Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins

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Abstract
Various cases of conjoined twinning have been presented as problems for the animalist view that we are animals. In some actual and possible cases of human dicephalus that have been discussed in the literature, it is arguable that there are two persons but only one human animal. It is also tempting to believe that there are two persons and one animal in possible instances of craniopagus parasiticus that have been described. Here it is argued that the animalist can admit that these are cases in which human persons are not animals, without forfeiting the title “animalist.” It is also shown that this is not only an option but also a well-motivated and plausible option for the animalist. Seeing this requires getting clear on what the word “we” should be thought to include in the animalist’s claim that we are animals. Here animalism is defended against twinning objections by figuring out how to view the scope of the animalist’s identity claim.

Keywords
animalism, conjoined twins, identity, persons
INTRODUCTION

What are we? There is a variety of answers to this question. Since *substance dualists* believe we think and feel with an immaterial, non-physical mind, they might choose to believe that each of us is an immaterial mind, or they might decide that each of us is a combination of an immaterial mind and a material body. The *constitution theorist* believes that while each of us is wholly constituted by a spatially coincident material object (the human animal), the person is not identical with the animal or its body. The *brainist* thinks that a human person is identical with a proper part of the corresponding animal/body, specifically, the brain or some functioning part of it.1 And according to the position called “*animalism,”* each of us is an animal—not merely constituted by, or a part of, or otherwise intimately connected with an animal, but numerically identical with it.

While the idea that we are animals is a refreshingly simple view and apparently a matter of common scientific sense, there are many objections to it. One objection to animalism that I address here is what Blatti (2007) labels the “dicephalus objection.” McMahan (e.g., 1998, 2002) and Campbell and McMahan (2010, 2016) argue that the type of conjoined twinning called “dicephalic parapagus” is a threat to animalism. Dicephalic twins are twins conjoined below the neck, sharing some of the same organs but (as the name implies) with two separate heads, and therefore two separate brains. With two separate brains, suitably developed and functioning, there are two separate centers of consciousness and self-consciousness, and so, it would seem, two persons. Yet, if the duplication of organs is sufficiently limited, then it also seems that there is only one human animal there. The result that there are two human persons but one human animal appears contrary to the animalist view that each of us is an animal (given that two things cannot be one).

As mentioned in Section 2, some animalists respond to the dicephalus objection by arguing that in cases of dicephalus there is in fact more than one animal present—two animals, one for each of the two persons. However, McMahan (2002) describes a hypothetical extreme case of dicephalus where it seems less plausible to claim that there are two animals present. There is the option of insisting, e.g., with Olson (2014), that in these dicephalus cases there is actually only one person despite the strong temptation to think otherwise. However, there is a more attractive option for the animalist. In Sections 3 and 4, I show how an animalist can consistently and even plausibly maintain that in some possible cases of dicephalus, there is one human animal but two persons. I also show, in Section 5, how the animalist can plausibly maintain that there is one human animal and two persons in response to a hypothetical instance, presented by Campbell and McMahan as a threat to animalism, of an actual but even rarer type of conjoined twinning, *craniopagus parasiticus.* We can see how the animalist can, not only consistently, but also plausibly maintain that there is one human animal and two persons in these cases by getting clear on what “we” is supposed to pick out in the animalist’s claim that we are animals, which is the goal of Section 3.

DICEPHALIC PARAPAGUS

McMahan mentions an actual and widely discussed case of twins conjoined at the torso. For the sake of the twins’ anonymity, let us refer to this case with the label “D.” While there is a single

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1 Bailey (e.g., 2015) uses the label “brainism” in his description of various alternatives to animalism. The brainists include McMahan and Campbell who present cases discussed here of conjoined twinning as an objection to animalism.
torso, McMahan writes, “no one doubts” that the twins in D are “separate and distinct” individuals. “Each has her own private mental life and her own character, each feels sensations only on her own side of the body, and each has exclusive control over the limbs on her side…” (2002, p. 35). However, “there seems to be only one organism between them,” and if so, then “they cannot both be identical with the organism, as that would imply that they were identical with each other, which they are not” (p. 35). If McMahan is right, then D is a counterexample to the claim that all human persons are organisms, thereby refuting the claim that all human persons are animals (since animals are organisms). Moreover, in that one case it seems we have more than one counterexample, for since neither twin is a better candidate than the other for being the organism, it seems we should accept that neither is the organism. McMahan also points out that “if dicephalic twins are not human organisms, this strongly suggests that none of us is an organism” since “there is no reason to suppose that dicephalic twins are fundamentally different types of being from the rest of us” (p. 35).

Here, McMahan expresses two threats to animalism. We seem to have a counterexample to the animalist claim that each of us is an animal. As Campbell and McMahan put it, “[s]ince animalists claim that we are identical to organisms, they are committed to the claim that wherever there is one of us, there is precisely one organism identical to this individual … Dicephalus, therefore, appears to be a counterexample to their theory” (2010, p. 286). The other threat to animalism, indicated in the last quote above from McMahan (2002), is that if the twins in the dicephalus case are not animals/organisms, then since they are not fundamentally different from the rest of us, none of us is an animal/organism either.

An animalist might try to avoid both threats at once by arguing that there are two human animals in the dicephalus case, and that each twin is identical with one of the two animals. While the twins in D share many organs (as McMahan reports, “a single liver, a single small intestine, a single large intestine, a single urinary system, and a single reproductive system” [2002, p. 36]), the duplication of organs that does obtain might lead one to believe that there are two human animals, given in particular that there are two brains controlling different parts of the whole organic mass and contributing to the regulation of different sets of vital processes.

One might resist the two organisms interpretation. McMahan points out that the twins in D “constitute a single integrally functioning set of organs wrapped in a single skin, sustained by a single coordinated system of metabolism, served by a single bloodstream, protected by a single immune system,” which suggests that “[t]hese systems and the processes they sustain together constitute a single biological life” (2002, p. 37). Still, given the temptation some might find to count two organisms, McMahan has us imagine an extreme case of dicephalus where “instead of two necks emerging from a single torso, there are two heads diverging from a common neck”; imagine further that “the cerebrums diverge from a single brainstem.” “There are two faces—two pairs of eyes, two mouths that function independently, and so on—and, more important, two cerebrums, each controlling its own face and the limbs on its

In support of the claim that there are two overlapping organisms in actual cases of dicephalus, see for example Liao (2006, pp. 340–341), Lee and George (2008, pp. 45–47), and Olson (2014, p. 28). Also see Blatti’s (2007) proposal that cases of dicephalus are borderline cases in which there is more than one but less than two animals.

