Emilio Garroni and the aesthetic
Conceptualism in Kant’s Third Critique

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Abstract
In recent years, nonconceptual content theories have seen Kant as a reference point for his notion of intuition (§§ 1-3). This work aims to dismiss the possibility that intuition is provided with an autonomous function of de re knowledge. To this end, it will explore certain epistemological points that emerge from Garroni’s reading of the Third Critique in the conviction that they provide a suitable context to verify the presence of autonomous, epistemically nonconceptual content in the transcendental system (§§ 4-5). It is here, in fact, that Kant discusses those cases where intuition is given without bringing into play the conceptual component. As Garroni posits, in this frame of reference, such content cannot subsist without the interplay between aesthetic and conceptual dimensions (§§ 6-7). Long before the development of the debate on Kantian nonconceptualism, and during the period in which the Kantian debate on the epistemic considerations contained in the Third Critique was developing deeply for the first time, Garroni had already identified a theoretical position on these issues, which can be labelled aesthetic conceptualism, thanks to his fundamentally epistemological reading of the Third Critique.

Keywords
Kant, Conceptualism, Nonconceptualism, Power of Judgment, Aesthetic Judgment

1.

Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy was published in 2006. That work consisted of a series of essays by leading Kantian scholars on the challenging relationship between aesthetic and epistemic reflection in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.

Apart from two giants of continental philosophy – Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze – who took very seriously the fundamental unity of the entire transcendental project articulated in Kant’s three Critiques, Kant’s Third Critique received less attention than the first two for most of the twentieth century as it was judged to be simply a dated treatise on art, beauty and artistic

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genius. Indeed, Kant’s aesthetic theory was marginalised by most philosophers because they did not consider aesthetics as substantively relevant to the main topics of epistemology and ethic of Kantian enterprise.

For the authors of *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, the critical epistemological program introduced in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* cannot be separated from his account of aesthetic judgement, imagination and sensibility articulated primarily in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Kukla (2006), editor of the book, highlights this total change of direction within the Anglo-American debate, in particular by noting the publication of some significant contributions: Theodore Uehling’s (1971) *The Notion of Form in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, Donald Crawford’s (1974) *Kant’s Aesthetic Theory*, Eva Schaper’s (1979) *Studies in Kant’s Aesthetics* and the first edition of Paul Guyer’s (1979) *Kant and the Claims of Taste*. From 1990 forward, philosophical attention to the systematic connections between aesthetic theory and the cognitive dimension became a reference point in the Kantian debate with several classic contributions, such as Béatrice Longuenesse’s (1998) *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* and Henry E. Allison’s (2001) *Kant’s Theory of Taste*.

It is noteworthy in this context that, already in 1976 with his essay *Estetica ed epistemologia. Riflessioni sulla “Critica del giudizio”*, Emilio Garroni had reconstructed a precise epistemological progression in the Third *Critique*. In the following years, he pointed out the so-called question of the *Sense*, especially in his foundational books *Senso e Paradosso* (1986) and *Estetica. Uno sguardo-attra-verso* (1992). In particular with respect to the former, he analysed some essential aspects of transcendental philosophy through an interpretative reading of Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Specifically, in a very dense textual passage, Garroni affirms that the task of philosophy consists of comprehension, which can be conceptualised as *tracing back* experience, through experience itself, towards the conditions of its possibility. Alongside the question of *Meaning* – in Kantian terms, the application of conceptual forms to intuitions within the form of judgement in order to have experience and knowledge – Garroni introduces the question of *Sense* as the fulfilment of the *transcendental paradigm* which clarifies the critical philosophy in its *founding paradox*.

The question of Sense is based on an aesthetic principle that is irreducible to the principles of the intellect: Philosophy can question the Meaning of experience’s conditions (that belongs to nature or art) by tracing it back the Sense – i.e., the condition of the con-
ditioned – only from within the determined experience and through it, not from a non-place outside of it. In this way, he developed an approach to Aesthetics defined as non-special philosophy, which also reflects its emphasis on the features assigned to the reflective judgement and its a priori principle developed in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Garroni’s analysis of the power of judgement (Urteilskraft) in the Third Critique goes beyond an explanation of the so-called judgements of taste and the notion of beauty as composing a critique of taste. Instead, from these he reinterprets a teleological as well as epistemological meaning and, more generally, engages with the very possibility of empirical knowledge.

