Phenomenology’s central insight is that affectivity is not an inconsequential or contingent characteristic of human existence. Emotions, moods, sentiments, and feelings are not accidents of human existence. They do not happen to happen to us. Rather, we exist the way we do because of and through our affective experiences. Phenomenology thus acknowledges the centrality and ubiquity of affectivity by noting the multitude of ways in which our existence is permeated by our various affective experiences. Yet, it also insists that such experiences are both revealing and constitutive of human nature. It is precisely this last point that marks an important distinction between a phenomenological study of affectivity and perhaps all others. For phenomenology, one cannot understand the nature of human existence without coming to terms with the character of affectivity and at the same time, one cannot come to terms with the character of affectivity without understanding the nature of human existence. Practical and social engagements, scientific endeavors, familial and political interactions are all predicted on the fact that we are beings who are capable of being affectively attuned to ourselves, to the world, and to others.

In this entry, we discuss Martin Heidegger’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s respective accounts of affectivity. In the first section, we present Heidegger’s understanding of affective existence. In this context, we discuss the significance of moods and offer an analysis of the affective phenomena of fear, anxiety, and boredom. In the second section, we present an overview of Sartre’s account of emotions and advance a Sartrean interpretation of fear and boredom. We conclude by raising some brief concerns with both accounts.

1. Heidegger and Affectivity

Heidegger’s phenomenological account of affect is both novel and important. Moreover, it can be instructive both within the phenomenological tradition and also more generally within the context of conceptual and empirically informed studies of emotion (see, e.g., Elpidorou 2013; Freeman 2014;
This is because for Heidegger, affective experiences are far more robust than we typically think; contrary to many folk psychological conceptions of emotion, they are not just discrete states that we happen to occupy that are caused by our surrounding environment; rather, they are basic to and constitutive of human existence. According to Heidegger, what makes us human (or, Dasein) is not just that we are rational, social, or practical beings. In addition to being these things, we are also affective, specifically, ‘mooded’ beings. Moods shape the fabric of our being insofar as they are the condition for the possibility of experiencing a world of values and concerns (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015). Additionally, affective experiences are disclosive. On account of their disclosive nature, they make accessible to us the valence of situations thereby highlighting what is important for us. For Heidegger, it is through moods that the world is disclosed to us and that we find ourselves amidst worldly projects and social situations that matter to and that affect us emotionally.

In what follows, we first situate Heidegger’s account of mood within the context of his project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time (BT). In order to do so, we briefly outline the role of Befindlichkeit (“attunement” or “disposition”) and Stimmung (“mood”) in Heidegger’s general account of human existence, discuss the relationship between the two, and consider how the former discloses the world. We then focus on the fundamental moods (Grundstimmungen) of anxiety and profound boredom; discuss why, for Heidegger, they are important; and try to make sense of the relationship between anxiety and fear, two “kindred phenomena” (BT 230/185).

1.1. Befindlichkeit and Stimmung

Heidegger’s account of mood unfolds systematically within the context of his project of fundamental ontology in BT, the aim of which is to ask the question of the meaning of Being. Heidegger answers this question with an analysis of the only kind of being for whom such a question arises, namely, human beings, or Dasein. Dasein is a unique kind of being insofar as its Being is disclosed (erschlossen) to it in various ways. Much of BT is an existential-ontological analysis of how Dasein exists in the world, how its existence in the world is disclosed to it, and how it makes sense of the meaning of this disclosedness.

Ontologically, Dasein is constituted by four basic structures of existence, or existentials—Befindlichkeit, understanding (Verstehen), fallenness (Verfallensein), and talk (Rede). These existentials are equiprimordially united in Dasein’s ontological structure, care (Sorge), which unifies and discloses Dasein’s being-in-the-world as temporal (BT 375/327, 293/249, 277/234). Each ontological
structure manifests ontically through the ways in which Dasein finds itself (befinden sich) in the world. Dasein’s ontic and ontological dimensions are two different, yet related ways of understanding and articulating its existence: whereas the former refers to the necessary structures of its existence, the latter refers to the concrete aspects of its comportment to the world and to others.

