

# DEPENDENT BEAUTY AND PERFECTION IN KANT'S AESTHETICS

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## Abstract

This paper attacks an account of Kant's controversial distinction between "free" and "dependent" beauty. I present three problems—The Lorland problem, The Crawford Problem, and the problem of intrinsic relation—that are shown to be a consequence of various interpretations of Kant's distinction. Next, I reconstruct Robert Wicks' well-known account of dependent beauty as "the appreciation of teleological style" and point out a key equivocation in the statement of Wicks' account: the judgment of dependent beauty can be thought to consist in comparing any two objects' teleological styles either in respect of how or in respect of how well each realizes a common purpose. I argue that this equivocation forces Wicks into a dilemma: either he must assert the impossibility of ugliness or he must assert that the judgment of dependent beauty is reducible to the judgment of perfection. Either way, he denies important theoretic desiderata.

## I. INTRODUCTION

In the "Analytic of the Beautiful" Kant draws a controversial distinction between "free" beauty and "dependent" or "adherent" beauty:

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) or merely adherent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). The first presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it. The first are called (self-subsisting) beauties of this or that kind; the latter as adhering to a concept (conditional beauty), are ascribed to objects that stand under the concept of a particular end. . . . Flowers are free beauties. . . . But the beauty of a human being (and in this species that of a man, a woman, or a child), the beauty of a horse, of a building (such as a church, a palace, an

arsenal, or a garden-house) presuppose a concept of the end that determines what the thing should be, hence a concept of its perfection, and is thus merely adherent. (Kant 1790, p. 114)

What tracks the difference between "free" and "adherent" (or dependent) beauty is that the latter presupposes, while the former does not, a concept of perfection, which entails two related concepts—the concept of "what the object ought to be" and "the concept of a particular end." Thus, to follow Donald Crawford, if Kant's distinction is to be tracked in this way, then the distinction between free beauty and dependent beauty should be understood as a distinction between distinct kinds of *judgment*.

In order to understand Kant's free/dependent beauty distinction, some discussion of the judgment of perfection will be helpful. Kant distinguishes two kinds of objective purposiveness:

Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e. the utility of the object, or internal, i.e., its perfection. (Kant 1790, p. 111)

What is essentially the difference between the two? Kant says:

To judge objective purposiveness we always require the concept of an end, and [if that purposiveness is not to be an external one (utility), but an internal one], we require the concept of an internal end, which contains the ground of the internal possibility of the object. (Kant 1790, p. 112)

There are two things to note here. First, Kant says that judgments of objective purposiveness, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, require the concept of an end and, secondly, that the difference between the two lies in a difference in the kind of *end-concept* required. According to Kant judgments of utility require an end-concept which is *external*, while judgments of perfection require an end-concept which is *internal*, to the possibility of the object.

But we may still be unclear about what it is for the concept of an end to be either internal or external to the possibility of an object. Kant states the following:

[A] Now as an end in general is that the concept of which can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself, [B] thus in order to

represent an objective purposiveness in a thing the concept of what sort of thing it is is supposed to be must come first; [C] and the agreement of the manifold in the thing with this concept (which supplies the rule for the combination of the manifold in it) is the qualitative perfection of a thing. Quantitative perfection, as the completeness of any thing in its own kind, is entirely distinct from this, and is a mere concept of magnitude (totality), in which what the thing is supposed to be is thought of as already determined and it is only asked whether everything that is requisite for it exists. (Kant 1790, p. 112)

Here Kant draws a distinction between two kinds of perfection—qualitative and quantitative. At present we are concerned only with qualitative perfection. As already observed in the citation preceding this one, Kant thinks that a judgment of objective purposiveness requires reference to the concept of an end. In the above citation, Kant appears to infer [B] from [A], which suggests that a given end-concept is to be regarded as either external or internal to the possibility of an object depending on whether the determination that the object has a given end, E, presupposes the prior determination that it is a thing of a given kind, K. If it does, then the end-concept is internal; if not, then the end-concept is external.

