

PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURE
MORALITY AND ART

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THE title of this lecture will, I am afraid, have suggested many fascinating topics about which nothing is to be said. I am not going to argue, with G. E. Moore, that aesthetic experience is an intrinsic good which ought to be pursued for its own sake. Nor shall I join in the debate as to whether moral considerations are relevant when we judge works of art. I shall talk about moral and aesthetic judgement, but in order not so much to relate as to contrast them, and that from a special point of view. What I want to do is to follow a hunch, originally a mere suspicion, hard even to formulate, that there is some element of fiction and strain in what we say about right and wrong, while our appraisal of aesthetic objects is relatively free from pretence. How far others share this uneasiness about morality I do not know but I am certainly not the only one to have such thoughts or to find this contrast. One often hears those not conditioned to suppress all thought of the mere possibility of an attack on morality say that they are sceptical about moral judgements, and it may be a successful tactical move, always supposing that one wants to ride them off the sceptical position, to ask whether they are also sceptical about the merits of works of art. My present intention is to pursue the matter rather than to close down the debate. I shall argue that the original, half-formed, thought about morality, and the contrast between moral and aesthetic judgement, has something behind it. If I am right we do maintain certain fictions about morality, and they are even reflected in the forms of language that we use, while there is no comparable lack of candour in what we say and think about works of art.

I must begin by raising, yet once more, the old question as to whether moral judgements are subjective or objective. That they are, simply, subjective seems to me certainly false. For to impute subjectivity implies a comparison with the words in which a man expresses or reports his feelings, sensations, aims, allegiances, and so on. Here questions of truth or falsity either do not arise at all or else arise only in a special way. Where we have the

verbal form of an exclamation, as when someone says 'alas!' or 'ow!' or 'how nice!' we cannot tell him that what he said was false, though we can suggest that he is pretending or being insincere. Where he uses a declarative sentence, as in saying 'I am dismayed' or 'that hurts' or 'I like that', we may say 'that is not true', but only if we think he is lying or at least insincere. Whichever form of words he chooses there is no room for the kind of mistake that he can make when his eyes have deceived him, or when he has drawn the wrong conclusion from some piece of evidence or other, which might of course, in a special case, be evidence about himself.

That all moral judgements are subjective in this sense is ruled out, rather trivially, by the fact that some, at least, are not asserted directly but rather derived; this at once breaks the analogy with subjective utterances by introducing a possibility of error not due to insincerity. Nothing follows, however, about the premises from which such conclusions are drawn, and we are not yet committed to any view about what their status may be. Now about this there has been a great deal of controversy, some philosophers arguing that a man can choose for himself, so long as he meets formal requirements of generality and consistency, what his ultimate moral principles are to be; while others insist that certain criteria of good and evil belong to the concept of morality itself. The first, or formalist, position seems to me indefensible, implying as it does that we might recognize as a moral system some entirely pointless set of prohibitions or taboos, on activities such as clapping one's hands, not even thought as harmful, aggressive, treacherous, cowardly by the community in which the prohibitions exist. A moral system seems necessarily to be one aimed at removing particular dangers and securing certain benefits, and it would follow that some things do and some do not count as objections to a line of conduct from a moral point of view. There may be strict proof of some moral propositions, such as that Hitler's treatment of the Jews was morally indefensible. Many philosophers have rejected this possibility on the general theoretical grounds of a logical gap between 'is' and 'ought'. I shall not here renew the arguments against this supposed refutation. It seems to me that there is no difficulty in principle in making such a derivation, and that there are, as I said, starting-points fixed by the concept of morality. We might call them 'definitional criteria' of moral good and evil, so long as it is clear that they belong to the concept of morality—to *the* definition and not to some definition which a man can choose for

himself. What we say about such definitional criteria will be objectively true or false.

