

Carrie Figdor

What's the Use of an Intrinsic Property?¹

Introduction

Philosophical work on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is typically motivated not only by its intrinsic interest, but by citing its uses in other areas of philosophy. This roster standardly includes, among others, uses in metaethics, regarding intrinsic moral value; philosophy of mind, regarding the supervenience of mental properties on physical properties; philosophy of science, regarding causal efficacy; and metaphysics, regarding real change. But how the analytical work that follows the list helps to illuminate the items on it is rarely explicitly addressed.² Presumably, the proposed analyses are ready to be called upon whenever participants in these other debates need further clarification of what is meant by 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic'. I will argue, however, that it is not clear that these analyses can do any work at all, and that in the specific case of intrinsic value this assumption is clearly false. Ellis (2002, p. 51) once complained that philosophers "have not succeeded in explicating a concept [of intrinsic] that is of much relevance to the theory or practice of science." I suspect they have not provided an analysis of much relevance to anyone. It is not that standard analyses draw a distinction without a difference, but that the distinction they draw may make no difference.

I'll begin by clarifying what I call standard I/E analyses before examining why they do nothing to illuminate core metaethical debates, such as that over moral value. The core problem is that the analyses are committed to an assumption that is inconsistent with the nature of many properties, of which *having value* is an important example. This assumption cannot be given up without leaving the standard view unmotivated; while if it is kept and defended, what is left is rendered unfit for duty. In effect, standard accounts face the problem of being either irrelevant or impotent.

¹ Many thanks to Robert Francescotti and Vera Hoffmann-Kolss for helpful comments on earlier drafts and discussion of the issues raised in this paper.

² An exception is Hoffmann-Kolss (2010), who examines the role of the distinction in supervenience. Among non-metaphysicians, metaphysical work on the I/E distinction has been explicitly called upon by Barcelo Aspeitia (2011) in his defense of internalist justification in epistemology; notably, he employs a localist analysis (Figdor 2008, described below). I focus here on metaethics, although my arguments should pressure those defending standard I/E accounts to demonstrate that their analyses can actually do the work they are supposed to be able to do.

1 The Standard I/E Distinction

The platitudes used to characterize the I/E distinction of interest here involve claims about a thing having a property in itself, or in and of itself, or by its intrinsic nature—in short, in some way that is not dependent on other things or what they or the world that the thing is in is like.³ The platitudes may be stated somewhat more formally in both global and local terms as a first step towards analysis:

Global: F is an intrinsic property iff necessarily, any x that is F is F in virtue of the way x itself, and nothing else, is.

Local: x has F intrinsically iff x has F in virtue of how x itself, and nothing else, is. (Weatherson and Marshall 2013)⁴

What I call the *standard* I/E distinction is a *global* distinction. With the exception of Figdor (2008), those who have published on the topic focus on defining a global rather than a local distinction.⁵ Here I largely set aside the question of

3 Examples from across the decades include: “Intuitively, a property P is an intrinsic property of an object x just in case x ’s having P does not depend on the features of x ’s environment, but only on what x is like in itself” (Francescotti 2012, p. 91); “You know what an intrinsic property is: it’s a property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on outside of itself” (Yablo 1999, p. 479); and “The intrinsic properties of something depend only on that thing; whereas the extrinsic properties of something may depend, wholly or partly, on something else” (Lewis 1983, p. 197). Weatherson and Marshall (2013) call this the “interior/exterior” notion, in contrast with a duplication preservation notion and a local/non-local notion in which (necessarily, for any F), an ascription of F to a thing is entirely about that thing and its parts and not at all about other things. (This use of ‘local’ is not to be confused with a localist view—explained below—of, say, their local/non-local notion.)

4 Globalist views are often not clearly or consistently distinguished from localist ones. For example, W&M begin their section on analyses of the I/E distinction as follows: “It is at least initially appealing to think that, if an object has a property in an intrinsic fashion, then it has it independently of the way the rest of the world is. The rest of the world could disappear, and the object might still have that property.” This sounds like a prelude to local analyses, but only global analyses follow.

5 The localist analysis I provided in Figdor (2008) was as follows:

(I-ly*) x has F intrinsically =_{df.} x has F , and (i) x ’s having F is compatible, in the relevant set of possible worlds, with x ’s having A_R and with x ’s having $\sim A_R$, or (ii) x has G intrinsically, and x ’s having G explains x ’s having F .