McMahan (2002, pp. 36–37) provides more in support of the single organism view. Also see Campbell and McMahan (2010, p. 291 and 2016, p. 240) for resistance to the two organisms interpretation of case D. And see Boyle’s (2020) rigorous defense of the view that there is just one animal in dicephalic twinning.
side of the body;” but there is “only one brainstem regulating a single autonomic nervous system for a single set of organs with no duplication below the level of the brainstem itself” (p. 38). Since the hypothalamus has certain regulatory functions, McMahan adds that we might even suppose that in the extreme case the brains diverge above the hypothalamus. Let us call this extreme case of dicephalus, “D*.” Even if we maintain that there are two human animals in D, it is very tempting to think that there is only one in D*. Yet, as in D, there are two cerebrums each controlling one of the two faces and the limbs on that side of the body, and as in D, “[t]here are two separate centers of consciousness, each with its own private sensory pathways and each capable of independent thought, emotion, expression, and movement” (p. 38). So it is still hard to deny that there are two persons.

Campbell and McMahan reject animalism in favor of the brainist view that we are parts of animals—“specifically, the areas of the brain that are necessary and jointly sufficient for the capacity for consciousness” (2010, p. 289). But does the possibility of D* provide a strong enough reason to reject animalism? While it is tempting to hold that there is only one person in D*, that view can be resisted (see, e.g., Hershenov (2004, §VI) and Olson (2014)). Also, while it is compelling to judge that there is one human animal in D*, that there is just one is not entirely clear. Shewmon (2001) points out that most integrative functions of the body are not mediated by the brain, listing various somatically integrative functions that may be present to some degree even in brain-dead patients. Shewmon’s discussion raises doubts about whether the brain, and brainstem in particular, should be viewed as the primary control center of vital functions, and the evidence presented also gives reason to deny that the number of organisms always corresponds to the number of functioning brains/brainstems. On the basis of this evidence, one might reasonably question the one animal verdict in D*. Yet, one might, with McMahan, accept Shewmon’s points and still believe that there is only one animal in D* given the amount of unity of function present in the whole organic mass, with little or no duplication below the cerebrum. I will not try to decide here whether there is only one human animal in D*. I will also not suppose it settled that there really are two persons. What I will argue is that the animalist need not resist the plausible view that in D* there are two persons and one human animal.

We can see why an animalist need not resist that view by getting clearer on who exactly it is that animalists claim are animals. Remember that the dicephalus objection is meant to pose two potential threats to animalism. There is the worry that we have in these cases, especially D*, counterexamples to the claim that each of us is an animal. The analysis in Section 3 of the animalist’s identity claim shows how animalism avoids this threat, as explained in Section 4; also

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4See also Campbell and McMahan (2016, pp. 233–234) and McMahan’s (2002, §1.5.1) development of the Embodied Mind Account of Identity.

5McMahan (2002, pp. 429–433) argues based on Shewmon’s work that brain death is neither necessary nor sufficient for the death of an organism. See also Campbell and McMahan (2016, pp. 243–244) for support of the claim that a functional brain or brainstem is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a human organism. Liao (2006, p. 341) mentions that having a brain is not necessary for the persistence of the human organism. See also Liao (2006) and Boyle (2020) against the idea that the number of organism lives always matches the number of functioning brainstems. Also, see Olson’s (2016b) concessions in light of Shewmon’s points.

6Liao (2006) offers another reason to deny that there is one animal in the extreme case, pointing out that in most cases of dicephalus, twinning occurs after the creation of two embryos with two sets of capacities for regulating and coordinating vital processes.
answered in Section 4 is the additional worry that if the dicephalic twins are not animals, then since they are not fundamentally different in kind from other human persons, none of us is an animal.

3 | WHO ARE ANIMALS?

Animalism is generally described as the view that we are animals. It is sometimes described as the stronger claim that we are essentially animals. This latter claim, which many animalists accept, is in addition to the identity claim since something can be (identical with) some F without being essentially an F. One can be a teacher, for example, even though one existed prior to being a teacher and can continue to exist after retiring from pedagogy. Likewise, one can consistently believe that while we are animals, we could have existed or can continue to exist without being animals. On this view, like “teacher,” “animal” is not a substance sortal, but instead designates a contingent feature of an individual. Let’s call the view that we are animals “modest animalism,” and use “strong animalism” for the more robust view that we are animals essentially. While modest animalism does not answer the important question of what sort of changes we can undergo while continuing to exist, it still is a highly significant thesis, one that brainists, constitution theorists, and most substance dualists would reject.

Let us focus on the identity claim that modest and strong animalists share and try to get clear on what that amounts to. There is no question that the animalist’s view that we are animals is a claim of numerical identity. It’s the thesis that

\[ A_i: \text{Each of us is numerically identical with an animal.} \]

What is not clear is what “us” refers to. Who are we in the claim that we are (numerically identical with) animals? To answer this question, a series of inadequate interpretations of \( A_i \) will be considered and rejected; this is for the purpose of motivating each of the elements of the final three formulations, \( A_i^5 - A_i^7 \), presented at the end of this section. (The subscripted “I” is meant to indicate that what is represented is the identity claim that all animalists share.)

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7While he does accept the essentialist claim, Olson often characterizes animalism itself as the view that we are animals: “animalism does not say that we are animals essentially” (2007, p. 26). Other characterizations of animalism as the identity claim itself, with the essentialist thesis viewed as additional, include Blatti & Snowdon (2016, p. 2), Bailey (2015, p. 867), Blatti (2007, p. 596), and Snowdon (1990; 2016, p. 266).

8Olson (2015b, p. 98) uses the label “strong animalism” for the identity claim conjoined with various other claims animalists sometimes make, including but not limited to the claim that animals are animals essentially. Olson (2015b) gives the title “weak animalism” to the bare claim that we are animals, which is what I am calling “modest” animalism, and he uses the description “new animalism” for the conjunction of weak (modest) animalism and the denial of any further claims animalists often make, e.g., that animals are animals essentially or fundamentally. He uses the labels “accidental animalism” (2015a) and “accidentalism” (2016a) for the view that we are animals but can exist without being animals. Johnston (2016) uses the label “phase animalism” for the view that “I could cease to be an animal after having been one” (p. 117). Also see Noonan’s (2019, pp. 199–203) distinction between weak and strong animalism.

9I say “most” rather than “all” substance dualists would reject animalism, for a substance dualist might endorse the hylomorphic view that each of us is an animal and the animal itself is composed of two distinct substances.

10As Blatti and Snowdon point out, “a philosophical identity thesis employing the word ‘we’ or ‘us’ raises the question: Which group is meant by ‘we’?” (2016 p. 9).
In discussions of personhood and personal identity, “person” is generally used to denote individuals with certain complex psychological features, especially rationality and self-awareness.\textsuperscript{11} But having psychological features does not necessitate that one is an animal or any other type of organism. Olson notes the possibility of gods or angels or Cartesian egos who qualify as persons without being animals or organisms of any kind (e.g., 1997, p. 124).\textsuperscript{12} So the core animalist belief that we are animals should not be understood as the view that \textit{all possible persons} are animals. Nor is the claim that \textit{all actual persons} are animals. For even if there are no gods or angels, it is arguable that there are, or will likely soon be, some wholly inorganic material systems that have whatever psychological features yield personhood.\textsuperscript{13}

So animalism is not the view that all possible persons or even all actual persons are animals. What, then, does “us” in $A_1$ include? Which persons are animalists claiming to be animals? Persons who are gods, angels, or robots are not animals. \textit{Human} persons, it seems, are the ones animalists (strong or modest) claim are identical with animals. So perhaps we should interpret $A_1$ as

$$A_1: \text{Every human person is identical with an animal.}$$

This does not preclude \textit{non-human animals} from being persons. If there are members of other animal species that have whatever psychological features are sufficient for personhood, then they, too, are identical with animals.\textsuperscript{15} Or so the animalist is likely to believe.