With respect to the specific issue concerning the formation of empirical knowledge, in recent years nonconceptual content theorists have held Kant as a reference point for his notion of intuition (§§ 2-3). In this work, I will analyse several complementary issues that intertwine with respect to the notion of nonconceptual content as it concerns the very possibility of empirical knowledge. This work will dismiss the possibility that intuition is provided with an autonomous function of de re knowledge. To this end, I will explore certain epistemological points emerging from Garroni’s reading of the Critique of the Power of Judgment to demonstrate whether these verify the presence of autonomous, epistemically nonconceptual content in the transcendental system (§§ 4-5). It is here, in fact, that Kant discusses those cases where intuition is given without bringing to bear the conceptual component. As Garroni holds, in this regard, such content cannot exist absent the interplay between the aesthetic and conceptual dimensions, between Sense and Meaning.

Long before the debate on Kantian nonconceptualism developed, and indeed during the period in which the Kantian debate on the epistemic considerations contained in the Third Critique were originally emerging, Garroni had already identified a theoretical position on these issues. We could call Garroni’s position aesthetic conceptualism due to his fundamental epistemological reading of the Third Critique (§§ 6-7).¹

¹ I have developed some aspects of these topics in Forgione (2018) by referring to the so-called theory of the concept of a transcendental object contained in the First Critique in support of an interpretative reading which can be labelled as weak conceptualism. In this paper, I attempt to reach the same conclusion pursuant to certain epistemological points emerging from Garroni’s reading of Third Critique. English quotations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1992ff.). The Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) is cited by the usual A/B method. Specific works cited are referred to by means of the following abbreviations. Critique of the Power of Judgment: KU. The Jäsche Logic: Log. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: Anth.
Kant is widely regarded as the preeminent philosopher of the conceptualist position—the perspective that holds it to be impossible to obtain knowledge, experience or perception of reality without conceptual capacities. In the last decade, Kant has also become a key reference point for even theorists of nonconceptual content by virtue of a detailed reflection on the sensible dimension and, in particular, on the related notion of intuition.

McDowell is one of the most influential contemporary theorists of conceptualism. In *Mind and World*, he examines several components of the Kantian approach—largely filtered through Sellars’ controversial reading—to assert a Kantian conceptualist theory of cognition and to attack any other approach based on a nonconceptual content, such as that proffered by Evans. According to recent interlocutors in the Kantian debate on nonconceptual content, however, Sellars and McDowell have not properly recognised Kant’s fundamental contribution to the nonconceptualist theory. Moreover, some claim that the contemporary debate itself has not adequately emphasised its own debt to Kant, leading Hanna (2006, pp.90-91) to posit that “Kant’s theory of intuition is the hidden historical origin of both sides of the debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists”.

The debate on nonconceptual content occurs among several not entirely consistent positions. It has developed from several theoretical sources, among which Evans’ *Varieties of Reference* particularly stands out. While it is difficult to find agreed upon definitions in the current debate, Bermúdez’s (2003) general considerations provide an adequate starting point. Bermúdez argues that, if the content of a (human or non-human) creature’s mental state consists in what that mental state actually represents then, according to the *theory of nonconceptual mental content*, certain mental states represent reality even if their holder does not possess the concepts required to articulate that content. More precisely, while conceptualism holds that the mental states of non-human creatures have no mental content because they lack the requisite conceptual apparatus, nonconceptualism regards representational content as determined not only (or not exclusively) by conceptual capability, but also by certain nonconceptual capacities shared by infants and non-human creatures (cf. Evans, 1982; Bermúdez, 2003; Gunther, 2003; Hanna, 2008, 2011).

Utilising the nonconceptualist approach, Speaks (2005, p.360) distinguishes two theses. According to the first, positing *absolute-
ly nonconceptual content and endorsed by Evans (1982), Peacocke (1992), Heck (2000), a mental state contains absolutely non-conceptual content if and only if the type of content that comprises the mental state is different from the type of content that comprises beliefs and thoughts. The second thesis concerns the relationship between subject and content, asserting the existence of a relatively nonconceptual content. Specifically, the second thesis posits that a subject’s mental state at time \( t \) consists of relatively nonconceptual content if and only if the content of the mental state in question includes contents not conceptually grasped or held by the subject at time \( t \).