(E-ly*) x has F extrinsically =_{df.} x has F , and (i) x ’s having F is not compatible, in the relevant set of possible worlds, with x ’s having A_R or else x ’s having $\sim A_R$; or (ii) x has G extrinsically, and x ’s having G explains x ’s having F .

A_R is “relevantly accompanied”, where relevance is relative to the context of use of the claim

how these two distinctions are related to focus on the question of whether we need a global distinction to begin with.⁶ We do want a distinction, but it's not at all clear that a global distinction is what we want. I'll begin by characterizing global and local distinctions, and then use a widely known, if not wholly embraced, contender for an adequate global distinction to press my case.

A global distinction is a distinction between kinds of properties, akin to the physical/mental and natural-kind/artifact-kind distinctions: it is a 2nd-order distinction that partitions properties.⁷ Universally accepted, if not logically necessary, features of global I/E distinctions can be gleaned from the literature by considering how recalcitrant instances are treated.

First, it is typically assumed that the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) holds in the sense that, for any property F, F is either intrinsic or extrinsic. Global analyses usually provide conditions for a property to be intrinsic, and what's not intrinsic is *ipso facto* classified as extrinsic; there is no "neither" category if a property does not meet the conditions for intrinsicity. (Vallentyne 1997, p. 209 provides a typical expression of LEM in this context: "A property is extrinsic just in case it is not intrinsic.") That said, since some do argue for exempting certain kinds of properties from the domain of application of the I/E distinction, LEM in this context holds for any property F that belongs to any class of properties to which the I/E distinction applies. For example, if the I/E distinction applies only to purely qualitative properties—to a first approximation, those picked out by predicates that lack reference to particular individuals, places or times—any non-purely-qualitative property is *ipso facto* in the "neither" category; but the purely qualitative ones are either intrinsic or extrinsic. These and other do-

about intrinsicness or extrinsicness. These criteria do not rule out the case where x can have F in a way that satisfies I-ly* and in a way that satisfies E-ly* at the same time. (I provide detail in the text below.)

6 A local distinction can ground a global distinction in various ways. If a property is had intrinsically (with logical or conceptual necessity) by all possible individuals that can have it, then the property may be classified as intrinsic. But a property could also be classified as intrinsic iff a weighted majority of its instances are had intrinsically, or if most instances are had intrinsically and it is a basic physical property, or whatever.

7 For simplicity, I'll assume properties are universals that are instantiated by individuals, although presumably the I/E distinction is neutral regarding various theories of properties, including realist, nominalist or conceptualist views (see also Marshall 2012, p. 532, who identifies properties as sets of pairs of things and worlds). The discussion in the text can be adjusted accordingly. So, for example, if properties are tropes rather than universals, a global I/E distinction would hold (by LEM, discussed below) that all 1st-order resemblance classes of tropes fall into one of two 2nd-order resemblance classes (the intrinsic class or the extrinsic class), while a local distinction would claim that tropes in the same 1st-order resemblance class may fall in distinct 2nd-order resemblance classes.

main restrictions effectively make the standard I/E distinction 3rd (or higher)-order.

Second, intrinsicity and extrinsicity are exclusive in that a property cannot be both intrinsic and extrinsic. For example, if F is intrinsic, and an instance intuitively has F extrinsically, the recalcitrant instance is treated as a putative counterexample to which the response that the property F is both intrinsic and extrinsic is not an option. (A recalcitrant instance is just a case where a given standard analysis renders a verdict on a property, e.g., it is intrinsic, and an individual intuitively seems to have the property the other way, e.g., extrinsically.) I will discuss exclusivity further below. Note that LEM does not rule out the “both” option; LEM forbids a property F to be put in the (non-existent) middle but leaves open that F could be put on both sides of the distinction.

Third, the global distinction is primary or prescriptive in that the property classification dictates how its instances should be had: if F is intrinsic, then any instance of F *should* be had intrinsically, such that any instance of F that intuitively is not had intrinsically is *ipso facto* a putative counterexample.⁸ Weatherson (2001) may be taken to express the primacy commitment when he writes: “[I]f F is intrinsic, then whether some particular thing is F is independent of the way the rest of the world is” (pp. 365–6). One cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, but the fact that recalcitrant instances are typically treated as counterexamples to a given analysis shows that a normative element is already built into this ‘is’.

