Why Are You Proud of That? Cognitivism About “Possessive” Emotions

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Abstract: Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals. This cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique. I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985).

In Xenophon’s Socratic dialogue, Symposium, the dinner party guests discuss what they each find most worthy of pride [mega phronein]: Autolykos cites his father, Antisthenes his wealth, Kritoboulos his beauty, and Nikeratos his ability to recite Homer from memory. Socrates, ever surprising and forever shocking, refers to his ability to render people attractive to the entire community by claiming that he is most proud of his “skill as a pimp [mastropeia]” (1990, p. 238, 3.10)!
Clearly, the emotion of pride takes a wide range of objects. This heterogeneity makes accounting for the general relation between a person and the object of their pride particularly difficult. For the vastly different kinds of things that we are proud of—including our family members, our possessions, our physical appearance, and our abilities—seem to be related to us in different kinds of ways. Indeed, one would be forgiven for being skeptical of ever finding, as Hume put it, “that common circumstance, in which all these objects agree” (1978, p. 659-660).

Some philosophers argue that the concept of possession can help us to explain the unity underlying the heterogeneity of pride’s objects (Isenberg, 1949; Foot, 1958; Kenny, 1963; Davidson, 1976; Baier, 1980; Taylor, 1985). On this view, pride is an emotion that we feel towards what we judge to be valuable qualities in our possession. Arnold Isenberg provides the earliest systematic philosophical account of this kind: “The definition of pride, then, has three parts. There is (1) a quality which (2) is approved (or considered desirable) and (3) is judged to belong to oneself” (1949, p. 3). However, such a judgment appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient for pride. We may take pride in our grandparents’ achievements, even though we do not take ourselves to possess our grandparents or their achievements (or, at least, we no more take ourselves to “possess” them than we do our colleague’s grandparents or their achievements, about which pride may be unintelligible). On the other hand, we might not take pride in our health or our wealth, even if we judge that we possess these valuable qualities. So, it seems that possession cannot explain our partiality to the objects of our pride. But no other substantive account of this partiality relation appears to be viable.²
Some draw a general conclusion about the nature of emotions from the failure to substantively characterize this relation. Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson argue that this failure undermines the cognitivist or “quasijudgmentalist” framework commonly employed in the analysis of pride and other “possessive” emotions:

What sense can be made of the possessive pronouns that arise in glosses of pride, guilt, and many other emotions? We contend that by claiming thoughts of possession to be a necessary constituent of pride, the judgmentalist tradition has things backwards. The sense in which the club’s accomplishments belong to the fan is simply that he is able to be proud of them. It is, after all, “his team”—but in this sense only. Should the quasijudgmentalist fall back on the claim that the fan feels as if the triumph were his own, we would suggest that the only sense in which this is true is the trivializing sense: he is proud of it. (2003, pp. 135-136)

Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve, and thus conceptually depend upon, judgments (or other quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson argue that no such articulation is available in the case of possessive emotions like pride, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to possessive emotions, at least) is false. This conclusion, in turn, has profound meta-ethical significance. For it rescues from the charge of circularity the Humean project of understanding evaluative judgments in terms of emotional reactions (Foot, 1958).

My aim in this article is to propose and defend a cognitivist account of pride’s partiality relation without appealing to the concept of possession or belonging. I argue that taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your
life accords with some of your personal ideals. Such judgments, and the personal ideals that they are about, are explanatorily prior to, and specifiable independently of, one’s emotional responses. That is, what personal ideals one has is not cashed out in terms of, among other things, what one takes pride in; rather, what one takes pride in is cashed out in terms of what personal ideals one has—that is, in terms of what judgments one makes about the kind of life one should live. I thereby defend an account of the type that D’Arms and Jacobson argue cannot be found.

In Section 1, I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985). In Section 2, I sketch the personal ideals account of pride. In Section 3, I show that this account provides necessary (cognitive) conditions for feeling pride, as well as the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a token of pride accurately represents its intentional object, without invoking the concept of possession. I also address concerns that cognitivist accounts cannot plausibly explain the possibility of recalcitrant emotions.