*Befindlichkeit* is a basic ontological structure of human existence that makes it possible for human beings to find themselves in the world in a way that holds meaning for and thus matters to them. It is one of the ways in which Dasein’s existence in the world is disclosed to it. Heidegger uses the term “*Befindlichkeit*” to denote the ontological character of a phenomenon, mood (*Stimmung*), that is ontically (i.e., in an ordinary manner) most familiar to us (BT 172/134). Thus, the terms “*Befindlichkeit*” and “*Stimmung*” name the same phenomenon, understood from different perspectives: the former, an ontological structure of Dasein’s existence, refers to a basic mode of existence in, and openness to, the world; the latter, the ontic manifestation of *Befindlichkeit*, refers to the various and specific ways in which Dasein can relate to and disclose the world. For Heidegger, *Befindlichkeit* is always manifested through mood and Dasein is always in some mood. As modes of a fundamental ontological structure, moods are both constitutive and disclosive of the way one exists or finds oneself (*sich befinden*) attuned to the world and of how one is faring in the world with others. Moods have an important, underlying revelatory dimension in that they affect and to an extent, even determine, how things appear to us. Moods disclose three key features of Dasein’s existence to it: (a) its thrownness (*Geworfensein*), (b) Being-in-the-world as a whole, and (c) what matters to it.⁶

1.2. Fear, Anxiety, and Boredom

For Heidegger, not all affective states are metaphysically on par; some have more primary disclosive powers than others. Those that do are called “fundamental moods” (*Grundstimmungen*) or “fundamental attunements” (*Grundbefindlichkeiten*) and constitute the most far-reaching and primordial possibilities of disclosure in which Dasein is revealed to itself in some exceptional way (BT 226/182). Heidegger’s point in outlining such fundamental modes of existence is that they bring us closer to an understanding of both the meaning of Being as such and also of Dasein’s existence. In what follows, we begin by briefly discussing fear, an important, yet for Heidegger, ultimately inauthentic mood or affective state.⁷ We then focus on what Heidegger takes to be two fundamental affective experiences: anxiety (*Angst*), fear’s authentic relative, and profound boredom (*tiefe Langeweile*).⁸ We highlight some of the similarities between them and discuss how they both enable Dasein’s authentic existence.
For Heidegger, fear (Furcht) is an affective experience that arises when one encounters something in the world that is fearsome or threatening: something that has as its kind of being either readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenen), presence-at-hand (Vorhandenen), or Dasein-with (Mitdasein). According to Heidegger, fear compels Dasein to turn away from itself, thereby preventing Dasein from being able to face its own existence (BT 229-30/184-5). Thus, in fear, Dasein fails to notice its thrownness and insofar as this is the case, it cannot take over its ground (in other words, it cannot authentically take over its possibilities as its own). Thrownness is a central feature of Dasein’s existence and as long as Dasein exists, it is always thrown (BT 223/179, 321/276, 344/297)—that is, it finds itself always in a specific material, embodied, social, political, historical, and ancestral situation that it did not choose, that is beyond its control, and that both grounds and delimits Dasein’s actions and possibilities. Dasein’s thrownness is revealed to it through moods, but in a peculiar way: moods disclose Dasein’s thrownness “in the manner of an evasive turning-away” (BT 175/136; cf. 230/185). That is, moods do not reveal our thrownness as a fact that can be apprehended or perceived. Instead, through moods, our thrownness is disclosed in our very tendency to turn away from it. In fear, this turning away is understood by Heidegger as both a fleeing and a falling (BT 230/185): we flee from our thrownness by evading our true self (who we were, are, and can be) and by falling into the “world” of concern we can, temporarily at least, ignore the weight of our existence (BT 233-4/189). Fear precludes one from becoming one’s authentic self (BT 373-4/325-6) and precisely because it does so, it is considered to be an inauthentic affective experience.