These three features—LEM, exclusivity, and primacy—structure current debate as global analyses are proposed, assessed, criticized and defended. The basic structure is as follows. First, a global analysis will classify a property F as intrinsic.⁹ If it does, then by primacy all its instances should be had intrinsically. When instances are found that intuitively do not follow suit, they are putative counterexamples to the analysis. By exclusivity, reclassifying F as both in-

⁸ Note that primacy currently holds for intrinsic properties; if a property is classified as extrinsic it is permissible for it to be had intrinsically (e.g., *is square or accompanied* had by a square). But primacy need not and did not always apply to the intrinsics. By Kim’s (1982) definition, a property is intrinsic if it is possible for it to be had without other contingent things existing, and extrinsic if necessarily it could only be had with other contingent things existing. In this case primacy applies to the extrinsics. Either way, primacy is or encapsulates a normative standard by which intuitive judgments of how a property F is had in a particular case can show (at least *prima facie*) that a given analysis’s classification of F is wrong.

⁹ Alternatively, a global analysis is proposed that classifies previously problematic (as well as unproblematic) properties intuitively correctly. A new property F is found that satisfies the analysis but which has an instance that intuitively has F in the “wrong” way; primacy kicks in and debate proceeds as in the text.

trinsic and extrinsic is not an option. This leaves LEM as the only commitment that can be, and often is, fiddled with—that is, the domain of application is shrunk so that LEM still applies, albeit within a more restricted domain. The only other alternative seems to be to minimize the counterexample as a non-disfiguring flaw.¹⁰

A local distinction is an account of the cases. It is a 1st-order distinction, between the ways in which individuals have properties. A local I/E distinction partitions how individuals have properties into having them intrinsically or extrinsically. The I/E localist is in good company, for other local distinctions include the essential/accidental, internal/external and necessary/contingent distinctions: a property had intrinsically by one individual (which is then an intrinsic property of *that individual*) may be had extrinsically by, and hence be an extrinsic property of, another individual, just as *being a mathematician* is an essential property of one individual (Andrew Wylie) and an accidental property of another (Paul Krugman). Moreover, the same individual can have the property at the same time both intrinsically and extrinsically, such that the property is both an intrinsic and an extrinsic property of that individual. As I will discuss below, *has value* and *is good* are properties that an individual can have both intrinsically and extrinsically at the same time.

Localists of any variety are motivated by the fact that the vast majority of properties have instances that will fall on both sides of any global distinction. In this specific case, localists judge the intrinsicity of each instance, not the intrinsicity of the property. The local distinction is considered fundamental, but this is not the same as primacy. If an instance of F is had intrinsically by an individual, this does not imply that other instances *should* be had intrinsically just because this one is. A legitimate global notion can be developed, but it needs motivation.¹¹

10 The role of “our” intuitions in this debate cannot be overemphasized. As a typical example, Trogdon (2009, p. 137), following Witmer, Butchard, and Trogdon (2005), claims that the reason “we all” find *being cubical and lonely or non-cubical and accompanied* intuitively non-intrinsic is because it can be had by individuals in virtue of intuitively non-intrinsic properties. But many of us may have no intuitions about it, or have conflicting intuitions, or may not agree that such intuitions track the truth. Thus, while Witmer, Butchard, and Trogdon (hereafter, “WTB”) state that “while we don’t want to say that every property can be classified a priori as intrinsic or not, ...” (2005, p. 330), globalists do give the impression of doing just this given their use of intuitive classificatory judgments that are assumed to be both reliable and universal as the sole source of evidence for or against global accounts.

11 For example, Francescotti (1999) proceeds by developing a global notion from a local one. All his effort is put into developing the local notion; an intrinsic property *simpliciter* is just one in which it is necessary that any item that has F has F intrinsically. He describes (pp. 591–2) the

While LEM, exclusivity and primacy are not logically required of global analyses, giving up any one of them undermines the motivation for pursuing a globalist approach. For example, it is a standard criticism of particular global analyses that responses to counterexamples that constitute fiddling with the domain of application of LEM (“fiddling with LEM,” for short) tend to introduce further notions themselves in need of analysis (and also appear *ad hoc*). The debate over property naturalness exemplifies this criticism.¹² From the current perspective, however, the problem is that for each putative counterexample that is taken to represent a class of properties to which the analysis does not apply, the global I/E distinction divides an ever smaller domain (and will often become an even higher-order distinction), without a principled limit to this process. Since the utility of any global distinction varies inversely with its scope, the motivation for drawing one depends heavily on dealing with putative counterexamples in some way other than by fiddling with LEM. And since so many properties have instances that will be recalcitrant to a global analysis, the problem facing global analyses is to maintain their ability to do any work at all.