So far we have been describing elements of objectivity in a moral system, but there is still some room for subjectivity for all that has yet been said. For even if the arguments against fixed starting-points in ethics are invalid, and even if there actually are definitional criteria of moral good and evil, allowing some moral propositions to be proved from the facts, it does not follow that we can settle all moral questions in this way. There could be both fixed starting-points and an element of 'play' in the system, allowing different and irreconcilable points of view about certain things. I think that this is probably the actual position, and that the concept of morality while it fixes a great deal also leaves quite a lot open. It seems, for instance, that while one can determine from the concept of morality that there is an objection to murder one cannot determine completely what will count as murder. Thinking about the problem of abortion I come to the conclusion that there is a genuine choice as to whether or not to count as a human being, with the rights of a human being, what would become a human being but is not yet capable of independent life.¹ Again there seems to be a more general choice of starting-point involved in the decision as to how far we are going to protect an individual against the claims of the community, where the interests of the majority clash with his. It is extremely difficult to find a clear and obvious principle when we start looking into the problems, e.g., of medical ethics. We ourselves have a strong objection to the idea of *using* one person for the benefit of others, and it probably guides our intuitions in many cases. It does not seem clear, however, that one could rule out of court the principles of a strict utilitarian who would, at least if he were consistent, allow things that we will not allow in the interests of cancer research. And so it may be that *at some points* we really do find the kind of ultimate breakdown in moral argument that has been suggested as a quite general possibility by those who refuse to admit definitional criteria of right and wrong.

It seems, therefore, that philosophers on both sides of this line of controversy must ask themselves about the status of what we might call 'contingent principles' used in forming moral

¹ It would be quite another matter to suggest that one could put the distinction between what is and is not a human being where one chose, and still have an interpretation of the principle that there is a moral objection to the *killing of human beings*.

judgements. My contention is that if we really reach such starting-points in a man's morality we have something that can only be stated subjectively. By this I mean that the words will operate subjectively however much we insist on an objective form. Let us see what the arguments against subjectivity are worth at this point.

It is often said that no moral utterance could simply state a fact about one's own attitudes, the objection being that when one person says 'X is permissible' and another 'wrong' or 'not permissible' both statements cannot be true. But that, in a discussion of subjectivity, is just the point at issue. If the declaration of a contingent principle really has the characteristic given to it in the hypothesis, if, that is, it really is a starting-point, why not say that the only truth of which it is capable is that (depending only on veracity and sincerity) which can belong to a subjective report such as 'that hurt' or 'I am hostile to that man'? No doubt it will be objected that this cannot be right, because we actually use 'true' and 'false' in a different way in connection with 'moral judgements', saying 'false' not to charge a man with lying or insincerity but to state an opposed point of view. That we do this is, of course, true, but the question is what the role of this piece of usage is once a statement of a contingent principle has been reached. It is certainly not necessary in order to allow us to speak of the man who says '*p*' and the one who says 'not *p*' as disagreeing. 'Disagree' is (to use an expression of Miss Anscombe's applied by her in a different context) 'a light word'. If you find something pleasant and I do not, or you find some food delicious and I do not we can say 'how we disagree'. My suspicion is that the existing use of 'true' and 'false', and the choice of an objective form of expression ('it is right') does have a role but a rather disreputable role. When we say that something 'just is' right or wrong we want to give the *impression* of some kind of fact or authority standing behind our words, though by hypothesis both are here ruled out, maintaining the trappings of objectivity though the substance is not there. Perhaps there is not, in the language already, a subjective form of words which will say just what we want, but we do not have to keep the language as it is.¹

This, then, is the first place where we see a statement of moral position dressed up to look like something other than it is. Do we

¹ Anyone who suggested that we could use the existing expression 'think it right' would be very far out indeed. For this implies just the contrast between truth and opinion that is being denied.

find the same gap between appearance and reality at a similar point in our appraisal of works of art?

There is, of course, a great deal of difference between the activity of passing moral judgement and that of aesthetic appraisal and it is perhaps strange that philosophers have often tried to find a theory to cover them both. In the first place Nelson Goodman is surely right in insisting that the decision about what is good and bad does not play an all-important part in the critic's work: '... works of art are not race-horses, and picking a winner is not the primary goal.'¹ Secondly, the picture of an ultimate breakdown in argument does not have the same hold on us in aesthetics as it does in ethics. This is partly because a critic tries to display the characteristics of his subject but rarely to offer *proof* that it is good or bad. Moreover, description does not present the object of art as it presents the object of moral judgement, so that it is not obvious even what would be meant by saying, of a work of art, that two people might agree on all the facts and still disagree about the values. The idea of 'all the relevant facts' seems to have no application if we are thinking about works of art. Nor is it clear that there could be contingent principles in aesthetics as in morals. This may sound surprising, for, of course, there have been many conflicting announcements about what makes a work of art 'good' or 'great'. One has only to think of Tolstoy's insistence that good or true art must produce a feeling, quite distinct from all other feelings, of 'joy and spiritual union' with the author and with others who appreciate the work. Such an announcement does not, however, have the status of our 'contingent principles' in ethics. For there is a touchstone by which Tolstoy's judgement may be tested, and by which, incidentally, it may be shown to be insufficient. Someone may, if he chooses, restrict his own attention to works of art that satisfy certain criteria. What is great or good is determined, however, by what people find in certain objects, that is deeply interesting and significant to them. If someone insists that what is thought of as a defect is really a merit he says something that relates necessarily, though of course in no simple way, to the reactions of others. He has the alternative ready to hand in an overtly subjective statement of his own appreciation or taste. In matters of moral judgement it is hard to accept subjectivity where it genuinely exists. It seems far easier in aesthetics, and this may be because it is not our own conduct that is in question. We are apt to be haunted by the thought of authority when it is