Against what he labels Relativist Nonconceptualism – which ultimately leads, in his view, to a Highly Refined Conceptualism – Hanna (2008) introduces several Kantian nonconceptualist arguments, including the well-known Two Hands Argument. That argument holds that incongruent counterparts do not possess any descriptive or conceptual difference and can be distinguished only from a perceptual perspective. As such, while Hanna advances an absolutely nonconceptual content, Kantian nonconceptualists have articulated several propositions within the transcendental system to identify comparatively nonconceptual content in intuition (cf. Allais 2009). Within this general framework, the difference between the content that attends nonconceptual cognition and conceptual cognition, respectively, seems to reflect the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions. In other words, intuitive representations are assumed to possess certain semantic features pertaining to the indexical dimension along with some epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (cf. Hanna, 2008; de Sá Pereira, 2013).

3.

In three classic passages (Log, p.589, A19/B33 and A320/B376), Kant articulates the difference between the two primary types of representations, intuitions and concepts. Starting with the mathematical-philosophical debate instigated by Hintikka (1967, 1969, 1972) and Parsons (1969, 1984, 2012), the conditions that must be fulfilled in order for a representation to be classified as an intuition have been articulated. In the passages referenced above, Kant argues that intuition is a singular representation. This is the singularity condition which posits, based on the type of denotation involved, that an intuition is a singular representation denoting an
individual object. A concept, on the other hand, relates to different objects that may be classified under its domain on account of the presence of a property the concept represents. In the second and third passages, Kant adds that an intuition is “immediately related to the object”. Here, he articulates the immediacy condition, which concerns the type of relationship – once again immediate – between the representation and its denotation. This is opposed to a concept, which refers to its object through the mediation of the conceptual features or marks composing the concept’s intension.

Although the latter condition has been at the centre of a harsh dispute between Hintikka and Parson (cf. Capozzi 1973; 2020), several commentators have linked the immediacy condition with the referential directness of the intuition. These scholars contend that intuitive representations not only induce the immediate cognition of objects, but also identify them without the mediation of any conceptual or descriptive content. If concepts and intuitions are two distinct types of objective representations, then, from a strict epistemic point of view, they are both necessarily involved in judgement for the determination of objective knowledge. Hence the well-known adage, “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”.

The togetherness principle, which posits that knowledge is produced only through the joint intervention of concepts and intuitions, was supported by McDowell’s Kant-inspired conceptualist position (A50/B74). Hanna (2006) argues against this position and proposes instead that concepts and intuitions are cognitively and semantically interdependent only with respect to the constitution of objectively valid judgments. Beyond this specific epistemic dimension consisting only of empirically meaningful judgments, empty concepts or blind intuitions are certainly possible. Hanna essentially distinguishes a direct relation of the perceptual dimension in the Kantian approach: intuitions are cognitive representations that are semantically independent from concepts with nonconceptual cognitive contents. Against this background, the togetherness principle is consistent with Kantian nonconceptualism on account of the epistemic and metaphysical independence of the intuitive representation.

As such, the power of judgement would be necessary only for objective cognition and not for perception. The latter would depend only on intuitive representations without the intervention of concepts, which are the general rules that constitute judgements. The overall aim of nonconceptualists is primarily to delimit conceptualist claims underlying the argumentative structure of Tran-
This includes some arguments concerning the conditions of knowledge and experience, namely that they are based on the application of conceptual forms to sensible intuitions through a deflationary strategy aimed at weakening the *togetherness principle*. As already observed, the power of judgement is allegedly necessary only for objective knowledge, not for perception. Instead, perception is assumed to rely on the use of intuitive representations without the intervention of concepts, or general rules constituting judgements (cf. Hanna 2006; Allais 2009).

The Kantian nonconceptualist strategy has several additional ramifications. In particular, it refers to those passages from *Transcendental Deduction* (A89/B122, B132, B145), claiming that no intervention of the intellect is required in order to ensure that phenomenal objects are given in intuition. Second, it distinguishes figuative from intellectual synthesis. Third, it asserts that intuition may be based on the nonconceptual activity of synthesis. Accordingly, beginning from a rejection of the conceptualist approach in the manner of McDowell, intuition can be assumed to provide a separate perceptual presentation of spatio-temporally located mind-independent entities, be they objects or empirical details.