Although, if “human” means “human animal,” then $A_1$ amounts to the trivial claim that all persons who are human animals are animals, which no one (reasonably) denies.\textsuperscript{16} The first entry in the Merriam-Webster definition of the adjective “human” is “of, relating to, or characteristic of humans.”\textsuperscript{17} Suppose, then, that we define “human” as “of, relating to, or characteristic of the species \textit{Homo sapiens}.” A heart can be a human heart, in the sense of being characteristic of our species, even though the heart itself is not an animal. When “human” is used in this sense, $A_1$ does not presuppose that human persons are animals, and thereby avoids triviality.

However, even with this liberal sense of “human” there is a problem with $A_1$ as a formulation of the animalist’s identity claim. Something can be human in the sense of being

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11}One might think that various moral and/or legal features are also definitive of personhood. Perhaps whatever moral and legal features are essential to personhood are a function of the psychological features. Perhaps not. Hereafter, for simplicity, I will talk about the psychological features necessary or sufficient for personhood, leaving open whether there are moral or legal features that are necessary and/or sufficient.
  \item \textsuperscript{12}As “person” is often used in discussions of personhood, whatever moral or legal features might be required for personhood do not themselves necessitate that one is an organism; e.g., gods or angels might have moral properties, and we might wish to extend legal rights to whatever thinking and feeling inorganic machines there happen to be.
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Olson (e.g., 1997, p. 124) mentions the potential personhood of digital computers.
  \item \textsuperscript{14}If the claim were that every human person is identical with something that is an animal, then as Olson (2015b, p. 89) makes clear, the thesis would be consistent with the constitution view since “is” might be construed as the “is” of constitution. But $A_1$ would not be accepted by constitution theorists since it employs the “is” of identity.
  \item \textsuperscript{15}Or perhaps I should write, “whatever psychological and/or moral and/or legal features.” Recall footnote 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{16}Likewise, “‘human person’ cannot mean here: ‘person who is an animal of the species \textit{Homo sapiens}’ on pain of triviality,” as Noonan (2019: 201–202) mentions.
  \item \textsuperscript{17}https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/human
\end{itemize}
characteristic of our species without being an animal, e.g., a human heart. That itself is not a problem with AI. The worry about AI is that a person can be human in that sense without being an animal. Suppose that the brain or just the cerebrum of some human person is removed in such a way and placed in life-sustaining fluids and artificially stimulated in a manner that ensures that its former complex psychological activity is retained. If sufficiently complex psychological activity is retained, it would seem that the brain/cerebrum counts as a person—a remnant person, as Johnston (2007) calls it. Then there would be a person who is human in the sense of relating to or characteristic of our species, but it is arguable that the remnant person is not an animal.  

A remnant person could be a detached head, or a brain, or the cerebrum itself. It is not clear whether the head or the whole brain counts as an animal. Johnston (2007, p. 45) maintains that neither is an animal, but he also acknowledges that some might claim otherwise. Yet, even if one grants that the head or whole-brain counts as an animal, one might still find it hard to believe that the cerebrum itself is an animal. Olson writes, “A detached cerebrum is no more an organism than a detached arm is an organism” (2007, p. 41); “a detached cerebrum is not an animal, or a living organism of any other sort” (1997, p. 115). The detached cerebrum is comprised of living organisms, individual cells, and processes characteristic of life will occur so long as those cells remain alive. However, it’s “not just that many life-sustaining organs... have been removed from the cerebrum, but also that those organs that once coordinated the life-sustaining functions that went on in the... cerebrum have been cut away” (1997, p. 115). And one can accept this as a reason to deny that the cerebrum is an organism even while also accepting the evidence mentioned earlier that the brainstem is not best viewed as the control center of life or at least not the primary control center and that a functioning brainstem is not necessary for life.

While it does seem somewhat implausible to consider a detached cerebrum an animal, there is controversy on this issue. Madden claims that the term “animal” is “polysemous: between (a) an individual of a certain genetic zoological kind, and (b) a fairly well-developed example of such an individual”; and while it is odd to call a remnant person an animal in sense (b), “it might be argued that the remnant person is a newly sprouted animal in sense (a)” (2016a, p. 205, fn. 32). One might even have an account of our persistence that supports the idea that a human animal goes with the suitably sustained detached cerebrum (rather than the cerebrumless body left behind) and while remaining an animal. See Madden (2016b).

Even if it is true that the remnant person counts as an animal, and even if it counts as an animal while being a mere cerebrum, one certainly need not believe that to qualify as an animalist.

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18Johnston uses the notion of a remnant person as an objection to the (strong) animalist belief that we are essentially animals, for assuming that the remnant person is not an animal, if we are essentially animals, then a new person is brought into existence with the removal of the brain, an implausible result given that “[y]ou can’t bring a person into being simply by removing tissue from something... unless that tissue was functioning to suppress mental life or the capacity for mental life” (p. 47). See also Olson (1997, p. 120).

19See, for example, van Inwagen (1990, §15) and Olson (1997, p. 133). See also Shewmon (2001) who maintained that “an isolated living brain, supporting retained consciousness, would have to be classified as possessing integrative unity (i.e., as being a live ‘organism as a whole,’ although hardly a ‘whole organism’ and in fact a severely mutilated and moribund one), precisely because the consciousness would represent at least one emergent, holistic-level property” (p. 461).

20Also, what Shewmon claimed (quoted in fn. 19) in support of the idea that an isolated living brain is an organism might be said of the detached cerebrum.
As Olson points out, a remnant person not being an organism, and therefore not an animal, “is perfectly compatible with animalism, which does not say that all people are organisms” (2016a, p. 148). It is also compatible with animalism that the remnant individual, with enough of the right sort of psychological activity sustained, qualifies as a genuine person. So if “human” is used, as it is being used here, to apply not only to human animals but also to some of their proper parts (those characteristics of the species), then $A_1$ is not an adequate formulation of the animalist’s identity claim.

To allow an animalist to believe that a remnant person is not an animal, it might be suggested that we interpret $A_1$ as

$$A_1^2: \text{Every human person to which there is a corresponding animal is identical with that animal.}$$

Constitution theorists, brainists, and substance dualists can all agree that each of us corresponds to an animal in some respect or other—corresponding in the sense of, e.g., being constituted by the animal, being a proper part of the animal, having the animal as a proper part, or being wholly distinct from but intimately causally related to the animal. But constitution theorists, brainists, and most substance dualists will deny that we are identical with that corresponding animal. And, yet, it is precisely because there are many different types of correspondence that $A_1^2$ is an inadequate way to characterize the identity claim common to animalists. The remnant human person can correspond to a human animal in various ways, including being in the same room, being causally influenced by, and having a similar genetic composition. But we do not want to require that the animalist consider the remnant human person an animal. So we need to specify the type of correspondence with a human animal that given animalism guarantees being identical with the animal.