Before beginning, I should clarify that this paper focuses on the occurrent emotion of pride, not pride understood as a dispositional or background emotion. This paper also does not engage with the literature about the character trait of pride and its relation to self-respect, humility, and other dispositions (Kristjánsson, 2001; Fischer, 2012 and 2016). My aim is to vindicate a cognitivist account of the occurrent emotion of pride, and to do so without appealing to any substantive conception of possession.
1. TAYLOR’S ACCOUNT OF EMOTIONAL POSSESSION

According to Gabriele Taylor, pride is founded upon the relation of belonging that is believed to hold between the self and the object of pride. To take pride in something, on Taylor’s view, is to see its belonging to oneself as an accomplishment. A person sees something as an accomplishment, Taylor says, when “she values it in that she sees it as being beyond her norm of expectations in the sense of it being better than for some reason or another she thinks she is, or others are, entitled to expect” (1985, p. 41).

The relation of belonging at play in Taylor’s account is in two respects more expansive than in Isenberg’s account. First, Taylor stresses that instances of the relation may have more than two places, e.g., that you and I belong to the same group. So my pride in my grandfather may be expressed as my seeing the fact that he and I belong to the same family as an achievement. Furthermore, as this example illustrates, Taylor proposes that the relevant sense of belonging is a multi-directional relation: the object of pride might belong to me; I might belong to the object of my pride (as with group pride); or I might belong to the same group as the object of my pride.

Second, Taylor expands the sorts of objects between which this relation can hold. Taylor offers the following illustrations:

…we may treat the case of ‘being responsible for’ as falling under the relation of belonging: where an agent is proud of something he has brought about, that which he has brought about would then be regarded as an event which ‘belongs’ to the agent in the sense that he is at least partially responsible for its existence. We may treat similarly the case where a person is proud not of something he has or has done, but is proud of standing in a certain relationship to a thing or person. He is proud not of his
beautiful house, but is proud of owning a house (any old house). ‘Owning a house’ is now what he sees as desirable and as ‘belonging’ to him. It may belong to him in the sense that it is a state he is responsible for having brought about. But ownership of that house may have fallen into his lap without any effort on his part. Then the ownership is a belonging of his in much the same way as his personal characteristic, his handsome face or his sense of humour, may be said to be belongings of his.

(1985, p. 32)

Taylor’s examples of pride are all plausible. Taylor rightly wants to ensure that her account captures not only pride in something one has or has done, but also pride in standing in a certain relationship to a thing or person. Not only might there be pride in one’s good deeds or one’s beautiful house, but, as Taylor notes, one might feel proud that one stands in the relation of moral responsibility or ownership to such things. In that event, one’s owning a house, and not the house itself, is what the person would see as belonging to herself. This distinction is delicate, but insightful. A person might easily be proud of having a garden or owning a nice piece of jewelry; more difficult to understand, and in any case very different, is a person who is proud of the garden or the jewelry itself.4

The question before us is whether the relation of belonging best makes sense of these examples. I suggest that it does not. When Taylor extends the sense of belonging, we are left with nothing more than the notion of predicing some quality or attribute of oneself. Recall that my pride in owning a house entails, on Taylor’s view, that I believe the attribute “owning a house” belongs to me. Taylor emphasizes that the sense of belonging need not be fleshed out with the owner’s being responsible for having brought his ownership about. He might have merely inherited the house. To see that “belonging” has come down to merely
predicating some quality or attribute of oneself, consider another example. Suppose I am proud of the fact that I don’t own a house (being a communist). On Taylor’s analysis, the quality, “not owning a house,” belongs to me. Even the property of living in the same world as Mark Rothko’s paintings belongs to me. These examples suggest that “belonging” excludes little, if anything.

While it is true that one can feel proud of nearly anything—that is, insofar as one can think the relevant proposition about nearly anything—an account of pride must have some content to it so that we might, when appropriate, deny that someone is related to the object of pride in a way that renders pride accurate. Such an account needs to explain not only the propriety, when it is appropriate, of my colleague feeling closely related her grandparent’s achievements; it must also explain the impropriety, when it is inappropriate, of my feeling closely related to those achievements. It must explain what is inaccurate or false, in cases where it is inaccurate or false, about my being proud of living in a world with Rothko’s paintings. Taylor intends to provide such an explanation by appeal to the idea of belonging. “Thinning out” the relation of belonging, though, removes its explanatory power. It cannot explain the error, in cases where it is erroneous, of my feeling partial to my colleague’s grandparents or Rothko’s paintings.