But one might suggest that there are at least two possible directions of implication: on one hand, identifying an object as being of a certain kind K may imply that it has such and such a function; on the other hand, identifying the function that a thing is supposed to serve may imply that it is supposed to be a thing of a certain kind. Is Kant interested in the function-to-kind implication or the kind-to-function implication or both?

Let me illustrate what I think Kant has in mind. Suppose that I observe: "This ashtray makes a good paperweight." Here I make a judgment of utility. Ashtrays generally are not made to be paperweights, although some can be useful as such. Thus the fact that an ashtray makes a bad paperweight does not necessarily make it a bad ashtray because being a good paperweight is not the sort of thing that an ashtray is supposed to be. Ashtrays are supposed to be things of a different kind, and the kind of thing that they are supposed to be is conceptually determined by the characteristic function that they are supposed to serve (to collect cigarette remains, say).

Suppose, however, that I observe "This ballpoint pen writes well." Here I make a judgment of perfection. Functioning as a writing instrument is not "external" to [being] a ballpoint pen in the way that functioning as a

paperweight is external to being an ashtray. On the contrary, writing is what ballpoint pens are *for*. So serving the end of writing is an end-concept that is internal to the possibility of a thing's being a ballpoint pen. Accordingly, representing x as a good ballpoint pen depends on representing x as a thing serviceable for writing.

Once it is determined that a given object is supposed to be a thing of a given kind, K, then an assessment (of the kind referred to by [C] above) can be made as to how well the object fulfills its characteristic end, E. To make such an assessment is to make a judgment of qualitative perfection. When I make a judgment of qualitative perfection I essentially judge of a particular item that

- (1) x is a thing of kind K.
- (2) x, *qua* K, is supposed to serve such and such a purpose, function, or end.
- (3) x's being a *good* K depends on how well x fulfills the end that Ks are supposed to serve.

Let us call the end a thing has or is supposed to serve in virtue of [its] being a thing of kind K its K-determined end.

Now having briefly discussed the structure of the judgment of perfection, let us return to Kant's free/dependent beauty distinction. Kant's distinction has raised a number of important objections, one of which by Ruth Lorand. Lorand claims that if Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty is to be understood as one that implies two distinct kinds of aesthetic judgment—those that presuppose a concept of perfection and those that do not—then the analysis of aesthetic judgment presented in the "Analytic of the Beautiful" can not constitute a single unified theory. Instead, Kant is to be understood as giving two distinct analyses, one for aesthetic judgments that do take into account a thing's *end*, and a second for those aesthetic judgments that do not. Call this The Lorand Problem.

As Dennis Dutton correctly observes, if we take the Lorand Problem seriously, we have exactly three exclusive options. First, we can deny that there are judgments of free beauty. Or, second, we can deny that there are judgments of dependent beauty. Or, third, we assert that there are cases of free beauty and dependent beauty and that Kant's aesthetic theory is to be understood as a single account of both kinds of aesthetic judgment, and subsequently try to resolve The Lorand Problem. Dutton argues that The Lorand Problem is basically insoluble and that therefore we must take the

first option. To assert that free beauty exists, he argues, involves asserting the existence of a phenomenon that consists in being a "presuppositionless, 'self-subsistent' form to be experienced in a conceptual vacuum . . ." (Dutton 1994, p. 238).

Dutton's alternative does not enjoy wide support among the interpreters of Kant's theory of beauty, and the reason is that there is significant textual support against it. For this reason some interpreters—notably, Martin Gammon and Henry Allison—maintain that Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty must be upheld; moreover, they argue that Kant's distinction can be upheld and The Lorand Problem avoided. This group of interpreters, so-called "complex" or "hybrid" theorists, hold that a judgment of dependent beauty consists in a complex, the two components of which are a judgment of free beauty and a judgment of perfection. Hence the judgment of dependent beauty is not a distinct kind of *aesthetic* judgment. Rather it is a conjunction consisting of two judgments, one of which is an aesthetic judgment—"x is beautiful"—and the second of which is a judgment of perfection—"x realizes (to some degree) the end in accord with, or characteristic of, things of kind K."