A natural thought is that the crucial brand of correspondence is having the body of an animal. So suppose we construe $A_1$ as the claim that

$$A_1^3: \text{Every human person who has the body of an animal is identical with that animal.}$$

On one version of substance dualism, each of us is a combination of an immaterial mind and a material body. The proponent of this view might say that we have the body of an animal in the sense of having the animal body as a proper part. Or a substance dualist might believe that each of us is an immaterial mind itself, the body not really being a part of us, while also maintaining that we have an animal body in the sense of being wholly distinct from but intimately causally connected with that body. A brainist might say that we have the body of an animal in the sense of being a proper part of (and a major controlling part of) the animal body. These theorists would hold that in the sense in which we have the body of an animal, we are not identical with the animal. So they would reject $A_1^3$. However, some who believe that we, human persons, are

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21The qualifier “most” allows for substance dualists who endorse the hylomorphic view that each of us is an animal and the animal itself is composed of two distinct substances. See fn. 9.

22Olson uses the label “compound dualism” (vs. “pure dualism”) for the view that “each of us is made up of both a simple immaterial substance and a material organism” (2007, p. 168). Bailey uses “Union dualism” for the view that “we are amalgams: part material animal and part immaterial soul” (2015, p. 869).
immaterial souls might hold that it is more accurate to say that we do not have the bodies of animals. And someone who thinks that each of us is a brain or some portion of a brain might be inclined to say that the only body we really have is the body of a brain or part of a brain, and not the body of an animal. If no human person really has the body of an animal on some non-animalist view, then on that view $A_3$ is vacuously true. So $A_3$ does not adequately distinguish animalism from its rivals. (It is also worth noting that an animalist might find talk of our *having a body*, animal or otherwise, obscure enough to refrain from any such talk. Some of those animalists might not be prepared to accept $A_3$.)

Noonan mentions the possible formulation, “Any person that has the body of (or is composed of exactly the same matter as?) a biological animal is a biological animal” (2019, p. 202). Suppose we replace the obscure mention in $A_3$ of having the body of an animal with the clearer talk of *being composed of exactly the same matter* as an animal. Or since an animalist might wish to allow that matter does not exhaust our physical constitution, suppose instead that we replace the reference to having the body of an animal with talk of *being wholly spatially coincident* with an animal.

$A_4$: Every human person who spatially coincides with an animal is identical with that animal.

where spatial coincidence is understood as *complete* spatial coincidence. Endorsing $A_4$ distinguishes the animalist from the constitution theorist. The problem is that $A_4$ does not differentiate animalists from their brainist and substance dualist rivals. One who believes that no human person is spatially coincident with an animal would consider $A_4$ true, albeit vacuously. (And, of course, one who believes that no human person is composed of exactly the same matter as an animal would accept as vacuously true the identity claim restricted to human persons composed of exactly the same matter as an animal.)

However, there is a way to add to $A_4$ to distinguish animalists from all of their rivals. Suppose that with the right sort of technological innovations and with sufficient demand, remnant human persons start to become commonplace. Suppose one day the number of remnant human persons comes to exceed the number of much larger human persons that actually exist today. Animalists who believe that remnant persons are not animals would concede that if this were the situation someday, then at that time animalism would be true of only a minority of human persons. An animalist might admit that in this hypothetical case brainism is true of the majority. The animalist would remind us that this is not the way things actually are. The human persons that really exist are not remnant persons. And if there happen to be

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23See, for example, van Inwagen (1980) and Olson (1997, pp. 143–153).

24Noonan (2019, p. 201) mentions that he is following Shoemaker in using “biological animals” for animals whose persistence conditions are purely biological. So Noonan presents this as a formulation that it seems a strong animalist would accept.

25Snowdon compares his animalist formulation “(A) Each of us is identical with, is one and the same as, an animal” (2014, p. 7) with “(APA) Necessarily if we have a person at the same place as an animal then that person is the animal” (p. 26). (APA) generalizes to all persons who coincide with animals, which animalists are likely to accept; this generalization to all persons who coincide with animals appears in the upcoming formulation $A_7$. Snowdon (p. 27) notes that (APA) makes a modal claim that (A) does not. And none of the formulations here begin with “Necessarily,” for it is doubtful that deserving the label “animalist” requires believing that the thesis is a necessary truth.
a few remnant human persons out there that we do not know about, then even assuming they are not spatially coincident with animals, it is true at least that the typical human person is spatially coincident with an animal, and these typical human persons, the animalist would add, are identical with animals.

As mentioned earlier, an animalist might insist that remnant persons are animals. But even if it were true that they are animals, a definition of “animalism” should not require animalists to believe that they are animals. Characterization of the animalist’s identity claim should not preclude an animalist from denying that the detached cerebral (or the whole brain or head) is an animal. Of course, an animalist who denies that remnant persons are animals is also likely to deny that they spatially coincide (i.e., wholly spatially coincide) with animals. So we do not want a formulation of the animalist’s identity claim that requires that all human persons spatially coincide with animals.

A plausible suggestion, then, is that “we” in “we are animals” refers to human persons who spatially coincide with animals, with the implication that human persons generally do. This implication distinguishes animalism from brainism and versions of substance dualism. So let us add to A_1^4 as follows:

\[ A_1^5: \text{Every human person who spatially coincides with an animal, as human persons generally do, is identical with that animal.} \]

“Generally” allows that there might be a person, e.g., a remnant person, who is human (in the sense of being characteristic of the species Homo sapiens) but does not spatially coincide with an animal, and the spatial coincidence restriction is what allows (but does not require) a proponent of A_1^5 to maintain that a remnant human person is not an animal.\(^{26}\)

Two slight modifications might be desired. A characterization of animalism should remain neutral on the Lockean thesis that two things of the same kind cannot exist in exactly the same place at exactly the same time. So the formulation should allow the possibility that at some time there is more than one animal with which some human person is spatially coincident, the person being identical with one of those animals. Also, the formulation should remain neutral on whether endurantism is true. Suppose, as four-dimensionalists believe, we have temporal parts in addition to spatial parts. Then for some person to be identical with a temporally extended animal, the person needs to coincide with the animal temporally as well as spatially, with all the same spatial and temporal parts. To handle both concerns, let’s change A_1^5 to read

\[ A_1^6: \text{For every human person who spatiotemporally coincides with an animal, as human persons generally do, there is a spatiotemporally coincident animal with which the person is identical,} \]

\(^{26}\)Olson admits that a remnant person not being an organism “is perfectly compatible with animalism, which does not say that necessarily all people are organisms, but only that we are—we normal human people. (For all animalism says, there might be entirely inorganic beings who count as people in the sense of being rational, self-conscious, and so on: angels, for instance.)” (2015a, p. 27). The parenthetical remark suggests that “we normal human people” amounts to “the people we normally encounter, who are human.” But, in addition, given that an animalist can allow that a remnant human person is not an animal, the animalist’s view should not be seen as entailing that all human persons are animals, but rather that the human persons we normally encounter are animals (since these are the human persons who spatially coincide with animals).
and as before, the talk of coincidence refers to complete coincidence.