¹ *Languages of Art*, p. 262.

a question of what we are to do, and the thought that somehow and somewhere it is written down is very compelling indeed. It is not very tempting to refer aesthetic values to the will of God.

We find, I think, the same pattern if we raise the question of the relativity of judgements in morals and aesthetics. I will first try to show that we are over-resistant to theories of ethics that allow the relativity of some moral judgements. Relativism is often these days said to be absurd as a theory of moral judgement. As a theory of *all* moral judgement it is, of course, false if the thesis of definitional criteria is correct. (There would be nothing relative about the truth of the proposition that Hitler was a moral monster.) But if what we have also said about contingent, alternative, starting points for a moral system is true it should follow that there are moral judgements for which a relativistic account will be right.

Since there is a good deal of confusion about what is meant by a relativistic theory of ethics, we should discuss this before going on. Sometimes, for instance, relativism is contrasted with absolutism, so that a relativistic theory says that circumstances may always alter cases while its rival holds that certain kinds of action are always and everywhere good or bad. So, to deny relativism in this sense, which is not the one in which I am interested, one would need to say for example that if the description 'torture' or 'judicial condemnation of the innocent' applied to an action it was, in any circumstances, morally inadmissible. I mention this distinction only to set it aside. It belongs to our present topic only indirectly in providing other examples of what might be contingent principles.

Perhaps it will be best to begin not with a definition of relativism but with some examples of judgements outside ethics for which a relativistic account would be correct. Many could be taken from the province of taste, as when, for example, clothes are said to be elegant or smart. Again we might consider the statement that someone is good-looking or fair of face. Other examples could come from gastronomy. The food at a certain restaurant is said to be good; or it is said that a particular process, say burying eggs for long periods, or letting yak's butter go rancid before floating it on the tea, gives the product a delicious flavour. Presumably no one will deny that the truth of such judgements is relative, not, of course, to the speaker's tastes, since one may *make a mistake* in thinking one's wife good-looking or the flavour of one's cooking good, but rather to the reactions

of certain people at certain places and times. This is not to suggest that there is some simple connection between, say, the preferences of a majority and the judgement of taste; to give a proper account one would have to look at each case separately and ask, for instance, whether connoisseurs are recognized in the given area, and if so what kind of authority they are allowed. The relevant point for this discussion is that reactions do vary a great deal from time to time and place to place, and that while sentences predicating such things as handsomeness or good flavour have a truth value as uttered in a given context they cannot be used 'across cultures' as it were, since it is impossible to extract the utterance from both contexts and ask questions about the truth. It would quite obviously be ridiculous for us to say that our opinion about the Tibetans' tea is correct and theirs mistaken, nor would we necessarily dispute questions of female beauty even with a traveller from the eighteenth century, never mind with a representative of the ancient Maya peoples who practised cranial deformation and on purpose made their children cross-eyed. It is not that such judgements do not have a truth value, but they do not have one unless relativised in a particular way.

Another example, which may be more controversial, is to be found in the use of the sentence 'that's a good thing'. Moral philosophers have sometimes spoken of this proposition in a portentous way, as if it passed judgement on the state of the universe from some lofty point of view. And indeed it may do so, if the speaker has lofty interests, and knows or supposes that his hearer has them too. But 'It's a good thing that such and such' may be said by the robbers as well as the cops, and by those interested only in making money on the next race and getting safely home. It would be ridiculous to say that when the backers of rival horses reacting to some news affecting their prospects, say 'a good thing', 'a bad thing' the truth of what they said is to be judged by the interests of racing, never mind the welfare of mankind; nor can a third speaker say 'which of them is right'. Yet this type of utterance is once more to be contrasted with subjective statements such as 'I am glad'. One may make a mistake in thinking it a good thing that such and such has happened, and two speakers who have the same desires and allegiances may challenge each other's opinion about whether it is.