At one point, Taylor does confront the insufficiency of “belonging” to flesh out the emotional partiality that pride embodies: “It is of course a fact about a person that he belongs to this family, that country or profession, and it may be a fact to which he pays little or no attention. But if he is proud of his grandfather, his local football team, or his predecessor then it must be a fact that weighs with him” (1985, p. 31). The metaphor of weight adds much needed substance to the belonging relation. Perhaps what weighs with one, what one
sees as important, picks out the salient sense of partiality. This idea (undeveloped in Taylor’s work) is promising, and I develop it in a cognitivist direction in the following section. I conclude this section by noting that the weighing metaphor does the work that the belonging account was supposed to do. Given that Taylor’s is the most sophisticated belonging-based account of pride, my analysis of it supports D’Arms and Jacobson’s claim that “belonging” is a mere distraction in the analysis of pride.5

2. THE PERSONAL IDEALS ACCOUNT

Let us begin afresh. Based on my reading of the philosophical and psychological literature on pride, cited below, I claim that any adequate account of the emotion of pride must be able to explain (or, if need be, explain away) four paradigm cases of pride: achievement pride, gift pride, ownership pride, and group pride.

Achievement is the most commonly cited paradigm of pride (e.g., Solomon, 1976, p. 345; Tracy and Robbins, 2004, p. 173; Kauppinen, 2017). Watching the Olympic games supplies plenty of evidence for the prevalence of the view that pride in achievement is appropriate, and sometimes valuable. Notably, it does not appear that Olympians take pride in their bodily or mental qualities alone—they take pride in their victories (which are events), as well. A natural explanation is that the achievement, teleologically characterized, is thought to be pride-worthy. Call this the achievement paradigm of pride.

On the other hand, pride is sometimes directed towards qualities having nothing at all to do with one’s agency (e.g., Taylor, 1985; Tracy and Robbins, 2007, p. 149). A person might take pride in her god-given physical agility or in her booming voice. In American Pastoral, Philip Roth offers an example of the same general sort: “Just a little ways from the
church are The Oaks, a pair of two-hundred-year-old oak trees that are the town’s pride” (Roth, 1998, p. 167). Call this the gift paradigm of pride.

Between these two extremes lie paradigms involving varying degrees of agency. For instance, in Hume’s view, “the relation, which is esteem’d the closest, and which of all others produces most commonly the passion of pride, is that of property” (Hume, 1978, p. 309). Call this the ownership paradigm of pride. Pride in one’s possessions is unlike both achievement pride and gift pride. Ownership pride lacks the teleology of achievement pride. Indeed, someone’s pride in her house need not be based in any activity of hers since, as Taylor notes, she might have inherited it. On the other hand, ownership pride is distinct from gift pride since it reflects specific ownership rights that one may exercise, or transfer (Baier, 1980a, p. 140; Baier, 1980b, p. 405).

To these three paradigms of pride we must add group pride (Neu, 1998). Group pride is familiar in both public and private realms. Family pride, national pride, racial pride, ethnic pride, and LGBTQ pride are ubiquitous and often named as such, as are sports team pride and school pride. While there is disagreement about whether group pride is accurate or praiseworthy, it is of such historical and political significance that it counts as a paradigm of pride and so must be accounted for. Even immoral group pride, such as Aryan pride, counts as pride and so its intelligibility must be accounted for.

An appeal to the proud subject’s personal ideals helps to explain each of the four paradigm cases, and provides the key to developing a set of necessary judgments for feeling pride, as well as the conditions under which a token of pride accurately represents its intentional object. In particular, these cases all involve someone taking themself to be living in accordance with their personal ideals in virtue of the object of their pride.
Taking pride in something requires taking your relation to that thing to indicate that your life accords with some personal ideal of yours. Elizabeth Anderson succinctly characterizes such ideals as a person’s “conceptions of what kind of person she ought to be, what kinds of character, attitudes, concerns, and commitments she should have” (1993, p. 6). Such concerns and commitments may include personal relationships as well as individualistic projects. Like the possible objects of pride, the possible content of a person’s ideals is broad, tracking the many ways she might evaluate herself. It is easy to take for granted the role played by personal ideals in the explanation of a person’s pride, but appropriate thought-experiments bring this role to the fore.

