

Defending Millian Theories

BRYAN FRANCES

In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke's puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean's arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuating elements of propositions or belief contents that are sensitive to our varying personal conceptions of the referents of those elements) are viciously circular. Thus, the Fregean must give new arguments for her central claims. Second, I offer original, positive arguments for the Millian idea that the thoughts that Cicero was bald and that Tully was bald are identical. Strangely enough, the arguments appeal to nothing but pre-theoretical principles regarding folk psychological usage—traditionally the source of Fregean intuitions. Third, I examine one of the most important recent papers on Kripke's puzzle, that by David Sosa (1996). Sosa claims to have found a way to turn the tables on Kripke's puzzle by using it to argue against Millian theories. I argue that Sosa's argument on behalf of the Fregean is question-begging. I conclude that Millian theories can be seriously defended without any use of theoretical constructs such as guises or Russellian propositions, and that Fregeans provide new argument for their theory's central claims.

Suppose Peter is a monolingual English speaker who in 1996 learned of Geoffrey Hellman the philosopher of mathematics and came to mistakenly believe that Hellman lives in St. Paul, not Minneapolis. Some time later in 1997 he heard about Geoffrey Hellman the pianist, came to know that Hellman lives in Minneapolis, but did not learn that the philosopher is the pianist: he thinks there are two Hellmans. It seems that Peter is perfectly rational despite having explicitly contradictory beliefs: that Hellman [the pianist] lives in Minneapolis and that Hellman [the philosopher] does not live in Minneapolis.

Saul Kripke has offered thought experiments similar to the one involving Peter in order to further the discussion regarding the connections between thought and language (Kripke 1979). In this article I set aside my own Fregean inclinations in order to offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent. I first give what I believe to be the correct analysis of Kripke's puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. After almost twenty years it is still controversial what, exactly, the lessons are of Kripke's thought experiments. The main lesson, which will be further articulated below, is that the Fregean has to start all over in attempting to

establish her theory; the traditional Fregean arguments are failures. Thus, one cannot rest content, as many have done, with merely determining how the Fregean would account for Peter's situation. As we will see, that project misses the point of Kripke's puzzle entirely. The real challenge the Fregean faces, one inexplicably missed or misconstrued by many if not most commentators, is that of providing a new argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, that is, individuating elements of propositions, belief types, or belief contents that are sensitive to our varying personal conceptions of the referents of those elements. Second, I offer original, positive arguments for the Millian idea that one may believe, for instance, that Cicero was bald even though one vigorously, honestly, and knowingly dissents from "Cicero was bald". In fact, the arguments conclude that the thoughts that Cicero was bald and that Tully was bald are identical. Strangely enough, the arguments appeal to nothing but pre-theoretical principles regarding folk psychological usage—traditionally the source of Fregean intuitions. No appeal is made to Frege–Kripke puzzle cases or theoretical constructs such as guises or Russellian propositions. Third, I examine one of the most important recent papers on Kripke's puzzle, that by David Sosa (1996). Sosa claims to have found a way to turn the tables on Kripke's puzzle by using it to argue *against* Millian theories. I will argue that Sosa's argument on behalf of the Fregean is question-begging. I conclude that Millian theories can be seriously defended without any use of theoretical constructs such as guises or Russellian propositions, and that Fregeans need to provide new arguments for their theory's central claims.

1. Kripke's Millian argument against Fregeanism

The Kripkean argument given by Millians against Fregean theories goes something like this, utilizing the Peter–Hellman story. Peter assents to "Hellman [the pianist] lives in Minneapolis". So he seems to believe that Hellman lives in Minneapolis. He also assents to "It's not the case that Hellman [the philosopher] lives in Minneapolis". So he seems to believe that it's not the case that Hellman lives in Minneapolis. It is highly plausible to suppose that no one can be fully rational and believe that *P* and that it's not the case that *P*. But surely Peter is a paradigm of rationality. Thus, since we have reached a contradiction something must give way: either Consistency (a fully rational individual cannot believe that *P* and that it's not the case that *P*) or Disquotation (if a fully ratio-

nal person honestly assents to an English sentence P° , then she believes that P).

The Millian then asks us to consider the traditional Fregean argument for the thesis that one can believe that Cicero was bald while failing to believe that Tully was bald. Mary, a paradigm of rationality, assents to “Cicero was bald” and “It’s not the case that Tully was bald”. The Fregean infers from these assents that Mary believes that Cicero was bald and that it’s not the case that Tully was bald. This inference in the Fregean argument relies on Disquotation. Let *Substitutivity* be the principle that if English proper names a and b are coreferential, then S believes (thinks, etc.) that a is F° and S believes (thinks, etc.) that b is F° have the same truth value (assuming that the difference in a and b is the only one in the two sentences, the other linguistic parts agreeing in meaning, reference, etc.). If Substitutivity holds, then since Mary believes that Cicero was bald she also believes that Tully was bald. And we already inferred from Disquotation that she believes that Tully was not bald. But, the Fregean continues, this cannot be right: no fully rational person can believe that P and that it’s not the case that P . This part of the Fregean argument relies on Consistency. The Fregean concludes that Mary does *not* believe that Tully was bald, that the thoughts that Cicero was bald and that Tully was bald are distinct, and that Substitutivity is incorrect. But the Fregean had to use both Consistency and Disquotation in this argument—and we just saw that the conjunction of these two principles leads to a contradiction in the Peter–Hellman story. So the Fregean argument against Substitutivity has at least one false premise.¹ The Millian, who endorses Substitutivity, may not be as crazy as we all used to think. Furthermore, the Fregean has lost her most characteristic argument against Substitutivity. This is the main initial conclusion of Kripke’s argument.

It will be worth our while to make the principles behind the Millian argument more precise.

¹What is stunning about this reconstruction of the Fregean argument is that Mary’s strenuous dissents to “Tully was bald” are completely left out of consideration. However, in my opinion one main reason we are hesitant to attribute the belief that Tully was bald to Mary is that she knowingly and honestly *dissents from* “Tully was bald”. This suggests that the Fregean’s argument should go as follows. Mary assents to “Cicero was bald” and dissents from “Tully was bald”. The Fregean then infers that Mary believes that Cicero was bald and she does not believe that Tully was bald. If Substitutivity holds, then since Mary believes one she also believes the other. But this cannot be right: we just decided that she did not have the Tully belief. The Fregean concludes that Substitutivity is false without ever worrying about possibly contradictory beliefs. However, it can be shown that this argument has all the problems and virtues of the Fregean argument given in the text.

Rationality_P: Peter is as rational as one can realistically get.²

Assent_P: Peter honestly³ assents to “Hellman [the pianist] lives in Minneapolis”; and he honestly assents to “It’s not the case that Hellman [the philosopher] lives in Minneapolis”.

