The Poem as Icon

A Study in Aesthetic Cognition

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for Donald

without whom, not

Acknowledgments

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

3. The In-visibility of Being

4. The Ontology of Poetic Perception as Iconic of Reality

   4.1 Prosodic structure

   4.2 Prepositional use

   4.3 Concealed images

   4.4 Sound patterning

Chapter 4 Metaphor

1. Metaphor as Actual World Formation

2. Metaphor as Possible World Formation

3. Metaphor in the Literary Arts

4. The Semeosis of Poetic Metaphor

5. Metaphoring as Cognitive Processing

6. The Hierarchy of Cognitive Metaphoring

7. The Ontology of Poetic Metaphor

8. The Role of Metaphor in Poetic Iconicity

Chapter 5 Schema

1. Probing Sensate Cognition

2. Schema as Correlation Between Self and World

3. Schema as Constraint on Experience

4. The Role of Schema in Imagination and Language

5. Schema as Internalizing Sensate Structure in Poetry

6. PATH and VERTICALITY Schemata in Li Bai's *Shudaoan*

7. The Poetic Use of Schema

Preface

This book is the culmination of many years of reading and research in an attempt to understand the nature and significance of poetic creativity. It brings together several strands of my thinking as it has developed over time through various presentations at conferences and invited lectures and in articles that have appeared over the past few years. I have benefited immensely from the innumerable authors I have read, only some of whom I cite in this book, and I am grateful to the many friends and colleagues who have inspired and encouraged my work in the past, both by their constructive criticisms and their suggestions for further readings that have led me into new and ever broadening territories of linguistics, semiotics, philosophy, phenomenology, theory of art, cognitive science, cognitive poetics, and aesthetics. To name all who have inspired me would take a book in itself.

The challenge I have undertaken in presenting my theory to a wider audience inevitably leads to an uneven technique, precariously balanced as it is between the demands of rigorous scholarship and the accessibility of disciplinary terminology. As a result, I have appended a glossary of terms to help the reader understand the ways in which I am using such terminology to develop my argument. Several friends and colleagues have helped me in the writing of this book. Amy Cook, Gudrun M. Grabher, Kimberly Grogan, Emmylou Grosser, Connie Kirk, Karin Kukkonen, Greg Mattingly, Margaret McBride, Jeff Morgan, and Elizabeth Shively gave me useful suggestions on individual chapters. Sandy Denis and Lynn Perry stalwartly read through each chapter draft to show me where my writing was too dense or problematic. Leslie Clark read through the entire manuscript and pointed out places where I could improve the presentation of my thoughts and organization. If there are places I fail to make my point clear, it is not due to their lack of diligence. I thank them all.

I recognize that I am presenting an extremely simplified and ahistorical account of complex theories. My justification in doing so is to avoid philosophical–historical tangents that would muddy the main force of my argument. If this results as a fresh (or at least re-visited) view of age-old problems and solutions, then I shall have succeeded in what I have set out to accomplish.

CHAPTER 1   POETIC COGNITION

My strategy in this study is to lay out a theory of poetic iconicity by building an analysis of the major elements that contribute to the potentiality of a poem becoming an icon. This chapter prepares the groundwork by discussing the nature of human sensate cognition in its relation to the being of reality and introducing a theory of aesthetic cognition that places poetic cognition as a subcategory within its interdisciplinary field. I begin with the central question of how poetry achieves the felt experience of the essential being of reality that poets and writers throughout the centuries have claimed for their art. In order to establish a "new world view" of aesthetic cognition and poetic iconicity, I redefine the shifting meanings of terms from various disciplines.

This study is an attempt to resolve long-standing questions of poetic function from a cognitive perspective. My objective is to show how poetry, as one expression of the aesthetic faculty, potentially enables us to cognitively access and experience the "being" of reality, all that is and is not, both seen and unseen. Just as the far reaches of the visible and invisible worlds are experienced through scientific knowledge, so are they experienced through artistic feeling. Scientists and poets are not pursuing different realities: they are pursuing them from different perspectives. Human cognition thus has different aspects and functions, whether scientific, poetic, linguistic, sensate, and so on. Underlying all is the aesthetic faculty, defined, not in terms of taste, beauty, and pleasure in the arts, which are simply products of the aesthetic faculty, but as the cognitive processes of memory, imagination, attention, discrimination, expertise, and judgment. Just as scientists construct models of reality and then test their validity in order to achieve knowledge, so iconicity, I argue, is the means by which a poet enables hearer/readers to respond affectedly to a poem as an icon of the experienced reality of being.

The greatest puzzle of written language is how we are able to translate physical markings on

a page into comprehensible language that enables us to think and feel, imagine and experience

elements of the natural and social worlds. For the literary arts, while writers in past ages and

across cultures have felt it sufficient to describe, in quite similar terms, their impetus and origins,

only with the rise of the cognitive sciences in the twentieth century have they found it important,

even necessary, to explore more deeply into the cognitive dimensions of not just what the literary

arts are, but how they become to be what they are, both from the perspective of their creators and

from those who experience them. For instance, Archibald MacLeish (1960) examines comments

from the third century Chinese poet, Lu Chi, and the nineteenth century English poet, Samuel

Taylor Coleridge, to ask these fundamental questions:

> How, for example, is it possible, by any means of meaning, to carry world across
>
> into mind *whole* in all its complexities? How can boundless space actually be
>
> enclosed in a square foot of paper? That it can be we have not only Lu Chi's
>
> assertion but Dante's *Comedy* to attest, and yet—how can it? And how can deluge
>
> pour from the inch space of the heart? Rimbaud has done it, but how has it been
>
> done? (9)

Responding to Coleridge's (1951[1817]) famous statement in *Biographia Literaria* on the nature

of poetry, that the power of the imagination "reveals itself in the balance or reconcilement of

discordant qualities: [...] a more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order" (269),

MacLeish asks:

> But if the reconcilement exists in the poem then the things reconciled must exist
>
> there also—the "more than usual state of emotion" and "the more than usual
>
> order." And it is this suggestion that tempts the pursuer of poetry out to the

crumbling edge of caution. If the order and emotion are there in the poem

awaiting reconcilement *where* are they in the poem and how did they get there?

(43)

Anticipating the cognitive revolution to come, MacLeish makes an interesting concession about the limits of the poet: "These are dark and difficult questions which involve speculations no practicer [*sic*] of the art of poetry is in a position to pursue: they require new philosophical examinations—revolutionary aesthetic theories—scientific experiments by the masters of the new sciences" (47). Although this might be a rather ingenuous statement—after all, poets from every age and every cultural tradition have made insightful observations on the causes of poetic effects, and literary critics and philosophers from Aristotle and Lu Chi on have weighed in on the question—it is true that a shift has occurred that invites more rigorous investigation based on Western scientific methodology into what is still generally accepted as the mystery of the arts. This, inevitably, has given rise to tensions, not between artists and scientists, but between scientists and critics of the arts, reflected in the distinction made between science and aesthetics.

The natural sciences focus on the nature of physical reality, aesthetics on the science of cognition. Even though cognitive researchers have challenged Descartes' model of self and world as two distinct substances, *res cogitans* (mind) with no extension in space, and *res extensa* (material objects) with both mass and extension, we still trap ourselves into theoretical formulations that carry underlying assumptions of such divisions. Language, as Wittgenstein noted many years ago, both constrains and enables our world perception. We now talk of "the embodied mind," thereby still maintaining the mind as a substance, an object.[1] "Mind" is a nominalization that reifies the activity of "minding," turning it into a thing that can be put into or

taken out of another thing. In beginning to address MacLeish's "dark and difficult" questions, we need to expose and challenge the premises on which we found our enquiries.

An eliminativist materialistic view of the world would argue that only objects that have both mass and extension (*res extensa*) exist. This view underlies much recent work in the neurosciences that explains human consciousness and subjectivity in neurobiological terms so that they become organs of the brain. When I argue that there is "no such thing as mind," I do not subscribe to the notion that the brain is responsible for all our activities. As Thomas Fuchs (2018) so succinctly puts it, "the brain becomes the organ of the mind—but the mind is not 'in the brain,' for *it is the overarching manifestation, the gestalt, and the ordered patterns of all relations that we have to our environment as animate beings, and as humans to our fellow humans*" (207; original emphasis). The brain is thus an organ of the person, not vice versa. My use of the word *minding* is the term I adopt for the cognitive (sensory-motor-emotive-conceptual) processes of the living human being. Although we have an "introspective sense of mind," to use Mark Turner's (1996) phrase, it is, to continue his comment, "a loose fantasy. Consciousness […] shamelessly represents itself as comprehensive and all-governing, when in fact the real work if often done elsewhere, in ways too fast and too smart and too effective…." (6) That work, Turner writes, produces meanings that "are not mental objects bounded in conceptual places, but rather complex operation of projection, binding, linking, blending, and integration over multiple spaces" (57). Those operations, I will show, are primarily preconscious.

Addressing graduating philosophy students at the University of Manchester, Dorothy Emmet, Sir Samuel Hall Professor of Philosophy, said: "Whatever else you are, I hope you will not leave this University as naïve realists." I wondered at the time why Emmet would reduce something that seemed, after four years of immersion in philosophy, so obvious to us. Her statement has

never left me, and I have come to understand the wisdom of her parting words. She was in effect

using Occam's Razor to cut to the very heart of the philosophical enterprise.[2] We had been

taught that all invention, all discovery, must start from some axiom or other. Science starts, as

Alan Sokal (2000) has expressed it, from the axiom that objective reality exists: "There *is* a real

world; its properties are *not* merely social constructions; facts and evidence do matter" (51).

Ironically perhaps, religion also starts from a similar axiomatic premise: that there *is* a God. As

Carl Sagan (2007) once put it, "I would suggest that science is, at least in part, informed worship."

The worlds of science and religion in their very different ways open up our minds to the idea

of worlds of abstraction, beyond the senses. The discovery of atomic time, in its unvarying

precise oscillation, replaces the concept of earth or solar time by which we have recorded time

for centuries. Atomic time is a move toward abstraction, away from the identification of time

passing that is more closely linked to our senses, time as recorded by the diurnal movement of

the earth and sun. Religion depends on another kind of abstraction, in its belief in the immaterial,

the world of the spirit.

The aims of philosophers and poets are different. Philosophy begins where science and

religion stop. By questioning the basic axiom of objective reality, philosophy opens up through

logic the possibility of alternative worlds. Poetry differs from philosophy in that poetry's truths

come from empirical, not logical, knowledge, so that, as Wallace Stevens (1951) notes, "they are

pursuing two different parts of a whole" (54). That "whole" is, I believe, the underlying nature of

"being." Through cognitive analysis, one may begin to answer MacLeish's questions about how

poetry does what it does. However, I go one step further to ask what is poetry's significance in

bringing world whole into mind, enclosing space on paper, and pouring deluge from the heart?

Accordingly, my objective in this study is to show how poetry may enable us to iconically access and aesthetically participate in that underlying nature in all realms of human experience.[3]

1. Iconicity and the Being of Reality

I came to the theory of poetic iconicity by noticing several recurring factors in studies of literature and cognition. If one considers the comments made by poets and writers throughout the ages, a common element surfaces, in spite of the very different perspectives and genres in which they are writing. They speak in terms of poetry as a "vision of reality" (Yeats 1918: 13), of "things in their thingness, of *Dinge* in their *Dinglichkeit*" (Ransom 1938: 112-13), "the object as it really is" (Eliot 1964: 82-83). Anthony Hecht (1995) speaks of poetry as capturing "the rich complexity of actuality—the unsimplified plenitude of the objective world" (130). These writers suggest that poetic art has the capacity to conjure up the feelings of experiencing the concrete, precategorial world, as it is before minding conceptualizes it. Joseph Conrad, in his preface to *The Nigger of the Narcissus*, expresses succinctly this notion of poetic art:

> A work that aspires, however humbly, to the condition of art should carry its
> justification in every line. And art itself may be defined as a single-minded
> attempt to render the highest kind of justice to the visible universe, by bringing to
> light *the truth, manifold and one, underlying its every aspect*. It is an attempt to
> find in its forms, in its colors, in its light, in its shadows, in the aspects of matter
> and in the facts of life, what of each is fundamental, what is enduring and
> essential—their one illuminating and convincing quality—*the very truth of their
> existence*. […] All art, therefore, appeals primarily to the senses, and *the artistic
> aim* when expressing itself in written words *must also make its appeal through the*

senses, if its *high desire* is to reach *the secret springs of responsive emotions*. […]

My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the written word, to

make you *hear*, to make you *feel*—it is, before all, to make you *see*. That—and no

more, and it is everything. (Zabel 1947: 705-708; my emphases)

Conrad's task is what Shklovsky (1965) calls making "the stone stony" (12). As Aristotle (1995)

first argued in Chapter 9 of his *Poetics*, whereas discursive language abstracts from the

particularities of reality to capture what they have in common, aesthetic language does the

opposite: it captures the essence of the particular individuality of experienced reality, the "being"

of reality. The term *being* in its broadest sense refers to that which exists or is conceived of

existing, either material or immaterial; in narrower terms, being is the "essence" of reality. In

poetic iconicity, being is understood as both the "anima" of organic systems and the "essence" of

what makes a rock a rock. In this sense, particular creations of human cognitive activity may

become icons of the essence of reality.

Elżbieta Tabakowska (1999) makes the following point about iconic relations:

Traditionally, it has been generally assumed that iconic relations are

one-way processes: from expression to concept. However, if we agree

that the ability to recognize a given similarity results from the language

user's knowledge of a given culture and language, then we can also

reasonably assume that the process may be reversed: via the (linguistic)

convention, the user of language might associate (by recognizing

relevant similarities) certain expressions with certain concepts, and in

consequence arrive at a certain view, or interpretation, of reality. (411)

The suggestion that Tabakowska makes here—that iconicity has something to do with the way we perceive reality—reflects the direction I take in defining what I mean by poetic iconicity. Just as a material artifact may be an icon of something beyond itself, so may particular elements of human institutions, such as culture or society, become icons of something beyond themselves. Thus sunshine laws and town hall meetings are icons of democratic principles; Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech in 1963 and Barack Obama's speech in 2015 on the plight of black women are icons of the balanced scales of racial, economic, and social justice.

I thought of similar statements made by writers over the centuries that art grasps the ineffable, the unseen, the inexpressible. Yet art is concrete, individual, expressive, emotive, descriptive, affective, subjective. How can art be at the same time concrete and express something that is abstract? Archibald MacLeish (1960) identifies the poet's work as follows:

> The poet's labor is to struggle with the meaninglessness and silence of the world
> until he can force it to mean: until he can make the silence answer and the non-
> Being BE. It is a labor which undertakes to "know" the world, not by exegesis or
> demonstration or proofs but directly, *as a man knows apple in the mouth*. (9; my
> emphasis)

MacLeish's (1952) poem, "Ars Poetica," expresses the same principle:

> A poem should be palpable and mute
>
> As a globed fruit
>
> […]
>
> A poem should not mean
>
> But be.

By bringing a poem into being, the poet enacts a manifestation of that which is created: the primordial experience of the essence of being that underlies the structures of reality. This reality, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962[1945], 1968) notes, is usually "in-visible" to us, not as absence or void, but as being hidden in the visible but always present in the moment. The sense of our inherence in the world, our experiencing ourselves in the present moment, is described by Merleau-Ponty (1968): "[T]he presence of oneself to oneself, being no less than existence, is anterior to any philosophy, and knows itself only in those extreme situations in which it is under threat: for example, in the dread of death or of another's gaze upon me" (404). At moments of great emotion we are made, if only momentarily, self-aware of our being as part of the primordial being of "presence." This awareness creates the possibility of iconicity in the arts: the relation of creative human expression to the presence of experienced reality. In preparing to explore that relation, the following sections briefly discuss the nature of the cognitive self, the roles of science and aesthetics, and the need to establish appropriate terminology for the interdisciplinary fields concerned in an aesthetics of cognition.

2. Toward a Theory of Aesthetic Cognition

With rapidly increasing neuroscientific developments in knowledge about the workings of the human brain and similar developments in psychology about the mind, cognitive scientists no longer assume that the arts are beyond scientific reach.[4] Yet, in applying methodologies appropriate to the natural sciences, problems surface. Consider, for example, Van Gogh's comment to a friend, Émile Bernard, on his painting, *The Garden of Saint-Paul Hospital:* *"*You'll understand that this combination of red ochre, saddened with grey, of black lines that define the outlines, this gives rise a little to the feeling of anxiety from which some of my

companions in misfortune suffer" (qtd. in Kimmelman 2015: 24).[5] His painterly observation—

that grey can sadden red ochre, that these, combined with the "black lines that define the outlines"

can create feelings of anxiety, and that Bernard will understand this affect—strikes at the heart of

what it means to experience the painting. Yet it does not tell us *how* such painterly features can

evoke, even "a little," the feelings experienced by Van Gogh's companions. Presumably, such a

claim could be empirically tested, but problems remain. To what extent would a quantitative

result tell us anything about how the human mind can emotionally feel such visual affects?

Would we need a statistically sufficient number to assure us that such affects are indeed

realized? More than 90%? Why not 50%? Or indeed, if just one observer records such a response,

why wouldn't that be a valid confirmation of Van Gogh's point?

　　One could envision our empirical researcher turning to fMRI technologies to determine if the

painting triggers reactions in certain areas of the brain linked to sensory perceptions and

emotions, but again, how far would that take us?[6] Neuroscientists have discovered that certain

synaptic pathways in the brain develop their use depending on exposure to environmental

experience, so that every human brain is slightly different.[7] It should come as no surprise that a

fellow painter, an art historian, a frequent art gallery/museum visitor, or a person with no

experience of art at all might have very different responses to Van Gogh's painting, not to

mention the vagaries of human attention affected by mood swings or what one had for breakfast.

　　Yet another problem surfaces in considering Van Gogh's comment. One important

component of scientific methodology is replicability: the importance of getting the same results

from a particular study, if repeated exactly. Water will always boil at the same temperature,

assuming no additives and no change in elevation from sea level. The catch is in exact repetition.

Art is unique. Like language effects in poetry, there is no one-to-one correlation between using

grey and red ochre together that would create a feeling of sadness. It must, as Van Gogh reminds us, lie somehow in the *combination* of features in the painting: semiotic signs—in this case visual—that can, I shall argue, be shown to create iconic semblance with their subjects. MacLeish makes the same point about poetry. It is not the sounds alone in a poem that create an emotional affect, but rather the sounds together with the poem's images, its syntactic patterns, its metaphors, its subject matter. The challenge lies in determining how these combinations work to evoke affective response. Nor are the sensory-motor-emotive processes of sensate cognition that created the poem or painting necessarily replicable for their respondents.[8] In the case of a painting especially, any empirical test would have to be conducted, as some experiments have done, with observers of the painting *in situ*, and not a representation of it, whether online or in an art book, for it is the qualities of texture, brush strokes, and so on, even the way the painting is displayed, that contribute to an observer's affective response (Robinson 2005).

When it comes to poetry, the problems are compounded. The sensory-motor-emotive (sensate) affects of a poem lie not only in the poem's images but especially in its prosody: metalinguistic features of pattern and repetition, the inflections of the spoken voice, that are only partially represented in written form by word choice and order and punctuation. Paying attention to interpreting a poem without considering its prosody can lead to missing its sensate affects and therefore to a misreading or misevaluation of the poet's intent, understood, not in the sense of communicative intention, but rather in the sense of intensity, or intension.

A question remains: has a scientific approach anything to say about the arts that has not already been documented by experts? Artists and students of the arts have for centuries made insightful comments about the nature of art in its many manifestations. Such comments reveal sophisticated and deep knowledge. Often missing, however, is explicit illustration of the

evidence for such observations or analysis of the ways art achieves such effects. In a review of

Other Flowers: Uncollected Poems by James Schuyler, Dan Chiasson (2010) makes the

remarkable and noteworthy observation that "Schuyler found for memory and remorse their

exact angles of repose" (45).[9] Since no examples are given, one would need to read Schuyler's

poems to take an educated stab at what Chiasson might be referring to, and even then, the ways

Schuyler achieves such "exact angles of repose" may not be self-evident.[10] The term *angle*

implies visual perspective; *repose* a certain stillness. Are the angles of memory and remorse to

be understood as separate effects, as the plural use of *angle* may suggest, or as interrelated axes?

Chiasson's phrase is striking and memorable; it evokes Emily Dickinson's lines, "Remorse - is

Memory - awake -" (*H57, F781/J744*), "Experience is the Angled / Road" (*H175, F899/J910*),

and "Repose to typify" (*A191, A831, A66, F895/J1068,1775*), but it is by no means evident that

Dickinson's use of these terms is equated with or different from Schuyler's.[11]

    It is this kind of explanatory omission—explicatory example, evidence, and evaluation—in

literary criticism that studies in aesthetic cognition seek to remedy. In its descriptive mode,

aesthetic cognition as applied to poetry is no different from literary hermeneutics, or "close

reading." Where it differs is in its focus on providing explanatory methodology for poetic effects

and a theoretical basis for poetic evaluation. In order to do so, aesthetic cognition reaches out

beyond the text itself, not only as biographical, historical, sociological, or psychological analyses

do to provide relevant contextual evidence for the content of art, but to the dynamic workings of

human minding itself as it encompasses feelings aroused by sensory-motor-emotive impressions

in formulating its conceptualizations of human experience. Culture, life experience, historical

data, and so on, are from this perspective necessary subsets of the larger domain of creative

human expression in its relation to experienced reality.

One area that offers possibilities for probing more deeply into finding evidence for poetic effects is neurological cognition (neurocognition for short).[12] One Spring day, a volunteer working on the Bridge of Flowers in Shelburne Falls, Massachusetts commented that a tune she'd heard on the radio while driving to the bridge was still running through her head. Others joined in: how invasive that could be, they said (they are gardeners, after all). Why, they asked, does the brain tend to run in such grooves? Neurocognition is still in its very early stages of scientific development. It has been shown, for instance, that the left hemispheric brain of musicians is more active when listening to music than the right hemisphere of non-musicians' brains. But what would be the result of experiments designed to test ways in which musical experience and expertise might give us further insight into brain function? Do brains react differently when music is experienced through manual manipulation of an instrument in performance as opposed to listening to recorded music? Are different brain functions engaged in creating and listening to classical, rock, heavy metal, or new wave music? What is the role of memory in responding to music? Technology is not as yet advanced enough to adequately answer these questions; fMRI scans still provide only the roughest of indications as to what might be happening in the brain. Nevertheless, as science develops the tools to delve further into the workings of the brain, these questions might one day be answered.[13]

The preceding discussion raises a significant point. Science cannot proceed without instruments to probe and test hypotheses. Think of Galileo's telescopes, the electron microscope, the CERN reactor. In this sense, Giambattista Vico's (1948 [1744]) admonition in the eighteenth century that we cannot know the causes of something that we haven't ourselves made can be seen in a somewhat different light. Vico was comparing Cartesian science with his "new science" of human culture (M. Freeman 2011). The two sciences are alike in creating human artifacts,

material or immaterial. Their difference lies in the purposes for which such artifacts are made.

Scientific instruments are designed to discover knowledge about the natural world, cultural

instruments to simulate human relationships with and responses to the natural world. In the

plastic arts, the instruments are material: wood, clay, concrete, steel in sculpture and architecture;

oils, watercolors, canvas, parchment in the visual arts; brass and other metals, wood, ivory, skin

in music. In other arts, the instruments are more closely related to the human body: muscular

movement in dance, vocal chords in singing and oral poetry. Literature lies at the interface

between artifact and body: the development of ink, pencil, paper, and later, computers, cameras,

film are at the service of language, which emerged in the development of human cognition.[14] The

choice of medium in the arts, like that in the sciences, both enables and constrains their practice.

Another potentially productive area of aesthetic cognition is evaluation. Is it merely a matter

of sensory taste, as claimed in the well-worn phrase, *de gustibus non disputandum* ("there's no

quarreling over taste")? Or is Baumgarten's (2007[1750]) "taste" to be understood rather as

discrimination?[15] What or who decides whether a novel is good, or even great? Is *Catcher in the

Rye* great as some say, or sophomoric as others do? Why do some readers think *Grapes of Wrath*

one of the best books ever written, while literary critics tend to relegate it to the good-but-not-

great category?[16] Ever since Immanuel Kant (1911[1790]) added judgment to the definition of

aesthetics, the question of evaluation has been problematic in discussions of the arts, even though

art connoisseurs are generally, though not infallibly, expert in distinguishing between the

mediocre and the good. Obviously, there has to be a difference between questions of taste, which

are indeed personal and individually idiosyncratic, and the larger questions of what makes art art,

and how there can be some consensus about what is good—or even great—art. I suggest that

"taste" and "beauty" are by no means the (only) relevant criteria in answering these questions. Taste, beauty, and pleasure are produced by, not constitutive of, the aesthetic faculty.

Some consensus exists—even if not universal, more so among experts—that one can probe into the question of why some artistic products have universal validity while others don't. What is it that experts "know" that enable them to pass judgments on artistic quality? If some are occasionally mistaken, is all evaluation thereby rendered suspect? These are not new questions. They have been puzzled over and debated for centuries. Time, in fact, has been one determinant in the argument for quality: Shakespeare is great because he still speaks to us through the ages and across languages and cultures. But this leads us no closer to what it is about Shakespeare that makes his works endure. We are still faced with the conundrum of exactly why Shakespeare's works are more highly considered than Christopher Marlowe's or others' among his contemporaries. Missing in better understanding these factors of aesthetic cognition is a clearer exposition of the terminology we use and the assumptions that underlie our thinking.

3. Developing a Multidisciplinary Terminology

The need for redefining terminology becomes clear when one considers the use of the term *cognitive* as an adjective to describe certain contemporary disciplines. In its broadest sense, "cognitive" applies to all activities of human minding, so that it is redundant: all such research is cognitive. Using it as an adjective is understandable in cognitive science, since it distinguishes the sciences of the mind from the natural sciences. Cognitive linguistics was developed in reaction to early formulations of Chomskian linguistics that predicated a separate syntactic module in the brain specified for language, whereas cognitive linguists understand language function as distributed. However, both claim the label *cognitive*. By reversing adjective-noun

phraseology, the various cognitive disciplines may be seen more correctly as different modes of viewing the same cognitive faculty, whether they are linguistic, psychological, social, neurological, scientific, aesthetic, and so on. For this reason, the use of *cognitive poetics* is similarly problematic, and I therefore now adopt *poetic cognition* as a more accurate description.

As a subcategory of aesthetic cognition, poetic cognition has the potential to provide a theory and methodology in establishing the nature of poetic effects and relating them to human cognitive processes. However, like all interdisciplinary endeavors that attempt transdisciplinarity in their applications, "where both disciplines are borrowing and lending" (Callies et al. 2011: 3), such research is still in its very early stages. Simon Penny (2017: 427-433) notes that interdisciplinarity is inherently unstable. It comes into existence as new world views begin to emerge, and moves toward the formation of a new discipline. It is characterized by the temporary adoption of terminology from concepts developed in various disciplines, terminology which inevitably loses the rigor of its original formulation as it embraces phenomena from environments different from those in which it was first employed. During this stage, meanings themselves become unstable, a condition which marks Penny's (2014) first stage in the life history of a discipline:

1. the stage of half-formed vocabulary and vague promises;

2. the stage in which ideas from various fields are interfaced, and new relationships and distinctions are built, out of which, assiduously and incisively, a new vocabulary, reflective of a new world view, is built;

3. the stage when this vocabulary is deployed by members of the group in order to conduct sophisticated and dense discourse(s). In this stage the

       epistemological history of these terms is shared knowledge and the terms

       operate as shorthand;

4. these terms, rather than standing for a history of research and debate become

       reified, and, for instance, are written about in textbooks and taught, to a new

       generation of students who take these ideas as axiomatic ground-level realities.

       As a result, terminology so rigorously developed in 2+3 become like magical

       incantations full of presumed meaning;

5. the stage of paradigmatic failure, where problems arise which often appear to

       need, i.e., only technical or methodological tweaks, but as problems progress,

       turn out to be problems in principle. The explanatory power of the paradigm

       comes into question and interrogation, internal and external begins. Return to

       1 and repeat.

Penny's stages are not quite so rigidly defined as a discipline develops in actual practice, when traces characteristic of different stages may occur at the same time. Nevertheless, Penny's stages are helpful in providing a rough outline of the life cycle of a discipline.

    Poetic cognition as an emerging discipline has reached the second stage, in which its terminology is still fluid. This fluidity arises from several sources that reflect different stages in Penny's life cycle. Sometimes it results from drawing upon terminology that has special meaning in another discipline. Isomorphism is a case in point. Originally understood in the natural sciences as referring to different organisms with the same structure, the term was adopted in literary criticism to correlate content with form, thus leading to the misleading assumption that form and meaning are somehow separable elements as two different organisms are. In cognitive

linguistics, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1999) have been at pains to maintain the

original distinction, and that distinction becomes important for poetic iconicity.

A different kind of problem arises from assumptions that underlie terminology across

multidisciplines. The human tendency to reify (make objects), through grammatical

nominalization, out of what are events, activities, or processes results in conceptual

categorizations that obscure the preconscious processes of sensory-motor-emotive experiences.

Tsur (2008) argues that one crucial function of poetry is to access these subliminal processes by

delaying categorization. Only when we can pierce through the reification of such concepts as

mind or *metaphor* to see them as active processes of minding and metaphoring are we able to

perceive their specific cognitive functioning.

Terminological fluidity in stage 2 may also result from adopting terminology that has already

reached stage 4 in its original discipline. Many terms in literary criticism, such as *aesthetics*, or

mimesis, from the original Greek, are taken as axiomatic givens, "full of presumed meaning."

When a word gets translated, it tends to change meaning. For instance, in Thomas à Kempis's

fifteenth-century treatise, *Imitatio Christi*, the Latin meaning of *imitation* meant following the

precepts of Christ by doing what he did. First recorded in English, according to the *OED*, in the

sixteenth century, its verbal form, to *imitate*, still carried the active concept of following by

doing. However, its English reification in nominalized form took on the more modern notion of

copying by representing behavior or attitude rather than action, and even the idea of being

counterfeit, thus raising the paradigmatic problems characteristic of Penny's stage 5 for its

unexamined use in stage 4.

The word *cognitive* is a case that reflects the paradigmatic failure of stage 5. That is, broadly

speaking, the term refers to mental processes. In the past, these have been restricted to

conceptual reasoning, excluding the preconscious processes of motor functions, sensory impressions, and emotive motivations. However, the development of brain research in the neurosciences and the work of cognitive psychologists increasingly point to the integral part sensate cognition—the sensory-motor-emotive faculties—play in the workings of human "minding" (M. Freeman 2009). Fuchs (2018) notes: "Perception, attention, action, planning and motor execution crucially depend on *conation*, that is, vital functions such as arousal, vigilance, drives, and basal motivational, and affective states, which are mainly tied to centers in the brainstem and diencephalon, and which energize all higher functions of consciousness" (111). The conative function thus results from the living organism's anima and underlies the sensory-motor-emotive faculties. Such developments in understanding the nature of cognition guide and constrain the deployment of the term *cognitive* in poetic cognition.

A similar problem exists with the term *aesthetics.* From the Greek αἴσθησις, meaning perception, understanding, discernment, it has been restricted in the modern period to the study of taste, beauty, and pleasure in the arts. The aesthetic faculty, however, is a fundamental aspect of cognition that concerns applications of memory, imagination, attention, discrimination, expertise, and judgment in all aspects of human activity, including the natural and humanistic sciences. The problem with using words that carry such pre-assumed baggage suggests that new terminology needs to replace them in order to prevent misunderstanding. Such a proposal, however, seems improbable, if not impossible, to achieve.

These examples of terminological fluidity and reification are just a few of the terms used, often without definition, in the practice of poetic cognition, and which give rise to the lack of a common understanding of otherwise misleading claims. Accordingly, I append a Glossary that defines how I use such terminology in the context of poetic iconicity. Each chapter revolves

around particular terms that are functional elements within the theory of poetic iconicity, and

applies them to various poetic examples, recognizing, however, that the whole is always more

than the sum of its parts. The challenge for poetic iconicity, as MacLeish noted, is to characterize

the ways in which poetry is able to "carry world across into mind *whole* in all its complexities."

4. Overview of Chapters

Developing a theory of poetic iconicity involves exploring the various meanings attributed to the

term *icon*. I start, therefore, in Chapter 2 with a functional definition of the poetic icon that draws

from several different sources: Charles Sanders Peirce's (1935, 1938) semiotic theory, in

identifying icon at the first, immediate level of experience; cognitive linguistics, in the ways

language shows iconic effects; religion, in its connection of the ikon [*sic*] to religious experience;

and popular usage, in its dependence on affective response. I then revisit certain Western

presuppositions of meaning by functionally redefining the relation of form/diagram to

content/image on the one hand and verbal activity to nominal objectivity on the other in order to

lay the groundwork for my argument that iconicity is the means by which a poet enables

hearer/readers to affectively respond to a poem as a semblance of felt reality. I end with

discussion of the ways iconicity has been understood in literary criticism with examples of

sound-sense iconicity in poems by Alexander Pope and Wallace Stevens, syntax-sense iconicity

in a poem by John Keats, and consideration of Lakoff and Turner's (1989) description of iconic

mapping in poetry.

   Merleau-Ponty's (1962, 1968) phenomenological research into precategorial experience of

the in-visible being of reality and Susanne K. Langer's (1953) theory of semblance in art

constitute the subject matter of Chapter 3. Semblance provides the ontological underpinning of

iconicity that relates it to the experienced world, or, as Henry James put it, "felt life." The choice

of the term *semblance* is deliberate. My aim is to avoid plunging into the long history of debate

over the meaning of mimesis in order to simply present a theory of semblance that is functionally

descriptive of the way in which poetry, as in all the arts, gives us insight into the phenomenal

existence of both self and world. In so doing, I take up the Eastern idea of language as

manifestation. Through this insight, we are able to experience how a poem can iconically enact

the essence of being that underlies our conscious awareness. I show how poems by W. S.

Merwin, Wallace Stevens, and Brendan Galvin create such iconic semblance.

For an artifact—any product of human making—to become an icon, it must result from

creating a semblance of something separate and beyond itself, whether material or immaterial.

Thus, metaphor is basic to iconic creation. In chapter 4, I consider metaphor as process as well as

product in order to understand its role in poetic iconicity. First, I lay the groundwork for a

cognitively oriented view of metaphoring by discussing two contrasting views of what happens

when one either takes metaphor literally or sees it as a model of reality. By adopting a cognitive

view of embodied subjectivity, I suggest a more interconnected and integrated approach to self

as part of world. I then introduce the notion of metaphoric processing as a hierarchy of linguistic,

conceptual, and sensory-motor-emotive levels, and compare my view of metaphorical function in

poetry with Peircean-influenced approaches. Finally, I build on the model of blending to explain

how metaphor functions in the creation of a poetic icon with analyses of poems by William

Blake, Emily Dickinson, and Sylvia Plath.

For a poem to become an icon of the being of reality, more than simply linguistic and

conceptual elements are at work. Underlying conceptual metaphors are embodied schemata that

constitute the basis for metaphorical mapping. I discuss in Chapter 5 the structural aspects of

schemata, as Mark Johnson (1987) has identified them. An example from a poem by the T'ang

dynasty poet Li Bai shows how sensate impressions are governed by schemata. The role of

schema underlying metaphor is evidenced by Elżbieta Wójcik-Leese's (2010) analysis of poetry

by Elizabeth Bishop. By exploring the structural role such schemata play in the corpus of two

poets, Emily Dickinson and Robert Frost, I identify what differentiates their poetics.

Next, I take up in Chapter 6 the question of prosodic affect, the subliminal sensory-motor-

emotive processes of sensate cognition that, along with conceptual thinking, comprise the

subjective materiality of the poetic text. Such an exploration involves not just the affective

perceptions arising from experiencing the poetic text but also psychological and neuroscientific

research into the existence and function of emotions and sensations in creating human thought

about the external and socio-cultural worlds. The synaesthetic integration of the sensory-motor-

emotive elements of sensate cognition is shown most clearly through the sonic and structural

prosodies of poetry, evidenced in a poem by William Carlos Williams and an English translation

of one by the T'ang poet Wei Ying-wu. These stylistic features establish the affective tone that

establishes a poet's intent and guides a respondent's experience of a poem, as revealed in a poem

by Thomas Hardy. The chapter concludes with a prosodic analysis of affect in a poem by

Wallace Stevens.

I turn in Chapter 7 to my argument that poetry achieves the semblance of felt life when it

becomes an icon of the being of reality. My discussion of poetic examples from Robert Frost,

Wallace Stevens, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Horace Smith, and Rainer Maria Rilke thus draws all

the elements together in showing how iconicity is the motivating force for poetic creativity in

both poet and respondent.

In chapter 8, I place poetic iconicity within the larger context of aesthetic activity by

exploring the assumptions that underlie the use of the term *aesthetics* in historical and contemporary discourse. I show one means by which poetry can be read aesthetically by comparing two translations of a Martial epigram. Poetic evaluation is addressed by looking at two poems by Thomas Hardy and Matthew Arnold. An analysis of another Arnold poem on the nature of aesthetics shows how the poet creates the poem as an icon of felt reality. I conclude by suggesting that the arts are the ultimate manifestation of a general understanding of aesthetics that underlies all human cognitive processes by introducing qualia, discrimination, and value into a more comprehensive theory of the relation between self and world.

In an Afterword, I return to the themes of the introductory chapter. The question of how it is possible for human minding to encompass the in-visible reaches of the world is placed in the context of a never-ending exploration, in both the sciences and the arts, into the mysteries of being. Like Langer before me, I believe that such exploratory research might contribute to a more general aesthetic theory of the arts, and of the sciences as well, in order to understand the complex nature of human cognition.

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1. Shaun May (2015) makes a similar observation on notions of the mind interacting with the body:

> Of course, we can ask what needs to be the case—both physiologically and neurologically—for us to be able to do something, but not 'how the mind and body interact' whilst we are doing it. At least on some articulations of these views, the hypotheses of the 'brainbound mind', the 'embodied mind' and the 'extended mind' commit the same logical mistake—thinking that talk of the mind being located anywhere is coherent. (58)

2. Historically, philosophical tradition has been divided into two conflicting ideas, neither of which are tenable according to the cognitive theory I follow: *naïve realism*, which assumes that qualia (our subjective experience of color, taste and so on) are, in Fuchs' (2018) terms, "objective characteristic[s] of the material world" (25); and *idealism*, which assumes that our perceptions are purely subjective, "from which we can only draw problematic conclusions concerning the reality, in which we believe we are living" (6). In opposition to both, Fuchs argues for the reality of what he calls "mediated immediacy": "[T]he manifold processes of mediation and transformation, which underlie my perception, can also become the foundation of a *shared* reality. They do not merely create momentary glimpses or specters *for me*, but present the objects themselves *for us*. So we can replace the notion of a "naïve realism" by a *realism rooted in the shared lifeworld*." (171; original emphasis)

3. Although I focus on poetry, the possibilities of aesthetic iconicity apply to the arts in general.

4. An excellent survey of scholarship on cognitive literary anthropology and hermeneutics may be found in Abramo et al. (2017).