The obvious benefit of the complex view is that it does not posit, in addition to the judgment of free beauty, a second kind of aesthetic judgment, of dependent beauty. However, there are at least two conditions of theoretical adequacy that the theory of judgments of dependent beauty must meet. On the one hand, an account of judgments of dependent beauty requires that the imagination enjoy "free play" in its selection of the means to a given representational end. On the other, for an account to be adequate it must be capable of showing why making a judgment of dependent beauty is not merely to assert the conjunction that "x is beautiful and x is to realize the end in accord with being a member of kind K" but to judge that "x is beautiful because x realizes an end which is in accord with, or characteristic of, things of kind K". If it is to express more than the sum of the parts of the conjunctive judgment, the robust judgment of beauty must assert in addition to each of these two components the further judgment that they stand in some conceptual or "positive" or "intrinsic" relation. Call the problem of showing how judging a thing's perfection can be a determining factor to judging its beauty *the problem of intrinsic relation*.

The two theories of Kant's free/dependent beauty distinction that most directly address the problem of intrinsic relation are the accounts given by

Donald Crawford and Robert Wicks. According to Crawford's account, cases of dependent beauty are cases in which the beauty of a thing is a function of its perfection. If an end's "being in accord with" or "being characteristic of" a thing of kind K is *identical to* the end of *being* a thing of that kind, then the beauty I experience in relation to a thing of a kind K will be determined by the extent to which it *succeeds* in being a thing of that kind. When I judge, for example, that a Porsche Boxer is beautiful, I am not merely issuing the judgment, "This is beautiful *and* this is a Porsche Boxer." Rather, the beauty I judge in relation to the vehicle is determined by the extent to which it realizes the end of being the kind of vehicle it ought to be. So when I judge, "This Porsche Boxer is beautiful," I judge that it is so in virtue of the fact that it is a *good instance* of its make, model and year.

Crawford's account has been attacked on the basis that it fails to satisfy an important theoretical requirement. While his account seems to steer clear of The Lorand Problem, Crawford's account, argues Wicks, collapses the distinction between judgments of dependent beauty and judgments of perfection. On Crawford's account, since judging a thing of kind K to be beautiful consists in judging it in terms of the degree to which it realizes the end of being a thing of that kind, any morphologically sound instance of, say, the species "Stinkbug" should be judged to have some degree of beauty. Hence the general problem with Crawford's account is that it locates every instance of kind K within a *continuum of beauty* in accord with the particular degree to which each instance of K succeeds in realizing the end of being a thing of kind K. Call this The Crawford Problem.

Wicks praises Paul Guyer's account as "the most convincing and often recited interpretation of dependent beauty to date," but his major criticism is that Guyer's position fails to adequately address the problem of intrinsic relation (Wicks 1997, p. 389). On Guyer's account, a free beauty judgment is made in accord with certain constraints that are imposed on it by a judgment of perfection. When, for example, I issue a judgment of dependent beauty in reference to a church, my judgment "presupposes" a judgment of perfection—"This building is (to be) a church"—which determines a proscribed range of properties—church-frustrating or church-interfering properties—on which I am not permitted to ground my judgment of free beauty. So in the event that I judge a church to be beautiful, the ground of my judgment cannot be the pleasing graffiti, displayed on its

walls, because graffiti (regarded as vandalism) is a church-interfering property.

According to Wicks, the problem with Guyer's account is that it fails to explain how a judgment of dependent beauty can presuppose a judgment of perfection in a "positive" or "intrinsic" way. For we do not explain why *x* is beautiful on account of the fact that *x* realizes the end characteristic of things of kind *K* by explaining that our judgment of *x*'s beauty is not based on any *K*-frustrating or *K*-interfering properties exhibited by *x*. Rather we want an explanation which shows how *x*'s realizing the end characteristic of things of kind *K* can positively contribute to *x*'s beauty.