Disquotation: If *S* is as rational as one can realistically get, then if *S* honestly assents to an English sentence P° , then *S* believes that *P*.⁴ In particular, if Peter is as rational as one can realistically get, then if he honestly assents to “Hellman lives in Minneapolis” (or “It’s not the case that Hellman lives in Minneapolis”), then he believes that Hellman lives in Minneapolis (or that it’s not the case that Hellman lives in Minneapolis).

Consistency: If *S* is as rational as one can realistically get, then *S* does not believe that *P* and that it’s not the case that *P*. In particular, if Peter is as rational as one can realistically get, then Peter does not believe that Hellman lives in Minneapolis and that it’s not the case that Hellman lives in Minneapolis.

The set of these four principles is inconsistent. Since the first two principles are unproblematic, either Disquotation or Consistency must go. Here is the Millian’s reconstruction of the Fregean argument.

Rationality_M: Mary is as rational as one can realistically get.

Assent_M: Mary honestly assents to “Cicero was bald”, and she honestly assents to “It’s not the case that Tully was bald”.

Disquotation: If *S* is as rational as one can realistically get, then if *S* honestly assents to an English sentence P° , then *S* believes that *P*. In particular, if Mary is as rational as one can realistically

²The subscript “P” is for “Peter”. By “as rational as one can realistically get” I do not intend any idealization. All I mean is that Peter is just about as rational as we, in fact, ever get. I do not think there are any grounds for doubting *Rationality_P*. The only reason to dispute it is that Peter seems to have contradictory beliefs: he believes that Hellman [the pianist] lives in Minneapolis and that Hellman [the philosopher] does not live in Minneapolis. If he does have explicitly, even occurrently held, contradictory beliefs or thoughts, how can he remain rational upon reflection? However we answer this question, we need to observe that no matter how we characterize his beliefs he *must* come out rational in the end. Even though Peter *may* have contradictory beliefs, the beliefs that *P* and that it’s not the case that *P*, we all recognize that *it’s not his fault*; he is *blameless*; he has done nothing to deserve his wretched position. His odd situation is due to circumstances *beyond his control*; the unfortunate contingencies that led to his odd situation did not occur internal to his cognitive apparatus, so to speak. He has not failed to live up to some standard of using all his introspective abilities to determine whether he has contradictory beliefs. So the problem is certainly not with Peter’s rationality.

³By “honestly” I intend sincere, reflective, knowing, etc., assent meant to exclude assents made while acting, etc.

⁴Here and elsewhere “*P*” is to be replaced so that *S* believes that P° , true or not, ascribes a first-order *de dicto* belief. Also, due to the nature of the counterexamples we can ignore sentences containing indexicals and other problematic devices. In my forthcoming paper (forthcoming c) I defend the application of Disquotation to the Peter–Hellman case.

get, then if she honestly assents to “Cicero was bald” (or “It’s not the case that Tully was bald”), then she believes that Cicero was bald (or that it’s not the case that Tully was bald).

Consistency: If *S* is as rational as one can realistically get, then *S* does not believe that *P* and that it’s not the case that *P*. In particular, if Mary is as rational as one can realistically get, then she does not believe that Tully was bald and that it’s not the case that Tully was bald.

The set of these four claims entails that Mary believes that Cicero was bald but does *not* believe that Tully was bald. So Substitutivity would have to be false if these four claims were true. As with the Peter–Hellman story, the first two claims are unproblematic. But as the Millian has pointed out with the Peter–Hellman story, either Disquotation or Consistency is false; so the traditional Fregean argument against Substitutivity rests on a false premise. So the Millian is not necessarily crazy.

This Millian argument against Fregeanism is solid, but I think it has two significant weaknesses, neither of which I recall being brought out in the literature. First, there is a closely related alternative Fregean argument, to be presented and examined in the next section, that does not use Consistency even though it reaches the *same* conclusions as the one given above. And as we will see, *Frege–Kripke puzzle cases cannot be used to show that this alternative argument relies on a false premise.*

Second, I think that any good Fregean would reject Consistency anyway, which strongly suggests that the Fregean argument given above may not have anywhere near the importance Kripke and others give it. To see this let us ask how is it that the Fregean *accounts for* the apparent datum that Mary can rationally believe that Cicero was bald while failing to believe that Tully was bald. Mary can be in this odd situation because, it is claimed, she associates different Fregean senses with Cicero. In particular, she associates a sense we will call Cicero₁ with “Cicero” and she associates a distinct sense, Cicero₂, with “Tully”. For our purposes it matters little what the nature of Fregean senses is. When thinking about Cicero using Cicero₁ she will express her belief that Cicero was bald with the sentence “Cicero was bald”. When thinking of Cicero using “Tully”, that is, when employing Cicero₂, she assents to “Tully wasn’t bald”. The reason this situation is unproblematic, according to the Fregean, is that the two thoughts believed are not related as a thought and its negation: Mary’s belief that it’s not the case that Tully was bald is not the negation of her belief that Cicero was bald. Mary’s assents to “Cicero was bald” express a certain *cognitive content* or *knowledge worth*, a content not expressed by her dissents from “Tully was bald” because of the nonidentity of Cicero₁ and Cicero₂.

Now consider Jan, who like Mary seems to believe that there were two Roman orators, one bald and the other hairy. Also like Mary, Jan's putative beliefs about the orators are both in fact about Cicero. Finally, Jan has the *same* two senses of Cicero, Cicero₁ for the bald one and Cicero₂ for the hairy one. The only difference between Mary's and Jan's situations is that whereas Mary thinks the orators have different names, "Cicero" and "Tully", Jan thinks that both orators are named "Cicero" in English. Jan has never heard the name "Tully".

I think the Fregean would be hard-pressed to find any significant cognitive difference between Mary's and Jan's epistemic repertoires. It is difficult to see how this linguistic accident—Mary has two names for Cicero while Jan has just one—could make for a difference in their *Fregean* thoughts regarding Cicero. On Fregean theory Jan's assents to "Cicero was bald" express her Fregean thought containing sense Cicero₁ and make it true that she believes that Cicero was bald; her assents to "It's not the case that Cicero was bald" express her Fregean thought that contains Cicero₂ and make it true that she believes that it's not the case that Cicero was bald. Exactly as in Mary's case the beliefs are not contradictory in their Fregean contents. The Fregean will hold that Jan's odd situation of believing that *P* and that it's not the case that *P* is possible because she employs different senses corresponding to "Cicero": Cicero₁ and Cicero₂ are different senses and some of Jan's utterances of "Cicero" express the one, some the other. Of course, Jan's beliefs are contradictory in some superficial linguistic sense, but the Fregean will want to make a distinction between the contradictory linguistic contents of Jan's beliefs and their consistent Fregean thought contents. More on this crucial distinction below.

Jan is in a Frege–Kripke puzzle situation. In effect, what we have established with Kripke's puzzle is that on Fregean theory Consistency is false. So one might ask why it is that philosophers have fussed over Kripke's puzzle. Its conclusion is that a conjunction (of Disquotation and Consistency) is false. But on Fregean theories one conjunct (Consistency) is false. So where's the threat to Fregeanism?