An animalist might wish to endorse an identity claim that is not applicable only to human persons. There might be members of some non-human animal species that are persons, and I suppose that most animalists would want the “we” in “we are animals” to apply to them as well. So an animalist is also likely to endorse the following more general identity claim:

\[ A_7 \]: For every S-person (where S is an animal species) who spatiotemporally coincides with an animal, as S-persons generally do, there is a spatiotemporally coincident animal with which the person is identical.

“Generally” allows (but does not require) the proponent of \( A_7 \) to maintain that a remnant dolphin person, for example, does not spatiotemporally coincide with an animal, and therefore is not an animal.\(^{27}\)

Strong animalists would not regard either \( A_5 \), \( A_6 \), or \( A_7 \) as fully descriptive of their position, for while these theses are compatible with the view that persons who are animals are animals essentially, they do not entail that strong view. However, \( A_5 - A_7 \) arguably do capture the identity claim (that we are animals) at the core of animalism, allowing but not requiring the truth of the additional claim that animals are animals essentially. It does seem that one who endorses any of \( A_5 - A_7 \) warrants the label “animalist.” The formulations do distinguish animalists from their brainist, constitution theorist, and substance dualist rivals.

This discussion of the identity claim that strong and modest animalists share puts us in a better position to see what the animalist can and perhaps should say about the extreme case of dicephalic parapagus, \( D^* \).

4 | D* REVISITED

The formulations in the previous section (other than \( A_1 \)) restrict the range of human persons who are claimed to be animals. This restriction is desirable since it seems one can deserve the label “animalist” even while believing that a remnant person is not an animal. \( A_5 \) and \( A_6 \) restrict the range of human persons claimed to be animals to those who spatially (and temporally) coincide with animals, which allows that a remnant person is not an animal provided it does not coincide (i.e., wholly coincide) with an animal. Also, it seems that endorsing \( A_5 \) or \( A_6 \)—or \( A_7 \), which applies to any persons there might be of any animal species—does make one worthy of the title “animalist,” distinguishing animalists from their brainist, constitution theorist, and substance dualist rivals. Also, endorsing any of \( A_5 - A_7 \) allows but does not require accepting the additional claim that animals are animals essentially.

Given that accepting any of \( A_5 - A_7 \) makes one an animalist, one can qualify as an animalist (modest or strong) while maintaining that the persons in \( D^* \) are not animals. It also seems that this is a well-motivated and plausible view for the proponent of \( A_5 - A_7 \) to take. Like the

\(^{27}\)Johnston (2016, p. 126) mentions the possibility of non-human remnant persons, e.g., dolphins and dogs, and that the remnant person argument against the (strong) animalist belief that animals are essentially animals goes through in their case as well. Johnston also points out that if frogs can survive as remnant thinking things, even if not as persons, then the remnant frog case shows that animality is not a substance kind. (Although, those who believe that animals are essentially animals would probably deny that any of the animals mentioned survive as the remnant individual, or they might maintain that the remnant individual does count as an animal.)
actual instances of dicephalus, in D* there is a high degree of psychological disunity. We are imagining that, as in actual cases, the psychological activity produced by the brain in one head is quite different from, psychologically discontinuous with, and independent of the psychological activity produced by the brain in the other head. Let us suppose that the psychological disunity in D* is as robust as that between some pair of typical persons. The great psychological disunity we are imagining perhaps does not entail that there are two persons present.\(^{28}\) However, it does make that conclusion quite compelling. As mentioned in Section 2, one might question the idea that the brain or brainstem is the primary control center of life-sustaining functions and there is reason to deny that the number of functioning brainstems always matches the number of organism lives. But even so, the absence of organ duplication below the cerebrum in D* does make it tempting to believe that in that extreme case there is only one human animal present. The idea that there are two persons and one human animal in D* certainly is not an implausible one.

If there are two persons and only one animal, then at least one of the persons is not an animal. But neither person in D* is any more suited to being an animal than the other is. So if at least one of the two is not an animal, then it seems that neither is an animal. And if neither is an animal, then given \(A_i^5 \text{–} A_i^7\), neither coincides, i.e., wholly coincides, with an animal. In that case, it seems that each of the two persons is a proper part of the animal. It is arguable that the two persons spatially overlap in the actual case D, and it is not implausible to think that the persons spatially overlap in D* as well. Although, since there is a lot less duplication of body parts in D* than in actual cases of dicephalus, one might suppose that the two persons in D* overlap to an even greater degree than they do in actual dicephalus cases—greatly overlapping proper parts of the same human animal. This view of D* is an option for the proponent of \(A_i^5 \text{–} A_i^7\) and it seems a reasonable one.

So the coincidence restriction, the restriction to human persons (and non-human animal persons in \(A_i^7\)) who spatially (and temporally) coincide with animals, allows an animalist to maintain that the human persons in D* are not animals. Also, it seems that invoking the coincidence restriction in this case is well-motivated and plausible. However, there is an important concern to address. Remember the two threats to animalism that the dicephalus objection is supposed to present. There is the worry that possible dicephalus cases are counterexamples to the animalist claim that each of us is an animal. While this worry has been answered, there is the other concern that if the twins in those cases are not animals, then none of us is an animal. Regarding the idea that an animalist might regard dicephalic human twins as exceptions to the general rule that human persons are animals, McMahan points out that “there is no reason to think that conjoined twins are metaphysically fundamentally different from the rest of us (i.e., that we are organisms while they are some different kind of thing)” (1998, p. 255). The concern might be put in terms of essential properties as well. Campbell and McMahan claim that “since each person in a case of dicephalus is the same kind of entity that we essentially are, none of us is essentially an organism” (2010, p. 286). Obviously, one cannot be an animalist while holding that none of us is an organism/animal. But if an animalist holds that unlike the typical human person, the dicephalic twins are not organisms, and therefore not animals, then that animalist seems committed to the apparently undesirable view that the twins are not essentially the same kind of entity that so many other human persons are.

\(^{28}\)Even with extreme disunity the temptation to conclude that there are two persons can be resisted. Hershenov (2004, § VI) and Olson (2014) were cited earlier. Also see Snowdon’s (2016) discussion of how various principles about the unity of mental states fail to provide sufficient reason to reject a single person verdict in split-brain cases.
In actual dicephalus cases, the animalist can reasonably maintain that each twin is an animal since it is not implausible to think that in those cases there are two human animals present. So one can insist that the typical human person is an animal while avoiding the conclusion that the twins in actual dicephalus cases are essentially or fundamentally different in kind. However, if it is granted that there is only one human animal in D, then it seems that the animalist who also wishes to hold that there are two persons in that case needs to worry about the result that there is an essential or fundamental difference in kind between the persons in D and all of the human persons who are animals.

