agency

Much of the philosophical reflection on agency is centered on human agency, which is often referred to as 'full-blooded agency.' This is also the term that I will use throughout this handbook to indicate that this agency exhibits a distinctive combination of features. In addition to purposiveness, full-blooded human agency exhibits the following features:

1 There is structural complexity both in our pursuits and in our ends. Much of this complexity stems from the extended temporal character of our agency in the mode of planning—we have psychological, conceptual, and reasoning capacities to engage in integrated long-term plans, often directed at ends that we could not pursue and conceive in the absence of these very capacities (see 'Planning agency,' Chapter 31, and 'Agency, time, and rationality,' Chapter 32).
2 We occupy a privileged epistemic position with respect to our own intentional conduct: we have a distinctive kind of self-knowledge about what we are doing and why we are doing it (a kind of self-knowledge that might extend to or explain other forms of self-knowledge). (See 'Agency and practical knowledge,' Chapter 21, and 'Agency and self-knowledge,' Chapter 23.)
3 In explaining, assessing, and interacting with the intentional conduct of fellow human beings, we expect them to have *reasons* that justify and make sense of their conduct (reasons that are in principle expected to be explicitly offered by the agent when one is asked for them). In this way, we make explicit what a constitutive feature of intentional conduct—being the object of a distinctive kind of explanation: explanation in terms of reasons, rationality, and intelligibility. The offering and the asking for reasons, moreover, is not an idle kind of external appraisal. We have a basic disposition to modify and adjust our behavior in light of our appreciation of the reasons that purport to justify it. Hence, we operate with the expectation that our conduct conforms to the reasons that purportedly justify it. The same disposition and expectation operate in response to the explicit requests of reasons. To the extent that our conduct does not conform to these reasons, we are expected to modify it (if still possible) or to be held accountable for the failure to do so. (See 'Agency, reasons and rationality,' Chapter 36, and 'Agency and practical reasoning,' Chapter 37.)
4 The accountability to rational justification is at the basis of what might be called 'ethical responsibility.' We hold each other responsible for our intentional conduct, its consequences, and its results (something that takes place in various settings, including interpersonal relationships, institutional and legal contexts, and morality). It is because of its intimate relation to the practice of holding agents responsible that full-blooded agency is the natural home for the application of such qualifications and concepts as voluntariness, willingness, duress, compulsion, coercion, reluctance, consent, innocence, and guilt. (See 'Agency and responsibility,' Chapter 25.)

5 Full-blooded agency is the ground of the possibility of attributing normative or deontic statuses: only full-blooded agents can be regarded as genuine and full bearers of duties, obligations, rights, and responsibilities. Full-blooded agency is thus a precondition for both legal and moral personhood. (See 'Agency and personal identity,' Chapter 34.)
6 Traditional questions about freedom and free will seem to be appropriate only once full-blooded agency is on the scene. (See 'Agency, will, and freedom,' Chapter 24.)
7 Questions about identification, self-governance, authenticity, and autonomy only arise in the presence of full-blooded agency. (See 'Agency and identification,' Chapter 26, and 'Agency and autonomy,' Chapter 27.)
8 Full-blooded agency comes in a distinctive social form. This sociality is not limited to the capacity to engage in social activities, but it is also a constitutive aspect of the practices of explanation, justification, and accountability.
9 Finally, all these dimensions, features, and implications of full-blooded agency either go together with, or are partly made possible, constituted, or enhanced by our critical and reflective capacities. Minimally, we have the linguistic, conceptual, and reasoning resources to articulate our goals and the reasons in their support, and to understand the very notion of goals and reasons. This is our basic critical capacity: we can represent and understand the basic rational structure of our intentional agency and its normative implications. An important consequence of this critical capacity is that rational scrutiny and justification are not limited to our instrumental conduct but also extend to our ends. Higher-order reflective abilities can then be turned toward all features and implications of our full-blooded agency, in its psychological, conceptual, rational, normative, and moral dimensions—as evinced by the very existence of the *philosophy of* agency. (See Part 8, 'Agency, reasoning, and normativity,' Chapters 36–42.)

Much of the work in the philosophy of agency is centered on full-blooded agency, given that we are supposed to be agents of this kind. Unsurprisingly, many of the chapters in this volume have the same focus. The appearance of the word 'agency' in them (including in some of their titles) might often be better interpreted as 'full-blooded agency,' which is something that should be apparent to the attentive reader.

5 Four pictures of agency

This volume does not try to advocate for a specific positive account of agency. Its aim is rather to introduce the reader to several central issues and some different approaches in the philosophy of agency. The reader is invited to explore various aspects of agency, their connections, and their implications. There is no privileged place of entry or re-entry, although several chapters are loosely organized around some larger set of questions, as described in the introduction to the sections of this handbook.

To provide some initial direction, however, I'd like to offer four general *pictures* of agency that can seem to inform, often implicitly, various specific philosophical views about agency. By 'picture' I mean an approach to the philosophy of agency that tends to provide some basic orientation in selecting the questions that are considered worth asking and in setting the desiderata and constraints on their answers, including judgments about salience and irrelevance, the style of argumentations, and the examples that tend to be used (including the choice of paradigmatic illustrations of agency). This orientation might not be self-conscious or explicit, and it might originate in a pre-theoretical view on the nature of agency, which

might then be elevated into a more systematic philosophical account. A picture is not the same as a full account or theory that aspires to consistency and coherence. Rather, a picture tends to motivate certain lines of inquiry and to frame the questions to be raised. It might not exclude other approaches. One might find strands of different pictures within more elaborate philosophical accounts of agency, some of which might actually and explicitly try to reconcile different pictures. This should not be surprising. After all, each of the pictures that I am about to present appears to highlight some intuitively plausible aspects or dimensions of agency. Thus, as we start to reflect on the nature of agency, we should try to become aware of the role that any of these pictures might implicitly play in framing our investigation. And we should not be too cavalier in dismissing (or privileging) any of them.

Given my understanding of what a 'picture' of agency is, it should not be surprising that what I am about to offer are only some impressionistic sketches, where I hint at some variations on what I take the distinctive theme of each of these pictures (which also means that it is unlikely that one could find a philosopher that fits neatly into a single picture and that exhibits all of the traits that I am about to present). Notice that I am not claiming that these are the only four possible pictures of agency, but this is my best attempt to begin to articulate some of the approaches that can be encountered in the philosophy of agency literature.

5.1 Agency as creation

According to this picture, agency is the capacity to create or produce, to bring about something new, such as the initiation of an action. A down-to-earth example of this creative power is the 'at will' raising of one's arm from a position of rest, which is prompted by nothing other than one's choice or decision to do so. A similar example is the case of the arbitrary selection between two or more open paths, especially in the case in which they appear to be equally desirable (think about Buridan's ass scenario, for instance).

This picture emphasizes the role of the agent as the *source* or *origin* of action, where the action is added as something *new* to the world. This is why I call this approach 'agency as creation' (rather than agency as the mere power of initiation or selection). I also suspect that, for some proponents of this picture, the ideal or model of agential power might be something like a divine 'fiat'—a divine *ex-nihilo* creative act. This is not to say that raising one's arm or selecting from among open paths is without constraints. But within those restrictions, for this picture, agency operates unfettered, hence its 'discretionary,' 'at will,' or 'arbitrary' character. According to this picture, exercises of agency are ultimately manifestations of a radical kind of freedom (possibly as radical as the 'liberty of indifference,' which is unfettered even by the constraints imposed by responsiveness to reasons and thus open in principle to the possibility of perverse action). The insistence in this picture on the (locally) unconstrained creative or productive powers of the agent might ultimately reflect and expose a deep concern with our possible 'captivity,' with the worry that we might ultimately lack freedom.

Relatedly, in this picture, the attribution of some conduct to the agent is primarily a matter of *tracing the source* of that conduct back to the agent as the place where one cannot go any further. The investigation of the internal structure of the agent appears to be a less urgent task, possibly because of the expectation that this investigation could not reveal much. This creative power might thus be a distinctive but *irreducible* feature of agency. This irreducibility, however, raises the worry that this picture might be difficult to reconcile with any naturalistic view of the world—especially if one thinks of the basic exercises of agency as 'inserting' themselves *ex nihilo*, so to say, into the natural causal order.

5.2 Agency as self-constitution

According to the second picture, agency is ultimately a matter of self-constitution or self-maintenance. In this picture, the paradigmatic example of the exercise of agency is the conduct of an organism, which is ultimately directed at the organism's self-maintenance, that is, at securing its continuous survival in response to the ultimate existential threat: that of dissolution and death. For this picture, agency is ultimately the same as the capacity of life: agents are first of all organisms (self-constituting and self-maintaining entities), and different kinds of agency reflect different kinds of life-form.

The sense of life (and organism) in this picture need not be restricted to the 'biological,' to material organisms with a metabolism. In principle, it seems possible to extend the idea of self-constitution and self-maintenance to *rational* life, to the life of a rational subject *as* a rational subject, where the existential threat arises within the rational order rather than within the causal one. Inconsistency and incoherence might be to rational life what material disintegration is to physical life. In both cases, the threat is to the maintenance of the kind of integrity and unity required to sustain continuous existence either as a rational or a biological agent (or both). (Notice that this description of rational life concerns the characterization of the kind of unity and existence at stake in the power of agency—it is a separate issue whether a rational life-form could exist in a disembodied form or as embodied in a non-biological form, say in a material artifact.)

This picture of agency gives expression to the idea of agency as self-motion, as self-originating conduct with a necessary teleological orientation. Within this picture, there is no question about the source of the agent's basic *busyness*, since self-maintenance comes with the built-in preoccupation to fend off any potential fatal threats—which the agent might constantly encounter in its path to survival. Unlike agency-as-creation, the basic concern here is not captivity, but mortality.

Agency-as-self-constitution offers a straightforward account of the attributability of the action to the agent. As an exercise of self-motion, any piece of conduct is necessarily of the 'self,' that is, of the entity that is, by its nature, in the business of constituting itself—of making its 'self.' This invites an investigation in the conditions that make possible for the entity to have both adequate internal integrity and sufficient separation from the external world to constitute a distinct and viable *unit* of agency. Likewise, in this account, there is a straightforward path to the attribution of agential conduct to the agent 'as a whole.' Agency is to be primarily attributed to the self-maintaining entity rather than to any of its functional components, such as an organ or a subsystem. The operations of these components might have their own teleological orientation, but if these components are not self-sustaining in relative isolation from the larger entity, they might be said to have agency only in a derivative sense, if at all. Likewise, larger aggregates of self-maintaining agents would not exhibit genuine agency unless they reach a level of integration such that, at that level of organization, they would count as self-maintaining units in their own right. (This is not to say that self-maintenance is maintenance in isolation from the external world or from other agents. The picture of agency-as-self-maintenance can actually be well-positioned to account for the mutual interdependence of agents, including various forms and levels of sociality and the nesting of different levels of agents within each other.)

In agency-as-creation, the creative power is primarily manifested in each individual exercise of agency, as directed at bringing into existence the particular object of that individual act of creation. In agency-as-self-constitution, agency still has a creative aspect, but what is ultimately (and constantly) brought into existence is the agent itself. The agency of self-constitution is the agency of continuous self-(re)creation.

This does not mean that self-constituting agents must explicitly represent their own maintenance as the object of any of their particular activities. Self-maintenance might often be performed by the explicit pursuit of instrumental means, without necessarily representing or appreciating them as means to self-maintenance. An organism might never seek self-maintenance as the direct object of any of its goal-directed pursuits, whose proximal object is always some specific (and usually telic) way of contributing to its survival, such as getting food, avoiding predators, and seeking shelter. It is only for a reflective self-maintaining agent, who becomes cognizant of the fundamental structure of their agency, that (atelic) self-maintenance might become the primary and explicit object of concern (for the telic/atelic distinction see above and 'Diachronic agency,' Chapter 30).

Here are some of the attractive features of this picture. First, it is easy for it to emphasize the temporal dimension of agency. This is because self-constitution is a continuous process, which is terminated only by the agent's death. The continuity of self-constitution should not be confused, however, with a relentless process of positive intervention in the world. There is nothing in the idea of a self-maintaining entity that stands opposed to taking advantage of already favorable conditions by coasting and drifting. If anything, the negative mode of agency—letting things unfold naturally—could be seen as the preferred mode of self-maintenance, if only one were not under constant threats. After all, for this picture of agency, positive interventions are ultimately only in response to present or anticipated threats. It is only the indifference or the hostility of the world that might force the self-maintaining agent into a relentless series of mostly positive interventions. In agency-as-self-constitution, there might be no special value attached to spontaneous or 'unforced' individual acts of positive creation or production as such.

Another interesting feature of this picture is that it might offer the basis for an account of the connection between agency and normativity—by leveraging either the built-in aim or function of self-maintaining entities or the force of the existential threat that always hangs over the heads of self-constituting entities. (See 'Agency and normativity,' Chapter 38, and 'The aim of agency,' Chapter 39.)

Finally, this picture might make it easier to account for the natural history of agency and the existence of different kinds of agents, since this history and variety might just reflect the unfolding of the tree of life on Earth. But for this same reason, this picture might run into problems when trying to account for the rational aspect of agency, especially in the form of self-conscious reason-responsiveness. Although agency-as-self-constitution might explicitly contemplate 'rational' life-forms, there is a legitimate worry about whether the notions of self-maintenance and self-constitution can really apply to rational agency, especially of the critical and reflective kind.

Agency as self-constitution seems especially apt at accounting for the agential character of the operations of simpler forms of life. The concern is that it might become much less plausible when applied to the distinctive features of full-blooded agency. In a related vein, one might wonder whether an excessive reliance on a picture of agency inspired by the structure of biological life might rule out the possibility of genuine agency in the absence of either metabolism (say, in robots or androids) or of any existential threats (say, in immortal beings).

5.3 Agency as psychological causality

According to a third picture, agency is fundamentally the *psychological* capacity to bring about bodily movements that intelligibly fit with the agent's desires, cares, concerns, or commitments. A straightforward illustration of this picture is found in what is known as

the 'standard story about action' (see Introduction to Section I). According to this story, an action is a bodily movement caused (in the right kind of way) and rationalized (that is, made intelligible) by the agent's desire for a certain end and her belief that moving her body in that particular way will bring about that end.

There is something intuitively appealing about the standard story, since it seems to conform to ordinary folk-psychological explanations of action, in terms of the so-called belief/desire psychology. For instance, one explains the action of reaching for a glass of water out of the combination of one's desire to quench one's thirst and one's belief that one can satisfy that desire by extending one's arm in the direction of the glass of water. This arm movement 'makes sense'—it is made intelligible or 'rationalized'—by that particular combination of mental states. (By contrast, it would not make sense to reach for the glass of water if, say, one believed that the glass was outside of one's reach or one had no desire for the water.) In this account, the elements of one's psychology play a double explanatory role: they make the action intelligible by providing reasons for its performance; and they bring about the action by causing it (in the right way—this qualification is always implicit because of the so-called problem of 'deviant causal chains,' on which see 'Agency and causation,' Chapter 1, and 'Agency, functions, and teleology,' Chapter 2).

The standard story is not the only version of what I am calling agency-as-psychological-causation. For instance, one could offer a much more elaborate characterization of the psychological structure (or 'psychic economy,' as this is sometimes called) that is explanatory of the action, including the existence of different kinds of mental states (including intentions, plan states, and higher-order mental states) and more complex ways in which they might relate to each other. (See 'Intentional agency,' Chapter 9, 'Planning agency,' Chapter 31, and 'Agency and identification,' Chapter 26.)

What makes these various accounts versions of the psychological-causation picture is their focus on an account of action in terms of its psychological (as rationalizing) causal antecedents. Unlike the pictures of agency-as-creation and agency-as-self-constitution, this picture makes the presence of a mind—of a psychic economy—central to the nature of agency; it does so by articulating the internal structure of the psychological structure and its contribution to bringing about genuine exercises of agency. As I remarked earlier, this articulation appears to be a problem for agency-as-creation, especially if that picture insists on the *sui generis* character of the agential powers. The agency-as-creation picture is at risk of locating agency outside of the natural causal order. A commitment to a naturalistic explanation appears to be a major motivation behind the agency-as-psychological-causation model, hence its insistence that both the internal operation and the external outputs of the psychology be accounted for in terms of the generic bond of ordinary causation. Psychological causation is ordinary causation *by* elements of one's psychology, not some kind of supernatural, mysterious, or spooky power.

Agency-as-creation is not necessarily guilty of invoking some kind of magic, but it can lend itself to such invocation. For, unlike agency-as-psychological-causation, it does not start from the very idea that agency is a capacity to be explained in terms of the naturalistic operation of some underlying causal structure.

Notice that this is not a concern with agency-as-self-constitution. A self-maintaining entity is one with an internal structure and organization that is in principle naturalistically explainable. What differentiates agency-as-psychological-causation from agency-as-self-constitution is that the former starts from a *psychological* structure. This appears to be an advantage when one is to account for the distinctive features and implications of full-blooded agency, which is imbued with psychological and rational

attributes. The psychological and rational dimensions of agency, instead, are only a secondary feature of agency-as-self-constitution, given that self-maintenance is, first of all, an ontological rather than a psychological or rational property. By starting with life rather than with mind, agency-as-self-constitution might end up being too generous in the attribution of agency to simpler kinds of organisms while struggling to account for the distinctive rational dimension of full-blooded agency at the other end of the spectrum. A related advantage of agency-as-psychological-causation is that, in principle, it faces no difficulty accommodating the possibility of genuine agency in entities that are not self-maintaining—such as artificial, non-biological machines—as long as they are realizations of a sufficiently complex psychic economy.

Agency-as-self-constitution, however, might fare better than agency-as-psychological-causation when we come to the question of how to attribute actions to their agents. As we have seen above, in agency-as-self-constitution, the self-originating character of the exercises of agency is guaranteed by the very notion of self-constitution. The psychological causation picture, instead, might struggle on this front. According to psychological causation, where exactly is the capacity of agency located? Who or what is exercising this capacity? 'The psychic economy!'—one might say. But what does make this economy that of a genuine *agent*—in the sense of a sufficiently integrated unit to count as the proper locus of the exercise of agency? The concern is that the elements of the psychic economy might be doing the work by themselves, without any discernible role for the agent (this is known as the problem of the 'disappearing agent'). The risk is that the psychological-causation picture might either explain the agent away or surreptitiously and uninformatively assume some homuncular unity within the internal working of the psychic economy. True, the psychological causation story is framed in terms of the operation of a *system*—a psychic 'economy'—but there seems to be nothing in the basic idea of psychological causation that, by itself, explains how to individuate a system with the kind of unity and integration that we expect of the idea of a genuine agent.

In addition to the worry of the disappearing agent, many objections have been raised against the standard story of action. These objections target its metaphysics of mind and of causation, its seeming inability to account for extended guidance rather than just the initiation of actions, and its troubles with the putative agential character of omissions and refraining. (See the introduction to Part I, 'The metaphysics of agency,' and Chapters 1–6.) However, the standard story is only one possible version, even if an intuitive one, of agency-as-psychological-causation. Its problems need not necessarily invalidate the picture in all of its possible forms. After all, the basic idea of psychological causation seems most welcoming to different characterizations of the psychic economy, including a variety of mental architectures, with very different components and structures (including different metaphysical accounts of causation and the appeal to psychological elements belonging to different metaphysical categories—such as states, events, and processes).

In my view, what makes these different accounts instances of the psychological-causation picture is not a commitment to the specific features of the standard story but the aspiration to provide a naturalistic account of how a psychology can operate causally and yet stay within the rational order, so as to give rise to full-blooded agency. This is what makes agency-as-psychological-causation especially attractive but also potentially most vulnerable. For there is always the worry that the causality invoked by this picture to explain the operations of the psychic economy might not be able to explain the truly distinctive aspects of full-blooded agency, including its normative character and its self-conscious and reflective dimensions.

5.4 Agency as reason responsiveness

According to this last general picture of agency, agency is primarily the capacity to respond to reasons. Agency is first of all exercised in making up our minds on the basis of normative or rational considerations about how we ought to make up our minds. In the paradigmatic cases, in making up our minds about what to do, we thereby also give shape to our conduct in the material world. Our agency, however, is not primarily exhibited in the 'at will' shaping of our physical actions but in our avowals or disavowals of reason-responsive attitudes.

It is useful to compare this picture to agency-as-creation. In agency-as-creation, agency is ultimately a matter of making a difference within the causal fabric of the world. This kind of difference can be modeled in terms of changes in the physical world, such as selecting which path to take at a junction or setting into motion an inert body. In agency-as-reason-responsiveness, instead, the change is first of all within a *normative* rather than a physical space. In agency-as-reason-responsiveness, the agent takes on a new shape because of the new status acquired by some of one's own attitudes (paradigmatically, one's judgments) in response to one's sensitivity to normative considerations.

Crucial to both pictures is the idea of the agent as the direct *source* of one's own agential conduct. But the two pictures drastically differ in the character of the proposed source. This difference can be illustrated by the distinction between 'authorship' and 'authority.' According to agency-as-creation, the agent is the source of agential conduct. It is so because the agent is the author—the creator or originator of this conduct. This authorship, which retains a voluntary character, is ultimately accounted for in causal terms.

By contrast, in agency-as-rational-responsiveness, the agent is a source in the sense of being the authority that endorses, judges, or avows something. Being the agent is, first of all, a matter of putting a stamp of approval (hence the change in normative status within the space of reasons) rather than of directing one's conduct into some physical direction instead of another (even if one's conduct is by default expected to take on a specific direction in physical space as a result of the change in one's normative status).

The two pictures also differ in their interpretation of what they fear the most. Both are worried about the loss of freedom, especially in the form of being pushed around by mere causality. But agency-as-creation might respond to this concern by encouraging a radical resistance to any form of 'constraining,' even the one induced by responsiveness to reasons. Thus, agency-as-creation might end up encouraging an extreme view of agency as the defiance of reason, as epitomized by choices done in an arbitrary matter or in the absolute refusal to be shaped by any rational consideration.

The defiance of reason, instead, is contrary to the very spirit of agency-as-reason-responsiveness. The kind of freedom that the latter view wants to affirm is that of autonomy—of self-determination in response to one's appreciation of the reasons for action, not that of arbitrary indifference (if not even defiance) of one's assessment of which reasons bear on one's practical circumstances.

What counts in favor of the agency-as-reason-responsiveness? First, this picture accounts for the seeming agential and active character of aspects of our lives that go beyond physical actions, including the vicissitudes not only of our cognitive attitudes but also of some of the conative and affective ones. This is shown by our practices of explaining, appraising, and holding agents responsible on account of the reason-responsive (rather than 'at will') formation, retention, and revision of these attitudes. Second, the view does not have problems with the attribution of a piece of conduct to its own agent. This is because, at least in the paradigmatic cases, the subject's judgment that so-and-so is to be done *constitutes* the fact that

the doing of so-and-so is the doing *of* that subject. Third, this picture has no trouble accounting for the relation between agency, reasons, rationality, and, more broadly, the normative domain. This is because the connection between agency and normativity is built right into this picture of agency.

These same features, however, might also constitute the major vulnerability of agency-as-reason-responsiveness. First, by being centered on reason-responsiveness, this picture might be unable to account for the simpler kinds of agency. Second, it is unclear how this picture fits with a naturalistic outlook. It is not that this picture is in principle anti-naturalistic, but, unlike agency-as-psychological-causation, it does not seem to be bothered with securing foundations with impeccable naturalistic credentials (which is unsurprising since it primarily trades in the abstract space of the normative).