The initial threat is that the Fregean has to provide new arguments against Substitutivity. On her own theory Consistency is false; and the most straightforward way to argue against Substitutivity is to use Consistency. So how on earth is she to argue against Substitutivity? And if she cannot provide a compelling argument against Substitutivity, then how is she to defend her rejection of Substitutivity? Or does she really need to reject Substitutivity? These are some of the crucial questions that must be addressed in any adequate account of Kripke's puzzle.

2. The alternative Fregean and Millian arguments

Consider the following *alternative* Fregean argument, one that I think characterizes Fregeanism better than the Fregean argument given in the previous section. Mary, a paradigm of rationality, assents to “Cicero was bald”. So she believes thought *C*, the thought expressed by her assents to “Cicero was bald”. She also assents to “It’s not the case that Tully was bald”. So she believes the negation of thought *T*, the negated thought expressed by her assents to “It’s not the case that Tully was bald”. Let *Millianism* for coreferential proper names be the principle that if English proper names *a* and *b* are coreferential, then *a* is *F*[°] and *b* is *F*[°] express the same thought.⁵ It follows from Millianism that thought *C* is identical with thought *T*. So if Millianism is correct, then Mary believes thought *T* and its negation. But this cannot be right: no rational person can believe a thought and its negation. Thus, *C* ≠ *T*; Millianism is incorrect.

When made more precise, the alternative Fregean argument relies on each of the following claims.

Rationality_M: Mary is as rational as one can realistically get.

Assent_M: Mary honestly assents to “Cicero was bald”, and she honestly assents to “It’s not the case that Tully was bald”.

Meaning_M: Mary’s honest assents to “Cicero was bald” express thought *C*. Mary’s honest assents to “It’s not the case that Tully was bald” express the negation of thought *T*.

Disquotation_F: If *S* is as rational as one can realistically get, then if *S* honestly assents to a sentence ϕ , where *S*’s assents to ϕ express thought *P*, then *S* believes *P*.⁶

Consistency_F: If *S* is as rational as one can realistically get, then *S* does not believe a thought and its negation.

The set of these claims entails that Mary does *not* believe *T*; since they also entail that Mary believes *C*, we conclude that *C* ≠ *T*. The falsehood of Millianism follows. *Rationality_M*, *Assent_M*, and *Meaning_M* are unproblematic. So the only way to find fault with the argument is to focus on *Disquotation_F* and *Consistency_F*.

The Millian is able to use Frege–Kripke puzzle cases to produce a conclusive argument to the effect that the first Fregean argument against Substitutivity rests on a false premise (*Consistency* or *Disquotation*); the Millian did so by deriving a contradiction from the Fregean premises. However, as we have seen, such an argument cannot be too important, for

⁵ Here we assume that “*F*” gets replaced so that the sentences are non-intentional and the difference in *a* and *b* is the only one in the two sentences, the remaining linguistic parts having the same reference, meaning, etc.

⁶ The subscript “*F*” is for “Frege”.

the Fregean would give up Consistency anyway! So a crucial question is whether the Millian can show that the *alternative* Fregean argument rests on a false premise. Just as one might expect, Disquotation_F and Consistency_F show up in the alternative Millian argument (using the Peter–Hellman story) corresponding to the alternative Fregean argument. But this time an extra premise is needed to derive the contradiction.

Rationality_p: Peter is as rational as one can realistically get.

Assent_p: Peter honestly assents to “Hellman [the pianist] lives in Minneapolis”, and he honestly assents to “It’s not the case that Hellman [the philosopher] lives in Minneapolis”.

Meaning_p: Peter’s honest assents to “Hellman [the pianist] lives in Minneapolis” express thought *K*. Peter’s honest assents to “It’s not the case that Hellman [the philosopher] lives in Minneapolis” express the negation of thought *L*.

Disquotation_F: If *S* is as rational as one can realistically get, then if *S* honestly assents to a sentence ϕ , where *S*’s assents to ϕ express thought *P*, then *S* believes *P*.

Identity_p: Thoughts *K* and *L* are identical.

Consistency_F: If *S* is as rational as one can realistically get, then *S* does not believe a thought and its negation.

These six claims are collectively inconsistent and each one is needed to reach the inconsistency. Just as in the case of the alternative Fregean argument, the first three claims are unproblematic. Thus, either Disquotation_F, Identity_p, or Consistency_F must go. Obviously the Fregean is going to avoid the inconsistency by rejecting Identity_p. The rejection of Identity_p is exactly analogous to the lesson of the alternative Fregean argument regarding Mary and Cicero. That argument attempted to show that Mary’s uses of “Cicero was bald” and “Tully was bald” express different thoughts: *C* ≠ *T*. Obviously we can apply the entire alternative Fregean argument to Peter in an attempt to show that Peter’s uses of “Hellman lives in Minneapolis” express, on different occasions, different thoughts: *K* ≠ *L*. The Fregean took the lesson of the Mary–Cicero story to be that thoughts *C* and *T* are distinct—so it is obvious that she will take the lesson of the Peter–Hellman story to be that thoughts *K* and *L* are distinct. So the Fregean rejects Identity_p by endorsing Consistency_F and Disquotation_F. The Millian cannot use Frege–Kripke puzzle cases in order to show that the alternative Fregean argument rests on a false premise, either Consistency_F or Disquotation_F.

This Fregean response is correct as far as it goes—Kripke’s puzzle provides no direct threat to *this* argument against Millianism—but as we will see in the next section the fascinating point is that it does not go very far. At this point we should, for the sake of completeness, note how the alternative Fregean argument can be extended to produce a rejection of Sub-

stitutivity. All it shows thus far, assuming Disquotation_F and Consistency_P, is that Mary does not believe *T*, the thought expressed by her uses of (i.e. dissents from) “Tully was bald”. If sound, the valid alternative Fregean argument shows that *C* and *T* are distinct and Millianism is false. But from the soundness of the Fregean’s alternative argument one cannot yet obtain the conclusion that Mary does *not* believe that Tully was bald. She does not believe *T*, the thought expressed by her dissents from “Tully was bald”, but that is another, albeit very closely related, matter.

One might think that all the Fregean needs in order to mount a valid argument against Substitutivity using the premises of the alternative Fregean argument is the addition of some relatively innocent premise. After all, from Disquotation_F and Consistency_F (and the unproblematic Rationality_M, Meaning_M, and Assent_M) we have the conclusion that Mary does not believe *T*, the thought she expresses with “Tully was bald”. What better reason could there be for concluding that she fails to believe that Tully was bald? Even so, it is not easy to formulate a nonquestion-begging principle that can serve as the missing premise. Here is one principle that seems to do the job.

Disbelief: If *S* fails to believe thought *H*, and *S* uses English sentence *P*° to express *H* and *only H*, then *S* fails to believe that *P*. In particular, if Mary fails to believe thought *T* (the one expressed by her uses of, i.e. dissents from, “Tully was bald”), and Mary uses the sentence “Tully was bald” to express *T* and *only T*, then Mary fails to believe that Tully was bald.