In response to this concern, it should be noted that one can admit that human persons who spatiotemporally coincide with animals (as human persons generally do) are animals without believing that they are animals essentially, i.e., without believing that they cannot exist unless they are animals. One can endorse modest animalism and reject the strong variety. The merely modest animalist might hold that all persons, animal or non-animal, are essentially persons—or that all persons that are human (in the sense of being characteristic of our species) are essentially human, whether or not they qualify as animals—or that all persons that are human (in that sense) are essentially organic, which also does not require being an animal. And there are other options. The point is that by endorsing modest and rejecting strong animalism, the animalist can maintain that the persons in D are not animals without believing that there is a difference in what they and the typical human person essentially are.

I don’t know what exactly it is for two things to be fundamentally different in kind. But one reason one might have for believing that two things are fundamentally different in kind is believing that their essential features differ and that they differ in particular in the most specific kind to which they essentially belong (e.g., being an animal and not just being a material object). A merely modest animalist who believes that there is no difference in what typical human persons and the non-animal persons in D essentially are will need some other reason for thinking that there is a fundamental difference in kind between them. It is not clear what that other reason might be, and the modest animalist can simply deny that there is any fundamental difference between them. So the first point in response to the essential/fundamental difference concern is that by endorsing modest animalism and rejecting the strong variety, an animalist can consistently hold that the twins in D are not animals without admitting that they differ in terms of what they are essentially and/or fundamentally from all of the human persons who are animals.

One might argue that strong animalism is the main target of the twinning argument of McMahan and Campbell; so the main issue, one might think, is not whether modest animalists can answer twinning concerns, but whether strong animalists can do so. Yet, while perhaps a main target, it is not so clear that strong animalism is the main target since McMahan and Campbell wish to conclude not only that we are not essentially animals, but also that we are not animals period (being proper parts of animals instead). Still, the question does remain, can a strong animalist plausibly respond to the concern about allowing essential or fundamental differences between the persons in D and other human persons if it is maintained that the former are not animals?

Suppose that persons who are animals are animals essentially, i.e., cannot exist without being animals. A consequence of this view is that if the persons in D are not animals, then there is a kind to which a typical human person essentially belongs that differs from any kind to which the twins essentially belong. While this result might seem alarming, it is not clear how implausible it actually is. If we did share the intuition of strong animalists that “animality” marks the kind of thing one is essentially, then we would expect animal persons to differ from non-animal persons.
in terms of what they are essentially. So in the extreme case of D*, the strong animalist who maintains that the twins are not animals would simply not share the intuition that there is no difference in essential kind. Also, it is not clear why the strong animalist should deny a difference in essential kind in these extreme cases.

One might be inclined to resist the idea of a difference in essence because one might suspect that it entails some difference in moral status. But the idea that animal persons differ from non-animal persons in the kind of entity they essentially are does not itself entail any moral differences between the two groups. The remnant person who is a mere cerebrum and the twins in D*, while arguably not animals, have sentience and interests and whatever moral rights those guarantee. Also, since they are persons, they have whatever additional psychological complexity is necessary for being a person, and whatever additional moral rights all of that psychological complexity entails. So even if “animality” marked a difference in essence, the fact that some person is not an animal is no reason to think that the individual has less moral significance than those persons who are animals. Suppose it were insisted that animal persons and non-animal persons are not just essentially a different kind of being, but also fundamentally so (e.g., different in terms of the most definitive kind to which they essentially belong). That still does not entail a difference in moral status, especially if the members of both groups are undeniably persons, as are the twins in D*. Suppose there are persons who are immaterial souls in addition to the persons who are animals. Even assuming that animality is a fundamental kind, one would not expect the former to be of lesser moral standing simply for not being animals.

One might insist that animality marking an essential and fundamental difference between the persons in D* and typical human persons is implausible, not because it entails any moral difference, but simply because all persons are essentially and fundamentally persons. However, one can accept that all persons are essentially and fundamentally persons while also believing that animality is an essential and fundamental feature. One might believe that human persons who are animals are essentially/fundamentally animals and persons. It is simply not clear that the threat of animality marking an essential/fundamental difference between the persons in D* and typical human persons should dissuade one from maintaining that the latter are animals while the former are not.

To recap: We have seen that there is a good reason for the coincidence restriction in AI5 – AI7. The coincidence restriction allows one to maintain that remnant persons (especially, mere cerebrums) are not animals while still deserving the label “animalist.” The coincidence restriction also allows one to qualify as an animalist while claiming that the persons in D* are not animals. And it seems that invoking the coincidence restriction in these cases is well-motivated and plausible. The concern about there being an essential/fundamental difference between the persons in D* and typical human persons, if the latter are animals and the former are not, may be answered in either of two ways: by endorsing merely modest animalism, which allows the animalist to deny that there is an essential/fundamental difference, or by endorsing strong animalism and maintaining that the essential/fundamental difference verdict does not itself have any objectionable consequences.

29One could coherently endorse the strong animalist belief that we are animals essentially (that we cannot exist without being animals) while denying that animality is our fundamental kind. One might, for example, believe that even though we are animals essentially, each of us is most fundamentally a member of the species Homo sapiens.

30See, for example, Sharpe (2015).
McMahan (2009) and Campbell and McMahan (2010, 2016) discuss another, and rarer, type of conjoined twinning, *craniopagus parasiticus*.

In *craniopagus parasiticus*, there is what one would naturally describe as one complete and fully developed human organism with a head in which the brain generates consciousness and both controls and receives signals from the body in the normal way. Yet, at the top of this head, there is a second head that is attached by a continuous growth of cranial bone and is thus upside down in relation to the primary head and the body. This second head has failed to develop a body and thus terminates in a truncated neck. As the name for the phenomenon implies, the second head draws life support from the organs below the primary head, yet it contributes nothing to their regulation, control, or functioning. There is no duplication of organs apart from those in the second head. (Campbell & McMahan, 2010, p. 291)

They mention that while it is unclear whether in any of the few recorded instances the second head had sustained any consciousness at all, it seems theoretically possible for the brain in the parasitic head to have developed in such a way that it generates consciousness and even self-consciousness. They have us imagine “a case of *craniopagus parasiticus* in which the parasitic head contained a normally developed cerebrum, cerebellum, and brain stem, but in which the nervous system was truncated at the brain stem.” If “the cerebrum in the second head was physically and functionally entirely separate from that in the primary head so that neither brain had any direct conscious access to the mental states of the other, each head would be a fully distinct, separate, and independent center of consciousness” (2010, p. 292). In that hypothetical case, it seems there are two persons. Campbell and McMahan recognize that an animalist might insist that while there are two persons, there are also two organisms/animals in this imagined case. However, this reply is ineffective against a modification that Campbell and McMahan introduce to their earlier hypothetical case. Suppose that “the parasitic head has a fully developed cerebrum but a truncated, or only a partially developed, lower brain” (p. 294). They recognize that some areas of the reticular formation, which is necessary for consciousness, extend into the brainstem. But even so, it is possible, they point out, that the brainstem of the parasitic head developed the capacity for activity necessary for consciousness but no ability to regulate any vital functions. Let us call this extreme case of *craniopagus parasiticus*, “CP*.”