To regard an event as a pride-worthy achievement involves regarding it as evidence of having the sort of character and commitments, or succeeding in the sorts of activities, that you think you should have or do. The proud Olympic medalist takes her victory to show that she has succeeded in contests that matter, or that she has the courage and tenacity of a champion. An athlete who has long aspired to such achievement, and who would evaluate herself poorly if she failed, would have reason to feel pride upon winning. On the other hand, when an Olympic medalist discovers that she is happy with, but not particularly proud of, setting a world record and personal best, the obvious interpretation is that she has discovered that such success doesn’t matter to her to any significant degree and hence is not significantly bound up with any of her personal ideals.

Does the claim that, like this Olympian, (1) you might discover which personal ideals you have (or lack) by observing what you take pride in conflict with the claim that (2) feeling pride and having personal ideals are cognitive states? You might think it does, if you assume that only non-cognitive states can be discovered like this. But I deny this assumption. Since
one often engages in cognitive activity without explicit awareness of having done so, and since such activity is often embedded in our unreflective interpretations of the world, we must distinguish between what one really thinks (broadly construed) and what one *thinks* one thinks. Discovering your personal ideals by noting what you take pride in is, in my view, discovering what you really think (and not merely how you non-cognitively respond or feel). Noticing when one does or doesn’t feel pride can help one discover the judgments embedded in one’s “cognitive sets”: cognitive mental states that, as Karen Jones puts it, “(1) focus attention, (2) direct inquiry, (3) shape interpretation, and (4) structure inference” (2004, p. 336; see also Calhoun, 1984). A cognitive account of pride need not say that pride requires the specific cognitive states of belief or otherwise easily articulated judgment.

Pride in one’s possessions, gifts, and membership in social groups also reflects aspects of one’s cognitive sets that relate to personal ideals. Ownership of fancy cars and houses is a matter of pride only when we evaluate ourselves in terms of whether our lifestyles are luxurious. Likewise with respect to gifts and group affiliations. If one is proud of one’s lustrous hair, one’s Japanese ancestry, one’s natural citizenship, or one’s sense of balance, then one must regard these qualities as mattering to whether one accords with one’s personal ideals. If one does not tend to experience pride in such things, then one is unlikely to care much about the relevant personal ideals. When a sibling, a citizen, or a musician says that she’s not proud of the excellences of her sister, country, or sense of rhythm, then we have compelling evidence that she is not committed to certain related personal ideals.

The correct attribution of pride depends upon the success conditions of the relevant personal ideal, and there is no reason to believe—and every reason to deny—that all personal ideals require some one substantive relation to hold between self and object. Rather, living
in accordance with different personal ideals requires substantively different relations to objects of pride. The success conditions for the ideal of being a great jazz pianist differ greatly from the success conditions for the ideal of being a great sports fan or being a great citizen. The conditions of partiality—that is, of what makes the object of my pride closely related to me—will differ in each case, though they are in each case a function of the relevant personal ideal.

This pluralistic feature of personal ideals provides the key for responding to D’Arms and Jacobson’s pessimistic conclusion about the prospects of a cognitivist account of emotional partiality. Although D’Arms and Jacobson are correct to note that there is no general and substantive set of necessary conditions for making sense of the possessiveness of the emotion of pride, that fact does not undermine the cognitivist account of pride under discussion.

3. CONSTITUTIVE COGNITIONS OF PRIDE

On the personal ideals-based account of pride sketched in the previous section, the following constitutive cognitions jointly individuate pride from other types of emotions:

(1) The descriptive judgment(s) that:

a. some object exists, did exist, or will exist;

b. some proposition is true;

c. some event occurred, is occurring, or will occur;

d. some relation obtains, obtained, or will obtain; or

e. some object had, has, or will have some property.
(2) The normative judgment that the content of the descriptive judgment(s) provides evidence that one is living in accordance with some of one’s personal ideals; and

(3) The normative judgment that the relevant personal ideals are worthy of one’s adoption or pursuit.