The analysis presented here will not engage with the different interpretations of *Transcendental Deduction* passages suggested in the debate. It is one thing to establish that the intuitive representation provides a peculiar, autonomous (with respect to conceptual forms) contribution to content. It is quite another to maintain that such a contribution allows perception of an object independently of any conceptual articulation through an autonomous epistemic function of *de re* presentation assigned to intuitions. According to Garroni’s interpretative reading of Third *Critique*, the question of Sense regards the non-intellectual condition of experience. This condition, however, cannot but involve an intellectual legality in order to establish a conceptual reference.

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2 As to the first point, cf. Hanna (2001, p.199) (2005, p.259), Allais (2009, p.396) and Schulting (2012, p. 84); however, cf. also the antithetical conceptualist interpretations of A89/B122 by Allison (2001, p.38), Grüne (2011). As for the other two points, Allais (2009) draws attention to the passages on the threefold synthesis in the first edition of the *Transcendental Deduction*. With respect to apprehension and reproduction, only recognition involves the conceptual dimension. Second, Allais refers to A78/B103, where a distinction is drawn between the imagination’s synthesis and the functions of the intellect. Several commentators (see e.g., Ginsborg, 2008; Schulting, 2012) have rejected this reading, highlighting the passages where synthetic activity is attributed to the intellect (e.g., B129) and the spontaneity of the imagination is paralleled with that of the intellect (e.g., B162n). For an overview of the development of this debate, cf. the essays contained in Schulting (2016), especially Heidemann’s article, which develops arguments according to which Kant advocates a kind of aesthetic nonconceptualism in the Third *Critique* on the basis the doctrine of the judgement of taste.
It is well known that, in the context of the First Critique, one of the most important epistemological roles is played by the imagination’s (Einbildungskraft) operation of exhibition (Darstellung). This depends on the exhibition of conceptual forms and, in particular, on the application of concepts to empirical intuitions through direct schematism. As a result, the imagination is assigned an unprecedented mediating function from both the transcendental and empirical perspectives. The possibility of applying concepts unbinds the imagination from the use of images. Kant asserts an explicit difference between schema and image, acknowledging schematism as having a specific procedural function that allows the application of the conceptual dimension and the subsumption of the sensible particular. As such, from a strictly empirical point of view, Kant combines two roles in the imagination: the traditional exercise of the active memory (cf. B120; Anth § 28) and the new cognitive function of mediation among heterogeneous faculties.

This issue is significantly different if we consider the free schematism and creative imagination introduced by Kant in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. While, in the First Critique, the objective schematism of the imagination (KU § 9) is solely used to mediate between conceptual and intuitive components, the free schematism of the KU examines cases in which one of those two elements is missing. In the famous passage KU § 59, for example, Kant discusses so-called symbolic or indirect exhibition. In the absence of empirical intuition, an abstract concept (in Kant’s example, the concept of a monarchical state) is expressed by building an analogy to the manner in which the power of judgement operated in a previous, different direct schematization (that between the concept and the intuition of a hand mill). As such, Darstellung does not rest on direct intuition – which is absent because of the abstract nature of concepts – but rather on the form of the reflection.

The second case is particularly important for the debate on non-conceptualism as it is precisely a concept suitable to a given intuition that is missing. The paradigmatic example concerns aesthetic ideas, also known as innere Anschaungen: “by an aesthetic idea [ästhetischen Idee], I mean that representation of the imagination [Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft] that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible” (KU § 49).
Kant assigns a new role to imagination – now regarded as the faculty of presentation (Vermögen der Darstellung) (KU § 23) – following the introduction of the a priori principle of purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) that underlies the power of judgement (Urteilskraft) and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (Gefühl der Lust und Unlust), which comprises up one of the three faculties of the soul. Analysis of the power of judgement transcends the explanation of so-called judgements of taste and the notion of beauty composing a critique of taste. From these, the analysis reinterprets a teleological and epistemological issue and, more generally, addresses the very possibility of empirical knowledge. This appears utterly undetermined if one clings to the sole dictates of the KrV and its analysis of all phenomena as comprised of synthetic a priori judgements. Garroni cites Scaravelli’s example: it is not possible to spot the difference between a rock and a volcanic eruption solely by reference to the transcendental laws of nature.