But for the globalist giving up primacy and exclusivity are not viable options either. Without primacy, there is no reason to treat recalcitrant cases as counterexamples; it becomes unclear why one needs to classify the property F if one has a localist account of x’s having F, especially if F can be had intrinsically or extrinsically. Exclusivity also seems constitutive of extant global accounts in that the “both” option (a property that is both intrinsic and extrinsic) appears incoherent, and is not simply ignored; I will underscore this point in the next two sections. It is a swift slide into irrelevance for a global distinction once the “both” option is live. Moreover, if a property F can be both, then given a recalcitrant instance of F there seems to be no principled way to choose between reclassifying F as “both” or maintaining the original classification and dealing with the problem some other way. It becomes too easy to shield an analysis from counterexamples.

local/global distinction in terms of a property being had intrinsically by an individual vs. a property being intrinsic as a kind or *simpliciter*, using *co-exists with the number 21* as an example of a property that is not intrinsic *simpliciter* because it is had intrinsically by the number 21 and had extrinsically by anything else.

12 The problem of hyperintensionality for Lewis’s duplication-based account (Eddon 2011) also relies on exclusivity and primacy, and the responses Eddon considers (and counters) include fiddling with LEM and minimizing the flaw. The problem of hyperintensionality (for Lewis) is that (a) if one individuates properties in terms of sets of possible individuals, and (b) if one holds that duplicates are worldbound individuals, then one will not be able to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic necessary properties or intrinsic from extrinsic identity properties.

Despite these problems, one might maintain that the original motivations still underscore the need for a global distinction. What I will show, however, is that globalists face a dilemma: if they give up the commitments, the global distinction lacks motivation vis-à-vis a local distinction; but if they keep those commitments, the global distinction can't do the work it's supposed to do. Either way, how a given global analysis deals with recalcitrant instances is not the critical issue; it is whether any global analysis is worth the trouble.

2 A Specific Standard Account and Exclusivity Illustrated

There is no “received” standard analysis, but Langton and Lewis (1998) command a fair number of partial adherents for at least providing a necessary condition for intrinsicity in the form of an independence of accompaniment criterion (described below). The Langton and Lewis (L & L) account has been defended by others via development (WBT 2005) or modification (Weatherson 2001), and is intended by L&L to buttress Lewis's earlier (1983, 1986) duplication-based accounts. But even among those preferring alternative analyses, L&L's independence criterion (IC) generally has not been the target of criticism (e.g., Vallentyne 1997 provides an account of the having or lacking of a property in a way that is independent of the presence or absence of other objects or times, but elaborated in terms of world-time-contractions). Rather, their additional criterion of property naturalness, introduced to exclude disjunctive properties from the class of basic intrinsics, has been far more widely criticized (e.g., Hawthorne 2001, Sider 2001, Marshall and Parsons 2001).¹³ It is fair to say that their independence criterion, as a way of capturing at least part of what it is for a property to be had “in and of itself,” enjoys widespread tacit acceptance if not explicit support.

In what follows I will target IC, not naturalness, by showing how exclusivity is built into IC and how damaging this commitment is to the ability of a standard distinction to do the work it is supposed to do. Generally speaking, any analysis

¹³ IC is regarded (including by L&L) as not sufficient because disjunctive properties can satisfy it even though individuals can have them in ways that are intuitively non-intrinsic. The property *being cubical and lonely or non-cubical and accompanied* will satisfy IC, yet for many this property is intuitively not intrinsic. Exclusivity and primacy both play roles in this criticism, while L&L's restriction of basic intrinsics to natural properties (which are non-disjunctive) is a way of fiddling with LEM.

that excludes the possibility of the instantiation of a property by a thing, both in itself and in relation to other things at the same time, will have the same problem. Since other global analyses are *prima facie* committed to exclusivity, if not as explicitly as in IC, I leave it to their champions to show how their accounts avoid the globalist's dilemma.