The discussion of the previous section provided a prima facie argument that tokening these three types of judgments is necessary for feeling pride at all. I also suggested that failing to feel pride on some occasion provides evidence that one fails to token one or more of these judgments. (I leave open the question of whether making these judgments suffices for feeling pride.)

These judgments are necessary constituents of pride. Pride differs from joy and delight insofar as it requires self-regarding normative judgments of the form listed above. Someone who satisfies condition (1) might feel joy or delight about getting the sugary dessert they wanted, even if getting or eating dessert is no part of their personal ideals (thus failing to satisfy conditions (2) and (3)). Taking pride in getting some sugary dessert is possible, I suppose, but only if you regard it as evincing that you are the kind of person you ought to be or that you have the kind of commitments you ought to have. Perhaps you struggled mightily to achieve the financial security that allows you to have this dessert. Or perhaps you regard this dessert as a gift that represents having the family life that you judge you ought to have.

These three conditions furthermore help to supply conditions under which one’s pride accurately represents its intentional object. For, one’s pride accurately represents its object (or, as I shall sometimes say, following D’Arms and Jacobson, one’s pride is fitting) just when these three judgments are true. So, while one can feel pride even if these judgments
are false, one’s pride is *accurate* (or fitting) just when they are all true. In this section, I discuss and defend the account largely in terms of accurate representation.

First, one’s pride accurately represents its intentional object only when it is descriptively accurate (condition (1)). Being disqualified from a race undermines the fittingness of pride about having won the race. Since pride may take various metaphysical kinds of intentional objects, this condition is disjunctive. If the intentional object is a proposition (e.g., I won the race) then the proposition must be true; if the object is an event (e.g., my victory) then it must have occurred; if the object is a relation between oneself and something (e.g., my ownership of the house), then the relation must obtain; and if the intentional object is a property of some individual (e.g., my athletic skill) then the individual must have that property.

Condition (2) concerns the relation between the object of pride, one’s personal ideals, and oneself: one’s pride accurately represents its object only when one lives in accordance with some of one’s personal ideals in virtue of that object. Whether this condition is satisfied on any given occasion may be a matter of normative controversy. On some conceptions of humility, for example, a humble person holds such high standards for themself that they rarely or never satisfy this condition. Consider Gandhi’s remarks about whether the activities for which he is famous show that he lived in accordance with his ideals: “The more I reflect and look back on the past, the more vividly do I feel my limitations … If anything that I write in these pages should strike the reader as being touched with pride, then he must take it that there is something wrong with my quest, and that my glimpses are no more than mirage” (1957, pp. xii; xiv).
Some instances of pride clearly violate this condition, though. A great movie critic who is also a snob might mistakenly judge that her good taste in movies reflects a general intellectual or ethical excellence that is absent in those who lack her aesthetic discernment; and someone who is not only proud of his family but also an aristocratic snob might mistakenly conclude from his grand heritage that his own pursuits and interests are honorable. (Of course, not all great movie critics or descendants of great families are snobs.) Thomas Hill, Jr. correctly argues that at the core of snobbery lies the “disposition to count people as worthy of ‘honor’ and ‘contempt’ on inadequate grounds, in inappropriate contexts, or to an unfitting degree” (Hill, 1991, p. 162). If so, then, because of this failure of normative judgment, the snob tends to violate pride’s second fittingness condition.\footnote{11}

Condition (3) concerns the normative status of the relevant personal ideals themselves: the personal ideals in accordance with which one takes oneself to be living must be worthy of adoption or pursuit. For, on my view, a person has a personal ideal when and only when, and because, she judges it (implicitly or explicitly) to be worthy of adoption or pursuit. So, the judgment that one has met some of one’s own ideals presupposes that one judges the ideal or ideals to be worthy in this way. Thus, the worthiness of one’s personal ideal stands to pride exactly as danger stands to fear: one can be mistaken about such worthiness or danger and, when that is so, such a mistake renders one’s pride or fear inaccurate. So taking pride in something involves not only representing some action, say, as indicating that one is living in accordance with a personal ideal; it also involves representing this personal ideal as worthy of one’s adoption or pursuit. It follows that fitting pride accurately represents the relevant personal ideal as being worthy of the subject’s adoption or pursuit. (Note that, as in the case of pride in one’s ancestors, the object of pride supplied by
condition (1a) may not be adoptable or pursuable. Rather, in such cases what one judges to be worthy of adoption or pursuit is some personal ideal, such as having a wonderful family.\textsuperscript{12} This consideration delivers the third and final condition.