In other words, the issue here is the transition from the principles of pure understanding and nature in general (Natur überhaupt) to the possibility of knowing nature in its particularity, that is, in its own particular laws and empirical concepts. These particular laws and empirical concepts are contained within those principles but cannot be deduced by them a priori (KU, Intr. § IV). This is the so-called problem of the third manifold, introduced by Scaravelli (1968) and developed by Garroni (1986), which addresses the transcendental problem of understanding the possibility of the apprehension of an empirical object in its concrete particularity. In this respect, Garroni points out that Kant makes a distinction between ‘cognition in general’ and ‘cognition (of given objects) in general’ (Erkenntnis [gegebener Gegenstände] überhaupt) (KU § 21):

In the first case, Scaravelli would have noted it is merely ‘the analytical texture of all phenomena’ that is at stake, meaning an agreement between pure concepts and phenomena in general, whatever they may be, regardless of their particularity. However, once such an agreement has been legitimised as a general matter, there is nothing that requires an agreement based in experience, which could present itself not only as infinitely varied, but even as unorganizable (Garroni 1986, p. 216).

For Garroni, the two epistemic dimensions described in the foregoing are not simply two aspects of Kant’s approach. Instead, they collectively constitute a kind of transcendental paradigm.

In the KU, Kant describes two different operations executed by the faculty of judgement (Urteilskraft). Of these, the determining power of judgement (bestimmende Urteilskraft) is articulated in the KrV as the subsumption power in which the universal – the
rule to be applied to intuition – is given *a priori*. As stated previously, the question essentially addresses the application of the universal, necessary forms of the pure principles of the intellect. On the other hand, the reflecting power of judgement (*reflektierende Urteilskraft*) is legitimated in the KU, requiring a new *a priori* principle. Here, even if the universal rule is absent, experience must be ensured for the very reason that the intellect’s principles of the First Critique are necessary but not sufficient conditions for empirical knowledge. With respect to empirical knowledge, such principles produce synthetic units for the general knowledge of nature. Nonetheless, with respect to transcendental laws, certain empirical units of cognition are analytical units in that they all necessarily share the same principles. For this reason, in the *First Introduction* to the KU, Kant clearly articulates the necessity for further synthetic unity also with respect to the differences among them (KU, First Intr. § VIII).

Such is the epistemological problem of the *regulative* role of the principle of purposiveness. It allows the manifold particular phenomena of nature – the ‘aggregate’ as Kant described it – to be connected *as though* it constituted a system (cf. Guyer 1990, 2003; Guyer, Walker 1990). Garroni (1986) suggests that this may occur even if such a systematic unity of particular laws has no character of necessity, as with the transcendental laws, but is instead built by the power of judgement according to the *analogic* principle of purposiveness. With respect to this epistemological context, the principle of purposiveness is purely subjective; that is, it prescribes not to nature but to the subject itself a law of specification for a reflection on nature based on its empirical laws. As such, it guides the power of judgement in its reflecting function, forming additional systematic knowledge.

5.

The intrinsic bond between the purposiveness and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is touched on in the crucial seventh paragraph of the introduction to the KU, where Kant specifically addresses aesthetic judgements. He makes a distinction between what is simply subjective in the representation of an object – i.e., its aesthetic quality – and the elements used for to determine the object in order to gain knowledge, namely its logical validity. In this respect, Kant adds that whatever is subjective in a representation is not an element of knowledge, such as the feeling of pleasure and
displeasure experienced in connection with its apprehension and purposiveness. Purposiveness, as being represented in perception, is in fact not a quality of the object.

This is one of the most important concepts in Garroni’s reading of the Third Critique. With respect to aesthetic judgements, the simple apprehension of an object in the intuition is accompanied by the feeling of pleasure. The representation here is related to the subject – not to the object – and the pleasure expresses the object’s suitability as it relates to the subject’s cognitive faculties. In this way, it is indeed a subjective formal purposiveness. As for the matter of taste, the reflecting power of judgement takes on an aesthetic role in that it is based on the simple apprehension of the form of the sensible representation solely as connected to the feeling of pleasure or, in other words, to an inherently subjective component. Nonetheless, it also – and even more importantly – assumes a constitutive role ‘deduced’ as an a priori principle of Urteilskraft überhaupt turning into Gemeinsinn (sense or common sense). Stated differently, the aesthetic reflecting power of judgement is the universal condition expressing a priori the harmonization of the faculties in free play, which operates in the predisposition of the mental equipment common to all and universally communicable.