So far all the examples of truths relative to a context of utterance have been from the class of evaluative judgements, but

there are others from elsewhere. We might think here of the sentence 'N. M. is tall'. For suppose that our man, N. M., being about 5 ft. 9 in. goes to live first in Southern Italy and then in California; he will properly be called first tall and then not tall without any change in his height, while in mid-Atlantic 'N. M. is tall' may have no use at all.

It will be apparent that the relativity in which we are interested is a special case of that belonging to any sentence containing indexical expressions such as 'I' or 'here', or tensed verbs, since these too are true as uttered in one context but not in another. It is not easy to give an account of the distinctive mark of relativity as we want to consider it in ethics. Something must be said about this, however, since one would not call a theory of ethics relativistic in that it allowed for an element of relativisation coming merely from the use of indexical expressions in making moral judgements. If we speak of relativism in ethics we mean something more than this. Roughly we might say that the relativity in which we are especially interested is truth relative to standards or tests. So we know that when 'he is tall' is said in California the height of Californians must be appealed to; when an Eskimo speaker talks to an Eskimo audience about good food what he says is to be tested by Eskimo tastes.

Since the context of utterance is necessary to determine the truth or falsity of these sentences for which relativization is necessary there is, of course, no question of contradiction between speakers saying '*p*' and 'not *p*' in relevantly different contexts. The meaning of '*p*' may nevertheless be the same, though it is a difficult problem as to when we will say that this is so. It seems unproblematic in the case of sentences containing indexical words (such as 'I am English') and also for the case of being tall, since we would be inclined to gloss 'N. M. is tall' as meaning, in all contexts, 'N. M. is well above average height' rather than in one context one thing and in another context another. What of the sentence 'the flavour is good' as uttered by people of different gastronomic backgrounds? One would say that the words do have the same meaning, especially if the relation of the judgement to preferences were exactly the same in the two communities. It would be harder to know what to say if in one community but not the other there were connoisseurs of flavour with a position like that of our connoisseurs of wine. Luckily this problem does not have to be solved just now, since it is only where '*p*' is thought to have a constant meaning that there will be any question of contradiction between '*p*' and 'not *p*'. What is

important to us is that a difference of context of utterance will often remove apparent contradiction even here.

Let us now consider whether a relativistic account should be given of moral language. It was pointed out earlier that a completely relativistic account is out of the question for those of us who believe that there are some criteria of good and evil implied in the concept of morality. Moreover no moral judgement will depend for its truth solely on its utterance in a given context, since all are subject to the definitional criteria. Nevertheless, if it is the case that different speakers can validly relate their conclusions to different contingent principles there is an element of relativity in morality. Perhaps a good model for comparison would be that of a discussion between two or more people about what it would be best to do where certain aims were implied in the question that had been raised, as e.g., what would be best for the college as discussed in a college meeting, but where some other aims and principles might nevertheless not be shared. In such a case we would talk together about what was best until some divergence of principle actually appeared, though after that the discussion might have to end. This seems to be how we do talk about morality with those whose principles resemble our own.

I think it likely that even this modest amount of relativity will not easily be accepted where ethics is concerned. For if it is accepted we must admit that in certain cases 'it is wrong to do X ' will be true as said by A who has one set of contingent principles, and false as said by B who has another, the description and circumstances of X being taken as the same for A and B . And we do not like to admit this, particularly when thinking of ourselves as A or B , as if we felt that the word 'true' in the sentence 'As uttered by him p is true' somehow implied a weakening of our own allegiance to principles from which not p can be concluded. Yet we have to say that a Tibetan uttering a sentence meaning 'Rancid yak's butter gives a good flavour to tea' would be saying something true, and that we could find similar examples having to do with elegance or personal beauty. As said by some other person the sentence might be true though as said by us it would be false. No compromise of our own position is involved, and if we refused to apply the word 'true' here this could only support the *fiction* of a superior point of view. This is, of course, exactly the point about the moral divergencies we have been considering, i.e. the ones stemming from the adoption of different contingent principles. So long as we still

have something to bring forward to show why particular principles should not be adopted we have a genuine possibility of showing that ours is a superior point of view, and it is very important that nothing that can really be said should be squeezed out. But if someone merely *asserts* that something is right or wrong, as for instance he may say when discussing euthanasia 'to kill a human being is never permissible' he should admit the relativity of judgements based on this contingent principle. If his allegiance to it really requires a fiction about its status there is something wrong, and it may be that some people who do not mean to base their morality on religion would change their moral views on such matters if they no longer covertly referred to an authority such as God. On the other hand some contingent principles would surely survive. People do care, for example, that individuals should not in everything be sacrificed for the good of others, or that the unborn should be counted as in the human community. They are ready to fight for such things; why should they not continue to do so?