IC formalizes what it is to be independent of accompaniment by another contingently existing thing: a property P is intrinsic only if it is independent of accompaniment, and extrinsic otherwise.¹⁴ There is no “neither” option except implicitly in the form of excluded kinds of properties, such as non-natural properties; and there is no “both” option. In fact, there *can't* be a “both” option. Independence of accompaniment is determined by whether, for any property P, all four of the following cases are logically or conceptually or metaphysically possible: (1) an individual has P and is accompanied by another contingently existing thing (A), (2) an individual has P and is lonely (which is defined as the negation of accompaniment, $\sim A$), (3) an individual lacks P and has A, and (4) an individual lacks P and has $\sim A$. Assuming classical logic, it is not logically possible for an individual to have $(P \ \& \ \sim A)$ and $(P \ \& \ A)$ at the same time.

One reason a localist finds IC problematic is because it requires all four cases to be considered in assessing independence. When we assess whether an individual has a property intrinsically, we will want to consider whether it would still have the property even if it were alone in the universe (or relevantly alone), but how other individuals might have the property is beside the point. A cube will have *being cubical and lonely or non-cubical and accompanied* if it is lonely and will lack this property if accompanied, but what might be the case with non-cubes or other cubes (that are not its counterparts) is not relevant to assessing whether this cube has it intrinsically.¹⁵ A localist assessment of independence will require that the same individual (or its counterparts) be considered in the two relevant cases—here, (1) and (2)—and will ignore the other two as irrelevant.¹⁶

14 As just stated, IC is a modification of the Simple Independence Criterion (from WBT 2005), which includes an ‘iff’. IC (or SIC) was motivated by the fact that Kim’s (1982) analysis resulted in classifying the property *being lonely* ($\sim A$) as intrinsic, when Lewis (1983) and everyone since intuitively thinks it is extrinsic. (I will question this below.)

15 I include reference to (Lewisian) counterparts so as to remain neutral regarding the metaphysics of modality. Localists, like globalists, need some interpretation or other of the semantics of modal statements.

16 This is why WBT’s (2005) modification of L&L remains a global distinction: it avoids their natural-property condition, but adopts (all of) IC as a necessary condition. On their view an intrinsic property is one that satisfies IC either directly or else indirectly if one has it by virtue of having another property that satisfies IC. Thus, WBT’s to “have F in an intrinsic fashion” is not

But the deeper problem with IC stems from its interpretation of the relation between being accompanied and being lonely. These are of course technical terms. ‘Accompaniment’ refers to the property of being accompanied by other contingent objects, and ‘loneliness’ is defined as the negation of accompaniment. But self-accompaniment (or reflexive accompaniment) and other-accompaniment are compatible, not contradictory. One can be (and usually is) self-accompanied and other-accompanied at the same time. Thus any property that can be had both ways at the same time by the same individual cannot be assessed for intrinsicity using IC.¹⁷ Any analysis that treats being lonely and being accompanied as exclusive, formally or not, faces the same issue.

Properties that can be had intrinsically and extrinsically at the same time by the same individuals are neither rare nor weird; recalcitrant instances of them cannot be minimized as non-disfiguring flaws. To borrow Hawthorne’s (2001) example, the property *is attending*—the “existential derivative” of the relation *attending to something or other*—is “flexible” (as Hawthorne puts it): a thing can have this property by either self-attending or other-attending. Notably, Hawthorne uses the example against L&L’s naturalness condition; that it meets IC is “beyond dispute.” But he also adds (in fn.1) that “I assume we do not want to relativize matters so that we count the existential derivative [*is attending*] an intrinsic property of Jones (who is attending to his leg) but not of me (who is attending to the table).” This assumption is true only if “we” are globalists. And if Jones is attending to his leg and to Hawthorne at the same time, “we” also presumably do not want to say that this property is both intrinsic and extrinsic. Yet if the very same property can be had self-reflexively and other-relationally by the same thing at the same time, then *is attending* cannot be assessed for intrinsicity at all, since then it can be had by a single individual in a way that is logically consistent with its being the only thing and logically inconsistent with its being the only thing at the same time.

If we call properties that can be classified using IC *exclusive-disjunctive* properties, then the problem is that many properties are not exclusive-disjunctive. Exclusive-disjunctive properties in general are those that can be partitioned by their logical independence of a pair of logical contradictories. In the case of the I/E distinction, the relevant contradictories are accompaniment and loneliness. At best, then, the standard I/E distinction must really just be about a

the same as Figdor’s (2008) “having F intrinsically.” For WBT, to have a property in an intrinsic fashion is either to have a property F that satisfies IC or to have another property that satisfies IC and in virtue of which one has F.

