In *How We Hope: A Moral Psychology*, Adrienne Martin not only insightfully advances the philosophical literature on hope, but also, maybe more importantly, provides substantial food for thought to anyone whose philosophical interests encompass desires and motivations.

Martin’s aim is to develop and defend a superior alternative to the ‘orthodox definition’ of hope, according to which hope is a desire for an outcome coupled with a belief that the outcome is neither impossible nor certain. In her view, the orthodox definition cannot adequately account for even trivial hope (like hoping that the bus is on time), let alone ‘hope against hope’, which is hope for something one sees as both highly valuable and highly unlikely (like hoping that a cure for one’s terminal disease becomes available before one succumbs to it).

While Martin identifies and builds on key insights from the recent works of Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Ariel Meirav, all of whom recommend improvements to the orthodox definition, she ultimately finds each of their proposals unsatisfactory as they stand (Chapter 1). Similarly, she positions her view as a better alternative to the ends-setting conception of hope suggested by the work of Margaret Urban Walker and Victoria McGeer, according to which hoping is ‘setting the end of pursuing the hoped-for outcome’ (p. 64), as well as Cheshire Calhoun’s version of the orthodox definition (Chapter 3). Martin does, I believe, improve upon these.

Martin’s primary challenge to the orthodox definition focuses on its inability to make a crucial distinction in the following kind of case. Two people in similar situations, with identical desires, who assign identical probabilities to their desired outcome, can differ in their hopes. Specifically, one can hope against hope for an outcome (saying, ‘It is unlikely, but possible’) while the other can despair of it, lack hope, or hope more weakly (saying, ‘It is possible, but unlikely’). Since such people’s desires and probability assignments are identical, the orthodox definition cannot capture the familiar distinction in their responses. To allow for the distinction, Martin’s strategy, which I endorse, is to defend a syndrome account of hope, according to which hope is made up of ‘distinct but related elements such as feelings, modes of perception and thought, and motivational states’, not just a belief and a desire (p. 6).
One key move in her analysis is her choice to focus on hope’s relation to motivation (Chapter 2). She rejects both Humean and rationalist theories, each of which posits a single source of motivation, namely desire or judgment (respectively), and advocates for a Kantian, dualist alternative to those monist options. This dualist view allows for both (a) representing outcomes as attractive and (b) representing features of outcomes (including one’s attractions to them) as providing reasons to pursue those outcomes (or not). These are, respectively, subrational and rational motivational powers.

So Martin’s analysis of hope is like the orthodox definition in requiring that the hoping person assign a probability of between 0 and 1 to some outcome. It differs in that, instead of simply saying that the hoping person desires that outcome, Martin says both that the person (a) is attracted to it and (b) judges there to be adequate reasons to think, feel, and do certain things that are focused on or directed toward it. Furthermore, the hoping person represents their subjective probability assessment as licensing them to take their attraction as a practical reason. The hoping person’s making those judgments about reasons is described as ‘incorporating hope’s other elements into one’s rational schema of ends’ (p. 8), a process which, Martin argues, is governed exclusively by practical norms and which unifies hope’s elements into a genuine syndrome, rather than a mere random collection.

An illustrative example might be useful. On Martin’s view, since I hope that *Citizens United* will be overturned, that means that not only am I subrationally attracted to that outcome, but I also make judgments about what that attraction gives me reason to think, feel, and do. For example, I might judge that there are adequate reasons for me to feel joy when imagining the ruling being overturned, for me to spend time strategizing about how to get it overturned, and so on. Moreover, part of why I make those judgments is that I take my subjective assessment of the probability that the ruling will be overturned as giving me a sort of permission to use my attraction to that outcome as a practical reason.

After defending the core of her view, Martin argues that (a) the value of hope, though often real, is more contingent than many people realize or admit (Chapter 3), (b) there is a type of hope, akin to faith, that is uniquely and non-contingently able to protect us from despair and disappointment, which does not, however, presuppose any religious commitments (Chapter 4), and (c) there is also a specifically normative kind of hope that we can place in other persons, which involves relating to them as rational agents, not by holding them responsible, but rather by assessing them in light of aspirational principles (Chapter 5).
The book’s greatest strengths are its clear, relatively jargon-free prose; its substantive discussion of key works from the history of Western philosophy and contemporary philosophical and psychological research on hope; and its engagement with familiar real world cases of hope in health-related and political contexts. Of particular practical importance are Martin’s critiques, grounded in empirical psychological research, of the visualization techniques touted by some career advisors, counselors, and prosperity gospel devotees as means of attaining one’s hoped-for outcomes (p. 94). I also particularly enjoyed thinking about Martin’s dualist account of motivation, which I expect to continue thinking about in relation to theories of emotion and moral responsibility.

However, I want to flag some potential worries, primarily because others might want to give them careful attention from their own perspectives, not because I can fully explore them here or think that they necessarily constitute major flaws. For instance, surely some people will want to defend the monist accounts of motivation that Martin rejects, and further debate about that will be crucial, given that the success of her account of hope depends on the success of her underlying dualist view of motivation.

Another potential worry is about an apparent tension in Martin’s view regarding our ability to neatly categorize mental states. On one hand, she expresses skepticism about the possibility of a theory of emotions that could unify them all into a single type, and therefore eschews the term ‘emotion’ whenever possible (p. 24, n. 27). Her comments on this could be read as saying that emotions (probably) cannot be neatly separated from other mental state types. Similarly, Martin expresses misgivings about the standard division of mental states into cognitive and conative categories, on the grounds that ‘the licensing stance’ does not aim to fit the world, nor move us to make the world fit it (p. 52). If this is correct, then our ability to tidily categorize mental states (at least using certain familiar categories) is less robust than we might think.

But on the other hand, throughout the crucial second chapter about the incorporation element, Martin relies on the notion that we can fruitfully divide mental states into types, and familiar ones at that. For she repeatedly emphasizes that she is discussing what it takes for mental states to be successful instances of their types. She wants to be able to sort mental states into types (she mentions beliefs, intentions, judgments, pains, and attractions), and then sort those types into those that can and cannot appropriately be assessed in light of norms of rationality. For she needs mere attractions and pains to fail this test, and the others to pass, in order to maintain her distinction between subrational and rational motivational states. But it is at least not obvious to me that beliefs,
intentions, judgments, pains, and attractions are any more susceptible to being clearly divided from each other (and other mental state types) than emotions, cognitive states, or conative states are.

Of course, anyone will find it difficult to sort mental states into types. But given Martin’s doubts about our ability to do so in some cases, we can question her underlying assumption that we can rise to the challenge in other cases. While Martin may be able to allay this worry, it merits mention insofar as it highlights a potentially productive direction for future research; Martin seems well-positioned to contribute to debates about whether (and which) mental state types have the rigid boundaries describable via necessary and sufficient conditions, especially in light of her defense of a syndrome account.

To close, since Martin’s work can be seen as implicitly challenging philosophers of emotion not only to rethink their use of the very term ‘emotion’, but also to engage more deeply with debates about motivation, I look forward to reading the literature that is sure to arise in response to this incisive book.

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