In contrast to fear, anxiety carries for Heidegger greater existential and ontological significance and consequently, plays a much more important role in Dasein’s existential-analytic. A key difference between fear and anxiety is this: whereas that in the face of which Dasein fears is a determinate entity within-the-world (BT 230/185), that in the face of which Dasein has anxiety is not. What is threatening in anxiety does not have the character of a “definite detrimentality” (BT 231/186)—anxiety neither has a specific intentional object nor a determine cause. Moreover, it comes unannounced. That in the face of which one is anxious is “completely indefinite” (ibid.). In anxiety, the world of our everyday concern loses all significance, but not in the sense that it falls away from us as an absence (ibid.); rather, in anxiety significance is lost insofar as familiar entities appear foreign, disconnected from their ordinary uses and meanings (BT 393/343). As a result, one ceases to feel at home, one is unable to understand oneself, and one is thrown into a profound and uncanny crisis of meaning.
From the fact that anxiety renders everything insignificant, one ought not conclude that anxiety itself is a passive state of meaninglessness or insignificance: quite the opposite. The profound crisis of meaning that Dasein experiences in anxiety is not the end; rather, it initiates a transformation in Dasein’s existence. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about, namely, its own authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world (BT 232/187). More specifically, in anxiety, Dasein is brought to see itself for who it really is (BT 235/190-1): a thrown, fallen, finite being who is ever projecting its future possibilities and whose existence is oriented toward and also individuated by, its own death. Unlike fear, during anxiety, one does not flee from one’s thrownness. Even though anxiety, like fear, involves a turning-away, in anxiety one turns away from everydayness and turns toward one’s existence. In doing so, one finds oneself face-to-face with one’s “ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (BT 321/276). Heidegger writes:

Anxiety makes manifest Dasein in its being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, namely, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself…Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its Being and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is (BT 232/188; also see BT 321/276).

Moreover, and crucially, anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-world, which projects itself authentically upon its possibilities.

This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein…show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves – undisguised by entities in the world, to which, proximally and for the most part, Dasein clings (BT 235/191).

Though unannounced and unanticipated, Dasein’s authenticity is disclosed in this primordial sense in anxiety (BT 190/234-35). The capricious features of anxiety render it profound and ominous, particularly since it is unpredictable and inescapable.

In the first half of his 1929-30 lecture course *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (FCM), Heidegger discusses profound boredom (in addition to two other forms of boredom), thereby broadening his account of *Grundstimmungen* in his oeuvre. Up until that point,
Grundstimmungen had only been discussed in terms of anxiety, which played a key role in both BT and also in his lecture, “What is Metaphysics?” (1929). One of Heidegger’s aims in FCM is to delineate his conception of philosophy and metaphysics, already departing from the one presented in BT. Another aim is to develop his account of the fundamental mood (Grundstimmung) of boredom in terms of grasping the fundamental meaning of our being.

Heidegger delineates three forms of boredom in this lecture. The first is becoming bored by something (Gelangweiltwerden von etwas), for example, an object, person, or state of affairs (FCM §§19-23); the second is being bored with something (Sichlangweilen bei etwas), where it is not immediately clear to Dasein precisely what is boring, but only that one is bored (FCM §§24-28). In what follows, we limit our discussion to the third type of boredom (FCM §§29-41), profound boredom (tiefe Langeweile), since it is both the most fundamental kind and also the one that is central to Heidegger’s aim in the course. Unlike the first two forms of boredom, in profound boredom, nothing in particular is boring, nor is there any determinate cause of boredom or reason for being bored. And yet, everything bores us, even ourselves. The very construction that Heidegger uses to describe profound boredom—the impersonal, “it is boring for one,” where “it” (es) is the same subject found in expressions such as “it is snowing” or “it is cold”—expresses the depersonalized omnipresence of profound boredom (see, e.g., FCM §30). Neither I nor you experience this form of boredom; rather, in it, Dasein becomes an “undiﬀerentiated no one” (FCM 135/203). Not only does Dasein lose all concerns and interests, but all identifying characteristics, histories, and projects fall away. Like anxiety, profound boredom is unbidden, overpowering, and all-encompassing. Moreover, in profound boredom, the passing of time is absent in that all three temporal dimensions (past, present, future) merge into a unified temporality. The experience of profound boredom reflects that of anxiety. During profound boredom, one experiences the complete withdrawal of beings. This loss of signiﬁcance is ontologically important insofar as everything around and alongside us loses meaning, nothing carries any future prospects, and nothing relates to or gives meaning to our past (having-been). Thus, in profound boredom, Dasein becomes indiﬀerent to who and what one was, is, and to who and what one will be. And yet, as with anxiety, what might appear to be a nadir of Dasein’s existence by leading to complete meaninglessness, is anything but.