The key point is that the very predisposition of the faculties is also involved in the epistemological field as well as in the more specific formation of the conceptual dimension. In the context of general logic, the analysis abstracts certain representations from their contents. Pure concepts may differ from empirical concepts in substance (matter). While, with respect to the former, the content may be given a priori or constructed, in the latter the content must be derived from experience. Nonetheless, both have the same universal form, while differing in their sources. What is more, in sever-

3 Longuennesse (1998, p. 116) argues that the formation of concepts depends on a universalizing comparison, a logical act of comparison understood as a function of the capacity to judge according to the concepts of comparison introduced in the Amphiboly chapter (B 316). Allison (2001) instead moves from the definition of reflection found in the First Introduction to the Third Critique—where reflection is understood as the activity of comparison among the very representations from which empirical concepts form and that between representations and faculties, from which aesthetic judgements are formed. On this topic, Ginsborg (2015, § VII) goes further and explains the acquisition of empirical concepts on the basis of a normative account of the Third Critique. A precise correlation between the aesthetic and other types of reflective judgements is thus established according to the analysis of the a priori principle of the reflecting power of judgement. As regards the formation of empirical concepts, Garroni (1986; 2003) focuses on free schematism, namely the relative role of the creative imagination introduced in the KU thanks to the new reflecting function of the faculty of judgement, and, in particular, on what he calls “image-schemas” (see below). A comparison between the different readings of this and other related themes concerning the Third Critique, however – most notably Guyer (2006), who rejects Allison’s interpretative approach – is beyond the scope of this essay.
al passages Kant describes *comparation, reflection* and *abstraction* as necessary acts to constitute the form of a conceptual representation starting from an empirical intuition (Log, p. 592; on this topic, cf. Capozzi 2002).

In the context of transcendental philosophy, and considering the operation of reflecting judgement, when a concept is missing and the faculties *in free play* must find an agreement with a sensible representation to ensure an experience, the role of the power of judgement – and of imagination, along with free schematism – becomes pre-eminent as a constructive device. Here, Garroni (1986, p. 219) articulates the *aesthetic* nature of the principle of the reflecting power of judgement: “it is not an intellectual, nor a cognitive or logical unity […] rather, it is to feel the agreement of imagination and intellect under the sign of the imagination, which is preliminary to any explicit agreement, already consummated under the sign of the intellect”. At the same time, Garroni points out that the power of judgement is *more than* a purely formal and aesthetic activity restricted to the feeling of pleasure, as with judgements of taste. In fact, the power of judgement chiefly endeavours to facilitate agreement between the imagination and the intellect on account of this *a priori* anticipation of the experience in its own particularity (KU § 9) promoted by the aesthetic activity proper. In other words, judgement seeks to promote harmony between the imagination and the intellect according to a particular *proportion* between the two faculties (KU § 21), anticipating the context where genuine empirical knowledge may arise through a universally communicable disposition.

Among the different proportions, the most suitable for the disposition of the faculties of the soul is determined by feeling. Once again, the *free play* of the faculties, understood as common sense, is assumed as the unifying principle underlying not only the aesthetic power of judgement, but also the power of judgement *tout court*, even in its epistemic predisposition. The proportion of the powers depending on feeling is “the subjective condition of cognizing”. Without it, “the cognition, as an effect, could not arise”, its internal relation being “optimal for the animation of both powers of the mind (the one through the other) with respect to cognition (of given objects) in general” (KU § 21).

At the heart of the *Deduction* (KU § 35), Kant contends that the power of judgement applied to a representation in which an object is given “requires the agreement of two powers of representation: namely, the imagination (for the intuition and the composition of the manifold of intuition), and the understanding (as representation for the concept of the unity of this composition)”. The power of
judgement – and, paradigmatically, the power of taste (understood as the subjective power of judgement) – “contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations (i.e., of the imagination) under the faculty of concepts (i.e., the understanding), insofar as the former in its freedom is in harmony with the latter in its lawfulness”.

6.