5. An image of the painting can be seen at http://www.vggallery.com/painting/p_0659.htm.

6. Such investigations are not without merit. In Spring 2017, the opera singer Renée Fleming participated in an fMRI experiment in which her brain scans showed different activities depending on whether she was speaking, singing, or just imagining singing. (Jangraw 2017) More regions of the brain that include emotion, motion, and vision became active when Fleming was *imagining* singing, an intriguing discovery for the way imagination evokes sensate cognition.

7. Fuchs (2018) cites empirical studies in neurological research providing evidence that the brain's neuroplasticity enables cortical reorganizations resulting from life experiences.

8. Roman Jakobson (1960) cites Anton Marty's (1908) preference for the term *emotive* over *emotional*: "The so-called EMOTIVE or 'expressive' function, focused on the ADDRESSER, aims a direct expression of the speaker's attitude toward what he is speaking about. It tends to produce an impression of a certain emotion, whether true or feigned; therefore the term 'emotive,' launched and advocated by Marty (**269** [*sic*]) has proved to be preferable to 'emotional.' […] The emotive function, laid bare in the interjections, flavors to some extent all our utterances, on their phonic, grammatical, and lexical level." (354)

9. Chiasson made his comment in reference to many of the poems in this posthumous collection. He expresses interest in a volume "that made explicit those distinctions between good and bad implied by Schuyler's original exclusion of these poems: tell us what makes a good Schuyler poem different from a bad one. Make a guess about why these 163 poems didn't make the cut. And are some better than others?" (44). One ought to be able to do more than "make a guess" in evaluating the good, bad, and indifferent in these poems. Aesthetic cognition is an attempt to do just that.

10. The phrase *angle of repose* was first recorded in Loudon (1833) "where the courses lie at an angle of about thirty-two degrees, or what is called the angle of repose for masonry" (*OED*). It refers to an angle at which permanent stability can be achieved, depending on the construction materials used.

11. Emily Dickinson did not publish her poetry nor give her poems titles. Poem numbers refer to the R. W. Franklin 1998 (*F*) and Thomas H. Johnson 1955 (*J*) editions. All quotations in this volume are based on the manuscript copies held in various archives, the majority being at Amherst College (*A*) and the Houghton Library (*H*).

12. The term usually used for exploration into the arts from a neurological perspective is neuroaesthetics. Controversies over neuroaesthetics arise from reaction to researchers who claim (or at least imply) that brain activity alone accounts for artistic activity, as though the self were simply a function of brain processes (as much research in cognitivist neuroscience assumes). One doesn't have to accept this premise to recognize that neurocognition has a role to play in our understanding of the ways we respond to art (see note 7).

13. A useful survey of recent work in neurocognitive responses to poetry may be found in Jacobs (2017).

14. N. Katherine Hayles (2017, 2018) explores "cognitive assemblages": distributive systems that coordinate cognitive activity across machines and humans.

15. Scruton and Munro (2018) note that Baumgarten understood taste, not as the sensory faculty per se, but rather in terms of discrimination and evaluation in general. See their article in *Encyclopedia Britannica* for an extensive survey of aesthetics.

16. My example concerning Salinger's and Steinbeck's novels comes from John F. Dacey (2010) in Lowell, Massachusetts who writes that Steinbeck's book is "a true classic" and "has been my all-time favorite book ever since I first read it in the mid-1960's" whereas Salinger's book is "a pretender," in which the title "is as pointless as the rest of the book" (4).

CHAPTER 2 ICON

I begin my exploration into poetic iconicity by considering the nature of an icon and how it has been understood from the perspectives of semiotics, religion, linguistics, and popular discourse. All four contribute to a theory of aesthetic iconicity which depends functionally upon their shared features. I then take up two problematic issues in the question of "meaning" by revisiting the existence of cognitive economy through reification and the form-content dichotomy in order to place them in the context of iconicity in the arts. I end with a general overview and some examples of the way iconicity has been applied in literary critical approaches to poetry. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the main features that constitute poetic iconicity.

The word *icon* comes from the Greek εἰκών, meaning image or likeness. Its usage included pictorial representation, naming, and description. Plutarch's notion of *eikon* in *Moralia* is especially relevant for modern interpretations whereby an icon stands for the immaterial, with the Sun as body/sight/light related to the soul/mind/truth of Apollo, the god of the sun, knowledge, and the arts (King 1908):

> For though the eye possesses the power of vision, there is no employment of it
>
> without the light; similarly the prophetic faculty of the soul, like the eye, stands in
>
> need of *something of its own nature* to assist in grasping objects, and to sharpen
>
> its force. For which cause, most of the ancients supposed *Apollo to be the same*
>
> *with the Sun*, and they that understood and admired the beautiful and ingenious
>
> comparison, guessed that *what body is to soul, sight to mind, light to truth—the*
>
> *same is the Sun to the nature of Apollo*; his offspring, and his child, perpetually
>
> born of "Him that is," perpetually reflecting the author of its being; *for it kindles,*

promotes, and stimulates the power of vision of the sense, just as he does the

prophetic faculty of the soul. (XLII: 125; my emphases)

The relation of the eye to light and the Sun to Apollo is not simply one of analogy, but of a

necessary connection, where the *embodiment* of eye and sun "reflect[s] the author of its being."

These, in turn, provide an apt analogy for the need of the immaterial soul to be embodied in

"something of its own nature" to exercise its "prophetic faculty." The perspective of Plutarch's

comment suggests that knowledge of the immaterial cannot occur without its embodiment in

something that contains its own qualities; hence one becoming an icon of the other.

The Christian era gave especial significance to the usage of *icon* (spelt *ikon*) as signifying the

material representation of the immaterial. Instead of representing just a likeness, this meaning

embodies the sense of a "living image," an "embodiment," or a "manifestation" (Kittel and

Friedrich 1964: 76). Semiotics, linguistics, and popular discourse have further refined the notion

of an icon. Such interpretations reflect certain presuppositions in Western philosophy about the

relationship between mind and reality. To understand the nature of poetic iconicity, therefore, I

first present my definition of an icon in poetry and then address two practices affecting that

relationship: turning the processes of action into the materiality of object and separating form

from content. The final sections introduce the notion of iconicity in the arts with examples of

how it has been employed in literary criticism.

1. What Is an Icon?

The term *icon* is used somewhat differently in semiotics, religion, linguistics, and popular

discourse. However, they have certain features in common. Ontologically, they all connect a

product of human cognition, whether language, art, artifact or institution, with some aspect of the

experienced world, material or immaterial. They all adopt the condition of meaningful

significance to someone. And they all allow for the possibility of evaluation, whether something

is or isn't iconic. To understand the particular form that poetic iconicity takes as opposed to other

aspects of these four approaches, the following sections explore these various concepts of an

icon in some detail.

1.1. The semiotic icon

In semiotic theory, signs are by definition meaningful, and exist, according to Charles Sanders

Peirce (1935, 1938), at three levels of representation: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. These

modes of representation mark the scalar movement of the sign from concrete to abstract.[1] That is,

the icon reflects the concrete experience of the subliminal senses, the index operates at the

conceptual level, and symbol represents the sign in a conventionalized or abstract manner. All

three forms participate and interact in an actual sign. In this Peircean sense, the visual image

conveyed in the portrait of my mother is iconic. Because it points to the actual person of my

mother, it is indexical, existing at Peirce's second level of representation. The portrait itself is

symbolic by virtue of the genre and style in which it is painted.[2] In discussing the icon, Peirce

(*CP* 2.276) addresses its potentiality and its structure:

> A possibility alone is an Icon purely by virtue of its quality; and its object can
>
> only be a Firstness. But a sign may be *iconic*, that is, may represent its object
>
> mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be
>
> wanted, an iconic representamen may be termed a *hypoicon*. Any material image,
>
> as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in itself,
>
> without legend or label it may be called a *hypoicon*.

Peirce's definition focuses on what an icon does, not what it is: action, not object, evidenced by

his hypothetical: "If a substantive [*that is, a noun*] be wanted." The idea that a pure icon exists

only as possibility is important for understanding poetic iconicity as a process, not a product, of

aesthetic activity. Peirce's (*CP* 2.277) description of the hypoicon is enigmatic:

> Hypoicons may be roughly divided according to the mode of Firstness of which
>
> they partake. Those which partake of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are
>
> *images*; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the
>
> parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are *diagrams*; those
>
> which represent the representative character of a representation by representing a
>
> parallelism in something else, are *metaphors*.

Peirce is obviously struggling, in the repetitions of *represent*, to express his understanding of

metaphor.[3] But note his reference to "something else." For poetry, "something else" is not

simply mapping across domains on the basis of an existing similarity. It is an emergent structure,

something beyond what is manifested on the surface. That "something else" is what makes a

poem an icon of experienced reality. While it is beyond the scope of my thesis or my knowledge

to explore in detail Peirce's semiotic theory, the way I understand the role of metaphor in poetic

iconicity differs from other interpretations of Peirce's enigmatic statement about metaphor.

    An anonymous reviewer clarified Peirce's hypoicon by citing the *Oxford English*

Dictionary's entry for *hypo* as meaning "in a lower relation, in a lower degree, slightly,

somewhat, a little":

> Peirce uses the prefix in this context in the sense of an icon that is not a "pure" but
>
> iconic "to a lesser degree". Hence, the hypoicon is opposed to the notion of a
>
> "pure icon". A hypoicon is not a "pure icon" when it contains some ingredient of

indexicality (insofar as it may have a real "referent", depicting something that

really exists). A hypoicon may also be an icon that contains an ingredient of

symbolicity. For example, a painting of a certain style embodies the conventions

of this style. Signs based on conventions ("habits") are symbols in Peirce's

definition. Despite their indexical or symbolic ingredients, hypoicons are not

indices or symbols because their element of iconicity is predominant. […]

Metaphors, diagrams, and images are most certainly hypoicons, and hypoicons

are most certainly icons (and not indices or symbols). They are less "pure icons."

One might also call the[m] "hybrid" icons.

Likewise, Michael Cabot Haley (1988) notes:

Peirce explained that a pure icon (a pure resemblance) can only be a possibility,

not an actuality; but an actual sign 'may be *iconic*, that is, may represent its object

mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being' (*CP* 2.276). Such an

iconic sign, which represents its object mainly by resemblance to it, Peirce named

a *hypoicon*. We may thus think of the term as referring to any actual embodiment

of an icon proper. (19)

Commenting on Peirce's hypoiconic passage, Haley notes: "I believe the statement should not be

taken as a global definition, or even a complete Peircean definition of metaphor. Rather, we

should keep in mind that Peirce was setting out here to classify hypoicons, not to define

metaphor […]." (19) Images, diagrams, and metaphors are not *examples* of Firstness, but are

"partakers" in the various modes of Firstness which exist on the three levels of similarity, index,

and symbol, as Haley's exposition makes clear (36-38). This is how I understand them. They are

iconic, but not, in my theory, icons in themselves. The fact that a poem, as generally for all the

arts, can become an icon points to the potentialities, not actualities, of Peirce's "pure icon."

Iconicity is structurally complex (Emmorey 2014). I distinguish between elements that carry

iconic traits and iconic elements that are used purposively to create a poem (or any art form) as

an icon. This distinction depends on the way metaphor occurs in poetry as opposed to

conventional usage. I understand the Greek word *hypo* in its meaning of "below" or "beneath."

So, for me, hypoicons *as they occur in art forms* are not icons in themselves, though they are

iconic. Like an atom, the underlying structure of a poetic icon is complex, not simple. A poetic

icon occurs through the *integration* or "blending" of hypoiconic modes—metaphor, image,

diagram. To make my case, I draw upon the use of the term *icon* as it occurs in linguistics,

religion, and popular discourse as well as in semiotics.

1.2. The religious icon

In religion, and customarily spelt with a "k," an icon in Christian Orthodox practice is a picture,

bas relief, or other representation of Christ, the Virgin Mary, or the saints, *through* whom the

believer may seek divine consolation. A religious icon thus connects a material artifact with the

immaterial, reflecting the development in Christian thought most closely connected with

Plutarch's idea, in equating the sun with Apollo as "the author of its being," of an affective

connection of shared nature between sensory perception and abstract concept. This connection is

not one of representation but of identity, with the god present in his creation. Heidegger (1971),

referring to a Greek temple, notes that this connection is *transformative identification*:

> The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their
>
> outlook on themselves. This view remains open as long as the work is a work, *as*
>
> *long as the god has not fled from it*. It is the same with the sculpture of the god,

votive offering of the victor in the athletic games. It is not a portrait whose

purpose is to make it easier to realize how a god looks; rather, it is *a work that lets*

the god himself be present and thus is the god himself. The same holds for the

linguistic work. In the tragedy nothing is staged or displayed theatrically, but the

battle of the new gods against the old is being fought. The linguistic work,

originating in the speech of the people, does not refer to the battle; it *transforms*

the people's saying so that now *every living word fights the battle* [...]. (43; my

emphases)[4]

Theodorus Papadopoulos, a professional iconographer from Greece, describes an icon as a

way of "meeting with the divine": "The icon has as its purpose to transport us into the realm of

the spiritual experience, to go beyond the material world" (qtd. in Burgess 2017: C7).

From this perspective, one can perhaps come to a different understanding of the centuries-old

debate between Catholics and Protestants over the concept of transubstantiation: whether the

bread and the wine in holy sacrament actually become, or are simply a symbolic representation

of, the body and blood of Christ. Neither is true. Rather, the bread and the wine do not in their

materiality actually turn into flesh and blood, nor are they symbols, but icons. When the priest

says, echoing Christ's words at the Last Supper, "This is my body which is given for you; this is

my blood which is shed for you," the linguistic invocation *transforms* the bread and the wine into

icons of God's presence through which communicants might then share in the suffering of Christ

and become united in God's love. This sanctification of the communion wafer is why priests

have to take care that it is not stolen for use in black magic rites. What the religious usage of *icon*

contributes to the theory of poetic iconicity is thus the ability to directly access and emotionally

identify with the presence of the immaterial and spiritual through a material artifact without actually treating them as the same in existential identity.

1.3. The linguistic icon

Iconicity in linguistics focuses on the extent to which features of language, whether phonetic, syntactic, or semantic, reflect or correspond to the metalinguistic elements of prosody, diagram, or image. Iconic representations occur across all dimensions of language: sound (phonology), structure (syntax), and sense (semantics). Although Saussure assumed the symbolic and therefore arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign, current research is uncovering many instances of iconicity in linguistic expression.[5] Symbols, as Peirce noted, have icons and indexes as their components. If all signs are iconic at Peirce's First Level, then language itself must show iconic elements. These linguistic examples of iconicity are metaphorical in nature because they connect different domains on the basis of a perceived similarity. Masako K. Hiraga (2005) gives as an example the computer icon, in which the computer screen itself becomes a "desktop," and its icons of "folders," "trashcans" and so on indicate that users make meaningful connections to enable them to function more easily within the computer interface.

Classic examples of iconic representations in language are the way certain sounds can reflect sounds in the world, as in onomatopoeia, or clusters of sounds become associated with particular meanings, as in words like *sneer*, *snout*, *snort*, *sneeze*, all of which are negatively linked to features connected to the nose. Taking up the challenge presented by the question of sound conveying meaning, David S. Miall (2001) provides empirical evidence that, although "phonemes do not appear to possess a fixed quality that can be translated into literary meaning," nevertheless patterns of phonemic relationships may be found in literary texts (69). Miall (2006) writes: "I will argue that while studies in phonetic symbolism are suggestive, the evidence for

iconic meaning is inconclusive. I will present an alternative framework that I term *phonemic*

iconicity, in which phonemic distributions are shown to systematically embody contrasts of

meaning." (174-175)

In empirical studies of Milton's *Paradise Lost* and Coleridge's "Frost at Midnight," Miall

(2006) discovered reliable phonemic contrasts. In Milton, he found that Hell was characterized

by a greater proportion of narrow front vowels and hard consonants than Eden, characterized by

more open back vowels and softer consonants (183). In Coleridge's poem, on the other hand, the

father's negative experiences of an urban school are marked by more back vowels and unvoiced

fricatives and aspirates, contrasted with his reflections of a positive future for his child in a

natural environment marked by more glides, liquids, and nasals (184). It is therefore the context

in which the phonemic sounds occur, Miall argues, that determines how they signify the quality

of readers' responses:

> Thus, front vowels are able to connote the confined spaces of Hell in one context,
>
> but the feminine qualities of first names in another; plosives tend to characterize
>
> words for smallness, but are also prominent in Coleridge's reports of his negative
>
> experiences in "Frost at Midnight." The specific qualities that emerge from the
>
> array of phonemes in a text depend on the contrasts offered by the text. This, in a
>
> word, is *why such effects can be described as iconic rather than symbolic*,
>
> suggesting a relative rather than a fixed meaning. (188; my emphasis)

In syntax, the length of discourse may reflect the relative distance between speaker and

hearer, as in the contrast between the length of sentences in a formal lecture and the shortness of

sentences in a private conversation (Brown and Levinson 1978), or the order of words can

correspond to order of events, as in Caesar's oft-quoted phrase, *veni, vidi, vici*: I came, I saw, I

conquered. Caesar's words do not merely chronologically reflect the stages of his military expeditions in the order in which they are placed, but reveal a certain pattern of sounds. They are bisyllabic, the opening consonants alliterate, paralleling the assonance of the final vowels, with an internal progression of sounds in vowel transition from [ai] / [i:] to [schwa] and consonant movement from voiced nasal [n] to voiced [d] to fricative [ch], thus phonemically simulating Caesar's military movements (Ungerer 1999).

Iconic representation involves not just linguistic features of sound and structure but also of sense. Semantically, image terms can evoke iconic representations. For instance, "the White House" stands for the executive branch of US government. Emotions can be evoked by image terms. White and Sarkari (2016) published a picture in *Daily Mail Australia* with the accompanying tag: "Australian model Jordan Barrett looks tired and worse for wear slumped against a wall after a big night out with Jesse Somera." The term *slumped* invokes both the sensory position of the body and Barrett's negative emotional feelings that we too can recognize. Such language iconicity can affect the way we perceive and respond to physical events.

1.4. The popular icon

In popular usage, *icon* has yet another meaning that differentiates it from religious practice, Peirce's theory of signs, or linguistic iconicity. According to more popular, psychological notions of the symbolic, my mother's portrait, commissioned by my sister, symbolizes the love she feels for her mother. How successful the portrait is depends on its iconic element. When my niece first saw it, she exclaimed, "That's not Granny!" She did not mean it was a portrait of someone else; she meant that it did not adequately reflect the way she saw her grandmother. Her response indicates that, to become iconic, an image needs to trigger an apposite response in the viewer that captures something beyond the image itself. That something can be material, in the

physical appearance of my mother, or immaterial, in capturing her spiritual quality, or both. Peter

Schjeldahl (2017) expresses this notion of iconicity when he describes William Eggleston's

photographs as "unbeatably intense and iconic: epiphanies triggered by the hues and textures of a

stranded tricycle, say, or of a faded billboard in a scrubby field" (86). Schjeldahl's use of the

term *epiphany,* and his recognition that it is the forms, the "hues and textures" that trigger the

manifestation of something beyond the visible, aptly characterize this meaning of an icon.

In Bill Bryson's (2010) *Icons of England*, various writers describe particular English

artifacts, scenes, events, and so on, that are especially meaningful *for them*. In this sense,

anything *can* be an icon, but only *becomes* an icon for a particular person or group of people

when it carries meaningful significance as being characteristic of something else. If I, living in

Massachusetts, prepare scones with home-made strawberry jam and Devonshire clotted cream,

and invite neighbors in for tea, I have not created an icon of England. For me, a Devon tea

becomes iconic of a certain experience of England when it is served outdoors on tables in a

cottage garden in a Devonshire village on a sunny summer's day. In this example, time and place

are as important as the tea for creating an icon. When an object becomes iconic of a place, its

displacement becomes anomalous. It is startling for me to see artifacts of England in

Massachusetts: a red phone booth in the center of Rowe or a red double-decker bus in Boston.

The term *iconic* is now so overused and abused in popular usage that it has become bleached

of meaning, a clichéd expression, standing in for what people really mean, whether that meaning

involves something being prototypical, important to them, in some way significant, or simply

recognizable. In order for something to become truly iconic in the popular sense, it must exist

over time, undergo repetition, become accepted beyond the personal as carrying significance for

a group or nation. In this way, the Eiffel Tower becomes iconic of Paris, yellow checkered

taxicabs iconic of New York City, the Statue of Liberty iconic of America. As Jeff Berkowitz,

the developer of SkyRise, a new hairpin-shaped tower for Miami, Florida, noted: "I can hold up

a handful of architectural icons from throughout the world and you would identify the city in a

heartbeat." Berkowitz even anticipates that his tower will be iconic: "Miami is on the precipice

of becoming a world-class city and *one of the goals* is an iconic structure" (qtd. in Olorunnipa

2015; my emphasis). Berkowitz's comment highlights iconicity as a *motivating* factor in

architectural creativity, an aspect that is important for understanding the nature of poetic

iconicity. Places themselves can become iconic of something else. When New York City became

"the Big Apple," a term denoting musicians' lingo for outstanding performance, it captured

people's idea of the city as the ultimate example of great city living. The popular meaning of an

icon thus carries the notion of affective meaningfulness.

2. The Slippery Slopes of Meaning

Meaning, however, is not something that resides automatically in a sign, whether material or

linguistic. We *construct* meaning from the signs that appear to us. Traditional grammar

distinguishes between a word's denotative—its "literal" or dictionary meaning—and the

connotative—the associations and implications a word carries with it. For cognitive scholars, this

distinction no longer holds. Meaning is encyclopedic: that is, any language utterance is

meaningful only in the context of its situation, culture, and intentions of both speakers and

hearers. Cognitive scholars understand that meaning does not reside *in* language, but is rather

constructed by the speaker/writer and reconstructed by the hearer/reader *through* language signs

within the context of social and cultural networks.

Language is symbolic but that does not mean it is totally arbitrary. For instance, the English color word *red* is arbitrary, since it takes different forms in different languages and is applied to different hues and tints, but its network of meanings and significances is not.[6] Its Indo-European roots *reudh-, rudh-* indicate both the color and the Sanskrit term for blood, and its metaphorical associations of physiological, sensuous, and emotional affects give rise to the network of potential meanings reflected in the phrases in (1) – (8).

1.   the red-faced farmer (complexion from outdoor living)

2.   she reddened with embarrassment (blush from emotional reaction)

3.   caught red-handed (discovered doing something wrong, causing possible shame)

4.   the red planet (physical appearance named for Mars, the god of war)

5.   the red badge of courage (martial reference associated with blood)

6.   the Red Army (associated with the red flag of revolution, denoting blood)

7.   my love is like a red, red rose (heart as seat of emotion, associated with blood)

8.   a red-light district (indicative of prostitution, with sexual innuendo)

Such metaphorical transformations have significant consequences for the way we conceptualize the world and create material artifacts as icons. Meaning becomes a slippery slope when we take for granted underlying assumptions we make. For beginning computer users, the use of the word "document" for envelope can be confusing. Since the original MAC trashcan also served to eject discs, some MAC beginners were reluctant to eject a disc, thinking they were throwing it away. Consequentially, MAC engineers transformed the trashcan icon into an eject button when discs were moved to it. Such underlying assumptions can lead to errors of comprehension, with misleading consequences for the way we conceptualize our world. Two

general assumptions need to be examined and refined to understand the relation of iconicity to

meaning: the practice of reification through nominalization and the relation of form to content.

2.1 Reification as cognitive economy

The term *reification* comes from the Latin word *res* for "thing" or "object" and *facere* "to make."

In language, we reify when we turn action or event into a thing by grammatically nominalizing,

turning verbs into nouns. When we do so, we are exercising what psychologists call cognitive

economy: "the tendency for cognitive processes to minimize processing effort and resources"

(Colman 2008: 144). It would be impossible, for instance, to have an intelligible conversation

about taking a train to visit family without having the use of a noun phrase like *train journey,*

even though what it is in effect describing is a series of activities (deciding on the means of

travel, going to the station, buying a ticket, getting on the train, and so on). Such nominalization

brings complex processes down to human scale. The collapse of several dynamic activities into

one conceptual idea is a crucial development in the evolution of human cognition, enabling such

processes as categorization, generalization, and personification. However, there is both an

advantage and a price to pay for doing so. By turning action into object, it enables us to

transform a general notion like *leaping* into a specific example of a *leap* that can be identified,

categorized, and described. But it opens us up to the reification error of assuming its existence as

materially substantive, not processive. This error is most marked when considering the question

of cognition. When we adopt the word *mind* for the activity of cognitive processing, we begin to

think of mind as an object, an existing entity that can be separated from the body. This was

Descartes' error (Damasio 1994).[7] In distinguishing two basic elements in the world as *res*

cogitans and *res extensa*, Descartes made both *res substantiva*, thus turning cognitive processing

into an object, a "thing." As a result, I use the word *minding* rather than *mind* to capture the

activity that occurs in cognitive processing.[8]

An important factor in understanding the nature of the icon arises from the development of

grammatical functions that relate process and product. So, for example, in English, we have *to*

portray / a portrait; *to conceive / a concept*; *to think / a thought*. For some concepts, there is no

morphological distinction between verbs and nouns: *to leap / a leap*; *to doubt / a doubt*; *to mind /*

a mind. Several consequences emerge from the distinction made between verbs and nouns. Liane

Ströbel (2011) points out that in several languages, the strong tendency for using nouns gives rise

to empty verb constructions that make the noun (once a verb) into a predicate. This tendency

Ströbel writes, exists in order

> to create an expressive mental image (image schema, with the help of a
>
> sensomotoric based empty verb) for the recipient/hearer. By doing so, we
>
> underline the relation or strong link between the speaker (X) and the utterance (Y)
>
> (X=Y: I am experiencing doubts, doubts are in my possession, doubts are a part of
>
> me). [...] [T]ests in Romance Languages have revealed that the use of empty verbs
>
> connects the utterance closer to the discourse world, therefore "I doubt" should
>
> have a more general reading or interpretation than "I have doubts," which puts the
>
> focus on the here and now (I have doubts now/concerning a particular situation).
>
> (personal correspondence)

Noticeable in Ströbel's explanation is that the noun predication "I have doubts" gives rise to

conceptual metaphor that enables us to conceive of abstractions in terms of concrete embodiment

(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999): to "have doubts" (object possession); to "keep in mind"

(object possession / containment). When this happens, the element of action or motion underlying the noun form is obscured.

2.2. The form-content dichotomy

Although it is possible to separate form from content, neither can exist without the other. In Western literary tradition, this separation gave rise to the notion of "figures of speech," the notion that literary texts, especially poetry, are differentiated from conventional language by the ornaments and embellishments of special forms. Complicating this point of view is the commonly held assumption that "meaning" equates with "content" (Bolinger 1977). What is missing from this form-content perspective is the realization that meaning arises partially from the form *of* content and the content *of* form. In other words, symbols are indivisible. As Langer (1953) notes: "They only occur in a total form; as the convex and concave surfaces of a shell may be noted as characterizing its form, but a shell cannot be synthetically composed of 'the concave' and 'the convex'. There are no such factors before there is a shell." (369) Wellek and Warren (1956) attempted to resolve the problems raised by the form-content equation by introducing the terms *materials* and *structure*:

> This distinction is by no means a simple renaming of the old pair, content and form. It cuts right across the old boundary lines. "Materials" include elements formerly considered part of the content, and parts formerly considered formal. "Structure" is a concept including both content and form so far as they are organized for aesthetic purposes. The work of art is, then, considered as a whole system of signs, or structure of signs, serving a specific aesthetic purpose. (129)

Terminology that links form to meaning—as in the title of the first volume in the Iconicity Project, *Form Miming Meaning* (Nänny and Fischer 1999)—can imply that form is separable

from meaning, that form can somehow be applied "after the fact" on a pre-existing meaning. Tsur (2008) notes that researchers in iconicity "need the form-content dichotomy, because it enables them to talk about 'iconicity,' that is, to point out that one dimension of the text is similar in some respect to another" (638). This assumption is reflected in Sean Pryor's (2007) statement: "Iconicity assumes a meaning independent of the form" (98). I do not think that iconicity studies "need" the form-content dichotomy.[9]

Subsequently, cognitive linguists took up the issues arising from separating form and content, diagram and image by introducing a different way of perceiving the relations between what we perceive and how we conceptualize. Following Leonard Talmy (2000), I suggest that these should be understood more specifically as *ception* (cept) and *struction* (struct). In pointing out the problematic boundary separation between perception as sensate and conception as cognitive, Talmy writes:

> Accordingly, it seems advisable to establish a theoretical framework that does not
> imply discrete categories and clearly located boundaries, and that recognizes *a*
> *cognitive domain* encompassing traditional notions of both perception and
> conception. […] To this end, we adopt the notion of ception here to cover all the
> cognitive phenomena, *conscious and unconscious*, understood by the conjunction
> of perception and conception. While perhaps best limited to the phenomena of
> current processing, ception would include the processing of sensory simulation,
> mental imagery, and currently experienced thought and effect. (139; my
> emphases)

By fusing the notions of perception and conception, Talmy breaks down the traditional categorial separation of bodily and mental cognitive processes. In doing so, he develops a series of scalar

parameters from concrete to abstract that cross this categorial boundary (140-144). Although

Talmy does not mention proprioception, his reference to "both conscious and unconscious"

phenomena includes also the subliminal sensory-motor-emotive processes of cognition.[10] By

breaking down the barrier between sensate and cognitive, Talmy broadens the scope of human

cognition beyond the simply rational and logical aspects of human reasoning. With respect to the

content-form dichotomy, Talmy notes that a parameter extends from the "substantive make-up"

of an entity to its "schematic delineations":

> While the content end deals with the "bulk" form of an entity, the structural end
>
> reduces or "boils down" and regularizes this form to its abstracted or idealized
>
> lineaments. A form can be a simplex entity composed of parts or a complex entity
>
> containing smaller entities. Either way, when such a form is considered overall in
>
> its entirety, the content end can provide the comprehensive summary or Gestalt of
>
> the form's character. On the other hand, the structure end can reveal the global
>
> framework, pattern, or network of connections that *binds* the components of the
>
> form together and permits their integration into a unity. (142-143; my emphasis)

Talmy's use of the term *bind* is both suggestive and significant. Binding is a theoretical concept

that has two aspects: connection and constraint. An example of binding can be found in the

phenomenon of being "hangry." Occurring below the level of consciousness, physiological

(motor) processes of the digestive system trigger the sensory experience of hunger, which in turn

trigger the emotive experience of discomfort, deprivation, and unpleasantness that can lead to

anger. Jennifer MacCormack and Kristin Lindquist (2018) showed that these subliminal signals

can produce a conscious feeling of anger when placed in a negative context. Cept and struct are

subliminal binding processes that underlie conceptual metaphor mapping processes by creating a

unified integration of the various components of human cognition.

In other words, form and content / materials and structure / image and diagram are antithetical terms for the same fact. As George Henry Lewes (1879) notes, attempting to find a link between them raises the illusion of cause-effect, whereas they are simply "two modes of viewing the same event" (24). The significance of substituting cept and struct for image and diagram is that they are not simply conceptual in nature, but also refer to the subliminal sensory-motor-emotive dimensions of cognitive processing as motivating forces for poetic iconicity.

Noticeable in addressing the problems raised by the principle of cognitive economy and the form-content dichotomy is that we are often unwittingly trapped into theoretical assumptions and presuppositions that underlie such formulations. When were are so trapped, we fail to fully recognize the need to dispense with earlier formulations that depend on conflicting paradigms. In iconicity studies, we need to be wary of such preconceived notions as the mind-body split, reification, and the form-content dichotomy.

3. Iconicity in the Arts

Studies of iconicity in the arts have usually adopted one of two perspectives: iconography and iconology. Iconography refers to the study of a non-arbitrary relation between the elements of the art medium and the images or ideas expressed through them. Thus, in a gospel hymn, the ascending scale of musical notes evoking repetitions of the phrase "We are climbing Jacob's ladder" simulates the ascending movement of the climbers. Poetry can simulate both aural and visual relations, aural as in Tennyson's (1847) lines "The moan of doves in immemorial elms, / And murmuring of innumerable bees" (419), or visual as in Herbert's (1921[1633]: 104) "Easter Wings," where the line arrangements of the poem's two stanzas form the shape of wings.

Iconology refers to the study of the significance of iconographic features in order to understand the principles of societal attitudes underlying them. For instance, Mitchell (2008) explores the elements of pictorial representations of Christ's Passion in the notorious photograph of the Hooded Man of Abu Ghraib that "transform" the photograph "into an indelible icon of what a Christian nation accomplished in its crusade to liberate the Middle East" (86).

Both iconography and iconology are two of the methods by which art forms can become icons of the felt reality of being. In drawing from the ways in which iconicity is understood in semiotics, religion, linguistics, and popular discourse, I develop a theory of poetic iconicity that depends upon understanding the arts as an aesthetic activity that engages both artist and respondent in opening up the potentialities inherent in all creative making. In such poetic perception, as the poet Louise Glück (1994) describes it, "the actively felt rushes to displace the passively unexamined, unsettling everything that has been built on that ground, and the air turns giddy with *possibility*, as though *a whole new territory in the mind has been suddenly opened*" (94; my emphases). Glück's comment suggests that the arts encourage and enable the flexibility of minding, creating new pathways in human cognition that open up ever-expanding possibilities of creativity.

4. Iconicity in Literary Criticism

Poets through the ages have been particularly sensitive to the iconic aspects of language, in sound, sense, and structure. All such elements must participate in creating a poem as icon. A passage from Alexander Pope's (1711) *An Essay on Criticism* that shows how "sound must seem an eccho [*sic*] to the sense" is frequently cited to show how auditory or imagic iconic effects occur in poetry, how the words are saying what the words are doing (Alderson 2001: 17; Meier 1999: 149).[11] Although the articulation of sound is crucial in creating a poem as an icon of felt

reality, sound alone cannot do so, and may in fact prevent it. I once heard an elocution expert

perform a poem. Her elocutionary articulation was so intense that the sounds obscured the sense,

and the poem was lost. In Pope's passage, iconic effects of sound linked to sense occur at the

linguistic level. The poem as a whole, as its title shows, is not about the nature of poetry per se

but an analysis into what distinguishes a good critic from a bad one. Although critics tend to give

examples of iconic effects from just one or two lines, the entire passage makes a crucial point

about the nature of an icon and is therefore worth quoting in full.

The passage is an ironic tour de force of employing iconic elements to criticize those who

value sound alone. Lines 336-356 open with the metrical regularity of iambic pentameter lines in

which stress falls only and always on the even position of the line, broken only by rhythmic

alteration in lines 338, "in the bright muse," and 342, "not for the doctrine," both referring to the

possibilities of true poetry as revealing truth, a metrical contrast that continues through these

lines as the critic judges the triteness of weak poets' use of sound for its own sake:

> But most by numbers judge a poet's song:
>
> And smooth or rough, with them, is right or wrong:
>
> In the bright muse, though thousand charms conspire,
>
> Her voice is all these tuneful fools admire;
>
> Who haunt Parnassus but to please their ear,   340
>
> Not mend their minds; as some to church repair,
>
> Not for the doctrine, but the music there.
>
> These equal syllables alone require,
>
> Though oft the ear the open vowels tire;
>
> While expletives their feeble aid do join;   345

And ten low words oft creep in one dull line:

While they ring round the same unvaried chimes,

With sure returns of still expected rhymes;

Where'er you find "the cooling western breeze,"

In the next line, it "whispers through the trees":   350

If crystal streams "with pleasing murmurs creep":

The reader's threaten'd (not in vain) with "sleep."

Then, at the last and only couplet fraught

With some unmeaning thing they call a thought,

A needless Alexandrine ends the song,   355

That, like a wounded snake, drags its slow length along.

Lines 344 and 346 are most frequently cited as perfect examples of the lines doing what the words are saying. In line 344, the iambic meter is completely regular, with stressed vowels falling on the even positions of the line. The vowel onsets of these positions are preceded by vowel sounds ending the previous position, so that the mouth must remain open across each position:

Though óft the eár the ópen vówels tíre
  1   2   3   4   5   6 7   8 9   10

If you sound out the line, you will feel the exhaustive effort expended in having to keep the mouth open across word boundaries, an effort explicitly reinforced by the most open dipthong in the English language on "tire" in the last position in the line.

In line 346, its ten monosyllabic words fall on each of the ten positions, with eight of them carrying phonetic stress, with the only two unstressed words falling as expected on odd positions

of the line. The words are "low" in both simplicity and inflection, creating a "dull" monotonous delivery:

> And tén lów wórds óft créep in óne dúll líne
> 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 8   9   10

In both these lines as in all of the section, no cross-connection occurs with meaning beyond the sounds and the lines' metrical positions, no reference to a conceptual thought, except for "the last and only couplet fraught / With some unmeaning thing they call a thought" (lines 353-354).

In contrast, lines 357-372 show what a good poet can do with manipulating the sounds of language iconically to link sound with sense of something beyond the language itself:

> Leave such to tune their own dull rhymes, and know
>
> What's roundly smooth, or languishingly slow;
>
> And praise the easy vigour of a line,
>
> Where Denham's strength, and Waller's sweetness join.   360
>
> True ease in writing comes from art, not chance,
>
> As those move easiest who have learn'd to dance.
>
> 'Tis not enough no harshness gives offence,
>
> The sound must seem an eccho to the sense:
>
> Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows,   365
>
> And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows;
>
> But when loud billows lash the sounding shore,
>
> The hoarse, rough verse should like the torrent roar.
>
> When Ajax strives some rock's vast weight to throw,
>
> The line too labours, and the words move slow.   370
>
> Not so, when swift Camilla scours the plain,

Flies o'er the unbending corn and skims along the main.

Each line following Pope's admonition "The sound must seem an eccho to the sense" equates sound with sense as the activities of the wind, the stream, the torrent, Ajax, and Camilla are exemplified in the way the words are working.

Just one example might suffice to show the difference between the two passages. Both end with an Alexandrine, a line of twelve positions, which serve in English poetry to vary the regularity of the iambic pentameter meter of long poems, as in the Spenserian stanza and Pope's own long poems. The tiresome dullness of the thoughtless preference for sound without sense culminates in the "needless Alexandrine" in line 356. The movement of the snake is linked to the slow moving line, rather than vice versa. Sound patterning slows down articulation of the line in the co-occurrence of [k-d-r] in "snake, drags" and places two strong stresses across the caesura, followed by "slow length," thus emphasizing the Alexandrine's extra length. The Alexandrine in line 372 is the precise opposite of the former in its speed, occasioned by the variation of vowel sounds and the compression of two syllables, in "o'er" and "the un," into one position. The reference is to the myth of Camilla, infant daughter of King Metabus who, escaping from his enemies, tied her to his spear and flung her across the river Amasenus while he swam across, thus explaining why Camilla "skims along the main." But why is the corn "unbending"? Sheaves of corn will sway when high winds blow across the fields. Camilla's flight is so swift and light that she is faster and lighter than the wind. Here the line, with its phonetic sound patterning, metaphorically compares Camilla's movement to that of the wind. Whereas the iconic effects in line 356 simply reinforce themselves for their own sake, those in line 372 link sound to sense in a mythical representation of the experienced world.