Profound boredom leaves Dasein empty and holds it in limbo, yet it also brings the potential for “an exceptional understanding” of the kind of being that Dasein is (FCM 136/205). This is because entrancement—the loss of all meaning and signiﬁcance—results not only in the withdrawal of signiﬁcance but also in the revealing of possibilities proper to Dasein. What is revealed to Dasein in
this peculiar refusal is its freedom and this revealing acts as a call for action (FCM 148-152/222-28).
That is, in profound boredom, Dasein is called to resolutely disclose and appropriate itself, namely, to take action in the moment of vision (Augenblick), to choose what is properly its own, and to become the author of its own existential meaning (FCM 149/224) (for more detailed discussions of Heidegger and boredom, see De Beistegui 2003; Elpidorou & Freeman in press; Slaby 2014).

We can see then that there are important similarities between the Grundstimmungen of anxiety and profound boredom: first, both have distinctive revelatory functions; and second, both compel Dasein to face its own existence and to become authentic.

2. Sartre and Affectivity

Sartre addresses the topic of affectivity explicitly and in most detail in his Sketch for a Theory of Emotions. The Sketch might be the locus classicus of Sartre’s treatment of affectivity, yet it is not the only place in his work in which affectivity is discussed. In addition to a presentation of the notions of unreflective consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness—both of which are necessary for understanding Sartre’s position on the emotions—The Transcendence of the Ego includes brief discussions of the nature of states (e.g., hate) and dispositions. The Imaginary enriches and extends Sartre’s account of the Sketch. It contains, among other things, a careful analysis of feelings and an exploration into the relationship between emotions and imagination. Being and Nothingness adds layers to Sartre’s earlier account of emotions by painting a vivid picture of human existence in its various concrete and interpersonal manifestations. Saint Genet, Critique of Dialectical Reason, and The Family Idiot provide indispensable insights into Sartre’s more mature views about the power of circumstances to shape human existence. And Sartre’s literary writings supply texture, specificity, and urgency to his philosophical approach to affectivity.

It is not possible to offer a comprehensive account of Sartre’s views on affectivity in this entry (for a more detailed account, see Hatzimoysis in this volume). Our aim is not completeness but rather accessibility and clarity. By focusing primarily on the Sketch, we explicate the most central themes of Sartre’s view on emotions and put them to use by offering a Sartrean interpretation of the negative emotions of fear and boredom.

2.1. Emotions as Lived Transformations
For Sartre, emotions are embodied, enactive ways in which we exist in the world and engage with worldly objects, situations, others, and with ourselves. While experiencing an emotional episode, we could react to it by making the emotion the focal point of our consciousness or by becoming aware of ourselves as emoting subjects (STE 34). We could do that, and sometimes we do just that. Yet, for Sartre, emotions are not primarily nor most fundamentally reflective experiences. During emotional experiences, it is the world that is our primary concern, not our consciousness of it. And although we continue to be conscious of ourselves during emotional experiences, the form of awareness that characterizes emotions is pre-reflective (STE 35-7, 52, 61).

Emotions are thus, first and foremost, ways of relating to and experiencing the world—“[e]motion is a specific manner of apprehending the world” (STE 35). But by apprehending the world emotionally, the world is transformed: “The onset of emotion is a complete modification of the ‘being-in-the-world’” (STE 63; cf. STE 54). Emotions thus mark an existential transition: through them our engagement with the world is modified. Before the onset of an emotion, our experience of the world is characterized by means-ends relationships. In this mode of existence, the “world around us […] appears to be all furrowed with straight and narrow paths leading to such and such determinate ends.” (STE 39) Entities within it are perceived as calls for action. We find ourselves within a nexus of concerns, obligations, and possibilities. Such a world is both instrumental and deterministic. It is instrumental because, to attain the ends that one desires, one must first procure the means that lead to those ends. It is deterministic because there is a presumed order in the world; there are rules—physical, social, or otherwise—that one must obey. Due to its instrumental and deterministic character, our everyday concernful world can be inflexible. There will be occasions during which we will be unable to achieve the necessary means and consequently, our desired ends will remain out of reach. It is precisely when we find ourselves in such unyielding situations—situations in which our desires remain frustrated and our practical actions cannot resolve the difficulties that we face—that emotions arise. And they arise as a way of mitigating or even resolving the experienced difficulties (STE 39-40).