Wicks attempts to steer a course between the accounts of Guyer and Crawford. On the one hand, Wicks wants to enjoy the "intrinsic" or "positive" relation that is forged between beauty and perfection in Crawford's account, while, on the other hand, he wants to avoid The Crawford Problem. Since Guyer's account avoids reducing dependent beauty to perfection, Wicks sees Guyer, not Crawford, as the closer theoretical affiliate; however, Wicks claims that since his account of dependent beauty does not fail, as Guyer's does, to provide a solution to the problem of intrinsic relations, his own account enjoys greater theoretical adequacy.

A second crucial desideratum, however, has been mentioned which any theoretically adequate interpretation of Kant's free/dependent beauty distinction must also meet. According to Kant a judgment counts as an aesthetic judgment, only if it has the proper "determining ground." The proper ground for aesthetic judgments is an intra-subjective fact that is revealed to the subject only through an act of reflection. The intra-subjective fact revealed to reflection consists in a harmonious relation between the subject's cognitive powers—the imagination and the understanding—that Kant describes as "free play."

In "Dependent Beauty as the Appreciation of Teleological Style," Robert Wicks attempts to meet the two crucial theoretic desiderata by arguing two claims. First, "[a] positive or intrinsic relation between beauty and perfection is captured by the interpretation of dependent beauty as teleological style—call this The Intrinsicness Claim—which asserts that his account shows how, in cases of dependent beauty, a thing's perfection positively contributes to its beauty (Wicks 1997, p. 393). Second, Wicks claims that his account is *free-play preserving*.

In what follows I argue that a crucial equivocation is made in the statement of Wicks' account of dependent beauty. When we appreciate any two object's teleological styles under a given concept of perfection, we must compare them either in respect of merely *how*, or of *how well*, each fulfills the purpose or function as specified by that concept of perfection. Since The Intrinsicness Claim must be grounded on either of two competing interpretations of what the appreciation of teleological style consists in, Wicks faces a dilemma, each horn of which requires the denial of crucial theoretic desiderata.

## II. WICKS' ACCOUNT OF "IMAGINATION-CENTERED" FREE PLAY

In cases of dependent beauty, Wicks states that "[t]he kind of pleasure involved here is based on the free play which occurs in our imagination when we reflect upon the various ways to realize any given purpose, i.e., the process typical of imagining how to realize any plan" (Wicks 1997, p. 393). Following Wicks, then, let us cast the imagination as the *starring agent*, the essential role of which is to select a means to fulfill a given representational end.

How is the imagination's representational end determined? In cases of dependent beauty our aesthetic judgment "presupposes" a concept of perfection, which in turn determines two things. First, the presupposition of a given concept of perfection determines a given specification of the concept of kind K and, second, it determines a specification of a given end, E, which is in accord with, or characteristic of, things of that kind. Here I assume that an end, E, is "characteristic of" things of kind K, under a given specification of K, iff K is End-determining. A given kind K, is End-determining iff a thing of kind K has, or is supposed to serve, E as its end in virtue of being a thing of that kind. Now if the imagination is to realize its *representational end*, as determined by a specification of kind K, it must correctly represent the *object's end* to be one that is characteristic of things of that kind. Thus the successful realization of the imagination's *representational end* will consist in representing its object so as to be appropriately subsumable to (1) the specification of kind K and (2) the corresponding specification of the object's perfection, where this consists in representing its object to have the relevant K-determined end.



There are many ways to representationally skin a cat, and if the way you select produces a cat unskinned, then it is a way to skin a cat. Wicks recognizes this, when he says, "[i]n general, there is no 'definitive' way to realize a given purpose, and any imagined way to realize a given purpose is 'perfect' insofar as it does indeed realize that given purpose" (Wicks 1997, p. 393). The imagination may fulfill a given representational end in various ways, provided it selects a means from among an appropriate range—the appropriate range being prescribed by the particular concept of perfection. Now the appropriate range of means to a given representational end will coincide with the range of what Wicks calls "teleological styles." Every teleological style falling into the appropriate range as determined by a given concept of kind K corresponds to a permissible way of instantiating that concept. Let us call the appropriate range from which the imagination is permitted to select various means to fulfill its representational end the range of its *subsumptive freedom*. Thus the imagination's enjoyment of subsumptive freedom in relation to a given concept of kind K may be understood to *constitute* its enjoyment of "imagination-centered free play."