¹⁷ Of course, IC’s four cases will be satisfied by this property, so it will be classified as extrinsic anyway.

very special subclass of properties—a subclass which with each recalcitrant case threatens to get smaller all the time.

Size might not matter if no important properties were left out of the standard distinction's domain of application. Unfortunately for the globalist, this is not the case.

3 The Standard I/E Distinction and Metaethics

While the 'in itself' locution and the term 'intrinsic' appear regularly in metaethical discussions, not all are germane to the I/E distinction (global or local) discussed above. In particular, the distinctions between final vs. instrumental value and non-derivative vs. derivative value involve uses of 'intrinsic' that are not the ones I/E analyses try to capture. Relevant debates concern such questions as in virtue of what things have value, and what explains their having the value they have, and the relation between having value and being valued (Dorsey 2012). Does final value (value as an end, or for its own sake) supervene on intrinsic properties, as Moore (1903) held, or can something—a rare stamp, for example—have final value without its value supervening on its intrinsic properties, as Korsgaard (1983), Kagan (1998) and others hold? Does having value depend on being valued, as subjectivists claim (see, e.g., Kagan 1998, p. 281 and fn. 4)? These are the sorts of issues where the standard I/E distinction ought to provide illumination, if any.

Instead, it introduces confusion. Moore originated, or at least established as the received view, the connection between intrinsic value and the I/E distinction that justifies the inclusion of metaethics on the utility list.¹⁸ In "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" Moore (1922, p. 260) states that "[t]o say that a kind of value is intrinsic means merely that the question of whether a thing possesses it, and the degree to which it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question." In *Principia Ethica* (1903: Ch. VI, §112), he describes the method of determining what is intrinsically good by considering "what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good; ..." The Moorean position may be put by saying

¹⁸ Fletcher (2008) argues that Moore newly identified intrinsic value with intrinsic nature, essentialism, and final value; Mill, for example, appears to have used the term (to the extent he used it at all) to distinguish between value as an end (final value) vs. value as a means (instrumental value). If "Mooreanism" is the set of theses in which intrinsic value is identified with final value, held with necessity, and dependent solely on intrinsic properties of bearers (Fletcher 2008, p. 531), only the third thesis matters here.

that, for Moore, intrinsic value is a kind of value such that when it is possessed by something, it possesses it solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties, and its intrinsic properties are the properties the thing would continue to have even if it were alone in the universe (Bradley 2006). This is the view Korsgaard, Kagan and others argue against.¹⁹

All this should sound very familiar—and yet globalists should immediately start feeling queasy. Any standard I/E analysis that does not classify *being lonely* as an extrinsic property is deemed flawed. It was because *being lonely* (defined as above) came out as intrinsic on Kim's original (1982) proposal that it was jettisoned; L&L was its immediate successor, but every other global analysis follows suit or is deemed flawed. So given the universally accepted globalist classification of *being lonely*, Moore must be interpreted as saying that intrinsic value is value that depends on an extrinsic property. By any charitable reading of Moore, this is implausible. So either *being lonely* as defined is not an adequate rendering of Moore's intended uses of 'being alone in the universe' or 'in itself', or *being lonely* is improperly classified as extrinsic (or both).

What about typical metaethical properties? These include *having value* and *being good*. Do standard I/E analyses help illuminate debates about value and goodness? The short answer is that they can't, because these are not exclusive-disjunctive properties.

For a Moorean, something has final value when it possesses its value in virtue of its intrinsic properties. (This use of 'intrinsic' is ambiguous between a localist and globalist reading.) But properties a thing could have while alone in the universe include properties it can also have non-reflexively. *Having value* is such a property. Suppose (*pace* Moore) an item's *having value* entails the existence of a minded creature that has a pro-attitude towards the item—that is, it depends on *being valued* (what Kagan calls the "radical subjectivist" view). Then *having value* could include self-valuing and other-valuing cases. Those who think *having value* depends on *being valued* do not rule out the case where the valued is also the valuer. So a thing could have value in such a way that it would still have value while alone in the universe in either the Moorean way or in the subjectivist way (by valuing itself). In both cases the thing can also *have value* at the same time for reasons that do not depend on its being alone or that are consistent with its being accompanied. It can have value both intrinsically and extrinsically, and

¹⁹ These platitudes, like the ones in metaphysics, can be understood in global or local terms. However, as Feldman (1998) notes, the intrinsically good as "good in virtue of its intrinsic nature" is distinguishable from the intrinsically good as "that which would still be good even if it existed in complete isolation." To simplify matters here, I adopt his (1998, p. 349) interpretation of 'intrinsic nature' as 'the set of intrinsic properties'.

so *having value* will be both an intrinsic and an extrinsic property of that individual.