It certainly is compelling to maintain that there are two persons in CP*. It is also tempting to think there is only one human animal in that case. An animalist can argue, and perhaps convincingly, that the parasitic head in CP* does count as an animal. However, given that accepting A_{5}^–A_{7} is enough to qualify as an animalist, an animalist need not reject the two persons/one animal verdict. Of course, if one accepts any of A_{5}^–A_{7} while also believing that there are two persons and one human animal in CP*, then one will need to maintain that at least one of the two persons does not spatially coincide with the animal. One might argue, as one might in the case of D*, that neither person coincides with the animal. Although, unlike D*, in CP* the persons differ greatly in terms of how they relate to the total body mass. The brain of the parasitic head controls some of the behavior of the parasitic head (e.g., facial movement), but that’s it, whereas the brain of the non-parasitic head controls the behavior of the non-parasitic head and the body below. So one might be inclined to view the person whose psychological states are produced by the brain of the
non-parasitic head as a larger part of the total body mass, i.e., larger than the person whose psychological states are produced by the brain of the parasitic head. Perhaps the latter person coincides with the parasitic head and the former coincides with the remainder of the total body mass. This does not seem an implausible option for the proponent of $A_1^5 - A_1^7$ who accepts the two persons/one animal verdict in CP*. \footnote{Or one might propose that the person with the non-parasitic head coincides with and is the animal, and that person contains the other person as a proper part. The discussion in the next section is relevant to this proposal.} So if accepting any of $A_1^5 - A_1^7$ makes one an animalist, then it seems that an animalist can, not only consistently, but also reasonably maintain that there are two persons and one human animal in CP*.

There is the concern about there being an essential or fundamental difference between the persons in CP* and typical human persons, if the latter are animals and the former are not. But this concern can be answered just as it was in the case of D*, either by endorsing merely modest animalism and denying that there is an essential or fundamental difference, or by endorsing strong animalism and noting that the essential/fundamental difference verdict does not itself have any objectionable consequences (e.g., a difference in moral status). \footnote{Another very rare type of conjoined twinning that Campbell and McMahan discuss is cephalopagus, where there are two bodies fused at the thorax and with more extensive fusion at the head than in craniopagus. They describe a hypothetical extreme case in which there is a single head with “a single normally formed cerebrum with two cerebella and two brain stems, as well as a single face, mouth, and throat” and “the normal complement of other organs and appendages in each half of the total bodily mass below the neck” (2010, p. 298). Unlike D* and CP*, it is tempting to view this extreme case of cephalopagus as a case of one person and two human animals. (Hershenov (2005, fn. 14) and McMahan (2009) also present cephalopagus as an objection to the view that we are animals/organisms. Hershenov uses the label “cephalothoracopagus” and presents the case as an objection to the Biological Approach to personal identity, and McMahan speaks of “craniothoracopagus”; both labels make it clear that in such cases there is fusion at the thorax as well as the head.) I leave this type of conjoined twinning for discussion on another occasion, only to note here that the coincidence restriction allows animalists to accept the one person/two animal verdict in the hypothetical case Campbell and McMahan describe, and to maintain that the person is not identical with either animal. (Another option for the animalist is to agree with Boyle (2020) that there is only one human animal in cephalopagus.)}

6 | PERSON PARTS

Animalists have to worry about \textit{the thinking parts problem}.\footnote{See Olson’s (2007, pp. 215–219) presentation of the problem, a problem which “arises for any view according to which we are animal-sized things” (p. 216).} There are many proper parts of human animals that either are or contain bodily components whose activity produces thought. These parts include the head of the animal, the animal's brain, the top half of the animal, all of the animal except for the right foot, and all of the animal minus the left index finger. Within each of these and indefinitely many other proper parts of the human animal, lots of thoughts are taking place, i.e., all the thoughts that the person is having. So it seems there is no good reason for us to believe that we are the animal; it seems that for all we know one of those other thinking parts is the animal. An instance of this thinking parts problem is what we might call “the person parts problem.” If having psychological features of the right sort is sufficient for personhood, then it seems that for any human animal that’s a person, all of the thinking parts mentioned above will also count as persons, and for the animalist there is the issue of how we can know that we are the animal and not one of those other persons.
In addition to the epistemic worry, there is the problem that if human animals have many persons as proper parts, then assuming that these proper parts are not themselves animals, most human persons are not animals. This seems to be a result that no animalist would accept, and it is a result that is inconsistent with animalism on characterizations $A_1^5$–$A_1^7$. For while $A_1^5$–$A_1^7$ allow animalists to maintain that some human persons are not animals, the formulations require animalists to believe that the typical human person is an animal. That $A_1^5$–$A_1^7$ are inconsistent with the idea that most human persons are not animals is not itself a problem with those characterizations of animalism, for it seems that no one who believes that most human persons are not animals deserves the title “animalist.” What the person parts problem does show is that the animalist, on $A_1^5$–$A_1^7$ or on any plausible characterization, had better find a way to deny that we have many proper parts that are persons, given that those human proper parts are not animals.

To avoid the result that human animals have many person parts, an animalist might adopt the eliminativist strategy of denying that those undetached proper parts really exist. Although, this strategy is not open to animalists who maintain (as I claim they can plausibly maintain) that the twins in $D^*$ and $CP^*$ are proper parts of the human animal. Holding that the twins in $D^*$ and $CP^*$ are proper parts of the human animal also rules out the strategy of claiming that no human animal can have a person as a proper part. There is, however, the option of holding that personhood is maximal, where “a property, $F$, is maximal, roughly, iff large parts of an $F$ are not themselves $F$s” (Sider, 2001, p. 357). The idea that personhood is maximal is not a restriction on animals having persons as proper parts, but a restriction on persons having persons as proper parts. With the belief that personhood is maximal, animalists and non-animalists alike can avoid the proliferation of person parts (given that those parts qualify as large enough). And by avoiding the result that we have many person parts, one can accept that it is generally the case that human persons are animals, as proponents of $A_1^5$–$A_1^7$ maintain. Also, the idea that personhood is maximal allows that the persons in $D^*$ and $CP^*$ are proper parts of animals, given that the animal of which they are parts is not itself a person.