5.5 Conclusion

This concludes my initial and very rough sketch of four basic pictures of agency that might, at least implicitly, motivate and shape many philosophical investigations of agency. As I remarked at the outset, these are general pictures that might be neither fully explicit nor articulated by those who are under their influence. And it would not be surprising if many philosophers are attracted by more than one picture at the same time and possibly try to reconcile them, given that each of these pictures seems to highlight some distinctive and attractive features of our full-blooded agency. However, it is too early to say whether any such reconciliation is possible or whether one of these pictures (or possibly even a different one altogether) will eventually emerge as the correct one.

6 What's next?

6.1 'Philosophy of agency'

The questions and pictures that I have presented in this introduction are a sample of the philosophical issues raised by the notion of 'agency.' Many additional topics will be presented in the following chapters. Taken all together, they should give the reader a good (although far from comprehensive) overview of the 'Philosophy of Agency.' Notice that this label, although it is gaining prominence, has not yet replaced 'Philosophy of Action' as the standard name for this area of philosophy (whereas the old-fashioned and far too restrictive label, 'action theory,' seems to be, fortunately, almost forgotten).

Whenever it is in my power to do so (such as editing this handbook), I will insist on the use of 'philosophy of agency.' This is, I believe, for very good philosophical reasons. The primary topic of investigation is not 'actions,' which are just among the possible exercises of the capacity of agency. True, actions (together with acts and activities) appear to be the primary manifestations of agency, and, as such, they might correctly get the bulk of the attention. But this does not justify making actions, rather than the capacity that underlies them, the primary object of philosophical reflection. And even if one were to argue that agency can only be exercised in actions, this would still be a *substantive* view within the philosophy of agency, not a neutral definition of an area of philosophical inquiry.

Even those who might profess neutrality on this matter should be wary of the surreptitious effects of the use of the label 'philosophy of action.' This name might favor a potentially tendentious philosophical agenda, which could give undue prominence to actions over other manifestations of agency. Just to give an example about some hidden dangers: by starting the

investigation with talk of 'actions' one might privilege certain phenomena in their nominalized form rather than in a verbal one, including variations in tense and aspect. But who is to say that the focus should be primarily on actions rather than on acting, say? (Likewise, why should one privilege deeds over doings? Intentions over intending? Plans over planning?) In addition, the primary focus on actions might implicitly suggest that they could stand as separate items, which could be studied piecemeal, in relative isolation from each other and from their sources, and used as building blocks in the reconstruction of extended exercises of agency. Last but not least, the primary focus on the exercises of a capacity also risks obscuring the role played by agents, as the loci of this capacity. The philosophy of agency should be, at the very least, a philosophy of agency, agents, and actions. These are not idle worries, since important and foundational philosophical matters might lie behind these seemingly innocent linguistic choices, especially in the case of the philosophy of agency. (In further support for my terminological choice, consider how odd—and philosophical prejudicial—it would sound to refer to other philosophical areas by the analog of 'philosophy of action': for example, 'philosophy of belief' or 'belief theory' instead of epistemology; 'philosophy of mental states,' or 'propositional attitudes theory' instead of 'philosophy of mind;' 'philosophy of moral conduct' instead of 'ethics' or 'moral philosophy,' etc.)

6.2 How to read this book

This handbook is not going to propose any positive characterization of the nature of agency but rather to represent some of the variety of issues and viewpoints to be found in the philosophy of agency (not to mention that many of the central questions in this area revolve quite directly with addressing the very question of the nature of agency). This is also why there is no specific chapter in this volume titled 'The Nature of Agency.' The reader is rather invited to try to discover and reflect on the various questions by sampling different topics in this handbook, with no specific point of entry or progression. At the end of each chapter, the reader will find some additional suggestions for further related topics, which one might follow up at their discretion. Some chapters are organized around a set of common questions, and the reader is invited to read the introduction to these sections to learn more about how the topics might be related. This organization, however, is not a rigid one. Many chapters could have as easily been assigned to different sections, and different groupings of questions might have been proposed altogether.

The volume aims to be comprehensive but it is by no means exhaustive. Many topics are not covered here. The absence of any particular topic is hardly an indication of its lesser philosophical importance. Many are missing simply because this volume is the product of the coordination of the limited and constrained agency of the editor, the authors, and other potential contributors. (Consider, for instance, some of the topics that went through some advanced stages of planning but had to be dropped at some point: 'Agency, desire, and motivation,' 'Agency and the first person,' 'The logic of agency,' 'The sense of agency,' 'Agency and the virtues,' 'Agency and perception,' just to name a few.) In addition, there are for sure many unwitting omissions that just reflect the ignorance and imperfection of this editor.

But there are a couple of noticeable intentional omissions that require some justification. First, except for the brief discussion in 'Agency, will, and freedom,' Chapter 24 (and indirectly in 'Agency and autonomy,' Chapter 27, and 'Agency and responsibility,' Chapter 25), there are no chapters that deal directly with the question of freedom and free will, despite the centrality of these topics to the philosophical reflection on agency. This ultimately reflects a major division of philosophical labor that is now well-established within contemporary

Western Anglophone philosophy. There is an entire philosophical area specifically devoted to questions of freedom, free will, and responsibility, and several introductory and more advanced resources are already available (see, for instance, Griffith, M., Levy, N., & Timpe, K. (eds.), 2017, *The Routledge Companion to Free Will*.). I have thus decided that there was no point in duplicating in this volume what is already available elsewhere, and I invite the readers specifically interested in issues about freedom and free will to consult these other resources.

Likewise, there is no chapter devoted to shared, joint, collective, or social agency. This is not because these are not important aspects of agency. A reasonable claim can be made that agency, especially full-blooded agency, must necessarily come in some kind of social form. Some of these social aspects get explicitly discussed in some chapters (such as 'Material agency,' Chapter 19, 'Planning agency,' Chapter 31, 'Agency and the emotions,' Chapter 29, and 'Agency and responsibility,' Chapter 25). But a single introductory chapter on social agency would hardly add any new information which couldn't already be available in such publications as Jankovic, Marija, and Kirk Ludwig (eds.), 2017, *The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality* or the relevant entries in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (https://plato.stanford.edu). As for the case of freedom, readers specifically interested in collective or social agency should consult these resources.

Many readers of this handbook might also benefit from reading it in conjunction with a systematic introduction to the philosophy of agency, such as the excellent volume by Sarah Paul, (2021) *The Philosophy of Action*, Routledge (see also Lilian O'Brien, 2015, *Philosophy of Action*, Palgrave and Rowland Stout, 2005, *Action*, Routledge).

Finally, this handbook does not specifically discuss any of the long history of the philosophy of agency, although many of the topics have been the object of philosophical reflection and discussion for centuries. This is, once again, a major editorial choice forced by practical constraints in putting a volume of this kind together. It does not reflect any negative assessment of the philosophical value of a historical look at this discipline. On a related note, this handbook does not want to deny or hide its historical, geographical, and cultural situatedness. The general philosophical outlook presented in this volume is the one informed by the scholarly discussion in Western Anglophone philosophy from about the 1950s, with some occasional influences from the so-called 'continental' tradition and some glances at selected portions of the history of Western philosophy. Much of the philosophical discussion that has taken place within this tradition in the last seven decades or so is done with the aspiration that the questions that are raised and the answers that are offered might, at least in part, transcend the confines of the particular philosophical outlook within which they have been raised and offered. Whether this aspiration succeeds (or is ultimately in vain), however, is not something that could be addressed in this volume. My hope, however, is that much more work will be done to investigate the nature of agency within other philosophical traditions and other disciplines. Although I believe that any reader should feel confident about beginning the study of the philosophy of agency by reading this handbook, the reader should never be under the impression that the philosophy of agency either begins or ends with the contributions collected in this volume.[1]

Note

1 This handbook is the product of the joint, telic, and extended intentional activity of many agents. Whether or not they want to admit it, they all bear some responsibility for it (with the possible exception of their unwitting omissions). But I suspect that I am the 'most agent-of' this final product and so I will take most of the responsibility for it. The least burdensome and most welcome aspect of this responsibility is my duty (and desire) to thank all who contributed to the final attainment

by playing very different roles at different places and times. To begin with, I want to thank the editorial staff at Routledge: Rebecca Shillabeer—who first commissioned the handbook—, Gabrielle Coakeley, and Adam Johnson—who has overseen its further development and completion. This book could not have been conceivable without the existence of a thriving community of philosophers, who continue to engage in exciting conversations and reflections on the nature of agency. A fair number of them have directly participated in this volume, so I thank them all, both individually and jointly, for their chapters (and for their patience and promptness in dealing with my slow and desultory work toward the final success and closure of our joint pursuit). I also want to thank the many friends and colleagues who have not written a chapter for the handbook but have provided essential and invaluable support, advice, and above all philosophical inspiration over the years. In particular, John Fischer, David Horst, Richard Moran, Michael Nelson, Alexandra Newton, Sarah Paul, Andrews Reath, Karl Schafer, Tamar Schapiro, Sergio Tenenbaum. I also thank my colleagues and students at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and, more recently, at the University of California-Riverside. A special thank goes to the organizers and participants of the many meetings of the DFG Netwerk 'Practisches Denken und Gutes Handlen' and its descendant (aka 'The Action Network') who have done so much over the years to keep the philosophical conversation about agency both alive and lively. Last but not least, I have to thank the members of my small extended family—Marilena, Carla, and Susan—who have paid many of the direct costs of this project, by being around me during the ups and downs of the writing and editing process, but are only going to gain very indirect benefits from its eventual success: as much as it might surprise the readers of this handbook, not every full-blooded agent turns out to be also a philosopher of agency—something which, after all, we should all be thankful for.

Agency and causation

Buckareff, A. 2018. ‘I’m just sitting around doing nothing: on exercising intentional agency in omitting to act’. Synthese, 195: 4617–4635.

A causal process theory of agency is presented on which intentional agency involves an agent’s causal powers manifesting. The account is applied to the problem of omissions.

Kim, J. 2010. ‘Causation and mental causation’. Chap. 12 in Essays in the metaphysics of mind. New York: Oxford University Press: 243–262.

An understanding of causation as a productive relation is presented as required for theorizing about mental causation and agency.

Lowe, E.J. 2008. Personal agency: the metaphysics of mind and action. New York: Oxford University Press.

Event and substance causation are compared in chapters 6–8, with a case made for the priority of substance causation over event causation.

Menzies, P. 2003. ‘The causal efficacy of mental states’. In S. Walter and H. Heckmann , eds., Physicalism and mental causation: the metaphysics of mind and action. Exeter: Imprint: 195–223.

A sophisticated variant of a difference-making account of causation is developed as part of a non-reductive physicalist account of mental causation. A response to the problem of basic causal deviance for causalism assuming this account of causation is given.

Stout, R. 2007. ‘Two ways to understand causality in agency’. In A. Leist , ed., Action in context. New York: de Gruyter: 137–153.

Causal chain theories are critiqued. A neo-Aristotelian alternative is defended on which exercises of intentional agency are identified with causal processes involving the manifestation of an agent’s power of intentional agency.

Aguilar, J. 2020. ‘The standard story of action and the problem of agential guidance’. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia, 52: 3–25.

Aguilar, J. and Buckareff, A. 2010. Causing human actions: new perspectives on the causal theory of action. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/The MIT Press.

Aguilar, J. and Buckareff, A. 2015. ‘A gradualist metaphysics of agency’. In A. Buckareff , C. Moya , and S. Rosell , eds., Agency, freedom, and moral responsibility. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan: 30–43.

Alvarez, M. and Hyman, J. 1998. ‘Agents and their actions’. Philosophy, 73: 219–245.

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1993. ‘Causality and determination’. In E. Sosa and M. Tooley , eds., Causation. New York: Oxford University Press: 88–104.

Aristotle . 1996. Physics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Aristotle . 2016. Metaphysics. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Armstrong, D. M. 1983. What is a law of nature? New York: Cambridge University Press.

Beebee, H. 2000. ‘The non-governing conception of laws of nature’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 571–594.

Beebee, H. 2003. ‘Local miracle compatibilism’. Noûs, 37: 258–277.

Beebee, H. 2006. ‘Does anything hold the universe together?’ Synthese, 149: 509–533.

Bishop, J. 1989. Natural agency: an essay on the causal theory of action. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brent, M. 2017. ‘Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 47: 656–673.

Buckareff, A. 2011. ‘How does agent-causal power work?’ The Modern Schoolman, 88: 105–121.

Buckareff, A. 2017. ‘A critique of substance causation’. Philosophia, 45: 1019–1026.

Buckareff, A. 2018. ‘I’m just sitting around doing nothing: on exercising intentional agency in omitting to act’. Synthese, 195: 4617–4635.

Chakravarrty, A. 2005. ‘Causal realism: events and processes’. Erkenntnis, 63: 7–31.

Chisholm, R. 1966. ‘Freedom and action’. In K. Lehrer , ed., Freedom and determinism. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Random House: 11–44.

Clancy, S. 2013. A strong compatibilist account of settling. Inquiry, 56: 653–665.

Clarke, R. 2014. Omissions: agency, metaphysics, and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, D. 1980. Essays on actions and events. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dowe, P. 2000. Physical causation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dretske, F. 1988. Explaining behavior: reasons in a world of causes. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/The MIT Press.

Ehring, D. 1997. Causation and persistence. New York: Oxford University Press.

Enç, B. 2003. How we act: causes, reasons, and intentions. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fair, D. 1979. ‘Causation and the flow of energy’. Erkenntnis, 14: 219–250.

Frankfurt, H. 1978. ‘The problem of action’. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 157–162.

Ginet, C. 1990. On action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Goldman, A. 1970. A theory of human action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Gustafson, D. 1986. Intention and agency. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Heil, J. 2012. The universe as we find it. New York: Oxford University Press.
Heil, J. 2015. Aristotelian supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 115: 41–56.
Hornsby, J. 1980. Actions. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Hyman, J. 2015. Action, knowledge, and will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kim, J. 1976. 'Events as property exemplifications'. In M. Brand and D. Walton , eds., Action theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 310–326.
Kim, J. 2010. 'Causation and mental causation'. Chap. 12 in Essays in the metaphysics of mind. New York: Oxford University Press: 243–262.
Kuykendall, D. 2019. 'Powerful substances because of powerless powers'. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 5: 339–356.
Kuykendall, D. 2021. 'Agent causation, realist metaphysics of powers, and the reducibility objection'. Philosophia, 49: 1563–1581.
Lewis, D. 1986. Philosophical papers, vol. II. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. 2000. Causation as influence. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197.
Lombard, L. 1979. 'Events'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9: 425–460.
Lowe, E.J. 2008. Personal agency: the metaphysics of mind and action. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mackie, J. L. 1974. The cement of the universe. New York: Oxford University Press.
Marmodoro, A. 2017. 'Aristotelian powers at work: reciprocity without symmetry in causation'. In J. Jacobs , ed., Causal powers. New York: Oxford University Press: 57–76.
Mayr, E. 2011. Understanding human agency. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. 1992. Springs of action: understanding intentional behavior. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mumford, S. and Anjum, R. 2011. Getting causes from powers. New York: Oxford University Press.
O'Connor, T. 2000. Persons and causes: the metaphysics of free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
O'Connor, T. 2009. 'Agent-causal power'. In T. Handfield , ed., Dispositions and causes. New York: Oxford University Press: 189–214.
O'Connor, T. and Jacobs, J. 2013. 'Agent-causation in a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics'. In S. Gibb , R. Ingthorsson , and Lowe, E.J. , eds., Mental causation and ontology. New York: Oxford University Press: 173–192.
Pietroski, P. 2000. Causing actions. New York: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. 1903. Principles of mathematics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sartorio, C. 2009. Omissions and causalism. Noûs, 43: 513–530.
Schlosser, M. 2015. Agency. In E. Zalta , ed., The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Fall 2015 edition, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/agency/>
Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Setiya, K. 2007. Reasons without rationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Steward, H. 2012. A metaphysics for freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stout, R. 2002. 'The right structure for a causal theory of action'. Facta Philosophica, 4: 11–24.
Stout, R. 2007. 'Two ways to understand causality in agency'. In A. Leist , ed., Action in context. New York: de Gruyter: 137–153.
Stout, R. 2012. 'Mechanisms that respond to reasons: an Aristotelian approach to agency'. In F. O'Rourke , ed., Human destinies: philosophical essays in memory of Gerald Hanratty. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press: 81–97.
Swinburne, R. 2013. Mind, brain, and free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Thalberg, I. 1977. Perception, action, and emotion: a component approach. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Taylor, R. 1966. Action and purpose. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Agency, function, and teleology

Aguilar, J. and Buckareff, A. (eds.) (2010) Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
This is an edited collection of articles defending the causal theory of action, including a number of articles which touch on the problem of deviant causal chains.
Allen, C. (2009) 'Teleological Notions in Biology', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/teleology-

biology/>. (Accessed 1 January 2019)
This article is an overview of the role of seemingly teleological concepts (like *function* and *design*) in biology.
Stout, R. (2010) 'Deviant Causal Chains' in O'Connor, T. and Sandis C. (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 159–165
This article gives an overview of the problem of deviant causal chains and tentatively proposes a suggested solution involving which sort of mechanism is involved in the event.
Wilson, G. (1989) The Intentionality of Human Action. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Wilson's book contains a sustained argument against the causal theory of action and in favor of the irreducibility of teleological explanations of human action, with substantial discussion of the problem of deviant causal chains.
Wright, L. (1976) Teleological Explanations. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
This is the classic account of teleological explanation as a form of functional explanation.
Davidson, D. (2001) Essays on Actions and Events. 2nd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fodor, J. (1987) Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
McDonnell, N. (2015) 'The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains', Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4: 162–170.
Mele, A. (1992) Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behaviour. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. (2007) 'Action' in Jackson, F. and Smith, M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 334–357.
Mele, A. (2013) 'Actions, Explanations, and Causes', in D'Oro, G. and Sandis, C. (eds.) Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 160–174.
Millikan, R. (1984) Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Millikan, R. (2004) Varieties of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Neander, K. (2013) 'Toward an Informational Teleosemantics', in Kingsbury, J. , Ryder, D. , and Williford, K. (eds.) Millikan and Her Critics, Oxford: Blackwell.
Neander, K. (2018) 'Teleological Theories of Mental Content', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/content-teleological/>. (Accessed 1 January 2019)
Papineau, D. (1987) Reality and Representation. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Schlosser, M. (2007) 'Basic Deviance Reconsidered', Analysis, 67(3): 186–194
Sehon, S. (2016) Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sterelny, K. (1990) The Representational Theory of Mind: An Introduction. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Wilson, G. (1989) The Intentionality of Human Action. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Yablo, S. (1992) 'Mental Causation', Philosophical Review, 101(2): 245–280.

Agency, events, and processes

Galton, Anthony (2017) "Dynamic Present", in P. Hasle , P. Blackburn and P. Øhrstrøm (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time: Themes from Prior, Volume 1, Aalborg: Aalborg University Press: 167–187.
The paper argues against so called "at-at" theories of change according to which this concept can be explained in terms of objects' possessing different properties at different times. According to the proposed alternative, accounting for continuity of change and motion requires treating the present as an interval whose contents are inherently dynamic in nature.
Rödl, Sebastian (2012) Categories of the Temporal: An Inquiry into the Forms of the Finite Intellect, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The book argues that, due to its Fregean heritage, analytic philosophy fails to account for the relation of judgement and truth to time. According to the proposed alternative, tempus and aspect are to be treated as logical categories that belong to the very idea judgement.
Szabó, Zoltán Gendler (2008) "Things in Progress", Philosophical Perspectives, 22 (1): 499–525.
The paper argues against intensional analyses of the progressive and proposes an account of the unity of the progressive and the perfective that differs from the ones discussed above.
Waterlow, Sarah (1984) Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's Physics: A Philosophical Study, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The book is a seminal study of Aristotle's account of change and its relation to the power of agency. It argues that change, as Aristotle conceives it, possesses a unique metaphysical structure, and it suggests

that this structure tends to be obscured in the logical frameworks of contemporary approaches to ontology.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957) Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1964) “Before and After”, in Anscombe 1981: 180–195
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1979) “Under a Description”, in Anscombe 1981: 208–219.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981) Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers Vol. III, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981.
Bratman, M. (2000) “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency”, The Philosophical Review, 109 (1): 35–61
Comrie, B. (1976) Aspect. Cambridge University Press.
Charles, D. (2015) “Aristotle’s Processes”, in M. Leunissen (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics: A Critical Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 186–205.
Charles, D. (2018) “Processes, Activities and Actions”, in R. Stout (ed.), Process, Action, and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 20–40.
Crowther, T. (2011) “The Matter of Events”, The Review of Metaphysics. 65: 3–39.
Crowther, T. (2018) “Processes as Continuants and Processes as Stuff”, in R. Stout (ed.), Process, Action, and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 58–81.
Davidson, D. (1963) “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, in Davidson 2001: 3–19.
Davidson, D. (1967) “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”, in Davidson 2001: 105–122.
Davidson, D. (1969) “The Individuation of Events”, in Davidson 2001: 163–180.
Davidson, D. (1970) “Events as Particulars”, in Davidson 2001: 181–187.
Davidson, D. (1978) “Intending”, in Davidson 2001: 83–102.
Davidson, D. (1985) “Reply to Quine on Events”, in Davidson 2001: 305–311.
Davidson, D. (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Galton, A. (1984) The Logic of Aspect, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Galton, A. (2006) “On What Goes On: The Ontology of Processes and Events”, in Bennett, B. and C. Fellbaum , (eds.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems, Amsterdam: IOS Press: 4–11.
Galton, A. (2008) “Experience and History: Processes and Their Relation to Events”, Journal of Logic and Computation, 18: 323–340.
Haase, M. (2018) “Knowing What I Have Done”, Manuscrito, 41 (4): 195–253.
Hornsby, J. (2012) “Actions and Activity”, Philosophical Issues. A Supplement to Noûs. Action Theory: 233–245.
Hornsby, J. (2013) “Basic Activity”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 87: 1–18.
Kenny, A. (1963) Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge.
Lavin, D. (2013) “Must There Be Basic Action?” Noûs, 47 (2): 273–301.
Mourelatos, A. (1978) “Events, Processes and States”, Linguistics in Philosophy, 2: 415–434.
Parsons, T. (1990) Events in the Semantics of English: A Study of Subatomic Semantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Steward H. (2012) “Actions as Processes”, Philosophical Perspectives, 26: 373–388.
Steward H. (2013) “Processes, Continuants, and Individuals”, Mind, 122: 781–812.
Steward H. (2016) “Making the Agent Reappear. How Processes Might Help”, in R. Altshuler and M.J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and The Philosophy of Action, New York: Routledge, 67–83.
Stout, R. (1997) “Processes”, Philosophy, 72: 9–27.
Stout, R. (2003) “The Life of a Process”, in Debrock, G. (ed.), Process Pragmatism: Essays on a Quiet Philosophical Revolution, Amsterdam: Rodopi: 145–157.
Stout, R. (2016) “The Category of Occurrent Continuants”, Mind, 125: 41–62.
Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Thompson, M. (2008) Life and Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Vendler, Z. (1957) “Verbs and Times”, Philosophical Review, 66: 143–160.

Negative agency

Bach, K. 2010. ‘Refraining, Omitting, and Negative Acts.’ In T. O’Connor and C. Sandis , eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, 50–57. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Bach surveys the phenomena of omitting and refraining and argues that there are no actions that are negative in any interesting sense.
Clarke, R. 2014. Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. This monograph on omitting and refraining examines these phenomena from the perspectives of action theory, metaphysics, and moral responsibility.