The point may be emphasized by seeing how *having value* can be had intrinsically and had extrinsically by the same item at the same time on the specific localist view I have defended (see fn. 4). Suppose F = has value and G = being valued. x can have F intrinsically in two ways. First, it can have F in a way that is compatible with x's not being accompanied by other valuers and with x's being so accompanied (because the existence of other valuers is irrelevant to its having value). That's a Moorean view. Second, it could have F intrinsically by having G in one of the two ways in which x could have G—namely, by valuing itself—and thus by having G in a way that is compatible with x's not being accompanied by other valuers and with being so accompanied (since these other valuers are not relevant), and by adding that x's having G explains x's having F. That's a subjectivist view. But x could also have F extrinsically—although not to Moore—by having F in a way that is not compatible with x's not being accompanied by other valuers or with its being (only) self-accompanied; this is perhaps the typical sort of case subjectivists have in mind when they claim that a thing has value by being valued and the valuers are others, not x itself. Finally, one way for x to have F in both ways at the same time (which Mooreans will deny is a proper way of understanding value) would be for it to have G in both ways at the same time—that is, given a subjectivist theory, in the case in which x both values itself and is valued by others simultaneously, and in which both ways are relevant to its having value. The localist position does not preclude any of these (or presumably other) metaethical possibilities, as one might expect of any adequate way of analyzing the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. But it is difficult for any globalist analysis to exhibit the metaphysical flexibility that allows for the logical space of metaethical positions without precluding one position or another. One solution would be to give up exclusivity for F or for G, but this solution opens the floodgates to too-easy deflection of putative counterexamples to a given global analysis.

What about *being good*? It is difficult to see how any global analysis can account not only for the fact that we think some things are intrinsically good and others are extrinsically good, but that the same thing can be good in itself and good in relation to other things at the same time. (This is not to be confused with the final/instrumental distinction.) Consider Frankena's (1973, pp. 87–8) long list of intrinsic goods, which includes love. The same person can, at the same time, be loved by loving herself and by being loved by others. The same can be said for *being right* in the sense in which acts are right or wrong. An act can be right for multiple reasons at the same time, some of which wholly depend on the act alone and some of which depend on external factors. The property of *being a mo-*

rally relevant feature is similarly problematic. In short, metaethicists might well ignore the dictates of any standard I/E analysis when it comes to classifying *having value*, *being good* and *being right*. As noted above, fiddling with LEM to rule out non-exclusive-disjunctive properties will protect the standard I/E analysis, but this move will leave core metaethical properties out of its domain of application.

The above problems press on the standard analyses' commitment to exclusivity, which appears most explicitly in L&L's independence criterion. But one can also press from the commitment to primacy. For example, if *having value* is classified as an intrinsic property by a global analysis, then by primacy any individual *should* have it intrinsically if it has it at all. If this is right, then it seems that all it takes to win the metaethical debate is to point to this global analysis, note that some things, intuitively, have value extrinsically, and conclude that Moore must be wrong about *having value*.

Similarly, the standard I/E distinction runs roughshod over the metaethical debate regarding particularism. Particularists such as Dancy (1983) argue that whether a feature is good- or bad-making depends on contextual factors. For example, a Shakespeare play and a public execution can both be *well-performed* and thus *cause pleasure* in audiences, but in virtue of the latter feature the play is good but the execution is bad. It follows that while *being good* may be grounded in the same features, we cannot generalize from the presence of these features in one case to the claim that anything with these features will also be good (or, more generally, have the same moral valence that the given case exhibits).²⁰ So it is not merely that *being good* seems to be a property that cannot be classified by any global analysis because things can have this property based on multiple non-exclusive grounds at the same time. It also seems that important nuances of metaethical discussion are lost if the property of *being good* must be classified one way or the other when based on these grounds.