Since we have already concluded that Mary fails to believe thought *T*, and on Fregean *and* Millian theories she uses “Tully was bald” to express just one thought, the Fregean can use Disbelief to conclude that Mary fails to believe that Tully was bald; so the Fregean would have completed her argument against Substitutivity. Furthermore, Disbelief does not conflict with her analysis of Peter’s situation. If we apply Disbelief to Peter’s situation we get the following.

If Peter fails to believe thought *L* (the one expressed by his uses of “Hellman [the philosopher] lives in Minneapolis”), and he uses the sentence “Hellman lives in Minneapolis” to express *L* and *only L*, then he fails to believe that Hellman lives in Minneapolis.

This sentence is true on Fregean theory because on this theory the second conjunct of the antecedent is false: Peter uses “Hellman lives in Minneapolis” to express the two thoughts *K* and *L* from before. It is also true on Millian theories because on those theories the first conjunct of the antecedent is false. Assuming that Disbelief is innocent, has the Fregean given compelling arguments against Millianism and Substitutivity by using Disquotation_F and Consistency_F—arguments that avoid all the problems revealed by Kripke’s puzzle?

3. The main lesson of Kripke's puzzle

Virtually everyone agrees that Kripke's puzzle shows that Peter believes that Hellman lives in Minneapolis and that Hellman does not live in Minneapolis.⁷ The straightforward way to interpret this is to conclude that Peter believes and disbelieves the same thought, the thought that Hellman lives in Minneapolis, and that's all there is to it: so both Consistency and Consistency_F are false. And if we reject Consistency_P then we must reject the alternative Fregean argument against Millianism and Substitutivity. Since the Fregean who endorses the alternative Fregean argument thinks that this is not all there is to it, claiming that Consistency_F is true, she needs a compelling argument for this crucial premise, Consistency_P, in spite of her rejection of the closely related Consistency. By rejecting Consistency while accepting Consistency_P, the Fregean must hold that there are two kinds of thought content. In rejecting Consistency the Fregean admitted that Jan believes that Cicero was bald and that Cicero was not bald; but by accepting Consistency_F the Fregean claims that Jan does not, in some sense, believe a thought and its negation. Thus, on Fregean theories there is the ordinary, familiar type of thought content for which the beliefs that Cicero was bald and that Cicero was not bald have straightforwardly contradictory contents independently of the believer's conceptions of Cicero. When we say that everyone who believes that Cicero was bald believes the same thing, that is, has the belief that Cicero was bald, we are appealing to this "linguistic" content for which our different conceptions of Cicero are largely irrelevant in the sense that they do not ruin the identity of what we believe: we all share the same belief despite conceiving of Cicero in many different ways. The Fregean will agree that someone (e.g. Jan) may believe and disbelieve the same linguistic content. This linguistic content is (should be) recognized by Millians as well as Fregeans. However, endorsing Consistency_F in the face of rejecting Consistency forces the Fregean to argue for the existence of *another* kind of content lying behind the scenes, individuated by something like ways of conceiving or conceptions or individual concepts. It is this additional content or content-like property that makes Jan's beliefs consistent in one way.

How is the Fregean to argue for this additional kind of content, one particularly sensitive to our conceptions? Here is how the most straightforward, Fregean argument would go. Suppose Substitutivity is false; Mary believes that Cicero was bald but she does not believe that Tully was bald. With this failure of Substitutivity we need to find a distinction between the content of her belief that Cicero was bald and the content of her thought

⁷ Of course, this statement is false. But one can construct arguments in favour of this characterization of Peter's beliefs that are decisive. I set out these arguments in my paper (forthcoming c).

that Tully was bald. Fregean senses individuated by conceptions fit the bill as *constituents* of the propositions or belief contents: since the senses differ and are parts of the propositions, the propositions differ. It is important to remember that one cannot distinguish the “Cicero” and “Tully” contents just by pointing out that Mary has two conceptions or senses of Cicero. That fact may account for her different attitudes toward “Cicero was bald” and “Tully was bald”, but it does not help one differentiate the “Cicero” and “Tully” contents unless one claims that those differing conceptions result in different propositional constituents. Accepting *psychologically relevant* conceptions or senses, as *any* theorist should do in accounting for, for example, Mary’s different attitudes towards “Cicero was bald” and “Tully was bald”, does not mean one accepts *semantically relevant* senses, senses that figure in the identities of propositions, belief types, or belief contents. So with the failure of Substitutivity one had a good argument for Fregean, that is, semantically relevant, senses. These senses formed the backbone of the additional, Fregean kind of content. Thus, with the failure of Substitutivity, the Fregean can conclude that there are two kinds of content, the linguistic one and the internal, mental, psychologically and semantically relevant, Fregean one that is sensitive to our varying conceptions. This does not quite give me Consistency_o, but it is the important first step.

What we have learned from Frege–Kripke puzzle cases ruins this Fregean argument for an additional kind of content and Fregean senses, because the Fregean has no good argument for its initial supposition, that Substitutivity is false. Here’s why. The Fregean cannot use the straightforward argument against Substitutivity that used Consistency since she rejects that principle (as we discovered in §1). Instead she uses the alternative Fregean argument against Substitutivity given in §2. But, as we saw in §2, the alternative Fregean argument against Substitutivity will not be compelling unless we have a compelling argument for its controversial premise Consistency_F. We also saw that given the Fregean’s rejection of Consistency the soundness of an argument for Consistency_F amounts to the soundness of an argument for the additional, Fregean content. Thus, the alternative Fregean argument against Substitutivity will not be compelling unless we have a compelling argument for the existence of an alternative, Fregean content. That is, the Fregean’s *first* task is to get a compelling argument for the Fregean content; only then can her argument against Substitutivity be any good. However, as we just saw in the previous paragraph, the traditional argument for the additional, Fregean content will not be compelling unless we have a compelling argument for its controversial premise, the denial of Substitutivity. So the Fregean’s *first* task has to be to get a compelling argument against Substitutivity; only

then will her argument for Fregean content be any good. Thus, the Fregean is caught in a straightforwardly vicious circle: her only live argument for the denial of Substitutivity contains a premise (Consistency_F) that requires a compelling argument for the existence of an additional, Fregean content, but her only argument for the existence of an additional, Fregean content contains as a premise the denial of Substitutivity. Given the viciousness of the circle, *one cannot without begging the question appeal to semantically relevant senses in order to account for the Frege–Kripke puzzle cases*. Accounting for Frege–Kripke puzzle cases on the Fregean model has always been easy: the protagonist associates two semantically relevant senses with the object (e.g. Cicero) in question. But this appeal to semantically relevant senses is clearly question-begging since the Fregean has lost her argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses—the primary elements of the additional, Fregean kind of content. The primary lesson of Kripke’s puzzle is that the Fregean has to start over in arguing for her theory’s central claims that Substitutivity is false and that our conceptions determine semantically relevant senses.⁸

One should not be tempted to think that one does not really need an argument against Substitutivity or for semantically relevant senses (or, what amounts to the same thing, the additional, Fregean kind of content). The mere existence of Millian theories that provide accounts of our Fregean intuitions against Substitutivity without appeal to semantically relevant senses shows the folly of such an attitude. One can, of course, quarrel with those accounts, but one can quarrel with Fregean accounts as well. Independently of that matter, the idea should look foolish to any serious philosopher.