Wallace Stevens' (1961: 75-76) poem, "Bantams in Pine-Woods," exploits sound effects to iconically represent the Napoleonic bravado of the miniature chicken against its full-grown relative:

> Chieftan Iffucan of Azcan in caftan
>
> Of tan with henna hackles, halt!
>
> Damned universal cock, as if the sun
>
> Was blackamoor to bear your blazing tail.
>
> Fat! Fat! Fat! Fat! I am the personal.
>
> Your world is you. I am my world.
>
> You ten-foot poet among inchlings. Fat!
>
> Begone! An inchling bristles in these pines,
>
> Bristles, and points their Appalachian tangs,
>
> And fears not portly Azcan nor his hoos.

Reading the poem aloud makes us conscious of the sound qualities of its consonants and vowels. In English, the pronunciation of consonants occurs in pairs, such as [p/b], [t/d], [s/z]. The only phonetic difference in each pair is whether the consonant is pronounced with the throat valves open (unvoiced) or closed (voiced). Non-vibrating, unvoiced sounds carry a feeling of sharpness, of tenseness, whereas vibrating, voiced sounds carry a feeling of continuousness, of relaxation. Compare Stevens' poem with the Tennyson's lines, quoted earlier: "The moan of doves in

immemorial elms / And murmuring of innumerable bees." Tennyson's sound is rounded,

unbroken, smooth because of its nasalized voiced consonants and front rounded vowels. The

sound of Stevens' lines is staccato, tense, and sharp because of its unvoiced consonants and the

open tense vowel [æ]. It is important to note, however, in both examples, that it is not the sounds

alone that carry the feelings of aggression in Stevens and peacefulness in Tennyson, but the

combination of sounds with the images presented. To cite just one example: The open tense

vowel [æ] in *bantam*, repeated in "Fat! Fat! Fat!" and several more times in each of the five

stanzas, expands the mouth to its widest point as the "inchling" chicken expands itself to

challenge the much larger "ten foot poet," whereas the short front rounded vowels in the

Tennyson lines are subsumed into the nasalized repetitions of the consonants [m]/[n] and the

fricative [z], onomatopoeically simulating the sounds of mourning doves and bees.

    In the twentieth century, literary critics with specialization in linguistics began to explore the

iconic elements of syntax in particular poems (Fowler 1966; D. Freeman 1970). In his essay on

Keats' ode, "To Autumn," Freeman (1978) explicitly identifies its syntactic strategies as "in

large part" iconic (17, note 21). The poem opens as follows:

> Season of mists and mellow fruitfulness,
>
> Close bosom-friend of the maturing sun;
>
> Conspiring with him how to load and bless
>
> With fruit the vines that round the thatch-eaves run;
>
> To bend with apples the moss'd cottage-trees,
>
> And fill all fruit with ripeness to the core;
>
> To swell the gourd, and plump the hazel shells
>
> With a sweet kernel; to set the budding more,

> And still more, later flowers for the bees,
>
> Until they think warm days will never cease,
>
> For Summer has o'er-brimm'd their clammy cells.

With a detailed syntactic analysis, Freeman shows how the surface structure of the parallel phrases VP PP NP ("to load and bless / with fruit the vines") transforms the actual agents as subjects—fruit loading vines, apples bending trees, ripeness filling fruit, kernels filling gourds and plumping hazel shells—into instruments as objects, so that a process of nature is given a cause: the season of autumn "conspiring with" the sun to cause the fruit to load, the apples to bless, etc. Freeman concludes: "the sun can be seen, in the poem's grammar, as a meta-instrument for Autumn, the ultimate agent of all the natural forces in the poem" (10). He then shows how the rest of the poem's syntax and semantics "reinforce the autonomy and power of Autumn as avatar of the imagination. Autumn controls and impels the process of fruition: transient natural states are made permanent processes in Art by the agency of Autumn *qua* Imagination" (10-11). One is reminded of Plutarch's image, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, where the sun becomes the embodiment of Apollo, as the power of vision needs light. Just as an immaterial force needs embodied materiality, so the embodied materiality becomes an icon for that force. Freeman notes:

> [I]n "To Autumn" we have a poem ostensibly about autumn that is really a poem about the poetic imagination; that, further, the poetic imagination is for Keats *a reciprocal force* between poet and reader located in the poem's syntax; that, finally, in the idealized act of reading the poem—that is, of *internalizing* its syntactic patterns—we *resynthesize* the imaginative act which created it. (3; my emphases)

Lakoff and Turner (1989) further explore the notion of iconicity in poetry with a detailed analysis of William Carlos William's poem, "To a Solitary Disciple" (140-159). They conclude their discussion as follows:

> What we have here is an image-mapping based on structure—in this case structure that is in part metaphorically imposed. When such a mapping exists between the structure of a sentence and the structure of the meaning of the image that the sentence conveys, the mapping is called "iconic." This is, in general, what iconicity in language is: a metaphorical image-mapping in which the structure of the meaning is understood in terms of the structure of the form of the language presenting that meaning. Such mappings are possible because of the existence of image-schemas, such as schemas characterizing bounded spaces (with interiors and exteriors), paths, motions along those paths, forces, parts and wholes, centers and peripheries, and so on. When we speak of the "form of language," we are understanding that form in terms of such image-schemas. (156-157)

In summary, iconicity is the process by which a product of human cognition, such as language, art, artifact, or institution, may become an icon, material or immaterial, that enables respondents to construct access to and affectively connect with something beyond itself. From semiotics, it takes the notion of an icon as complex structure, consisting of metaphor, image (cept), and diagram (struct). From religion, it takes the idea of how one might access the immaterial and spiritual from the material. From linguistics, it takes the relations of sound, structure, and meaning as possible non-arbitrary relations. From popular discourse, it takes the idea of affective significance. For the arts, creating a material artifact, or embodying movement in the body as in dance, is a means by which the processes of imaginative creativity are made

manifest in such a way that they become an icon of respondent affective reciprocity between the material and the immaterial.

Each chapter that follows addresses one feature of iconicity's operation in poetry. As these chapters spell out those processes in detail, the question of aesthetic evaluation becomes a matter of whether the art work achieves its status as an icon of something beyond itself. In this way, art works, given the varied possibilities that exist in individually experiencing and interpreting them, come closest to Peirce's notion of the "pure icon" that exists only in potentiality.

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1. Harri Veivo (2001) clarifies the point that icon, index, and symbol do not indicate a typology of signs but are rather interacting *modes* of signification: "A single sign always has features of symbolicity, indexicality and iconicity" (85).

2. I am grateful to Christina Ljungberg for this clarification of the Peircean symbolic (personal correspondence).

3. Commenting on the mammoth task of comprehending the enormous quantity of Peirce's writings, Haley (1988) writes that "my objective is not to present the final word on Peirce's conception of metaphor (which would be a rather un-Peircean thing to try in any event), but to present my own rediscovery of metaphor from the fresh perspective of a Peircean semiotic" (xii). Likewise, I do not attempt here to pre-empt Peircean scholarship, but rather to acknowledge my debt to the Peircean semiotic in drawing my attention to the roles of metaphor, image, and diagram in Peirce's definition of a hypoicon.

4. Heidegger's comment that the sculpture "lets the god himself be present and thus *is* the god himself" reflects Giambattista Vico's (1948 [1744]) view in *Scienza Nuovo* that for "the first men" Jove *is* thunder (M. Freeman 2011).

5. Most notable in this respect are the studies published in John Benjamins' *Iconicity in Language and Literature* book series sponsored by the Iconicity Project (www.iconicity.ch).

6. According to the cognitive psycholinguistic theory of fuzzy categorization (Rosch 1973; Lakoff 1987), such semantic networks indicate that the polysemous nature of lexical usage arises from conceptual associations developed over time according to Wittgenstein's (1953 §65-71) theory of family resemblances. See, for example, Adam Głaz's (2002) monograph on the conceptual domain of EARTH.

7. It is not clear that Descartes himself made this error. See the discussion in Chapter 4 on taking metaphor literally.

8. A comprehensive discussion of the reification of mental representations as treated by "the standard view" in the cognitive sciences can be found in Zahnoun (2018).

9. The many studies of iconicity in literature are illuminating and valuable (see, for example, Olga Fischer's, Winfried Nöth's, and Max Nänny's articles in Nänny and Fischer 1999 and 2001, among many others) as one reviewer noted. However, the form-content dichotomy obscures the integrative factors at work in human cognitive processing.

10. Damasio (2010) adopts the term *exteroception*: sensing the exterior through smell, taste, touch, vibration, hearing, and seeing. (51)

11. The quotation from Pope owes its source to his marking the following lines in his copy of Ben Jonson's poem, *Eupheme*: "when the Sound had parted thence, / Still left an Eccho in the Sense" (Mannheimer 2008: 152). Jonson's lines occur in a section that characterizes the mind's nature as best revealed through the language of speech. Jonson's doubling of the letter *c* in the word *echo* is an iconographic sign of its repetition of sound.

CHAPTER 3   SEMBLANCE

I start my investigation into the various features that participate in poetic iconicity by taking up the notion of semblance: the ontological underpinning of iconicity that relates it to the experienced world, or, as Henry James put it, "felt life." The choice of the term "semblance" is deliberate. My aim is to avoid plunging into the long history of debate over the meaning of mimesis in order to simply present a theory of semblance that is functionally descriptive of the way in which poetry, as in all the arts, unites our inner selves with the phenomenal world by opening up the essence of being that underlies our conscious awareness. The ways in which poems create semblance are manifold and varied, as indicated in my discussions of poems by Brendan Galvin, W. S. Merwin, and Wallace Stevens.

Studies of all the arts contain two elements crucial to poetic cognition: the role of feeling and the role of mimesis, or as I prefer to call it, semblance. As Langer (1953) has extensively argued, artistic creation is the semblance of felt life "through forms symbolic of human feeling" (40). Poetic iconicity is the means by which poetry creates in language that semblance of felt life: the sensations, emotions, and images that enable both poet and respondent to encounter and experience them as phenomenally real. In this way, poetic iconicity bridges the "gap" conceived between mind and world: it enables a poem to become an icon of the essence of being.

What do poets mean when they say they are expressing the truth of reality, achieving in Hecht's (1995) words, "the rich complexity of actuality—the unsimplified plenitude of the objective world" (130)? No exegesis, demonstration, or proofs suffice to empower us to "know" the world as we experience it. The notion of "reality" is itself complex and hard to capture in words. Does it refer to existence? to being? to life? to truth? I find myself using these terms

interchangeably, as aspects of undefined and unidentified phenomena. The words are abstractions, nominalizations, whose unexamined meanings become either empty of meaning, as in some popular uses of the word *icon*, or take on other meanings as people struggle to reconcile the terms with their applications. For instance, Aristotle coined the term *metaphysical* for his chapter that dealt with knowledge beyond the physical realm as "after physics." In response to negative criticism of the sixteenth-century metaphysical poets, Hillyer (1941) argues that *metaphysical* took on very different meanings that made its original appellation meaningless:

> *Metaphysical* is a word with small merit and so many meanings as to have no
>
> meaning at all. [...] Literally, it has to do with the conception of the Universe and
>
> Man's place therein. Loosely, it has taken on, among others, such meanings as
>
> these: difficult, obscure, ethereal, involved, supercilious, ingenious, fantastic,
>
> incongruous. [...] If we must have a term based on the use of metaphor, then
>
> Ingenious or Fantastic were a better word than Metaphysical. (xxxiv–xxxv)

Nevertheless, the term as applied to the metaphysical poets is defended by those critics who see, as Herbert J. C. Grierson (1921) does, that the poets were "inspired by a philosophical conception of the universe and the rôle assigned to the human spirit in the great drama of existence" (xiii). The contrast between Hillyer's and Grierson's use of *metaphysics* depends not on a static definition of the term, but how it supports their critical stances. Consequently, my discussion of semblance places it within a functional, not philosophical, scope of meaning.

1 Beyond Mimesis

Imitation, copy, representation, depiction, image, resemblance. All have been used to explain the rhetorical feature of mimesis in art, depending on critics' theoretical stances

(Abrams 1965: 640-641). None of them capture the nature of artistic activity. They all imply that artists present a static view of reality that in no way reflects their inner motivations and workings, their attempt to capture a reality that exists independently of themselves and yet reflects their own sensibility. When an artist friend painted the birch tree in our north meadow, she was not simply providing a copy, imitation, or representation of the outwardly visible tree, but rather infusing into her painting her own perceptions and feelings about it.

Studies of mimesis can be traced back to Aristotle, and various theories have been developed over the centuries to account for the relation between art and life. Sternberg's (2012) publication is the most extensive treatment to date on mimesis from the perspective of fictional coherence through literary motivation. Cultural studies of *mimesis* in its changing applications of meaning all treat *mimesis* at the conscious, conceptual level. I focus on how we might understand the concept as a means by which poets attempt to capture pre-conceptual being, to move beyond interpretive meaning to affective experience. Langer's (1953) theory of art explores extensively the question of aesthetic mimesis:

> Everything has an aspect of appearance as well as of causal importance. Even so non-sensuous a thing as a fact or possibility appears this way to one person and that way to another. That is its "semblance," whereby it may "resemble" other things, and—where the semblance is used to mislead judgment about its causal properties—is said to "dissemble" its nature. Where we know that an "object" consists entirely in its semblance, that apart from its appearance it has no cohesion and unity—like a rainbow or a shadow—we call it a merely virtual object, or an illusion. In this literal sense a picture is an illusion; we see a face, a flower, a vista

of sea or land, etc., and know that if we stretched out our hand to it we would

touch a surface smeared with paint. (49)

By recognizing the illusory nature of artistic forms, Langer challenges the notion that art simply

represents, copies, or imitates elements of the experienced world. Here then, I focus rather on

mimesis as semblance, the relation of art to life, and, specifically for my purposes, the relation of

poetry to life.

With the emergence of technology whereby originals may be machine reproduced,

contemporary definitions of *imitation* have increasingly obscured the active function of

imitating: following by doing. In other words, when poets attempt to "imitate" nature, they are

understood to be representing nature through description. What is lost is recognition of the poet's

engagement with sensory perceptions and inner emotions that motivate poets to *enact* the

processes of the human and natural worlds. This is not the same as simply reproducing what they

see or hear. It is a common misperception that similarity exists a priori among objects, images,

and ideas. Instead, as Wallace Stevens (1951) notes, it is the human conceptualizing mind that

creates semblance (his "resemblance"), whether in nature or in metaphor:

It quite seems as if there is *an activity that makes* one thing resemble another. […]

The eye does not beget in resemblance. It sees. But the mind begets in

resemblance as the painter begets in representation. […] It is not difficult, having

once predicated such an activity, to attribute it to *a desire* for resemblance. (76;

my emphases)

Stevens is careful to distinguish between imitation and (re)semblance: "An imitation may be

described as an identity manqué. It is artificial. It is not fortuitous as a true metaphor is. […]

Resemblance in metaphor is an activity of the imagination; and in metaphor the imagination is

life." (73) That is why *semblance* is a better word than *resemblance*. Rather than similarity, semblance signifies *simulation*. For instance, an ornithologist who *imitates* bird calls does so through exercising his vocal cords to produce sounds outside the realm of human language. Onomatopoeia, on the other hand, is the use of phonetic and reduplicative human language sounds, like "cuckoo" or "cock-a-doodle-do," to *simulate* the birds' calls. By simulating natural events, when poets and artists attempt to capture the dynamic forces underlying what they perceive through their senses, they open up the world of a forever-changing reality. The creation of art through semblance and its transmission through culture is the theme of Brendan Galvin's (2011) poem "Flute" in which he explores the ways artists create iconic semblance with the external world.

In 2008, paleontologists in Tübingen discovered the fragments of a flute made from vulture bone in a stone-age cave at Hohle Fels in Swabia (Fig. 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Hohe Fels flute

National Geographic reported the finding the following year:

> Found with fragments of mammoth-ivory flutes, the 40,000-year-old artifact also adds to evidence that music may have given the first European modern humans a strategic advantage over Neanderthals. [...] With five finger holes and a V-shaped mouthpiece, the almost complete bird-bone flute—made from the naturally hollow wing bone of a griffon vulture—is just 0.3 inch (8 millimeters) wide and

was originally about 13 inches (34 centimeters) long. (Owens 2009)

Owens' comment suggests that artistic creation rose when formerly isolated cognitive

intelligences coalesced in Early Modern Humans. The Hohle Fels flute is approximately 40,000

to 36,000 years old, thus placing it in the "Middle/Upper Paleolithic transition" period. Steven

Mithen (1996: 15-163) provides evidence that a transformation occurred in the human mind

during this period over a time span of 60,000-30,000 years. According to archaeological

discoveries, the cognitive capacities of early humans relating to the natural environment, social

interactions, and technical competence all functioned independently of each other. During the

Middle/Upper Paleolithic transition period, a "cognitive explosion" occurred that caused these

separate functions to coalesce and create a "cognitive fluidity" in the physically expanding

brain.This coalescence, Mithen suggests, resulted in the capacity to create art.

   In 2011, *The Atlantic Monthly* published Brendan Galvin's "Flute." The three intelligences—

natural, social, and technical—are brought together as the poetic self recreates in language the

flute-maker's response to the natural environment by using his tool-making capacity to create the

flute from a vulture's wing bone. The flute-maker's attempt to recreate the bird's sounds

becomes artistically expressive as social interaction when the next generation responds to his

playing. The *National Geographic* report communicates knowledge of the flute's origins.

Galvin's poem expresses the experience of creating it. The flute-maker's attempt to simulate the

melodic song of a bird creates the semblance that makes the poem itself an icon of creativity

through semblance.

<div align="center">Flute</div>

    Tapper and tinkerer, whenever

    back in the trees a bird seemed

    to be singing, *See see me*,

    it drew you out of the rhythms

    of your work. Time and again   5

you considered how a gourd rattle

could sound like a fistful of pebbles

against stone, or the first patter

of wind-tossed rain, and the clopping

of two rocks together like   10

aurochs hooves. Depending on

the hand, a skin stretched

on a hoop might be subtle enough

for heartbeats, or the first fisted

rumble of a storm. But with nothing 15

more than their beaks, the birds

made their *whoops* and *carrocks*

to announce a triumph or ask

sweet questions. So when you came

across the bones of a griffon vulture 20

on a field, and began to study

its wreckage for useful parts,

I can see you snapping off a likely

section of wing bone and rubbing it

with a chamois rag too far gone to wear,   25

thinking it over as that bird

among the leaves seemed to be

taunting *See me see me, see see me*,

and instead of sharpening the bone

> you split it along both sides   30
>
> with a flint point, then fit your fingers
>
> to where you'd drill the holes before
>
> you made it one bone again
>
> and tried your breath down its length,
>
> *Thweep fee seep me* in every variation   35
>
> but the bird's, though already
>
> children by the fire were pointing
>
> and running to you up the field.

The poetic self is addressing the creator of a stone-age flute. The poem begins with the "tapper and tinkerer" who is distracted from work by the sound of a bird. He thinks about the way material objects—gourds, rocks, animal skins—can be used to make sounds like the ones nature makes. He considers the fact that birds use their bony beaks to make the sound he hears, and so turns to the wing bone of a griffon vulture to see if he can recreate the bird's sound. The sounds the flute-maker simulates, "*Thweep, fee seep me,*" occur "in every variation / but the bird's." Yet these sounds have their emotional affect on the next generation, the "children by the fire," who are already "pointing / and running" up the field to the source of the flute-maker's sounds.

More is going on than this simple paraphrase suggests. Galvin's poem is not just about imagining the thoughts and actions of the Hohle Fels flute-maker. The poem is the result of complex blendings of projections from several domains: art and nature, poet and flute-maker, journalistic accounts of the scientific discovery and its poetic transformation into imaginative experience, cultural transmission through artistic performance. As the flute is being created so is the poem.

Through the materiality of the poem on the page, in its long and narrow form without stanza interruption, the poet evokes the image of the thin and slender flute. Just as the flute-maker is perceived as splitting the wing bone in two, so the poem divides at its midpoint, between the flute-maker's meditating and his making, the move from cognition to action, in the exact center of the

poem: "sweet questions. So when you came" (line 19). Across this divide, the sounds of birds in the first part—"*See see me*" and "*whoops* and *carrocks*"—and "*See me see me, see see me,*" together with the sounds of the flute "*Thweep fee seep me*" in the second transform into thefour holes observed in the picture of the Hohle Fels flute, as the flute-maker uses them to simulate the bird's sound, not as identity manqué, but as semblance.

The relation between poet, bird, and flute-maker is marked by the poem's rhythmic structure and sound patterns. Note that the *poet* cannot reproduce the bird's sound; the bird only *seems* to be singing "*See see me.*" The phrase "seemed / to be singing" (lines 2-3) links poet to maker as the poet associates the phonetic sounds of [s] [i:] and [m] with the bird as its song drew the toolmaker "out of the rhythms" of his work. That work rhythm is associated with predominantly unvoiced consonants from the very beginning as the toolmaker is described as "tapper and tinkerer." Consider, for example, the repetitions of 'fist-', 'first', 'flint', 'fit', 'fing-', or 'rattle', 'patter', 'snapp-', 'clopp'. The sound of the bird's melodious calls the poet simulates in lines 3 and 28 stand in sharp contrast to the sound patterns associated with the toolmaker's thoughts and actions. The idea that the toolmaker could possibly do what the bird does seems futile. Bird and maker, however, are brought into relation in the making of the flute through the poem's structural rhythms and sound repetitions, linked by the "semblance" of "seemed to be" in lines 2-3 and 27. The sounds [s] / [i:] occur only with references to nature in 'trees', 'leaves', and the bird sounds with one important exception, as the poet "see[s]" the flute-maker as he begins making the flute (line 23). The sound [i:], however, occurs also with [b], both in the use of the existential copula 'be' and in two words that draw together both human and bird: 'heartbeats' (line 14) and 'beaks' (line 16). The semblance of the sounds of 'seemed / be' thus link poet and song to 'bird' and 'bone.' Just as the poem breaks in the exact center, so does its structural prosody. The first part contains four sentences, the last just one. Each line, however, is enjambed, creating dynamic rhythms and sounds that present a force for movement against stasis. This rhythmic movement creates a melodic temporality as the poem moves from the poet's

simulation of the bird's call as "*See see me*" to the "*Thweep fee seep me*" of the flute-maker.

Galvin's poem is not claiming identity between art and nature, but presenting art as simulated semblance. As we read the poem, either silently or aloud, we use our capacity to split the self, identifying with the flute-maker who is being addressed as "you" at the same time that we take on the voice of the poet who appears with the flute-maker in line 23, "I can see you," drawing us into aesthetic activity that makes us create the poem afresh on each reading. Through the materiality of its language, flute and poem become an icon of aesthetic creativity by the manifestation of iconic semblance carrying "world across into mind *whole in all its complexities*" (MacLeish 1960: 9).

2. Manifestation

The notion of language manifesting, directly revealing the outer world of our senses does not characterize the perennial debate over whether Mind Independent Reality exists. Western thought tends to assume that, locked as we are within the compass of our human brains and minds, our conceptualizing language blocks us from ever being able to know the "true" nature of reality. Asian views are different. "[I]n most Chinese thought," Stephen Owen (1992) writes, "literary thought is 'manifestation': everything that is inner—the nature of the person or the principles that inform the world—has an innate tendency to become outward and manifest" (21):

> In the peculiar natural philosophy of *Wen-hsin tiao-lung* the impulse within
> natural process to make inherent distinctions manifest already implies that mind
> arise; manifestation is complete only if there is a subject to recognize and know it.
> Mind is that for which manifestation occurs. Mind, in its turn, implies the
> necessity of language as a form of manifestation unique and proper to mind itself.
> Language is the fulfillment of the process, the knowing that makes known, and
> that fulfillment will be human *wen**. (189)[1]

Although poets in the Western tradition cannot, in Owen's (1985) words, "escape their ancestry"

(21), they nevertheless have an intuitive understanding of *wen*, of language as aesthetic pattern, that reveals the intrinsic, natural, relationship of words to our experience of nature. Poets know what cognitive scientists are only now beginning to recognize.

Rather than adopting the "either/or" perspective suggested by Owen's comparison of Western and Chinese thoughts about language, I suggest that it is not language per se that blocks or enables our experience of nature, but the way language is used. The terms *blocking* and *enabling* refer to Leonard Talmy's theory of force dynamics as an explanation of causation. According to Talmy (2000:10), force dynamics describes what happens when the energy or force of one object or entity blocks or allows the energy or force of another to occur. For instance, a dam causes the build-up of water in a reservoir by blocking its normal flow; a steep hillside accelerates the flow of a mountain stream. In like manner, the development of abstract thought by naming or reifying sensory feelings and events allows a rapid acceleration of conceptual reasoning, but at the cost of blocking or concealing its origins.

Conceptual reification serves to block the underlying, preconscious experiences of minding. Having reified cognitive activities through nominalization, we tend to assume the existence of mind as an entity, that is then conceived metaphorically as a container: we can bring things to mind, we can keep things in our minds, and so on. In fact, it is hard not to speak in this way. It is much more efficient and economical to speak of "mind" as though it were an entity than it is to characterize the actual cognitive events that the word refers to. It is precisely this ability to conceptualize and to abstract from the experience of sensory and emotional expression that led, as Vico argues, to the development of human thought. But in reifying the mind, we are blocking or concealing those underlying forces.

Literary language, to the contrary, as Tsur (1992: 360-361; 2008: 577, 585) has shown, serves to slow down cognitive economy by delaying categorization. Delaying conceptual categorization enables us to draw closer to and thus make manifest the phenomenological world of immediate, preconceptual experience. In other words, the aesthetic pattern (*wen*) of literary

language allows access to the precategorial activities of the mind that Vico describes as

attributing senses and passions to the external world, and thus makes manifest the "coming-to-

be" of the experienced world. The term *minding* captures this aspect of our cognitive capacities

that include the sensory-motor-emotive as well as the rational, a mindfulness that is aware of our

surroundings, attentive to and caring about the way we experience and conceptualize our world.

Through the operations of iconicity, poetic language succeeds in making the "coming-to-be"

of the world manifest and evoking an affective response to it. In so doing, it creates semblance

between ourselves and the world, so that we are not observers of the world, but part of the world

and identified with it. This notion of semblance is encountered in W. S. Merwin's (1967) poem,

"The Dry Stone Mason," with its focus on the relation between the bodily workings of human

cognition and the outer world of experience that create an identification between the mason and

the stones of his trade.[2]

Merwin's poem concerns the changes that occurred when the art of dry-stone-wall

construction gave way to more modern practices with the use of mortar:

The Dry Stone Mason

The mason is dead the gentle drunk

Master of dry walls

What he made of his years crosses the slopes without wavering

Upright but nameless

Ignorant in the new winter

Rubbed by running sheep

But the age of mortar has come to him

Bottles are waiting like fallen shrines

Under different trees in the rain

And stones drip where his hands left them

Leaning slightly inwards

His thirst is past

As he had no wife

The neighbors found where he kept his suit

A man with no family they sat with him

When he was carried through them they stood by their own dead

And they have buried him among the graves of the stones

The lack of punctuation, the ambiguities of possible syntactic enjambment, and the peculiarities of tense usage create an uneasy effect on an otherwise apparently straightforward narrative of the life and death of the poem's subject. Readers encountering the poem for the first time often stumble over the first two lines as they puzzle over whether the word *drunk* should be read as a noun or an additional adjective to the word *gentle*, both describing the mason as a "Master of dry walls." Such puzzlement is compounded by the abrupt changes of tense in the first stanza, starting with the simple present *is* dead, followed by a mixture of past *made* and present *crosses*, and ending with the present perfect *has come*. To cap all that, the three lines of description following "What he made of his years" are referentially ambiguous. Do they refer to the mason's life or to his walls? "Upright but nameless" can refer to both; "Ignorant in the new winter" can only metaphorically be applied to the walls, since knowing is constrained by a [+ human] feature; whereas "Rubbed by running sheep" [+ material] refers to the walls, raising an inappropriate comical image if applied to the mason. This referential ambiguity resolves itself into the recognition that "What he made of his years" applies to both the mason and his walls, creating a semblance of identity between them, both being upright and without wavering.

Such semblance becomes clearer as the poem proceeds, with the reader encountering again the peculiarity of tense usage. The three stanzas cover his life, death, and burial. Because the last two lines of the poem are incoherent regarding tense, with the present perfect *have buried*

following the simple past constructions *was carried*, *stood*, the reader must become actively

engaged in constructing the poem to recognize the force of the identification of the mason with

his life's work.

> The poem is framed in the opening and last lines by the sentences: "The mason is dead / And they
> have buried him." Following the opening words in lines 1-2 are the mason's life events traced
> backwards in time. He was first a "Master of dry walls," before he became a "gentle drunk." The
> order reverses again in line 3 to describe his mastery: "What he made of his yearscrosses the slopes
> without wavering"—the longest line in the poem describing both his life's work and its results as
> depicted in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2 Dry stone wall in Donegal
Med Partnership, Creative Commons license.

The final line of the first stanza resolves the semblance between mason and wall. "The age of

mortar" signals both the invention of mortar that turned dry-stone-wall construction into a dying

art and the death of the mason's life work, with the pun on *mortar* and *mortality*. Left behind in

the central stanza after the mason's death are the results of his life experience. Bottles have

replaced stones, and both are described in terms of the other: the bottles are "like fallen shrines,"

and the stones "drip" in the "rain" that metaphorically opposes the "dry" of the mason's art.

Again, ambiguous enjambent encourages dual reading of the final two lines of this stanza.

Mastery of dry wall construction involves placing the stones so that the weight of the stone

pushes inwards to support the structure (see Fig. 3.2). But the mason can also be said to be

"leaning slightly inward," no longer upright and without wavering, as he drew within himself in

his drunkenness at the loss of his life's occupation.

The final stanza reveals the relation of the mason to his stones. He has no other relation, and

so is buried among them, as they too, have lost their function in life.[3] They are his "family," while the neighbors stand "by their own dead." With the creation of identification between mason and stone, the poem focuses, not on the outward manifestation of dry-stone construction, but on the intimate relation between the man and his life's work, relating the feelings of commitment to a work of art, so that the poem itself becomes a semblance of a felt reality, made manifest in reaching beyond the material to the depths of the dry stone mason's phenomenal experience of being one with his stones.

3. The In-visibility of Being

Although Merleau-Ponty's untimely death in 1961 cut short the development of his ontology of the flesh (1962(1945], 1968), enough remains to give a sense of where he was heading in his understanding of our phenomenological world. As I understand his thought, the world is real, not because it exists independently of mind, but because our embodied being is part of the world. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, he writes: "To be body, is to be tied to a certain world, as we have seen; our body is not primarily *in* space: it is of it" (148; original emphasis). Our bodies are synthetic unities of movements, sensations, thoughts, and emotions, so that they should be compared, "not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art" (150). A poem cannot exist, he says, apart from its existence on the page:

> Its meaning is not arbitrary and does not dwell in the firmament of ideas: it is
> locked in the words printed on some perishable page. […] A novel, poem, picture
> or musical work are individuals, that is, beings in which the expression is
> indistinguishable from the thing expressed, their meanings accessible only
> through direct contact, being radiated with no change of their temporal and spatial
> situation. It is in this sense that our body is comparable to a work of art. It is a
> nexus of living meanings […]. (151)

Merleau-Ponty speaks of the pre-conscious experience of our physical bodies interacting

with the external world, before conceptual awareness kicks in. He describes this pre-conscious

state as precategorial or primordial experience of the "in-visible," the unseen, hidden world that

exists within the visible world. If you have ever experienced the feeling of time stopping, of

being suspended in the present moment with all your faculties focused on that present, then you

have, for the briefest of moments, entered the realm of the in-visible, what Paul Eluard refers to

as *l'autre monde*, the "other" world, a hidden reality (qtd. in Burnside 2005: 60). To experience

it is to live wholly in the present moment, to grasp the phenomenally real. It happened to me

during the Old Topanga/Malibu fire many years ago in Los Angeles. When I saw the flames

shooting 200 feet above the neighboring ridge, felt the fiery heat, and saw the sparks carried by

the wind in my direction, I experienced the thin line that separates us from the awareness of

imminent death. It is true that we could die at any moment. I was suspended in that awareness,

conscious only of a reality I normally don't experience. It isn't a state one can stay in for very

long. It would drive one mad. And yet it is a state that enables you to see through the veil into

that "other world." Merleau-Ponty (1962[1945]) describes this response as anticipation and

significance in its intention vis-à-vis the world; a response that "becomes aware of itself as

absolutely transparent and the originator of its own presence in the visible world" (405). It is

what it means to live wholly in the present moment, to grasp the phenomenally real. The

Persianword for this experience is *ghayb*: the unseen world from which the soul receives its

nourishment, an experience all art tries to enact.[4]

Aseity is the term Merleau-Ponty uses for the reality of this independent, underived existence.

I-seity is my term for the state of self-identity in iconically experiencing aseic reality. It is

perhaps what Antonio Damasio (1999) means by "core consciousness." Although Damasio's

theory of the tripartite division of the self into *protoself*, *core consciousness*, and *extended

consciousness* has received some criticism (Munévar 2014), core consciousness exists at the

intermediate level between the unconscious state of the physical structure of the organism and

the consciously aware "metacognitive" autobiographical self, as it senses the emotive

changesthat affect the protoself through interaction with internal or external stimuli.

When critics and poets speak of poetry as expressing the inexpressible, they refer to the fact

that art provides the i-seic self access to this aseic reality. As John Burnside (2005) describes it:

> *autremonde*—that nonfactual truth of being: the missed world, and, by extension,
>
> the *missed self* who sees and imagines and is fully alive outside the bounds of
>
> socially-engineered expectations—not by some rational process (or not as the
>
> term is usually understood) but by a kind of radical illumination, a re-attunement
>
> to the continuum of objects and weather and other lives that we inhabit. (60)

This primordial experience of the precategorial in-visible is what poets attempt to encapsulate

through iconicity. In the several volumes of the Iconicity Project (http://www.iconicity.ch/),

researchers talk of the self-referential nature of the icon in unifying consciousness with the

world. In literary studies, it is often expressed as occurring through estrangement, making the

familiar unfamiliar, or seeing the world anew. In religious terms, it is the transcendence of the

material world into the realms of the spiritual. Let me put this self-referential nature of the icon

more simply. An index points to. A symbol stands for. An icon is constitutive of. A rose—its

name, or its picture—acts as an index, pointing *to* the flower it represents. A rose is also a

symbol *for* love. It is iconic when it becomes the semblance *of* a felt experience, when the i-seic

self becomes one with its aseic reality. An early poem by Emily Dickinson (*A82-1/2, F25/J19*)

brings the i-seic self of the rose into being, as the forces of nature conspire in its creation:

> A sepal - petal - and a thorn
>
> Opon a common summer's morn -
>
> A flask of Dew - a Bee or two -
>
> A Breeze - a'caper in the trees -
>
> And I'm a Rose!

Poetic iconicity differs from other forms of iconicity in at least two ways. It creates the

feeling of form and it breaks through or transcends the abstracting tendency of conceptual

language in order to create the immediacy of the present moment in its primordial or "other-world" experience. Wallace Stevens, in his essays and poems, captures this semblance between the visible and in-visible worlds of our experience.

4 The Ontology of Poetic Cognition as Iconic of Reality

In his essays on imagination and reality, Stevens (1951) describes how poetry might be part of the structure of reality, a reality that is both visible and invisible. He quotes C. E. M. Joad's (1936) observation that the intellect "presents us with a false view" of reality by transforming its "vibrations, movements, changes" into "a collection of solid, static objects extended in space" (551). This reification tendency of the intellect obscures the true nature of the structure of reality, of "things as they are" that are never static but always changing (Stevens 1951: 25; see also Langer 1967: 20-21). Motivated by the emotive sensitivity of the poet, the imagination enables us to see things as they are, not as things constructed by the intellect. Stevens characterizes poetry as realizing the subliminal "vibrations, movements, changes" of lived experience. This is Merleau-Ponty's primordial or precategorial experience, that which resides hidden within the seen, the "in-visible."

Stevens (1967: 398) exemplifies the relation between imagination and reality in his poem "Of Mere Being." The title reveals its subject: "Mere" being nothing more than that which simply *is* and not a construction of the intellect. The question becomes how poetry can, constructed as it is by means of language, that very product of the intellectualizing, conceptualizing self, nevertheless break through its own barriers to access the primordial, the precategorial. It is the same question that Tsur (2003) raises in his discussion of mystic and romantic poetry, and also in his (1998) statement that "poetry is organized violence against language" (223). In other words, all poetic truth is involved with experiencing Merleau-Ponty's in-visible in the visible; as Stevens (1951) comments: "It is important to believe that the visible is the equivalent of the invisible" (61). The strategies of poetry—its meter and

rhythms, its soundpatterns and repetitions, its images and metaphors, its micro- and macro-structures—work together to create an iconicity of sense experience, the illusion of felt life. In the brief analysis that follows, I discuss some of the ways Stevens' (1967: 398) poem reveals iconic semblance in creating the illusion "of mere being."

Helen Vendler (1984) describes "Of Mere Being" as "an iconic poem" (42); Harold Bloom (1977) as "a death-poem" (98, 316, 343, 352); William Bevis (1974) as investing "its perception with value and emotion" (279); Eleanor Cook (1988) as an example of anagogic metaphor (298, 311–312). Each of these descriptions, in its own way, refers to the characteristics that make the poem a semblance of felt life.

<div style="text-align:center">

Of Mere Being

</div>

The palm at the end of the mind

Beyond the last thought, rises

In the bronze decor,

A gold-feathered bird

Sings in the palm, without human meaning,   5

Without human feeling, a foreign song.

You know then that it is not the reason

That makes us happy or unhappy.

The bird sings. Its feathers shine.

The palm stands on the edge of space.   10

The wind moves slowly in the branches.

The bird's fire-fangled feathers dangle down.

The poem iconically presents the primordial, precategorial invisibility of "mere being" through a

strategy of abstraction that serves to make the prosodic forms of its language only potentially

realizable by either delaying or not fully or completely actualizing the various forms that

structure the poem. What results is an abstraction of structure that becomes a ghost form,

hovering just beyond the actual conceptualizations of the poem's images and language. This

feeling of the presence of absence is reflected in the poem's prosodic structure, the idiosyncratic

use of prepositions, images that obliquely conceal their underlying reference, and sound

patternings that link all three together.