Fischer, J. M. and Ravizza, M. 1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5 of this book advances a detailed account of responsibility for omissions, addressing as well some questions about the metaphysics of omission.
Payton, J. D. 2021. Negative Actions: Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Payton argues that intentional omissions and instances of refraining are token-identical with ordinary, 'positive' events.
Sartorio, C. 2009. 'Omissions and Causalism.' Noûs 43: 513–530. Sartorio argues that a standard causal theory of action cannot be extended to cases of intentionally not doing a certain thing, for in these cases the absence of action is caused not by an intention to omit but by an omission to intend.
Alvarez, Maria and John Hyman . 1998. 'Agents and Their Actions.' Philosophy 73: 219–245.
Bach, Kent . 1980. 'Actions Are Not Events.' Mind 89: 114–120.
Barker, Stephen and Mark Jago . 2012. 'Being Positive about Negative Facts.' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 117–138.
Beall, J. C. 2000. 'On Truthmakers for Negative Truths.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78: 264–268.
Bernstein, Sara . 2014. 'Omissions as Possibilities.' Philosophical Studies 167: 1–23.
Brand, Myles . 1984. Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brownstein, Donald . 1973. 'Negative Exemplification.' American Philosophical Quarterly 10: 43–50.
Clarke, Randolph . 2014. Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, Donald . 1980a. 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes.' Chap. 1 in Essays on Actions and Events, 3–19. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, Donald .. 1980b. 'Agency.' Chap. 3 in Essays on Actions and Events, 43–61. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, Donald .. 1985. 'Replies to Essays I–IX.' In Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, ed. Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B. Hintikka , 195–229. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dowe, Phil . 2001. 'A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and "Causation" by Omission.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79: 216–226.
Dowe, Phil .. 2009. 'Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of Non-Locality.' Monist 92: 23–40.
Dretske, Fred . 1988. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Enç, Berent . 2003. How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1970. A Theory of Human Action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hochberg, Herbert . 1969. 'Negation and Generality.' Noûs 3: 325–343.
Hornsby, Jennifer . 2004. 'Agency and Actions.' In Agency and Action, ed. John Hyman and Helen Steward , 1–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hornsby, Jennifer .. 2010. 'The Standard Story of Action: An Exchange (2).' In Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, ed. Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff , 57–68. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lewis, David . 2004. 'Void and Object.' In Causation and Counterfactuals, ed. John Collins , Ned Hall , and L. A. Paul , 277–290. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mellor, D. H. 1995. The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.
Moore, Michael S. 2009. Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O'Connor, Timothy . 2000. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Payton, Jonathan D. 2018. 'How to Identify Negative Actions with Positive Events.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96: 87–101.
Priest, Graham . 2000. 'Truth and Contradiction.' Philosophical Quarterly 50: 305–319.
Sartorio, Carolina . 2009. 'Omissions and Causalism.' Noûs 43: 513–530.
Schaffer, Jonathan . 2005. 'Contrastive Causation.' Philosophical Review 114: 297–328.
Schaffer, Jonathan .. 2012. 'Disconnection and Responsibility.' Legal Theory 18: 399–435.
Shepherd, Joshua . 2014. 'Causalism and Intentional Omission.' American Philosophical Quarterly 51: 15–26.
Smith, Michael . 2010. 'The Standard Story of Action: An Exchange (1).' In Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, ed. Jesús H . Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff , 45–55. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Steward, Helen . 2012. A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Varzi, Achille C. 2006. 'The Talk I Was Supposed to Give…' In Modes of Existence: Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic, ed. Andrea Bottani and Richard Davies , 131–151. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Varzi, Achille C. . 2008. 'Failures, Omissions, and Negative Descriptions.' In Meaning, Intentions, and Argumentation, ed. Kepa Korta and Joana Garmendia , 61–75. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Vermazen, Bruce . 1985. ‘Negative Acts.’ In Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, ed. Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B. Hintikka , 93–104. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bounded agency

1

John Conlisk , Why Bounded Rationality? Journal of Economic Literature 34 (1996): 669–700. A useful survey of the first few decades of work on bounded rationality, with special emphasis on satisficing.
Elijah Millgram , The Great Endarkenment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Examines different forms of agency shaped by disciplinary specialization.
C. Thi Nguyen , Games and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Argues that games can be a testbed for exploring different forms of agency.
Nassim Taleb , Antifragile. New York: Random House, 2012. Explores the conceptual space needed to describe agency that is robust in the face of a changing environment.
The Fall 2016 issue of *Social Philosophy and Policy* or, alternatively, David Enoch, Against Utopianism, Philosopher’s Imprint 18 (16), Sept. 2018, are recent entry points into the debate over (non-)ideal theory in political philosophy, for readers who would like to explore parallels with the move to bounded agency.
Allen, W. , 1983. Zelig. MGM, Santa Monica. Produced by Jack Rollins , Charles Joffe and Robert Greenhut .
Bendor, J. , 2003. Herbert A. Simon: Political Scientist. Annual Review of Political Science, 6, 433–471.
Bratman, M. , 2007. Structures of Agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bratman, M. , 2018. Planning, Time, and Self-Governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Diamond, C. , 1991. Riddles and Anslem’s Riddle. In The Realistic Spirit, pages 267–289, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Guinebert, S. , 2018. Hörigkeit als Selbstboykott. Mentis, Paderborn.
Ismael, J. T. , 2016. How Physics Makes Us Free. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Ivanhoe, P. J. and van Norden, B. , editors, 2001. Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Hackett, Indianapolis, 2nd edition.
Kahneman, D. , Slovic, P. , and Tversky, A. , 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Katsafanas, P. , 2013. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. Oxford University Press, New York.
Korsgaard, C. , 2009. Self-Constitution. Oxford University Press, New York.
Millgram, E. , 1997. Practical Induction. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Millgram, E. , 2005. Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Millgram, E. , 2010. Pluralism about action. In O`Connor, T. and Sandis, C. , editors, A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, pages 90–96, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.
Nietzsche, F. , 2000. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Random House, New York. Edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann .
Searle, J. , 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Thompson, M. , 2008. Life and Action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Velleman, J. D. , 2015. The Possibility of Practical Reason. Maize Books, Ann Arbor, 2nd edition.
Vogler, C. , 2002. Reasonably Vicious. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Wimsatt, W. , 2007. Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Agency and games

Bradford, Gwen . 2015. Achievement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-Recent central work on the notion of achievement; offers the most contemporary version of a perfectionist, excellence-oriented explanation of the value of playing games
Huizinga, Johan . 1955. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-element in Cult. Boston: Beacon Press.
-The foundational text for the study of games; establishes the idea that play spaces are an alternative, secluded space where we take on alternate roles and alternate rules apply.
Lugones, Maria . 1987. Playfulness, “world”-travelling, and loving perception. Hypatia 2 (2): 3–19.

-Important feminist analysis of “playfulness” as moving between normative worlds, and as holding onto those worlds lightly.
Nguyen, C. Thi . 2020. Games: Agency as Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-The chapter author’s account of games as the art form working in the medium of agency; stresses the way that games sculpt agency in order to sculpt aesthetic experiences of action.
Suits, Bernard . 2014[1978]. The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia. 3rd ed. Peterborough, CAN: Broadview Press.
-The definitive work in analytic philosophy on the concept of a game; argues that to play a game is to voluntarily take on unnecessary obstacles to make possible the activity of struggling to overcome them.
Bogost, Ian . 2010. Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Chalkey, Dave . 2008. Reiner Knizia: “Creation of a Successful Game”. Critical Hits. http://www.critical-hits.com/blog/2008/07/03/reiner-knizia-creation-of-a-successful-game/
Flanagan, Mary . 2013. Critical Play: Radical Game Design. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gaut, Berys . 2010. A Philosophy of Cinematic Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Huizinga, Johan . 1955. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-element in Cult. Boston: Beacon Press.
Malaby, T. M. 2007. Beyond play: A new approach to games. Games and Culture 2 (2): 95–113.
Nguyen, C. Thi . 2020. Games: Agency as Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nguyen, C. Thi .. 2020b. The arts of action. Philosopher’s Imprint 20 (14): 1–27.
Nguyen, C. Thi .. 2019. Games and the art of agency. Philosophical Review 128 (4): 423–462.
Nguyen, C. Thi .. 2017a. Competition as cooperation. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44 (1): 123–137.
Nguyen, C. Thi .. 2017b. Philosophy of games. Philosophy Compass 12 (8).
Nussbaum, Martha . 1992. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Salen, Katie and Eric Zimmerman . 2004. Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Simon, Robert L. 2014. Fair Play: The Ethics of Sport. Boulder: Westview Press.
Stenros, Jaakko . 2012. In defence of a magic circle: The social and mental boundaries of play. In Proceedings of DiGRA Nordic 2012 Conference: Local and GLobal – Games in Culture and Society. http://www.digra.org/wp-content/uploads/digital-library/12168.43543.pdf.
Suits, Bernard . 2014[1978]. The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia. 3rd ed. Peterborough, CAN: Broadview Press.
Tavinor, Grant . 2009. The Art of Videogames. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Taylor, T. L. 2009. Play between Worlds: Exploring Online Game Culture. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Taylor, T. L. . 2007. Pushing the borders: Player participation and game culture. In Structures of Participation in Digital Culture. Ed. Joe Karaganis . New York: Social Science Research Council.
Waern, Annika . 2012. Framing games. Proceedings of Nordic DiGRA 2012.
Weimer, Steven . 2012. Consent and right action in sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 39 (1): 11–31.
Zimmerman, Eric . 2012. Jerked around by the magic circle: Clearing the air ten years later. Gamasutra, February 7th. https://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature/135063/jerked_around_by_the_magic_circle_.php

Minimal agency

Barandiaran, X. E. , Di Paolo, E. , and Rohde, M. (2009) Defining agency: individuality, normativity, asymmetry, and spatio-temporality in action. Adaptive Behavior 17:367–386.
Discusses the properties of minimal agency from the perspective of the leading organizational theory.
Burge, T. (2009) Primitive agency and natural norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79:251–278.
Proposes that natural flourishing of living organisms leads to natural functions and natural norms.
van Hateren, J. H. (2015) The origin of agency, consciousness, and free will. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14:979–1000.
Explains the fitness estimation theory of minimal agency and sketches ways to extend it.
Barandiaran, X. E. , Di Paolo, E. , and Rohde, M. (2009) Defining agency: individuality, normativity, asymmetry, and spatio-temporality in action. Adaptive Behavior 17: 367–386.
Breidenbach, J. C. (2018) Action, animacy, and substance causation. In: W. M. R. Simpson , R. C. Koons , and N. J. Teh (eds.) Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science. New York: Routledge, Chapter 10.
Burge, T. (2009) Primitive agency and natural norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 251–278.

Dennett, D. C. (1996) Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness. New York: Basic Books.
Di Paolo, E. A. (2005) Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4: 429–452.
Dretske, F. I. (1999) Machines, plants and animals: the origins of agency. Erkenntnis 51: 523–535.
Faisal, A. A. , Selen, L. P. J. , and Wolpert, D. M. (2008) Noise in the nervous system. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 9: 292–303.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1978) The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 157–162.
Fulda, F. C. (2017) Natural agency: the case of bacterial cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3: 69–90.
Kauffman, S. , and Clayton, P. (2006) On emergence, agency, and organization. Biology and Philosophy 21: 501–521.
Laskar, J. , and Gastineau, M. (2009) Existence of collisional trajectories of Mercury, Mars and Venus with the Earth. Nature 459: 817–819.
Millikan, R. G. (1989) In defense of proper functions. Philosophy of Science 56: 288–302.
Moreno, A. , and Mossio, M. (2015) Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and Theoretical Enquiry. Dordrecht: Springer.
Neander, K. (1991) The teleological notion of 'function.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69: 454–468.
Oderberg, D. S. (2013) Synthetic life and the bruteness of immanent causation. In: E. Feser (ed.) Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 206–235.
Sterelny, K. (2001) The Evolution of Agency and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Steward, H. (2012) A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Hateren, J. H. (2015) The origin of agency, consciousness, and free will. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14: 979–1000.
Varela, F. G. , Maturana, H. R. , and Uribe, R. (1974) Autopoiesis: the organization of living systems, its characterization and a model. BioSystems 5: 187–196.

Animal agency

Boyle, Matthew (2012) 'Essentially rational animals', in G. Abel and J. Conant (eds.) Rethinking Epistemology. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Verlag.
In this paper, the author attempts to argue the case for thinking that being an animal is fundamentally transformed when the powers distinctive of rationality are present, in a way that justifies the idea that humans are animal agents of an utterly distinctive kind, in many ways non-continuous in virtue of that transformation, with other animal agents.
Frankfurt, Harry . (1978) 'The problem of action'. American Philosophical Quarterly 15: repr. in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: CUP): 69–79.
In this paper, Frankfurt argues against the causal approach to making the distinction between what an agent does and what merely happens to him; and makes out the case for the view that the conditions for attributing the guidance of bodily movements to a whole creature, rather than to a mechanism within one, obtain outside the human arena.
Hurley, Susan and Nudds, Matthew (2006). Rational Animals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A useful collection of articles, which asks interesting questions about what it might mean to attribute rationality to a creature and brings to bear on the issues many empirical studies of the kinds of tasks animals are able to perform and psychological theorising concerning the processes which might underlie them.
Rowlands, Mark . (2013) Can Animals Be Moral? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
This book argues, against centuries of tradition, that animals can act for moral reasons and thereby count as what Rowlands calls 'moral subjects'.
Steward, Helen . (2012) A Metaphysics for Freedom Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch 4.
This chapter defends the view that many animals are agents, and also considers the difficult question of how can be decided which animals are agents, and why.
Boyle, M. (2012) "Essentially rational animals," In G. Abel and J. Conant (eds.) Rethinking Epistemology. Berlin: Walter de Grutyer Verlag.
Brandom, R. (2009) Reason in Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. (1987) Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Chase, A. and Glaser, O. (1930) "Forward movement of paramecium as a function of the hydrogen ion concentration," Journal of General Physiology 13: 627–636.
Davidson, D. (1963) "Actions, reasons and causes," Journal of Philosophy 60: 685–700, repr. in Davidson *Essays on Actions and Events.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980: 3–19.

Davidson, D. (1973) “Freedom to act,” In T. Honderich (ed.) Essays on Freedom of Action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 137–156. Repr. in Davidson (1980): 149–162.
Davidson, D. (1975) “Thought and talk,” In S.D. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press: reprinted in Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (1982) “Rational animals,” Dialectica 36(4): 317–327.
Dennett, D. (1987) The Intentional Stance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1978) “The problem of action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, repr. in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 69–79.
Glaser, O. (1924) “Temperature and forward movement of paramecium,” Journal of General Physiology 7: 177–188.
Locke, J. (1975)[1689]. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mele, A. (1992) Springs of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mill, J.S. (1970)[1872] A System of Logic, 8th ed. London: Longman.
Musschenga, Albert (2015) “Moral animals and moral responsibility,” Les ateliers de l’éthique 10(2): 38–59.
Rowlands, Mark . (2013) Can Animals Be Moral? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1956) “Empiricism and the philosophy of mind” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1: 253–329
Steward, H. (2012) A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stich, S. (1979) “Do animals have beliefs?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57: 15–28.
Stoecker, R. (2009) “Why animals can’t act,” Inquiry 52: 255–271.

Intentional agency

Alvarez 2013 develops a view of human agency in terms of two-way powers.
Baker 2013, especially Chapters 2 and 6, offers a fresh and accessible discussion of the first-person perspective in different types of agent.
Bratman 1999, especially Chapters 2 and 3, develops the planning theory of intention and defends the irreducibility of intentions to desires and beliefs.
Hieronymi 2009 develops an account of the will that emphasizes the criticizability of the agent herself for her intentional actions.
Mele 2003, especially Chapters 2, 3, and 10, discusses a range of issues concerning the defensibility of a naturalistic event-causal view of intentional action and agency.

Alvarez, M. 2013. “Agency and Two-Way Powers”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113:1, pp. 101–121.
Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957/2000. Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Baker, L. 2013. Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bishop, J. 1989. Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M. 1999. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Stanford: CSLI.
Brent, M. 2017. “Agent Causation as a Solution to the Problem of Action”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 47:5, pp. 656–673.
Carruthers, P. 2018 “Valence and Value”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97:3, pp. 658–680.
Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. 1984. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dretske, F. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dretske, F. . 1986. “Misrepresentation”, in R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17–36.
Enç, B. 2003. How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frost, K. 2014. “On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit”, The Philosophical Review, 123:4, pp. 429–484.
Goldman, A. 1979. “What Is Justified Belief?” in G.S. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1–25.
Hieronymi, P. 2009. “The Will as Reason”, Philosophical Perspectives, 23, pp. 201–220.
Hornsby, J. 2004. “Agency and Actions”, in Hyman Steward (eds.), Agency and Action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.1–24.

Hornsby, J. 2010. “The Standard Story of Action: An Exchange (2)”, in Aguilar and Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 57–68.
Hursthouse, R. 1991. ‘Arational Actions’, Journal of Philosophy, 88, pp. 57–68.
Hutto, D. and Myin, E. 2013. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jaworska, A. 1999. “Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 28:2, pp. 105–138.
Kauppinen, A. 2021. “Rationality as the rule of reason”, Noûs, 55:3, 538–559.
Lewis, D. 1972 “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, pp. 249–258.
Mayr, E. 2011. Understanding Human Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. 1988. ‘Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48:4, pp. 723–731.
Mele, A. . 1992. Springs of Action. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. . 2003. Motivation and Agency. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Brien, L. 2019. ‘The Subjective Authority of Intention’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 69:275, pp. 354–373.
O’Shaughnessy, B. 1986/2008. The Will. Volumes 1 and 2, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pietroski, P. 2000. Causing Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Putnam, H. 1975. “The Nature of Mental States”, Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schlosser, M. 2011. “Agency, Ownership, and the Standard Theory”, in Aguilar, Buckareff , and Frankish (eds.) New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. London: Palgrave-MacMillan.
Schlosser, M. 2012. “Taking Something as a Reason for Action”, Philosophical Papers, 41:2, pp. 267–304.
Shepherd, J. 2014. “The Contours of Control”, Philosophical Studies, 170:3, pp. 341-395.
Sinhababu, N. 2017. Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, M. 2010. “The Standard Story of Action: An Exchange (1)”, in Aguilar Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 45–56.
Stout, R. (ed.) 2018. Process, Action, and Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Velleman, D. 1992. “What Happens When Someone Acts?” Mind, 101:403, pp. 461–481.
Wooldridge, D. 1963. The Machinery of the Brain. New York: McGraw Hill.

Rational agency

Boyle, M. (2011). ‘“Making up Your Mind” and the Activity of Reason’. Philosophers’ Imprint 11.
Rational creatures can make up their minds about what to believe on the basis of reasons in favor of believing. According to this essay, a belief just is the actualization of this power.
Boyle, M. and Lavin, D. (2010). ‘Goodness and Desire’ in Tenenbaum 2010, p 161–202.
The essay argues that the specific form that goal-directedness takes in rational creatures is the capacity to act under the guise of the good, i.e., to act in light of her answer to the question ‘What should I do?’.
Marcus, E. (2012). Rational Causation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
An articulation of a conception of rational agency along the lines presented in this entry and of the challenges it poses to the naturalistic orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind.
Moran, R. (2001). Authority and Estrangement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
An exploration of the connection between the first-person perspective and the phenomenon of normative self-consciousness: our (fallible) ability to know what we believe or want (and why) in virtue of it reflecting our judgments about what is to be believed or to be wanted (and why).
Rödl, S. (2007). Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
It is argued that the determination of one’s belief as a matter of what to believe and one’s action as a matter of what to do is at the same time an exercise of the ability to think of oneself as a subject—as “I.”
Anscombe, G.E.M. (2000). Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Boghossian, P. (2014). ‘What Is Inference?’ Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1–18.
Boyle, M. (2012). Essentially Rational Animals, in Rethinking Epistemology, Abel, G. and Conant, J. , eds., Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter.
Davidson, D. (1963). ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685–700.

Korsgaard, C. (2009). ‘The Activity of Reason’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 83 (2):23–43.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McHugh, C. and Way, J. (2016). Against the Taking Condition. Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314–331.
Tenenbaum, S. (ed.) (2010). Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 161–202.
Thompson, M. (2008). Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Agency, powers, and skills

Alvarez, M. , 2013. Agency and Two-Way Powers . Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (113), 101–121.
An important statement of the ideas that agential powers are powers of a distinctive form, and that manifestations of human agency should be understood in terms of the exercises of such powers (rather than in terms of the occurrence of intentional actions).
Clarke, R. , 2015. Abilities to Act. Philosophy Compass (10), 893–904.
An overview of recent literature on abilities, primarily focusing on texts that concern the connection between abilities and freedom of the will.
Kenny, A. , 1975. Will, Freedom and Power. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, ch. VII.
An important discussion of abilities, and of how they differ from and relate to opportunities.
Ryle, G. , 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson, chs.2, 5.
The locus classicus in the analytic tradition of an approach to agency that gives pride of place to powers and skills.
Small, W. , 2017a. Agency and Practical Abilities. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements (80), 235–264.
A discussion of recent approaches to abilities, paying special attention to the relationship between their specification and their role in the explanation of action.
Alvarez, M. , 2013. Agency and Two-Way Powers . Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (113), 101–121.
Annas, J. , 2011. Practical Expertise. In J. Bengson and M. Moffett eds., Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 101–112.
Beere, J. , 2009. Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M. , 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Clarke, R. , 2010. Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (80), 523–550.
Clarke, R. , 2015. Abilities to Act. Philosophy Compass (10), 893–904.
Danto, A. , 1963. What We Can Do. The Journal of Philosophy (60), 435–445.
Davidson, D. , 1967. The Logical Form of Action Sentences. Reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events, 105–148. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1980).
Dreyfus, H. , 2001. Phenomenological Description versus Rational Reconstruction. Revue International de Philosophie (55), 181–196.
Fridland, E. , 2013. Problems with Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies (165), 879–891.
Fridland, E. , 2014. They’ve Lost Control: Reflections on Skill. Synthese (191), 2729–2750.
Frost, K. , 2020. What Could a Two-Way Power Be? Topoi (39), 1141–1153.
Hornsby, J. , 1980. Actions. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Hornsby, J. , 2004. Agency and Actions. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements (55), 1–23.
Hornsby, J. , 2010. Trying to Act. In T. O’Connor and C. Sandis , eds., A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 18–25.
Kenny, A. , 1975. Will, Freedom and Power. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Kern, A. , 2017. Sources of Knowledge: On the Concept of a Rational Capacity for Knowledge. Trans. D. Smyth . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lavin, D. , 2013. Must There Be Basic Action? Noûs (47), 273–301.
Maier, J. , 2015. The Agentive Modalities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (90), 113–134.
Makin, S. , 2006. Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book Θ. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mele, A. , 2003. Agents’ Abilities . Noûs (37), 447–470.
Riley, E. , 2017. What Skill is Not. Analysis (77), 344–354.
Ryle, G. , 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.