To see how, consider the following example. Though it is finite, the appropriate range from which the imagination may select the means to represent an object under the concept of as an economy car does afford the imagination a range of subsumptive freedom. In fulfilling this representational end, the imagination may, but need not, represent its object as a Honda Hatchback, a Toyota Tercel, a Volkswagon Bug, etc. So long as the imagination selects a means that is appropriately subsumable to the concept of an economy car, the imagination's representation of its object conforms to the rule determined by that concept. In such an event, the imagination enjoys harmonious free play, because the imagination's act of representing an object as, say, a Honda Hatchback under the concept of an economy car is both *free*—in that it could have represented its object otherwise under that concept—and *harmonious*—in that its representation of the object is rule-governed (i.e., in conformity with the rule imposed by the concept of an economy car) and therefore in accord with the understanding's general demand for representations which are concept-subsumable.

### III. THE "HOW" VERSUS "HOW WELL" INTERPRETATION

According to Wicks' account the subject's appreciation of teleological style does not depend solely on the imagination's enjoyment of free play but also on an act of reflective comparison. The subject who experiences dependent beauty does so as a result of contemplating the "contingency" of an actual object's structural configuration (i.e., actual teleological style). But such contemplation requires that the subject compare the object's actual configuration with various alternatives that he brings before his mind by means of an act of reflection. But here Wicks equivocates in his statement of *the respect in which* the subject is to reflectively compare the object's actual structural configuration with various others that fall within the appropriate range. Here is but one such instance:

The imagination-centered free play of the cognitive faculties in response to the object's systematic configuration issues from our reflection upon *how* that configuration stands as one among many possible ways to realize the object's purpose. Since the defined purpose of the object is an abstract concept, and as such can therefore never fully determine every contingent detail of its concrete instantiation, what we appreciate in positively judging the object in reference to dependent beauty is the contingency of the way the object realizes its purpose *so very well*. In short, we appreciate the object's "teleological" or "functional" style when we appreciate it as a dependent beauty. (Wicks 1997, pp. 392-393, emp. added)

On the "how" interpretation, the subject is required to compare a given teleological style with, not against, another teleological style, such that none are regarded as better than, or superior to, any other style falling into the appropriate range. On the "how well" interpretation, however, the comparison requires that a given teleological style be *evaluated against* various other styles and therefore that a given teleological style must ultimately be seen in a comparatively superior light if the subject is to experience any aesthetic pleasure in relation to it.

Judging merely *how* an object goes about being realizing the end characteristic of things of kind K requires a specification of kind K and thus a corresponding specification of the object's K-determined end. The object's K-determined end will determine the appropriate range of means—i.e., the appropriate range of teleological styles—with which its own actual style may be compared. For example, suppose that I am comparing two

objects—say, Honda Hatchback and a Toyota Tercel—in respect of how, not how well, each is an economy car. In such a comparison, the two cars are not being compared against each other in reference to certain functional or performance criteria in order to determine which car is the superior economy car. Rather, the two cars are being compared simply in respect of how each constitutes a different way of going about being the sort of thing it ought to be. By contrast, when I compare the two vehicles in respect of how well each goes about being an economy car, I evaluate each in reference to a criteria which determines *how good* a car of that kind each is. Thus, in such cases, I am not interested in judging merely whether an individual is a way it is required to be to be an economy car *at all* but with whether and to what extent it is the way it must be to be a *good* economy car.