4.1 Prosodic structure

The poem appears to be written in free verse. No clearly discernible metrical pattern underlies

the verse line. There is a struggle going on between the desire for an underlying metrical form

and its actual representation in the prosody of the lines. The number of syllables per line ranges

from a low of five to a high of ten (not more, which is significant); its stress patterns vary from

iambic to trochaic to anapestic; its stanzaic tercets fail to approximate the *terza rima* form

introduced by Dante and adapted by Shelley in "Ode to the West Wind"; there is no obvious

rhyme scheme. However, the poem does not read like prototypical free-verse form: it is as

though an abstract metrical pattern is hovering as an invisible ghost behind, beyond, or below

theacoustic realizations of linguistic stress patterns in the poem.[5] This ghost of meter finally

materializes in the last line of the poem as a perfectly formed iambic pentameter line: "The

bird'sfire-fangled feathers dangle down." The rest of the poem has been inexorably moving

toward this moment, as its eleven lines begin to approximate but do not quite form the

pentameter structure. The only lines that have ten positions before the final iambic pentameter

line occur in the center of the poem:

> 5   Sings in the palm, without human meaning,
>
> 6   Without human feeling, a foreign song.
>
> 7   You know then that it is not the reason

Line 5 opens in anapestic style but reverts after the caesura to the trochaic; line 6 does the

opposite, opening in trochaic style, but ending after the caesura in the iambic on "a foreign

song." This ending provides a feeling of closure, reinforced by its position at the end of the first

half of the poem and the period marking the end of the first sentence. The iambic nature of this

closure halfway through the poem anticipates the poem's final iambic pentameter line. Line 7,

which starts the second half of the poem, is the only one that approximates the intonational

quality of prose. The fact that these ten-syllable lines do not form a tercet stanza in itself but run

over a stanza break indicates both what is and is not there, suggesting a form that is in-visible

within the visible actualization of the poem's form.

4.2 Prepositional use

Another way that Stevens (1996) manages "to get as close to ['plain reality'] as it is possible for a

poet to get" (636) is through his idiosyncratic use of prepositions. Cook (1988) notes: "Stevens' play

with prepositions acts to dislocate slightly the logic of referential language, to displace slightly the

language of place" (30). The title of Stevens' poem does not say "on" being,indicating that the poem

is a meditation on the subject of being, but "of" being, the poem a part of being that is part of world.

Its subject is to be what *constitutes* being. The prepositions in the first stanza play with different

notions of place: "at the end," "of the mind," "beyond the last thought," and "in the bronze décor," a

movement from "at" to "in" through "beyond," another move from the visible *at* to the in-visible

décor by going *beyond* thought. Bloom (1977) observes: "'Beyond' is a particularly haunting word

throughout Stevens' poetry. His aim always is to play 'a tune beyond us, yet ourselves,' and to teach

us, somehow, to 'bear brightly the little beyond'" (98). The prepositions describing the palm

undergo a subtle shift, from "at the end" (line 1) to "on the edge" (line 10). The palm is *at* the end of

the mind but *on* the edge of space.

The mind is not equivalent to space; rather, the boundary of the mind is the boundary of space.

The palm thus connects the inner and the outer; as it rises at the end of mind, it stands on the

edge of space. The palm's concurrent motion and stasis reflect the reality of continuous

metamorphosis, the never-ending becomings that constitute life, the living being.

4.3 Concealed images

Homophoric usage of the definite article in "the palm" establishes its existence as a necessary component of what is beyond thought. It is always there, whenever we reach the end of mind which is the edge of space. The bird is not identified in the same way; rather, it is *in* the palm, singing a song that is identified as foreign because it is "without human meaning, / Without human feeling." This identification of "a gold-feathered bird" draws our attention to the kind of bird it is, not the Yeatsian bird of "Sailing to Byzantium" (although the allusion is there), but the phoenix, the bird of the sun, death by fire and resurrection.[6] Although the phoenix is not mentioned by name, its absence is present, hovering in the word "palm," which, in Greek, Cook (1988) notes, is φοίνιξ "phoenix" (312). Likewise, the un-named life-giving sun is present in *bronze*, *gold*, *shine*, and *fire*.

One word is not explicitly mentioned as a human category: *emotion*. That is, we have "thought," "meaning," "feeling" (the outer five senses), and "know." Emotion, however, is represented in the contrastive valence of happy/unhappy that immediately follows the negation of reason. It is no coincidence that, in Chinese mythology, the phoenix is the bird of happiness. The bird's song, without human meaning or feeling, is an expression of the world just beyond our conceptual reach, it is "foreign" to our understanding through language, and thus it can trigger the emotions that connect us to the physical world of primordial experience, that which is "beyond the last thought."

4.4 Sound patterning

The movement of sound patterns in the monosyllabic words *palm*, *bird*, and *mind* resonate through the poem in forming the feeling of mere being that together they constitute. All three coalesce in a kaleidoscope of sound patterning with variation. The [p] of *palm* is an unvoiced bilabial and is thus the furthest removed from the voiced, nasalized bilabial of [m] at the end of the word and at the beginning of *mind*. The [b] of *bird* falls between [p] and [m] as the voiced bilabial, and shares with *mind* the voiced dental [d] at the end of the two words. The sound

pattern created places the mind in the middle, linking the palm with the bird (Fig. 3.3).

Figure 3.3 Sound linkage

The word *mind* is also linked through its beginning voiced nasalized bilabial with the title word *mere*

and three other words in the poem that begin the same way: *meaning, moves,* and *makes*. All three are

verbal processes associated with minding. The only other occurrence of the [m] phoneme is in the

middle of the word *human*. At its other extreme, the unvoiced bilabial [p] of palm occurs only in the

words *happy* and *unhappy*, both associated with valenced emotion that Vendler (1984) notes establishes

"the claims of sensual desire against the reasoning mind" (42).The sound patterns and modulations of

the vowels that move throughout the poem, as Bevis (1974) notes, form feelings of value and emotion

(279). These patterned alternations associate the back vowel [a] of the palm with those of *beyond*,

bronze, *foreign*, *song*, and the introductionof that which is *not*, in "not the reason," a strategy of negation

of reason that raises the existenceof the not-mentioned (Langer 1953):

> Where there is no exclusion of opposites, there is, strictly speaking, no negative.
>
> In non-verbal arts this is obvious; omissions may be significant, but never as
>
> negatives. In literature, the words, 'no,' 'not,' 'never,' etc. occur freely; but what
>
> they deny is thereby created. In poetry, there is no negation, only contrast. (242)[7]

    The desire for the resolution of being that has created movement throughout the poem is

captured in the realization of iambic pentameter at the very end. The three main physical images

of the poem—the palm, the bird, and the feathers—each occur three times, paralleling the

poem's tercet structure. The pattern of repetitions across the four stanzas for the words *palm,*

feather, bird are as follows:

stanza 1	palm
stanza 2	feather – bird – palm
stanza 3	bird – feather
stanza 4	palm – bird – feather

The poem creates a zoom-in focus, starting with the palm in the first stanza, to the gold-feathered bird in the second, and then a focus on the shining feathers of the third. The bird, central to the poem, lies in the middle between palm and feather. After the single reference to palm in the firststanza comes the pattern *feather – bird – palm* in the second. The third stanza then provides the missing elements from stanza 1. This restoration, from its reversed order in stanza 2, of the order*palm – bird – feather* is then fully realised in the final stanza, with its concluding iambic pentameter line a direct reference to the phoenix about to be consumed by fire.

The word *fire-fangled* is an idiosyncratic coinage. The word *fangled* appears in contemporary English only in the compound *new-fangled*, but Stevens may have been thinking of the lines from Shakespeare's (1905) *Cymbeline*: "Be not, as is our fangled world, a garment / Nobler than that it covers" (V.iv.134-135). The scene is a peculiar episode in the play, but raises the idea of an *autremonde* that "sense cannot untie" (V.iv.149): a world invisible, beyond the senses, beyond all reason, and yet real. The "fire-fangled feathers" comprise the garment of the visible world that covers primordial reality.

The poem becomes a paean to the phoenix, starting at the moment of its rise from the ashes, and ending in momentary stasis as the bird is about to be consumed once more by fire. The first and last stanzas thus serve as a frame for the middle two stanzas that encapsulate the moment of the phoenix's life, without human meaning or feeling, without reason, the bird's song connecting us with our emotional senses to the primordial experience of mere being-as-becoming.

To be an icon of reality, the poem must capture the sense of our being part of this seen-and-unseen world. Stevens (1951) touches on the elements that characterize poetic semblance:

In his chapter on "Forms in the Realm of the Mind," M. Focillon speaks of a vocation of substances, or technical destiny, to which there is a corresponding vocation of minds; that is to say*, a certain order of forms corresponds to a certain order of minds*. These things imply *an element of change*. Thus a vocation recognizes its material by foresight, *before experience*. As an example of this, he refers to the first state of the *Prisons* of Piranesi as skeletal. But "twenty years later, Piranesi returned to these etchings, and on taking them up again, he poured into them shadow after shadow, until one might say that he excavated this astonishing darkness not from the brazen plates, but *from the living rock of some subterranean world*." (48-49; my emphases)

Stevens' poem simulates the primordial existence before conceptualizing experience, the subterranean world of the unseen within the seen, in the form of the phoenix, continuously and forever ecstatically metamorphosing in its rising and falling, in its perpetual cycle of death and resurrection. The poem thus speaks directly to the notion of semblance as a means of iconic access to Merleau-Ponty's in-visible in the visible.

Semblance may occur in manifold and different ways, as indicated in my discussion of the poems by Galvin, Merwin, and Stevens. Galvin focuses on how the artist creates semblance through simulation of the experienced world; Merwin focuses on the way we are participants of and identify with it; Stevens focuses on bringing the in-visible into the becoming of poetic being. In the following chapter, I discuss metaphor's role in creating an ontology of semblance.

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1. Owen defines *wen* as "pattern," "literature," "the written word."

2. I am grateful to Aaron Fischer, SUNY/Old Westbury student and poet in the 1970s, who drew my attention to Merwin's poem.

3. Compare the difference between "stone graves" and "graves of the stones."

4. My position differs somewhat from how Yuriko Saito (2017) describes the direct experience of reality of Buddhist nature: "The raw immediacy of the phenomenon can be felt with our whole

body and mind *but defies verbalization*. It is describable only as 'suchness,' 'thusness,' or 'hereof the immediate present.'" (17; my emphasis). I suggest that the arts enact the articulation of such raw immediacy through their various media.

5. For T. S. Eliot (1975[1917]), good free verse needs "the constant suggestion and the skilful evasion of iambic pentameter" so that "the ghost of some simple metre should lurk behind the arras in even the 'freest' verse" (34). See also Annie Finch (1993).

6. The connection of Stevens' bird to the phoenix is also discussed in Thornburg (2012). The phoenix myth is very ancient, appearing in disparate cultures with slightly different associations. In Greece, it refers to the mythical bird of Arabia which flew to Egypt every 500 years to be reborn. The oldest, apparently, is the Chinese myth, possibly dating as far back as 8000 B.C.

7. A reviewer referred me to Paul Werth's (1999) and Laura Hildalgo-Downing's (2000) work on negative accommodation in discourse. In building on Werth's work on non-entities in the conceptual domains of subworlds, Hildalgo-Downing writes: "Strictly speaking, the conceptual domains triggered by negative words cannot be said to 'exist' in the sense of being ontologically actual or real; however, they can be said to have some kind of status as mental constructs in the minds of speakers, hearers and readers who use the language" (219).

CHAPTER 4   METAPHOR

As we saw in the previous chapter, for an artifact—any product of human making— to become

an icon, it must result from creating a semblance of something beyond itself, whether material or

immaterial. Metaphoring is thus basic to iconic creation. In this chapter, I consider metaphor as

process as well as product in order to understand its role in poetic iconicity. First, I lay the

groundwork for a cognitively oriented view of metaphor by discussing two contrasting views of

what happens when one either takes metaphor literally or sees it as a model of reality.

Metaphorical meaning is encyclopedic: it arises from the cumulative association of experience,

conceptualization, context, and culture. By adopting a cognitive view of embodied minding, I

suggest a more interconnected approach between ourselves and the worlds of our experience. I

then compare my view of metaphorical function in poetry with two Peircean-influenced

approaches, and introduce the notion of metaphoric processing at the linguistic, conceptual, and

sensory-emotive levels. Finally, I build on the model of blending to explain how metaphoring

functions in the creation of a poetic icon.

> Poor Mr. Casaubon had imagined that his long studious bachelorhood had stored
>
> up for him a compound interest of enjoyment, and that large drafts on his
>
> affections would not fail to be honoured; for we all of us, grave or light, get our
>
> thoughts entangled in metaphors, and act fatally on the strength of them.
>
> George Eliot, *Middlemarch*

Metaphor is dangerous. Its danger is obscured when metaphor is assumed to be merely a

figurative form of speech that creates an apparent but false relation between two unlike domains.

Safety lies in presuming its powerlessness: "It's only a metaphor."[1] Such a sense of security is

dangerous because it can give a false confidence of safety (Webster 1844). Eliot's Mr. Casaubon

indeed acted fatally in taking literally the idea that affections could be banked with interest. The

act of metaphoring has iconic power, the power to transform our conventional ways of seeing

and, by so doing, to change or modulate our minds and our behavior. To see arguments in terms

of war, for example, by using such statements as "she shot down his theory" or "he torpedoed

her plans," is to transform disagreement into aggression (Lakoff and Johnson 1980):

> Our conventional ways of talking about arguments presuppose a metaphor we are
>
> hardly ever conscious of. The metaphor is not merely in the words we use—it is
>
> in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is not poetic,
>
> fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk about arguments that way because we
>
> conceive of them that way—and we act according to the way we conceive things.
>
> (6)

When we begin to take metaphor literally, we are "used by metaphor" to constrain our world

perceptions (Turbayne 1970).[2] As a consequence of taking metaphor literally, the world of the

United States changed in 2010 with the Supreme Court decision in *Citizens United v. Federal

Election Commission* that corporations are people and money is speech. The decision has not just

affected the political scene, but the ways in which the law is administered on many other fronts

to confuse the public-private distinction. The act of metaphor makes, and continually changes,

the world we live in by influencing how we think, imagine, see, and formulate new discoveries

(Barsalou 2016; Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Kahneman 2011; Lakoff and Nuñez 2000). That is

its power and the source of its danger.

Because metaphoring constantly shapes our experience, it behooves us to consider if it only

functions as a source of perennial danger in making us victims of false perception. Are all

metaphors bad for us? What would be the case of a metaphor that is good for us? Before we

consider the role of metaphor in poetic iconicity, we need to distinguish between metaphor as

actual or possible world formation in conventional and artistic representations.

1 Metaphor as Model

Because scientific knowledge is founded on the creation and testing of metaphors-as-models of

reality, Colin Murray Turbayne (1970) notes that scientists must be wary of mistaking the

metaphor-model for reality in real-world understanding. Einstein, in showing that Newton's

theory of universal gravitation worked only within certain contexts, had to reconstitute a

different equation in his theory of relativity to account for the space-time continuum. Scientific

exploration constantly challenges prevailing metaphorical paradigms to reach new knowledge.

Descartes' model of the mind-body split has been taken as objectively true for centuries.[3] Taking

this model literally has two important consequences: it creates the mind and the body as two

separate, independent entities; and it decontextualizes by interpreting them as separate from the

context in which they are embedded. In Robert D. Stolorow's (2012) words:

> Descartes's vision can be characterized as a decontextualization of both mind and
>
> world. Mind is isolated from the world in which it dwells, just as the world is

purged of all human meaning. In this vision, the mind is pictured as an objective

entity that takes its place among other objects, a "thinking thing" that, precisely

because it is a thing, is ontologically decontextualized, fundamentally separated

from its world.

Taking the conceptual metaphor MIND IS A THING literally results in assuming a mind-body

split.[4] In rejecting this notion, cognitive researchers think of the mind as embodied within the

context of an interrelated world.[5] It becomes a question of which metaphorical model best

illuminates the nature of the actual world of our experience without its implications and

entailments being taken literally.

2 Poetic Metaphor as Literal

On the other hand, Samuel R. Levin (1977) argues that poetic metaphors present a *deviant* view

of reality, but nevertheless "have meaning and thus express truth conditions" (127). We should

therefore take poetic metaphor literally to adjust our notions of the actual world into a possible

(but unrealized) world. Levin takes a first-generation cognitivist approach in which the

formalization of cognition into rule-based structures disregards human interaction with the actual

world, as Donald C. Freeman (1991) notes in his review of Levin (1988):

The canons distinguishing "deviant" from "non-deviant" sequences and literary

metaphor from other kinds of metaphor, are Out There, foundational, determined

by necessary and sufficient conditions, based upon academic literary experience

rather than situated in everyday bodily experience. The necessary consequence of

this approach […] is a theory of metaphor that is closed and hermetic. (150)

Logically, Levin's possible world argument is a *reductio ad absurdum*, leading us to conclude

that metaphor in poetry and fiction has nothing to say about the real world and is therefore

escapist, existing only to give us pleasure. Poets and writers would surely be surprised to learn

that their creative efforts have nothing to say about our experienced world. Under Levin's view,

it is not surprising that literature, like all the arts, is devalued as irrelevant to real-life concerns.[6]

Consider Levin's (1988) example of lexical misuse in the sentence "The earth pirouettes

around the sun": "'pirouette' is not the appropriate word to use of the earth's actual behavior.

[…] because what the earth does is not properly described as pirouetting—around the sun or

anywhere else" (15). To the contrary, *pirouetting* is a perfect metaphorical compression for the

earth's movement, since it captures in one word what one would otherwise have to say about

"the earth's actual behavior": that it rotates 360° on its axis as it moves around the sun, just as

the ballet dancer rotates 360° in performing a pirouette on stage. The metaphor helps us to

comprehend the relation of the earth to the sun by bringing its complex rotations down to human

scale. Distinguishing between good and bad metaphors is not whether human attributes can be

applied to non-human things, but whether the metaphor as model accurately relays some truth

about the nature of the non-human world.

Carl Safina (2015) argues from empirical evidence that wolves share many cognitive

capacities with humans, but have falsely become objects of dread:

> To consider 'the wolf' in literature and culture is to study not a living thing but
>
> the projected fears of people insecure about civilization. [...] When they get inside

the human mind, wolves become a metaphor for the feral and precivilized, the

gang, for people living outside the bounds of convention and conformity. [...]

People cast wolf as the villain, then confuse the actor with the character they play.

(170-171).

By getting "inside the human mind," the metaphor of wolf as villain has been taken literally so

that, to put it in Turbayne's terms, the model has been mistaken for reality. Seeing the wolf as

villain is an example of the way we have separated ourselves from the natural world in order to

manipulate, exploit, and destroy our shared environment.

3. Metaphor in the Literary Arts

John Ruskin (1856) distinguished between good and bad metaphors in literary works with his

description of "the pathetic fallacy":

Now we are in the habit of considering this fallacy as eminently a character of

poetical description, and the temper of mind in which we allow it as one

eminently poetical, because passionate. But, I believe, if we look well into the

matter, that we shall find the greatest poets do not often admit this kind of

falseness—that it is only the second order of poets who much delight in it.

Thus, when Dante describes the spirits falling from the bank of Acheron 'as

dead leaves flutter from a bough', he gives the most perfect image possible of

their utter lightness, feebleness, passiveness, and scattering agony of despair,

without, however, for an instant losing his own clear perception that *these* are

souls, and those are leaves; he makes no confusion of one with the other. But

when Coleridge speaks of

> The one red leaf, the last of its clan,

> That dances as often as dance it can,

he has a morbid, that is to say, a so far false, idea about the leaf: he fancies a life

in it, and will, which there are not; confuses its powerlessness with choice, its

fading death with merriment, and the wind that shakes it with music. Here,

however, there is some beauty, even in the morbid passage […]. (156-157)

Ruskin's idea of good metaphor rests upon the distinction between the use of 1) elements and

events in the natural world to illuminate something about ourselves and 2) the fallacy of

ascribing human emotive and sensory aspects to the natural world. In the Coleridge passage,

Ruskin ascribes "life" to the leaf's dance, and "will" in the choice of "can." In doing so, it is he

who ascribes the emotive feeling of "merriment" to the dying leaf, while recognizing that it is the

wind, and not its own purpose, that makes a leaf dance.[7] Life belongs as much to the leaf as it

does to all organic nature. Ruskin is, to a certain extent, thinking of the human being as separate

from and observant of the natural world, and aesthetics as involving merely beauty and pleasure.

To the contrary, I suggest that "good" metaphors are those that iconically break through the

surface level of our conceptual perceptions to the underlying sensory-motor-emotive nature of

our being as participants of our social, cultural, and natural worlds.

4. The Semeiosis of Poetic Metaphor

Haley's (1988) study, *The Semeiosis of Poetic Metaphor*, from which I borrow the title of this

section, is a brilliant and erudite development of Peirce's description of the icon as it relates to

poetic metaphor. Like most Peircean scholars, Haley accepts the notion in Peirce's classification

of the hypoicon that images, diagrams, and metaphors are all examples of embodied icons.

However, he provides an extensive analysis to argue that "a complete and correct Peircean

definition of metaphor as sign would not be limited to or constrained by this passage" (20). This

leads him to coin the term *metaicon* to refer to "that sort of *iconic* character which is peculiar to

metaphor proper, or to metaphor in its highest form" (20). The metaicon thus becomes "a sign

grounded in a type of iconicity which encompasses images and diagrams at the same time

exceeding them by a critical magnitude" (22).[8] It is this "type of iconicity" that for me defines

poetic iconicity.

   In his discussion of Shakespeare's sonnet 73, Haley (1988) explains his understanding of the

metaicon:

> the "life-seasons" metaicon is not merely a mechanism for naming the intangibles
>
> of old age, but a *reciprocal relation* that encourages us to think about the cyclical
>
> nature of time, whereby we come to view *both* the human life cycle *and* the
>
> seasons in a poignantly new way, to discover *something of that order which unites*
>
> *man and the cosmos*. (86; my emphases)

In Haley's view, a metaicon occurs when "the overarching figural congruence [*between the two*

parts of a metaphor] is very nearly symmetrical and reversible" (88). His insight is important in

recognizing the special role poetic metaphor has in creating iconic reciprocity between mind and

world. An example of such reciprocity may be seen in William Blake's (1971 [1789]) poem

"The Divine Image" (Fig. 4.1).

Figure 4.1 XLIV Blake, *Songs of Innocence*

The question in Blake's poem is identifying source and target in the metaphor: "For Mercy, Pity, Peace, and Love / Is God, our father dear" (Forceville 1995).[9] Since the common rendering of the metaphor is "God is Love," and not "Love is God," Forceville notes that Blake may very well have reversed conventional word order by placing source before target in order to highlight God's virtues. Either reading—source-target or target-source—seem possible. However, the implications of "God is Love" are not the same as those of "Love is God." The former indicates love as an attribute of God, whereas the latter, God as an attribute of love. The poem's iconic reciprocity results from a complex conceptual blending in which the target and source domains are not God/man as one domain and the virtues as another but rather God and mankind as the two domains who, *through* the virtues, are made one.

Blake's etching provides a metalinguistic context in which the poem may be understood. By identifying Mercy, Pity, Peace, and Love as the "four daughters of the voice of God," Jean H. Hagstrom (1964: 82) draws upon the idea of the *Logos* ("the Word") embodied in the world. God's word, embodied in the four virtues, is mirrored by the voice of human prayer entreating their intercession. Through "the elaborating design" of both words and pictorial representation in Blake's etching, language and image iconically combine to embody the four virtues that make the divine human and the human divine.

Blake's third stanza is significantly both the center of the poem, linking the first two stanzas with the last two, and the end of a section in the etching, marked by the living plant crossing beneath it that serves as the ladder enabling Christ to step down as human to rescue men from their distress and men to step up as divine through their shared attributes. What appears linguistically to be reversible metaphor—virtue is God/man :: God/man is virtue—is conceptually rather expressed in the metaphor "the human form divine":

> For Mercy has a human heart
>
> Pity a human face:
>
> And Love, the human form divine,
>
> And Peace, the human dress.

Through the mediation of the central stanza, the statements of the first two stanzas are repeated in the last two as consequences of that mediation. When the divine virtues are revealed in human form, the poem as a whole becomes an icon through which God and man become one.

Haley's need to create the term *metaicon* arises from understanding images, diagrams, and metaphors as icons *in themselves*. Such a view is consistent with accounting for iconicity in conventional semiotic representations. Because my reading of poetic iconicity encompasses more than a semiotic perspective, a poetic icon, I suggest, is produced through an *integration* of the three Peircean components to create the "something else" that makes a poem potentially an icon of reality. Whereas Haley sees poetic metaphor as creating reciprocity between its two domains, I see their coalescence as triggering an emergent structure that leads to making the poem *as a whole* an icon of reality. This emergent structure is most clearly explained by Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) blending theory.

5. Metaphoring as Cognitive Processing

Historic disputes on the nature, role, and function of metaphor as product center on arguments

for and against such things as comparison, similarity, identity, juxtaposition, or class inclusion

(see Holyoak and Stamenković 2018 for a comprehensive review). Such disputes all perceive

metaphor as an entity that can be defined, described, and categorized. Its etymology, however,

points to another way of understanding, rooted in the Greek term μετα-φερειν, "to carry beyond

or across." If one recognizes metaphoring as the activity of mapping elements across domains,

then it can create many different kinds of metaphor.

In cognitive linguistics, a domain is a conceptual entity consisting of a coherent knowledge

structure (Evans 2007). Domains are spatially and temporarily structured idealized cognitive

models (Lakoff, 1987: 281-285; Talmy 2000: 42-47). There are as many domains as can be

humanly conceived: as great as the universe to the minuteness of an atomic element. Domains

are conceptually derived from embodied experience—both sensorily and emotively subjective—

that exists at a subliminal, precategorial level. In Ruskin's example from Dante, the two domains

are nature and human life. The end of life of the leaves falling from the tree is equated with the

end of human life. This equation has become an archetypal motif in our experience.

Metaphorical mapping between domains is not simply a figure of speech but an integral part of

our cognitive processes of understanding.

Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Fauconnier and Turner's

(2002) Conceptual Integration Theory ("blending") define metaphor as a dynamic process

structuring the way we perceive and construe our world experience. According to Conceptual

Metaphor Theory, we understand abstract concepts in terms of concretely embodied image and

orienting schemata, so that we perceive ideas like love and justice in terms of paths and balances,

construing love as a journey and justice as weighing scales.[10] In Conceptual Integration Theory,

we create new emergent structure from fusing or blending shared topology from different

domains, whether they are abstract or concrete. These conceptual approaches inform the role

metaphor plays in iconic representations, but they are not the whole story. The question remains

as to what faculties constrain the selective processes that enable blending to occur.[11]

6. The Hierarchy of Cognitive Metaphoring

Preconscious, precategorial, subliminal elements of sensory-motor-emotive processing,

conceptualization, and their verbalization through linguistic expression constitute embodied

cognition of the self.[12] Like Damasio's distinction of the tripartite self, cognitive linguists have

identified metaphoring as a process consisting of three hierarchical levels, described by Zoltán

Kövecses (2002) as "the supraindividual level corresponding to how a given language and

culture reflects metaphorical patterns, the individual level corresponding to the metaphorical

cognitive system as used by individual speakers of a language, and the subindividual level

corresponding to universal aspects of various kinds of embodiment" (245). In this section, I

attempt to also account for how metaphoric processing occurs to integrate the subliminal,

conceptual, and verbalization of linguistic expression.

At the surface level, metaphor mappings create linguistic expressions, such as the *obstacles*

we encounter as we make our *way* through life, or Shakespeare's opening soliloquy in *Richard*

III, when Richard says "Now is the *winter* of our discontent / Made glorious *summer* by this *sun*

of York" (my emphases). These linguistic metaphors arise from underlying conceptual

metaphors, mappings that enable us to perceive abstract ideas through concrete, embodied

experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). At the deepest level of metaphoring, sensory-motor-

emotive metaphors bind our subliminal, precategorial, sensate interactions with the external

worlds of our experience. By definition, these sensate metaphors lie below the level of our

conscious minds. At this level, iconicity operates as the motivating force for *poesis* ("making").

Consider cognitive metaphoring as a living tree (Fig. 4.2).[13]

Figure 4.2 Cognitive metaphor tree

Linguistic metaphoring exists at the surface, much as the leaves of a tree emerge from its

branches. Conceptual metaphoring constitutes the trunk and branches that support and feed the leaves. Sensory-motor-emotive (sensate) metaphoring constitutes the roots that lie below the surface and without which the tree cannot grow. The leaves depend upon the trunk's branches, and both depend upon the tree's roots. Lying subliminally under the surface of consciousness, the bindings of sensate experiences with elements of the physical and social worlds cannot be formulated in words. Nevertheless, they motivate the production of conceptual metaphors, just as the roots of a tree nourish the tree above ground. Beneath the surface of the cognitive tree lie the pre-conceptual, subliminal roots of sensory, motor, and emotive experiences that feed our conceptual awareness. Just as the living tree survives by drawing sustenance through its roots, so do all our cognitive activities depend on the anima or life force of sensate cognition. And just as the roots of the tree are nourished by the quality of the material components of the earth in which they are embedded, so do sensate experiences draw from the natural, cultural, and social worlds of our environment. As a result, the qualities of aesthetic imagination and judgment arising from sensate cognition enable the flourishing of the physical and spiritual values that give rise to the harmonious balance of self as part of world. Although all three levels of metaphoring exist in poetic forms, it is the root structure of sensate metaphoring that constitutes the motivating force for the creation of a poem.

7. The Ontology of Poetic Metaphor

As we saw in Chapter 3, poetry has been defined variously as a vision, an illusion, an imitation, a semblance of reality. That poetry can create in our minds an image of the world's reality makes it iconic in the semiotic sense; what Wimsatt (1954) describes as "a verbal sign which *somehow*

shares the properties of, or resembles, the object which it denotes" (x). Philosophically, the word

image refers to impressions of all five senses in the conceptual mind. In the broadest sense, a

mapping occurs between our subliminal sensate perceptions of the worlds external to us and our

conversion of these into conscious awareness.[14] We experience the world around us through the

bodily interactions of our five senses (sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell). These sensations are

preconscious. Consider, for instance, the physical sensation of sitting in your chair if that is

where you are as you read this. Now that I have made you aware of that sensation, you are now

conscious of the feeling of the physical touch of your body against the seat of the chair. That

physical sensation didn't just appear when I made you aware of it; it was there all the time. But

by bringing it into consciousness, you have registered the feeling in your thoughts. (You can try

this for all five senses.) Language is the conceptualization of our experience. O'Regan (2011)

notes: "Human language and thought are not just raw symbol manipulation: The concepts that

are manipulated are *constrained by the physical world and the particular way humans interact*

with it" (75; my emphasis).

By transforming the physical into the phenomenal, minding also constrains the way we

approach the world around us. In conceptualizing experience, language begins the process of

abstraction from it. At the level of such abstraction, we can never have direct knowledge of the

"real" world; we can only know our experience of it. As Marius von Senden (1960[1932])

explains: "When I say 'I see a window,' these words are a false account of what I literally see.

For 'window' is not a visual term but a conceptual one. I see not a 'window,' but something

colored, whose specific quality I know to have the meaning 'window'" (298). By failing to

distinguish between an object and its sign, we conflate the two by not differentiating between

them. Unlike everyday language, the poetic function, in Roman Jakobson's (1987) description, occurs "when the word is felt as a word and not a mere representation of the object being named or an outburst of emotive, when words and their composition, their meaning, their external and inner form, acquire a weight and value of their own instead of referring indifferently to reality" (378).[15] The felt "weight and value" of words in poetic discourse arises from suspending an automatic identification between sign and object.

Metaphoring enables us to keep separate the elements of its domains at the same time we derive new meaning from their projection into a new, blended space. As noted earlier in Ruskin's comment, Dante does not confuse spirits falling from the bank of Aceron with leaves falling from the bough of a tree, but rather draws from them their common elements of death to emphasize the souls' "utter lightness, feebleness, passiveness, and scattering agony of despair." In so doing, Dante creates his poetic lines as an icon through which their sensory-motor-emotive elements are invoked. For Jakobson, it is "artifice"—the structural elements of art—that makes a poem an icon. This autonomy of the poetic sign makes it closest to Peirce's icon, the simplest unit of sign that is able to stand alone, and why Wimsatt (1954) refers to poetry as a "verbal icon."

Poetic metaphor is therefore not simply a feature that renders imagery more vivid, nor does it exist only at the conceptual level. It is a structuring process that fuses or blends ception and struction at every level of the cognitive metaphor tree to create the poem as an icon of felt life, as in an Emily Dickinson poem:[16]

> 'Twas here my summer paused
>
> What ripeness after then

To +other scene or other soul

My sentence had begun.

To Winter to remove

With ~~To~~ winter to abide

Go manacle your icicle

Against your Tropic Bride

+ any

The conceptual metaphor structuring the poem is SEASONAL CHANGE IS A LAW SENTENCE. It is governed by the laws of nature and the laws of man. The domain of the source space is that of a human law court at the moment of sentencing a defendant to jail. The domain of the target space is the natural law governing the passing of summer into winter.

In the first stanza, the activity ("summer") of the defendant is stopped ("paused") at the moment of trial ("here") when the "sentence had begun." The intervening lines reinforce a contrast between the sentencing of the defendant to winter's jail while summer's ripeness will be enjoyed by "other/any scene or other soul." The second stanza is the sentence being pronounced. It plays with the language of legal sentencing: "You will go to jail and remain there for [...]" (lines 5-6) and the conditions laid down: "I order you to be chained/placed in solitary confinement [...]" (lines 7-8). This structure highlights pairing across the stanzas, so that the images presented of summer—"ripeness" and "Tropic Bride"—contrast with the icicle of winter that will enchain the defendant.

The domain of the target space involves the dual identification of the poem's voice as both

human and nature that occurs with the first-person pronoun *my*: summer can belong to both human beings and nature. "My sentence" is both the sentence imposed upon the human as defendant and the sentence imposed by nature as judge. This dual identification explains the otherwise puzzling association of "scene" (nature) and "soul" (human) in line 3. It accounts for the otherwise inexplicable switch from *my* in the first stanza to *your* in the last at the same time that it creates a participatory connection between human and natural events. If human, lines 2-3 represent thoughts of northern hemisphere residents in winter thinking of southern hemisphere residents in summer, while as "defendants" their "sentence" to abide "with winter" is beginning. If nature, lines 2-3 represent the southern hemisphere that will take up summer's ripeness abandoned by the northern hemisphere as the earth orbits around the sun. If human, the last two lines of the poem are instructions to winter to keep the condemned prisoner in its icy grip in opposition to summer's heat. If nature, they are instructions to impose the coldness of winter on the northern hemisphere against the southern "Bride" of a tropical summer.[17] This doubleness ofseasonal change as sentencing judge and human as sentenced prisoner entails the sensate feelingsundergirding the idea of winter's onset that motivates the poem.

8. The Role of Metaphor in Poetic Iconicity

How image and diagram might iconically interrelate with metaphor in poetic texts was explored in Masako Hiraga's (1998, 2005) groundbreaking studies on applying blending theory to the role of iconicity and metaphor. By postulating a generic space and a blended space, Fauconnier and Turner (2002) show how the image-schematic structure of the generic space governs the projection of similar (isomorphic and topological) structures in two input spaces to a further,

"blended" space in which new structure emerges—topological information that occurs in neither

input space. What gets projected from what spaces determine the different kinds of possible

blending that can occur:

> In an elaborate typology of networks, four kinds stand out on a continuum of
>
> complexity: *simplex, mirror, single-scope,* and *double-scope*. At the high end of
>
> the continuum of blending complexity, double-scope networks blend inputs with
>
> different (and often clashing) organizing frames to produce creative emergent
>
> frame structure in a blended space. Double-scope blending is what we typically
>
> find in scientific, artistic, and literary discoveries and inventions. Indeed, double-
>
> scope creativity is perhaps the most striking chracteristic of our species. (xiii)

It is important to note Turner's (2014) warning not to assume that blending occurs at the

cosnscious, conceptual level: "essentially all blending is invisible to consciousness" (9). Not only

does blending theory provide a means whereby new information might arise out of old,

accounting for creativity in general, it provides a new way of defining metaphor's role in

creating a poetic icon by formulating Haley's Peircean notion of the metaicon as equivalent to

the emergent structure of double-scope blending and Peirce's "something else."

   Hiraga (2005) describes metaphor as giving iconic meaning to form and iconic form to

meaning. She defines iconicity as a mapping between form and meaning and metaphor as a

mapping between two conceptual spaces of meaning (35). This distinction leads her to separate

iconicity from metaphor, finding iconic moments in metaphor and metaphoric moments in

iconicity. Hiraga suggests that "grammatical metaphor" is the bridge that links Peirce's image to

diagram: "these metaphors, more or less, concern the relationship of form and meaning in

grammatical conventions (e.g. phonology, morphology, word formation and word order)" (41).[18]

Like Haley's, Hiraga's semiotic theory focuses on the role of metaphor *within* a poem. My focus

is on the poem as a psychological gestalt. The poem as a whole creates a complex blend: the

double-scope process by which multiple blends, whether parallel or successive, create

"optimality crossovers" into each others' input spaces when "running" the blend (M. Freeman

2005).

I propose that in art forms, the emergent meaning of the blend becomes iconic when both the

structural and relational mappings between image (cept) and diagram (struct) are metaphoric.[19]

Fauconnier and Turner (2002) note that conceptual integrations (blendings) are not necessarily

metaphoric in nature, although they all share the same mapping schemes, "regardless of whether

the ultimate meanings are flatly literal, poetically metaphorical, scientifically analogical,

surrealistically suggestive, or opaque" (154). Many blendings involve a simple transfer of

properties from one domain to the other, as in role assignment in "Paul is the father of Sally" or

identity transfer, as in James McCawley's famous statement, "I dreamed I was Brigitte Bardot

and I kissed me." In metaphorical blending, by contrast, as Seana Coulson and Teenie Matlock

(2001) note, "metaphor comprehension requires the *transformation* rather than the pure *transfer*

of properties from one domain to another" (306; my emphases). They cite a headline referring to

the movie *Titanic*: "Titanic: Unsinkable After All" (299-300). Although the actual ship

physically sank, the movie in winning an Oscar succeeded and therefore did not sink. Here the

term *sink* has transformed its meaning from the physical act of drowning to the conceptual idea

of failure, resulting in the conceptual metaphor FAILING IS SINKING / SUCCEEDING IS NOT

SINKING. When such metaphorical transformation occurs in the isomorphic structure of the

generic space, Fauconnier and Turner's instances of "poetically metaphorical" occur. For

instance, in Shakespeare's "Now is the winter of our discontent," the blending of elements from

the two input spaces of natural seasons and human feelings occur through a shared structure in

the generic space that is metaphorical, not identical. That is, *winter* is structurally composed of

the negative, physical attributes of severe coldness and death, whereas *discontent* is structurally

composed of the negative, emotive attributes of deprivation and unpleasantness. When such a

metaphorical relation exists in the generic space, iconicity may occur (Fig. 4.3).

Figure 4.3 Poetic iconicity blending model
Based on Fauconnier and Turner (2002)

The blending diagram for poetic iconicity may be seen as an upside-down cognitive metaphor

tree. At the level of the generic space, sensate metaphoring is subliminal. Its metaphoric

expression does not appear linguistically within the poem, but motivates conceptual metaphoric

mapping between the domains of the input spaces. Projections from these mappings to the

blended space create the actual poem through the emergence of Haley's (1988) "*reciprocal,*

teleological congruency" that marks the poetic icon (38).