Small, W. , 2017a. Agency and Practical Abilities. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements (80), 235–264.
Small, W. , 2017b. Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (5), 57–76.
Small, W. , 2019. Basic Action and Practical Knowledge. Philosophers' Imprint (19), 1–22.
Small, W. , 2020. Practical Knowledge and Habits of Mind. Journal of Philosophy of Education (54), 377–397.
Small, W. , 2021. The Intelligence of Virtue and Skill. Journal of Value Inquiry (55), 229–249.
Sosa, E. , 2015. Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, J. , and Krakauer, J. , 2013. Motor Skill Depends on Knowledge of Facts. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (7), 1–11.
Stanley, J. , and Williamson, T. , 2017. Skill. Noûs (51), 713–726.
Vetter, B. , 2015. Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vetter, B. , 2019. Are Abilities Dispositions? Synthese (196), 201–220.
Vihvelin, K. , 2013. Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Expert agency

* Christensen, W. , Bicknell, K. , McIlwain, D. , and Sutton, J. (2015). "The sense of agency and its role in strategic control for expert mountain bikers." Psychology of Consciousness 2(3): 340–353.
An exploration of agency in expert mountain biking that resonates strongly with my view that expert agency is often guided by the conscious mind.
* Høffding, S. and Montero, B. G. (2019) "Not being there: Reconciling expertise induced amnesia and the possibility of total recall," Mind and Language 35(4): 621–640
An article that lays out the idea of post-performance amnesia and presents a fuller explanation of how post-performance amnesia can be compatible with conscious attention in action.
* Montero (2018) Thought in Action: Expertise and the Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, particularly chapter 9, "The Pleasure of Movement and the Awareness of the Self."
Here, I discuss why I think it is a mistake to interpret Csikszentmihalyi's concept of flow as implicating a loss of self.
* Slingerland, Edward (2007). Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China (New York: Oxford University Press).
Slingerland's presentation of his conception of the wu-wei as effortless and agentless, a view which contrasts with the view I advocate.
* Velleman, J. David (2008). "The way of the wanton," in C. Mackenzie and K. Atkins (eds), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency (New York: Routledge).
Velleman's application of Slingerland's and, as he understands them, Csikszentmihalyi's ideas to action theory.
Armstrong, D. M. (1981) "The nature of mind" in his The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Baddeley, A. (2014). Essentials of Human Memory (Classic Edition) (London: Psychology Press).
Bammell, Ives (1961) The Shop-talk of Edgar Degas Paperback (Boston: University Press).
Bargh, J. and Chartrand, T. (1999). 'The unbearable automaticity of being,' American Psychologist 54: 462–479.
Beilock, S. and Carr, T. H. (2001). "On the fragility of skilled performance: What governs choking under pressure?" Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 130(4): 701–725.
Beilock, S. L. , Carr, T. H. , MacMahon, C. , and Starkes, J. L. (2002). "When paying attention becomes counterproductive: Impact of divided versus skill-focused attention on novice and experiences performance of sensorimotor skills," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 8: 6–16.
Beilock, S. L. , Wierenga, S. A. , and Carr, T. H. (2003). "Memory and expertise: What do experienced athletes remember?" in J. Starkes and K. A. Ericsson (eds.), Expert Performance in Sports: Advances in Research on Sport Expertise (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics): 295–320.
Bermúdez, J. (2010). Action and awareness of agency: Comments on Chris Frith. Pragmatics & Cognition, 18: 576–588.
Bermúdez, J. P. (2017). "Do we reflect while performing skillful actions? Automaticity, control, and the perils of distraction," Philosophical Psychology 30(7): 896–924, DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1325457
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (1990). Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: Harper and Row).

Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (2014). “The concept of flow,” in M. Csikszentmihalyi (ed.), Flow and the Foundations of Positive Psychology (Dordrecht: Springer): 239–263.
Deakin, Janice M. and Cobley, Stephen (2003). “A search for deliberate practice: An examination of the practice environments in figure skating and volleyball,” in J. Starkes and K. A. Ericsson (eds), Expert Performance in Sports: Advances in Research on Sport Expertise (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics): 90–113.
Dewar, M. , Garcia, Y. F. , Cowan, N. & Della Sala, S. (2009). “Delaying interference enhances memory consolidation in amnesic patients.” Neuropsychology 23(5): 627–634.
Dreyfus H. L. and Dreyfus, S. E. (1986). Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer (New York: Free Press).
Dugdale, J. R. and Eklund, R. C. (2003). “Ironic processing and static balance performance in high-expertise performers,” Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 74 (3): 348.
Ericsson, K. A. , Krampe, R. T. , and Tesch-Romer, C. (1993). “The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance,” Psychological Review 100(3): 363–406.
Ericsson, K. A. (2008). “Deliberate practice and acquisition of expert performance: A general overview,” Academic Emergency Medicine 15: 988–994.
Fraser, Chris (2007). “Review: On Wu-Wei as a unifying metaphor,” Philosophy East and West 57 (1): 97–106.
Guthrie, E. R. (1952). The Psychology of Learning (New York: Harper and Row).
Høffding, S. (2018). A Phenomenology of Musical Absorption (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan).
Høffding, S. and Montero, B.G. (2020) “Not being there: An analysis of expertise-induced amnesia,” Mind & Language 35 (5): 621–640.
Ivanhoe, P. J. and van Norden, Bryan W. (2005). Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett).
Jackson, S. A. and Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1999). Flow in Sports: The Keys to Optimal Experiences and Performances (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics).
Meinertz, A. (2008). Erik Bruhn: Billedet indeni. København: Schønberg.
Millican, P. and Wooldridge, M. (2014). “Them and us: Autonomous agents in vivo and in silico,” in A. Baltag and S. Smets (eds), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics (Outstanding Contributions to Logic Volume 5) (Berlin: Springer-Verlag).
Montero, Barbara Gail (2016). “Aesthetic Effortlessness,” in Sherri Irvin (ed.), Body Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 180–192.
Montero, B. G. (2018). “The elusive concept of *Expertise*: Who counts as an expert?” Archives of Psychology 2(5): 1–16.
Pilzecker, A. , Müller, G. E. (1900). Experimentelle beiträge zur lehre vom gedächtniss. Germany: J.A. Barth.
Onuma, Hideharu , DeProspero, Dan , and DeProspero, Jackie (1993). Kyudo: The Essence and Practice of Japanese Archery (New York: Kodansha America).
Pacherie, Elisabeth (2007). “The sense of control and the sense of agency,” Psyche 13 (1): 1–30.
Prince, Allison , Zhang, Yifan, Croniger , Colleen, and Puchowicz, Michelle (2013). “Oxidative metabolism: Glucose versus ketones,” Advances in Experimental Medicine and Biology 789: 323–328.
Sherman, Robert (1980). “Natalia Markarova,” Great Artists Series (excerpted from a 1977 interview) (WNYC archives id: 70039).
Shusterman, Richard (2008). Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics (New York: Cambridge University Press).
Slingerland, Edward (2007). Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China (New York: Oxford University Press).
Slingerland, Edward (2014). Trying Not to Try: The Art and Science of Spontaneity (New York: Crown Publishers).
Velleman, J. David (2008). “The way of the wanton,” in C. Mackenzie and K. Atkins (eds), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency (New York: Routledge).
Wixted J.T. . (2004). “The psychology and neuroscience of forgetting.” Annu Rev Psychol 55: 235–269.
Wulf, G. and Lewthwaite, R. (2010). “Effortless motor learning? An external focus of attention enhances movement effectiveness and efficiency,” in B. Bruya (ed.), Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in Attention and Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): 75–101.

Agency and mistakes

Constitutive standards of action have been mostly discussed in the context of constitutivist accounts of agency (see Agency and Normativity in this volume). But a general discussion of the relation between agency and standards of evaluation, which does not presuppose the theoretical apparatus of constitutivism, can be found here:

Shepherd, J. (2021). The Shape of Agency. In The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Knowledge: 57–91. Oxford University Press.

Two very different approaches to performance mistakes can be found in these papers. Amaya 2020 provides a framework for thinking about some of these mistakes as exercises of agency, whereas Sripada (2019) provides a model for thinking about them as glitches of subpersonal mechanisms.

Amaya, S. (2020). Out of Habit. Synthese.

Sripada, C. (2019). The Fallibility Paradox. Social Philosophy and Policy, 36(1): 234–248

Although not part of the discussion of the chapter, performance mistakes raise interesting questions about moral responsibility and blame. For differente perspective about cuplability for performance mistakes, see the following two papers:

Amaya, S. , and Doris, J. M. (2014). No Excuses: Performance Mistakes in Morality. In J. Clausen and N. Levy (Eds.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics: 253–272. Netherlands: Dordrecht.

Rudy-Hiller, F. (2019) Give People a Break: Slips and Moral Responsibility. The Philosophical Quarterly, 69(277): 721–740.

Amaya, S. (2013). Slips. Noûs, 47(3), 559–576. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814569057_0006

Amaya, S. (2017). Two Kinds of Intentions: A New Defense of the Simple View. Philosophical Studies, 175(7), 1767–1786. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0934-1

Amaya, S. (2020). Out of Habit. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02780-3

Amaya, S. , and Doris, J. M. (2014). No Excuses: Performance Mistakes in Morality. In Springer Handbook of Neuroethics, ed. J. Clausen and N. Levy , pp. 253–272. Netherlands: Dordrecht.

Andrews, K. (2013). Ape Autonomy? Social Norms and Moral Agency in Other Species. In Animal Minds and Animal Ethics, ed. K. Petrus and M. Wild . Bielefeld: Transcript.

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1963). Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Arpaly, N. (2003). Unprincipled Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.

Austin, M. A. (1957). A Plea for Excuses. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57, 1–30.

Brand, M. (1984). Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bratman, M. E. (1987). Intentions, Plans and Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Burge, T. (2009). Primitive Agency and Natural Norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(2), 251–278.

Davidson, D. (1971). Agency. In Agent, Action, and Reason, ed. R. Binkley , R. Bronaugh , and A. Marras , pp. 1–37, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Davidson, D. (1978). Intending. In Philosophy of History and Action, pp. 41–60. Dordrecht: Springer.

Dennett, D. C. (1982). Making Sense of Ourselves. In Mind, Brain, and Function, ed. J. I. Biro and R. W. Shahan , pp. 63–81. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Ford, A. (2011). Action and Generality. In Essays on Anscombe's Intention, ed. J. Hornsby , F. Stoutland and A. Ford , pp. 76–104. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. The Journal of Philosophy, 68(1), 5–20.

Freud, S. (1901). The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. (1915). Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. London: Hogarth Press.

Frost, K. (2018). Basic Mistakes in Performance. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 44, 17–21.

Gauthier, D. (1986). Morals By Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grünbaum, A. (1984). The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Holton, R. (1999). Intention and Weakness of Will. The Journal of Philosophy, 96(5), 241–262.

Jónsdóttir, M. , Adólfsdóttir, S. , Cortez, R. D. , Gunnarsdóttir, M. , & Gústafsdóttir, Á. H. (2007). A Diary Study of Action Slips in Healthy Individuals. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 21, 875–883.

Lavin, D. (2004). Practical Reason and the Possibility or Error. Ethics, 114(3), 424–457. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00296

Mele, A. R. (1988). Irrationality: A Précis. Philosophical Psychology, 1(2), 171–177.

Mele, A. R. (1992). Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behaviour. Oxford University Press.

Mele, A. R. (2006). Practical Mistakes and Intentional Actions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 43(3), 249–260.

Mylopoulos, M. , and Pacherie, E. (2020). Self-Control as Hybrid Skill. In Surrounding Self-Control, ed. A. R. Mele , pp. 81–100. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Norman, D. A. (1981). Categorization of Action Slips. Psychological Review, 88(1), 1–15.
Peabody, K. (2005). Trying Slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby Account for Mistakes and Slips? Philosophia, 33, 173–216.
Putnam, H. (1975). Minds and Machines. Chap. 18 in Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, pp. 362–385. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Radoilska, L. (2013). Addiction and Weakness of Will: An Integrated Account. In Addiction and Weakness of Will, pp. 119–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reason, J. (1984). Lapses of Attention in Everyday Life. In Varieties of Attention, ed. R. Parasuraman and D. R. Davies , pp. 515–549. New York: Academic Press.
Reason, J. , and Mycielska, K. (1982). Absent-Minded? The Psychology of Mental Lapses and Everyday Errors. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Rorty, A. O. (1980). Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58(4), 333–346. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408012341341
Shepherd, J. (2021). The Shape of Agency. In The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Knowledge, pp. 57–91. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silver, K. (2019). Habitual Weakness. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 8(4), 270–277.
Smith, M. (1998). The Possibility of Philosophy of Action. In Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, eds. Bransen J. , Cuypers S.E. , pp. 17–41. Dordrecht: Springer.
Sorensen, R. (2011). What Lies behind Misspeaking? American Philosophical Quarterly, 48(4), 399–409.
Strawson, P. (1962). Freedom and Resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 187–211.
Thompson, M. (2008). Life and Action. Canbrdige, MA: Harvard University Press.
Velleman, D. (2000). Introduction. In The Possibility of Practical Reason, pp. 1–31. Oxford: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Velleman, D. (2004). Précis of The Possibility of Practical Reason. Philosophical Studies, 121, 225–238.
Wallace, R. J. (1994). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Watson, G. (1975). Free Agency. The Journal of Philosophy, 72(8), 205–220.
Watson, G. 1987. Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme. In Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman , pp. 256–286. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Agency and disability

Barnes, Elizabeth . 2016. The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
An excellent introduction into some of the philosophical issues surrounding specifically physical disabilities. Barnes argues that physical disabilities involve ‘mere-difference,’ not ‘bad-difference.’
MacIntyre, Alasdair . 1999. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. Peru, IL: Carus Publishing Company.
MacIntyre’s book focuses primarily on ‘the virtues of acknowledged dependence’ but canvasses a wide range of issues. Of particular relevance here are his arguments against overly idealized and atomistic conceptions of human agency.
Shoemaker, David . 2015. Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
While not specifically focused on disability, Shoemaker’s book illustrates how reflection on ‘non-standard’ or ‘marginal’ cases of agency and responsibility can help us understand important facts about human agency in general.
Timpe, Kevin . 2019. “Moral Ecology, Disabilities, and Human Agency,” Res Philosophica 96.1: 17–41.
This article argues that human agency is not simply a function of intrinsic properties about the agent, but rather depends on the ecology that the agent is in. In particular, it shows how, by paying deliberate attention to structuring the social environment around people with disabilities, we can mitigate some of the agential impact of those disabilities.
2p15p16.1 Microdeletion Syndrome. 2014. Surrey, England: Rare Chromosome Disorder Support Group.
Ardal, Pall S. 1993. “Depression and Reason.” Ethics 103: 540–550.
Barnes, Elizabeth . 2016. The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berenbaum, Sheri A. , Richard Abrams , Samuel Rosenberg , and Michael Alan Tylor . 1987. “The Nature of Emotional Blunting: A Factor-Analytic Study.” Psychiatry Research 20: 57–67.
Berger, Ronald J. 2013. Introducing Disability Studies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bird, Geoffrey and Richard Cook . 2013. “Mixed Emotions: The Contribution of Alexithymia to the Emotional Symptoms of Autism.” Translational Psychiatry 23.3: 10.1038/tp.2013.61.
Bird, Geoffrey , Giorgia Silani , Rachel Brindley , Sarah White , Uta Frith , and Tania Singer . 2010. “Empathic Brain Responses in Insula Are Modulated by Levels of Alexithymia but Not Autism.” Brain 133.5: 1515–1525.
Buntinx, Wil H. E. 2014. “Understanding Disability: A Strengths-Based Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology and Disability, ed. Michael L. Wehmeyer . Oxford: Oxford University Press: 7–18.
Burack, Jacob A. , Natalie Russo , Heidi Flores , Grace Iarocci , and Edwards Zigler . 2012. “The More You Know the Less You Know, But That’s OK: Developments in the Developmental Approach to Intellectual Disability,” in The Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Disability and Development, ed. Jacob A. Burack , Robert M. Hodapp , Grace Iarocci , and Edward Zigler . Oxford: Oxford University Press: 3–10.
Carlson, Licia . 2010. The Faces of Intellectual Disability: Philosophical Reflections. Bloomington, MA: Indiana University Press.
Carlson, Licia and Eva Feder Kittay . 2010. “Introduction: Rethinking Philosophical Presumptions in Light of Cognitive Disability,” in Cognitive Disability and its Challenges to Moral Philosophy, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell: 1–25.
Caton, Hiram . 1986. “Pascal’s Syndrome: Positivism as a Symptom of Depression and Mania,” Zygon 21.3: 319–351.
Clifton, Shane . 2018. Crippled Grace: Disability, Virtue Ethics, and the Good Life. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.
Crane, L. , L. Goddard , and L. Pring . 2009. “Sensory Processing in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders,” Autism 13: 215–228.
DeVidi, David . 2013. “Advocacy, Autism and Autonomy,” in The Philosophy of Autism, ed. Jami L. Anderson and Simon Cushing . Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 187–200.
Donaldson, Ivan , C. David Marsden , Susanne A. Schneider , and Kailash P. Bhatia . 2012. Marsden’s Book of Movement Disorders. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hancarova, Miroslave , Martina Simandolva , Jana Drabova , Katrin Mannik , Ants Kurg , and Zdenek Dedlacek . 2013. “A Patient with De Novo 0.45 Mb Deletion of 2p16.1: The Role of BCL11A, PAPOLG, REL, and FLJ16341 in the 2p15-p16.1 Microdeletion Syndrome.” American Journal of Medical Genetics, Part A 9999: 1–6.
Hansen, Jennifer . 2004. “Affectivity,” in The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, ed. Jennifer Radden. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 36–53.
Harris, James C. 2006. Intellectual Disability: Understanding its Development, Causes, Classification, Evaluation, and Treatment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Iarocci, Grace and Stephen A. Petrill . 2012. “Behavioral Genetics, Genomics, Intelligence, and Mental Retardation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Disability and Development, ed. Jacob A. Burack , Robert M. Hodapp , Grace Iarocci , and Edward Zigler . Oxford: Oxford University Press: 13–29.
Kahane, Guy and Julian Savulescu . 2009. “The Welfarist Account of Disability,” in Disability and Disadvantage, ed. Kimberley Brownlee and Adam Cureton. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 14–53.
Kasari, Connie L. , Laudan B. Jahromi , and Amanda C. Gulsrud . 2012. “Emotional Development in Children with Developmental Disabilities,” in The Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Disability and Development, ed. Jacob A. Burack, Robert M. Hodapp, Grace Iarocci, Edward Zigler. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 239–253.
Kennett, Jeanette . 2001. Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kim, Cynthia . 2015. Nerdy, Shy, and Socially Inappropriate: A User Guide to an Asperger Life. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Kittay, Eva Feder . 1998. Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. New York: Routledge.
Lloyd, Kenneth G. , Oleh Hornykiewicz , Lynne Davidson , Katherine Shannak , Irene Farley , Menek Goldstein , Masato Shibuy , William N. Kelley , and Irving H. Fox . 1981. “Biochemical Evidence of Dysfunction of Brain Neurotransmitters in the Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome,” The New England Journal of Medicine 305.19: 1106–1111.
MacIntyre, Alasdair . 1999. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. Peru, IL: Carus Publishing Company.
Mendez, Mario F. , Aaron McMurtray , Eliot Licht , Jill S. Shapira , Ronald E. Saul , and Bruce L. Miller . 2006. “The Scale for Emotional Blunting in Patients with Frontotemporal Dementia.” Neurocase 12: 242–246.
Moss, Joanna and Patricia Howling , and Chris Oliver . 2012. “The Assessment and Presentation of Autism Spectrum Disorder and Associated Characteristics in Individuals with Severe Intellectual Disability and Genetic Syndromes,” in The Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Disability and Development, ed. Jacob A. Burack , Robert M. Hodapp , Grace Iarocci , and Edward Zigler . Oxford: Oxford University Press: 275–299.

Nelkin, Dana . 2014. “Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.” Nous 50.2: 356–378.
Niccols, Alison , Karen Thomas , and Louis A. Schmidt . 2012. “Socioemotional and Brain Development in Children with Genetic Syndromes Associated with Developmental Delay,” in The Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Disability and Development, ed. Jacob A. Burack , Robert M. Hodapp , Grace Iarocci , and Edward Zigler . Oxford: Oxford University Press: 254–274.
Proust, Joëlle . 2013. “Mental Acts,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, ed. Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis . Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell: 209–217.
Ricciardi, Lucia , Benedetta Demartini , Aikaterini Fotopoulou , and Mark J. Edwards . 2015. “Alexithymia in Neurological Disease: A Review.” The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 27.3: 179–187.
Roberts, John Russell . 2001. “Mental Illness, Motivation and Moral Commitment,” Philosophical Quarterly 51.202: 1–59.
Shakespeare, Tom . 2014. Disability Rights and Wrongs, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
Shoemaker, David . 2015. Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silberfeld, Michel and David Checkland . 1999. “Faulty Judgment, Expert Opinion, and Decision-Making Capacity.” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20: 377–393.
Smith, Will . 2017. “Agency and Practical Abilities.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80: 235–264.
Timpe, Kevin . 2016. “Executive Function, Disability, and Agency.” Res Philosophica 93.4: 767–796. first Res Phil
Timpe, Kevin . 2019. “Moral Ecology, Disabilities, and Human Agency,” Res Philosophica 96.1: 17–41.
Timpe, Kevin . 2022. “Denying a Unified Concept of Disability.” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
UPIAS . 1976. The Union of the Physically Impaired against Segregation and Disability Alliance discuss Fundamental Principles of Disability. London: The Disability Alliance.
Weiner, William , Lisa Shulman , and Anthony E. Lang . 2001. Parkinson’s Disease. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
WHO . 2010. “Definition: Intellectual Disability.” http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/noncommunicable-diseases/mental-health/news/news/2010/15/childrens-right-to-family-life/definition-intellectual-disability.
Williamson, Peter C. and John M. and Allman. 2011. The Human Illness: Neuropsychiatric Disorders and the Nature of the Human Brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pathologies of agency

Fulford, K.W.M. , Davies, M. , Gipps, R.G.T. , Graham, G. , Sandler, J.Z. , Stranghellini, G. and T. Thornton (eds.) 2013. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A comprehensive overview of how and why mental disorder might impact different aspects of agency. It brings together conceptual analysis, empirical research, and clinical studies to shed light on philosophical and normative issues arising from psychiatric practice.
Radoilska, L. (ed.) 2012. Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The first book-length multidisciplinary inquiry into the nature and scope of personal autonomy in the context of mental disorder. It helps challenge tacit assumptions in the philosophy literature, according to which mental disorders are primarily threats to autonomous agency.
Radoilska, L. 2013. Addiction and Weakness of Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Introduces the notion of necessarily less-than-successful action to qualify the kind of criticisable irrationality that underpins both addiction and weakness of will. It argues that being necessarily less-than-successful rather than a symptom or clinical diagnosis is what distinguishes pathologies from inner obstacles to agency.
Schramme, T. (ed.) 2014. Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity. MIT Press.
The collection addresses the question of what makes the moral agency of psychopaths wanting. Against the grain, the contributors show that psychopathy is best understood as a cluster of deficits affecting different moral capacities rather than a uniform lack of empathy towards others.
Shoemaker, D. 2015. Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The monograph develops a pluralist conception of responsible agency which can be broken down into three main facets: answerability, accountability and attributability. Different mental disorders and abnormal psychological conditions are shown to preclude some facets of responsible agency while at the same time leaving others intact.
Alvarez, M. 2013. Agency and Two-Way Powers . Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113(1): 101–121.
Anscombe, G.E.M. 1963. Intention, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

Berridge, K. and Robinson, T. 2011. Drug Addiction and Incentive Sensitization. In Poland, J. and Graham, G. (eds.) Addiction and Responsibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 21–53.
Bolton, D. and Banner, N. 2012. Does Mental Disorder Involve Loss of Personal Autonomy? In Radoilska, L. (ed.) Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 77–99.
Bortolotti, L. 2013. Rationality and Sanity: The Role of Rationality Judgments in Understanding Psychiatric Disorders. In Fulford, K.W.M. , Davies, M. et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 480–496.
Bradford, G. 2015. Achievement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. 2007. Structures of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Culvert, C.M. and Gert, B. 2004. Competence. In Radden, J. (ed.) The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 258–270.
Dancy, J. 2000. Practical Reality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, D. 2001. How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Davidson, D. (ed.) Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 21–42.
Hieronymi, P. 2014. Reflection Responsibility. Philosophy & Public Affairs 42: 3–41.
Holton, R. 2009. Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hornsby, J. 2013. Basic Activity . Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 87:1–18.
Kennett, J. 2002. Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency . Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208): 340–357.
Jamison, K. R. 1995. An Unquiet Mind. New York: Vintage Books Random House.
Laplane, D. and Dubois, B. 2001. Auto-Activation Deficit: A Basal Ganglia Related Syndrome. Movement Disorders 16: 810–814.
Levy, R. 2012. Apathy: A Pathology of Goal-Directed Behaviour. A New Concept of the Clinic and Pathophysiology of Apathy. Revue Neurologique 168: 585–597.
Levy, R. 2015. Apathy: Anonymised Case-Studies. Neuroscience and Philosophy. Paris-Sorbonne Universités, 27 Nov.
McKenna, M. 2012. Conversation and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A.R. 1987. Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moran, R. and Stone, M. 2009. Anscombe on the Expression of Intention. In Sandis, C. (ed.) New Essays on the Explanation of Action. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 132–168.
Pacherie, E. 2007. The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behaviour: A Window onto Agentive Self-Awareness. Functional Neurology 22 (4): 211–217.
Poland, J. and Graham, G. (eds.) 2011. Addiction and Responsibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Potter, N. N. 2013. Empathic Foundations of Clinical Knowledge. In Fulford, K.W.M. , Davies, M. et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 293–306.
Radden, J. 2012. Privacy and Patient Autonomy in Mental Healthcare. In Radoilska, L. (ed.) Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 123–142.
Radoilska, L. 2013a. Depression, Decisional Capacity, and Personal Autonomy. In Fulford, K.W.M. , Davies, M. et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1155–1170.
Radoilska, L. 2013b. Addiction and Weakness of Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Radoilska, L. 2015. Autonomy in Psychiatric Ethics. In Sadler, J. , van Staden, G.W. and Fulford, K.W.M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 354–371.
Schramme, T. (ed.) 2014. Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Schwitzgebel, E. and Ellis, J. 2017. Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical Thought. In Bonnefon, J.F. and Trémolière, B. (eds.) Moral Inferences. New York Routledge: 170–190.
Setiya, K. 2008. Practical Knowledge . Ethics 118 (3): 388–409.
Shoemaker, D. 2009. Responsibility and Disability. Metaphilosophy 40(3/4): 438–461.
Shoemaker, D. 2015. Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. 2007. On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible . The Journal of Ethics 11: 465–484.
Strawson, P. 1962. Freedom Resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 1–25.
Wallace, R.J. 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Widdershoven, G.A.M. and Abma, T.A. 2012. Autonomy, Dialogue and Practical Rationality. In Radoilska, L. (ed.) Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 217–232.