The Fregean has to start over arguing against the Millian. Are there other Fregean arguments against Substitutivity or for the additional, Fregean kind of content? As far as I know, only Joseph Owens (1995) and David Sosa (1996) have offered new arguments against Substitutivity. I have argued elsewhere (forthcoming (a)) that Owens’ argument is inadequate; Sosa’s argument will be criticized below. The dual view of content, with or without the Fregean construal of the behind-the-scenes content, has gained popularity from analyses of Kripke’s puzzle and the anti-individualist or externalist thought experiments offered by Tyler Burge and

⁸I believe that Kripke took his puzzle cases to cast doubt on the conjunction of Consistency and Disquotation (although he did not put it this way). Kripke also seems to have taken these principles to be so ingrained in our ordinary intentional state attribution practice that with their rejection the coherency of the practice is threatened. Both the Millian and the Fregean have theories according to which Consistency is false, but that does not quite impugn Kripke’s point. Even so, I do not interpret the Kripke puzzle cases as offering a serious threat to the coherency of our practice for the simple reason that I am not sure what the threat is intended to amount to.

Hilary Putnam.⁹ However, this view has met with heavy opposition from Burge (1986, 1989), Owens (1987, 1989, 1990, 1992), and Robert Stalnaker (1990) among others. In spite of these criticisms, Brian Loar (1987, 1988) and others have gathered evidence, justifiably found compelling by many, that seems to require some kind of additional, perhaps Fregean, kind of content or content-like property that is not captured by “that”-clauses. Elsewhere (forthcoming (b)) I have argued for the surprising claim that the folk psychological phenomena thought by these theorists to require an additional kind of content are best and most naturally accounted for with just the ordinary content given by “that”-clauses. These matters are complex and cannot be adequately addressed in a short compass. It will have to suffice to note that the arguments for an additional, Fregean kind of content—one sensitive to our varying conceptions—are either question-begging against the Millian (relying on the denial of Substitutivity) or under heavy fire.

4. A new argument for substitutivity and Millianism

Given the failure of Fregean arguments against Substitutivity and Millianism, what are we to think of these two counterintuitive principles? Is there any good *argument* for either accepting or rejecting them? Although like most theorists I am *inclined* to think that Substitutivity and Millianism are false, I want to present a *positive* argument for both. I think my argument is novel, since the best (but not all) reasons for accepting these doctrines that I know of have been negative, coming from the difficulties found in alternative theories. However, not only is there a reasonably good argument for both Substitutivity and Millianism, but, incredibly, it comes from mere elementary, pre-theoretical reflections on standard and perfectly ordinary folk psychological usage—precisely the primary source of intuitions *against* Substitutivity and Millianism! The argument has no direct, positive consequences for the existence of Russellian propositions or any other theoretical construct of Millian theories, but it supports those theories by making Substitutivity and Millianism more attractive.

The argument is based on a thought experiment. Suppose that there is no name for Bigfoot in British English other than “Bigfoot”; in Canadian English the only name for Bigfoot is “Sasquatch”; and US English, the

⁹Some who have endorsed the dual content view are David Lewis (1983), Brian Loar (1987, 1988), Colin McGinn (1982), and Jerry Fodor (1982, 1987, 1991). Fodor now has doubts about the dual content view, but many others are still committed to it.

language I am using, has just those two terms for Bigfoot.¹⁰ Pretend that otherwise the languages (dialects, whatever) are relevantly identical (i.e., identical for all the sentences to be discussed below but otherwise as different as they really are). Edna, who knows only British English, honestly assents to the British English expression “Bigfoot is real”. She knows nothing of the word “Sasquatch”, and she has just one conception of Bigfoot. She is not in any relevant Frege–Kripke puzzle or any other strange circumstance regarding “Bigfoot”, “Sasquatch”, or Bigfoot. She does not know any other languages. Edna is not in any relevant odd circumstances whatsoever. There is nothing relevantly odd about the varieties of English under discussion. Edna is just your average monolingual Brit who, as they would put it, “believes that Bigfoot is real”. Her conception associated with “Bigfoot” sufficiently conforms to British English’s use of “Bigfoot” so that if Edna honestly utters “Bigfoot is real” then the British English sentence “Edna believes that Bigfoot is real” is true. This point about conceptions just means that Edna has stable, run-of-the-mill attitudes regarding “Bigfoot” and Bigfoot so that (i) if she honestly assents to an ordinary British “Bigfoot” sentence then the corresponding British belief ascription is true, and (ii) the British belief sentence retains its truth value across contexts. All told, this seems to be a perfectly coherent situation.

Since Edna honestly assents to the British English expression “Bigfoot is real”, the British English sentence “Edna believes that Bigfoot is real” is true. How would a Canadian report Edna’s belief? Suppose a Canadian reporter was trying to malign Edna in a Canadian newspaper by picking on her beliefs in hidden hairy humanoids. The reporter cannot use “Bigfoot” to write about Edna’s beliefs because her readers do not know that term of British English. Since her readers know “Sasquatch” the reporter will write “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real”. Surely the reporter will have written the truth! This is standard practice; the reporter’s choice is obviously correct if *any* translation is correct. The “Sasquatch” sentence is the correct translation of the “Bigfoot” sentence. It is crucial to remember that Edna’s situation is completely stable and normal. So one cannot, for example, object that Edna’s situation is odd enough that ascriptions concerning her views on Bigfoot are context-sensitive in the way one can reasonably argue that belief ascriptions are context-sensitive for individuals in, for example, Frege–Kripke puzzle cases. All I have claimed thus far is that what the Canadian reporter wrote is *true*; in order to reject the first step of my argument one must insist that the reporter wrote falsely when she wrote, in Canadian English, “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real”. However, if the Canadian reporter has reported falsely, then unbelievably

¹⁰The argument need not be applied to proper names; general terms work as well.

many ordinary, run-of-the-mill translations and expositions of people's beliefs are just plain false. Surely that is wrong. Interpreting Kant or Wittgenstein, for instance, may be difficult, but it would be outrageous to assert that Strawson, Allison, Anscombe, and Kripke never wrote anything true about those philosopher's beliefs! There is of course a diverse set of interesting cases in which translation is problematic, for example, translating the British English "Bigfoot is so-called because of the size of his footprints" into Canadian English, but these sentences do not challenge the translation at issue. Given Edna's circumstances, the translation of the British "Edna believes that Bigfoot is real" into the Canadian "Edna believes that Sasquatch is real" is as unproblematic a translation as there could be regarding someone's beliefs.