Emotions are capable of offering a solution to the difficulties that we face only because the world that they usher in is unlike the one encountered in our concernful existence. During our emotional experiences, we “live it [the world] as though the relations between things and their potentialities were not governed by deterministic processes but by magic” (STE 40). Emotions modify our world, and do so profoundly. They confer onto situations and encountered entities new qualities. Importantly, they also alter the way in which the world itself is experienced—the world is
no longer governed by instrumental rules and means-ends relationships. Precisely because emotions do not reveal a world that is deterministic and governed by instrumental rules, they are capable (at least, most of the time) of providing escapes from the difficulties that gave rise to them. A fit of anger is an escape from an argument not because it deals with the issue at hand but because one no longer needs to offer a response to the argument. One can yell and silence one’s interlocutor, or one can just walk away. Anger magically absolves one of the responsibility of dealing with a difficult situation. Crying during sadness does something similar. It can offer us a respite from a difficult situation. It affords us a break and thus an escape because, at least temporally, it suspends the need to deal with the world. But the world of emotions is magical not only because emotions change the way in which we experience and relate to the world; it is also magical because of the peculiar manner in which they do so. The change that emotional consciousness brings about is not material: emotional conduct “is not effectual” (STE 41). Emotions change the world magically insofar as they change our consciousness of the world.12

2.2. Fear and Boredom

Emotions are embodied, enactive, and unreflective attempts to resolve insurmountable difficulties by changing the ways in which we relate to the world. By offering us a world in which deterministic means no longer hold, they strive to make the difficulties that we previously encountered disappear. A Sartrean characterization of any type of emotion requires the explication of at least two features of emotions: (i) the difficulty that gives rise to the type of emotion; and (ii) the manner in which the onset of the emotion attempts to resolve the difficulty.

Consider fear. Sartre discusses fear in the Sketch (STE 42-3) and distinguishes between passive and active fear, both of which arise on account of the experience of a threat. Thus, what gives rise to the emotion of fear is the perception of a situation that is threatening to one’s well-being. Passive and active fear are both fear not only because they arise due to the perception of a threat, but also because they share a common aim: they both attempt to take care of the perceived threat when deterministic means fail us. If fear arises on account of the perception of a threat and if its aim is to negate that threat, then how does it attempt to fulfill its aim? In other words, what exactly is the magical transformation brought about by the onset of fear that carries the potential to resolve the experienced difficulty? Here is where the distinction between passive and active fear becomes pertinent. The two subtypes of fear are differentiated in terms of the manner in which they offer an escape from the perceived threat.
In the case of passive fear, we cannot outrun the threat, nor can we escape it using ordinary means. So, we use the only means available to us: we negate it by negating our consciousness of it. We faint, thereby we make the threat disappear.

I see a ferocious beast coming towards me: my legs give way under me, my heart beats more feebly, I turn pale, full down and faint away. No conduct could seem worse adapted to the danger than this, which leaves me defenseless. And nevertheless it is a behaviour of escape; the fainting away is a refuge. (STE 42)

The transformation that passive fear brings about is the same as that which all emotions bring out: it is, according to Sartre, magical. Consequently, its power is limited. We negate the threat without materially changing the world. And that means that we do not really make the beast disappear. The beast is there; we simply do not perceive it.

Whereas in the case of passive fear we negate our consciousness in order to negate the threat; in active fear, we flee. Yet, in essence the two are different manifestations of the same phenomenon. “Flight is fainting away in play,” Sartre writes (STE 43). And he adds that “it is magical behaviour which negates the dangerous object with one’s whole body, by reversing the vectorial structure of the space we live in and suddenly creating a potential direction on the other side. (ibid.). While fleeing, we have magically transformed our world so that it does not contain the threat. But of course, the threat still exists. By running away, we have at least temporarily forgotten about it. Out of sight, out of mind. It is tempting to think of fleeing as some kind of prudential or calculative action. We flee in order to escape. But as Sartre warns us, this would be a misunderstanding of the character of emotional consciousness. Fear is unreflective behavior. It is not a tool that we calculatedly employ; rather, we live the world through it. As a type of emotional consciousness, fear “is primarily consciousness of the world.” (STE 34)\(^{13}\)

Though boredom is not discussed in the Sketch, Sartre’s account could indeed be applied to it—in fact, given that Sartre’s account is a general account of affect, it ought to apply to boredom. A Sartrean explication of boredom would need to specify the difficulty that gives rise to boredom and the solution that boredom attempts to offer. The problem that gives rise to boredom is not difficult to discern. Boredom arises on account of the perception of a situation that is not meaningful, interesting, or captivating to us. The problem of boredom is, in other words, a perceived
meaninglessness, lack of interest, or challenge. We wish to do something other than what is available to us. And when we find ourselves in such a difficult situation, we experience boredom.