In these dense passages, an important point emerges for Garroni and also for the broader debate on nonconceptualism. Specifically, in the absence of a concept, and through a merely empirical intuition, the faculties are predisposed to necessarily discover agreement. This is demonstrated even in the case of an indeterminate concept (KU § 23) presented as a merely general, basic intellectual legality – in the KU Kant speaks of harmony with the lawfulness of the understanding in general – so as to build a reference (in other words, an actual concept for that sensible representation assumed in its particularity). In addition, in building such a reference, to enable the imagination, according to such an aesthetic anticipation, to schematize freely – once again, without the concept – although in view of (the construction of) possible knowledge. In contrast to the exhibitio symbolica, where the intuition (but not the concept) is missing, this free schematism – a sort of oxymoron, if schematizing means to present concepts – specifies the analogical criteria for the formation of empirical concepts according to the a priori principle of Urteilskraft (Garroni 2003, p. 41).

For this reason, it is possible to speak of aesthetic conceptualism in Garroni’s reading of Third Critique. On the one hand, Garroni posits that the most suitable proportion for the disposition of the faculties of the soul is determined by feeling. That is, so to speak, the aesthetic of his conceptualism, insofar as this disposition cannot be determined through concepts, but only through feeling. On the other hand, this aesthetic condition, which expresses a subjective principle of the power of judgement in general, predisposes the faculties to find an epistemic agreement. In this way, it is therefore not possible to consider that the epistemic contribution of intuition does not involve the predisposition of the faculties for the formation of possible knowledge. Certainly, the intuitive representation provides a peculiar, autonomous (with respect to conceptual forms) contribution to content, but such a contribution does not allow perception of an object independently of any conceptual articulation or involvement of the faculties.
Garroni is clear about this specific point. The representations of the imagination arising from the apprehension of an object’s forms in intuition – that is, in the free play of the faculties – are certainly rich in determinations. Nonetheless, they are also primarily the presentations of indeterminate intellectual concepts as they are already linked with intellectual legality. As Garroni (2003, p. 44) pointed out with respect to the term image-schema, these images are not just ‘given’, they are instead original, imaginative-intellectual formulations comprising the conditions of possible schemas. Indeed, they imply an indeterminate relation between the imagination and the intellect which may be gradually specified and articulated in increasingly determined conceptual relations.

7.

If a question concerns the formation of empirical concepts rather than their application, the possibility of the activation of the empirical scheme and its relative concept is prompted by a given intuitive representation. In turn, the determination of such a possibility is triggered by the image-schema – i.e., the ‘product’, so to speak – of a vague relevantisation established by a general agreement of the faculties. Such an agreement is ultimately based on the power of the imagination to release representations from any specific concept (or, as with aesthetic ideas, to render them unbound by definition) so that, instead, these may be “available to concepts variously definable, also in the sense of analogy” (Garroni, 2003, p. 46). Such is the foundational premise of both empirical schemas and concepts which also discloses the essence of the exhibitio symbolica as an applicative variant of the same analogical procedure.

In conclusion, with respect to the current debate, the Kantian nonconceptualist strategy consists in isolating empirical intuition so that it can provide its own epistemic contribution. This is achieved by invoking the sole imagination in a synthetic activity based on no given conceptual dimension with respect to its relative judgement. Pursuant to Garroni’s analysis of the specific features of the reflecting power of judgement and its relative a priori principle, the KU supplies a picture at odds not only with such a nonconceptualist position, but also with respect to the specific role of imagination and judgements. In a crucial passage, Kant affirms that “the apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without the reflecting power of judgment, even if unintentionally, at least comparing them to its faculty for relating intuitions to concepts”
(KU, Intr. § VII). For these reasons, intuition cannot be considered an epistemically autonomous representation unless the faculties intervene to find or build a conceptual reference analogically.

As such, in Garroni’s terms of *Senso e Paradosso* (1986, p. 229), Sense is rendered only through specific experiences and, in turn, each specific experience is accompanied by Sense as a condition to its possibility: “there is no discrete class of objects that only say or serve something specific and, in a different class, objects that completely disregard saying and serving concrete meaning, therefore turning to pure stupefied contemplation, producing a feeling of pleasure”. This condition of aesthetic possibility may be grasped only paradoxically through the involvement of conceptual forms in function of a possible experience.

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