The third condition excludes the possibility of accurate pride being based in an unworthy ideal. On this account, a white supremacist’s pride in “white culture,” say, is not merely odious but in addition fails to accurately portray its object—in particular, it fails to accurately portray its object because it is odious. (Here I assume without argument that the personal ideals undergirding such white pride are unworthy of adoption or pursuit.) Such a consequence invites the charge that this condition imposes extraneous normative standards upon the internal logic of pride. Let us consider this charge in more detail.

One might argue, as follows, that morally appalling pride can be accurate, for reasons analogous to why morally appalling fear can be accurate. A racially motivated instance of fear might be accurate even if the racist attitudes motivating it are morally odious (e.g., if, by chance, the object of fear really is threatening). Analogously, one might urge that the racist’s pride can accurately represent its object, and that their fault lies not in any misrepresentation but, instead, in the viciousness of taking pride in that object. Here I am imagining that the racist judges, say, that her having only white friends is evidence that she lives in accordance with her racist ideals. And, indeed, this judgment might be true. So why not conclude that such pride is fitting?

The issue comes down to whether considerations about the worthiness of the subject’s ideals are included in the representational content of pride. I believe that the commonly acknowledged fact that only a racist would take pride in this so-called achievement precludes the possibility that it is pride-worthy. For, once one acknowledges the worthlessness of the
ideal driving one’s pride one should see that there is simply nothing to be proud of—just as one should see that there is nothing to fear once we acknowledge the harmlessness of the object of fear. By contrast, the fact that only a racist would be afraid in some scenario does not preclude the possibility that the apparent threat renders fear fitting. For even if one acknowledged that one’s fears were racially motivated, one’s fear could still accurately represent the world: that is, the object of one’s fear could really be dangerous. Therefore, the argument by analogy fails. Pride has normative content in a way that fear does not and, so, the third condition does not impose extraneous normative standards upon it.

What about the person who discovers that she takes pride in what she judges to be unworthy of pride? Imagine an anti-war American who feels pride when learning of her country’s latest military conquest, even though she consciously and sincerely denies that this is worthy of pride. This type of example might suggest that pride does not involve judgment at all. For, pride can be recalcitrant to reasoning in a way that beliefs and other judgments typically cannot be.

Several responses are in order, and ultimately a full account of recalcitrant judgment would be required to give a satisfying response to the objection. I do not attempt to provide such an account here, since the main burden of this paper is merely to articulate a non-possession account of the cognitions involved in feeling pride. What follows are sketches of a cognitivist account of recalcitrant emotion.

First, to be clear, all parties agree that the fact that emotions sometimes conflict with judgments does not entail that emotions do not involve judgments. For, all parties allow for the possibility—and, perhaps, commonality—of conflicting judgments, especially judgments concerning matters in which the stakes are high and the evidence is uncertain (as often occurs
regarding what is most important in life). We must not merely assume that consistency of one’s judgments is statistically normal and that irrationality is rare, let alone impossible.

Second, we should also grant the possibility—and commonality—of self-deception and other obstacles to self-knowledge, especially self-knowledge about cognitions relating to personally significant matters. When a jealous person consciously and sincerely rejects the judgments that the cognitivist claims jealousy involves, the epistemic status of such rejection is unclear. Should Othello’s therapist believe him if he sincerely denies doubting Desdemona’s love for him?\(^\text{15}\)

Third, and relatedly, when emotions stubbornly conflict with judgments, we must not assume that the recalcitrance lies with the emotion. (One should certainly not build this assumption into our definition of recalcitrance, as D’Arms and Jacobson appear to do when they initially characterize it thus: “We will say that an emotion is *recalcitrant* when it exists despite the agent’s making a judgment that is in tension with it” (2003, p. 129).) In some circumstances, one’s emotions may be more reasons-responsive than are the beliefs that conflict with them. In such cases we should say that the belief (not the emotion) is recalcitrant. Some Huck Finn-like “reverse akratic” cases illustrate this possibility.