The icon-blending diagram is an abstract model. That is, the elements of the input spaces in poetic metaphor both share the integration of cept and struct. However, with double-scope blending, the organizing frames for the input spaces operate differently. For instance, in Dickinson's Summer-Winter poem, it is the legal structs of the source space that enable the running of the blend that makes the sentencing seen from the perspectives of both judge and defendant. Similarly, it is the source structs of the seasons of winter and summer that enable Shakespeare's target of Richard's discontent and the pun on the sun/son of York. This becomes clear in Brandt and Brandt's (2005) semiotic account of Fauconnier and Turner's model that constructs "a mental space architecture" to include "diagrammatic elements that ground the meaning in discourse" (241). Their "virtual space" in my modification is the emergent structure of Peirce's "pure icon" that results in the actual poem (Fig. 4.4).

Figure 4.4 Semiotic poetic iconicity model
Based on Brandt (2004)

Through a network of multiple mappings, the conceptual integration of elements in mental spaces can, in some instances, produce a blended space which has "emergent structure," something that exists in none of the other spaces but which emerges from the blend. In poetic iconicity, this emergence is the poem itself. Discussions of the role of metaphor in poetry necessarily focus on the conceptual and linguistic levels, since the underlying sensate level that is below the level of consciousness cannot be articulated directly. Although it is the sensory-motor-emotive level that motivates the poet, whose cognitive processes of creativity work upward from the roots through the trunk to the leaves of the cognitive metaphor tree, the respondents to a poem work downward from the linguistic leaves through the conceptual trunk to its sensory-motor-emotive roots.

That the motivating metaphor of the generic space is "hidden" is what enables a poem to exist as a possible potentiality of Peirce's "pure icon." The metaphor of the generic space is already the result of a metonymically binding process of blending that occurs below the level of conceptual awareness. As the poet is motivated by this subliminal process to formulate the images and structures of the poem in language, so do its respondents intuit and realise the possibilities it presents through their own blending processes.[20] In this way, a poem may be seen, like Anglo-Saxon riddle poetry, as expressing metaphorically the actual world of sensate experience that is not expressed linguistically (Greenfield and Calder 1986: 269; Frye 1976: 141). In her poem "Metaphors," Sylvia Plath's (1981) image of pregnancy expresses a truth about the trope captured by blending theory: the creation of something new, the birth of new meaning brought into existence by means of the metaphoring process. Neither the feelings associated with the physical event of human pregnancy nor the birth of something new are

actually mentioned in Plath's poem.

<div style="text-align: center">

Metaphors

I'm a riddle in nine syllables,

An elephant, a ponderous house,

A melon strolling on two tendrils,

O red fruit, ivory, fine timbers!

This loaf's big with its yeasty rising.

Money's new-minted in this fat purse.

I'm a means, a stage, a cow in calf.

I've eaten a bag of green apples,

Boarded the train there's no getting off.

</div>

The invitation to solve the riddle is all the reader needs initially to motivate the metaphorical mappings in the poem. The three levels of metaphoring—sensory-emotive, conceptual, and linguistic—map onto the cognitive metaphor tree (Fig. 4.5).

linguistic metaphors reflecting nine months of human pregnancy

conceptual metaphor: POETRY IS PREGNANT

subliminal sensate metaphors of feeling pregnant

Figure 4.5 Cognitive metaphor tree for Plath's "Metaphors"

As respondents, we work downward from the linguistic to the sensory-motor-emotive level. We interpret the first three metaphors, "An elephant, a ponderous house, / A melon strolling on two tendrils," as images related to pregnancy: the extra weight that causes a lumbering gait, the container of the stomach becoming huge and massive, the appearance of the pregnant woman with huge belly on legs that appear stalk-like by comparison. The blend that creates the metaphor "[I am] An elephant" projects the image of an elephant as "ponderous" into the blend that creates the metaphor "[I am] a ponderous house" and the image of a moving elephant into the blend that creates the metaphor "[I am] A melon strolling […]." In Plath's poem, the nine metaphors that map the identity of the speaker—riddle, elephant, house, melon, loaf, purse, means, stage, cow— are themselves the result of various blended spaces but also serve as input spaces to the elaboration that takes place in "running" the overall blend, including the nine letters of the title, the nine lines, each with nine syllables, that constitute the poem itself, all standing for the nine months' gestation period for childbirth. To understand the ideas expressed in the final two lines of the poem, "I've eaten a bag of green apples, / Boarded the train there's no getting off," we adopt Eubanks' (1999) "licensing stories": "our repertoire of ideologically inflected narratives, short and long, individual and cultural, that organize our sense of how the world works and how the world should work" (426). Our own experience of the discomfort felt from eating unripe fruit enables us to share the negative feelings of the speaker who has eaten a whole "bag" of them, and the feeling of inevitability—that this is something that once set in motion cannot be undone—is communicated by the image of a moving train that has no exit doors.[21]

At the conceptual metaphorical level, the process of creating the poem iconically unites the semantic and structural components in such a way that the poem itself becomes an icon

through which we can understand the reality of poetic creation. Semiotically, the subcomponents

of struct and cept are both contained within the two domains of the conceptual metaphor POETIC

ACTIVITY IS BEING PREGNANT, so that the subliminal sensate elements that underlie both the

creation of poetry and the idea of childbirth fuse into the blend that is the poem (Fig. 4.6).

Figure 4.6 Blending model for Plath's "Metaphors"

In Plath's "Metaphors," on one level, the riddle is answered by "a pregnant woman," but on

another the answer is "metaphor," and on yet another, "the poem" itself. Plath's poem is an icon

of the way metaphor becomes the generic structure for the emergence of poetic creation,

embodied in the metaphor of childbirth.

When one focuses on metaphor as product, problems surface as to whether a metaphor

should be considered as a testable model of reality or taken literally when used poetically. On the

other hand, focusing on the metaphor as process shows how metaphoring is hierarchical in

nature, from the cognitive levels of subliminally sensate to conceptual to linguistic expression. In

art forms, instead of focusing on metaphor usage within a poem, I conceive of metaphoring as

the generic structure of blending theory that enables the creation of the poem as an icon of

something beyond itself. In Blake's poem, that emergent structure is the unity of God and man. In Dickinson's poem, it creates a dual identification of the poetic voice as both human and nature. In Plath's poem, it becomes an icon of poetic creation itself, embodied in the metaphor of childbirth. By metaphorically integrating more closely the sensate effects of prosodic features with the grammatical and imagistic elements of a poetic text, the poet creates for us an icon of reality. As we descend more deeply toward the sensory-motor-emotive level of the cognitive metaphor tree, the next chapter picks up the role of sensate schemata that undergird conceptual metaphoring.

---

1. Having created a metaphor in a letter, Emily Dickinson wrote: "That's what they call a metaphor in our country. Don't be afraid of it, sir, it won't bite." She then extends this metaphor to include her dog Carlo as "the noblest work of Art" that does bite. (L34, Johnson 1965: 92)

2. Turbayne's and Lakoff and Johnson's seminal publications have been increasingly influential across various disciplines, such as psychoanalysis, where the literalization of metaphor can affect both analysands and analysts (Carveth 1984).

3. There is evidence in Descartes' writings that he may not have taken his model of "mind as thing" literally (Skirry 2005).

4. Conceptual metaphors and schemata are rendered in SMALL CAPITALS to distinguish them from their manifestations in linguistic expressions.

5. In a study of the brain's interaction with its environment, J. Kevin O'Regan (2011) provides empirical evidence that sensory feelings are not representations in the brain but rather actively engage with and manipulate the sensory information we receive from the world outside ourselves. See also Mark Rowlands' (2010) theory of the "amalgamated" mind.

6. The danger in such an approach manifests itself in educational fiscal policies that, while giving lip service to the importance of the arts, nevertheless cut creative programs as marginal.

7. The passage Ruskin quotes is from stanza 6 of *Christabel*, ll. 49-50 (E. Coleridge 1912). The leaf is in fact not dancing, but still adhering to its branch, without wind to shake it loose:

> There is not wind enough to twirl
>
> The one red leaf, the last of its clan,
>
> That dances as often as dance it can,
>
> Hanging so light, and hanging so high,
>
> On the topmost twig that looks up at the sky.

8. Although Haley does not reference Roman Jakobson on the literary icon (though he does comment on his theory of the "metaphoric and metonymic poles"), nor Lakoff and Johnson's theory of conceptual metaphor, nevertheless on many levels his study is compatible with theirs. Haley's treatment of the poetic metaicon resonates with Jakobson's (1987) claim that the poetic function is characterized by iconic manifestations.

9. For controversies concerning the bidirectionality of metaphor, see the special issue of *Poetics Today* (Goodblatt and Glicksohn 2017), Bruhn's (2018a) response to Glicksohn (2018), and Strack (2019).

10. Not all metaphoring has the concrete-to-abstract directionality identified in conceptual metaphor theory. Yeshayahu Shen (1995) identifies saliency as an additional component of directionality in the semantic structure of metaphors.

11. Bruhn (2018b) shows how conceptual selection involved in blending is both constituted and constrained by Deacon's (2012) formulation of ententional processes.

12. A great deal of literature exists on the conscious and unconscious self. See Schaefer and

Northoff (2017) for a useful if brief survey on the neural substrates of the self.

13. Owen's (1992) similar description for the Chinese notion of *wen* provides independent

evidence for my formulation: "In the common organic tree metaphor for literature, *wen* is the

visible outward pattern of the leaves, which, observed carefully, reveals the hidden shape of the

trunk and branches: *wen* is the organic external manifestation of some substance [*chih**] or

'natural principle' [*li**] (e.g., growth or "treeing"]" (594).

14. More specifically, the process at the subliminal level involves metonymic binding (Strack

2019: 31-49).

15. By "indifferently," Jakobson means "lack of differentiation."
16. The difficulty of attempting a cognitive analysis is compounded when only a transcript exists

(*ATr41; F1771/J1756*). This poem, whose original manuscript is lost, was transcribed by

Millicent Todd and reviewed and corrected by Mabel Loomis Todd, indicated by the substitution

of "to" by "With." The transcript captures Dickinson's practice of placing a cross by a word or

phrase that is then given possible alternatives (variants) below.

17. Helen Vendler (2010) reads Dickinson's poem in terms of human sexuality (518-519).
Dickinson may very well have in mind the opening soliliquy in *Richard 111*, Act 1, scene 1:

"Now is the winter of our discontent / Made summer by this sun of York." Richard contrasts his

brother King Edward's ability to luxuriate in the ripeness of sex whereas he, condemned by his

disfigurement—"Cheated of feature by dissembling nature"—, is determined to become a villain.

The notion of Richard's wintry discontent opposed to Edward as summer's "sun/son" of York is

suggestive for Dickinson's oppositions. Rebecca Patterson (1979), describing the poem as

"rather curious," writes that "in two frantic closing lines the poet threatens to come as 'Tropic

Bride' and melt the beloved's icicle breast" (188). Patterson is reading "against" as physical

proximity whereas I see it as being in opposition to.

18. Line Brandt (2013) identifies seven types of iconicity in poetry under the rubric of *enunciation*:

    phonetic, syntactic, line break, performative, rhythmic, rhetorical, and graphic.

19. See the discussion of Talmy's analysis of *cept* and *struct* as replacements for *image* and *diagram* in

    Chapter 2.

20. Whether the cognitive processes involved in metaphor production and comprehension are the

same or different has not as yet been resolved (Bruhn 2018a; Glicksohn 2018).

21. The reference in line 9 to "the" (not "a") train followed by "there's no getting off" invites the

idea that Plath has a specific train in mind. In the blend, this train becomes a metaphor for an

irreversible pregnancy. Readers who perceive an echo of the deportation of Jews in cattle cars

may be justified in doing so, given the negative tone of the final two lines and their knowledge of

Plath's feelings about the Holocaust. For the poem itself, the train becomes a metaphor for the

inevitability of its composition, once started.

CHAPTER 5   SCHEMA

For a poem to become an icon of reality, more than simply linguistic and conceptual elements

are at work. As we saw in the metaphor tree hierarchy, sensory-motor-emotive elements

undergird the conceptual. These sensate elements are represented by embodied schemata that

reveal the preconceptual, subliminal levels of cognitive processing and that constitute the basis

for metaphorical mapping. In this chapter, I focus on the ways schemata bind the sensate

elements of cognitive metaphoring in poetic discourse by revisiting Plath's poem, "Metaphors."

After giving examples of poetic use of schemata in poems by Li Bai and Elizabeth Bishop, I end

by showing how schema defines Frost's and Dickinson's poetics.

      Schemata lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conception.

                                             Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*

As we probe deeper into the roots of the cognitive metaphor tree (Fig. 4.2), we move into the

subliminal, preconscious elements of our experience. The question of how we can articulate the

inarticulate is paradoxical; to bring our sensate cognitions into awareness is to conceptualize

them as feelings (Damasio 1999). Nevertheless, as psychologists and neuroscientists explore the

human brain in all its cognitive manifestations, we can discover more about these sensate aspects

of human cognition (Damasio et al. 2000; Forgas 2000; Frijda et al. 2000; LeDoux 1998;

O'Regan 2011). Much recent work in the cognitive sciences has revolutionized the Cartesian

dichotomy, what Terrence Deacon (2012) describes as the "wound that severed mind from body

at the birth of modern science" (544). Subsequent research has explored further the implications

of embodiment, such as 4e cognition: embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended; or DEEDS:

dynamical, embodied, extended, distributed, and situated (Wheeler 2005).[1] Both theories treat

mind as an object being worked upon and an active process of minding.[2] Instead of engaging

with arguments over the status of such theories, I focus on the structures of schemata that

motivate a poet's imaginative faculty to create an iconic link between language and reality.

1. Probing Sensate Cognition

Underlying conceptual metaphors, schemata structure our subliminal embodied experiences and

conceptualizing awareness of our being part of the physical world. Mark Johnson (1987) defines

a schema as "*the structure of a schematizing activity of imagination in time*" (153; original

emphasis), noting that "there is a preconceptual activity in which imagination freely grasps

something of the meaning and significance of an object or experience, even though there is no

conceptual way to express this insight" (163). He explores the Kantian notion that "categories (as

pure concepts) can apply to sensible intuitions (as empirical)" through schematism (152):

> They operate at one level of generality and abstraction above concrete, rich
>
> images. A schema consists of a small number of parts and relations, by virtue of
>
> which it can structure indefinitely many perceptions, images, and events. In sum,
>
> image schemata operate at *a level of mental organization that falls between*
>
> *abstract propositional structures, on the one side, and particular concrete*
>
> *images, on the other*. (29; my emphasis)

Johnson's concept of a schema arises from the principles of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, in

which conventional conceptual metaphors like *life* are abstractions understood in concrete terms

like *journey*. Etymologically, *concrete* comes from the past participle of Latin *concrescere*, "to

grow together, harden," hence a material thing; *abstract* from the past participle of Latin

abstrahere, "to pull away from, remove," hence not related to something material. Linguists

prefer to speak of terms denoting concrete objects as scalar in generalization. For instance, "my

computer chair" refers to a specific, physical object; "chair" to a category of items for sitting;

whereas "furniture" is more generalized, including "chair" within its category. In the metaphor

LIFE IS A JOURNEY, the word *journey* is at the more generalized end of the scale, since it can

refer to many different types of journey. A journey, furthermore, is not material like a concrete

object, but a conceptualization of a physical activity. How, then, is the word *life* different? We certainly experience life, love, beauty, or justice in their physical manifestations. They are more "abstract" than words like *journey* because they refer more innerly to our sensory-motor-emotiveexperiences, hence toward the roots of our subliminal, precategorial cognitive processes.

Schemata structure the underlying, preconscious elements of our sensate experiences at the basis of all human minding. The neural and bodily processes of sensory experience, motor function, and emotive forces bind together interactively to create the unity that is both the unconscious and conscious self. John Dewey (1981[1896]) recognized this coordination of functions in the activity of seeing:

> Upon analysis, we find that we begin not with a sensory stimulus, but with a sensorimotor coordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the movement of body, head and eye muscles determining the quality of what is experienced. In other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a Sensation of light. (97; quoted in Menary 2016)

In his study on the sensorimotor elements of seeing, O'Regan (2011) notes: "Human language and thought are not just raw symbol manipulation: The concepts that are manipulated are constrained by the physical world and the particular way humans interact with it" (75). This interaction, O'Regan claims, occurs through *dynamic* engagement between our sensory perceptions and the external world, so that seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling are governed and guided by both our sensorimotor experiences and the physical world (28).

Schemata thus operate in two ways: to jointly structure our subliminal sensate cognition and conceptual awareness, and to connect them with the physical world. Johnson (1987) identifies sixteen image schemata among many others that are "*pervasive, well-defined, and full of internal structure to constrain our understanding and reasoning*" (126; original emphasis). Schematic operation may be seen as the binding of cept and struct as a unified whole.

Commenting on Kant's demand that "a schema be both intellectual and sensuous," Marc Champagne (forthcoming) argues that "the faculty of the understanding does not require any schemata to render the deliverances of sensibility intelligible." To think of the Kantian faculties as separate implies the need for a "missing link," or hierarchical, as a "ladder" between the two. Champagne suggests instead the analogy of a sponge in water, whereby "sensibility soaks in understanding." The schema operating between sponge and water is one of OSMOSIS, whereby both elements share structure that enables diffusion between the two. Sponge and water, however, are still separate entities. As we saw in the previous chapter, mapping connects elements across domains through various kinds of correspondences while still maintaining them as discrete and separate entities. The sensate and the conceptual, on the other hand, are co-responding, participating aspects of the cognitive faculty and are thus integrated into a unified whole through binding, which is, Daniel Strack (2019) suggests, "the crucial process that fuses the multimodal minutiae of sense perception into concepts."[3] The schematic processes that integrate Damasio's protoself, core consciousness, and extended consciousness are best characterized through the phenomenon of binding. Talmy's unified notion of ception and the parameters of structuration are schematically bound in the development of human cognition.

2. Schema as Correlation of Self and World

As bipedal beings, we stand and move upright, balanced on either side by symmetrical pairs that help us maintain a dynamic equilibrium of forces. We are evolutionally endowed with two legs and feet, two arms and hands, two eyes, two ears, the two hemispheres of our brains. All operate to create a unified sense, the "raw feel," of experience. Our eyes, for example, give us stereoscopic vision, our ears stereophonic sound. Internal organs regulate our rhythmic pulse rate, assimilate the air we breathe, digest the food we eat, retain what our bodies need and expel the remainder. Sinha and de Lòpez (2000) describe this embodied experience as follows: "The human body (and nervous system) interaction with the physical (and social) world is the

universal source of image schemas (and event schemas, force dynamic and motion schemas)"

(21). That interaction is two-way: we both manipulate and are manipulated by our environment

(O'Regan 2011: 75).

Image schemata represent the different ways we bodily interact with our environment. Some

are structures of motion, such as BALANCE, CONTAINER, PATH, and CYCLE; some orient our

bodies deictically, such as NEAR-FAR and CENTER-PERIPHERY; others are structures of force,

such as COMPULSION, BLOCKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, RESTRAINT REMOVAL. Each schema carries

with it the potentiality of its opposite: balance against imbalance, linearity against circularity,

obstruction against restraint removal.

3. Schema as Constraint on Experience

In our daily activities, we are not aware of just how much schemata structure our conceptual,

physical, sensory, and emotional engagement with the world. That realization manifested itself

during a hike I took with two friends and a Belgian Malinois. Hiking automatically invokes the

PATH schema. Its image-schematic structure is a linear line that connects two points with

connecting points along the way:

<div align="center">A||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||B</div>

As Johnson (1987) notes, a physical path is "not inherently directional—a path connecting point

A with point B does not necessarily go in one direction. But human beings have purposes in

traversing paths, so they tend to experience them as directional" (114). The PATH schema is the

internal structure that creates correlations between the two parts of the conceptual metaphor

PURPOSES ARE PHYSICAL GOALS because they both share the same internal *isomorphic* structure

of an initial state, a final desired state, and movement from one to the other (115-116).

Whereas physical and conventional metaphorical activities utilize the PATH schema in

predictable and taken-for-granted ways—obstacles in our way, avenues to explore, directions to

take—poetic metaphor does something different. The challenge is to discover and then explain

what that difference may be. First, we need to consider schema's role in binding physical sensory

experiences with conceptual minding. The significance of our hike lay in the fact that, without at first realizing it, our individual PATH schemata shared the same goal but had different purposes.

Our shared goal was to hike from the trailhead (point A) to the place we had left ("spotted") one of our cars (point B). However, because we each had a different purpose, we were following our trail/path/way experience according to different structural PATH schemata that related goals to locations. Polly's goal was to find and follow previously taken trails, Leslie's to follow the GPS coordinates, mine for the exercise. Meanwhile, Leslie's dog Beau, trained in search and rescue, was inerrantly finding his way sensorily toward the car we had spotted. At one point, Polly's purpose in finding an old trail sent her in the opposite direction from Leslie's GPS. That made me think of how we were all operating: Polly intuitively, Leslie scientifically, Beau sensorily, myself experientially. I was torn between Leslie's scientific guidance versus Polly's memories. When we realized our different purposes, Leslie adjusted hers to fit Polly's, Polly's benefited from the general direction of Leslie's GPS, and Beau and I simply went along for sensory enjoyment.

Our hiking experience manifests the PATH schema operating in an actual, physical way. But the PATH schema also underlies metaphorical expressions that constitute our thinking about more generalized experiences (Gibbs 2013). Building on Johnson's observation that schemata constitute and constrain our experience, understanding, and reasoning, I propose that schemata structurally bind our preconscious sensate processes with our conscious conceptualizations.

4. The Role of Schema in Imagination and Language

Empirical evidence supports the connection language makes between subconscious cognitive processes and experience of the environment. Although Raymond W. Gibbs (2017) does not mention schemata as such, his examples of embodied simulation experiments all involve direction, movement, and orient schemata. For instance, these schemata determine how fast people respond to a picture of a nail after reading sentences like "The carpenter hammered the

nail into the wall" (horizontal) and "The carpenter hammered the nail into the floor" (vertical):

"One interpretation of these findings is that people automatically project a mental image of an

object in its appropriate spatial orientation in light of what the sentence implies" (223).

Directional, movement, and orient schemata also govern embodied simulation through written language (225). Experiments show that, given a prompt like "the girl pushed the boy," writing systems constrain the way speakers respond. For languages with left-to-right directional writing systems, speakers respond more quickly to pictures that place the girl on the left of the frame; forthose with right-to-left directional writing systems, speakers respond more quickly to pictures that place the girl to the right of the frame (224-225). Since schemata undergird metaphorical constructions, it is no surprise that, as Gibbs notes, language metaphoring is "significantly grounded in embodied action and experience" (227). The "mental image" people have in response to these prompts is a consequence of underlying schemata that point to the subliminal sensate features of cognitive processing.[4]

A significant difference between the ways Polly and Leslie were operating resides in their

mapping strategies: Leslie was relying on the physical dimensions of her GPS coordinates, Polly

on her memory of past hikes. O'Regan (2011) explains the difference this way:

> Imagining and seeing are essentially the same, sharing the same basic properties
>
> of actively exploring and accessing information. The only difference is that
>
> whereas imagining finds its information in memory, seeing finds it in the
>
> environment. One could say that vision is a form of imagining, augmented by the
>
> real world. The experienced "presence" of seeing as compared to imagining
>
> derives from the fact that the environment is much richer than imagination, and
>
> from the fact that in addition to this richness, vision has bodiliness,
>
> insubordinateness, and grabbiness. (66)

The "presence" of seeing is determined by O'Regan's four ways in which we engage with the

world: *richness*—the reality of the physical world; *bodiliness*—the "intimate link between body

motions and resulting sensory input"; *insubordinateness*—that "sensory input not controlled by

one's body"; and *grabbiness*—"an alerting mechanism that grabs cognitive processing when

sudden outside events occur" (31). Sensory experiences, O'Regan says, "possess these

propertiesstrongly, whereas thoughts and automatic neural functions do not" (165):

> We should not think of feel as something that happens to us, but rather as a thing
>
> that we do. This means that the quality of sensory feel, the impression we have, is

> the quality of our way of interacting with the environment. As a quality, it is
>
> something abstract and therefore not something that can be generated in any way,
>
> let alone by the brain. […] Raw feels are ineffable because interactions our bodies
>
> have with the environment are complex: *We do not have cognitive access to every*
>
> *single detail of the interactions*. (181-182; my emphasis)

In contrast to our physical and conceptual applications of schematic processing, the challenge

for the poet is to discover ways we can manipulate the words of our language to revitalize

imagining into O'Regan's "'presence' of seeing": to create an intimate, intuitive feeling for the

"presence" of the world's sensory plenitude. If successful, a poem works by enabling our

imagination to more directly access and *empathize* with our sensory experiences (M. Smith

2014):

> Empathy is a kind of imagining; in particular it is a type of *personal* or *central*
>
> imagining. Such imagining takes the form of imagining perceiving or more
>
> generally experiencing events, in contrast to *impersonal* or *acentral* imagining,
>
> where we imagine that certain events have taken or are taking place, but without
>
> imagining that we perceive or experience them. In centrally imaging a situation,
>
> we mentally *simulate* experiencing it. (100; original emphases)

When we "think" of the concept *journey*, we do not actually "imagine" a specific journey.

Murray Smith's *central imagining* occurs when poets simulate sensate perceptions. Schemata are

the processes by which such central imaginal simulation of experience occurs. Just as the poet

simulates sensory experience, so the respondent is invited to share in that experience. When such

simulation is successfully shared, then the poem acts as an icon for the reality—Peirce's

"something else"—beyond the words.

5. Schema as Internalizing Sensate Structure in Poetry

A schema produces the isomorphic relationship between the two domains of metaphor that

motivate all the elements of a poem in the creation of an icon of felt reality. Consider, for instance, diarrhea, the term used to describe a physical condition of bodily excretion. Its symptoms occur when the stool loses its normal compositionality and becomes watery, often creating an urgent need for expulsion. Experiencing diarrhea is unpleasant. When I say that a friend has verbal diarrhea, I am creating a relationship between the forms that physical diarrhea take and the kind of incessant stream of talk that appears to be involuntary and urgent, evidenced by the speed of delivery and the intonational pressures of the speech act. This is of course a metaphor, produced by blending a bodily function and a speech act. Experiencing diarrhea is unpleasant for the victim, the one experiencing it in physical terms and the one experiencing it metaphorically. What enables the analogy to work is the principle of isomorphism.

In the metaphor, the relations mapped between the person with diarrhea and the person experiencing another's verbal speech are not equivalent. Total isomorphism, as several researchers have noted, would create complete identity, which is impossible, both in the real world and in natural language (Holyoak and Thagard 1995: 29-31; Rudrauf and Damasio 2005: 238; Lehmann 2007: 11). Even though we identify a certain species at our bird feeders as song sparrows, each bird has its own individual identity. The experience of phenomenal reality is more complex than any language can hope to encapsulate. This complexity of life is why Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) blending theory reduces complex ideas to human scale and why Langer (1967) attributes so much importance to the simpler forms of art, since in its semblance of felt life, it enables us to construct "a concept of mind adequate to the living actuality" (244).

The isomorphic principle of relating schematic structures through binding enables metaphoric mapping. The question then becomes how schemata specifically operate to structure the underlying sensate levels that motivate a poet's conceptual and linguistic metaphors. As we saw in the previous chapter, Plath's poem is doing more than expressing the sensate experience of pregnancy. Given the focus of its title, "Metaphors," the concept of a pregnant woman becomes the source for the target of writing poetry, so that the structuring metaphor governing

the poem is WRITING POETRY IS BEING PREGNANT. The schemata underlying this conceptual

metaphor reveal the sensate, affective dimensions of the poem. Sensate impressions in poetry

occur primarily through the prosodic rhythms and sounds of language. This "auditory

imagination," in T. S. Eliot's (1964) words, is "the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating

far below the conscious levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word" (118-119).

The schemata of CONTAINER, MASS, PROCESS, BALANCE and ITERATION structure both

domains of pregnancy and poetry. Plath's poem is a type of blend in which its organizing frame

comes from the pregnancy space. However, there is an additional relation between the two input

spaces of pregnancy and poetry.[5] That relation isomorphically links pregnancy and poetry

through their shared ITERATION schema in the poetic repetition of nines, marking the nine

months of gestation. ITERATION, the regular patterning of repeated rhythmic sound, operates to

create rhythmical BALANCE as a semblance of the pulsing regularity of our heartbeats.

In Plath's poem, variations of stress placement and sound patterning create a feeling of

imbalance that results from the elephant, house, and melon images mirroring the weightiness,

shape, and unsteady movement of a pregnant woman. This imbalance is resolved in the line "O

red fruit, ivory, fine timbers!" Rhythmically, after the initial strong stress "Ó" onset, the line is

balanced by the strong-weak /xx pattern of *ívory* (representing the elephant) and *fíne tímbers*

(representing the house) after the strong stress pattern *réd frúit* (representing the melon). The

associations of sound structures within the line, with the continuous and periodic [r], [n], [m]

accompanying the fricative [f] and voiced consonants [d] and [b] create a sonic rather than

dissonant balance (Tsur ms.)

The poem's "I" maps onto woman and poet through the vital relation of identity. The images

of elephant, house, and melon map onto the woman's belly and the poem's body through the

CONTAINER and MASS schemata. These schemata enable projection from the two input spaces

into a blended space in which the potential child becomes the potential poem. The "something

else" that typifies this emergent structure in the blended space is the "I" that becomes the poem

itself, its riddle being the role of metaphoring as process in its creation. Finally, the PROCESS schema governs both the images of the final two lines: in the sensate discomfort of being pregnant and the labor of writing poetry represented by eating too many green apples, and in the motion of an unstoppable train as the physical process of a pregnancy and an intensional commitment to producing a poem. The use of *intensity* rather than *intention* indicates not meaning "intended" by creative writers but signaling reflective and subliminal sensate experiences, which, if successful, evoke affective responses in the respondent.[6]

6. PATH and VERTICALITY Schemata in Li Bai's *Shudaonan*

In China, the Qinling, Micang, and Daba mountain ranges create a formidable East-West barrier separating the Wei river valley (Guanzhong) from the Sichuan plain. The plank roads built in ancient times to cross these mountain ranges from East to West are called the Roads to Shu (Jupp n.d.). The Shu Road is the subject of a famous Tang dynasty poem by Li Bai called *Shudaonan*—literally "Shu-way-difficulty."[7] Many variations exist as to how the written form of the poem appears (Chan n.d.). In classical Chinese, characters are written vertically from top to bottom and read from right to left. The following two representations of the Chinese poem show how PATH and VERTICALITY schemata interact in the poem (Fig. 5.1).

Horizontally oriented text   *Vertically oriented text*

Figure 5.1 Shudoanan images (Courtesy of Jialong Zhao)

As Zhao Jialong (2011) explains, Li Bai creates elongated irregular lines by diverging from the five- or seven-character verse-lines characteristic of T'ang Dynasty poetry. The lines marked in the horizontally oriented text trace the irregular linear movement of the PATH schema through the poem. In the vertically oriented text, the VERTICALITY schema becomes paramount, with the poem's route traversing high mountain peaks. With the rotation, Zhao writes,

> the seemingly irregular and disordered lines now become a picture of mountain
> with high peaks and deep valleys. It is just the scenery the poet wants to describe,
> which effectively demonstrates the danger and difficulty of the road to the Shu
> kingdom. The shape of *Shudaonan* is closely related to the theme of the poem.
> (23)

The Chinese character representing difficulty in pinyin is *nan*, reflected in the poem's title and repeated twice in a phrase that repeats three times at the beginning, middle, and end of the poem.

"The initials and finals of 'Nan' is the same 'n' whose pronunciation," according to Zhao, "requires the airstream burst out of lung and resonance of nose and oral," reflecting in breath and sound the sensory difficulties of traversing the difficult and unpredictable path (16). The vertical version in its left-to-right form in Fig. 5-1 is also a variant from the poem's original written form, that is, from right to left, a schematic orientation that mirrors the actual direction of the physical route the traveler is taking from East to West across the mountain ranges.

Zhao's cognitive analysis of Li Bai's poem shows how the irregular patterns of high and low tones, rhythms, and rhymes that constantly shift in their movement throughout the poem reinforce the sensate experiences of traveling the Shu Road. Although English translations of the poem cannot capture these schematic details, nevertheless a translation, "The Perilous Shu Road" by Frederick Turner and Chinese scholar Y. D., manages to capture through PATH and VERTICALITY schemata the sensate elements of traversing the Shu road.[8] The length of the translated poem—74 lines as compared to the 27 lines of the original—compensates for the lack

of the visual up-down VERTICALITY schema by reinforcing the linear PATH schema. The

repetitions of *nan* are rendered as *perilous, dreadful,* and *harder*. Its three occurrences in the

poem are translated as: "The road to Shu is the most dreadful way, / Harder to climb than is the

deep blue sky." This contrast between road and sky is reinforced throughout the poem by the

VERTICALITY and PATH schemata that underlie the sensate descriptions of the attempt to traverse

the Shu road, as a brief analysis of the following section shows.

> The western face of Mount Tai Bai
>
> > is where the wild birds fly,
>
> Migrants that find their way across
>
> > the summit of E Mei.
>
> It's said the mountain broke and fell   15
>
> > in a great landslide
> >
> > and many brave men died
>
> And afterward the stair of heaven was joined
>
> > to the cliff causeway.
>
> Above, a peak so high   20
>
> > the six swift dragons of the sun must veer aside;
>
> Below, a rushing flood whose churning waves
>
> > turn back in whirlpools on themselves.
>
> Even the yellow crane can not pass here,
>
> > whose element's the sky;   25
>
> The very apes wish they could cross,
>
> > but fear to climb so high.
>
> So spiraled round is Qi Ni Pinnacle,
>
> To climb a hundred steps takes nine

> whole circuits of the stone;   30
>
> You touch Orion, Gemini,
>
> you look up, hold your breath
>
> —You stroke your overburdened chest
>
> —you heave a long deep sigh.   (ll. 11-34)

The immense height of the mountain ranges is expressed through the images of up/down and above/below that characterize the VERTICALITY schema. Invocation of the "face" of Mount Tai Bai, followed by the "summit" of E Mei, then "a peak so high" to the "spiral" of Qi Ni Pinnacle reinforces the sense of increasing heights, culminating in the descriptive detail of effort in a PATH schema that "takes nine / whole circuits of the stone" to climb one hundred steps. "So high" are the peaks reaching far into the "deep blue sky" that even the birds "whose element's the sky" that can fly above the lower ranges "can not pass" them. Images of above/below invoke both VERTICALITY and PATH schemata, positioning the climber precariously on a "mountain that broke and fell" between a peak above and a "rushing flood" below. The reader is drawn sensorilyand emotionally into the scene by the pronoun *you* in lines 31-34, identifying the reader with the climbers who are so high that they touch the stars, looking up even higher as the effort of breathing from an "overburdened chest" becomes painful. The scenario of the poem makes present the actuality of climbing the mountain ranges, rather than achieving the goal of crossing, so that the negatives associated with both birds and animals attempting the impossible are reinforced. The image of touching the stars while still looking up points to what still lies beyond,the "something else" that is the core of the iconic experience. Linguistically, conceptually, physically, sensorily, and emotionally, both Li Bai's poem and Turner and Y. D.'s translation create an icon of the awesome nature of traversing the physical Shu road as metaphor for the difficulties of achieving transcendence. Li Bai's use of schemata as opposed to my account of our hike shows the difference between the iconically motivated poetic and the conventional.

7. The Poetic Use of Schema

Readers not sensitive to the operation of schemata in a poetic corpus can miss the elements that serve to construct the underlying sensate schemata that form a poet's conceptual universe (M. Freeman 1995). Wójcik-Leese's (2010) research explores Elizabeth Bishop's poetics from the perspective of schemata that underlie metaphor.

Movement is an important aspect of Bishop's poems, as they recount journeys and walks and sea voyages, all of which Wójcik-Leese shows become metaphors for the poet's mind in motion. Bishop's poetry depends upon several image schemata that underlie the dominant metaphor structuring her poetics: MENTAL LIFE / CREATIVITY IS AN EXPLORATION OF A VISUAL FIELD. Wójcik-Leese explores how the schemata of PATH, CONTAINER, VERTICALITY, CENTER-PERIPHERY, LINK, and BALANCE are instrumental in relating poetic thinking to bodily experience.

Wójcik-Leese's (2010) chapter, "Patterning the Walk of the Mind" features Bishop's poem, "The End of March" (243-262). The poem incorporates the themes of looking, exploration, and seascape as the poet describes a walk she took with two friends along a beach in early Spring, with a particular destination: "I wanted to get as far as my proto-dream-house / my crypto-dream-house, that crooked box / set up on pilings […]" (ll. 24-26). Unlike the usual and conventional way the PATH schema operated in the story of our hike, Bishop's poem utilizes the PATH schema to make the walk vividly present so that, as the speaker simulates the actual walk in memory, we as readers participate in its experience. The poem opens as follows:

> It was cold and windy, scarcely the day
>
> to take a walk on that long beach.
>
> Everything was withdrawn as far as possible,
>
> indrawn: the tide far out, the ocean shrunken,
>
> seabirds in ones and twos. (ll. 1-5)

The "withdrawn […] tide far out" and "indrawn […] ocean shrunken" descriptions invoke the CENTER-PERIPHERY schema pointing to the corresponding subliminal patterning of the mind contemplating the walk. Noting that Roger Gilbert (1991) places the poem within the genre of the "Walk Poem," Wójcik-

Leese defines the complex WALK schema for Bishop's poem as follows:

> — a source point A,
>
> — movement from A [self-movement],
>
> — an interior [subjective self],
>
> — a boundary,
>
> — an exterior,
>
> — a centre-point [corresponding to the walker's body],
>
> — a periphery,
>
> — an agent [prototypical actor – self-moving]
>
> — a patient [prototypical objects – can be moved],
>
> — bringing a patient from an exterior to an interior [caused motion]. (247)

With its various possibilities of meaning, the title of the poem introduces several features of this complex schema: *End* can mark the boundary of both time (of month) and space (in the purposive goal of the walk and termination of movement); the semantic network of the term *March* includes a manner of walking as both deliberate and arduous, reference to a domain of knowledge ("the march of mind or intellect"), a boundary, and the rhythmic movement of verse (*OED*), thus invoking the CONTAINER, CENTER-PERIPHERY, and PATH schemata. Through these schemata, Wójcik-Leese situates the poem in terms of her overall thesis of Bishop's poetics, in this case relating the poet's thinking "to the bodily experience of movement through space" (246). In "The End of March," that movement is reflected in the purpose of the walk: a *physical* goal to reach the house while at the same time being a *mental* goal in the speaker's description of it as "my proto-dream-house, / my crypto-dream-house" (lines 24-25). The house whose destination is never reached thus becomes a potential location for poetic creativity, whose description is never-ending.