Mental agency

Strawson, Galen (2003). ‘Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaneity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103(3): 227–257.

This paper argues that the role of mental action in our thinking can at best be indirect. It has been very influential in discussions of mental action, and many have since proposed alternative conceptions of mental agency, which in one way or other try to challenge Strawson’s argument.

L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds), (2009). Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

This volume contains 12 specially written papers covering such topics as the scope of mental action, the epistemology of mental action, the phenomenology of mental action, the role of mental agency in perception, and the relationship between the voluntary and the active in the mental sphere.

O’Shaughnessy, B. (2000). Consciousness and the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

This book contains a sophisticated and detailed exploration of the role that mental agency plays in our conscious mental lives. It includes proposals about the connections between the exercise of mental agency and self-knowledge, our temporal awareness and states of consciousness, and it also discusses the different structures that mental agency can take.

Levy, Y. (2019), ‘What Is Mental Action?’, Philosophical Psychology 32(6): 969–991.

This paper questions the theoretical significance of distinguishing between mental and bodily agencies, and discusses the proposal that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily actions.

Bishop, J. (1989). Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brand, M. (1984). Intending and Acting, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Buckareff, A. (2005). ‘How (Not) to Think about Mental Action’, Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 8(1): 83–89.

Davidson, D. (1963). ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Journal of Philosophy 60(23): 685–700.

Davidson, D. (1971). ‘Agency’, in his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.

Descartes, R. (1996). Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. by J. Cottingham , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dorsch, F. (2009), ‘Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency’, in L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds), Mental Actions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibbons, J. (2009). ‘Reason in Action’, in L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds), Mental Actions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldman, A. (1970). A Theory of Human Action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Grünbaum, T. (2008). ‘Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure’, Philosophia 36: 67–86.

Haddock, A. (2005). ‘At One with Our Actions But at Two with Our Bodies: Hornsby’s Account of Action’, Philosophical Explorations 8(2): 157–172.

Hieronymi, P. (2009). ‘Two Kinds of Agency’, in L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds), Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hornsby, J. (1997). Simple Mindedness: In Defence of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lavin, D. (2013). ‘Must There be Basic Action?’, Noûs 47: 273–301.

Levy, Y. (2016). ‘Action Unified’, Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262): 65–83.

Levy, Y. (2019). ‘What Is Mental Action?’, Philosophical Psychology 32(6): 969–991

McCann, H. J. (1975). ‘Trying, Paralysis, and Volition’, in H.J. McCann (ed.), The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will and Freedom (pp. 94–109). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mele, A. (2009). ‘Mental Action: A Case Study’, in L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds), Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O’Shaughnessy, B. (1973). ‘Trying (as the Mental “pineal gland”)’, The Journal of Philosophy 70(13): 365–386.

O’Shaughnessy, B. (2000). Consciousness and the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Peacocke, C. (2009). ‘Mental Action and Self-Awareness (II): Epistemology, in L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds), Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pink, T. (2009). ‘Reason, Voluntariness and Moral Responsibility’, in L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds), Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Proust, J. (2013), ‘Mental Acts as Natural Kinds’, in Till Vierkant , Julian Kieverstein and Andy Clark (eds), Decomposing the Will (pp. 262–282). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ryle, G. (1949), The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson.
Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Soteriou, M. (2013). The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steward, H. (2012). A Metaphysics for Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, Galen (2003). 'Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaneity', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103/3: 227–257.
Upton, C. and Brent, M. (2018). 'Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action', Philosophical Psychology 32(1): 52–71 (2019)
Wu, W. (2013). 'Mental Action and the Threat of Automaticity', in Andy Clark , Julian Kiverstein and Tillman Vierkant (eds), Decomposing the Will (pp. 244–261). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Agency and the body

Bermudez, J. L. , Marcel, A. J. , and Eilan, N. (1995) The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
This is the volume from which the contemporary discussion of body, self, and agency sprang.
O'Shaughnessy, B. (2008), The Will, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press.
This is the 2nd edition of O'Shaughnessy's classic work (1st ed. 1980), which includes pioneering discussions of volitionism (or 'trying theory'), the body image, the phenomenology of embodied agency, sub-intentional actions, and a dual aspect theory of action.
De Vignemont, F. and Alsmith, A. (2017) The Subject's Matter. MIT Press.
The latest collection of essays exploring themes inspired by the discussion of the body, self, and agency inaugurated by Bermudez et al.'s The Body and the Self (1995).
De Vignemont, F. (2018) Mind the Body. Oxford University Press.
This is a cutting-edge discussion of philosophical issues in bodily self-consciousness arising from reflecting on the cognitive science of body representations, which culminates in a theory of body ownership relating to body representations for action (body schema) for self-defense.
Wong, H. Y. (forthcoming) Embodied Agency. Oxford University Press.
This is a systematic discussion of the relation between embodiment and agency, bringing together the recent philosophy and science in an account of embodied agency.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1963). Intention, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
Baier, B. , and Karnath, H. O. (2008). Tight link between our sense of limb ownership and self-awareness of actions. Stroke, 39(2): 486–488.
Baloh, R. W. , Honrubia, V. , and Kerber, K. A. (2011). Baloh and Honrubia's Clinical Neurophysiology of the Vestibular System, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Balslev, D. , Cole, J. , and Miall, R. C. (2007). Proprioception contributes to the sense of agency during visual observation of hand movements: Evidence from temporal judgments of action. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19(9): 1535–1541.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2019). Bodily ownership, psychological ownership, and psychopathology. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(2): 263–280.
Berthoz, A. (1991). Reference frames for the perception and control of movement. In J. Paillard (Ed.), Brain and Space (pp. 81–111). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berthoz, A. (2000). The Brain's Sense of Movement (Vol. 10). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Blanke, O. (2012). Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 13(8): 556–571.
Botvinick, M. , and Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see. Nature, 391(6669): 756–756.
Brugger, P. , Lenggenhager, B. , and Giummarra, M. J. (2013). Xenomelia: A social neuroscience view of altered bodily self-consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology, 4: 204.
Cole, J. (1992). Pride and a Daily Marathon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cole, J. (2016). Losing Touch: A Man without His Body. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cole, J. , and Paillard, J. (1995). Living without touch and peripheral information about body position and movement: Studies with deafferented subjects. In J. Bermúdez , A. Marcel , and N. Eilan (eds.) The Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 245–266.
Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dijkerman, H. C. , and De Haan, E. H. (2007). Somatosensory processing subserving perception and action: Dissociations, interactions, and integration. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(2): 224–230.
Garbarini, F. , Pia, L. , Fossataro, C. , and Berti, A. (2017). From pathological embodiment to a model for body awareness. In F. de Vignemont & A. Alsmith (Eds.), The Subject's Matter: Self-consciousness and the

Body. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 371–388.
Hornsby, J. (1980). Actions. London: Routledge.
Ingram, H. A. , Van Donkelaar, P. , Cole, J. , Vercher, J. L. , Gauthier, G. M. , and Miall, R. C. (2000). The role of proprioception and attention in a visuomotor adaptation task. Experimental Brain Research, 132(1): 114–126.
Martin M. G. F. (1995). Bodily awareness: A sense of ownership. In J. Bermúdez , A. Marcel , and N. Eilan (eds.) The Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 267–289.
O'Brien, L. (2007). Self-knowing Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O'Shaughnessy, B. (1995). Proprioception and the body image. In J. Bermúdez , A. Marcel , and N. Eilan (eds.) The Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 175–203.
O'Shaughnessy, B. (2008). The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory, 2 vols., 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sedda, A. , and Bottini, G. (2014). Apotemnophilia, body integrity identity disorder or xenomelia? Psychiatric and neurologic etiologies face each other. Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment, 10: 1255.
Steward, H. (2009). Animal agency. Inquiry, 52(3): 217–231.
Tsakiris, M. (2010). My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body ownership. Neuropsychologia, 48: 703–712.
Vallar, G. , and Ronchi, R. (2009). Somatoparaphrenia: A body delusion. A review of the neuropsychological literature. Experimental Brain Research, 192(3): 533–551.
Velleman, D. J. (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
De Vignemont, F. (2014). A multimodal conception of bodily awareness. Mind, 123: 989–1020.
De Vignemont, F. (2018). Mind the Body: An Exploration of Bodily Self-awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wong, H. Y. (2015). On the significance of bodily awareness for bodily action. Philosophical Quarterly, 65: 790–812.
Wong, H. Y. (2017a). In and out of balance. In F. de Vignemont & A. Alsmith (Eds.), The Subject's Matter: Self-consciousness and the Body. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: pp. 311–334.
Wong, H. Y. (2017b). On proprioception in action: Multimodality versus deafferentation. Mind & Language, 32(3): 259–282.
Wong, H. Y. (2018). Embodied agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97(3): 584–612.

Agency, consciousness, and attention

Block, N. 2007. Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience. The Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 30(5–6): 481–499.
This work, with associated commentaries, provides an empirically engaged perspective on the issues about access and consciousness. A more philosophical presentation of the issues can be found in (Block, 2008).
Goodale, M. A. and A. D. Milner . 2004. Sight Unseen: An Exploration of Conscious and Unconscious Vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
An informal presentation of Milner and Goodale's important work on human cortical vision, especially their collaborative work with the patient DF.
Mack, A. and I. Rock . 1998. Inattentional Blindness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
A classic work on the limits of attentional capture. Mack and Rock coined the term inattentional blindness.
Wu, W. 2014. Attention. New York: Routledge.
This book introduces the topic of attention including two chapters that summarize work in psychology and neuroscience.
Wu, W. 2017. Attention and Perception: A Necessary Connection? In B. Nanay , ed. Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. Routledge: New York: 148–162.
This work provides a critical discussion on whether attention is necessary for perceptual consciousness.
Allport, A. (2011) 'Attention and integration', in Mole, C. , Smithies, D. , and Wu, W. (eds) Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press US: 24–59.
Anderson, B. (2011) 'There is no such thing as attention', Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2: 246. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00246.
Baars, B. J. (1988) A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Block, N. (1995) 'On a confusion about the function of consciousness', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–247.

Block, N. (2008) ‘Consciousness and cognitive access’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 108: 289–317.
Cisek, P. and Kalaska, J. F. (2010) ‘Neural mechanisms for interacting with a world full of action choices’, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 33(1): 269–298.
Clark, A. (2001) ‘Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight?’ Philosophical Review, 110(4): 495–520.
Dehaene, S. and Naccache, L. (2001) ‘Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework’, Cognition, 79(1): 1–37.
Desimone, R. and Duncan, J. (1995) ‘Neural mechanisms of selective visual attention’, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 18: 193–222.
Frankfurt, H. (1988) ‘The problem of action’, in The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 70–84.
Haffenden, A. and Goodale, M. (1998) ‘The effect of pictorial illusion on prehension and perception’, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10(1): 122–136.
Harman, G. (1990) ‘The intrinsic quality of experience’, in J. Tomberlin (ed) Philosophical Perspectives, 4 Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company: 31–52.
James, W. (1890) The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1. Boston, MA: Henry Holt and Co.
Mack, A. and Rock, I. (1998) Inattentional Blindness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Milner, A. D. and Goodale, M. A. (1995) The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mishkin, M. , Ungerleider, L. G. and Macko, K. A. (1983) ‘Object vision and spatial vision: Two cortical pathways’, Trends in Neurosciences, 6: 414–417.
Mole, C. (2009) ‘Illusions, demonstratives and the zombie action hypothesis’, Mind, 118(472): 995–1011.
Mole, C. (2011) Attention Is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mole, C. (2013) ‘Embodied demonstratives: A reply to Wu’, Mind, 122(485): 231–239. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzt031.
Wallhagen, M. (2007) ‘Consciousness and action: Does cognitive science support (mild) epiphenomenalism?’ The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58(3): 539.
Wu, W. (2011) ‘Confronting many-many problems: Attention and agentive control’, Noûs, 45(1): 50–76.
Wu, W. (2013a) ‘Mental action and the threat of automaticity’, in Clark, A. , Kiverstein, J. , and Vierkant, T. (eds) Decomposing the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 244–261.
Wu, W. (2013b) ‘The case for zombie agency’, Mind, 122(485): 217–230.
Wu, W. (2015) ‘Experts and deviants: The story of agentive control’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, p. n/a-n/a. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12170.
Wu, W. (2017) ‘Attention and perception: A necessary connection?’ in Nanay, B. (ed.) Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge: 148–162.
Wu, W. (2018) ‘The neuroscience of consciousness’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/consciousness-neuroscience/.

Material agency

Andy Clark (2008) Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
This book, which provides a sustained argument for decentering our understanding of the mind from biology without abandoning materialism, could be seen as a model for the account of material agency offered in this essay.
Donald Davidson (1980) “Agency,” Chap. 3 in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Even if many disagree with the account here, it articulates an understanding of agency that retains its grip on our intuitions.
Anton Ford (2018) “The Province of Human Agency,” Noûs 52(3): 697–720.
Much of the ingenious and profound argument in Ford’s sophisticated defense of an understanding of human agency as realized in the relation between person and world can be deployed as ground clearing for the account of material agency offered in this essay.
Margrit Shildrick (2015) “‘Why Should Our Bodies End at the Skin?’: Embodiment, Boundaries, and Somatechnics,” Hypatia 30(1): 13–29.
Shildrick’s essay defends an account of the human body realized in across biological and non-biological systems, and so invites this essay’s understanding of our agential capacities as realized across those same

systems.
Bratman, Michael . (2003) “Two Problems about Human Agency,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101(1): 309–326.
Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix . (1987) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
Ford, Henry (1923) My Life and Work (NYC: Doubleday).
Frankfurt, Harry (1978) “The Problem of Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15(1): 157–162.
Freud, Sigmund (1930, 1962) Civilization and Its Discontents, translated by James Strachey (NYC: W.W. Norton).
Ginet, Carl (1975) Knowledge, Perception, and Memory (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company).
Glick, Ephraim (2012) “Abilities and Know-How Attributions,” in Knowledge Ascriptions (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 120–139.
Haraway, Donna (1990) “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the 1980s,” in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (NYC: Routledge): 190–233.
Korsgaard, Christine (2009) Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity (NYC: Oxford University Press).
Maier, John (2015) ‘The Agentive Modalities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90(1): 113–134.
Mele, Alfred R. (2003) Motivation and Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Seltzer, Mark (1992) Bodies and Machines (NYC: Routledge).
Shildrick, Margrit (2009) “Prosthetic Performativity: Deleuzian Connections and Queer Corporealities,” in Deleuze and Queer Theory, ed. C. Nigianni (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
Shildrick, Margrit (2015) ‘‘Why Should Our Bodies End at the Skin?’: Embodiment, Boundaries, and Somatechnics,” Hypatia 30(1): 13–29.
Small, Will (2017) “Agency and Practical Abilities,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Suppl. 80: 235–264.
Stanley, Jason and Williamson, Timothy (2001) “Knowing How,” The Journal of Philosophy 98(8): 411–444.
Velleman, J. David (1992) “What Happens When Someone Acts?” Mind 101(403): 461–481.
Wigley, Mark (1991) “The Disciplining of Architecture,” Assemblage 15: 6–29.

Epistemic agency

Peels, R. 2016. Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
This recent book provides an excellent discussion of the various notions of responsibility and accountability. While it is focused primarily on believing, it offers valuable insights into the similarities between action and believing.
Pojman, L. 1986. Religious Belief and the Will. London: Routledge, Kegan, and Paul.
This book provides an excellent survey of the history of discussions by philosophers of doxastic freedom.
Thomson, J. 2008. Normativity. Peru, IL: Open Court.
This book is primarily about the nature of normativity, a branch of meta-ethics. But it offers an excellent introduction to the complex issues involving responsibility, blame, and goodness. It also includes excellent discussions of epistemic duties.
Williams, B. 1973. Deciding to believe. Chap. 9 in Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 136–151.
This article has been enormously influential. It discusses the nature of believing, whether believing is essentially normative, the nature of inference, and whether a person can believe at will. Just about all contemporary discussions of epistemic agency trace back to this article.
Alvarez, M. and Hyman, J. 1998. Agents and their acts. Philosophy, 73, 219–245.
Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957. Intention. Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bach, K. 1980. Actions are not events. Mind, 89(353), 114–120.
Bennett, J. 1990. Why is belief involuntary? Analysis, 50, 98–107.
Boghossian, P. 2014. What is inference? Philosophical Studies, 169, 1–18.
Boyle, M. 2011a. Transparent self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume LXXXV, 223–241.
Boyle, M. 2011b. “Making up your mind” and the activity of reason. Philosopher’s Imprint, 11(17), 1–24.
Broome, J. 2013. Rationality through Reasoning. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Burge, T. 1998. Reason and the first person. In C. Wright , B. Smith & C. MacDonald (Eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds (pp. 243–271). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Byrne, A. 2018. Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cassam, Q. 2019. Vices of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chrisman, M. 2016. Epistemic normativity and cognitive agency. Noûs, 52(3), 504–529.
Davidson, D. 1984. Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R. 2000. The ethics of belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(3), 667–695.
Govier, T. 1976. Belief, values, and the will. Dialogue, 15, 642–663.
Hieronymi, P. 2009. Believing at will. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary volume 35, 135–187.
Hintikka, J. 1962. Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Hunter, D. 2018a. The metaphysics of responsible believing. Manuscrito, 41(4), 255–285.
Hunter, D. 2018b. Directives for knowledge and belief. In D. Whiting et al. (Eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 68–89.
Hunter, D. 2022. On Believing: being right in a world of possibilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hyman, J. 1994. Vision and power. The Journal of Philosophy, 91(5), 236–252.
Hyman, J. 2015. Action, Knowledge and Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kenny, A. 1989. The Metaphysics of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marcus, E. 2009. Why there are no token states. Journal of Philosophical Research, 34, 215–241.
Marcus, E. 2014. Rational Causation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McCormick, M. 2015. Believing against the Evidence. New York: Routledge.
McHugh, C. 2014. Exercising doxastic freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(1), 1–37.
Meylan, A. 2015. The legitimacy of intellectual praise and blame. Journal of Philosophical Research, 40, 1–15. DOI:10.5840/jpr201511537.
Montmarquet, J. 1993. Epistemic Virtues and Doxastic Responsibility. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Moran, R. 2001. Authority and Estrangement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Nickel, P. 2010. Voluntary belief on a reasonable basis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(2), 312–334.
O'Brien, L. 2007. Self-knowing Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Owens, D. 2000. Reason without Freedom. London: Routledge.
Peels, R. 2016. Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pojman, L. 1986. Religious Belief and the Will. London: Routledge, Kegan, and Paul.
Rödl, S. 2007. Self-consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roeber, B. 2019. Evidence, judgment, and belief at will. Mind. DOI:10.1093/mind/fzy065.
Roessler, J. and Eilan, E. (Eds.). 2003. Agency and Self-Awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. New York: Barnes & Noble.
Setiya, K. 2008. Believing at will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 32, 36–52.
Shah, N. 2006. A new argument for evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly, 56 (225), 481–498.
Sosa, E. 2009. A Virtue Epistemology Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steglich-Petersen, A. 2007. Against essential normativity of the mental. Philosophical Studies, 140, 263–283.
Steward, H. 1997. The Ontology of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomson, J. 1977. Acts and Other Events. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Thomson, J. 2008. Normativity. Peru, IL: Open Court.
White, A. 1971. Inference. Philosophical Quarterly, 21(85), 289–302.
White, R. 2005. Epistemic permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 445–459.
Williams, B. 1973. Deciding to believe. Chap. 9 in Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 136–151.
Winters, B. 1979. Believing at will. Journal of Philosophy, 76, 243–256.
Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Agency and practical knowledge

Rödl, S. (2011). 'Two Forms of Practical Knowledge'. In Anton Ford , Jennifer Hornsby , and Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 211–241.
Explores the idea that Anscombe and Kant had similar views of practical knowledge (as knowledge of what one does, and why, and also moral knowledge).
Roessler, J. (2010). 'Agent's Knowledge'. In Constantine Sandis and Timothy O'Connor (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell: 236–243.