This is *not* to say that the Canadian expression "Edna believes that Sasquatch is real" and the British expression "Edna believes that Bigfoot is real" have the same sense; neither am I claiming that the Canadian expression "Sasquatch is real" and the British expression "Bigfoot is real" have the same sense. I have neither said nor implied *anything* interesting regarding the relations among "that"-clauses, content, propositions, belief types, etc. For all I have argued, there are no belief contents, propositions, etc.; alternatively, perhaps every utterance of, for example, the British "Bigfoot is real" expresses a different belief content. All I have argued for is the mundane claim that if the British belief ascription is true, then the Canadian one is true as well. The argument does require that the two belief ascriptions retain their truth values from utterance to utterance, but since Edna's epistemic situation vis-à-vis "Bigfoot", "Sasquatch", Bigfoot, and anything else of relevance is stable and normal, this condition is unproblematic. It is hard to see how the Canadian ascription could be downright false given that the British ascription is true.¹¹

So the first premise of my argument might be put this way: if in British English "Bigfoot" is the only name of Bigfoot, in Canadian English "Sasquatch" is the only name of Bigfoot, English in England and Canada is otherwise relevantly the same, in England Edna's conception associated with "Bigfoot" sufficiently conforms to British English's use of "Bigfoot" (so that in British English if Edna honestly utters "Bigfoot is real", then the British English sentence "Edna believes that Bigfoot is real" is true), in British English Edna honestly assents to "Bigfoot is real", Edna is not in any relevant Frege–Kripke puzzle or other odd circumstance, and the sentence "Edna believes that Sasquatch is real" is the perfectly proper Canadian English translation of the British English sentence "Edna believes that Bigfoot is real", then "Edna believes that Sasquatch is real"

¹¹ Thanks to Mark Crimmins and Mark Richard for remarks that led to some of the points made in this paragraph.

is true in Canadian English. Since the antecedent is true, “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real” is true in Canadian English.

Thus, the Canadian sentence “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real” is true. Thus, it seems clear that the US sentence “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real” is true. How could it be false? Well, if there was something really odd about either Edna, Canadian English, US English, or “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real”, for instance, then perhaps the US sentence could be false. But by a perfectly ordinary and coherent stipulation no such oddities are present. Consider the consequences of the US sentence being false. A person who knows only US English echoes the true Canadian newspaper sentence “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real”. By the first premise the sentence in the newspaper is true, so it is very counterintuitive to hold that the person who reads it says something false. Thus, here is a second premise: if “Sasquatch” has the same meaning and referent in US and Canadian English, with the exception of “Bigfoot” not naming Bigfoot in Canadian English, US and Canadian English are relevantly the same, and Edna is not in any relevant Frege–Kripke puzzle or other odd circumstance, then if the sentence “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real” is true in Canadian English then it is true in US English. From our suppositions and the second premise it follows that the sentence “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real” is true in Canadian English only if it is true in US English. Since we have seen from the first premise that “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real” is true in Canadian English, it is true in US English. That is, Edna believes that Sasquatch is real. Once again, this implies nothing interesting regarding belief contents or their relation to “that”-clauses; I have not, for example, argued that the Canadian expression “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real” has the same sense as the US English “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real”. Since Edna expresses her belief that Sasquatch is real with the sentence “Bigfoot is real”, it follows that Edna’s assents to the British “Bigfoot is real” express her belief that Sasquatch is real.

The British English sentence “Edna believes that Bigfoot is real” is true. British and US English are exactly the same except only the latter has the term “Sasquatch”. Thus, it seems clear that the US sentence “Edna believes that Bigfoot is real” is true. How could it be false? Well, if there was something really odd about either Edna, British English, US English, or “Edna believes that Bigfoot is real”, for instance, then perhaps the US sentence could be false. But once again by stipulation no such oddities are present. Thus, a US reporter would be correct in reporting Edna’s belief with the US English expression “Edna believes that Bigfoot is real”. (This inference relies on the second premise altered to apply to “Bigfoot” and US and British English.) So Edna believes that Bigfoot is real and

expresses her belief with “Bigfoot is real”. Thus, we have concluded that she expresses her belief that Bigfoot is real *and* her belief that Sasquatch is real with her honest assents to “Bigfoot is real”. Now *how many* beliefs does Edna have regarding the reality of hidden hairy humanoids? Edna would naturally say that she has just one such belief, and there is nothing odd about her situation that warrants an attribution of two beliefs. If the answer is “one”, then our conclusion is that *her Bigfoot and Sasquatch beliefs are identical*. The completely ordinary, proper, and stable US English sentences “Edna believes that Sasquatch is real” and “Edna believes that Bigfoot is real” attribute the same belief to Edna.

The argument thus far can be construed as resting on the following reasonable principles—although there are other, probably better, ways to express the principles behind the argument.

Translation: If in language (dialect, etc.) L_1 is the only name of x , in language L_2 is the only name of x , L_1 and L_2 are otherwise relevantly the same (in meanings, referents, etc.), an agent S whose only language is L_1 has just one conception C associated with x and x , C sufficiently conforms L_1 's use of x (in the sense that in L_1 if S honestly utters x is F° then the L_1 sentence S believes that x is F° is true across contexts), the agent honestly assents to the L_1 sentence x is F° , S is not in any relevant Frege–Kripke puzzle or other odd circumstance, and the sentence S believes that x is F° is the perfectly proper L_2 translation of the L_1 sentence S believes that x is F° , then S believes that x is F° is true in L_2 .

Symmetry of Belief: If in language L_1 is the only name of x , in language L_2 only y and z name x , L_1 and L_2 are otherwise relevantly the same, the L_2 sentence y is F° is the perfectly proper translation of the L_1 sentence x is F° , an agent S honestly assents to the L_1 sentence x is F° so that the L_1 sentence S believes that x is F° is true across contexts, and S is not in any relevant Frege–Kripke puzzle or other odd circumstance, then the L_2 sentence S believes that y is F° is true.

Parsimony: If an agent has just one ordinary conception associated with each term in the sentence x is F° , she uses x is F° in just one language to express her belief B_1 and her belief B_2 , she would honestly assert that she expresses just one belief with that sentence, and she is not in any relevant Frege–Kripke puzzle or other odd circumstance, then $B_1=B_2$.

In order to conclude the argument we need to make some claims about the manner in which beliefs are shared. Thus far all we have is that *Edna's* Bigfoot and Sasquatch beliefs are identical; I have concluded nothing regarding the beliefs of anyone else. If we assume that Edna's belief that Bigfoot is real is a belief that others can have, that is, that it makes sense to talk about beliefs that people share or have in common, then *anyone who believes that Bigfoot is real has the same belief that Edna has—they each*

believe that Bigfoot is real. Similarly, anyone who believes that Sasquatch is real has the same belief that Edna has. Thus, on the assumption that there are sharable beliefs, we can conclude that *the* belief that Bigfoot is real—the belief that Edna and many others have—is identical with *the* belief that Sasquatch is real—the belief that Edna and many others have.