Fourth, explaining emotional recalcitrance in terms of the interaction between (non-cognitive) emotional and (cognitive) linguistic evaluative systems, as D’Arms and Jacobson appear to do, fails to explain whatever recalcitrance there might be within the linguistic system itself, of which a separate explanation would be needed. And, indeed, beliefs are also sometimes recalcitrant to judgment (Peacock, 1999, pp. 242-243; Gendler, 2008, fn. 26; Schwitzgebel, 2010). Their explanation of emotional recalcitrance thus carries the price of
precluding a unified explanation of recalcitrance, one that accounts for recalcitrance in belief, emotion, and desire.

Finally, as discussed in Section 2, judgments need not be beliefs or even belief-like—they may instead be embedded in cognitive sets, which may be highly resistant to reasoning due to their etiology and their pervasive functional roles in mental life (Calhoun, 1984).

Again, these responses are not intended to conclusively show that cognitivism about emotions can explain the possibility of recalcitrant emotion. But to my mind, they suggest that the possibility of recalcitrant emotion is far from being decisive against cognitivism.

Returning now to the third condition of the personal ideals account of pride—namely, that the relevant personal ideal is worthy of one’s adoption or pursuit—we should consider which ideals are worthy. It would be an exceedingly large task to develop a theory of worthy ideals with which we could sharpen this condition, since that topic includes and extends beyond all of normative ethics. Indeed, one might deny that any headway whatsoever can be made in developing a philosophical account of the worthiness of ideals. I disagree. Again, a cognitivist can accept that intuitions about the conditions under which pride is accurate guide us in determining which ideals are worthy. For even if pride’s accuracy is analyzed partly in terms of ideals’ worthiness, our intuitions about the former can help us to discover what we really think (and not merely what we think) about the latter. So, while it is true that discussion about the worthiness of a personal ideal must avoid excessive moralizing about what a person should care about (for what a person cares about partially constitutes the particular person that she is and helps to make her life worthwhile), I will briefly, and without argument, suggest that the following two necessary conditions for the worthiness of a personal ideal are worthy of further consideration.
One promising, though highly controversial, condition is that living in accordance with a worthy personal ideal must not require the violation of any moral obligations. (Again, I do not propose this condition in order to saddle this account of pride with controversial claims about the categorical nature of moral reasons; rather, I wish only to allude to one dispute that must be resolved in order to completely flesh out the account.) Reflection on our intuitions about whether, say, certain examples of “white pride” accurately represent the world suggest that some ideals, like white supremacy, are unworthy on moral grounds.

A second possible condition on the worthiness of a personal ideal is that living in accordance with it must enhance the meaningfulness of one’s life (Kauppinen, 2017). Trivial personal ideals, such as being the best jelly bean counter, appear to fail this test, at least insofar as examples of pride taken in such “achievements” strike us as being inaccurate. However, I will leave discussion of these controversial matters for another time.

4. CONCLUSION
The personal ideals account of pride reveals as quixotic the search for a single partiality relation, like possession, that holds in all cases of fitting pride. There is no substantive special relation that all proud agents take, in virtue of their being proud, to hold between themselves and the objects of their pride. Existing accounts of the pride relation cannot make good sense of all paradigm cases of pride. The personal ideals account, on the other hand, allows that each personal ideal sets its own success conditions—living up to some ideals requires the exercise of one’s agency, while others require, say, mere ownership or familial connections. There is no relation that all people, with respect to all worthy ideals, bear to each thing that counts in favor of their living in accordance with their ideals.
The personal ideals account provides a non-vacuous and non-circular (even if only schematic) explanation of which relations ground pride: a person takes pride in something only if they take their relation to it to indicate that they are living in accordance with a personal ideal of theirs. Thus, I reject the skeptical conclusion regarding cognitivism about the emotions that D’Arms and Jacobson have drawn from the fact that there is no substantive account of emotional partiality available in the case of pride. For the characterization in terms of personal ideals is conceptually independent of pride, and so provides a (non-circular) explanation of what any given person is disposed to be proud of.