The potentiality of the poetic process as never-ending reflects Benedetto Croce's (1953[1909]) thesis: "The concept of a work of external art is impossible even as a concept, it is for philosophy not only serious error, it is absurdity. The work of art is a spiritual fact and

therefore can never be external or physical." (*Problemi di Estetica,* 467, qtd. in Carr 1917: 167).
Any physical manifestation of art is a semblance, an icon of the "something else" that resides in
the artist's aesthetic imagination.

   The following excerpt from Wójcik-Leese (2010) shows how the PATH schema points to the
underlying and infinite, never-ending process of poetic creativity in "The End of March":

> Within the poet's conceptual universe, circumscribed by the metaphor MENTAL
> LIFE/POETIC CREATIVITY IS AN EXPLORATION IN LANDSCAPE/OF A VISUAL FIELD,
> walking along and across the boundary fosters alertness to the mental landscape –
> it encourages the mind's forward drive. The end of the march becomes once again
> subverted: the destination is not reached. It should not be reached. The march
> must continue, because the conceptual periphery constantly intrigues with its
> shifts. This mental motion – originated in the mover's interaction with the
> environment and the poet's interaction with the literary tradition – embodies the
> mind thinking. It portrays the incessant process rather than its destination: a
> completed thought. (262)

Notable is Bishop's application of the PATH schema, not as a journey that has a destination, but
one that never ends. That poetry—as indicated by all three examples from Plath, Li Bai, and
Bishop—is an incessant process of potentiality reflects Peirce's notion of the "pure icon" that
exists only as pure possibility.

8. Schema as Defining a Poetics

Although many schemata may interact within a particular poem, only one or two tend to
predominate over a poetic corpus, as revealed in Robert Frost's introduction, "The Figure a
Poem Makes," to his 1939 edition of poetry (Lathem and Thompson 1972: 393-396). The
introduction reflects the two schemata that structure Frost's poetics: PATH and BALANCE. For the
poet, Frost argues, the PATH schema is not, as it is for the scholar, a movement "with

conscientious thoroughness along projected lines of logic" (395). Rather, it is a wild and free

one, "giving way to undirected associations and kicking ourselves from one chance suggestion to

another in all directions as of a hot afternoon in the life of a grasshopper" (394). One aspect of

the PATH schema for Frost is that true art is discovering the unknown through the *process* of

writing, a goal that, as Frost notes in a talk on education by poetry, is "believed into existence,

that begin[s] in something more felt than known" (339). It is the BALANCE schema that enables a

poem "to have wildness and at the same time a subject that can be fulfilled" (394). Johnson

(1987) explains the BALANCE schema as follows:

> The experience of balance is so pervasive and so absolutely basic for our coherent
>
> experience of the world, and for our survival in it, that we are seldom ever aware
>
> of its presence. We almost never reflect on the nature and meaning of balance,
>
> and yet without it our physical reality would be utterly chaotic, like the wildly
>
> spinning world of a very intoxicated person. The structure of balance is one of the
>
> key threads that holds our physical experience together as a relatively coherent
>
> and meaningful whole. (74)

Frost's poetry is dynamic in movement, but ends in some form of control, however "momentary"

that control may be in the face of uncontrollable forces. Here is his succinct statement of how the

two schemata of PATH and BALANCE interrelate:

> It should be of the pleasure of a poem itself to tell how it can. The figure a poem
>
> makes. It *begins* in delight and *ends* in wisdom. The figure is the same as for love.
>
> No one can really hold that the ecstasy should be static and still in one place. It
>
> *begins* in delight, it *inclines* to the impulse, it *assumes direction* with the first line
>
> laid down, it *runs a course* of *lucky events*, and *ends* in a clarification of life—not
>
> necessarily a great clarification, such as sects and cults are founded on, but in *a*
>
> *momentary stay against confusion*. It has denouement. It has *an outcome* that
>
> though *unforeseen* was predestined from the first image of the original mood—

and indeed from the very mood. […] It finds its own name as it *goes* and

discovers the best *waiting* for it in *some final phrase* at once wise and sad […].

(394; my emphases)

The verbs in this passage all reflect the PATH schema, of beginning and end with points in

between. The unforeseen lucky events along the way reflect the "cavalier" nature of the

movement poets create in sticking "to nothing deliberately, but let what will stick to them like

burrs, where they walk in the fields" (395). The fulfillment of the poem occurs with the

restoration and equilibrium of the BALANCE schema, with the outcome of the movement in

"some final phrase" as a "stay"—however momentary—"*against* confusion."

Frost's two most famous poems clearly exemplify the PATH and BALANCE schemata of his

poetics. In "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening," the two schemata structure the poem,

with two conflicting desires—the desire for stasis and the desire for movement—and the

resolution of these desires at the end by the speaker's acceptance of the need for movement, a

movement which, on another level, is frequently read as the turn toward life as opposed to an

inviting death. The tension in the poem between the two schemata turns on the ability of the

speaker to assert control over the feelings that caused him to stop in the first place, and to follow

the impulse, in the inner stanzas, of the horse's need for movement. In "The Road Not Taken,"

the poem moves the grounding of the speaker's perspective from a past mental space (in the first

three stanzas) to a future mental space (at the beginning of the last stanza) and ends in the

speaker's reality space at the moment of the present. This present space pivots on the balance

between the past space which projects the future uncertainty of which path to choose and the

future space which invokes the recalling of the past decision. The poem ends, then, at the

"momentary stay" in which the speaker asserts control: "And that has made all the difference."

The same movement of PATH and BALANCE schemata may be seen in Frost's longer poem,

"Birches," a poem that Monteiro (1988) indicates as fully encapsulating the nature of Frost's

poetics (99-111). The trees the speaker sees in the opening line of the poem "bend to left and

right" in the characteristic dualism Norman Holland (1988) recognizes as shaping Frost's

thought patterns (43). Themselves paired as bending "left" or "right," these trees become paired

opposites to "the lines of straighter darker trees" in the following line. The balance of these

paired opposites are reflected in the opposition of agency, as the speaker contrasts the different

results nature and boys have in bending trees. Unlike nature's ice storms which bend birches

irreversibly, the boy's swinging restores them to their upright position as the boy launches

through the air to the ground. The directional up/down and away/toward of the PATH schema

enable the reader to imagine and sensorily simulate the boy's movements:

> He learned all there was
>
> To learn about not launching *out* too soon
>
> And so not carrying the tree *away*
>
> Clear *to the ground*. He always *kept his poise*
>
> *To* the top branches, climbing carefully
>
> With the same pains you use to fill a cup
>
> *Up* to the brim, and even *above* the brim.
>
> Then he flung *outward*, feet first, with a swish,
>
> Kicking his way *down to the ground*. (ll. 32-40; my emphases)

The poetic self's preference for thinking a boy has been swinging the bent trees expresses the

preference for a restored equilibrium of balance. "It's when I'm weary of considerations, / And

life is too much like a pathless wood" (ll. 43-44) that the poetic self dreams of "going back" to

the "poise" the swinger of birches must learn to be successful at his game. Balance, with its

implication of control, is what is needed when one loses one's sense of direction:

> I'd like to get away from earth awhile
>
> And then come back to it and begin over. (ll. 48-49)

Although the conjectural wish space imagined by Frost's speaker "to get away from earth awhile"

holds within it the danger and threat of no return (again Frost's balancing of dual possibilities),

the boy's swinging takes him "*Toward* heaven" (l. 56; Frost's emphasis) rather than "to" it. The

return of the boy to the ground restores the balance and control of the closing lines:

> That would be good both going and coming back.
>
> One could do worse than be a swinger of birches. (ll. 58-59)

Frost's "momentary stay" in "Birches" is the desire to believe, if only for a while, that one

can "come back" and "begin over" the journey of life. This preference is balanced by a

knowledge and acceptance of the unidirectional linearity of life. The sensory schematic

movements between two worlds create the world of our experience as an icon of an imagined

world governed and constrained by the actual world.

The schemata governing Emily Dickinson's poetics are quite different from Frost's. Whereas

Frost's conceptual universe is based on PATH and BALANCE, Dickinson's is based on

CONTAINER and TRANSFORMATION (M. Freeman 1995, 2000).[9] Dickinson's CONTAINER schema

depends on the CYCLE schema that Johnson (1987) describes as part of our physiological make-

up: "We experience our world and everything in it as embedded within cyclic processes: day

and night, the seasons, the course of life (birth through death), the stages of developments in

plants and animals, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies" (119). The schema is also something

imposed by conventional cycles, such as the time constructs we have created: the hour, the week,

the year. Johnson summarizes four features shared by conventional cycles:

> 1. Cycles constitute temporal boundaries for our activities.
>
> 2. Cycles are multiple, overlapping, and sequential.
>
> 3. Cycles can be quantitatively measured according to mathematics of time, but they
>   will also have qualitative differentiation.
>
> 4. There is a difference between "natural" and "conventional" cycles. (120-121)

As Johnson notes: "Most fundamentally, a cycle is a temporal circle" in which "backtracking is

not permitted" (119).

Dickinson was enormously sensitive to the natural cycles of the seasons. However, her

imagination reached beyond the boundaries of the cultural model of "cycle" she inherited to spatialize its temporal construct. She often changes the linear trajectory of things that move—everything that flies; sun, stars, and planets; and human beings—into a circular one:

Butterflies from St Domingo / Cruising round the purple line - (*H28, F95/J137*)

Some little Wren goes seeking round - (*H30, F86/J143*)

Within my Garden, rides a Bird / Upon a single Wheel - (*H26, F370/J500*)

And all the Earth strove common round - (*H209, F826/J965*)

Meanwhile - Her wheeling King - [referring to the sun] (*H200, F246/J232*)

Convulsion - playing round - / Harmless - as streaks of Meteor - (*H101, F187/J792*)

Swifter than the hoofs of Horsemen / Round a Ledge of dream! (*H269, F164/J65*)

The Feet, mechanical, go round - / Of Ground, or Air, or Ought - (*H26, F372/J341*)

I worried Nature with my Wheels / When Her's had ceased to run - (*A81-10/11, F887/J786*)

My wheel is in the dark! / [...] / Yet know it's dripping feet / Go round and round. (*A80-5/6, F61/J10*)

To these components we can add the seasons, the weather, life itself:

[Autumn] eddies like a Rose – away - / Upon Vermillion Wheels - (*H105, F465/J656*)

The Seasons played around his knees (*H176, F970/975*)

As Floods - on Whites of Wheels - (*H97, F739/J788*)

Of Life's penurious Round - (*H43, F283/J313*)

Whereas, like the PATH schema, the CYCLE/CIRCLE schemata invoke the sensory perceptions of movement through space and time, they also, unlike the PATH schema with its simple linear trajectory, enclose space within their boundaries, hence invoking the CONTAINER schema, with its in-out orientation (Johnson 1987):

1) protection from, or resistance to, external forces.

2) limitation and restriction of forces within the container.

3) gets a relative fixity of location for the contained object.

4) accessibility or inaccessibility to view.

5) transitivity of embedded containment. (22)

All these entailments may be found throughout Dickinson's poetry. However, accompanied by a

TRANSFORMATION schema, the boundaries of the CONTAINER schema exist only to be

transgressed. TRANSFORMATION is another crucial schema in our embodied experience. Its

structure is, roughly, an initial state, some causative agent acting upon that initial state, and then

an emergent or resultative state. It can be a metamorphosis, when a material object transmutes

into another, as an acorn becomes a tree, or a caterpillar becomes a butterfly. It can refer to any

change of appearance or character, even the transition from life to death. In Dickinson's poetry,

the two schemata of CONTAINER and TRANSFORMATION interrelate in such a way that movement

either in or out of the CONTAINER triggers not just a change of place, as in the PATH schema, but

a change of form. Dickinson's poetry is full of images of containment and breaking boundaries,

of an orientation that is either in or out of life's circumference (*H42, F710/J475*):

> Doom is the House without
>
> the Door -
>
> 'Tis entered from the Sun -
>
> And then the Ladder's
>
> thrown away,
>
> Because Escape - is done -
>
>
> 'Tis varied by the Dream
>
> Of what they do outside -
>
> Where Squirrels play - and
>
> Berries dye -
>
> And Hemlocks - bow - to

                                           God -

In this poem, although the container of the grave is physically sealed, the ability to dream

invokes the living world outside.

    Unlike Frost, Dickinson never wrote anything formally about her poetics. In a letter to

Thomas Wentworth Higginson, she wrote: "I had no Monarch in my life, and cannot rule myself,

and when I try to organize—my little Force explodes—and leaves me bare and charred" (*L271*, T.

Johnson 1965: 414). This sentence is often read as an expression of failure in poetic craft,

although it is "dramatic, figurative, rhythmical, poetic" (Small 1990: 2). I would go further and

claim that it encapsulates the essence of Dickinson's poetics, as does her other famous remark as

reported by Higginson:

> If I read a book [and] it makes my body so cold no fire ever can warm me I know
>
> *that* is poetry. If I feel physically as if the top of my head were taken off, I know
>
> that is poetry. These are the only way I know it. Is there any other way. (*L342a*, T.
>
> Johnson 1965, 473-74)

Both of Dickinson's comments invoke the CONTAINER schema, with its internal structure of

spatial boundedness in an in-out orientation, involving Johnson's (1987) "separation,

differentiation, and enclosure, which implies restriction and limitation" (22). Once the container

is breached, however, the forces that limit and constrain are no longer operative, and the

formerly constrained object is in a state of boundlessness, of freedom. Emotions are often

experienced in terms of breaking out of the CONTAINER schema (Kövesces 2000), and in both of

Dickinson's comments on poetry, forces are at work to breach the constraints of order and

control. Although cognitive linguists, to my knowledge, have not yet explored the

TRANSFORMATION schema in depth, it is a basic experiential and complex schema that governs

life itself in all its forms, and involves the force dynamics of change (see Lakoff and Johnson

1999: 206-208). It may take several forms, such as mutation of essence or shape. In the first of

Dickinson's comments above, it is not just a question of forces exploding, but that the poet is

left"bare and charred." In the second, poetry operates as a force that makes one "cold" or "feel

physically as if the top of [one's] head were taken off."

Poets intuitively structure their poetics through schemata that underlie poetic metaphoring.

From the viewpoint of poetic iconicity, Johnson's definition of schemata operating at an

intermediary level between struct and cept indicates the means by which the poetic icon is

realized. In other words, schemata are the active processes through and by which the three

hypoiconic elements of metaphor(ing), image (cept) and diagram (struct) form a poem as icon. In

the upside-down blending model of the cognitive metaphor tree (Fig. 4.3), schemata form the

internal structure of cognitive processing that enables projections from the generic space of

sensory-motor-emotive metaphoring to the input spaces of cept and struct that then project to the

blended space of the icon. In the next chapter, I dig further into the depths of sensate cognition in

order to explore the motivating role of affect in both undergirding and linking subliminal

experiences with conceptual awareness.

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1. Reviews of such theories can be found in Rowlands (2010) and Garratt (2016).

2. Shaun May (2015) makes the following observation on notions of the mind

interacting with the body:

> Of course, we can ask what needs to be the case—both physiologically and
>
> neurologically—for us to be able to do something, but not 'how the mind and
>
> body interact' whilst we are doing it. At least on some articulations of these
>
> views, the hypotheses of the 'brainbound mind', the 'embodied mind' and the
>
> 'extended mind' commit the same logical mistake—thinking that talk of the mind
>
> being located anywhere is coherent. (58)

3. Strack's chapter on "Metonymic Binding and Conceptualization" provides a much needed

revision of metonymy in relation to metaphor, and argues that metonymic binding undergirds

metaphoric mapping. Fuchs (2018), in discussing the problematic usage of *mapping* for

interactive relations, introduces the term *resonance* to explain the ways in which body and brain

"influence and modulate each other constantly so that the brain-body system as a whole

maintains a homeostatic equilibrium" (118-119).

4. Bergen (2012) provides a comprehensive survey of empirical research that provides evidence

for the ways in which our cognitive processes are integrated with our sensate experiences.

5. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 92-93) discuss such additional relations between spaces as

"outer space" relations.

6. In this sense, intensionality derives from sensate processes that bind through constituting and

constraining higher-level mental representations (Deacon 2012; Bruhn 2018b).

7. I am indebted to Zhao Jialong (2011) for introducing me to this poem at the University of

Petroleum China and sharing with me his honors thesis.

_____

8. Among the various English translations of Li Bai's poem Zhao Jialong and I read, we both

agreed that Turner's and Y. D.'s (n.d) version most accurately represents the schemata and

descriptions of the original. The entire poem may be found online.

9. In my earlier work, I identified Dickinson's schema of TRANSFORMATION as CHANGE. Mark

Johnson pointed out that the notion of change was too general to operate as a schema in his

definition (personal correspondence). I therefore have amended my description to the more

specific and accurate notion of TRANSFORMATION. For a discussion of the relationship of

TRANSFORMATION to the CONTAINER schema, see Cho (2018).

CHAPTER 6   AFFECT

In the previous two chapters, I identified sensory-motor-emotive (sensate) processes as

metaphorical mappings lying beneath the surface of consciousness and structured by various

bodily schemata. In this chapter, I probe more deeply into how these processes are both

affectively integrated at the subliminal level and related to feelings at the level of conceptual

awareness. The anima (life-force) of affect is the motivating factor that enables the manifestation

of the underlying features of sensate cognition in poetic language. Sensory-motor-emotive

experience in poetry lies primarily in the affective weight of its sonic and structural prosody, the

subjective materiality of stylistic features articulated in language through metalinguistic forms,

as indicated in a poem by Thomas Hardy. I then show how affective schemata in a Wallace

Stevens' poem iconically creates an indefinable feeling of fear of the external unknown.

All cognition is primarily emotion.

George Henry Lewes, *Problems of Life and Mind*

The question I raise in developing a theory of poetic affect is simple: How does the poet achieve

sensory-motor-emotive affects in a poem, and how do we as respondents feel those affects? The

answer is by no means simple.[1] We conceptualize our feelings of embodiment through

imaginative schemata. Schemata bind elements of the external world to the physiological,

conceptual, and emotive networks of our cognitive processes. The valence of schemata like

PATH, CONTAINER, or BALANCE is neutral. They acquire value through force dynamics that lie

below the level of consciousness. I propose a theoretical model to explain how the force

dynamics of affect convey the anima (life force) of sentient, emotive, and physiological affects

inpoetic language.

    Affect is, Brian L. Ott (2017) notes, "a complex and often contentious concept. So much so

that one is likely to encounter nearly as many conceptions and uses of affect as there are scholars

of affect." He identifies two main aspects: state, from Spinoza's *affectio*, "an elemental state generated by an encounter between two or more bodies," and force, from Spinoza's *affectus*, "the intensive force that bodies exert upon one another." Spinoza's definitions of *affectio* and *affectus* refer to agents as forces and patients as states. Affect is a transitive activity between agent/subject and patient/object that arises from sensory, motor, or emotive factors and not between them directly, as the following examples show:

- Sally's wild gestures made her brother nervous. [motor-emotive]

- Sally's perfume made her brother nauseous. [sensory-motor]

- Sally's unhappiness distressed her brother. [emotive-emotive]

Affect relates sensory, motor, emotive factors of the self to the sensory, motor, emotive factors of others. In poetry, as in art in general, the bottom-up process of *affect as force* motivates the poet's creativity which results in the top-down process of *affect as state* in the respondent.

Critics often speak of the emotive effect evoked by a literary text, the fact that a literary work can "move" us, what Meir Sternberg (2003) calls "affect-bound reduction" (355). It is not the author's personal feelings that are created in a literary work, but feelings that are *conceived* by the author in creating semblance. Respondents to a literary text are not experiencing these conceived feelings directly. In T. S. Eliot's poem, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," I may feel sad at Prufrock's failure to engage with life, or I may feel that he is being ridiculous, but these are responses to and not affects that emanate from the text itself. The poem's affect arises from appreciating Prufrock's point of view as he contemplates the limits of his engagement with life: "Dare I eat a peach?" Nor am I angry or frustrated at Casaubon's treatment of Dorothea in George Eliot's novel, *Middlemarch*, though one of the characters, Will Ladislaw, is. Instead, I recognize these feelings of anger and frustration in Will, and empathize with him. Edward Bullough (1912) termed this "psychical distance" (qtd. in Langer 1953: 318-319).[2] The feelings respondents experience are rather a state of emotional knowledge, what Indian scholars call *rasa*, communicated through suggestiveness or *dhvani* (Hogan 2003: 156). The affect we as

respondents feel isn't something static "in" the poem but a dynamic response to the poet's intensions and motivations. When a poem "works," it reaches into our subliminal cognitive processes as we act upon and are acted upon by the text.

1. The Synaesthetics of Affect

The elements of sensate cognition—sensory, motor, emotive—are distinguished from each other by nature and function, but synaesthetically bind with each other through affect. For instance, with the initial consonant cluster [sn] in words associated with the nose, sonic pronunciation of such sensory and negatively charged words as *sniff*, *sneer*, *snort*, *snarl*, causes a curling upward of the nostrils. The motor coordinations of our bodies—both at the visceral level, as in the movement of blood, our pulse rates, the air we inhale and exhale, and externally, in our physical movements—are based on affective interaction between ourselves and the external world. The senses most closely related to bodily experience—smell, taste, and touch—directly trigger affective responses. Smelling a rose is pleasurable, smelling a skunk is not. Tastes are notoriously individual; some like sugar in their coffee, others hate it. Touch is the most intimate of all our bodily experiences, and haptic researchers have empirically verified that touch sensations cause affective reactions (Keltner et al. 2014: 128-129). Feeling a caress, irritation, or blow on the skin can be comforting, chafing, or disagreeable. The senses of hearing and vision also have their affective responses when we experience the different qualities of sound or the extremes of light and darkness.[3] All these affect and are affected by our emotive states, so that use of the term *affect* is frequently synonymous with *emotion* (see Hogan 2018).[4]

Damasio (1999) has hypothesized that two distinct pathways link physiological changes in the body to the brain that "reads" them as emotions, which, when brought to conscious awareness, become feelings (69; see also LeDoux 1998).[5] Damasio's "body loop" accounts for emotional changes in physical experience: when we see a snake we may experience fear. The "as if body loop" accounts for the ability to "read" emotions through imaginative representations of

external stimuli: imagining an encounter with a snake can trigger a fear response.

Cognitive psychologists have on the whole restricted their research to categorizing emotions or exploring their effects on motivation and cognition (Ortony et al.1980; Masmoudi et al. 2012). Neuroscientists have focused on evidence from neuroimaging studies (Damasio et al. 2000; LeDoux 1998; Barrett and Wager 2006). Linguists have explored the metaphorical structures in conceptualizing emotions (Kövecses 2000; Maalej 2007). What has not been explored to any great extent is precisely how works of art, especially the literary arts, convey emotive affect through their various forms (but see Langer [1953, 1967], Jacobs [2017], and Tsur *passim*). In poetry, the fusion of sensory, motor, and emotive processes create the impression or "illusion" of virtual life, as Langer (1953) shows in Witter Bynner's (2019) translation of a poem by the T'ang dynasty poet Wei Ying-wu (215):

A Farewell in the Evening Rain

To Li Ts'ao

Is it raining on the river all the way to Ch'u?—

The evening bell comes to us from Nan-king.

Your wet sail drags and is loath to be going

And shadowy birds are flying slow.

We cannot see the deep ocean-gate—

Only the boughs of Pu-kou, newly dripping.

Likewise, because of our great love,

There are threads of water on our faces.

The poem creates a fusion of sensory, motor, and emotive perceptions, as the poetic self responds to the imminent departure of the traveler beyond "the deep ocean-gate" that leads into the unknown. The external elements—the slow moving birds, the dragging of the sails, the dripping boughs, the rain obscuring sight, the sound of the evening bell—all fuse in the emotional moment of a tearful departure, "gathered up," in Langer's words, "into the great love

for which the whole poem is weeping" (216).

Artistic forms are both motivated by and convey sensate feelings that arise from interactions with the external world. These interactions occur at both the conscious, conceptual level and the subliminal, precategorial, and visceral levels of embodied minding. In poetry, synaesthetic affect is conveyed through its prosodic forms. Prosody is both sonic and structural.

2. Sonic and Structural Prosodies

The term *prosody,* from the Greek *προσῳδίᾱ* (a song sung to music, the tone and accent of a syllable), refers to the theory and practice of versification. Sonic prosody includes sound patterning and the structures of meter and rhythm, and is the usual way prosody is referred to in literary studies. Poetry is a medium meant to be articulated in sound. Reuven Tsur (ms, 1998) and Richard Cureton (1992, 1993) focus on prosody's affective dimensions. Its written form, much like a musical score, is merely a map of instructions for oral performance and aural reception. The words themselves cannot indicate voice inflection. It is the metalinguistic forms of prosody—meter, rhythm, patternings, repetitions, punctuation, line breaks, stanza divisions—that signal the way a poem should be read.

A simple example of how inflection affects the import of a person's response may suffice. The result of the United States election of 2016 between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump can be summed up as "He won." Ending with a period, the sentence conveys a matter of fact. Affective responses to the election result, however, were as varied as the attitudes of the electorate. Ending with a question mark, "He won?" expresses surprise at the unexpected result. Extra emphasis on the verb, "He *won*?" also expresses disbelief, possibly disgust. Emphasis on the noun, "*He* won?" introduces stress contrast, whereby the expected result, "She won," did not occur. Ending the sentence with an exclamation point, "He won!" expresses happiness, even exultation, at the result. Many interpretive responses can be given to an uninflected written text. To read a poet's intension adequately, one needs to capture a poem's sonic affect.

The force of affect is also expressed through structural prosody. In the sentence "the flowers blossomed yesterday and withered today," the order of events is iconically chronological: yesterday comes before today, first the flowers bloom, then they die. The sentence holds no surprises; it reflects something that is part of our everyday experience. If I adjust the sentence slightly, "the flowers that blossomed yesterday withered today," more emphasis is placed on the withering, since the opening clause, being subordinate, demands what Tsur calls "requiredness," the expectation of completion. The affect engendered by the idea of withering is heightened through the suspense created by the incomplete clause "that blossomed yesterday," bringing this sentence closer to poetic expression. Both sentences, though different in their import, are still in discursive mode, they tell us something about what the flowers do. However, by reversing the order of events, the Chinese poet Tong Cui Hui makes us see first the withered flowers and then makes us reflect on their earlier blossoming: "withered flowers today blossomed yesterday" (qtd.in Du, 1976: 491). By making "withered" an adjective, the line freezes the image of the flowers in their state of witheredness. Tong's line captures not just the event and the idea of decay but highlights the affect aroused in the *contemplation* of decay. It adds value to the everyday meaning of the first phrase; it makes us respond affectively to decay at the same time that the predicate makes us mourn the memory of past blossoming.

Structural prosody is reflected in John Robert (Háj) Ross's extensive analyses of poetry: "While prosody is typically thought of as pertaining only to accoustically perceptible parameters, usually only melody and stress, I would like to extend its meaning to cover more abstract types of linguistic elements" ('Structural'). These elements, in Ross's theory, set up an abstract rhythm as the "result of two simultaneous poetic processes": sectioning and arraying. A poem is sectioned in a hierarchy of structure, from stanza to line to phrasing. Within this framework, the different elements of linguistic representation—phonetic, syntactic, semantic—are arrayed. Arraying is governed and constrained by the kind of sectioning the poem has, from the smallest two-part section structure to a six-part structure, the largest Ross has encountered.

The poet Donald Hall (1991) devised an exercise in his introductory literature text to help students develop affective sensitivity to the structural features of a poem by asking which of three versions of a William Carlos Williams poem they thought was the poet's, and why (Table 6.1).[6]

A	B	C
As the cat climbed over the top	As the cat climbed over	As the cat
of the jamcloset first the right	the top of the jamcloset	climbed over
forefoot carefully then the hind		the top of
stepped down into the pit	first the right forefoot	
of the empty flowerpot	carefully then the hind	the jamcloset
		first the right
	stepped down into the pit	forefoot
	of the empty flowerpot	
		carefully
		then the hind
		stepped down
		into the pit of
		the empty
		flowerpot

From my own empirical observation, students who pay attention to syllable structure tend to choose **A.** Those who are in addition sensitive to stanzaic arrangement tend to choose **B**. Only those who recognize the way the poem's syllabic structure and stanzaic arrangement affectively

captures the movement of a cat as it gingerly moves across and down from cabinet to ground

choose **C**, Williams' own arrangement. Reading the poem aloud helps students become aware of

how catlike Williams' arrangement is. The delay between the first and second stanza identifying

where the cat is moving creates an anticipatory pause that is realized between the second and

third stanza, as the cat probes slowly with its right front paw. The same anticipatory pause is then

created by the break between the last two stanzas as the cat moves its hindquarters to reach

"down // into" the flowerpot. We can *see* the cat as it hesitantly moves through the poem.

3. The Import of Affect

In claiming that "all emotion, all feeling tone, mood, and even personal 'sense of life' or 'sense

of identity' is a specialized and intricate, but definite interplay of tensions—actual nervous and

muscular tensions taking place in our human organism," Langer (1953) expresses the

unambiguous nature of prosodic affect as follows:

> If feeling and emotion are really complexes of tension, then every affective
>
> experience should be a uniquely determined process of this sort; then every work
>
> of art, being an image of such a complex, should express a particular feeling
>
> unambiguously; […] it might have, indeed, a single reference. I suspect that this is
>
> the case, and that the different emotional values ascribed to a work of art lie on a
>
> more intellectual plane than its emotional import: for what a work of art sets
>
> forth—the course of sentience, feeling, emotion, and the *élan vital* itself—has no
>
> counterpart in any vocabulary. (373)

The emotional value placed on a work of art is not the same as its emotional import. A person

may cry, thus imposing emotional *value* on an event, but the crying has only one emotional

import depending on the circumstance: expressing happiness at a wedding or sadness at a

funeral. A reading of a poem that does not capture its affective tone can lead to misreading its

emotive import and misevaluating the poet's intension. In speech situations, participants are

attuned to the inflections and mannerisms accompanying the discourse: the tone of voice, the

kinesics of gesture, the expressions of facial features that convey emotion. Prosodic devices in

written language convey these metalinguistic features. But they do not exhaust the possibilities

of conveying the semblance of feeling in written form. Several additional strategies exist that

enable us to identify the forms of feeling in a written text.

    First is the question of focus: grounding the text in a situation that leads to the adoption of

perspective. Consider, for example, a poem by Thomas Hardy:[7]

<div align="center">

Transformations

</div>

Portions of this yew

  Is a man my grandsire knew,

  Bosomed here at its foot:

  This branch may be his wife,

  A ruddy human life   5

  Now turned to a green shoot.

  These grasses must be made

  Of her who often prayed,

  Last century, for repose;

  And the fair girl long ago   10

  Whom I vainly tried to know

  May be entering this rose.

  So, they are not underground,

  But as nerves and veins abound

  In the growths of upper air,   15

  And they feel the sun and rain,

And the energy again

That made them what they were!

On a communicative, discourse level, the poem may seem to be expressing the belief that people don't really die, but are transformed into another form of life. Beginning students of literature almost always read the poem this way. So do many experienced readers. The idea is certainly there in the poem. But whose belief is it? Such a reliance on the poem's narrative discourse misses the poem's emotive import. Consider, for instance, what we know about the speaker of the poem. Given its provenance, a Hardy poem at the turn of the last century, the speaker is presumed to be male, with the statement "vainly tried to know" a "fair girl" indicating his sex. He is old, since it was "long ago" that he courted the girl. Mention of a "yew" in the first line indicates that he is in a churchyard (yew trees are poisonous and in England are planted in enclosed churchyards to protect browsing animals from them). So we have an old man, possibly close to the end of his life, contemplating the graves of people who have been dead a long time.

What are his conjectures? His feelings? His *thoughts* lead him to the idea that the dead have been or are being transformed into the living plants around him. But what does he *feel*?

Sternberg (2003) has alerted us to the fact that "affective and conceptual processing may join forces or join battle […]: now in harmony, now in disharmony […] or now with this balance of power, now with that. The rhetoric of narrative thrives on such protean fact/feeling interdynamics" (364). What readers who focus on the poem's discursive meaning miss is that affective forces are at war with the conceptual. That is, the old man *wants* to believe in what he is musing because he is *resisting*, not accepting, the fact that he too must die.

One strategy that helps us identify the form of feeling in a text is grammatical selection. The grammatical form the poem takes shapes the old man's attitude. Note, for instance, the epistemic modals: "this branch *may* be his wife"; "These grasses *must* be made"; the fair girl "*May* be entering this rose." The three-stanza poem takes the form of a syllogism: if X is true and Y is true, then Z is also true, as indicated by the "So" of the final stanza. But the logic is false: mays

and musts do not lead to factual "are." The argument is not over whether dead bodies provide

fertilizer for living plants, which of course they do, but that the elements of life itself, the nerves

and veins, are what survive. What would otherwise be a grammatically well-formed assertion

that "they are not underground, / […] / And they feel the sun and rain, / And the energy again" is

interrupted by the insertion of the "But as" clause in lines 14-15. The irony of Hardy's use of the

"But as" construction in this context is that the old man is trying to make it mean "but since"

with the idea that the "nerves and veins" refer to the dead, not the living.

The "But as" construction disrupts the grammar by changing the scope governing the

following "And" lines, with the result that there is again a grammatical discordancy, reflecting

the tension between the old man's thoughts and his desires. The old man's feelings of wanting to

continue living betray him so that we understand that it is *his* "nerves and veins" that "abound /

In the growths of upper air," not those of the dead. Reading discursive grammar without

recognizing the minding that is being expressed through it misses the living scenario that the

poem is creating: the impact of felt, as opposed to reasoned, life. The use of the past tense in the

last line is the final betrayal of the old man's false logic: not "That make them what they are,"

which would support his faith in their still living continuance, but "That made them what they

were!" The exclamation point at the end adds the final emotional straw to the old man's

feelings:to want to believe what he otherwise knows is false. He too will die.

4. Schema Theory and the Structure of Affects

The proposal that schemata operate at the intersection between preconscious experience and

conscious awareness to bind sensate affect with conceptual awareness is supported if it can be

shown that sensate affects also are structured. Johnson (1987) claims that through the

superimposition of schemata "our world begins to take shape as a highly structured, value-laden,

and personalized realm in which we feel the pull of our desires, pursue our ends, cope with our

frustrations, and celebrate our joys" (125-126). If it is indeed schemata that enable us to both

express and share sentient, emotional, and physiological experiences as well as conceptual

meanings, then exploring the nature and function of imaginative schemata through the expressive

forms of poetry would further our understanding of these cognitive processes. They can be

envisioned, like the cognitive metaphor tree in Chapter 4, as a more general cognitive tree (Fig.

6.1).[8]

Figure 6.1

Just as the living tree survives by drawing sustenance through its roots, so do all our cognitive

activities depend on sensate cognition. And just as the roots of the tree are nourished by the

quality of the material components of the earth in which they are embedded, so do sensate

experiences draw from the natural worlds of our environment.

     One schema that Johnson finds central to human experience is SCALE, a more-or-less

structure that is both quantitative and qualitative (121-124). Affective schemata tend to be scalar,

as in the case of anxiety. Anxiety is future-oriented, directed toward what is and isn't there.

Anxiety has the effect of focusing attention on the task at hand, to the exclusion of what other

elements might be present in the immediate environment (Fox 1993: 207). It can be directed to

something as simple as crossing a busy road (Frühholz and Grandjean 2012: 19) or as complex

as entering an architectural competition. It structures one's intimate self, is both conscious and

unconscious. At the subliminal level, anxiety ranges from being an affect closer to the surface to

being deeper in its roots. When we speak of being overanxious, filled with anxiety, in a continual

state of anxiety, we see anxiety negatively. At this end of the scale, anxiety is closely associated with fear. At the other end of the scale, anxiety is an emotion that is closely linked in its schematic structure to anticipation, expectation, apprehension, all related to affective motivation (Fig. 6.2).

Figure 6.2 Scalar structure for anxiety

In my usage, the term *motivation* refers to the subliminal processes that drive an artist's creative intension: not what a poet intentionally means but what a poet sets out to do. Motivation is constituted by the function of affect in our sensory-motor-emotive activities.

In commenting on his motivation for writing *Owl's Clover*, Stevens (1957) notes that "it is what I wanted it to be without knowing before it was written what I wanted it to be, even though I knew before it was written what I wanted it to do" (220). He had in mind "the effect of the depression [*sic*] on the interest in art. I wanted a confronting of the world as it had been imaginedin art and as it was then in fact. If I dropped into a gallery I found I had no interest in what I saw.The air was charged with anxieties and tensions." (219) The result was the creation of "The Old Woman and the Statue," with the woman a symbol of those who suffered during the Great Depression and the statue a symbol of art. For Stevens, the embodiment of anxiety about the Great Depression he felt in the gallery was metaphorically fused with the motivation that triggered the poem. This fusion is captured in Stevens' use of the phrase "the depression" in lowercase form, punning on the actual Great Depression and the emotive state of depression.

As Stevens (1957) notes, one manifestation of the emotive element in a poem "is the disclosure of the individuality of the poet" (219). Although "[i]t is unlikely that this disclosure is

ever visible as plainly to anyone as to the poet himself" (219), it *is* manifest, and a reader attuned

to the sensate elements of a poem may capture something of the emotion(s) that motivated the

poet through responding to the affective qualities of the text itself.

5. The Force Dynamics of Affective Schemata

Affective schemata are structured by force dynamics.[9] The schema system of force dynamics is

connected to kinesthetic movement and is closely related to causation (Talmy 2000: 409-470). It

consists of an intrinsic force tendency toward either action/motion or inaction/rest, depending on

whether or not two entities are equivalent in force. When two entities meet, the force of one can

be stronger or weaker than the other, thus affecting whether the intrinsic tendency of the focal-

point entity, Talmy's "agonist," is inhibited or enabled by the strength of the force element,

Talmy's "antagonist," that opposes or stands apart from it. These physical force interactions

extend metaphorically to the psychological, both within the self (intrapsychological) and in the

social interactions of sentient entities (interpsychological). In his poem "Domination of Black,"

Stevens (1923: 22) takes the further step of interrelating the force dynamics of the physical and

psychological in expressing the feeling of fear.

Although ANXIETY and FEAR schemata share certain structures, such as scalarity, and effects,

such as focusing attention, they differ in intensity. Anxiety is more generalized in its focus,

which can be directed to both negative and positive outcomes, whereas fear is always negative.

The FEAR schema is determined by the possibility of harm to one's physical body, one's

emotional state, or one's goals. As such, it is pre-eminently force-dynamic, in that it always

involves two entities: the self as agonist and an antagonist, which could be another person,

another sentient being, external object, or an event, like fear of falling or fear of flying. In each

case, the danger to the self's homeostasis is the possibility of stronger force in its antagonist. In

Stevens' poem, the structures of the FEAR schema predominate through the sensations of colors

and sounds. In a 1928 letter to L. W. Payne Jr., Stevens (1996) comments:

Domination of Black: I am sorry that a poem of this sort has to contain any ideas

at all, because its sole purpose is to fill the mind with the images & sounds that it

contains. A mind that examines such a poem for its prose contents gets absolutely

nothing from it. You are supposed to get heavens full of the colors and full of

sounds, and you are supposed to feel as you would feel if you actually got all this.