Does it make sense to talk about beliefs in the sharable sense, belief *types*? Virtually everyone who reads this article believes that Bill Clinton won the 1992 US Presidential election. I believe it, and Nathan Salmon, Kent Bach, and Mark Crimmins also believe it. We all believe *it*, the *same thing*, that Bill Clinton won the 1992 US Presidential election. It is difficult for me to imagine how this notion of shared, articulated belief could be wrong given how firmly ingrained it is in our talk about belief. If this notion of belief is bankrupt, then there may be no hope for any coherent notion of belief. It seems to be a datum that in some sense—the *ordinary* sense—all of us who believe that Bill Clinton won the 1992 US Presidential election believe the same thing, something which turns out to be a belief and a true one at that. Even if we all have different belief contents, in some sense of “belief content”, we also share a belief; perhaps our differing belief contents have something in common that accounts for the fact that we all believe the same thing. Of course, it is most natural to think that the thing in common, the belief (type), is a content. After all, we know what content it is: the belief’s content is that Bill Clinton won the 1992 US Presidential election. It is also intuitive, but perhaps less so, to think that each person’s belief has just one content. Still, there may be two things here: a “linguistic” belief (type and content) according to which Edna and her friends all believe the same thing, that Bigfoot is real, and a whole slew of “mental” belief contents which the many Bigfoot lovers do not necessarily have in common. So the “that”-clause “that Bigfoot is real” when applied to Edna in a context so as to produce a true sentence may ascribe a content distinct from that ascribed when applied to Fred in a context so as to produce a true sentence. However, it would also, I have suggested, correctly ascribe a belief and content common to Fred and Edna. As in the previous section, I will not challenge here any dual conception of belief or belief content. All I require is that this must be a *dual* content view, so there is a notion of belief such that Edna and her Bigfoot-loving friends all have the same belief. The “that”-clause “that Bigfoot is real” does ascribe one and the same belief to Edna and Fred, regardless of what else it does.¹²

Suppose that in US English Alice honestly assents to “Bigfoot is real”. Suppose also that Alice’s conception associated with “Bigfoot” sufficiently conforms to US English’s use of “Bigfoot”. That is, Alice has a

¹²Thanks to Kent Bach for remarks that led to the points made in the last two paragraphs. His opposing view is spelled out in Bach (1997).

conception associated with “Bigfoot” that allows her to use “Bigfoot” well enough that in US English if Alice honestly utters “Bigfoot is real” then the US English sentence “Alice believes that Bigfoot is real” is true. Since Alice believes that Bigfoot is real, and we just concluded that the belief that Bigfoot is real is identical with the belief that Sasquatch is real, Alice believes that Sasquatch is real—even though she may honestly and knowingly dissent from “Sasquatch is real” (as in the standard Frege–Kripke cases thought to falsify Millian theories).

Is this really that counterintuitive? Like everyone else when I first encountered Kripke’s belief puzzle I was reluctant to admit that someone could be rational while having occurrently held contradictory beliefs, e.g., Peter believes that Hellman lives in Minneapolis and that Hellman doesn’t live in Minneapolis. However, why is this so unacceptable? It is at this point that we may have finally stumbled upon what is so surprising about Kripke’s puzzle: it helps us see the falsehood of the intuitive *reflection* principle that one can by reflection alone determine the simple logical relations among one’s propositional attitudes. Reflection seems to be the operative principle behind Consistency: since one can by reflection alone determine that one of one’s occurrent beliefs is the negation of another of one’s occurrent beliefs (i.e., since Reflection is true), if one is rational then upon reflection one should be able to detect the contradiction and thereby reject at least one of the beliefs. However, the story here is complex. First, Reflection is clearly false. I may know that I believe that Einsteinium is an element and know that I believe that Fermium is an element, but I may wonder whether these two beliefs are really just one, partially on account of the possibility that “Fermium” is just another name for Einsteinium. (Many elements with large atomic numbers have had two names, usually originating from different countries.) The beliefs are distinct according to *any* plausible view of belief, at least in part since the elements are distinct, but there is nothing in my experiential history that provides me with the conceptual resources necessary to discriminate between the Einsteinium and Fermium thoughts; introspective reflection is inadequate here. Thus, it is false that if thought *A* is not identical with thought *B*, then I can know by reflection alone that thought *A* is not identical with thought *B*. Similar results hold for other logical relations among thoughts: e.g., it is false that if thought *A* is not the negation of thought *B*, then I can know by reflection alone that thought *A* is not the negation of thought *B*. Second, even though one can by reflection alone determine that one of one’s occurrent *thoughts* is the negation of another of one’s occurrent *thoughts*, this fact cannot be used to support Consistency. The reason is this. By reflection alone Peter is in a position to assent to “The thought that Hellman [the philosopher] does not live in Minneapolis is the negation of the thought that Hellman

[the philosopher] does live in Minneapolis”; so perhaps he knows by reflection alone that the thought that Hellman does not live in Minneapolis is the negation of the thought that Hellman does live in Minneapolis. Even so, it’s not the case that he knows by reflection or anything else that *his belief* that Hellman does not live in Minneapolis is the negation of *his belief* that Hellman does live in Minneapolis. Peter fails to assent to any sentence under any circumstance that means that his belief that Hellman does not live in Minneapolis is the negation of his belief that Hellman does live in Minneapolis. But that is exactly the knowledge he needs to realize that he has contradictory beliefs so that he may then reject one of them. Thus, it looks as though one is not going to be able to appeal to Reflection-like intuitions in order to support Consistency. Peter has contradictory beliefs but he doesn’t know it because, after all, he is confused. This is still unintuitive, but perhaps not as much as it is commonly thought.

Edna didn’t know the name “Sasquatch”, and Alice was in a Frege–Kripke puzzle. However, even the reader, who I assume knows perfectly well that Twain and Clemens, can be used to defend Millianism. You believe that Twain wrote *Huckleberry Finn*, and you believe that Clemens wrote *Huckleberry Finn*. How many beliefs do you have regarding the authorship of *Huckleberry Finn*? If you have just one belief, then given the straightforward construal of shared belief the belief that Twain was *P* is identical with the belief that Clemens was *P*. One can of course accept that one has two beliefs here; this is far from a conclusive argument the Millianism. Even so, this little argument illustrates another way that denying Millianism conflicts with ordinary intuitions regarding belief.¹³

¹³ Any thorough analysis of this argument would include discussion of how current theories of belief ascription would best deal with it.

One can present modal versions of the preceding Millian arguments that do not rely on two subjects or on three languages. Instead, we have one person in two possible worlds, and one language in three possible worlds. Although I doubt it, there may be some problems with the non-modal argument that the modal one escapes; alternatively, perhaps the modal argument has flaws the non-modal one lacks. Since the revision is straightforward, I will just set up the scenario.

