as “something” is subject to two interpretations, it is plausible that “the world” and “the domain” and “reference” are all subject to two related interpretations as well. Indeed, Hofweber admits that “reference” has these two senses. Given this, Hofweber’s explanation of the metaphysical significance of external existence is just the claim that externally existent things are objects of external reference, are members of the external domain, and are externally worldly, while things that exist merely internally have none of these features. This is manifestly unilluminating: if we wonder—as I think we should—why external existence is the only metaphysically important notion of existence, then we should equally wonder why the “external” notions of reference, domain, and world are the important notions. And, to this question, I think Hofweber provides no answer at all. Furthermore, traditional concerns about his sort of view suggest that internal existence might actually be of some metaphysical interest: concerns about consistency, for example, in connection with examples like “Meinong believed in the round square, so he believed in something,” or “Russell was interested in the internally nonexistent golden mountain, so he was interested in something.” If we treat these examples as Hofweber proposes to treat the Holmes example above, we are led to contradiction. These concerns seem particularly pressing given that Hofweber accepts a similar argument for the internal existence of the largest prime number.

Despite these reservations, the book is full of interesting arguments and insights, and it should be on the reading list for anyone interested in the metaontological matters that have received so much recent attention.—Chad Carmichael, Indiana University/Purdue University Indianapolis

LONGUENESSE, Béatrice. I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. xviii + 257 pp. Cloth, $45.00—Longuenesse’s book treats the topics of self-reference, self-consciousness, and naturalized self-emergence, with an eye toward producing a naturalized Kantian psychology. Kant is the focal point of this impressive study, that which we go “back” to, and return from: “back again” to the near present.

What Longuenesse is attempting is no easy task: she is seeking to naturalize Kant, in two senses. First, she is seeking to find a way to interpret Kant such that embodied cognition can play an essential role in a Kantian psychology. She does so by teasing out the uses of “I,” showing how various uses either do or do not rely upon consciousness of one’s own body. She claims a distinct place for Kant’s “I think” as independent of consciousness of one’s own body and a precondition for any use of “I,” while maintaining that knowledge of the “I” is dependent on embodied cognition. Second, she seeks to maintain a Kantian conception of pure
practical reason in conjunction with the Freudian thesis that it comes to be through a developmental process of internalization. She does this by incorporating aspects of Kant’s psychology into a Freudian naturalized account of the emergence of the ego and super-ego.

Chapter 1 helpfully summarizes the narrative of the book as well as the individual chapters. Part I, entitled “Back to . . .” comprises two chapters. The project of chapter 2 is to clarify Kant’s division between “I” as subject and “I” as object, comparing this division to Wittgenstein’s. She argues, against Gareth Evans, that it is the unity of consciousness, rather than the unity of an embodied entity, that is a necessary condition for any use of “I” at all. Chapter 3 expands on this conclusion through an examination of the ways in which uses of “I” relate to the body. Longuenesse argues here that Sartre, Anscombe, and Evans have neglected one type of self-consciousness: a prereflective, first-personal “I” that is not itself dependent on consciousness of the body. The result of these chapters is that Kant’s “I” as prereflective subject, which is a condition for the uses of “I” or forms of consciousness discussed in these twentieth-century authors, has yet to be explored in recent history. That brings us to Part II, “. . . Kant.”

Part II (chapters 4, 5, and 6) is a sustained interpretation of Kant’s psychology, particularly the relationship of the “I think” to the Paralogisms. Chapter 4 is a striking comparison of Descartes’s *cogito* to Kant’s “I think,” in which Longuenesse presents Kant as endorsing a version of Descartes’s *cogito* argument while rejecting Descartes’s answer to the question “What am I?” Chapters 5 and 6 go on to examine the first three Paralogisms. Consistent with the claims made in chapter 4, these two chapters show that for Kant, although I can know nothing about the “I” of “I think,” it represents an existing entity. These chapters thereby allow one to interpret Kant as offering a consciousness of one’s own existence based merely on thought. One can adopt this Kantian position and further maintain that to give any content to the “I” one needs embodied cognition.

In Part III, “. . . And Back Again,” Longuenesse brings these conclusions into conversation with Freud. Chapter 7 merges Freud’s account of the development of the ego with a Kant’s analysis of “I,” in order to produce a developmental, naturalistic account of Kant’s “I.” In chapter 8, she builds on this account to offer a naturalized, emergent account of Kantian practical reason, in parallel with Freud’s super-ego. Nevertheless, Longuenesse maintains that such naturalization does not undermine the binding nature of the emergent norms. An epilogue addresses several overarching questions concerning the narrative of the book.

This book will be of great interest to Kant scholars. In addition to its contribution to focused Kant scholarship, this book demonstrates the broader significance that Kant’s moral psychology has had and could continue to have. This book also offers immense clarity to various topics at the intersection of philosophy of mind and language: unity of consciousness and various types of self-awareness and self-reference.
One need not read the work in its entirety to appreciate its parts. Those interested in a particular figure or topic would benefit from reading the relevant chapters in isolation.

While many chapters were published previously, the book reads as a sustained argument for a striking conclusion. One’s opinion of whether Longuenesse succeeds in her project of offering a naturalized Kantian moral psychology will depend on how far one is willing to follow her modifications of Kant’s Critical philosophy, particularly in the final chapters. This book is essential reading for anyone invested in this project.—Naomi Fisher, Clark University


The book is laid out in five large chapters. The first begins by asking how desires can lead people’s lives to go badly and argues that making progress on this question requires asking what and under what circumstances desires can count as good reasons for action. This in turn leads to philosophical questions about goods themselves and therefore into the theory of practical reasoning. In contemporary philosophy this leads into the disagreements associated with the doctrine known now as “expressivism,” a successor to the emotivism that played such a key role in the early part of *After Virtue*, as expounded especially in the work of Alan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, supplemented by resources only to be found in Nietzsche and Harry Frankfort, the last of whom emerges as one of the most indicative moral thinkers of recent times. The chapter ends with a kind of impasse between expressivism and MacIntyre’s own neo-Aristotelian view. Expressivism does, however, seem to describe well the culture of modernity while also exposing incoherences in what MacIntyre calls throughout “Morality,” meaning the morality of modern West, a view that presents itself as the universal morality of all rational