(251)

The force dynamics of Stevens' (1923) poem are expressed in a kaleidoscope of sight and sound

through repeated juxtapositions of physical sensations and sensibilities with cognitive reactions

and memories that fuse into the emotion of fear. It is noticeable—even startling—that there are

no named colors or descriptions of sound in the poem itself, it simply invokes them. Just as the

poem's title conveys absence of color, so does the poem itself only intimate the possibility of

various colors in the fallen leaves, the peacocks' tails, and the flames of the fire.[10] As a result,

respondents are motivated to supply from their own knowledge the colors and sounds

mentioned,thus being drawn into participatory relationship with the poem. Stevens' comment

reflects a focus on experiencing rather than interpreting the poem. Reading the poem aloud

intuitively affects us through the sensory-motor-emotive affects of its sounds, images, and

structures.

Domination of Black

At night, by the fire,

The colors of the bushes

And of the fallen leaves,

Repeating themselves,

Turned in the room,   5

Like the leaves themselves

Turning in the wind.

Yes: but the color of the heavy hemlocks

Came striding.

And I remembered the cry of the peacocks.   10

The colors of their tails

Were like the leaves themselves

Turning in the wind,

In the twilight wind.
They swept over the room,   15

Just as they flew from the boughs of the hemlocks

Down to the ground.

I heard them cry—the peacocks.

Was it a cry against the twilight

Or against the leaves themselves   20

Turning in the wind,

Turning as the flames

Turned in the fire,

Turning as the tails of the peacocks

Turned in the loud fire,   25

Loud as the hemlocks

Full of the cry of the peacocks?

Or was it a cry against the hemlocks?

Out of the window,

I saw how the planets gathered   30

Like the leaves themselves

Turning in the wind.

I saw how the night came,

> Came striding like the color of the heavy hemlocks
>
> I felt afraid.   35
>
> And I remembered the cry of the peacocks.

Stevens' title introduces the major force-dynamic structure of the poem. The word *domination* contains within itself the antagonistic notion of one entity exercising force over another. The title juxtaposes two incompatible elements: agency and the absence of color. Does black dominate, or does some other entity dominate black?[11] The tension resulting from this ambiguity reflects the tensions underlying the interaction between external reality and internal sensibility that is the subject of this poem. The title sets up at the outset a scenario in which force elements are operating, as the poetic self encounters external forces and experiences internal emotion. My analysis briefly explores the affective strategies that enable us, in Stevens words, "to feel as you would feel if you actually got all this."

Ross ('The hidden') has made an extensive and intensive linguistic analysis of Stevens' poem. He notes that structurally it contains "a hidden stanza" in lines 19-28; if Stevens had provided a stanza break after line 18, the poem would have shown a conventional stanzaic form of 10-8-10-8 lines. In identifying many ways in which lines 19-28 differ from the rest of the poem, Ross provides a wealth of evidence for the existence of this hidden stanza as the deep or immanent structure underlying the poem's surface or typographical form. The question then arises why Stevens "hides" this stanza by fusing the two central stanzas into one.

The organization of three stanzas in a poem creates a sectioning in which the middle stanza may be seen as framed by the outer two, giving what Ross calls a "sonata-like home-away-(return) home" A B A tripartite structure. In Stevens' poem, Ross shows that the two outer stanzas share as many as seven prosodic properties in common than either do with the middle stanza.[12] This prosodic framing is metaphorically supported by the schematic structures of CONTAINER and CYCLE. The structure of the CONTAINER schema has an in-out orientation: in Stevens' poem, the first and last stanzas juxtapose the boundaries of being inside the room and

looking out of the window with the movements of colors both inside and out. The interior-exterior interplay indicates that the poem's overall conceptual schematic structure is that of CONTAINER, in which the middle stanza is contained within the frame of the outer two. Superimposed upon this schema is the CYCLE, whose structure Johnson (1987) describes as "multiple, overlapping, and sequential" (121). It has a circular, temporal motion that returns to its original state: the many repetitions of sound and image cycle throughout the poem's three stanzas, with the last stanza repeating the imagery of the first.

Both schemata share the interior structures of a MOTION schema—in-out in the case of CONTAINER, and circularity in the case of CYCLE—and a BOUNDARY schema, where the force dynamics of obstructing or enabling movement across boundaries may be exerted.[13] The speaker is inside the room by the light of the fire, while the bushes, the fallen leaves, the wind, the planets, and the hemlocks are located outside in the encroaching darkness. The light-dark contrast gives affective valence to the CONTAINER schema, where IN is safe and OUT is dangerous. The opening lines of the first stanza ostensibly maintain this division, with the colors of the bushes and leaves being seen in the flickering flames of the fire, while the fallen leaves themselves are turning in the wind outside. However, the "Yes: but" of line 8 creates a preliminary opposition to this separation.

Talmy (2000) notes that the *yes but* construction is a rhetorical force-dynamic element in argumentative discourse that roughly indicates "Your last point, arguing toward a particular conclusion, is true as far as it goes, but there is a more important issue at stake, one leading toward the opposite conclusion, and so the point I now make with this issue supersedes yours" (452). Stevens employs the *yes but* construction to establish a greater force by acknowledging the existential truth of the opening lines, but blocks it momentarily by introducing something more important: the two major elements in the poem of sight and sound—"the color of the heavyhemlocks" and "the cry of the peacocks"—that are foregrounded by the *yes but* construction.

These two opposing color/cry elements culminate at the end with the expressed emotion of fear.

There are five force-dynamic levels of containment in Stevens' poem. The outermost level is that of poet/respondent and poem, the innermost that of internal memory and emotion. The poem moves in cyclical repetition among the various levels from top to bottom and from outer to inner through an agonist (focal-point entity)—antagonist (force element) structure between self and other (Table 6.2).

Agonist	*Antagonist*
poet/respondent	poem
physical elements: leaves, tails, planets	force elements: wind, fire, night
sound (cry of the peacocks)	sight (color of the hemlocks)
internal sensibility: remembering, hearing, seeing	external stimuli: sights and sounds
interior memory	interior emotion

Table 6.2

The first two levels exist at the outermost, surface level, as the poet creates and the respondent experiences the linguistic level, the "leaves" of the poem in the physical elements of the external world. The last two levels move downward and inward toward the roots of the cognitive tree from the external stimuli evoking internal sensory processes to the final depths of internal memory and emotion. It is no coincidence that the central conflict of agonist/antagonist in the poem's movement—"the cry of the peacocks" and "the color of the hemlocks"—is the central point between what is external and what internal. The following sections analyze in more detail each of the poem's five force-dynamic levels.

5.1. Poet/respondent :: poem

At the outermost level of force-dynamic interaction in the poem, the poet and respondent as agonist become the focal-point entity to the poem's force-element status as antagonist. Emotional tension, as Charles Rosen (1987) remarked in discussing Chopin's piano technique, can arise from the very awkwardnesses induced by obstructing what would normally be smooth

performance of our bodily movements: "The performer literally feels the sentiment in the muscles of his hand." Claiborne Rice (2012), commenting on Damasio's somatic-marker theoryin which "emotion, feeling, and consciousness are strongly body-involved," has noted that the muscular actions involved in repeating sound patterns, whether read silently or aloud, indicate "that a body is acting and reacting in response to environmental stimuli" (186-187).

Of the poem's 36 lines, fully 22 (more than half) loosely conform to Germanic stress-timed meter, with short, two-stress lines giving an incantatory tone to the whole. Three lines (19, 20, 28) foreground a third stress on the word that encapsulates the force dynamics of resistance: *against*. This metrical pattern conveys the sense of relentless movement, reinforced by the remarkable number of word repetitions, 85% of the total, and by the repeated *turnings*, all occurring immediately after the *verso*, that cause the respondent to continually re-turn in moving through the poem. These movements create tension against what otherwise would be smooth patterning, a disruption of homeostasis.

As we move through the poem, the repetitions of the cry of the peacocks and the color of the hemlocks, with their line increase in length and stress number, stand out against the background of the shorter lines, so that more weight is placed upon them. The last three lines of the first stanza, with the short line "came striding" inside its surrounding longer lines, repeat in the last lines of the final stanza, with the short line this time becoming "I felt afraid" as night encroaches. This parallel placement of the only two lines in the poem in which, as Ross notes, no noun appears, brings them together. The linear movement of "came striding," in its deictic force of movement toward the poetic self carries the additional force of imminent harm to the poetic self's homeostasis, already destabilized by the repeated turnings.

Emotional resonance from the recollection of hearing the cry of the peacocks in the past includes that which arises from past readings (Bloom 1973). Literary critics have noted the way in which Stevens' poem recalls and sometimes echoes passages from previous poets, such as Shelley's leaves in *Ode to the West Wind*; Wordsworth's evocative description in lines 378-98

of*The Prelude* of "a huge peak, black and huge" that "strode after" the speaker; the "horrid

strides"of Milton's Satan in *Paradise Lost*, lines 666-79, when "black it stood as Night" (Cook

1988: 45-46). I do not know if Stevens had consciously in mind Shakespeare's *Macbeth* when

he composed his poem. The emotive affects in Shakespeare's drama are all associated with

omens of darkness and death, with "thick night," the croak of the raven," the howling wolf that

moves toward his prey "with Tarquin's ravishing strides," "the obscure bird" that "clamour'd

the livelong night," and of course Macbeth's recollection of the witches' prophecy: " 'Fear not,

till Birnham wood / Do come to Dunsinane."[14] All these associations are activated in the poem

for a respondent versed in cultural and literary history.

5.2. Physical :: force elements

The phrases "in the room," "in the wind," and "in the fire" indicate the location of the colors and

the leaves inside and outside the CONTAINER structure, but they are working very differently

according to their force-dynamic schemata. The inherent force-dynamic tendency of "fallen

leaves" as agonist is toward inertia, rest, whereas the wind, as stronger antagonist, causes them to

move in circular motion. Both are external elements, outside the room. The vivid colors of the

fallen leaves are also an external element, but they are brought inside the room, as are the colors

of the peacocks' tails, reflecting the out-in movement of the CONTAINER schema. The turning of

their colors is caused by the force-dynamics of the flickering fire (inside), and by extension the

forces of nature that cause the turning (in both senses) of the leaves in autumn (outside). The

planets outside, seen from inside, are associated with the leaves and tails, all agonist to the

antagonist forces of fire, wind, and night. Like the fusion of sight and sound and time, the

penetration of the external elements into the container of the room destabilizes the self's need for

coherence and order. The continual repetitions of words and phrases, especially with the frequent

turnings, create a circular motion, so that the linear movement of the hemlocks as their color

"came striding" forcefully intersects across the circular motion. This superimposition of the

PATH schema onto the CYCLE schema further destabilizes the self's homeostasis.

The color of the hemlocks, and the striding hemlocks themselves, unlike the interiorization of memory that identifies the poetic self with the cry of the peacocks, remain exterior, thus posing, like the encroaching night, the ultimate threat of fear. The repetitions of the first and last stanzas create a further cyclical movement as the poem ends where it began, with the color of the hemlocks and the cry of the peacocks. As Eleanor Cook (1988) notes: "The poem circles and recircles around its topos [of fallen leaves], with the incantatory circles broken, then resumed, broken, then resumed around the break, then finally broken" (43).

5.3 Sound :: sight

The central conflict in the poem is marked by "the cry of the peacocks" against "the color of the hemlocks." Schematically, the poem sets up a situation in which the poetic self, facing the great unknown of nature, takes in the sensory perceptions of the external world at the same time as it attempts to resist the significance it attaches to them, a significance which is carried into the poet's—and the respondent's—mind from centuries of cultural archetypal troping: night as death, the end of autumn and the onset of winter as death, the hemlock that Socrates drinks to his death. At the agonist-antagonist level, the force dynamics of the external elements approach and invade the boundary between outer and inner, both physically and emotionally. The self's homeostasis is reflected through the CONTAINER schema: the self is safely inside the room, by the fire, presumably still. Everything outside is in continual motion—colors, leaves, wind, planets, hemlocks, peacocks—which, if brought inside, threaten to disturb the self.

The description of the peacocks' tails and the flight of the peacocks from the hemlocks in the first part of the middle stanza reconstructs the actual presence of the peacocks as external elements in the scene being described. The result is a fusion of time: the poetic self is describing an event in the past, with the entire poem in past tense. But the last line of the first stanza invokes a time previous: "And I remembered the cry of the peacocks." Was the cry one that occurred at the same time as the colors of their tails turning and their flight from the hemlocks, or on an earlier occasion? As the poetic self recounts the tails of the peacocks turning in the "loud fire"

and the hemlocks loud with their cry (lines 24-27), there is a confusion of sight and sound and time.[15] The effect is destabilizing. It also has significance for the fusion of the middle stanza.

5.4. Internal sensibility :: external stimuli

The force-dynamic structure of agonist-antagonist is represented at the fourth level through the impact of external events on the sensibility of the poetic self. The sights and sounds represented in the poem invoke an EMISSION schema, which Pagán Cánovas (2010) associates with emotion causation. The structure of this schema is that an agent *A* emits *x* outward toward *B* who then takes it in. All sensory impressions, like sight and sound, are structured by this schema.[16] The EMISSION schema is closely associated with two force-dynamic schemata: what I will call an INTAKE schema (see note 10), whose structure includes receptor *B* taking in *x*, and a RESISTANCE schema when *B* prevents *x* from being taken in.[17] The emotions aroused in *B* depend on the nature of emission *x* and the effects caused by whether *B* takes in or resists *x*. In this way, these three schemata interact with the FEAR schema, when emission *x* is always bad and succeeds in forcing *B* to take it in, despite *B*'s resistance. The out-in structure of these schemata interacts with the CONTAINER schema, with *A* perceived as emitting *x* and *B* taking it in. Throughout the poem the self is in the position of agonist *B*, even when it is in subject position. That is, the expressions "I remembered / heard / saw" all place the self in the position of receiving sight and sound emissions from external stimuli. They pierce the boundary of the integrated self to cause an emotional reaction that is characterized by the climactic "I felt afraid" (line 35). Although the self identifies with the peacocks' cry in its resistance *against* the encroaching of the twilight, the leaves, and the hemlocks, it cannot resist taking in, by virtue of the EMISSION and INTAKE schemata, the sights and sounds that produce the emotional reaction of fear.

5.5. Interior memory :: interior emotion

The middle stanza contains the *interior memory :: interior emotion* level that is the innermost and most central of the five levels. This innermost level is enclosed within the level at which internal sensibility is affected by external sight and sound. The final line of the first stanza, "And

I remembered the cry of the peacocks," introduces the long middle stanza, as memory of the

self's past experience of hearing the peacocks and seeing their colors is reconstituted into the

present scene. It is no accident that the colors, mentioned throughout the poem as referring to the

leaves and the peacocks' tails, are singularized when it comes to the hemlocks. The hemlocks'

"color" is an abstract mental representation, reflecting the poet's sensibility in reacting

emotionally to their presence, not the actual colors of the trees.[18] The sound of the peacocks' cry

is not actually present in the reality space presented in the poem's first and last stanzas: it resides

in the internal memory of the self. As Joseph LeDoux (1998: 179-224) notes, emotional

resonance results from memories of past events that awaken similar responses in the present. The

only sound conveyed is the "cry," not a plural "cries" as one would imagine from the actual

experience of hearing peacocks, but an abstraction to a mental experience remembered from the

peacocks' sound.

The word *cry* is used only once as a verb, notably occurring after "I heard" in the line

immediately preceding Ross's hidden stanza: "I heard them cry—the peacocks." As Ross notes,

"Using *cry* verbally this way 'unlocks' the auditory component of the memory which is the focus

of C [*the hidden stanza, lines 19-28*], and indeed of the poem itself." By fusing lines 11-28 into

one stanza, Stevens emphasizes the A B A container structure. The straightforward recounting of

a past memory given in lines 11-18 segues into the meditative questioning in lines 19/20 and 28

that frames and therefore contains within the outer container the aural memory of the peacocks'

cry in lines 21-27. Ross's "hidden stanza," ending with "Full of the cry of the peacocks"—the

only repetition of "the cry of the peacocks" that is not at stanza end—iconically represents the

innermost sensory-emotive-motor forces at work.

The actual final line of the stanza, "Or was it a cry against the hemlocks?" fastens the

agonist-antagonist relationship between the peacocks and the hemlocks. As the poetic self

recounts his memory of the peacocks, they enter his imagination in such a way that their cry

becomes his cry as he imagines it agonistically uttered *against* the antagonistic force of the

hemlocks, metaphorically indicative of approaching night, winter, and death.

Ross also identifies another peculiarity of structuration that he notes "is significant far beyond chance, it seems to me, *yet is apparently interpretationless*" (my emphasis). He shows that the poem contains "an overwhelming prevalence of fiving"—numerical sets of five that occur in all three stanzas to create "a semantically motivated kind of 'numerical rhyme'." I agree with Ross's observation that the lack of apparent significant meaning of such fiving impinges on us with subliminal affect. Intriguingly, Ross suggests an analogy with Indian music, whereby the use of the five-stringed tamboura is "like the breath itself" which provides "a sort of tonal palette for an entire musical piece." As Langer (1953) notes about a work of art: "Something emerges from the arrangement of tones or colors, which was not there before, and this, rather than the arranged material, is the symbol of sentience" (40). It is the very basis of what underlies the affect of sensate cognition.

My focus on the underlying affective prosodic schemata of Stevens' poem is an attempt to explain, not what the poem means, but what the poem is doing. Stevens (1957) does not talk of *writing* poetry but of *achieving* it: always an ongoing attempt to capture the sensory-motor-emotive element that is "the transaction between reality and the sensibility of the poet" (217). In the ambiguity of the poem's title, that transaction works both ways, captured in the fear of the unknown and the resistance needed not to succumb to that fear. For both poet and respondent, Stevens' poem becomes an icon of the deepest affects of our sensate cognition.

6. Emotive – Conceptual Schemata

By showing the workings of schematism at the intersection of the experienced and its conceptualization, and the way emotive schemata like ANXIETY and FEAR interact with conceptual schemata like CONTAINER and CYCLE, I suggest that it is at this level that we can best develop a theoretical model of affect, both in poetry and in life. Affective schemata

- operate at the intersection of preconceptual experience and our awareness;

- are subliminal and preconceptual, but not unstructured;

- are prosodic in nature, both sonically and structurally;

- endow conceptual schemata with the valenced significance of force dynamics;

- enable us to both create and share experiences in common.

In the poetic arts, affective schemata provide the unique tone that characterizes a poem's emotive import. Reading "Domination of Black" aloud creates an intuitive affect which lies at the very deepest level of our sensate cognition. In her theory of art as a theory of mind, the American philosopher Susanne K. Langer (1967) notes:

> […] who has a naïve but intimate and expert knowledge of feeling? Who knows what feeling is like? Above all, probably, the people who make its image—artists, whose entire work is the making of forms which express the nature of feeling. Feeling is *like* the dynamic and rhythmic structures created by artists; artistic form is always the form of felt life, whether of impression, emotion, overt action, thought, dream or even the obscure organic process rising to a high level and going into psychical phase, perhaps acutely, perhaps barely and vaguely. (64)

By exploring the way poetry articulates feeling through its prosodic forms, we can begin to understand the mind's hidden complexities in the way the sensate elements of our preconceptual experiences both motivate and shape our human reasoning and behavior. When poetry succeeds in becoming the form of felt life, then it becomes an icon of a felt reality that reaches beyond to that "something else" that was not there before, the something beyond that characterizes the poetic icon, the subject of the next chapter.

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1. The question lends itself to empirical investigation, both individually qualitative (Ross n.d. 'Structural prosody'; Tsur *passim*) and statistically quantitative (Burke 2011; Claassen 2012; Miall 2006; van Peer et al. 2012).

2. Some readers report identifying with characters so that they do indeed share their emotional

feelings, thus violating Bullough's "psychical distance." In such cases, identity mapping occurs between respondent and character with the character's emotions projected onto the respondent. In Royall Tyler's (1790) play "The Contrast," Jonathan, a rube from Massachusetts, encounters theater in New York for the first time and fails to distinguish that what he is seeing is a play and not real life. Just as artists need to develop expertise in their work, so do respondents in appreciating art as semblance.

3. Arthur M. Jacobs (2017) was able to predict "the *basic affective tone* of poems (e.g. sad or friendly) based on an operational definition of (internal) sound that allows a quantitative, statistic validation," and interprets this "as evidence [*for Jakobson's (1960) theory*] that the iconic associations of foregrounded phonological units contribute significantly to the emotional and aesthetic perceptions of a poem by the reader" (316).

4. To speak of "emotional affect" is considered tautological. Affect also arises from sensory and motor effects, so that "emotional affect" is simply one type of affect. I use the term *emotive* to avoid tautological ambiguity.

5. Damasio (2005) clarifies the distinction he draws between emotion and feeling as follows: "In everyday language we often use the terms interchangeably. This shows how closely connected emotions are with feelings. But for neuroscience, emotions are more or less the complex reactions the body has to certain stimuli. […] This emotional reaction occurs automatically and unconsciously. Feelings occur after we become aware in our brain of such physical changes; only then do we experience the feeling of fear."

6. No longer having access to the textbook, I have reproduced the exercise from memory.

7. I am grateful to Donald Hall for pointing out a misprint in most editions of the poem, an error that was corrected in Samuel Hynes's (1983: 211) edition of Hardy's poems:

> The first time Hardy printed it, in the Mellstock Edition, he used the word "vainly"

[*line 11*]. The second time he published it, in *Moments of Vision*, the error crept in.

It is a typical typesetting error (and a typical proofreading error) that a word is

~~often~~? reprinted, mistakenly, when it is the same word that has been used in a

previous line above it – and which makes sense. The typesetter put "often" under

"often"– and if Hardy proofread it, he did not notice – again and again. Anyway,

"vainly" is the better word, in connection with a "fair girl," and I think it helps to

bring out (at least slightly) the Biblical sense of "know." (Letter to author,

January 22, 2008)

8. The tree accounts for all artistic representations—including language, visual, musical, and

performative arts—as well as conventional cognitive activities.

9. Whereas earlier analyses characterized emotion concepts through several unrelated conceptual

metaphors, Kövesces (2000) argues for a single underlying metaphor EMOTION IS FORCE. That

is, in our linguistic representations of metaphor concepts, we see emotion as the antagonist,

exerting power over the self. In elaborating Talmy's agonist/antagonist characterization of the

FORCE schema, Kövesces identifies three scenarios in the way we linguistically represent the

EMOTION IS FORCE metaphor: emotion causes a response; some physical force causes an

emotion; and a double focus that instantiates either of the first two scenarios (62-86). In this later

study, Kövesces recasts his earlier work on the CONTAINER schema as specifically representing

emotion into a force-dynamic one.

10. The physicist's view of light, as represented by Professor Barry Holstein, University of

Massachusetts/Amherst, is that "black occurs when all light (all colors) coming into a system is

absorbed and none is reflected back to the eye. In that sense then yes I would call it an absence

of color. Of course, the opposite is white where all colors are reflected from a system back to the

eye." (personal correspondence) The fact that black absorbs light creates an additional dimensionto the

way the FORCE schema operates in the poem as an INTAKE schema. The threat of approaching night

includes the threat of absorbing light.

11. Literary critics have commented extensively on Stevens' idiosyncratic, suggestive, and ambiguous use of prepositions (Bloom 1977, Cook 1988). However, they all, so far as I have been able to ascertain, assume that the title means that black dominates.

12. The seven are: repeated lines, exceptions to noun forms at line-end, line-final feminine endings, trisyllables, lexical association, positioning of the word *night*, and the three-time occurrences of *and* and *came*.

13. Zouhair Maalej (2007) discusses several conceptual schemata involved in linguistic expressions of the FEAR schema, all of which involve movement of some sort.

14. See D. Freeman (1995) for a detailed discussion of the PATH schema in *Macbeth*.

15. Stevens here, as in the "repeating" of the first stanza, is opportunistically taking advantage of the semantic networks of the two words, *repeating* and *loud* that contribute to the fusion of sight and sound in the poem. Both are prototypically words that indicate sound, as in "Repeat after me" and "That music is too loud." But "repeat" also means repetition, a major theme in the poem, and "loud" also can refer to the brightness and vibrancy of color, as in "loud fire" (line 25).

16. My discussion of the EMISSION schema depends upon modern scientific explanations of sensory perception. As humans, we are able to see a world of color, because our brains are adapted to register the wave spectrums that exist in the world around us (Jacobs and Nathans 2009). This ability results from a combination of trichromatic factors: the properties of the object, the kind of light available, and the particular vision system in the brain of the viewer. I suggest that there is a similar process regarding the aural spectrum. The ability to hear a range of sounds results from the properties of the object and the perception of the brain/auditory system.

17. This formulation refines Pagán Cánovas's (2010) initial description of the EMISSION schema as one in which *A* emits *x* to *B* who then receives it, and undergoes a change as a result.

18. Literary critics have variously described the color of the hemlocks. Most focus on the *effect* of the hemlocks on the poetic self, as suggested by the title "Black"; others note that the *actual* color of hemlock trees is green. Both, I think, miss the point. Hemlocks grow up straight and tall,

with no side branches on their trunks. From the perspective of a person on the ground, the trees

in a hemlock grove appear like dark legs supporting the canopy, hence the notion of them

"striding." It is the experiencing of actual hemlocks in evoking culturally emotive associations

that is being portrayed.

CHAPTER 7   THE POEM AS ICON

Not all poetry achieves the status of becoming an icon, nor is it necessarily a poet's intent. Inevitably, however, the question arises as to whether such iconicity indicates one way of evaluating poetry that lasts. In a case study of two poems on the same theme, I show how only one becomes an icon in my sense of the term. I then revisit the question of iconic motivation by briefly exploring our human propensity for finding aesthetic coherence between ourselves and the external world through our cognitive faculties of imagination and reason. Wallace Stevens' poetics constitutes a revelation of his theory that the aim of poetry is to enact an iconic semblance of the felt but hidden reality of being, exemplified throughout his poetic corpus and culminating in his poem "The Rock." I conclude with a brief example of the transformative power of the icon for both poet and respondent.

To sum up where we are. Chapter 2 showed that an icon is an artifact, a *product* of human cognition—language, art, event, institution, or object—through which we ontologically identify and affectively connect with the physical and spiritual worlds of our experience. Iconicity, on the other hand, is the active *process* by which an artifact becomes an icon. The following chapters prepared the groundwork for the structural complexity of a poetic icon by examining its main features. Chapter 3 explored the ontology of a poetic icon: the notion of semblance in the identification of the poetic self with the world of experienced reality. Chapter 4 discussed the role of metaphoring in creating an icon: mapping across domains, both material and immaterial. Poetic metaphoring involves fusion: blending concepts, images, and schematic structures into an iconic whole. Chapter 5 probed more deeply into the schematic underpinnings of conceptual metaphor: the sensory-motor-emotive processes of sensate cognition that motivate affective creativity. Chapter 6 probed even more deeply into the inner recesses of affect through the workings of prosody to reveal the way a poem becomes an icon of something hidden, in-visible, the "something else" in Peircean terms.

A poetic icon occurs when an art object or event—performance, picture, poem, sculpture—successfully invokes something beyond itself through motivation, isomorphism, and simulation. This "beyond itself" is not simply a representation of external reality, nor is it transcendence to the unreal. It is rather revelation: an attempt to reach beyond the conventional immediacy of our everyday experience, to plunge into and manifest the depths of our primordial experience of precategorial being that underlies the structure of reality both in ourselves and the world of which we are a part. This reality is in-visible to us, not as absence or void, but as being hidden in the visible but always present in the moment. At these moments we are made, if only momentarily, self-aware of our being as part of primordial being, establishing the "presence of absence." This is the reality that the arts attempt to capture through their emphasis on the concrete, the particular, the individual. By restoring the primacy of the sensory-motor-emotive underpinnings of our experiences, feeling is invested with form and form with feeling. It is this that creates the possibility of the poem as icon.

1. A Case Study of Two Poems

What happens if there is no motivating force of iconicity, as I have defined it, engaged in a poem? A strong version of my argument would claim that then no iconic semblance takes place. I am not prepared to go that far. I may be identifying one out of several possible mechanisms in making a poem an icon of reality. The fact that not everyone may respond *experientially* to a poem the same way is a matter for empirical investigation.[1] However, in comparing two sonnets on the same theme by Percy Bysshe Shelley and Horace Smith, I discovered that whereas I couldfind no motivating metaphor structuring the images and prosody of Smith's poem, Shelley's metaphoring occurs on every dimension of the poem's imagistic and prosodic levels. This difference may explain why Smith's sonnet lapsed into obscurity whereas Shelley's sonnet still speaks to us today (Table 7.1).[2]

Shelley's Sonnet	Smith's Sonnet
I met a traveller from an antique land,	In Egypt's sandy silence, all alone,
Who said—"Two vast and trunkless legs of stone	Stands a gigantic Leg, which far off throws
Stand in the desert....Near them, on the sand,	The only shadow that the Desart knows:—
Half sunk a shattered visage lies, whose frown,	"I am great OZYMANDIAS," saith the stone,
And wrinkled lips, and sneer of cold command,	"The King of Kings; this mighty City shows
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read	"The wonders of my hand."— The City's gone,—
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,	Nought but the Leg remaining to disclose
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed;	The site of this forgotten Babylon.
And on the pedestal, these words appear:	We wonder,—and some Hunter may express
My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings,	Wonder like ours, when thro' the wilderness
Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!	Where London stood, holding the Wolf in chace,
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay	He meets some fragment huge, and stops to guess
Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare	What powerful but unrecorded race
The lone and level sands stretch far away."	Once dwelt in that annihilated place.

Table 7.1 The "Ozymandias" sonnets

Both sonnets share the theme of the disappearance of what was once a great empire. The requirement of a turn or *volta*, classically at the sestet but manipulated to serve the purposes of the verse, establishes the sonnet's formal frame. Shelley focuses on Ozymandias's statue, Smith on Ozymandias's works. It is not the choice of focus that determines whether or not each poem is motivated by poetic iconicity, but the cognitive strategies each poet employs that may awaken a respondent's emotional engagement with the "something beyond" that the poem invokes.

Shelley's and Smith's versions of the inscription on the statue paraphrase somewhat differently its recorded inscription, provided in Booth's (1814) translation of Diodorus Siculus as "I am Osymandias, king of kings; if any would know how great I am, and where I lie, let him excel me in any of my works," and indicate the very different purposes the poets have.[3] Neither Shelley's nor Smith's version includes reference to where Ozymandias might lie. Diodorus' translation of the original inscription (if indeed there were one) focuses on Ozymandias's

challenge to discover his greatness by surpassing his achievements. Smith's version loses the

sense of challenge by simply naming the "works" of "this mighty City" as testimony to the

"wonders" wrought by Ozymandias. Shelley turns the challenge into a direct command, "Look,"

and reinforces Ozymandias's greatness by having him address not just anyone, but "ye Mighty."

By collapsing the challenge into the one word "despair!" Shelley sets up the irony that exists

between what the inscription was originally meant to mean—despair at being unable to surpass

Ozymandias's achievements—and what it actually does to the nineteenth-century observer and

subsequently to contemporary respondents to his poem. Smith's inscription misses both the

challenge of the original and the irony that Shelley captures. This contrast raises the question:

What precisely are the cognitive strategies that Shelley successfully manages and Smith fails to

apply in creating their sonnets as icons of felt reality?

   Both poems focus on change from existence to nonexistence through time. In Smith's sonnet,

change is represented at two points in time: the present moment, in which "we wonder" at the

disappearance of Ozymandias's city some time in our past, and some future moment, when a

hunter similarly wonders at the disappearance of London at some point in *his* past. Smith's time

is past and imperfective, with Ozymandias's story never resolved. Shelley's time is past and

perfective, with Ozymandias's story ending in disappearance into nothingness.[4] Smith attempts

to capture the idea of disappearance, but he focuses on what is there rather than what is not, by

using words with negative connotations but positive effects, such as "silence" (the absence of

noise), "alone" and "only" (the absence of others). The *nought but* construction (line 7) results in

focus on the remaining leg, not the absent body. Following are examples of prosodic differences

between the two sonnets that show how only Shelley's poem becomes an icon of felt reality.

1.1 Prosodic details in Smith's sonnet

The pure rhymes of Smith's sonnet show no repetitions of subtle sound patterning. In the first

three lines of Smith's poem, the low back-rounded sound repeats in *al<u>o</u>ne*, *thr<u>o</u>ws*, *<u>o</u>nly*, *shad<u>o</u>w*,

and *kn<u>o</u>ws*, continued in the following four lines in *st<u>o</u>ne*, *sh<u>o</u>ws*, *discl<u>o</u>se*. Six of these eight

occurrences are at line end, thus linking the internal vowel sound of both the *a* and *b* rhymes.

The two remaining occur in the phrase "<u>o</u>nly shad<u>o</u>w" in line 3, coinciding with a prosodic and

syntactic caesura on position 5. Such repetition creates a feeling of monotony, but monotony is

not utilized metaphorically to create a structural schema for the poem. The semantic relation

between "only" and "alone" shows Smith treading on his own words: if the leg is alone, then it

would logically be the only shadow cast (and where, then, is the observer?). This back-

roundedsound then disappears altogether from the rest of the poem, so that no sound link is

made between the description of Egypt's desert and London's wilderness.

Smith's poem shows no diffusion of stable shape, no tension set up in the formal patterning

of the lines or the repetitions of words. The one place where Smith attempts anything

approximating a topicalized attribute occurs at the beginning: "In Egypt's sandy silence." By

reversing the relationship of sand and silence, Smith creates an unsuccessful blend, since no

topology for *sand* isomorphically structures *silence* (compare "silent sands") to create further

meaning in emergent structure. I suggest that such violation of topology is successful only when

sustained in the gestalt of the poem as a whole.[5] In Smith's case, no such gestalt exists.

Smith's sonnet is marked by a pattern of agency ascribed to inanimate objects. The human

activities of knowing, saying, and revealing are attributed to the inanimate: the silent "Desert

knows," the stone "saith," the "City shows," and the "Leg" discloses. This pattern is reversed in

the sestet; human activity is now attached to human agency, since it is "we" who wonder, "some

Hunter" who expresses, meets, and guesses, and a "race" that once dwelt. In Smith's revised title

appear "discovered" and "inserted"; in the poem itself, "forgotten," "unrecorded," and

"annihilated." All these are human activities, though the agents are unmentioned. I can find no

metaphoric schema that links, ironically or otherwise, the active and passive constructions to the

images of people and things in Smith's poem.

Naming reduces diffuseness, creating stability of reference. Whereas Shelley nowhere

identifies location by naming, Smith does it three times, in "Egypt's," "Babylon," and "London."

Babylon is presumably inserted between Egypt and London as a possible reference to the

prophecy in the Book of Isaiah (14: 4-23) against the king of Babylon for his overweening pride

and of the future destruction of "the golden city."[6] Babylon's great downfall is compared with

London's future, but no emotively motivated schema structures the comparison. The name of the

city alone is made to convey the allusion to Babylon's king, and only the parallel structures of

"this forgotten Babylon" / "that annihilated place," links Ozymandias's works to the City of

London. The presumed emotive force behind words like "forgotten," "unrecorded," and

"annihilated" dissipates in the lack of connection with any agency (who has forgotten? who has

not recorded? who has annihilated?), and the intrusion of people rather than objects in the word

"race" seems egregious and only there to serve the demands of rhyme. One wonders what

possible connection "some Hunter" chasing a wolf in the wilderness (or is it London that is

"holding the Wolf in chace"?) has to the events of the poem.[7]

    No deictic grounding of the reader or even the poem's speaker occurs until the final sestet,

with the shift to the perspective of "some Hunter" in future time from the present space of "We

wonder." Temporal reference throughout the poem is predominantly the present, representing

both Egypt's past and London's future. Three notable exceptions—"The City's gone," "Where

London stood," and "Once dwelt"— create a perspective of contemplating the past from a

present space, a viewpoint that remains incomplete and unresolved. Smith represents the lost past

as "this" for Babylon (line 8), followed immediately by "We wonder" (line 9), thus putting 'us'

in the scene. He then refers to his own time as "that" for London (line 14). These deictic terms

distance the past colossus from the present hunter-observer who is simultaneously located in the

past of the respondents' future. Smith might have intended this distancing to invoke the idea that

the "powerful but unrecorded race" is his own contemporary society, but why "unrecorded"?

There is no deictic grounding of the poetic self or respondent in Smith's sonnet. It is

propositional telling, not imaginative creativity. As Langer (1953) notes:

        There is, of course, a great deal of poetry in our literary heritage that is ruined by

unimaginative report of emotion. But it is neither the moral idea nor the mention

of feelings that make such passages bad; it is the lapse from creativity, from

creating the illusion of a moral illumination or a passional experience, into mere

discourse about such matters; that is, the fallacy of using the poem simply to state

something the poet wishes to tell the reader. (255)

1.2 Prosodic details in Shelley's sonnet

In Shelley's poem, change is characterized by the conceptual metaphor ENTROPY THROUGH

TIME IS CHANGE THROUGH SHIFT or, more briefly, ENTROPY IS SHIFT. *Entropy* in its popular

sense implies a reduction or lessening of forces to the point of nothingness, a negation of energy.

Shift implies a slight, not major, adjustment from a position of balance. Shelley's metaphor is

based on the schemata of BALANCE and PROCESS, realized in the term *shift* in the movement

from a stable position to instability. At the linguistic level of metaphoring, the poem's structure,

images, line breaks, and other prosodic elements all feature applications of the mapping of

temporal decay through barely perceptible shifting of forces to give us an ironic feeling of the

futility of man's hubris in assuming memorial permanence through his achievements. At the

conceptual level, ENTROPY IS SHIFT enacts the force of the inevitable processes of decay that

bring men's work to nought. Ozymandias's static belief that his works will remain unchanging

forever doom them to death. Underlying the conceptual metaphor are the sensory-motor-emotive

processes of prosody that draw us as respondents into sharing the subliminal feelings of decay

and instability. Literary critics have used the term *shift* to refer to several features in Shelley's

poem (Austin 1994; Tsur 2008: 595-622). Shifting manifests itself both semantically, sonically,

and structurally in all the macroscopic and microscopic features of the poem. In each case,

shifting occurs from an expected "position," as in deviation from the standard sonnet form or a

change in point of view. Following is a brief summary of some of these features.

When words with similar but not identical phonetics appear in a formal pattern or near each

other, tension is set up between sameness and difference, resulting in the impression that shifting

has occurred. In Shelley's poem, the most obvious shifts of sound occur in the rhyme scheme, where assonantal vowels shift from pure rhyme equivalence, as in *stone/frown, appear/despair*. But shifting also occurs in patterned repetitions, as in *trunkless legs*, where the unvoiced consonant [k] which precedes [l], [e], [s] in *trunkless* transmutes to its voiced equivalent [g] and moves to a position between [e] and [s] in *legs*, with a further shift from long to short in their syllable count. Another example immediately follows in *stone/stand*, where the vowel shifts between the identical [s], [t], [n] consonants, which themselves shift in the following phrase both in placement and voicing, from the [s], [t], [n], [d] of *stand* to [n], [d], [z], [t] in *in the desert*. The effect is one of continuous phonetic shiftings, creating a sense of instability. These shiftings culminate in the rhyme scheme, as [t] disappears altogether in the word *sand*, a phonetic echo of the disappearance of Ozymandias's city in the desert sands.