An alternative summary of relevant issues concerning knowledge of what one does.
Schwenkler, J. (2015). ‘Understanding “Practical Knowledge”. Philosophers’ Imprint 15.
Traces Anscombe’s theory to its roots in Aquinas and Aristotle.
Setiya, K. (2017). Practical Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The most detailed recent comprehensive study of practical knowledge and its importance to action theory and ethics.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1963). Intention. 2nd edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Reprinted 2000 by Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Armstrong, D. (1968). A Materialist Theory of Mind. London: Routledge.
Campbell, L. (2018a). ‘An Epistemology for Practical Knowledge’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(2): 159–177.
Campbell, L. (2018b). ‘Propositionalism about Intention: Shifting the Burden of Proof’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1512819.
Davidson, D. (2001). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Engstrom, S. (2009). The Form of Practical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Frey, C. and Frey, J. (2017). ‘G.E.M. Anscombe and the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action’. Analytic Philosophy 58(3): 202–247.
Frost, K. (2018). ‘A Metaphysics for Practical Knowledge’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1516972.
Ginet, C. (1990). On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grice, P. (1971). ‘Intention and Uncertainty’. The Proceedings of the British Academy 57: 263–279.
Hampshire, S. (1959). Thought and Action. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press.
O’Brien, L. (2003). “On Knowing One’s Own Actions”. In Johannes Roessler and Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
O’Shaughnessy, B. (2003). “The Epistemology of Physical Action”. In Johannes Roessler and Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Paul, S. (2009). ‘How We Know What We’re Doing’. Philosopher’s Imprint 9(4): 1–24.
Paul, S. (2012). ‘How We Know What We Intend’. Philosophical Studies 161(2): 327–346.
Paul, S. (2015). ‘The Transparency of Intention’. Philosophical Studies 172(6): 1529–1548.
Rödl, S. (2007). Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sellars, W. (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Setiya, K. (2008). ‘Practical Knowledge’. Ethics 118(3): 388–409.
Small, W. (2012). ‘Practical Knowledge and the Structure of Action’. In Abel Günter and James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology. Berlin: DeGruyter, 133–228.
Thompson, M. (2011). ‘Anscombe’s *Intention* and Practical Knowledge’. In A. Ford , J. Hornsby and F. Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Velleman, J. D. (1989). Practical Reflection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Agency and evidence

Anscombe, G.E.M. (1963/2000). Intention, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
The seminal contemporary work on the nature of practical reason.
Jackson, Frank and Robert Pargetter . (1986). ‘Oughts, Options, and Actualism’. The Philosophical Review 95, 233–255.
Presents the influential example of Professor Procrastinate, which raises the problem of whether prediction informs decision.
Marušić, Berislav . (2015). Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Develops the view that is outlined in this chapter.
Schwenkler, John . (2019). Anscombe’s Intention: A Guide. New York: Oxford University Press.
Provides an interpretation of Anscombe with extensive discussion of the form and structure of practical reasoning.
Velleman, David . (1996). ‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’. Chap. 7 in The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Shows how belief can be grounded in practical reasoning.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1963/2000). Intention, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Bok, Hilary . (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bratman, Michael . (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dancy, Jonathan . (2018). Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ferrero, Luca . (2009). “Conditional Intentions.” Noûs 43, 700–741.
Goldman, Holly . (1976). “Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection.” The Philosophical Review 85, 449–487.
Hájek, Alan . (2016). “Deliberation Welcomes Prediction.” Episteme 13, 507–528.
Jackson, Frank . (2014). “Procrastinate Revisited.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95, 634–647.
Jackson, Frank and Robert Pargetter . (1986). “Oughts, Options, and Actualism.” The Philosophical Review 95, 233–255.
Joyce, James . (2002). “Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One’s Own Actions.” Philosophical Studies 110, 69–102.
Langton, Rae . (2003). “Intention as Faith.” In Action and Agency, edited by Helen Steward and John Hyman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 243–258.
Levi, Isaac . (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levi, Isaac . (2007). “Deliberation Does Crowd Out Prediction.” In Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, edited by Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen , Björn Petersson , Jonas Josefsson and Dan Egonsson , Lund University.
Lewis, David . (1994). “Humean Supervenience Debugged.” Mind 103: 473–490.
Liu, Yang and Huw Price . (2019). “Heart of DARCness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97, 136–150.
Marušić, Berislav . (2012). “Belief and Difficult Action.” Philosophers’ Imprint 12, 1–30.
Marušić, Berislav . (2013). “Promising against the Evidence.” Ethics 123, 292–317.
Marušić, Berislav . (2015). Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marušić, Berislav and John Schwenkler . (2018). “Intending Is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.” Analytic Philosophy 59.3: 1–32.
Portmore, Douglas . (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Portmore, Douglas . (2019). Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rabinowicz, Wlodek . (2002). “Does Practical Deliberation Crowd out Self-Prediction?” Erkenntnis 57, 91–122.
Ross, Jacob . (2012). “Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond.” In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 2, edited by Mark Timmons . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schwenkler, John . (2015). “Understanding ‘Practical Knowledge’.” Philosophers’ Imprint 15, 1–32.
Schwenkler, John . (2019). Anscombe’s Intention: A Guide. New York: Oxford University Press.
Setiya, Kieran . (2007). Reasons without Rationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Setiya, Kieran . (2008). “Practical Knowledge.” Ethics 118, 388–409.
Spohn, Wolfgang . (1977). “Where Luce and Krantz Do Really Generalize Savage’s Decision Model.” Erkenntnis 11, 113–134.
Thomason, Richmond . (1981). “Deontic Logic and the Role of Freedom in Moral Deliberation.” New Studies in Deontic Logic: Norms, Actions and the Foundations of Ethics 152, 177–186.
Vavova, Katia . (2016). “Deliberation and Prediction: It’s Complicated.” Episteme 13, 529–538.
Velleman, David . (1989/2007). Practical Reflection, 2nd ed. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Velleman, David . (1996). “The Possibility of Practical Reason.” In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 270–299.

Agency and self-knowledge

Cassam, Quassim . 2014. Self-Knowledge for Humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
This book contains an extended examination and critique of agentialist accounts of self-knowledge.
Coliva, Annalisa . 2016. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
This book evaluates a wide range of accounts of self-knowledge. It makes the case for a pluralist view, according to which self-knowledge takes a variety of forms.
Bilgrami, Akeel . 2006. Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Boyle, Matthew . 2009. Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78: 133–164.

Boyle, Matthew . 2011. Transparent Self-Knowledge . Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Sup Vol. 85: 223–241.
Burge, Tyler . 1996. Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 91–116.
Byrne, Alex . 2018. Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coliva, Annalisa . 2012. One Variety of Self-Knowledge: Constitutivism as Constructivism. In The Self and Self-Knowledge, A. Coliva (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 212–242.
Fernandez, Jorge . 2013. Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gertler, Brie . 2018. Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96: 91–109.
Hasan, Ali and Richard Fumerton . 2020. Knowledge by Acquaintance vs. Description. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/
Korsgaard, C.M. 2009. The Activity of Reason. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 83: 23–43.
McGeer, Victoria . 1996. Is “Self-Knowledge” an Empirical Problem? Renegotiating the Space of Philosophical Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 93: 483–515.
McGeer, Victoria . 2007. The moral development of first-person authority. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1): 81–108
Moran, Richard . 2001. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Moran, Richard . 2003. Responses to O’Brien and Shoemaker. European Journal of Philosophy 11: 402–419.
Nisbett, Richard and Timothy Wilson . 1977. Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes. Psychological Review 84: 231–259.

Agency, will, and freedom

Hobbes, T. (1999) ‘Of liberty and necessity’ in ed. V. Chappell , Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 15–42.
Hobbes’s classic and highly influential attack on the idea of a freedom of the will.
Kahn, C. (1988) ‘Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine’ in ed. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long , The Question of ‘Eclecticism’ (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 234–259.
A famous historical account of the development in late antiquity of our conception of the will.
Pink, T. (2017) Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
This develops the themes of this article in much more detail.
Aristotle (1985) Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett).
Bratman, M. (1987) Intention, Plans and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Davidson, D. (1980) ‘Actions, reasons and causes’ Chap 1 in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 3–19.
Hobbes, T. (1999) ‘Of liberty and necessity’ in ed. V. Chappell , Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 15–42.
Hobbes, T. (2012) Leviathan, ed. N. Malcolm (Oxford: Oxford University Press): volume 2.
Kahn, C. (1988) ‘Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine’ in ed. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long , The Question of ‘Eclecticism’ (Berkeley: University of California Press): 234–259.
Korsgaard, C. (1997) ‘Skepticism about practical reason’ Chap. 11 in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 311–334.
Pink, T. (2004) ‘Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory’ in ed. Thomas Pink and M.W.F. Stone , The Will and Human Action from Antiquity to the Present Day (London: Routledge): 127–153.
Pink, T. (2017) Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Pink, T. (2018) ‘Agents, actions and their objects in Suarez and Hobbes’ in ed. Constantine Sandis , Philosophy of Action from Suarez to Anscombe (London: Routledge): 1–28.
Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson).
Sehon, S (2005) Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency and Explanation (Cambridge MA: MIT Press).
Williams, B. (1995) ‘Nietzsche’s minimalist moral psychology’ Chap.6 in Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 65–76.

Agency and responsibility

Clarke, Randolph , Michael McKenna , and Angela M. Smith , eds. 2015. The Nature of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.

Coates, Justin , and Neal Tognazzini , eds. 2013. Blame: Its Nature and Norms. New York: Oxford University Press.

Coates, Justin , and Neal Tognazzini The above two anthologies compile recent work on “blame” and moral responsibility.

Frankfurt, Harry . 1988. “The Importance of What We Care About.” Chap. 7 in The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 80–94.

Frankfurt, Harry This short paper challenges the idea that responsible human agency is ultimately grounded in our capacity for choice or decision.

Watson, Gary , ed. 2003. Free Will. Second ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Watson, Gary A standard anthology of work on free will and moral responsibility.

Hieronymi, Pamela . 2020. Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hieronymi, Pamela This volume includes a short, opinionated primer on the problem of free will and moral responsibility, a reprinting of P. F. Strawson’s seminal “Freedom and Resentment,” and a close, line-by-line reading of that difficult article.

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1957. Intention. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Co.

Bratman, Michael E. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burge, Tyler . 2009. “Primitive Agency and Natural Norms.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 251–278.

Chisholm, Roderick M. 1964. Human Freedom and the Self, Lindley Lecture 1964. Lawrence: Dept. of Philosophy, University of Kansas.

Clark, Maudemarie , and David Dudrick . 2012. The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Frankfurt, Harry . 1988. “The Importance of What We Care About.” In The Importance of What We Care About, 80–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hieronymi, Pamela . 2005. “The Wrong Kind of Reason.” The Journal of Philosophy 102 (9): 1–21.

Hieronymi, Pamela . 2006. “Controlling Attitudes.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1): 45–74.

Hieronymi, Pamela . 2009. “The Will as Reason.” Philosophical Perspectives 23: 201–220.

Hieronymi, Pamela . 2014. “Reflection and Responsibility.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1): 3–41.

Hieronymi, Pamela . 2019. “I’ll Bet You Think this Blame Is About You.” In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility: Essays on Themes from the Work of Gary Watson, edited by Justin Coates and Neal Tognazzini , 60–87. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hieronymi, Pamela . 2020. Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hieronymi, Pamela . 2021. “Fairness, Sanction, and Condemnation.” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, edited by David Shoemaker , 229–258. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Johnson, Mark C. 2018. “What Bestiality of Thought: A Nietzschean Critique of Guilt, Punishment, and the Economics of Suffering.” Ph.D., Philosophy, University of California, Riverside.

Kant, Immanuel . 1997. *Critique of Practical Reason* . Translated by Mary Gregor . Edited by Karl Ameriks , Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Original edition, 1788.

Morris, Herbert . 1968. “Persons and Punishment.” Monist 52: 475–501.

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm . 1998. On the Genealogy of Morality, translated and edited by Maudemarie Clarke and Alan J. Swensen . Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co.

Pereboom, Derk . 2001. Living without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Scanlon, T. M. 2015. “Forms and Conditions of Responsibility.” In The Nature of Moral Responsibility, edited by Randolph Clarke , Michael McKenna and Angela M. Smith . New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strawson, Galen . 1994. “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 75: 5–24.

Strawson, Peter F. 1962. “Freedom and Resentment.” Proceedings of the British Academy xlviii: 1–25.

Wallace, R. Jay . 1996. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Watson, Gary . 1996. “Two Faces of Responsibility.” Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 227–248.

Wolf, Susan . 1980. “Asymmetrical Freedom.” Journal of Philosophy 77: 151–166.

Agency and identification

Bratman, M. 2000.
Defends a view of identification grounded in self-governing policies.
Frankfurt, H. 1971.
Introduces the seminal “hierarchy of desire” view of identification.
Seidman, J. 2009.
A comprehensive defense of a caring-based account of identification.
Velleman, J.D. 1992.
Defends a reductionist view according to which the role of the agent is played by the desire to act for reasons.
Watson, G. 1975.
Introduces influential criticisms of Frankfurt’s hierarchical approach and an alternative view tying identification to one’s evaluative judgments about how to live one’s life.

Arpaly, N. and Schroeder, T. 1999. “Praise, Blame and the Whole Self.” Philosophical Studies 93(2): 161–188.
Bratman, M. 1996. “Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason.” Philosophical Topics 24(2): 1–18.
Bratman, M. 2000. “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.” The Philosophical Review 109(1): 35–61.
Fischer, J.M. 2012. “Mission Creep: Responsibility and Autonomy.” Philosophical Issues 22(1): 165–184.
Frankfurt, H. 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988: 11–25.
Frankfurt, H. 1987. “Identification and Wholeheartedness.” Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988: 159–176.
Frankfurt, H. 1988. The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. 1992. “The Faintest Passion.” Reprinted in Frankfurt 1999: 95–107.
Frankfurt, H. 1999. Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jaworska, A. 2007. “Caring and Internality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(3): 529–568.
Jaworska, A. 2017. “Identificationist Views.” In The Routledge Companion to Free Will, ed. K. Timpe , M. Griffith , and N. Levy . New York: Routledge: 15–26.
Seidman, J. 2009. “Valuing and Caring.” Theoria 75: 272–303.
Shoemaker, D. 2003. “Caring, Identification, and Agency.” Ethics 114: 88–118.
Smith, A. 2004. “Conflicting Attitudes, Moral Agency, and Conceptions of the Self.” Philosophical Topics 32: 331–352.
Smith, A. 2005. “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life.” Ethics 115: 236–271.
Velleman, J.D. 1992. “What Happens When Someone Acts?” Reprinted in Velleman 2000: 123–143.
Velleman, J.D. 2000. The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Watson, G. 1975. “Free Agency.” Reprinted in Watson 2004: 13–32.
Watson, G. 1987. “Free Action and Free Will.” Reprinted in Watson 2004: 161–196.
Watson, G. 2004. Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Agency and autonomy

David, Shoemaker (2003) “Caring, Identification, and Agency” develops a care-based version of an identificationist view. (See also Jaworska 2007 and Seidman 2009).
Harry Frankfurt (1988) “Identification and Wholeheartedness” offers the basis for an influential and paradigmatically identificationist account of autonomy.
Kyla Ebels-Duggan (2015) “Autonomy as an Intellectual Virtue” offers a critique of dialogical conceptions of autonomy, and suggests that autonomy requires not just humility but also an appropriate degree of confidence in the truth of one’s views.
Michael, Bratman (2003) “Autonomy and Hierarchy” offers a planning theory of autonomous agency, and makes the point that self-governance involves governance by a justificatory point of view.
Mirja Pérez de Calleja (2019) “Autonomy and Indoctrination: Why We Need an Emotional Condition for Autonomous Reasoning and Reflective Endorsement” also offers a critique of answerability- based views, and points out that emotions such as anxiety and fear appear to play a significant role in undermining the autonomy of apparently self-answerable agents.

Bhandary, Asha . 2020. Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency, Care, and Culture. New York: Routledge.
Bratman, Michael . 2003. “Autonomy and Hierarchy,” Social Philosophy and Policy 20:156–176.
Bratman, Michael . 2007. “Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency,” Chap. 10 in Structures of Agency. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 195–221.
Dworkin, Gerald . 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ebels-Duggan, Kyla . 2015. “Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue,” in The Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and Justice. Eds. Harry Brighouse and Michael MacPherson . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 74–90.
Frankfurt, Harry . 1988. “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” Chap. 5 in The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 159–176.
Frankfurt, Harry . 1999a. “The Faintest Passion,” Chap. 8 in Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 95–107.
Frankfurt, Harry . 1999b. “Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,” Chap. 11 in Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 129–141.
Frankfurt, Harry . 1999c. “On Caring,” Chap. 14 in Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 155–180.
Jaworska, Agnieszka . 2007. “Caring and Internality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(3): 529–568.
Jaworska, Agnieszka . 2009. “Caring, Minimal Autonomy, and the Limits of Liberalism,” in Naturalized Bioethics: Toward Responsible Knowing and Practice. Eds. Hilde Lindemann , Marion Verkerk , and Margaret Urban Walker . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 80–105.
Meyers, Diana Tietjens . 1987. “Autonomy Competency,” Ch. 2.4 in Self, Society, and Personal Choice. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 76–97.
Mullin, Amy . 2007. “Children, Autonomy, and Care,” Journal of Social Philosophy 38(4): 536–553.
Mullin, Amy . 2014. “Children, Paternalism, and the Development of Autonomy,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17: 413–426.
Pérez de Calleja, Mirja . 2019. “Autonomy and Indoctrination: Why We Need an Emotional Condition for Autonomous Reasoning and Reflective Endorsement,” Social Philosophy and Policy 36(1): 192–210.
Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Seidman, Jeffrey . 2009. “Valuing and Caring,” Theoria 75: 272–303.
Shoemaker, David . 2003. “Caring, Identification, and Agency,” Ethics 114(1): 88–118.
Westlund, Andrea C. 2003. “Selflessness and responsibility for self: Is deference compatible with autonomy?” Philosophical Review 112 (4): 483–523.
Westlund, Andrea C. 2014. “Autonomy and Self-Care,” in Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender. Eds. Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper . New York: Oxford University Press: 180–198.

Agency and (the limits of) volitional conflict

Frankfurt, Harry . 1992. The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
A collection of essays which focus on the possibility and significance of psychic conflict.
Mason, H.E. , ed. 1996. Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
A wide-ranging collection of essays on the topic of moral dilemmas.
Worsnip, Alex . Fitting Things Together. Unpublished manuscript.
A sustained exploration of what is problematic about incoherent beliefs and intentions.
Buss, Sarah . 2020. “Reflections on the Relation between Reason and the Will.” In Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, in Ruth Chang Kurt Sylvan (eds.). New York: Routledge: 196–213.
Buss, Sarah . 2021a. “Personal Ideal and the Ideal of Rational Agency.” Unpublished Manuscript.
Buss, Sarah . 2021b. “Norms of Rationality and the Superficial Unity of the Mind.” Unpublished Manuscript.
Conee, Earl . 1982. “Against Moral Dilemmas.” Philosophical Review 91(1): 87–97.
Frankfurt, Harry . 1988. “The Importance of What We Care About.” Chap. 7 in The Importance of What We Care About, 80–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hedden, Brian . 2015. “Time-Slice Rationality.” Mind 124(494): 449–491.
Kiesewetter, Benjamin . 2017. The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kolodny, Niko . 2003. “How Does Coherence Matter?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58(3): 229–263.
Kolodny, Niko . 2005. “Why Be Rational?” Mind 114(455): 509–563.

Korsgaard, Christine . 1996. Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Loyd, Errol . 2018. The Importance of Being Rational. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, John . 1979. “Virtue and Reason.” The Monist 62(3): 331–350.
Marcus, Ruth . 1980. “Moral Dilemmas and Consistency.” Journal of Philosophy 77(3): 121–136.
Raz, Joseph . 2005. “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1(1): 1–19.
Ross, W. D. 1939. Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tessman, Lisa . 2015. Moral Failure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Titelbaum, Michael . 2015. “Continuing On.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5–6): 670–691.
Wikipedia. “Alien-Hand-Syndrome.” https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alien-Hand-Syndrom
Woodard, Elise . Forthcoming. “A Puzzle about Fickleness.” Nous.
Worsnip, Alex . 2021. Fitting Things Together. Unpublished manuscript.

Agency and the emotions

Scarantino Andrea . (2017). “Do Emotions Cause Actions, and If So How?” Emotion Review, 9(4): 326–334. The essay criticizes two arguments against the view that emotions cause action, and argues that they can help us better understand what a theory of the causal connection between emotions and actions should explain.
Tappolet, Christine . (2016). Emotions, Values, and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This is a defense of the perceptual theory of emotions, according to which emotions are perceptual experiences of values. It argues that emotions play a crucial role in our grasp of practical reasons, and more generally in human agency, and provides an account of the way emotions are tied to moral responsibility that departs from the response-dependent varieties of the Strawsonian approach to moral responsibility.
Hufendiek, Rebekka . (2016). Embodied Emotions: A Naturalist Approach to a Normative Phenomenon. London: Routledge. This study explores emotions as embodied, action-oriented representations, providing a non-cognitivist theory of emotions that accounts for their normative dimensions.
Frijda, Nico . (2004). “Emotions and Action.” In A. Manstead , N. Frijda , and A. Fischer (Eds.), Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium (Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction: 158–173). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This chapter discusses the relationships between emotion and action. First, it argues that motivation for action is part and parcel of what we mean by emotions. Second, it establishes the conditions under which those motivations do and do not actually lead to action.
DeLancey, C. (2002). Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This is a defense of the affect program theory that purports to shed light on the rationality of emotions and their role in autonomous agency, by using AI, and argues that emotions suggest a new approach to the challenges of the study of the mind and AI, whose primary topic is autonomy.
Annas, Julia , Narvaez, Darcia and Snow, Nancy E. (eds.) (2016). Developing the Virtues: Integrating Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bagnoli, C. (ed.) (2011a). Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
Bagnoli, C. (2011b). Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Moral Reasons. In Bagnoli (2011a): 62–81.
Baier, Annette . (1986). Trust and antitrust. Ethics 96 (2): 231–260.
Baier, Annette . (1991). Unsafe Loves. In The Philosophy of Erotic Love, ed. R. C. Solomon and K. M. Higgins . Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 1991: 433–450.
Borgwald, Kristin . (2012). Women’s Anger, Epistemic Personhood, and Self-respect: An Application of Lehrer’s Work on Self-trust. Philosophical Studies 161 (1): 69–76.
Brady, Michael S. (2009). The Irrationality of Recalcitrant Emotions. Philosophical Studies 145 (3): 413–430.
Brady, Michael S. (2011). Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons. In Bagnoli (2011a): 135–148.
Brady, Michael S. (2013). Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Browning, Gary (ed.) (2018). Truth and Love. Heidelberg/New York: Springer.
Colombetti, G. (2014). The Feeling Body. Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Darwall, Stephen . (1977). Two kinds of respect. Ethics 88 (1): 36–49.
Darwall, Stephen . (1998). Empathy, Sympathy, Care. Philosophical Studies 89(2–3): 261–282.
Darwin, Charles . (1872 [1998]). The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Introduction, Notes and Commentaries by Paul Ekman . London: Harper Collins.
Decety, J. and Jackson, P.L. (2004). The Functional Architecture of Human Empathy. Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews 3(2): 71–100.