A usual response to the particularist intuition about crowd-pleasing executions (e.g. Lippert-Rasmussen 1999) is to draw a distinction, such as between *causes pleasure by way of making a crowd pleased* vs. *causes pleasure by way*

²⁰ Dancy (1983, p. 531) partly characterizes his targets, whom he calls pluralists, as follows: "Pluralists generally assume that if a property tells in favor of an action being a duty, then it will tell in favor of any action that bears it." This is similar in spirit to the commitment to primacy that partly characterizes global analyses. Indeed, Dancy raises an objection to pluralists structurally similar to the exclusive-disjunctive problem for globalists: if acts of type ϕ are to be promoted while acts of type ψ are to be avoided, "when we have an act which, as is possible, is both ϕ and ψ , something has to give."

of making a billionaire lose a bet and donate a huge sum to charity. Drawing distinctions yields more fine-grained properties. Similarly, a defender of the standard analysis might respond that *having value* subdivides into *having self-value* and *having other-value*. But this splitting response does not resolve the issue. For any (presumably principled) way of determining when the splitting stops, at that point the globalist will face the same problem. There is no obvious place at which only exclusive-disjunctive properties are left standing, and if such a place were found it would likely be such that the vast majority of properties of interest will not be in it. When we individuate properties so finely that it becomes the rule, and not the exception, that only one individual can have the property in question, we have reached a point where one might as well just be a localist.²¹

Conclusion

The idea of a property being had by something “in itself” has motivated a variety of ways of precisifying the I/E distinction—as independence from accompaniment by other contingent objects, as not including relations to other contingent objects, and so on. The fact that the vast majority of properties have instances that will be recalcitrant on any global analysis has not to date been regarded as a fundamental flaw of the globalist approach. The attitude is that these are counterexamples to particular analyses and the globalist approach is fundamentally sound. Perhaps adding the fact that, for many properties, the same individual can have the same property at the same time in different ways without this being a contradiction will cause some to question this fundamental soundness. But the fact that critical moral properties are of this type should lay to rest the idea that global analyses are worth the trouble even if all counterexamples can be dealt with. A global analysis that covers only exclusive-disjunctive properties, either explicitly by adopting IC or in a more subtle way, will fail to be of much interest to anyone.

How did standard I/E analyses go so far off the rails? No doubt there are many contributing factors. But among them must be the “intuitive” judgment

²¹ It is taken for granted in this literature that any well-formed predicate corresponds to a property (*being such that X* and *being R or Q* are typical property-generating formulas); this alone allows for generating as fine-grained properties as one might want. But only an individuation scheme in which every property has just one instance will protect the globalist from the problem. This is an implausible view of properties, as it abandons the purposes for which we want properties to begin with.

that *being lonely* is just like *being accompanied* in that it also depends on how the world is, yet can also be adequately defined as its contradictory. We have not gotten the differences in their dependence on the world sorted out. One can uphold the intuitive judgment, but negation is too blunt an instrument to capture the differences we want. As Danto (1964) pointed out, with *Brillo Box* Warhol was trying to not not-represent, but this is not equivalent to trying to represent. So, too, with being alone in the universe. This is not the logical contradictory of being accompanied, but a way of being whose contrast is imperfectly captured by a negation sign. Moreover, this violation of classical logic reflects the success of natural languages in dealing with a nuanced world. In general, the globalist perspective requires us to fundamentally misconstrue the nature of many properties and the utility of our concepts for characterizing a world of complex cases.

This is not the place to defend an alternative local account. However, I think Moore's (1922, p. 263 and elsewhere) reference to "intrinsic nature" suggests a fruitful way to proceed. Korsgaard (1983, p. 175) explains Moore's view as being that intrinsic goodness "is dependent only on the thing's intrinsic nature and is just as constant: so long as the thing remains what it is it has the same value: and the value is the same, of course, for everyone and so also objective." I suggest that these references to a thing's nature are what we are trying to get at when we say that something has a property intrinsically, or that a property is intrinsic to, or is an intrinsic property of an individual. It has the property by its nature, and elements of a thing's nature are picked out by the fact that they are cross-contextually robust (but not thereby essential). From this perspective, independence of accompaniment (however ultimately defined) is a symptom of the distinction, not a core part of it. Obviously, the nature of "nature" must be illuminated in some other way than by identifying a thing's nature with the set of its intrinsic properties (*pace* fn. 19 above) or with the set of properties shared by duplicates, as one might also explicate the notion (see, e.g. Francescotti 1999, p. 591, although he does not support the duplication-based approach). But since there are already distinct ways of understanding a thing's nature, the challenge is to develop a notion that is compatible with the localist perspective. That account must await another opportunity.

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