#### IV. AGAINST THE "HOW" INTERPRETATION

On Wicks' account, if the reflective subject is to make a judgment of dependent beauty and thus to experience some positive degree of aesthetic pleasure in relation to the actual object which he judges, then the determinate concept of perfection that is presupposed by the judgment of dependent beauty must offer a sufficient range of subsumptive freedom. Moreover, the subject must become *reflectively aware* of (some portion of) that range, such that, the subject makes a comparison of the various means of representing an object under the presupposed determinate concept of perfection, either in respect of how, or of how well, any two means fulfills the end of representing an object under that particular concept. The imagination's enjoyment of a range of subsumptive freedom relative to a determinate concept of perfection is understood to constitute its enjoyment of free play, and the subject's reflective awareness of the imagination's free play is understood either to constitute, or to be causally sufficient for, the subject's appreciation of an item's teleological style. Finally, the subject's "appreciation of teleological style," which is brought about by the reflective comparison of various teleological styles within an appropriately determined range, constitutes his experience of aesthetic pleasure.

Under the "how" interpretation of the appreciation of teleological styles, the comparison of various means of representing an object under a determinate concept of kind K consists only in comparing how each means fulfills that representational end in a way which is uniquely different from,

but not superior to, any other means. Provided that there is a sufficient range of subsumptive freedom associated with a given specification of kind K and provided that the imagination restricts its comparison of means (i.e., teleological styles) to those which fall appropriately into the particular range determined by that specification, then *any* means it considers will qualify equally as a permissible means of representing an object as an instance of that kind. And given that each means falling into the appropriate range is a permissible way of representing an object as an instance of kind K, it is equally true of each such means, M, that, in the event the imagination actually selects M, various other means, M\*, existed which it could have selected. It follows that so long as the imagination enjoys a range of subsumptive freedom in representing an object under a given specification of the concept of kind K, then any means it actually selects from the appropriate range counts as a free and harmonious representational act because there existed various other appropriate means of representation at its disposal. Thus, on all such occasions, the imagination enjoys free play. Consequently, since, on Wicks' account, the imagination's enjoyment of subsumptive freedom constitutes its enjoyment of free play, and since the occurrence of free play either constitutes, or is causally sufficient for, the experience of aesthetic pleasure, the reflective subject will experience aesthetic pleasure in relation to every permissible means, and thus every teleological style, falling within the appropriate range.

On the how interpretation, since the comparison of any two teleological styles that fall appropriately within the K-determined range is sufficient to induce aesthetic pleasure in the reflective subject, each teleological style falling into that range will enjoy an *equal degree of beauty*. Thus if we have reason to reject Crawford's account because it allows all instances of kind K to be located within a continuum of beauty, then we have even more reason to reject Wicks' account. It is worth noting here that Henry Allison maintains that a *sin qua non* of an adequate aesthetic theory is that it be able to account for the phenomenon of ugliness.

## V. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENTIAL OF AESTHETIC PLEASURE UNDER THE "HOW" INTERPRETATION

I have posed the question whether, when we compare any two objects'

teleological styles, we are to see that comparison as controlled by the idea of how, or how well, each realizes the exact same purpose. If to compare x and y's teleological styles consists in the comparison of x and y with respect to merely how, not how well, they instantiate a given kind, and if any means counts as one in relation to which the imagination equally enjoys subsumptive freedom, how do we explain the difference in degrees of aesthetic pleasure x and y can offer? For instance, a Porsche Boxer offers me an degree of aesthetic delight no Toyota Tercel ever will. On Wicks account how can we explain the differential of aesthetic pleasure in such cases?

Kant draws a distinction between three distinct kinds of pleasure or satisfaction—the agreeable, the good, and the beautiful. To find x *agreeable*, I am required to have an inclination to, or desire for, x. In such cases pleasure is grounded on the presence of some desire in my motivational set. To find x *good*, I am required to have an end in relation to which x is represented as either an instrumental or constitutive means to the fulfillment of that end. In these cases, pleasure is due to the fact that something is regarded as a means to a given end one has adopted, and in the event that one's end is actually realized. If I judge an object to be *beautiful*, however, I must judge it to be so independently of whether the object actually exists, for my deriving aesthetic pleasure can depend neither on the actual satisfaction or imagined fulfillment of some desire nor on the realization of some end I have adopted. When my judgment is free of all taint from the other two kinds of pleasure, it qualifies as "disinterested" judgment of taste.

