Audi, Robert, *Means, Ends, & Persons: The Meaning & Psychological Dimensions of Kant’s Humanity Formula*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. xvi + 171, £29.99 (hardback).

Audi seeks to develop an ethics of conduct which focuses on treating persons as ends and not as mere means. While this approach has its roots in Kant’s ethics, Audi seeks to develop it independently of Kant.

We treat others *merely* as a means when we treat them as having *only* an instrumental value as a means to our end *and* we are not disposed to treat them differently. For example, I stop to ask a person for directions. I treat her, like a map, only as an instrument to my end. But after fulfilling her role as a means, she starts to choke. If I am disposed to stop and help her, then I have used her *solely* as a means. If I am not so disposed, then I have used her *merely* as a means. This is prima facie wrong, since I thereby treat the good of this person as having *only* an instrumental worth. We treat others as ends by caring about their good for its own sake in act, motive and manner. For example, when a mother feeds her baby out of love and with care, then she treats her baby as an end. Whereas a mother who feeds her baby hurriedly only in order to get some quiet fails to treat her baby as an end, since she performs the right act-type but her motive and manner are instrumental. Failing to treat others as an end is not, however, always prima facie wrong.

Two points of difference with Kant are worth noting. First, Kant focuses on treating persons as rational *agents* whose possible *consent* must always be sought. In contrast, Audi focuses on treating persons as having an objective good which we should care about. While a person’s consent plays an important *part* in determining a person’s good for Audi, it does not completely determine it in the way that it does for (some) Kantians. This raises problems for Audi in regards to paternalism which Kantians can avoid. Second, Kantians focus on respect for dignity as a rational motive which we can (if we are rational) always act on. Audi, in contrast, relies on motives that may or may not be present, such as love for others. When we lack such motives we can’t treat others as ends, and so for Audi moral worth is not the ever present possibility it is for Kantians.

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