Deonna, Julien A. and Teroni, Fabrice . (2012). The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. Abingdon: Routledge.
De Sousa, Ronald . (1987). The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
De Sousa, Ronald . (1988). Emotion and Self-deception. In Perspectives on Self-Deception, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Amelie O. Rorty . Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Dillon, Robin S. (ed.) (1994). Dignity, Character and Self-Respect. New York: Routledge.
Döring, S. (2003). Explaining Action by Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53(211): 14–30.
Döring, S. (2007). Seeing what to do: Affective perception and rational motivation. Dialectica 61 (3): 363–394.
Elster, Jon . (1999). Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Faulkner, Paul and Simpson, Thomas W. (eds.) (2017). The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (2004). Reasons of Love. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goldie, P. (2000). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Greenspan, Patricia S. (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Griffiths, Paul E. (1997). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Griffiths, P. E. and Scarantino, A. (2009). Emotions in the Wild: The Situated Perspective on Emotion. In The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, ed. P. Robbins and M. Aydede . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 437–453.
Gross, J. J. (2015). Emotion Regulation: Current Status and Future Prospects. Psychological Inquiry 26: 1–26.
Helm, Bennet W. (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hutto, Daniel . (2006). Unprincipled Engagement. Emotional Experience, Expression and Response. In Radical Enactivism, ed. R. Menary . Amsterdam: Benjamins: 13–38.
Hutto, Daniel . (2012). Truly Enactive Emotion. Emotion Review 4(2): 176–182.
James, W. (1890/1983). The Principles of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Jones, Karen . (2004). Emotional Rationality as Practical Rationality. In Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers, ed. Cheshire Calhoun . Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 18.
Lambie, J. A. (2009). Emotional Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge. Emotion Review 1: 272–280.
Mackenzie, Catriona . (2002). Critical reflection, self-knowledge, and the emotions. Philosophical Explorations 5 (3): 186–206.
McGeer . (2008). Trust, Hope and Empowerment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2): 237–254.
Moran, Richard A. (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Morton, Adam . (2013). Emotions and Imagination. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Murdoch, Iris . (1970). The Sovereignty of the Good. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Novitz, David . (1998). Forgiveness and Self-Respect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58(2): 299–315.
Nozick, Robert . (1989). The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Railton, Peter . (2016). “At the Core of Our Capacity to Act for a Reason: The Affective System and Evaluative Model-Based Learning and Control,” Emotion Review, (9/3): 1–8.
Roberts, R. C. (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, Amélie O. (ed.) (1980). Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rorty, Amélie O. (1987). The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 399–412.
Rorty, Amélie O. (1998). The Political Sources of the Emotions: Greed and Anger. Philosophical Studies, 1998: 143–159.
Scarantino, Andrea and De Sousa, Ronald (2018). Emotion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta , URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/emotion/
Shargel, Daniel and Prinz, Jesse . (2018). An Enactivist Theory of Emotional Content. In The Ontology of Emotions, in Hichem Naar and Fabrice Teroni (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 110–129.

Slaby, Jan , and Wüschner, Philipp . (2014). Emotion and Agency. In Emotion and Value, eds. S. Roeser , and C. Todd . Oxford: Oxford University Press: 212–228.
Slote, Michael . (2007). The Ethics of Care and Empathy. Abingdon: Routledge.
Snow, Nancy E. (2006). Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9(5): 545–561.
Solomon, Robert C. (1999). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Philosophical Review 108(1): 131.
Solomon, Robert C. (2004). Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as Engagements with the World. In Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion, ed. R. C. Solomon . Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press: 76–88.
Strawson, P. (1962/1974). Freedom and Resentment. Chap. 1 in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. London: Methuen: 1–25.
Tappolet, Christine . (2010). Emotion, Motivation and Action: The Case of Fear. In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Goldie Peter : 325–345.
Tappolet, Christine . (2011). Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects. In Bagnoli (2011a): 117–134.
Taylor, Jacqueline . (2011). Moral Sentiments and the Sources of Moral Identity. In Bagnoli (2011a): 257–274.
Varela, Francisco J. , Thompson, Evan and Rosch, Eleanor . (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
Walker, Margaret Urban . (2006). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Bernard . (1993). Shame and Necessity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Zahavi, Dan . (2014). Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Diachronic agency

Bratman M. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bratman M. (2007). Structures of Agency. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M. (2018). Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
A series of seminal books on planning agency as our characteristic form of diachronic agency; see also the 'Planning agency' entry in this volume.
Kauppinen, A. (2022). "Against Seizing the Day." Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 11.
Setiya, K. (2014). "The Midlife Crisis." Philosophers' Imprint 14(31): 1–18.
Two papers debating the implications of the distinction between telic and atelic ends for the meaningfulness of our pursuits and existence.
Ferrero L. (2015). "Agency, Scarcity, and Mortality." The Journal of Ethics 19(3–4): 349–378.
Hägglund, M. (2014). "Chronolibido," in A. Mukherjee and L. Marcus (Eds.), A Concise Companion to Psychoanalysis, Literature, and Culture: 312–327.
Scheffler S. "Fear, Death, and Confidence," In S. Scheffler and N. Kolodny (Eds.), Death and the Afterlife. New York: Oxford University Press: 83–112.
Three papers discussing the relationship between our diachronic agency, temporal goods, and mortality.
Altshuler, R. (2021). "Agency, Narrative, and Mortality," this volume.
Andreou, C. (2021). "Agency, Time, and Rationality," this volume.
Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M. (2007). Structures of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M. (2021). "Planning Agency," this volume.
Brewer, T. (2009). The Retrieval of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bykvist, K. (2013). "Time and Morality." In H. Dyke and A. Bardon (Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell: 549–562.
Callard, A. (2018). Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow. The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York, NY: Harper and Row.
Dorsey, D. (2017). "Future-Bias: A (Qualified) Defense." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98: 351–373.
Dyke, H. (2013). "Time and Tense." In H. Dyke and A. Bardon (Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell: 328–344.

Ferrero, L. (2009a). “Conditional Intentions.” Noûs 43(4): 700–741.
Ferrero, L. (2009b). “What Good Is a Diachronic Will?” Philosophical Studies 144(3): 403–430.
Ferrero, L. (2010). “Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor.” Philosophers’ Imprint 10(2): 1–23.
Ferrero, L. (2015). “Agency, Scarcity, and Mortality.” The Journal of Ethics 19(3–4): 349–378.
Ferrero, L. (2016). “Pro-Tempore Disjunctive Intentions.” In R. Altshuler and M. J. Sigrist (Eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Abingdon: Routledge: 108–123.
Ferrero, L. (2022). “The Structures of Temporally Extended Agents.” In C. Bagnoli (Ed.), Time in Action: The Temporal Structure of Rational Agency and Practical Thought. Abingdon: Routledge.
Fischer, J. M. (1994). “Why Immortality Is Not So Bad.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2(2): 257–270.
Hare, C. (2013). “Time – The Emotional Asymmetry.” In H. Dyke and A. Bardon (Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell: 507–520.
Holton, R. (2009). Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kauppinen, A. (2015). “Meaningfulness.” In G. Fletcher (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being. Abingdon: Routledge.
Kauppinen, A. (2018). “Agency, Experience, and Future Bias.” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7(4): 237–245.
Kauppinen, A. (2020). “Prudence, Sunk Costs, and the Temporally Extended Self.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 17(6):658–681
Kauppinen A. (2022). “Against Seizing the Day.” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 11.
Kelly, T. (2004). “Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the Past.” Noûs 38(1): 60–85.
Ludwig, K. (2015). “What Are Conditional Intentions?” Methode: Analytic Perspectives 4(6): 30–60.
Millgram, E. (2020). “Practical Reason and the Structure of Actions.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition).
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/practical-reason-action/.
Morton, J. M. (2017). “Reasoning under Scarcity.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(3): 543–559
Nguyen, C. T. (2020). “The Arts of Action.” Philosophers’ Imprint 20(14): 1–27.
Paul, L. A. (2014). Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rödl, S. (2010). “The Form of the Will.” In Tenenbaum, S. (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 138–160
Rödl, S. (2011). “Two Forms of Practical Knowledge and Their Unity.” In A. Ford , J. Hornsby , and F. Stoutland (Eds.), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 211–241.
Scheffler, S. (2013). Death and the Afterlife. New York: Oxford University Press.
Setiya, K. (2014). “The Midlife Crisis.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14(31): 1–18.
Sullivan, M. (2018). Time Biases: A Theory of Rational Planning and Personal Persistence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tenenbaum, S. (2010). “The Vice of Procrastination.” In C. Andreou and M. White (Eds.), The Thief of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 151–164.

Planning agency

Bratman, M.E. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Develops planning model of individual temporally extended agency.
Bratman, M.E. 2014. Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. New York: Oxford University Press. Develops planning model of shared intentional agency.
Harman, G. 1976. “Practical Reasoning,” Review of Metaphysics 29/3: 431–463. Introduces the importance of planning to intention and practical reasoning.
Millgram, E. 2014. “Segmented Agency,” in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe (eds.) Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. New York: Oxford University Press: 152–189. Challenges the planning theory’s approach to the unity of our agency.
Velleman, J.D. 2014. “What Good Is a Will?” in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe (eds.) Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. New York: Oxford University Press. Challenges the idea that intentions are practical commitments that are not belief-like attitudes.
Alonso, F. (2020) “Planning on a Prior Intention,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18:3: 229–265.
Alonso, F. (2021) “The Limits of Partial Doxasticism,” Philosophical Quarterly. doi: 10.1093/pq/pqab027
Anscombe, G.E.M. (2000) Intention, Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Originally published 1957)

Baier, A.C. (1997) “Doing Things with Others: The Mental Commons,” in L. Alanen , S. Heinämaa , and T. Wallgren , eds., Commonality and Particularity in Ethics. London: MacMillan.
Bratman, M.E. (1987) Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Re-issued CSLI Publications 1999.)
Bratman, M.E. (1999a) “Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context,” in M.E. Bratman ed., Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (1999b) “Davidson’s Theory of Intention” in M.E. Bratman ed., Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (1999c) “I Intend that We J,” in M.E. Bratman ed., Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (2007) “Three Theories of Self-Governance,” in M.E. Bratman ed., Structures of Agency. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (2014) Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (2017) “A Planning Theory of Self-Governance: Reply to Franklin,” Philosophical Explorations 20: 15–20.
Bratman, M.E. (2018a) “Introduction: The Planning Framework,” in M.E. Bratman ed., Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (2018b) “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” in M.E. Bratman ed., Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (2018c) “Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance,” in M.E. Bratman ed., Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (2018d) “Agency, Time, and Sociality,” in M.E. Bratman ed., Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (2018e) “A Planning Agent’s Self-Governance Over Time,” in M.E. Bratman ed., Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (forthcoming) Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. , Israel, D. and Pollack, M. (1988), “Plans and Resource-Bounded Practical Reasoning,” Computational Intelligence 4: 349–355.
Broome, J. (2001) “Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?’ in C. W. Morris and A. Ripstein , eds., Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapman, E. (2020) “Shared Agency and the Ethics of Democracy,” Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Philosophy. 18, Issue 2: 705–732.
Davidson, D. (1980a) Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (1980b) “Intending,” in D. Davidson ed., Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press.
Ferrero, L. (2009) “What Good is a Diachronic Will?” Philosophical Studies 144: 403–430.
Ferrero, L. (2014) “Diachronic Structural Rationality,” Inquiry 57: 311–336.
Frankfurt, H. (1988a) “The Problem of Action,” in H. Frankfurt ed., The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1988b) “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in H. Frankfurt ed., The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gibbard, A. (2003) Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gilbert, M. (1990) “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon,” Midwest Studies 15: 1–14.
Gold, N. (2018) “Putting Willpower into Decision Theory: The Person as a Team Over Time and Intrapersonal Team Reasoning,” in J. Bermúdez , ed., Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harman, G. (1976) “Practical Reasoning,” Review of Metaphysics 29(3): 431–463.
Holton, R. (2009) Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hume, D. (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knobe, J. (2003) “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language,” Analysis 63: 190–193.
Lavin, D. (2016) “Action as a form of temporal unity: on Anscombe’s Intention,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45: 609–629.
Millgram, E. (2014) “Segmented Agency,” in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe , eds., Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. New York: Oxford University Press: 152–189.
Millgram, Elijah . (2019) “Review of Planning, Time, and Self-Governance,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2019.05.15.
Murray, D. and Buchak, L. (2019) “Risk and Motivation: When the Will Is Required to Determine What to Do,” Philosophers’ Imprint 19(16): 1–12.

Nefsky, J. and Tenenbaum, S. (forthcoming) “Extended Agency and the Problem of Diachronic Autonomy,” in Carla Bagnoli , ed., Time in Action. New York: Routledge.
Núñez, C. (2019) “Requirements of Intention in Light of Belief,” Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01321-0.
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Paul, S. (2009) “How We Know What We’re Doing,” Philosophers’ Imprint 9(11):1–24.
Paul, S. (2014) “Diachronic Incontinence is a Problem in Moral Philosophy,” Inquiry 57: 337–355.
Setiya, K. (2004) “Explaining Action,” Philosophical Review 112: 339–393.
Shapiro, S. (2011) Legality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Simon, H. (1983) Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Snedegar, J. (2018) “Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly early view doi:10.1111/papq.12262.
Stoutland, F. (2002) “Critical Notice of *Faces of Intention* ,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 238–240.
Tenenbaum, S. (2016) “Reconsidering Intentions,” NOÛS 52: 443–472.
van Hees, M. , & Roy, O. (2008). “Intentions and Plans in Decision and Game Theory,” in B. Verbeek , ed., Reasons and Intentions. Farnham: Ashgate: 207–225.
Velleman, J.D. (1989) Practical Reflection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (Re-issued CSLI Publications 2007).
Velleman, J.D. (2000) “How to Share an Intention,” in J.D. Velleman , ed., The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Velleman, J.D. (2014) “What Good Is a Will?” in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe , eds., Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. New York: Oxford University Press.
Yaffe, G. (2000) Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Agency, time, and rationality

Andreou, Chrisoula . (2017). ‘Dynamic Choice,’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/dynamic-choice/. This entry reviews challenges to rational choice posed by the fact that choices are spread out over time.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1984) ‘Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command,’ in Thomas C. Schelling (ed.), Choice and Consequence. London: Harvard University Press.
This essay explores the idea of self-command or self-management given fragmentation involving “alternating values that are incompatible or uncompromisable” (86).
Ainslie, George . 2001. Breakdown of Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Andreou, Chrisoula . 2012. ‘Self-Defeating Self-Governance,’ Philosophical Issues 22: 20–34.
Bratman, Michael . 2014. ‘Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint,’ Inquiry 57: 293–310.
Bratman, Michael .. 2012. ‘Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance,’ Philosophical Issues 22: 73–88.
Bratman, Michael .. 1999. ‘Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention,’ in Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Broome, John . 2000. ‘Incommensurable Values,’ in Well-Being and Morality, ed. Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chang, Ruth . 2002. ‘The Possibility of Parity,’ Ethics 112: 659–688.
Ferrero, Luca . 2012. ‘Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality,’ Philosophical Issues 22: 144–164.
Gauthier, David . 1994. ‘Assure and Threaten,’ Ethics 194: 690–721.
Greene, Preston , and Meghan Sullivan . 2015. ‘Against Time Bias,’ Ethics 125: 947–970.
Holton, Richard . 2009. Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kavka, G. S. 1983. ‘The Toxin Puzzle,’ Analysis 43: 33–36.
Nagel, Thomas . 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Parfit, Derek . 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2019. Opting for the Best. New York: Oxford University Press.
Raz, Joseph . 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Artificial and machine agency

Bratman, Michael E. , David Israel , and Martha Pollack . 1988 “Plans and resource-bounded practical reasoning.” Computational Intelligence, 4: 349–355.

Broersen, Jan N. , Mehdi Dastani , Joris Hulstijn , Zisheng Huang , and Leendert van der Torre . 2001. “The BOID architecture: Conflicts between beliefs, obligations, intentions, and desires.” In Elisabeth André , Sandip Sen , Claude Frasson , and Jörg P. Müller , editors, Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS-01): 9–16. ACM Press.

Pollack, Martha , and John F. Horty . 1999. “There is more to life than making plans: Plan management in dynamic, multi-agent environments.” The AI Magazine, 20(4): 71–84.

Thomason, Richmond H. 2000. “Desires and defaults: A framework for planning with inferred goals.” In Anthony G. Cohn , Fausto Giunchiglia , and Bart Selman , editors, KR2000: Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: 702–713. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco.

Wooldridge, Michael J. 2000. Reasoning about Rational Agents. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Agre, Philip E. 1995. “Computational research on interaction and agency.” Artificial Intelligence 72(1–2): 1–52.

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958. Intention. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.

Blum, Avrim L. and Merrick L. Furst . 1997. “Fast planning through planning graph analysis.” Artificial Intelligence 90 (1–2): 281–300.

Bratman, Michael E. 1987. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.

Bratman, Michael E. , David Israel , and Martha Pollack . 1988 “Plans and resource-bounded practical reasoning.” Computational Intelligence 4: 349–355.

Broersen, Jan N. , Mehdi Dastani , Joris Hulstijn , Zisheng Huang , and Leendert van der Torre . 2001. “The BOID architecture: Conflicts between beliefs, obligations, intentions, and desires.” In Elisabeth André , Sandip Sen , Claude Frasson , and Jörg P. Müller , eds. Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS-01): 9–16. ACM Press.

Broersen, Jan N. , Mehdi Dastani , Joris Hulstijn , and Leendert van der Torre . 2002. “Goal generation in the BOID architecture.” Cognitive Science Quarterly 2 (3–4): 428–447.

Broersen, Jan N. , Mehdi Dastani , and Leon van der Torre . 2005. “Beliefs, obligations, intentions and desires as components in agent architectures.” International Journal of Intelligent Systems 20(9): 893–919.

Calvo, Rafael A. , Sidney K. D’Mello , Jonathan Gratch , and Arvid Kappas , eds. 2015. Oxford Handbook of Affective Computing. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Cohen, Philip R. , and Hector J. Levesque . 1990. “Intention is choice with commitment.” Artificial Intelligence 42(3): 213–261.

Doherty, Patrick , and James Kvarnström . 2008. “Temporal action logics.” In Frank van Harmelen , Vladimir Lifschitz , and Bruce Porter , eds, Handbook of Knowledge Representation: 709–757. Elsevier, Amsterdam.

Erol, Kutluhan , James Hendler , and Dana Nau . 1996. “Complexity results for HTN planning.” Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 18(1): 69–93.

Fikes, Richard E. , and Nils J. Nilsson . 1971. “Strips: A new approach to the application of theorem proving to problem solving.” Artificial Intelligence 2(3–4): 189–208.

Gigerenzer, Gerd , and Reinhard Selten , editors. 2002. Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Hobbs, Jerry R. 1990. “Granularity.” In Daniel S. Weld and Johan de Kleer , eds. Qualitative Reasoning about Physical Systems: 542–545. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA.

Horty, John F. 2012. Reasons as Defaults. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Horty, John F. , and Martha E. Pollack . 2000. “Evaluating new options in the context of existing plans.” Artificial Intelligence 127(2): 199–220.

Laird, John E. , Christian Lebiere , and Paul S. Rosenbloom . 2017. “A standard model of the mind: Toward a common computational framework across artificial intelligence, cognitive science, neuroscience, and robotics.” The AI Magazine 38(4): 13–26.

Miller, George A. , Eugene Galantner , and Karl H. Pribham . 1960. Plans and the Structure of Behavior. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York.

Newell, Allen . 1992. Unified Theories of Cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Newell, Allan , and Herbert A. Simon . 1963. “GPS, a program that simulates human thought.” In Edward Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman , eds. Computers and Thought: 279–293. McGraw-Hill, New York.

Nilsson, Nils J. 2010. The Quest for Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Pollack, Martha . 1992. “The uses of plans.” Artificial Intelligence 57(1): 43–68.

Pollack, Martha , and John F. Horty . 1999. “There is more to life than making plans: Plan management in dynamic, multi-agent environments.” The AI Magazine 20(4): 71–84.

Pollack, Martha , and Marc Ringuette . 1990. “Introducing the tileworld: Experimentally evaluating agent architectures.” In Thomas Dietterich and William Swartout , eds. Proceedings of the Eighth National

Conference on Artificial Intelligence: 183–189, Menlo Park, California. American Association for Artificial Intelligence, AAAI Press.
Reiter, Raymond . 2001. Knowledge in Action: Logical Foundations for Specifying and Implementing Dynamical Systems. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Russell, Stuart , and Peter Norvig . 2009. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 3rd edition.
Russell, Stuart , and Eric Wefald . 1991. Do the Right Thing. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Salvucci, Dario D. 2016. “ACT-R and beyond.” In Susan E.F. Chipman , editor, The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Science: 15–26. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Shanahan, Murray P. 2006. “A cognitive architecture that combines internal simulation with a global workspace.” Consciousness and Cognition 15(2): 433–449.
Thomason, Richmond H. 2000. “Desires and defaults: A framework for planning with inferred goals.” In Anthony G. Cohn , Fausto Giunchiglia , and Bart Selman , editors, KR2000: Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: 702–713. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco.
Weld, Daniel S. 1994. “An introduction to least commitment planning.” The AI Magazine 14(4): 27–61.
Wooldridge, Michael J. 2000. Reasoning about Rational Agents. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Agency and personal identity

Korsgaard, C. M. 1989. Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18(2), 103–131.
Korsgaard is one of the central defenders of the agential identity view, who offers a slightly different version and defense of the view than Frankfurt does.
Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
This book offers a detailed argument for Korsgaard’s mature view of the nature of agential unity and provides a strong example of the agential identity view.
Marino, P. 2011. ‘Ambivalence, Valuational Inconsistency, and the Divided Self,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83(1), 14–71.
This paper is a good example of a strain of philosophical thought that rejects the claim that agents must be strongly unified for slightly different reasons than I do.
Frankfurt, H. , 1988a. ‘The Importance of What We Care About.’ Chap. 7 in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 80–94.
Frankfurt, H. , 1988b. ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness.’ Chap. 12 in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 159–176.
Lewis, D. , 1983. Philosophical Papers Vol. i (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. , 1975. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P. H. Nidditch , ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. , 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perry, J. , 1975. Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Shoemaker, S. 1984. ‘Personal Identity: a Materialist’s Account’ in Shoemaker, S. and Swinburne, S . eds., Personal Identity: Great Debates in Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell: 57–132.

Agency, narrative, and mortality

Atkins, K. , Mackenzie, C. (Eds.), 2008. Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge, New York.
Key work in the transition from a focus on metaphysical to practical identity, with a helpful introduction.
Hutto, D. (Ed.), 2007. Narrative and Understanding Persons. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
A collection of important essays by both prominent critics and proponents of narrative identity.
Ricoeur, P. , 1992. Oneself as Another. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Along with Ricoeur’s earlier work on narrative, this is a founding source for work on narrative identity.
Stokes, P. , 2015. The Naked Self. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Critically examines how Kierkegaard can shed light on narrative and identity.
Altshuler, R. , 2015a. Teleology, Narrative, and Death, in: Stokes, P. , Lippitt, J. (Eds.), Narrative, Identity and the Kierkegaardian Self. Edinburgh University Press, Edingburgh, pp. 29–45.