Thus if Wicks intends his theory to be an interpretation of Kant's, then it cannot be that what accounts for the differential of aesthetic pleasure in relation to the Porsche Boxer and the Toyota Tercel is that I find the former more agreeable than the latter. Were Wicks to explain the difference by citing some feature of the vehicle, say its color or sleek "look", or anything that could be seen to express a capacity to take pleasure in the Porsche Boxer which is peculiar to me, then I could not claim a priori that, in relevantly similar circumstances, every relevantly similar (i.e., human) judger *ought* to conform to my judgment of taste, as Kant maintains.

On the how interpretation, then, the difference in aesthetic pleasure which I experience in relation to Porsche Boxer's and Toyota Tercel's distinct teleological styles cannot be explained by reference to such facts as

concern the contingent state of the subject's motivational set. But neither can the differential of aesthetic pleasure be explained by any such facts as would be brought to light by comparing the two vehicles in reference to a functional criteria for two reasons. First, a comparison of the two vehicles in light of a functional or performance criteria would likely involve criteria which were determined by reference to a particular agent's, or group of agents, adopted ends (e.g., to design and/or to possess a vehicle which serves various ends concerned with human transportation.) Given that the differential of pleasure I experience in relation to the vehicles were to be explained by the extent to which one car met functional criteria better than another, and given that such criteria were determined by reference to an agent's adopted ends, then the pleasure experienced in relation to them would not be legitimately qualify as *aesthetic* pleasure; consequently my judgment would fail to qualify as a judgment of taste because it would fail to be disinterested.

Second, I could not explain the differential of aesthetic pleasure experienced in relation to the two vehicles by the fact that I have compared each in light of a functional criteria and determined that the Porsche Boxer meets those criteria better than the Toyota Tercel because doing so would involve comparing them in respect of *how well* each goes about fulfilling some definitive purpose associated with a common conception of perfection. But to do so would of require that we abandon the how interpretation.

## VI. AGAINST THE "HOW WELL INTERPRETATION

Wicks states that

[w]hen we appreciate an object's teleological style we do not judge an object's *degree of perfection* and *rest with that*. Nor do we simply restrict our attention to a limited aspect of an object's configuration and make a judgment of free beauty within those constraints. Rather we *assess how* the object realizes its purpose in view of the many alternative ways to realize that very same purpose. (Wicks 1997, p. 394)

This citation suggests that dependent beauty as the appreciation of an

object's teleological style includes, but is not limited to, a judgment of perfection. Thus a given judgment, J, qualifies as a judgment of dependent beauty iff (1) J presupposes a judgment of perfection and (2) J "assess[es] how the object realizes its purpose in view of the many alternative ways to realize that very same purpose." Now if the assessment of the object's realization of its purpose is to be determined in respect of *how*, not how well, it does so, then Wicks' account leads, as shown, to the impossibility of ugliness; however, if the assessment of the object's realization of its purpose is to be determined in respect of *how well*, not merely how, it does so, then the judgment of dependent beauty reduces to the judgment of perfection, if no further condition is specified which is sufficient to differentiate the judgment of dependent beauty from the judgment of perfection. For, on the how well interpretation, a judgment of dependent beauty *just is*—full stop—an assessment of the degree to which a thing of kind K realizes its K-determined end. Since Wicks fails to provide the further sufficient condition that would ground the distinction between judgments of dependent beauty and judgments of perfection, he fails to show how the two kinds of judgment can be both distinct and intrinsically related; consequently, he fails to provide a solution to the problem of intrinsic relation.

It might be suggested that we can both avoid reducing the judgment of dependent beauty to the judgment of perfection and maintain that the judgment of perfection is intrinsic to, i.e., a determining factor of, the judgment of dependent beauty if judging a thing's perfection is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for judging a thing's (dependent) beauty. Then, the judgment of dependent beauty would include, but not be limited to, a judgment of the form "x realizes (to some positive degree) its K-determined end."