When thinking about art we do not, it seems to me, have the same worry about relativism as we do when thinking about morals. Or at least we do not have the same resistance to taking things as they come. If we actually have something to say in criticism of the art of some other time or some other culture, as that it is sentimental, we expect to be able to show that this is so, and to be backed up by the reaction of other generations as well as by our contemporaries. If there were genuinely nothing to say and nothing to show, as we suppose may be the case at certain points in morals, we would be most unlikely to insist that somehow, nevertheless, we must be right. In fact, as everyone knows, there is a most surprising, and rather moving, agreement between peoples whose civilizations are completely different, and who may even be culturally isolated from each other. It was not to be taken for granted for instance that we would recognize the expressiveness of figures made by Han craftsmen, or in pre-Columbian Mexico, or that this would have the importance for us that it does. Sometimes recognition or appreciation fails. But then we are increasingly likely to think of the matter like that, and not to condemn what we do not understand or like. Obviously this has something to do with the fact that we are, psychologically speaking, much freer from anxiety in relation to art than to morality, and also that our thoughts about artistic merit are not haunted by a historical connection with religion. Moral judgements regulate our conduct in just those

areas which arouse the deepest feelings of guilt, so that we want to erect the strongest possible barriers against what we fear we might do; aesthetic judgements guide our conduct in relatively calm waters when they guide it at all. Thus we are not nearly so likely to speak and feel as if things have been laid down for us in spite of the overt belief that they have not.

These considerations are no doubt connected with the final contrast that I shall draw between the way we think about morality and the way we think about art. In the first case, I want to say, we maintain a fiction of inescapability, while in the second we do not. In a sense, of course, it is right to think of moral judgement as inescapable. A man does not cease to be cruel or dishonest because he does not mind if he is cruel or dishonest, and these characteristics may also wreck his life. But suppose that he does not care, and moreover argues (it just might be truly) that in his position wickedness is likely to bring him more benefit than virtue. He is a ruthless amoral man, and moreover in such a special situation that we are not able to insist that even from the point of view of his own good he has reason to abandon his cruelty and dishonesty. We ask him if he does not care for example about the suffering his action will bring to others, and he says, and we believe him, that he does not care. What can we say to such a man? What we do say is that he *should* care, and that he *should not* do the things he does; we must, however, look carefully at this use of 'should', and in particular ask whether it implies that he has *reason* to change his life. Normally 'should' does carry a necessary connection with reasons for acting, since we use the word, for example, in giving advice, and advice must relate to what the agent wants (for himself or others) or to what he will care about at some future time.¹ We also use 'should' in contexts such as that of a college meeting, where common aims and principles are presupposed, and so far the use of 'should' is parallel to that of 'a good thing'. It is different, however, in that 'should' is not here applicable to someone not sharing in the common enterprise. If, for instance, it is important for the college that a certain shopkeeper moves his business we cannot on these grounds say that he *should* move, although we do say that it would be a good thing if he did. If we are to say that he should move, then, unless we are urging some duty upon him, we must bring considerations related to his desires, as for instance the lack of custom where he is. I am not, it should be

¹ I am not here committing myself to a *simpliste* view of advising. As a corrective to this see B. J. Diggs, 'A Technical Ought', *Mind* (1960).