The personal ideals account, unlike the possession account, also explains the intuition that pride is often importantly tied to agency. Our personal ideals help to structure our identities as the particular agents that we are. Moreover, worthy personal ideals typically provide norms that govern our actions, emotions, and thoughts, for which we are, typically, morally responsible.

Finally, the personal ideals account of pride—though it is a cognitivist account—does not entail that experiencing pride involves conscious and easily articulable judgments. A person’s ideals—their conceptions of what sort of character, projects, relationships, and interests they should have—are often inchoate and difficult to identify and articulate. Further work is needed in order to make sense of the very nature and ethical significance of such ideals, and to make sense of the ways in which we manifest our commitments to personal ideals in our feelings, thoughts, and actions.\textsuperscript{17}
REFERENCES


1 See also Xenophon (1990, pp. 249-251, 4.56-64).

2 For discussion and critique of the proposal that this partiality should be understood in terms of one’s moral responsibility for the existence or excellence of the object of pride, see Fischer (2017b).

3 For two accounts of pride that invoke personal ideals, though in different ways, see Helm (2010) and Fischer (2017b).

4 Thanks to Rachel Fredericks for this example.

5 One might object that the weighing metaphor does not take the place of the belonging relation because the former is an evaluative condition that has to do with favorably valuing the object of pride rather than with being closely related to it. This is not so, as we can see by considering that failures and other non-achievements can also weigh with one in the forms of regret and grief. We hope, for example, that a war criminal’s actions come to weigh with him. So, whether something weighs with one is independent of whether one values it favorably.

6 See also Tracy and Robbins, who note, citing the example of feeling pride for an Olympic winner from one’s own country, “the collective self … can be an important elicitor of self-conscious emotions” (2004, p. 174).

For recent work on personal ideals, see Velleman (2002), Buss (2004), Brownlee (2010a and 2010b), Fischer (2017a), and Riggle (2017).

In a similar spirit, Roberts observes of the pride relation that “We are tempted to try to reduce this attributed relationship to some essence. Perhaps we can do no better than to enumerate the kinds of relationship in terms of which people can feel pride; the essential point is that, whatever these are, they are such that the subject sees whatever he is proud of as reflecting well on his own worth” (2003, p. 276).

In other words, unlike fear and hope, pride is “factive” and not merely “epistemic,” in the sense that my accurate pride in the fact that I won the race entails that I won the race. On the other hand, my fear that I will fail can be accurate even if, once the time comes, I happen to succeed, and my hope that we will prevail can be accurate even if, once the time comes, we fail. See Chakrabarti (1992) for related discussion of whether “S is proud that p” entails “p.”

Wittgenstein offers what is, perhaps, another case that fails to satisfy condition (2): “When I have had a picture suitably framed or have hung it in the right surroundings I have often caught myself being as proud as though I had painted the picture” (1980, p. 17e).

I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for pressing me to articulate this claim.

The truth of this claim is consistent with the fact that the racist himself would disagree with this assessment, since I assume that the worthiness of an ideal is an objective matter.

This argument does not purport to establish that the standards of worthiness for personal ideals are objective. Rather, it shows merely that in feeling pride, one judges one’s personal ideal(s) to be worthy of adoption or pursuit. However, even if this third condition were non-
cognitive, the objection to D’Arms and Jacobson’s noncognitivist argument could still succeed if the other two conditions were cognitive and non-possessive. That objection requires only that there is a plausible account of pride as involving at least one judgment and no judgments about possession.

15 Accounts of recalcitrance also must carefully distinguish emotional attitudes from generalized anxiety, a phenomenon sometimes conflated with jealousy or fear. Minding this distinction is especially important when discussing cases like irrational aversion to flying or to harmless spiders.

16 For discussion of how personal ideals ought to be evaluated, see Hare (1963), especially Sections 8 and 9, “Ideals” and “Toleration and Fanaticism”; Strawson (1961); and Rescher (1987).

17 I am grateful to Rachel Fredericks, Angela Smith, William Talbott, Ingra Schellenberg, David Keyt, members of the Calgary Ethics Research Group, including Ann Levey, Noa Latham and David Dick, and two referees of Southwest Philosophy Review for helpful comments and discussion on earlier drafts of this article.