Suppose that in our actual world W_A , the world in whose language I am arguing, Mary honestly assents to “Cicero was bald”, and Mary’s conception *C* associated with “Cicero” sufficiently conforms to W_A ’s use of “Cicero” (so that in W_A if Mary honestly utters “Cicero was bald” then she has said what is expressed in W_A by “Cicero was bald”). Suppose that in world W_1 (a) Mary honestly assents to “Cicero was bald”, (b) there is no name for Cicero other than “Cicero” (though otherwise the relevant English words have the reference, meaning, etc., that they have in W_A), and (c) Mary’s conception *C* associated with “Cicero” sufficiently conforms to W_1 ’s use of “Cicero” (so that in W_1 if Mary honestly utters “Cicero was bald” then she has said what is expressed in W_1 by “Cicero was bald”). Finally, suppose that in world W_2 there is no name for Cicero other than “Tully” (otherwise the relevant English words have the reference, meaning, character, etc., that they have in W_A).

5. Sosa's attempt to turn the tables on the Millian

David Sosa (1996) defends the startling claim that the Fregean can use Kripke's puzzle to construct an argument against the Millian thesis (M) that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. When altered to apply to the Peter–Hellman story, Sosa's argument is the following.

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------|
| (1) Peter is rational. | Assumption |
| (2) Peter, on reflection, assents to "Hellman [the pianist] lives in Minneapolis". | Assumption |
| (3) Peter, on reflection, assents to "It's not the case that Hellman [the philosopher] lives in Minneapolis". | Assumption |
| (4) ($D_{English}$): If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to P° , then she believes that P . | ($D_{English}$) ¹⁴ |
| (5) Peter believes that Hellman [the pianist] lives in Minneapolis. | (2), (4) |
| (6) Peter believes that it's not the case that Hellman [the philosopher] lives in Minneapolis. | (3), (4) |
| (7) If Peter has contradictory beliefs, then Peter is not rational. | Analytic |
| (8) Peter does not have contradictory beliefs. | (1), (7) |
| (9) Let (H) abbreviate: if a name in ordinary language has a single referent, then it may correctly be represented logically by a single constant. If (H) is true, then if Peter believes that Hellman lives in Minneapolis and Peter believes that it's not the case that Hellman lives in Minneapolis, then Peter has contradictory beliefs. | Obvious, properly understood, |
| (10) (H) is false. | (5), (6), (8), (9) |
| (11) If (M) is true, then (H) is true. | Pretty obvious |
| (12) So (M) is false. | (10), (11) |

The problem with this argument is not only that (7) hardly seems analytic but that it is question-begging. Sosa remarks in note 14 of his article that

¹⁴ Sosa argues that (D)_{English} is not really needed for the argument to go through. Since I think that (D)_{English} is true, and the argument fails anyway, I will not dispute the point.

(7) is a controversial claim, since both Joseph Owens (1989, 1995) and Millians such as Nathan Salmon (1986) take it as a lesson of Kripke's puzzle that (7) is refuted. Sosa claims that their objection appears "theory-laden". Perhaps, but it does not matter. Salmon and Owens accept (*H*) and reject (7); Sosa accepts (7) and rejects (*H*) (and thereby (*M*)). Both (*H*) and (7) are intuitive and each theorist's rejection is theory-laden to some extent. Sosa's Fregean rejection of (*H*) is based on the idea that Peter attaches two senses to "Hellman" so that the two propositions or belief contents expressed by his uses of "Hellman lives in Minneapolis" and "It's not the case that Hellman lives in Minneapolis" contain these different senses. Therefore, the latter content is not the negation of the former content. Sosa hints that there is a linguistic sense in which Peter's beliefs are contradictory—as he puts it, what the two sentences "Hellman lives in Minneapolis" and "It's not the case that Hellman lives in Minneapolis" say is contradictory—but what really counts on the Fregean view are the Fregean propositions believed in, which are not contradictory (1996, fn.12). This rejection of (*H*) is obviously theory-laden: Sosa is taking Peter's differing conceptions of Hellman to result in different senses contained in the propositions or contents believed, an obviously controversial claim. When Sosa accepts (7) he interprets it as referring to Fregean contents, the putative belief contents lying behind the contradictory linguistic contents. In effect, what Sosa interprets as true in (7) is Consistency_F. On the other side of the debate, Salmon's rejection of (7) is based on the idea that Peter's beliefs are beliefs in contradictory propositions but Peter grasps the propositions under different guises, thereby saving his rationality. Salmon would reject Sosa's assumption that there are, in addition to the linguistic contents, Fregean contents that make (7) true; that is, Salmon would object to Consistency_F. According to Salmon all we have are the linguistic Russellian contents that are contradictory. Owens's rejection of (7) is also partly based on the idea that Peter's beliefs are beliefs in contradictory propositions. But instead of appealing to the theoretical construct of a guise or a Russellian proposition he argues against the dual view of content that the Fregean is forced to embrace: the superficial linguistic content of sentences and the inner, mental, psychologically relevant, perhaps Fregean, content of beliefs (Owens 1987, 1989, 1990, 1992). Both of these rejections are theory-laden to some extent.

6. Conclusion

Like most philosophers I hold dear my intuitions against Substitutivity and Millianism but frankly do not know what to do with them. I think

Kripke was exactly right when he wrote in 1979 that “in the present state of our knowledge, I think it would be foolish to draw any conclusion, positive or negative, about substitutivity” (1988, p. 135). I do not think matters have changed a great deal since then, in spite of the excellent work done by Millians and others. Still, there are some results that must be acknowledged, the ones reached above. First, the Fregean argument against Substitutivity that implicitly appeals to “that”-clauses, the first Fregean argument I examined above, has at least one false premise, Consistency or Disquotation. This was shown by Kripke’s puzzle cases. Second, the Fregean would give up Consistency anyway—which suggests that the original Fregean argument discussed in lieu of Frege–Kripke puzzle cases is not our proper focus. Third, there is an alternative Fregean argument which if sound refutes Millianism and Substitutivity. Kripke’s puzzle cases do not show that this argument rests on a false premise. Even so, the argument is not convincing since it employs a question-begging premise, Consistency_F. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the primary lesson of Kripke’s puzzle is that the Fregean has to find new arguments for her theory’s central claims that Substitutivity is false and that our conceptions determine semantically relevant senses, relevant in the sense that if your conception associated with name *N* is quite different from mine, then that difference results in different belief contents ascribed with the same “that”-clause containing *N*. Fifth, there are new, pre-theoretical, and compelling arguments for Substitutivity and Millianism that need further analysis. Finally, Sosa’s defense of the startling claim that hiding in Kripke’s puzzle is a good argument against Millian theories and Substitutivity rests on a question-begging premise. The overall lesson is that the debate between Millians and Fregeans remains wide open.¹⁵

Department of Philosophy
The University of Minnesota
Minneapolis
MN 55407
USA
stew0020@msn.com

BRYAN FRANCES

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