stressed, saying that these non-moral uses of 'should', carrying a necessary connection with reasons for acting, must relate a course of action to something by which the agent will be *moved*. For it is often the case that one should do something, like getting up in the morning, for the sake of something one does want (and it is true *now* that one wants it) as for instance to be a good philosopher, but which, at this moment leaves one cold. (Compare being fond of someone though just at the moment one feels one never wants to see him again.) Moreover the 'should' of advice can properly be backed up by some consideration about what the subject *will* want even if there is no sense in which he wants it now, and this too is enough to give reasons for acting. It is a clear case of irrationality if a man takes no account of the future penalty of his present action. When backed by moral considerations 'should' is used differently, and as we noticed earlier a man may be told that he should do something required by morality without any connection being traced between such action and his present or future desires. So though in some ways we may think of the 'should' of morality as comparable to any other, as if members of the community were meeting together with the particular aim of making good arrangements for a common life, the analogy breaks down where a man who explicitly puts himself outside the common enterprise is still told what on moral grounds he *should* do. That this is what we say is among the data, and it is obvious why we have this usage in the language. Firstly we do not expect people to stand outside the moral community as does our ruthless amoral man, and secondly we want to be able to influence those who do. What is not, however, clear is why they should do what we want. Someone who is a lover of justice, and who cares about the good of other people has the best of reasons for taking account of morality. Can we say the same of our uncaring man? If he does what we say he should do what will his motivation be? Will he not simply be afraid of our disapproval, or following a training which he is too timid or conventional to throw off?

I am sure it will be replied that the 'should' of morality necessarily gives reasons for acting to any man, but this is what I want to question. Why should we think that the connection with reasons exists necessarily even in the case of a 'should' that works, like this? In one sense it is true that moral judgements necessarily give reasons for acting, but in that sense it is also true that, for example, codes of etiquette must do so. (We would not speak of a code of etiquette unless people in general guided

their conduct by such rules.) Yet a man may ask whether he has any reason to obey some other code that he has been taught. Why should he not ask this also about the moral code claiming to free himself from morality as many have freed themselves from codes of manners? It is no use our reiterating the word 'should' and 'shouldn't', since this piece of usage is not being questioned, only the connection with reasons for acting when 'should' is used like this. If we want to use the moral 'should' as we do in applying it even to a man indifferent to the ends of morality must we not accept the penalty that the connection between what a man should do and what he has reason to do breaks down? What we are inclined to do is to ignore all this, insisting on the word 'reason' without being able to show why we should use it in the case of morality though not, like this, in the case of etiquette. The rationale is lacking though the motive is clear. We are, naturally, concerned about the man who doesn't care what happens to other people, and we want to convict him of irrationality, thinking that he will mind about that. Outside moral philosophy we would not think of the cool and prudent, though wicked, man as specifically irrational in his conduct; outside philosophy we also know that there is nothing one can do with a ruthless amoral man except to prevent him from doing too much damage. To say that since his conduct is immoral we can tell him of some reason why he should change it, or that he necessarily has reason to alter his ways, seems yet another case of keeping up a pretence. We speak as if there were an authority in the background to guarantee that wickedness is necessarily foolishness, though the 'binding force' of morality is supposed to be independent of such an appeal. Would it not be more honest either to change the language or else to recognize that the 'should' of moral judgement is sometimes merely an instrument by which we (for our own very good reasons) try to impose a rule of conduct even on the uncaring man?

Once again, when we turn to aesthetics we find that the same problem does not arise, and this is connected with a fundamental difference in the judgement of art and of conduct. If we ask, as Plato might have done, what good is rendered by good conduct, and again by good art, and to whom it is rendered in each case, the answers will not be the same. The good of good action, while it may indeed accrue to the man who does the action, will very often go rather to another. A man who is just or honest or charitable produces a benefit for others rather than for himself, which is why we may not always be able to show

that an unfeeling man, no lover of justice, has reason to be moral whatever the situation he is in. The good of good art, on the other hand, lies in such things as the pleasures of the imagination, and in general in the interest and enjoyment that a man gets from works of art. And since the one who chooses the book to read, the picture to look at, the music to hear, is usually the one to whom that good will come, there is no difficulty in seeing that he has reason to choose the good and reject what is bad. Where this connection breaks down, as it does in the untypical case of someone choosing a work of art but not able to appreciate it, we would not say that nevertheless he should choose what was good, unless in the hope that he might later come to appreciate it. We would recognize it as nonsense to say 'The fact that a work of art is a good work of art is itself a reason for choosing it, and never mind whether you will get anything out of it or not.'

I have now drawn contrasts at three different points between moral judgement and the judgement of works of art, in each case with a conclusion unfavourable to moral judgement. I know that what has been said about the appreciation of works of art has been inadequate, and I hope that if you reject my remarks on aesthetics you will consider the discussion of moral judgement as standing on its own. My main interest in these topics is from the point of view of moral philosophy rather than aesthetics, and what I should most like to do is to open a debate which might lead us to consider changes in the way we talk about what is morally good or bad. Why, after all, should we take it for granted that the form of language already developed is the one we want?