But what would be the final sufficient condition in virtue of which a judgment qualifies as a judgment of dependent beauty? The final sufficient condition upon which judgments of dependent beauty must be grounded and which would differentiate such judgments from judgments of perfection is a *Differentiating Feature*, F, such that (1) the object's teleological style exhibits F and (2) an F-possessing object is *causally sufficient* to induce aesthetic pleasure in the reflective subject and (3) the object does not possess feature F solely in virtue of the degree to which it realizes its K-determined end. One may ask, then, in virtue of *what else*, if not in virtue

of the degree to which a thing realizes its K-determined end, does a thing of kind K possess the feature F? Well, at least this much can be said: since a thing of kind K cannot be an F-possessing thing even in case a thing of that kind *maximally realizes* its K-determined end, the condition sufficient for determining a thing's possession of the feature F must be a *teleologically-neutral condition*. And since even the maximal realization of a thing's K-determined end is not sufficient to endow that thing with the feature F, F must be a *teleologically-neutral feature*.

The explanation of the difference between judgments of perfection and of dependent beauty by reference to a teleologically-neutral feature has three things to recommend it. If it is accepted, then we avoid The Crawford Problem, and the problems afflicting Wicks' account under the "how" and the "how well" interpretations. However one may well wonder whether a teleologically-neutral feature could also serve as a solution to the problem of intrinsic relation. For, since we want to show how *this*—judging the degree to which a thing of kind K realizes its K-determined end—explains *this*—why we judge a thing of kind K to be beautiful, and since according to the suggested explanation, judging the degree to which a thing of kind K realizes its K-determined end is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for judging a thing's (dependent) beauty, an *explanatory gulf* remains between our account of the judgment of perfection and the determining factor that is sufficient for the experience of (dependent) beauty.

It is difficult to see how, if modified as suggested, Wicks' account would be substantially different from Guyer's account, according to which a judgment of *free beauty* is made within certain parameters imposed by a prior judgment of perfection. So since Wicks intends his account to offer a solution to the problem of intrinsic relation and therefore to be superior to Guyer's account in this respect, Wicks is not free to claim that the judgment of dependent beauty is "intrinsically related" to the judgment of perfection iff the latter kind of judgment is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the former kind. Nor is Wicks free to claim that the judgment of dependent beauty is "intrinsically related" to the judgment of perfection iff the latter kind of judgment is a necessary *and* sufficient condition for the former kind. For were he do so, his account would reduce the judgment of dependent beauty to the judgment of perfection and subsequently fail to avoid The Crawford Problem.



## VII. CONCLUSION

I have argued that Wicks equivocates in the statement of what takes place in the reflective comparison of teleological styles. When one compares any two teleological styles, one may compare them in respect of how, or in respect of how well, each realizes the common end each has as a thing of kind K. But the *Kantle* can't be burned at both Wicks: either he must adopt the how interpretation of dependent beauty and is subsequently saddled with the empirically false claim that all things are equally beautiful; or he must adopt the "how well" interpretation and reduce the judgment of dependent beauty to the judgment of perfection. But both Kant and Wicks agree that making a judgment of dependent beauty is not the same thing as making a judgment of goodness of kind.

If, to avoid the unwanted reduction, Wicks asserts that the judgment of perfection includes but is not limited to the judgment of perfection and then say that the distinguishing feature of judgments of dependent beauty is that its determining ground is a teleologically-neutral feature, then Wicks cannot claim that judgments of dependent beauty essentially consist in the appreciation of a thing's teleological style. Suppose, again, that what is sufficient to differentiate judgments of dependent beauty from judgments of perfection is that the former must satisfy a teleologically-neutral condition. How can dependent beauty essentially consist in the appreciation of teleological style if what makes a thing (dependently) beautiful is its possessing a teleologically-neutral feature? In other words, how can the appreciation of (a thing's) teleological style be constitutive of (a thing's) dependent beauty, if the judgment of dependent beauty is determined by teleologically-neutral feature?<sup>1</sup>

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