Being stuck in a meaningless or unengaging situation is the problem that gives rise to boredom, but what solution does it offer? Boredom is characterized by a feeling of dissatisfaction and involves a strong desire to engage in something else. During boredom, we cannot maintain our attention to the situation at hand; we mind-wander and alternative goals and situations which we could pursue become salient to us. Time appears to be moving slowly and we undergo various physiological changes (see, e.g., Eastwood et al. 2013; Elpidorou 2018a). Ultimately, and because of the manner in which boredom is experienced, boredom modifies our situation: our situation loses its grip on us and is no longer meaningful or worth pursing. But unlike apathy, boredom is not a state in which we merely remain unengaged with our situation; instead, it repels us from our meaningless or unengaging situation. In sum, boredom transforms our world magically (Elpidorou 2015). It creates zones of interests and dullness. It delineates the meaningful and the fulfilling from that which is not. And it sets us in motion by pushing us out of our unsatisfactory situation.

A Sartrean take on boredom safeguards one from assuming an overly negative take on boredom. Although boredom is potentially problematic and can be associated with a number of harms, it is not necessarily negative. Depending on the context and the manner in which one responds to it, boredom could serve as the means out of a difficult situation and into a better (i.e., more fulfilling) life (Elpidorou 2018b). By transforming our bodies and our consciousness of the world, the onset of boredom motivates the pursuit of an alternative situation when our current situation ceases to be meaningful, engaging, fulfilling to us. Sartre’s view on boredom, however, comes with a price: it appears to turn boredom into something more radical than what it is. Often, when we experience boredom, we are aware of it. We know that we are bored and we even think of ways to alleviate it. It is on account of our realization that we are bored that we fight off boredom. We go for walks, check our phone, and turn on (or off) the television, all of which are means of making it disappear. If boredom involves a magical transformation, it is not one that strips our world of its means-ends relationships.

The worry generalizes. It would appear that Sartre’s account of the emotions renders them disruptive: they do not permit us to relate to the world in instrumental ways. But is it always the case that we “lose our heads” in the midst of our emotions? For instance, couldn’t we be afraid and still act calculatedly? One might worry that Sartre’s account of emotions is too inflexible (we either exist in our concernful world or in the magical world of emotions) or too radical (there are no “weak”
emotions). It is often objected that the main weakness of Sartre’s account is that it does not apply to positive emotions—such emotions, critics point out, do not seem to be solutions to experienced difficulties (see, e.g., Fell 1965; Weberman 1996). But given our foregoing discussion, it appears that his views on negative emotions are also susceptible to criticism, for not all instances of negative emotions need to mark an existential transition. Perhaps Sartre’s account could be amended in a way that avoids these and other difficulties. Whether such a restorative project can ultimately succeed remains to be seen.

3. Conclusion

Though Heidegger and Sartre adopt importantly different perspectives on affectivity, they both insist that it is a constitutive part of human existence. Furthermore, through their respective accounts, they highlight phenomenology’s ability to bring into clear view the significance of our affective experiences. But can the two accounts be rendered consistent with each other? Are Sartrean emotions compatible with Heidegger’s ontological claims? And do Heideggerian moods have a place in Sartre’s system? Although we cannot take up these issues in great detail here, we wish to conclude by raising a conciliatory suggestion: Sartre’s account appears to already utilize many of the philosophical resources that Heidegger derives from Befindlichkeit (and Stimmungen). The grounds of our emotions, according to Sartre, are experienced difficulties that we cannot overcome with pragmatic means. Such experiences are difficult precisely because they arise in situations that matter to us. Thus, emotions already presuppose that the world is meaningful to us; they are predicated on the fact that our existence matters to us. Seen in this light, Sartrean emotions appear to require something like Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit.