Altshuler, R. , 2015b. Free Will, Narrative, and Retroactive Self-Constitution. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14, 867–883.
Altshuler, R. , 2015c. Immortality, Identity, and Desirability, in: Cholbi, M. (Ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. Rowman & Littlefield, Lantham, MD, pp. 191–203.
Altshuler, R. , 2013. Practical Necessity and the Constitution of Character, in: Herrera, C.D. , Perry, A. (Eds.), The Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, pp. 40–53.
Atkins, K. , 2008. Narrative Identity and Moral Identity: A Practical Perspective, 1st ed. Routledge, New York.
Behrendt, K. , 2016. Learning to Be Dead: The Narrative Problem of Mortality, in: Cholbi, M. (Ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. Rowman & Littlefield, Lantham, MD, pp. 157–172.
Bevir, M. , 2000. Historical Explanation, Folk Psychology, and Narrative. Philosophical Explorations 3, 152–168.
Bratman, M. , 2000. Reflection, Planning , and Temporally Extended Agency . The Philosophical Review 109, 35–61.
Burley, M. , 2009. Immortality and Meaning: Reflections on the Makropulos Debate. Philosophy 84, 529.
Carr, D. , 1991. Time, Narrative, and History. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN.
Carroll, N. , 2007. Narrative Closure . Philosophical Studies 135, 1–15.
Chappell, T. , 2009. Infinity Goes Up On Trial: Must Immortality be Meaningless? European Journal of Philosophy 17, 30–44.
Currie, G. , 2010. Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Davenport, J.J. , 2012. Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality: From Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard, 1 ed. Routledge, New York.
Dennett, D.C. , 1992. The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity, in: Kessel, F.S. , Cole, P.M. , Johnson, D.L. (Eds.), Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 103–115.
Ferrero, L. , 2015. Agency, Scarcity, and Mortality. Journal of Ethics 19, 349–378.
Fischer, J.M. , 2009. Free Will, Death and Immortality: The Role of Narrative, Chap. 9 in Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 145–164.
Frankfurt, H. , 1971. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1), 5–20.
Frankfurt, H. , 1992. The Faintest Passion. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66, 5–16.
Goldie, P. , 2009. Narrative Thinking , Emotion, and Planning. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67, 97–106.
Heidegger, M. , 1996. Being and Time. SUNY Press, Albany.
Korsgaard, C. , 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Korsgaard, C. , 1989. Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit. Philosophy & Public Affairs 18, 101–132.
Lippitt, J. , 2007. Getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard, MacIntyre and Some Problems with Narrative. Inquiry 50, 34–69.
Lumsden, D. and Ulatowski, J. , 2017. One Self per Customer? From Disunified Agency to Disunified Self. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 55, 314–335.
MacIntyre, A.C. , 2007. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN.
Malpas, J. , 1998. Death and the Unity of a Life, in: Solomon, R.C. and Malpas, J. (Eds.), Death and Philosophy. Routledge, New York, pp. 120–134.
Nussbaum, M.C. , 1989. Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Nature. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, 303–351.
Parfit, D. , 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rudd, A. , 2007. In Defence of Narrative. European Journal of Philosophy 17, 60–75.
Sartre, J.-P. , 2012. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Washington Square Press, New York.
Schechtman, M. , 2011. The Narrative Self, in: Gallagher, S. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Schechtman, M. , 1996. The Constitution of Selves. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Scheffler, S. , 2013. Death and the Afterlife. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Schroer, J.W. and Schroer, R. , 2014. Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 171, 445–469.
Strawson, G. , 2004. Against Narrativity . Ratio XVII, 428–452.
Velleman, J.D. , 2009. How We Get Along. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Velleman, J.D. , 2006. The Self as Narrator, Chap. 8 in Self to Self. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 203–223.

Velleman, J.D. , 2003. Narrative Explanation . The Philosophical Review 112, 1–25.
Velleman, J.D. , 2002. Identification and Identity, in: Buss, S. and Overton, L. (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 91–123.
Velleman, J.D. , 2000. Well-Being and Time, in: The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 56–84.
Velleman, J.D. , 1992. What Happens When Someone Acts? Mind 101, 461–481.
Ward, D. , 2019. Moving Stories: Agency, Emotion and Practical Rationality, in: Candiotto, L. (Ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer International Publishing, New York, pp. 145–176.
Williams, B. , 1973. The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality, in: Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 82–100.

Agency, reasons and rationality

Alvarez, M. , 2010, Kinds of Reasons: An Essay on the Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. A detailed study of various kinds of reasons and their role in justifying, motivating and explaining action.
Dancy, J. , 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. A spirited defence of non-psychologism about reasons based on the connection between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should.
Davidson, D. , 1963, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, The Journal of Philosophy, 60 (23): 685–700. The locus classicus for the claim that the reasons that explain an action are mental states of agents that also cause the action
Parfit, D. , 1997, ‘Reasons and Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 71: 99–129. A helpful introduction to the distinction between normative and motivating reasons, and to some issues concerning their relation to each other.
Raz, J. , 1999, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. An examination of central themes about reason, thought and action, such as the nature of normativity, reason, the will and value.
Alvarez, M. , 2010, Kinds of Reasons: An Essay on the Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Audi, R. , 2001, The Architecture of Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baier, K. , 1958, The Moral Point of View, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Dancy, J. , 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dancy, J. , 2014, ‘On Knowing One’s Own Reasons’, in Littlejohn Turri (eds.), 2014: 81–96.
Darwall, S. , 2003, ‘Desires, Reasons and Causes’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 435–443.
Davidson, D. , 1963, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, The Journal of Philosophy, 60 (23): 685–700; repr. in his 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 3–21.
Hirstein, B. , 2009, ‘Confabulation’, in The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, T. Bayne , A. Cleeremans , and P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press: 174–177.
Hornsby, J. , 2007, ‘Knowledge, Belief, and Reasons for Acting’, in Explaining the Mental, C. Penco , M. Beaney , M. Vignolo (eds.), Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 88–105.
Hyman, J. , 1999, ‘How Knowledge Works’, Philosophical Quarterly, 49 (197): 433–451.
Hyman, J. , 2015, Action, Knowledge, and Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kolodny, N. , 2005, ‘Why Be Rational?’ Mind, 114 (455): 509–563.
Korsgaard, C. , 1996, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Littlejohn and J. Turri (eds.), 2014, Epistemic Norms, New Essays on Action, Belief and Assertion, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. , 2003, Motivation and Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. , 1997, ‘Reasons and Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 71: 99–129.
Parfit, D. , 2001, ‘Rationality and Reasons’, in Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values, D. Egonsson , J. Josefsson , B. Petersson and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Ashgate: 19–39.
Raz, J. , 1975, Practical Reasoning and Norms, London: Hutchinson & Co., reprinted, Oxford University Press, 1990 and 1999.
Raz, J. , 1999, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, M. , 1994, The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.
The Supreme Court, [2019] UKSC 41. JUDGMENT. R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant)v The Prime Minister (Respondent)Cherry and others (Respondents) v Advocate General for Scotland (Appellant)

(Scotland).
Unger, P. , 1975, Ignorance. A Case for Scepticism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Williams, B.A.O. , 1979, ‘Internal and External Reasons’, reprinted in his 1981, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 101–113.
Williams, B.A.O. , 1989, ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame’, in reprinted in his 1995, Making Sense of Humanity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 35–45.
Williamson, T. , 2017, ‘Acting on Knowledge’, in J.A. Carter , E. Gordon , and B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 163–181.

Agency and practical reasoning

Arpaly, N. , and Schroeder, T. (2012). Deliberation and Acting for Reasons. Philosophical Review, 121(2), 209–239.
They argue against the widespread claim that reasoning is crucial to responding to reasons. Instead, they show that reasoning is but one—relatively powerful—tool that allows us to track the reasons we have.
Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
A central book, not just for the novel and groundbreaking account of intentions, but also for the claim that intentions are not just outputs, but also distinctive inputs of practical reasoning. Chapter 3 is central.
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality through Reasoning. Wiley-Blackwell.
This book offers the most systematic account of reasoning to date. Readers should prioritize chapters 9, 10, 13, and 14.
Korsgaard, C. M. (1997). The Normativity of Instrumental Reason, in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 215–254.
Korsgaard lays out a challenge to instrumentalism that animated much of the subsequent debate.
Raz, J. (2005). The Myth of Instrumental Rationality. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 1(1), 1–28.
A key paper in laying out the rejection of distinctive normativity of rational requirements.
Arpaly, N. , and Schroeder, T. (2012). Deliberation and Acting for Reasons. Philosophical Review, 121(2): 209–239.
Bratman, M. (1981). Intention and Means-End. Philosophical Review, 90(2): 252–265.
Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M. (2009). Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-governance. Ethics, 119(3): 411–443.
Bratman, M. (2012). Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance. Philosophical Issues, 22(1): 73–88.
Broome, J. (2007). Wide or Narrow Scope. Mind, 116: 359–370.
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality through Reasoning. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brunero, J. (2013). Rational Akrasia. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu, 20(4): 546–566.
Dancy, J. (2018). Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (2001a). Agency. In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 43–62.
Davidson, D. (2001b). Intending. In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 83–102.
Fogal, D. (2020). Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure. Mind, 129(516): 1033–1070.
Ford, A. (2018). The Province of Human Agency. Noûs, 52(3): 672–697.
Harman, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kolodny, N. (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind, 114(455): 509–563.
Kolodny, N. (2008a). The Myth of Practical Consistency. European Journal of Philosophy, 16(3): 366–402.
Kolodny, N. (2008b). Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent? Ethics, 118(3): 437–463.
Korsgaard, C. M. (1997). The Normativity of Instrumental Reason, in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 215–254.
Korsgaard, C. M. (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. New York: Oxford University Press.
McHugh, C. , and Way, J. (2018). What Is Good Reasoning? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(1): 153–174.
Morton, J. M. (2010). Toward an Ecological Theory of The Norms of Practical Deliberation. European Journal of Philosophy, 19(4): 561–584.
Morton, J. M. (2017). Reasoning under Scarcity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(3): 543–559.
Mullainathan, S. , and Shafir, E. (2013). Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Raz, J. (2005). The Myth of Instrumental Rationality. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 1(1): 1–28.
Scanlon, T. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Schroeder, M. (2004). The Scope of Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 337–364.
Velleman, J. D. (2000). What Happens When Someone Acts? The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 123–143.
Way, J. (2010). Defending the Wide-scope Approach to Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Studies, 147(2): 213–233.

Agency and normativity

Katsafanas, Paul . 2018. “Constitutivism about Practical Reasons,” in Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (New York: Oxford University Press).
Millgram, Elijah . 2016. “Practical Reason and the Structure of Actions,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 ed) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/practical-reason-action/>.
Paakkunainen, Hille . 2017. “Normativity and Agency,” in Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (London: Routledge).
Each of these offers an excellent overview of similar terrain from a slightly different point of view.
Burge, Tyler . 1979. “Individualism and the Mental,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121.
Enoch, David . 2006. “Agency, Shmagency,” Philosophical Review 115(2): 169–198.
Enoch, David . 2011. “Shmagency Revisited,” in Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics (London: Palgrave-Macmillan).
Ferrero, Luca . 2009. “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency,” in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4: 303–333.
Ferrero, Luca . 2018. “Inescapability Revisited,” Manuscrito 41: 4.
Giddens, Anthony . 1979. “Structure, Agency,” in Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
Haslanger, Sally . 2016. “What Is a (Social) Structural Explanation?,” Philosophical Studies 173(1): 113–130.
Katsafanas, Paul . 2013. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press).
Korsgaard, Christine M. 2009. Self-Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press).
Lavin, Douglas . 2017. “Forms of Rational Agency,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80: 171–193.
Millgram, Elijah . 2010. “Pluralism about Action,” in Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (eds), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell).
Millgram, Eljiah . 2015. The Great Endarkenment (New York: Oxford University Press).
Putnam, Hilary . 1975. “The Meaning of Meaning,” in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: Mind, Language, and Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press).
Rosati, Connie . 2016. “Agents and ‘Shmagents’,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11: 113–182.
Setiya, Kieran . 2007. Reasons without Rationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Silverstein, Matthew . 2012. “Inescapability and Normativity,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6(3): 1–27.
Silverstein, Matthew . 2015. “The Shmagency Question,” Philosophical Studies 172(5): 1127–1142.
Silverstein, Matthew . 2016. “Teleology and Normativity,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11: 214–240.
Smith, Michael . 2011. “A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons: Its Promise and Parts,” Law, Ethics, and Philosophy 1: 9–30.
Smith, Michael . 2015. “The Magic of Constitutivism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 52(2): 187–200.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis . 2008. Normativity (La Salle, IL: Open Court).
Tiffany, Evan . 2011. “Why Be an Agent?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(2): 233–233.
Velleman, J. David . 2009. How We Get Along (New York: Cambridge University Press).
Walden, Kenneth . 2012. “Laws of Nature, Laws of Freedom, and the Social Construction of Normativity,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7: 37–79.
Walden, Kenneth . 2018a. “Practical Reason Not as Such,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13(2): 1–32.
Walden, Kenneth . 2018b. “Nature, Agency, and the Nature of Agency,” Philosophical Inquiries 6(2): 51–72.
Wegner, Daniel . 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge: MIT Press).
Wiggins, David . 1975. “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” in his Needs, Values, Truth (New York: Oxford University Press).

The aim of agency

Brunero, J. 2017. “Recent Work on Internal and External Reasons.” American Philosophical Quarterly 54(2): 99–118.

This survey piece provides an overview of three arguments for Internalism about Reasons, including one based in appeals to an aim of agency.

Ferrero, L. 2019. “The Simple Constitutivist Move.” Philosophical Explorations 22(2): 146–162.

This article provides an explanation of what is called constitutivism and argues that what I’ve here called Aim Theories are an instance of constitutivist explanations.

Pauer-Studer, H. 2014. “A Constitutive Account of Group Agency.” Erkenntnis 79(9): 1623–1639.

This article develops an instance of an Aim Theory to explain the nature and normative standards of Group Agency.

Wald, B. and Tenenbaum, S. 2018. “Reasons and Action Explanation” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Daniel Star (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 214–232.

This entry in the Handbook of Reasons and Normativity appeals to an account of agency’s aim to develop an answer to the long-standing problem causal accounts of action have dealing with deviant causal chains.

Wiland, E. 2012. “Constitutivism.” in Reasons. London: Continuum Press.

This chapter in a graduate-level text on reasons provides an accessible explanation of the motivation for believing that action or agency has an aim, its role in explaining reasons, and some general objections to the explanatory project.

Bukoski, M. 2016. “A Critique of Smith’s Constitutivism.” Ethics 127: 116–146.

Bukoski, M. . 2017. “Self-validation and Internalism in Velleman’s Constitutivism.” Philosophical Studies 174: 2667–2686.

Coṭé-Bouchard, C. 2016. “Can The Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?” Philosophical Studies 173 (12): 3181–3198.

Dreier, J. 1997. “Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality,” in Ethics and Practical reason, ed. Cullity and Gaut. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Reprinted with some modifications in Millgram, ed. 2001. Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dreier, J. 2001. “Humean Doubts about Categorical Imperatives,”in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, ed. E. Millgram , 27–48. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Enoch, D. 2006. “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come From What Is Constitutive of Action.” The Philosophical Review 115: 169–198.

Enoch, D. . 2011. “Shmagency Revisited.” in New Waves in Metaethics, ed. M. Brady , 208–233. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Enoch, D. . 2019. “Constitutivism: On Rabbits, Hats, and Holy Grails.” Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper 19-14. Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3382239

Ferrero, L. 2009. “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4: 303–333.

Ferrero, L. . 2018. “Inescapability Revisited.” Manuscrito 41: 113–158.

Flowerree, A. K. 2018. “Epistemic Shmagency?” in Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism, ed. C. Kyriacou and R. McKenna , 289–310. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gauthier, D. 1997. “Rationality and the Rational Aim.” in Reading, ed. J. Dancy Parfit , 24–41. Oxford: Blackwell.

Katsafanas, P. 2013. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kolodny, N. 2007. “How Does Coherence Matter?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 229–263.

Korsgaard, C. M. 1997. “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.” in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. G. Cullity and B. Gaut , 215–254. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Korsgaard, C. M. . 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lindeman, K. 2017. “Constitutivism Without Thresholds.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12(3): 231–258

Lindeman, K. . 2019. “Functional Constitutivism’s Misunderstood Resources.” Ethics 130(1): 79–91.

Lindeman, K. ms. . “Constitutive Aims and Normative Explanations.”

Littlejohn, C. 2013. “Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?” Logos and Episteme 4(3): 353–360.

Markovits, J. 2014. Moral Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McHugh, C. 2011. “What Do We Aim at When We Believe?” Dialectica 65: 369–392.

Morton, J. 2010. “Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation.” European Journal of Philosophy 19(4): 561–584.

Nolfi, K. 2018. “Why Only Evidential Considerations can Justify Belief.” in Normativity: Epstemic and Practical, ed. McHuhg, Way, Whiting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Paakkunainen, H. 2018. “Doing Away with the Shmagency Objection to Constitutivism.” Manuscrito 41: 431–480.

Rosati, C. S. 2016. “Agents and ‘Shmagents:’ An Essay on Agency and Normativity.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 11, ed. R. Shafer-Landau , 183–211. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schafer, K. 2017. “Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.” Noûs. Advance Online Publication. doi:10.1111/nous.12231.
Schafer, K. . 2018. “Constitutivism About Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding.” in The Many Moral Rationalisms, ed. Karen Jones and Francois Schroeter , 70–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schroeder, M. 2007. Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Setiya, K. 2007. Reasons Without Rationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Shah, N. 2003. “How Truth Governs Belief.” Philosophical Review 112: 447–482.
Silverstein, M. 2015. “The Shmagency Question.” Philosophical Studies 172 (5): 1127–1142.
Silverstein, M. . 2016. “Teleology and Normativity.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11: 214–240.
Silverstein, M. . 2017. “Agency and Normative Self-Governance.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(3): 517–528.
Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Smith, M. . 2009. “Reasons Without Rationalism After All.” Analysis 69(3) 521–530.
Smith, M. . 2012. “Agents and Patients” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112: 309–331.
Smith, M. . 2013. “A constitutivist theory of reasons: Its promise and parts.” Law, Ethics, and Philosophy 1: 9–30.
Smith, M. . 2019. “Formalism and Constitutivism in Kantian Practical Philosophy.” Philosophical Explorations 22(2): 163–176, DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2019.1599053
Tiffany, E. 2012. “Why Be an Agent?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90: 223–233.
Velleman, J.D. 2000. The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Velleman, J.D. . 2009. How We Get Along. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Velleman, J.D. . 2015. Foundations for Moral Relativism: Second Expanded Edition. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0086
Walden, K. 2012. “Laws of Nature, Laws of Freedom, and the Social Construction of Normativity.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7: 37–79.
Walden, K. . 2018. “Practical Reason Not as Such.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13(2): 125–153.
Wedgwood, R. 2002. “The Aim of Belief.” Philosophical Perspectives 16(16): 267–297.
Whiting, D. 2012. “Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93(2): 279–300.
Whiting, D. . 2014. “Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.” in Epistemic Norms, ed. Littlejohn and Turri. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Agency and morality

The volumes below contain both classical accounts and contemporary essays on the three types of ethical theory.

Darwall, Stephen , editor. Consequentialism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2003.
Darwall, Stephen , editor. Deontology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2003.
Darwall, Stephen , editor. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2003.

The book below defends the Kantian version of a constitutivist account of the moral goodness of action.

Korsgaard, Christine M. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

The books below defend another version of constitutivism, one in which the nature of action provides the standards for the rationality of action.

Velleman, J. David . Practical Reflection. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Reissued by the Center for the Study of Language and Information, 2007.
Velleman, J. David . The Possibility of Practical Reason. 1st edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 2nd edition, Michigan Publishing Services, 2015.
Velleman, J. David . How We Get Along. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Aristotle . (1984) The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W. D. Ross , revised by J. O. Urmson . in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. References to Aristotle’s works are given by the standard Bekker page, column, and line numbers.
Herman, Barbara . (1993) “Leaving Deontology Behind” Chap. 10 in The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 208–240.
Kant, Immanuel . (1998) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary Gregor . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. References to Kant’s works are given in the standard way by the page numbers

in the relevant volume of Kants gesammelte Schriften, which appear in the margins of most translation.
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996) “Kant’s Formula of Universal Law” Chap. 4 in Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 106–132.
Mill, John Stuart . (1979) Utilitarianism. Edited by George Sher . Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Agency in the law

Feinberg, Joel (1970) Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Moore, Michael (2009) Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals and Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morse, Stephen (2007) “The Non-Problem of Freewill in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 25: 203–220.
Pavlakos, George and Rodriguez-Blanco, Veronica (eds.) (2015) Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yaffe, Gideon (2012) “The Voluntary Act Requirement” in The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Law, Andrei Marmor (ed.), New York: Routledge.

Aesthetic agency

Boyle, Matthew 2009. Active belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1): 119–147.
Argues that even though we cannot believe “at will,” our beliefs are exercises of rational agency insofar as they are constituted by making up our minds about what to believe.
Hampshire, Stuart 1965. Freedom of the Individual. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Argues that there are two kinds of self-knowledge: knowing one’s mental states by observing them and knowing one’s mental states by making up one’s mind about their appropriateness, and locates the freedom of the individual in the latter. We often come to know our beliefs, intentions, desires, and emotions by asking the normative question concerning their appropriateness since these mental states are constituted by evaluating them to be appropriate to their objects.
Lopes, Dominic McIver 2018. Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Argues that aesthetic value plays an important role in the good life. It is a value insofar as it provides agents with practical reasons to act in ways that would ideally amount to achievements in the relevant practices.
Nguyen, C. Thi 2020. Games: Agency as Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Argues that games belong to a distinctive medium of art, the art form of agency, insofar as they offer players aesthetically (and practically) valuable experiences of adopting variety of different agencies, and of engaging in different motivational structures.
Smith, Angela 2005. Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life. Ethics 115 (2): 236–271.
Argues that we are (morally) responsible for our attitudes not insofar as they are under our voluntary control, but insofar as they reflect our evaluative judgments.
Anscombe, G.E.M. (2000) Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Boyle, Matthew 2009. Active belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1): 119–147.
Boyle, Matthew and Doug Lavin (2010) ‘Goodness and Desire’ in Tenenbaum, S. (ed.) Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 161–202.
Brewer, Talbot (2009) The Retrieval of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dyck, John (ms.) “Choosing Beauty.”
Gingerich, Jonathan (ms.) “Aesthetic Agency.”
Gorodeisky, Keren (2021a) “The Authority of Pleasure,” Nôus 55(1): 199-220.
Gorodeisky, Keren (2021b) “Must Reasons be Either Theoretical or Practical? Aesthetic Criticism and Appreciative Reasons,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Gorodeisky, Keren and Eric Marcus (2018) “Aesthetic Rationality,” Journal of Philosophy, 115(3): 113–140.
Hampshire, Stuart (1965) Freedom of the Individual. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kant, Immanuel [1790] (2000) Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lopes, Dominic McIver (2018) Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McDowell, John (1998) “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World,” in Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 112–130.
Meskin, Aaron (2004) “Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn from Others about Beauty and Art?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXIX(1): 65–91.
Milona, Michael (2016) “Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(4): 897–915.
Moran, Richard (2001) Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nguyen, C. Thi (2020) Games: Agency as Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schlosser, Markus (2019) Agency, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta , URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/>.
Shelley, James (2010) “Against Value Empiricism in Aesthetics,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(4):707–720.
Smith, Angela (2005) “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115(2): 236–271.
Tappolet, Christine (2016) Emotions, Values, and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Human Agency and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tenenbaum, Sergio (2007) Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yao, Vida (2019) “The Undesirable & the Adesirable,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99(1): 115–130.
Wolf, Susan (2015) “Responsibility, Moral and Otherwise,” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58(2): 127–142.
Wolf, Susan (2016) “Aesthetic Responsibility,” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 11: 1–25. <http://www.amherstlecture.org/wolf2016/>.