Against the maximality proposal, Sutton (2014) and Madden (2016a) show that there are cases in which large proper parts of an $F$ qualify as $Fs$. In response to this type of objection: (1) one might offer and defend a maximality proposal that places restrictions (other than size) on the sort of thing that can be a part of an $F$ while still being an $F$. For example, one might propose that for a proper part of an $F$ to be an $F$ its $F$-activity must be independent in the right sort of way of the $F$-activity of the whole, and then the task would be to explain what sort of independent $F$-activity would allow the part to be an $F$. Now, if the animal is a person, then assuming that the person-activity of the brain, the head, the top-half,... is not independent in the manner described of the person-activity of the animal, those parts will not themselves

\[34\] The qualification “large” is meant to allow, for example, that organisms can have organisms (including individual cells) as proper parts, and that there might be “multicellular persons composed of unicellular persons” (Burke 2003, p. 112) or even smaller persons, e.g., Block’s (1978) elementary particle people. Burke supports the idea that the concept person is maximal (e.g., 1994, 2003) and phrases the maximality proposal in a way other than with the ‘large’ restriction (2003, pp. 112–113) to allow that a person could have small persons as proper parts.

\[35\] The appeal to maximality provides a general response to “the Problem of the Many,” as Unger (1980) called it. In the vicinity of an $F$ there are very many $F$-like items that are proper parts of or otherwise spatially overlap the $F$. The maximality constraint allows one to maintain that at least many of these are not really $Fs$.

\[36\] See Francescotti (2019) for an example of how this strategy might go.
count as persons. Alternatively, (2) one can reject the maximality approach altogether and offer in its place a functional account of what it takes for some x to be an F, an account on which x is an F only if x’s proper parts contribute to x’s F-functioning in the right sort of way. Assuming that the brain, the head, the top-half,… do not have proper parts that contribute to their person-functioning in the right sort of way (however that way ends up being described), then those parts of the animal will not themselves count as persons. Without going into details here, there do seem to be promising ways along the lines of (1) and (2) for animalists and non-animalists alike to avoid the result that human persons have lots of person parts. These options can help one avoid the result that the majority of human persons are not animals, which is contrary to any of $A_{i}^{5}$–$A_{i}^{7}$, and since these options do not preclude animals from having person parts (even large ones), they can allow that the persons in $D^{*}$ and $CP^{*}$ are proper parts of the animal.

7 | CONCLUSION

If “human” were taken as synonymous with “human animal,” then the claim that all human persons are animals would be true by definition and would then be accepted by opponents of animalism as well. For the animalist’s identity claim to be the substantive thesis it is meant to be, “human” must have wider application, perhaps meaning “characteristic of the species Homo sapiens.” This weaker sense of “human” is consistent with our talk of organs, cells, and other body parts being human. But if “human” is used, as it often is, in a sense consistent with this way of talking, then the claim that all human persons are animals does not seem to be a defining feature of animalism. Consider a remnant human person who is a mere cerebrum (artificially stimulated to produce psychological states sufficient for personhood). One can agree with Olson that this remnant person is not an animal without forfeiting animalism. Even if one did want to maintain that a remnant person (even a mere cerebrum) is an animal, doing so certainly is not a requirement for being an animalist.

It might be suggested that the animalist’s identity claim is best viewed as the claim that a human person is identical with an animal provided there is a corresponding animal, which seems to allow that some human persons (e.g., remnant persons) are not animals. However, not just any sort of correspondence ensures identity from an animalist perspective. A person’s being in the same room as an animal is a type of correspondence with an animal, which obviously does not guarantee that the person is an animal. One type of correspondence with an animal that an animalist would consider not only necessary but also sufficient for being identical with an animal is a complete spatial (and temporal) coincidence. An animalist can allow that a remnant human person does not spatially coincide with an animal, and therefore is not an animal. The animalist will insist, however, that if a human person does wholly coincide with an animal, which the animalist would claim is how things generally are with human persons, then the person is an animal. So $A_{i}^{5}$ and $A_{i}^{6}$ (and $A_{i}^{7}$ which applies also to any persons there happen to be of other animal species) were offered as formulations of the animalist’s identity claim.

A proponent of $A_{i}^{5}$–$A_{i}^{7}$ does seem to warrant the label “animalist.” These formulations distinguish animalists in general from their constitution theorist, brainist, and substance dualist rivals.

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37 See Yang (2015) and Madden (2016a) for examples of approach (2).
Also, \( A_1^5 - A_1^7 \) are consistent with the strong animalist belief that animals are animals essentially. The coincidence restriction in \( A_1^5 - A_1^7 \), the restriction to those who spatially (and temporally) coincide with animals, is what allows an animalist to claim that in the case of a remnant human person, especially if only a cerebrum, the human person is not an animal. This coincidence restriction in \( A_1^5 - A_1^7 \) is what also allows an animalist to maintain that in \( D^* \) and \( CP^* \) there are human persons who are not animals. Not only are these options for animalists, modest or strong, they are plausible options for them as argued in Sections 4 and 5.

The dicephalus objection to animalism and the argument from craniopagus parasiticus belong to a class of counterarguments that Blatti (2007) calls “duplication objections.”\(^{38}\) A duplication objection to some view (animalism or otherwise) tries to refute the view by showing that its advocates are committed to claiming that one thing is identical with two or more things, contrary to the transitivity of identity. Standard cases of commissurotomy and dissociative identity disorder are arguably best described as cases in which there is only one person, despite the psychological disunity, for among the disunity observed there is also sufficient psychological unity in these cases to make the claim that there is more than one person plausibly resistible. However, there are possible extreme cases where the disunity is so vast and to such a high degree that one might be strongly inclined to say that in such cases there is more than one person.\(^{39}\) Since animalist theses \( A_1^5 - A_1^7 \) are compatible with this verdict in these non-twinning duplication cases, modest and strong animalists can accept the intuitive verdict there too, and perhaps plausibly so as in the twinning duplication cases \( D^* \) and \( CP^* \).

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\(^{38}\)Blatti (2020) also uses the label “multiplication objections.”

\(^{39}\)McMahan mentions “our sense that there is somehow sufficient unity of consciousness in the commissurotomy patient to make it unreasonable to believe that there are actually two persons present” (2002, p. 38). But he then goes on to imagine a hypothetical case in which the commissurotomy was performed at birth and each hemisphere was for years after presented with different stimuli. McMahan mentions in a footnote that he owes this example to Mark Reid. And not long ago Reid (2016) describes a case of brain bisection combined with intracarotid amobarbital procedure (IAP), a procedure in which one cerebral hemisphere is disabled by injection of a barbiturate without affecting the other hemisphere. With alternating IAP it is possible for each hemisphere to be conscious every other day since birth. In that case it seems there are two distinct persons, whom Reid calls “Lefty” and “Righty,” each sleeping during the day the other is awake. Also see Olson’s (2003) extreme dissociative identity scenario of Odd and Even, who have radically different personalities that appear on alternate days. Olson denies that this is a case of two persons; also see Liao’s defense (2006, § III) of the one person verdict in the extreme commissurotomy case McMahan describes. Although, one can be an animalist, e.g., by endorsing \( A_1^5 - A_1^7 \), while accepting the tempting view that there are two persons in the extreme cases.


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