The two philosophers are similar, however, in another, more problematic, respect: their accounts portray human existence as overly and almost exclusively negative. If, as Sartre maintains, all emotions (both negative and positive) are solutions to experienced difficulties, then emotions arise only when things go wrong for us. And if we accept Heidegger’s account of anxiety and profound boredom, then affectivity can lead to authentic existence primarily by bringing about a profound crisis of meaning, but cannot do so in extreme instances of joy, love, awe, hope, etc. Both philosophers, it seems, have neglected to investigate into the distinctive nature of positive affective experiences and to explore the transformative power and character of the various differing and subtle shades of affectivity that define our existence. Even if neither one has taken up those
important tasks in any detail, we can. In the case of affectivity, the phenomenological project must carry on.

References


### NOTES

1 The following section is a development of some of our discussion from Elpidorou and Freeman (2015).

2 All references to *Being and Time* will be indicated by “BT” followed by the English and German pagination. The English pagination corresponds to Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of the text, whereas the German pagination corresponds to the seventh and later editions of the text. References to *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* will be indicated by “FCM” followed by the pagination of McNeill and Walker’s English translation and by the pagination corresponding to the German text (second edition, 1992).
In this entry, we are unable to discuss a crucial feature of all three affective states, namely, their temporality. This omission is unfortunate since one cannot fully grasp the significance of fear, anxiety, or profound boredom without understanding how each is related to Dasein’s temporality. For our expanded discussion of the temporality of fundamental affective states, see Freeman & Elpidorou (2015).

We leave Befindlichkeit un-translated because no English term fully and adequately captures its meaning. For a lengthy discussion of this issue, see Elpidorou & Freeman (2015), note 4; see also Thonhauser’s discussion in his contribution on Heidegger in this volume.

In several instances in BT, Heidegger excludes talk from the list of existentials (BT 235ff./191ff., 263ff./221ff., 401/350); in others, he replaces fallenness with talk (BT 172/133, 203/161, 342/296). In BT 384/335, however, he mentions all four.

For an extended discussion of each of these three features, see Elpidorou & Freeman (2015).

Though in BT §30, Heidegger claims that fear is a mood (Stimmung), we hesitate in following his lead. This is because a close reading of this section yields the conclusion that, despite what Heidegger writes, fear more closely resembles what we would consider to be an emotion (an occurrent, intentional state experienced by an agent). Heidegger himself even confirms that fear is more emotion-like than mood-like (BT 230/185). For a more complete argument, see Freeman (2014, 250-52).

It ought to be underscored that Heidegger is not consistent with the use of his own terminology. He refers to anxiety as both “Grundstimmung” (BT 358/310; see also “What is Metaphysics?” in GA 9) and as “Grundbefindlichkeit” (for example, see BT 179/140, 227/182, 228/184, 233-5/188-90, 321/276, 393/342). Taking some interpretive liberty in the name of clarity and consistency, we will refer to anxiety as “Grundstimmung.” This is because the way that Heidegger describes it—namely, as a profound experience that brings us closer to authentic existence—it only makes sense for it to be a Stimmung (or experience of mood) and not a Befindlichkeit (structure of existence). This is because we cannot directly experience structures of existence. Moreover, there are a number of parallels between anxiety and profound boredom and the latter, according to Heidegger, is also a Grundstimmung and not a Grundbefindlichkeit.
For a more robust consideration of profound boredom, in addition to the other two forms of boredom, see Elpidorou & Freeman (in press).

All references to Sartre’s *Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions* will be indicated by STE followed by the pagination of the English translation.

Sartre draws a distinction between two types of emotions on the basis of whether the transformation happens on account of our own doing or not (STE 57). The issue is discussed in detail in Elpidorou (2016).

A more detailed presentation of Sartre’s account of emotions can be found in Elpidorou (2017).

Sartre considers only one possible expression of passive fear (i.e., fainting), thereby neglecting to consider other expressions of this emotion. In fact, the most prominent expression of passive fear is freezing. To use Sartre’s own example, upon encountering the predator or ferocious beast, one would very likely and at least initially freeze: one would remain motionless and orient oneself with respect to the threat. Although it is easy to see how fainting could solve the difficulty that gives rise to fear—indeed, fainting appears to be a solution to *every* conceivable difficulty that one may experience—it is not obvious how freezing could offer us a solution. What exactly is the magical transformation that such behavior brings about? And how does it negate the perceived threat? Given that Sartre does not discuss this issue, the onus of explication falls on commentators (see Elpidorou 2016).