The word *frown* that is stamped on the *stone* with which it is made to rhyme mocks the stone in its not quite perfect vowel assonance, as *command* (in its standard English pronunciation, [kə'ma:nd]) might mock the "sand" ([sænd]) as well as the inscriptional name "Ozy[mænd]ias."[8] Mockery is associated with turning's one's nose up or "cocking a snoot at," so that the word *sneer* resonates with the *sn-* sound that marks many of the words associated with the nose (*snort, snore, snout,* etc.) as well as the mimicry that occurs with the tense frontal vowel [i:] that forces lip stretching.[9] Interactive mimicry also occurs in the phrase "frown and wrinkled lips," as Tsur notes: "the diphthong in *frOWn* and the rounded [r] in *WRinkled* force you to contract your lips into wrinkles" (personal communication). The sound-image of the "wrinkled lips," with its clipped vowel repetition closed by the plosive [ps] and the [k] of "wrinkled," is picked up in the alliterative repetition of the hard sound in "cold" and "command," all three words related by ending with the voiced [d]. The employment of these phonetic features marks the way Shelley uses his sound palette to express the sensory-motor-emotive feelings he ironically attributes to the statue, ironic because these passions "survive" on "lifeless" stone, their continuity outlasting the discontinuous lives of the long-dead humans that felt and invoked them, just as the phonetic

patterning of the poem's words evoke recognition of those passions centuries later.

Syntactically, also, the poem shows multiple shiftings. The three lines that end Shelley's

octet all appear to mark closure, but each line following causes a shift to continuation. The effect

of these shifts is strengthened by accompanying linguistic features. The introduction of the

deictic "those passions" in line 6 suggests an anaphoric reference to the frown, lips, and sneer of

the preceding lines; however, the reader must shift in line 7 to adjust the deixis to a cataphoric

reference to "Which yet survive." Another shift occurs immediately afterwards, with the

continuation of "the passions" in the sentence in line 8, "The hand that mocked them, and the

heart that fed," causing an adjustment in the reading of "survive" from intransitive to transitive

and a shift from imperfective to perfective aspect, from the survival of Ozymandias's passions to

the fact they have in fact not survived, except through the sculptor's art. The tension in line 8,

reinforced by the comma, is realized in the feeling that something is missing syntactically. All

the critics I have read assume the missing syntax is a direct object of *fed*: "The hand that mocked

them, and the heart that fed [them]." However, the comma after "them" grammatically indicates

a change of subject. If the hand belongs to the sculptor and the heart to Ozymandias, then it is

thepassions that feed the heart, which would call for the prepositional phrase: "The hand that

mocked them, and the heart that fed [on them]."

In sonnets generally, the *volta*, or turn, occurs between the first eight lines and the remaining

six. Shelley's octet appears to end with "The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed," but

the sentence is continued, marked both by the semi-colon and the conjunction that follows, and

does not close until the end of line 11, which ends the description of the statue and its inscription.

Shelley's turn therefore does not occur until line 12, on the poem's shortest sentence that carries

the entropic force of the poem in its perfective aspect: "Nothing beside remains." The fact that

the turn comes after one long sentence comprising eleven lines gives it extra weight. It stops

continuity. On the macro level, then, entropic shift occurs with a diagrammatic reduction in the

ratio of lines as the sonnet moves from a vertical to horizontal image schema.[10] The conceptual

metaphor MORE IS UP governs the vertical to horizontal move, first with the image of the legs

that "stand" to the head that is "half sunk" and then from the inscription "on the pedestal" to the

"level(ing)" sands. MORE is also GREATER. By delaying the turn to line 12, Shelley overweights

the sonnet's proportional ratio from 8-6 to 11-3, so that MORE becomes LESS as the immense

weight of the statue collapses at the poetic climax, "Nothing beside remains."

In Shelley's poem, shifting takes on the negative connotations of slipping, crumbling,

deterioration, decay from forces within rather than from some exterior power, a movement from

more to less, thus suggesting movement of entropy from stability to instability, security to

insecurity, invulnerability to vulnerability. These negatively charged subliminal sensory-motor-

emotive metaphors link the poem's forms to its images, thus enabling us to feel the force of the

inevitable processes of decay that bring men's work to nought, as the upside-down cognitive

treebecomes the icon blending model for the poem (Fig. 7.1).

Figure 7.1 Blending model for Shelley's "Ozymandias"

Shelley's representation of Ozymandias's sensate passions motivating the creation of his works is a recognition of the underlying iconic processes of poetic creation, with ENTROPY IS SHIFT as the structuring metaphor for his poem at the linguistic, conceptual, and sensory-motor-emotive levels that we as respondents also feel.

2. The Workings of Poetic Iconicity

For a poem to become an icon of something beyond itself, it must invoke in its respondent the experience of that something else. The ability to see "something else" in a literary text is a characteristic of human minding that seeks significance in what it experiences (Rushdie 1980):

> As a people, we are obsessed with correspondences. Similarities between this and that, between *apparently unconnected things*, make us clap our hands delightedly when we find them out. It is a sort of national longing for form—or perhaps simply an impression of our deep belief that *forms lie hidden within reality*; that meaning reveals itself only in flashes. (344; my emphasis)

Rushdie's "apparently" suggests that our subliminal desires for correspondence and coherence indicate that what we see conceptually as separate entities is part of a unified form "hidden within reality." In literary studies, it is often understood as occurring through estrangement, making the familiar unfamiliar, or seeing the world anew. In religious terms, it is the transcendence of the material world into the realms of the spiritual. All refer to the question of the way we see ourselves in relation to our world. That question is complicated by the assumption that the mind and the body are separate entities.

2.1 The trap of the gap

By representing the mind as object, a "gap" is created between self and world. In neurological theory, the gap occurs because "the mind" is modular, receiving and processing multiple sense impressions in discrete areas of the brain (Aleksander 2005; Modell 2003; Velmans 2002). In cognitive theory, the gap is caused, Ellen Spolsky (1993) explains, by the "inevitable asymmetry

and incompleteness of mental representation" (2). In philosophical theory, the gap is described as the lack of connection between subjective mind and objective world (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). In linguistic theory, the gap arises from language as underdetermined: a language expression may have more than one meaning depending on its context (Chan 2012). The problem with any such theory is that it raises the specter of mechanism: the idea that the brain is an instrument that accounts for all human cognitive activity (Churchland 1989, 2019). In itself, it cannot account for the phenomenon of minding, encompassing such phenomena as intents, desires, empathy, or morality (Deacon 2012).

Belief in this gap is the means by which we are able, by cognitive minding, to think at all, to reason, to hypothesize, to consider counterfactual possibilities, to respond emotionally and ethically to situations we find ourselves in. Cognitive scientists refer to "distributed cognition" in the way minding is a collaboration of resources shared between cognitive processes and external factors (Hutchins 1995). It accounts for our ability to anticipate, accept, and encourage change. Fundamentally, it enables creativity. When Spolsky (1993) says that the "mind itself can hurt you into poetry" (2), she is suggesting that "innovation in literary systems can be understood as evidence of the mind's responses to incompatible representations" created by the gap (7).[11]

Above all, the gap traps us inevitably into awareness of the immaterial: that concepts like justice, truth, and beauty, the life force of the spirit, are not chimera, but real.

2.2 Closing the gap

Iconicity is the means by which poetry both exploits and bridges this so-called gap by integrating self with the material and immaterial worlds. For a given product of art to "work," the motivating force of iconicity must in some way be realized by the respondent. Bhabani Bhattacharya (1966) provides a perfect example. Sumita has been brought up by her father to embrace a Ghandian asceticism which suppresses all human instincts of sensate cognition. When Bhashkar, who is in love with Sumita, shows her an erotic sculpture in a nearby temple, she cannot respond to it, saying only "I know nothing about the art of sculpture" (126). When Bhashkar suggests that it

might be a view of life, she is incredulous. How can it be about "Life?" she asks with "honest incomprehension." When she begins to fall in love with Bhashkar, Sumita revisits the sculpture with a very different response. Looking later at her own image in a mirror, she thinks about the erotic figure of the stone woman: "Outwardly, one had nothing in common with the other, not face, nor form, nor gesture, nor poise, and yet there was *some mark of identity*. The living figure […] the hewn stone" (163; my emphasis). Through her own emotive motivation toward love, Sumita is able to see the iconic relationship between art and life.

Poetry thus constitutes the immaterial sensory-motor-emotive feelings of sensate cognition we experience through its material forms, like Sumita's growing awareness of herself as a woman in love as she thinks of the statue. In the presence of a poem we experience its presentness of a reality that animates, in Coleridge's words, "the whole soul of man into activity." In Merleau-Ponty's (1962) terms, art creates "the presence of oneself to oneself, being no less than existence" (404). Because Sumita now responds to the sculpture aesthetically, not ascetically, it becomes for her an icon of the felt reality of her love for Bashkar.

3. The Poetic Icon

Throughout his poetic life, Wallace Stevens was preoccupied with developing a theory of poetry that understands "poetry" not as the language of poetic expression but the "the thing itself, wherever it may be found" (qtd. in Morse 1957: xiv). Stevens focuses, not on the way a poem becomes an artifact of itself, as the phrase "art for art's sake" is often understood, but on the purpose of poetry to create the semblance of the in-visible anima that is the essence of reality. It is no accident that Stevens (1961) deliberately placed his collection, *The Rock*, at the end of his *Collected Poems*, with its final poem, "Not Ideas about Things but the Thing Itself" (534). His title poem "The Rock" culminates in the final statement of his theory of poetry by enacting the poem as icon. In commenting on its central section, titled "The Poem as Icon," Bloom (1977) asks:

Why the poem as *icon?* The word "icon" does not appear anywhere else in

Stevens' poetry, so that we have no clues as to what precise meaning it had for

him. "The fiction of the leaves is the icon / Of the poem, the figuration of

blessedness, / And the icon is the man." Are these two icons the same, so that the

poet himself is only a fiction of the leaves? "These leaves are the poem, the icon

and the man," the text goes on to say, and section II ends by proclaiming, "His

words are both the icon and the man." (345)

The body exists in an organic relationship with the world. What is invisible to it does not *not*

exist, but is rather "in-visible," lying latent, hidden, as another dimensionality, what Stevens

refers to as "the unreal," "beyond forgetfulness," Eluard's *autre-monde*. The negation of the

visible is not Sartrean absence or abyss but, as Merleau-Ponty (1968) says in his Working

Notes:"what, relative to the visible, could nevertheless not be seen as a thing (the existentials of

the visible, its dimensions, its nonfigurative inner framework)" (257). What this means is that

nothing should be understood as *no thing*: "Nothingness is nothing more (nor less) than the

invisible," that is, the existing flux before objectification into concepts (258). It is this sense of

nothing that Stevens (1923: 24) captures in the closing lines of "The Snow Man":

> For the listener, who listens in the snow,
>
> And, nothing himself, beholds
>
> Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.

In these lines, Stevens breaks through the veil of our conceptualizing the world as a positive

artifact that we can hear and see and feel in order to articulate the dimensionality of the in-visible.

The in-visible is Merleau-Ponty's (1968) primordial precategorial, that which exists before our

conceptualizing brings experience into consciousness: "what exists only as tactile or

kinesthetically, etc." (257). These two ideas—of no-*thingness* as the rock bottom of our sensate

selves existing in an invisible dimension, and the primordial experience of the precategorial—are

explored in "The Rock." For Stevens (1951): "The real is constantly being engulfed in the unreal.

[…] [Poetry] is an illumination of a surface, the movement of a self in the rock" (viii).

Certain motifs and themes linking imagination and reality that recur throughout Stevens'
poetic writings culminate in "The Rock," written after Stevens turned seventy, and together
constitute the poet's recognition of how a poem can become an icon of felt reality. Not only do
the three sections of the poem describe the nature of poetic iconicity, the poem itself becomes an
icon, a revelation of ontological reality accessed through the sensory-motor-emotive processes of
sensate cognition. The three parts of "The Rock" move from the illusion of memory to the
creation of poem as icon to end in a rhapsody of the essence of being.

Like the leaves of the cognitive metaphor tree (Fig. 4.2), Stevens' (1961: 525-528) poem is
full of linguistic metaphors, so much so that they conceal the underlying conceptual metaphors
from which they spring. The poem's dominant structuring metaphors are governed by two
prepositions: *in* and *of*.[12] Both prepositional phrases depend upon two conceptual metaphors:
STATES ARE LOCATIONS (*in*) and ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS (*of*). These become crucial to
Stevens' aim in establishing poetry as an icon of the nature of reality. Their interaction results in
a co-responding participation of minding and nature, entities that both affect and are affected by
each other. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) note a force-dynamic duality with respect to the figure-
ground orientation in these two metaphors:

> Perception requires a figure-ground choice. We do not perceive scenes that are
>
> neutral between figure and ground. […]
>
> - In the Location case, the causal force is applied to the affected party, since
>
>   it is the figure.
>
> - In the Object [*Possessions*] case, the causal force is applied to the effect,
>
>   since it is the figure. (198-199)

Both conceptual metaphors operate differently in the force dynamics of their figure-ground
orientation. In STATES ARE LOCATIONS, the figure is the affected entity (Talmy's "agonist" or
patient) and the ground the effect (Talmy's "antagonist" or agent), triggered by the preposition *in*.

In line I.6, the houses ("they") as figure are the affected entity and the "emptiness" as ground the

effect. The reverse is true for ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS: the figure is the effect and the

ground the affected entity in the predicate, triggered by the preposition *of*. In line III.3, "the

bleaker steps" are the affected entity as ground; "his descent" the effect as figure. However, by

combining the two metaphors in one phrase, Stevens complicates the figure-ground relationship

described by Lakoff and Johnson. As a result, the effective ground of the STATES ARE LOCATIONS

metaphor become the effective figure of ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS (Fig. 7.2).

Figure 7.2 Figure-ground relationship in Stevens's "The Rock"

Lewes (1879) explains how the effect-affect relation is not one of cause-effect, but rather the

different perceptions of figure and ground:

> That is to say, all the co-operant conditions which may severally be detected are
>
> the cause when viewed apart from their combination; these same conditions are
>
> the effect when viewed as a resultant. In consequence of this abstract mode of
>
> considering them, any one condition is often selected as the cause, and any one
>
> detail in the result as the effect. But in reality there is nothing in the effect which
>
> is not one of the conditions of its production; there is no new creation either of
>
> matter or motion, only *new combinations of matter and redirections of motion*.
>
> *If this be so, the relation between cause and effect is simply the relation*
>
> *between two modes of viewing a certain event*. (24; my emphases)

All figure-ground examples in Stevens' poem derive from an EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor in which Nature—sun, seasons, blossoms, fruit, planets—and Man are fused into one in their desire, the motivation of both, to cure and be cured. Poetry, as is true of all the arts, is an attempt to break through or transcend the way we are constructed as conventionally conscious human beings. How that structure gets expressed in human language constrains our view of reality: the minute we become conceptually aware of the world around us, we have at the same time made that world a phenomenological one, rich in its overlayering leaves but poor in enabling us to experience its essence directly and to become at one with it. Stevens' choice of "rock"—the mostsolid objective materiality of the external world—as metaphor for the essence of the invisible being of reality is nothing short of inspired. The following is a very brief analysis of the structureof "the Rock" in its enactment of Stevens' theory of poetry.

3.1 I: Seventy Years Later

Stevens creates a semantic network of figure-ground relations as they move from human experience to aspects of minding to nature, ending in the emergence (birth) of perception (sight) linking them all. This network structures Part I and becomes the structural pattern for the entire poem, with cognition the link between self and nature (Fig. 7.3).

HUMAN EXPERIENCE	COGNITION	NATURE
houses>freedom>emptiness>	mind>consciousness>assertion>	nature>design>cold>birth
stanzas 1-3	*stanzas 4-5*	*stanzas 7-9*

Figure 7.3 Cognitive link between self and nature

Part I opens with a contemplation of the nature of illusion: "It is an illusion that we were ever alive." The term *illusion*, in both Stevens' and Langer's work, is synonymous with semblance, fiction, ultimately arising from imagination. Illusion is something that seems to be but is not, a characteristic that marks the icon itself as something that appears to be, but is not what it

"sembles." The term *semble* comes from the Latin *simulare*, and is first recorded in the 14th

century in both its transitive and intransitive senses (*OED)*. Though now obsolete, its various

uses range over resembling, simulating, seeming, appearing, picturing, feigning, dissembling,

pretending, comparing, even the potentiality of "being likely to do something." All these

comprise the complexity of meanings that characterize the nature of an illusion and an icon.

Memory itself is an illusion, invention, an invocation of a presence of absence that recalls that

which is not. An absurdity of sounds and language, Stevens calls it, a phenomenon "not to be

believed" that they "were not and are not."

    The listing of the illusions and inventions of memory, all contained within the in-of phrases

that fuse both the inner and the outer elements of our being, segue into an analogy, "as if," that

introduces through a CONTAINMENT schema the idea of "nothingness," Stevens' no-thing, as

having a "métier," a sphere or occupation, for illusion. From this precategorial, preconscious root

springs the desire for leaves to cover the bare rock of in-visible being, resulting in the emergent

structure of the "birth" of the visible universe, and anticipating the opening of Part II.

3.2 II The Poem as Icon

Contained and therefore "hidden" within the frame of the outer two sections of the poem, Part II

speaks directly to the animating life-force of the being of reality. It opens with a proclamation:

> It is not enough to cover the rock with leaves.
>
> We must be cured of it by a cure of the ground
>
> Or a cure of ourselves, that is equal to a cure
>
> Of the ground, a cure beyond forgetfulness.

Both J. Hillis Miller (1976) and Bloom (1977) have speculated on Stevens' use of the word *cure*

and what it might mean. Bobby J. Leggett (1998), however, noting Stevens' consistently

ambiguous usage of the preposition *of*, sees the word *cure* as "belonging to" both the ground and

ourselves (109). The domination of the prepositional *of*-phrases in the opening lines indicates the

existence of the ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS conceptual metaphor, but its two parts are co-

respondent, working both ways, as we saw in "Domination of Black." The word *cure*, from the

Latin *cura*, "care," ranges over the ideas of restoration, recovery, preservation, remedy, the care

of souls. The effective agency of the rock's cure is established, not only as being both of

"ourselves" and "the ground," but the fact that both are equal in the cure affecting us "beyond

forgetfulness," the realm beyond human consciousness into the subliminal reaches of sensate

cognition. Having introduced the rock as the ground of our being, the leaves then become its

icon, through the hypothetical *if* clauses that relate the burgeoning of nature with our partaking of

its plenty: the potentiality of the leaves to both affect and be affected by the ground's cure.

    Stevens' terminology metaphorically invokes the doubleness of potential meanings: "ground"

as physical and the basis of all minding; "fiction" as "figuration," as "copy," and thus semblance;

"leaves" as the physical covering of underlying being, their mapping onto the chaplet, wreath,

and snood of the seasons, as well as the words of the poetic self that constitute the poem.

Through the ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS metaphor, the poem creates the leaves as its icon

which stand for the poetic self:

> These leaves are the poem, the icon and the man.
>
> These are the cure of the ground and of ourselves,
>
>
> In the predicate that there is nothing else.

The comma after "poem" sets off "the icon and the man" as a pair, so that a rough paraphrase of

the line reads "the leaves are the poem, [which is] the icon and the man."

    "These," then, become the leaves, the poem, the icon, and the poetic self that together restore

both ourselves and nature to the essence of being that encompasses everything. Stevens' use of

the word *predicate* is again a doubleness: it refers in its grammatical sense to the words of the

poem and also to its attribute, a quality that constitutes the life of being in Lewes' terms: "For

predicates—qualities—are not mere patterns on the web of a subject; they are the threads of that

web" (II, III, §24.150; qtd. in *OED*). The leaves, the poem, and the man animate the world:

nature and man as both, in a realization of the burgeoning of all life forms, expressed through the

birth images of "engendering" and "quickened," with the mind itself restored to its sensate

"root."

Part II thus elaborates on the ways in which the underlying rock of being manifests itself

through a fusion of the leaves, the poem, the icon, and the poetic self, creating a mapping of

identity between the poetic self and the poem so that "His words are both the icon and the man."

3.3 III Forms of the Rock in a Night-Hymn

Just as Part II focuses on the visible leaves, Part III focuses on the in-visible rock. The entire

night-hymn is a rhapsodic listing, in repetitive phrasal structure, of images of the rock as a

metaphor for the underlying state of being. Paralleling the structure of Part I, the first seven

instances of the *of* phrases culminate in the rock itself as origin, beginning, the starting point and

fusion of mind and rock life, and then end with the CONTAINMENT schema of Part I as

"nothingness" in which the rock-mind is "That in which space itself is contained," but which also

serves as "the gate"

> To the enclosure, day, the things illumined

> By day, night and that which night illumines,
>
> Night and its midnight-minting fragrances,
>
> Night's hymn of the rock, as in a vivid sleep.

Illusion, illumine: resonance of the way semblance brings to light the hidden, the invisible nature

of being itself, experienced through our sensory-motor-emotive processes of sensate cognition.

Poetry thus becomes the means by which we are "cured" to create "New senses in the

engendering of sense," Stevens' way of expressing how poetry uses language to break through

the "overlay" that conceptualization places on our preconscious experience of ourselves and the

world in order to create through the imagination the sense of the rock as the "vivid," animating

life-force of all being of reality in its in-visible essence.

4. The Transformative Power of the Icon

In the creation of poem as icon, metaphoring is not simply a matter of transfer from one unlike domain to another but is transformative, as Coulson and Matlock (2001: 306) note. Poetry enacts the integration of self with the material and immaterial worlds through cognitive minding. For a given product of art to "work," the motivating force of iconicity must in some way be realized by the respondent.

    I opened my discussion of the icon in Chapter 2 by quoting Plutarch's example of the sun as body, sight, and light to the soul, mind, and truth of Apollo, the god of light. In Rainer Maria Rilke's ekphrastic poem *Archaïscher Torso Apollos*, the presence of the god in the sculpted torso of Apollo is transformative:[13]

> Wir kannten nicht sein unerhörtes Haupt,
>
> darin die Augenãpfeln reiften. Aber
>
> sein Torso glüht noch wie ein Kandelaber,
>
> in dem sein Schauen, nur zurückgeschraubt,
>
> sich hãlt und glänzt. Sonst konnte nicht der Bug
>
> der Brust dich blenden, und im leisen Drehen
>
> der Lenden könnte nicht ein Lãcheln gehen
>
> zur jener Mitte, die die Zeugung trug.
>
> Sonst stunde dieser Stein entstellt und kurz

unter der Schultern durchsichtigem Sturz

und flimmerte nicht so wie Raubtierfelle

und bräche nicht aus allen seinen Rändern

aus wie ein Stern: denn da ist keine Stelle,

die dich nicht sieht. Du musst dein Leben ändern.

Contemplation of a statue of Apollo causes the viewer/poetic self to undergo, in Bernd Jager's (2003) words, "a sudden and dramatic transformation. Before his astonished eyes he sees the object of his study transform itself into the luminous body of a god, who then addresses him and urges him to change his life." Jager's analysis of the poem reflects many of the arguments I have made about the iconic power of art:

The poet describes the presence of the god in terms of a wide range of light metaphors. He thinks of the glow of candles and of a low burning oil lamp, he is reminded of the shine of apples and of bright eyes, of the shimmer of fur, of the blinding light of the sun or of a bright lone star in the sky. He becomes aware of the god not as an image, or as one visual object among many others, but as a mysterious source of light that illuminates him and his surrounding world. He does not so much see the god as he sees his world revealed in the light of the god. He enters a cosmos that derives its unity and coherence from Apollo's "seeing and showing". It is this luminous regard that sets a dynamic interplay in motion between a host and a guest, between heaven and earth and between self and other.

In commenting on most translators' use of the word *change* in the last line of the poem, Jager notes that "an entirely different register is opened by the German '*ändern*' and the English '*to*

alter', where the very idea of change becomes associated with the encounter of an Other. Change is understood in this instance as something that comes about through a personal exchange with an Other." By entering the world of both sculpture and poem, we come into the presence of an "other" that is absent, unseen, beyond the materiality of sculpture and poem, but with the power to change, to alter, to transform our lives. When a poem succeeds in doing so, it captures the very essence of our being. Artists and poets have, through the ages, been credited with the ability to speak truths, to capture, somehow, the "truths" of the universe through a different path from the ones scientists take. What is common to both, as I discuss in the following chapter, is the aesthetic faculty.

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1. I am not referring to a respondent's *interpretation*, which is indeed attested by countless different critical analyses of individual poems (M. Freeman 2008). It is rather a question of direct experiential feeling, analogous to the "raw feel" of a sensory impression from the interaction of the external object with the neurological processes of the human brain.

2. The two poets created their sonnets in friendly competition on Boxing Day, 12/26/1818. Shelley's poem, titled "Ozymandias," was originally published 1/11/1818 under the pseudonym Glirastes in *The Examiner*, no. 524. Certain changes in text were made in later editions. Smith's sonnet appeared a month later in *The Examiner* on 2/1/1818, with the same title, "Ozymandias," under the initials H. S. When the poem was reprinted in *Amarynthus, The Nympholet: A Pastoral Drama, In Three Acts. With Other Poems* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orne, and Brown, 1821), it was given the following title: "On a Stupendous Leg of Granite, Discovered Standing by Itself in the Deserts of Egypt, with the Inscription Inserted Below." The text remains the same in the two publications.

3. The poets would have read Diodorus Siculus in Greek. John Rodenbeck (2004) comments: "Mrs. Shelley's note on the year tells us that in fact Shelley's reading throughout 1817 was 'chiefly Greek.' She mentions specifically the Iliad, Aeschylus and Sophocles, the Homeric Hymns, Plato, and Arrian, and it is possible that he and Horace Smith found themselves reading Diodorus at the same time."

4. I am grateful to Donald C. Freeman for pointing out the perfective-imperfective contrast.

5. Peer Bungaard (Aarhus University, October 9, 2008) noted that poets do indeed violate topology. One avenue for research would be an empirical analysis of what makes such poetic violations successful.

6. I am grateful to Jacob Lunddahl Pedersen at Aarhus University (October 9, 2008) for pointing out the reference to Babylon's king in the Book of Isaiah.

7. Smith's spelling of the word *chace* reflects its older spelling, following the British practice of using [s] for verb forms and [c] for nouns.

8. Tsur (personal communication) noted the hidden rhyme in com**mand** and *Ozymand*ias. The verb *to mock* can mean either to make a mockery of or to imitate or make a model of (as in "mock-up"). Although the latter meaning goes back to the sixteenth century as a noun, its verbal usage was not recorded by the *OED* until the twentieth century. Shelley may have been playing with the meaning of the noun in making it verbal (perhaps marking the first recorded usage of the term in its model-making meaning), but the negative connotations of imposture, deceit, and ridicule that predominate in all uses of the word in its verbal, noun, and adjectival forms since the fifteenth century suggests that the emotive force of the word is guiding Shelley's choice.

9. The origins of the phrase "cocking a snook" (American) or "cocking a snoot" (British) are unknown, though the British form for the nose is more suggestive in this context. The *OED*'s etymological history for the word *mock* are all related to the wiping of the nose in derision.

10. I am grateful to Ewa Cruschiel for pointing out the vertical to horizontal movement.

11. Spolsky's line is an adaptation of W. H. Auden's line, "mad Ireland hurt you into poetry" in his poem, "In Memory of W. B. Yeats."

12. There are nineteen *in*-phrases, ten in the first stanza, six in the second, and three in the third. The *of*-phrases dominate: nine in part I, nineteen in part II, and ten in part III, for a total of thirty-eight, exactly double the number of *in*-phrases.

13. Jager (2003) includes a translation of the poem. Since so many exist and are still being written, I refer the reader to Art Beck's extensive discussion at jacketmagazine.com/36/beck-rilke-torso.shtml.

CHAPTER 8   AESTHETIC COGNITION

In this chapter, I place poetic iconicity within the broader context of aesthetics. The history of aesthetics, like iconicity, has developed its own specific meanings over time and in different situations and disciplines. Although by the twentieth century aesthetics was restricted to taste, beauty, and pleasure in the arts, I assert—unconditionally—that human cognitive activity depends on several interrelated and functional elements that constitute the aesthetic faculty. I therefore begin by redefining the notion of aesthetics. In the preceding chapters I approached poetic iconicity mainly from the perspective of the poet's motivations and intensions. Here I show how poetic iconicity can establish one means by which poetry can be aesthetically read and evaluated. After introducing what I see as misreadings of a Matthew Arnold's poem by not taking into account Arnold's aesthetic principles as evidenced in the poem, I show how his poem "Dover Beach" is a meditation on the aesthetic faculty in creating a poem as an icon of the felt being of reality.

As I was thinking of how iconicity and aesthetics are related, I happened to be driving home through our rural landscape. The distinction between the use of our senses aesthetically or nonaesthetically seemed clear to me as I paid attention to our scenic surroundings.[1] But I was following an old construction truck, rusty and black with grime. I began to wonder what it would be like if I thought about the truck aesthetically, and started to observe the truck closely.[2] I looked at the wooden slats installed on both sides of the open truck bed. They were all the same height, symmetrically arranged opposite each other and slanted slightly outward. On the bed of the truck, a heavy piece of equipment shaped in the form of a gigantic talon, like an eagle's claw, was attached by a pipe to housing on top of the truck cab. At first, I couldn't understand the point

of the slats since they seemed to obstruct the machinery. Suddenly, I began to appreciate that the truck was designed for a particular purpose: a vehicle for hauling logs from forest to mill, with the claw used to lift the sawn logs onto the truck bed and the slats to hold them in place. Attention, design, function: all characteristic of the way the aesthetic faculty had been used to create the truck to serve its purpose, just as poets attempt to achieve what they "set out to do."

By becoming aware of the sensory impressions I received from the truck, I perceived the "presence" of its reality as a participant in something beyond itself: the activities of loggers performing their work. That which had been absent to my thinking became present in my imagination. The truck before me became an icon of the aesthetic values of a local industry arising from our forested landscape. My experience leads me to redefine aesthetics in order to show how it grounds iconic creativity both in our everyday lives and our artistic endeavors.

1. The Aesthetic Faculty

Aesthetics in Western culture had, by the twentieth century, been reduced pretty much in its meaning and function to consideration of taste, beauty, and pleasure in the arts. As researchers explore aesthetics from a cognitive perspective, this attitude has changed. Inga Brinck (2017) focuses on the way empathy is a necessary prerequisite for an aesthetic response. Bence Nanay (2014) cautions that not all responses to art are aesthetic, and suggests that aesthetics needs to be separated from art, "but carefully" (102). James I. Porter (2017) returns to Kant and Aristotle to understand "the aesthetics of life" to challenge notions of aesthetics as autonomous experiences, severed from all other aspects of human activity. Yuriko Saito (2017) focuses on "*restoring aesthetics to its original task: investigating the nature of experiences gained through sensory perception and sensibility*" (1; original emphasis). Such experiences are not simply those of

aesthetic affects on respondents; they are also experienced by creators of the elements of our

human worlds, not only material artifacts but also social, political, cultural, and scientific

institutions, models and theories of how human and natural worlds work (Bueno et al. 2018;

Currie et al. 2014).

Contemporary cognitive research is not so much an expression of new discoveries about

human cognition as it is a revival, with new technologies and methodologies, of earlier theories

that challenge many stereotypical assumptions of Western thought over the centuries. Before

Descartes introduced his model of the mind-body split—a metaphor that has been taken literally

since his time—the Greeks developed the notion of *paideia*, the development of Greek cultural

education from a belief in the symmetry between world and self, resulting in an integration of

both physical and psychological processes in human cognition and activity (Jaeger 1944).

The Greek term for sensory perception is αἴσθησις, related to discernment and understanding

that comes from conceptualizing the sensory-motor-emotive level of our cognitive processing.[3]

Baumgarten (2007[1750]) coined the term *aesthetics* from the Greek as the science of sensate

cognition. In contrast to its usual contemporary meaning, therefore, I argue that taste, beauty, and

pleasure are products arising from the aesthetic faculty, not the faculty itself (Lewes 1879):

> By faculty is commonly understood the power or aptitude of an agent to perform a
>
> certain action or class of actions. It is thus synonymous with function, which
>
> means the activity of an organ, the uses of the instrument. I propose to detach
>
> faculty from this general signification, limiting it to the action or class of actions
>
> into which a function may be diversified by *the education of experience*. That is
>
> to say, *let function stand for the native endowment of the organ, and faculty for its*
>
> *acquired variation of activity*. The hand is an organ with the function of

> Prehension. To grasp, pull, scratch, &c., are its inherited powers. But the various
>
> modes of manipulation cutting, sewing, drawing, writing, fencing, &c. are
>
> faculties acquired by *intelligent direction* and the *combination* of other organs.
>
> (27; my emphases)

All life forms are naturally endowed with certain functions. Applying Lewes' definition to my construction truck, the prehensive functional abilities of a predatory bird's claw had been adapted by the imaginative faculty to manufacture the iron claw for the purpose of lifting logs. The opposing talon of the eagle's claw enables the bird to grasp its prey. The flexible opposing thumb in primates and humans allows for a wider range of grasping activity. From this perspective, cognition is a function shared by animals and humans in varying degrees, depending on the relevant education of experience. It appears, however, that human cognitive faculties are unique in possessing intelligent design and skill in memory, imagination, and reason.

The aesthetic faculty involves purpose, intension, function, and value ascribed to our imaginative understanding. It reflects the ability to discern, to discriminate, thus to distinguish qualitatively the successful from the unsuccessful, good from bad, right from wrong, the ugly from the beautiful, the true from the false. The aesthetic faculty underlies all human activities, including the natural and social sciences as well as the arts and humanities. It is not innate. It is acquired through education and intelligent design that leads to the capabilities of purpose, discrimination, expertise, judgment, and creative activity. All these depend on the generating power of the imagination. Aesthetic activity is not something unique to the artist. Everyone has the potentiality to develop it.[4] It includes the ability to attain a more extensive knowledge of the sensations and impressions presented through the faculty of the imagination that lead to discriminating empathetic and ethical judgment of human behavior and activity.

2. Aesthetic Function

The aesthetic faculty is common to both the arts and the sciences. Their function, however, is different. The sciences abstract from inchoate facts, the arts embrace them in all their concreteness and particularity. The reality of the world scientists and artists explore is the same; the approach they take results in a different kind of knowledge, the difference between "knowledge" and "understanding," *conoscere* and *sapere*, *connaître* and *savoir* (Carr 1917: 193). The arts exist at the intersection of the wholly man-made and the world of sensate cognition. The word *artifact* is a clue to the difference. From the Latin words for skillfulness and making, the word points to the ability of artists to create their own visions of reality through the various senses and thus, by *poesis* ("making"), to know the world in a way impossible to the Cartesian scientist. In creating a semblance of reality, artists draw closer to the existence of nature's being "as it really is," to use Croce's (1953: 120) words.[5] Evaluative judgment of the arts is based on how well artists manage to create an iconic semblance of this reality in all its particularities as it exists in the lived experience of minding.

Aesthetics is an activity of minding. Sensate activity and judgment entail the relation of our inner responses with our experiences of the external world. That relation is intuitive and emotive, not analytic and conceptual. Adherence to cognitivist scientific methodology that values abstraction, generalization, experiment, and prediction, in spite of its avowed turn away from the mind-body split, has resulted in an indifference, if not ignorance, toward the intuitive, imaginative workings of human minding that underlie all human cognitive activity. Scattered throughout the long history of aesthetics are patterns of approaches that hint toward the development of a cognitive science of aesthetics.

First is the role of memory and imagination in the formation of thought. Without them, conceptualization is impossible. For Aristotle (1995), memory, through the recognition of sameness in repetition, enables the establishment of *topoi*, or "places" in the mind; for Vico (1949[1744]), imagination, through sensory identification between emotion and experience, enables metaphorical transfer, out of which thought itself emerges, and on which further conceptual analogies can be built. For Croce (1953[1909]):

> There is but one Æsthetic, the *science of intuitive or expressive knowledge*, which
>
> is the æsthetic or artistic fact. And this Æsthetic is the true analogue of Logic,
>
> which includes, as *facts of the same nature*, the formation of the smallest and
>
> most ordinary concept and the most complicated scientific and philosophical
>
> system. (14; my emphases)

Logic proceeds at the level of conceptual analogy, aesthetics at the level of imaginative identification. Both are necessary components of minding. Analogy allows for the methods of science: empirical experimentation, testing, generalization, and prediction; identity rather presents what is and what is hypothetically possible. Imaginative identification occurs through metaphorical mapping. Experiential metaphor operates through sensory-motor-emotive affects; conceptual metaphor through analogy and reasoning. Linguistic metaphor falls under the category of expressive cognitive activity, allowing for the products of all art forms.

Second is the role of sensate cognition. Sensate activity is pre-rational, existing below the level of consciousness; "impressions" occur when the process of minding perceives sensations and makes them conscious (Damasio 2010; Fuchs 2018). It is perhaps here that the apparent incompatibility between the methods of the sciences and the methods of the arts emerges most clearly. Their relation can perhaps be understood as sharing the common faculties of memory,

imagination, attention, and discrimination. The neurosciences, through the development of more highly sophisticated instruments, are beginning to describe and analyze brain functions as a tool of the human organism that enables and controls our movements, sensations, and emotions. Such findings have led to an extreme assumption by some researchers that brain activity alone initiates and accounts for every aspect of human consciousness and life, what Raymond Tallis (2011) calls "neuromania." Rather, what is needed is a complementary and integrative account of the relation of scientific and aesthetic approaches to cognitive minding (Lutterbie 2017). Terrence Deacon (2012) argues that scientific theory needs to include attention to elements in the world that are not amenable to current scientific theory: "It's time to recognize that there is room for meaning, purpose, and value in the fabric of physical explanations, because these phenomena effectively occupy the absences that differentiate and interrelate the world that is physically present" (541).

A third factor in the development of aesthetic cognition is Vico's idea that we can only truly know that which we have made. As engineers, technicians, artisans, and artists express the aesthetic intuitions of sensate cognition in creating their artifacts, so do we engage in aesthetic activity in using and responding to them. The same is true for the immaterial artifacts of human culture and institutions, reflected in social, political, economic, and educational systems.

Because sensate cognition is the intuitive grounding for feeling, it is not amenable to a scientific methodology that is based on abstraction and experiment. But *understanding* the affects of sensate cognition is not an automatic given. Just as expertise is needed in the methodologies of the natural sciences, so expertise is needed in the methodologies of the humanistic sciences. The ability to judge and evaluate constitutes for Kant "the faculty of aesthetic interest" (Scruton and Munro 2018).

All human cognitive activity depends on six interrelated aesthetic functions: memory, imagination, attention, discrimination, expertise, and judgment. Together, they give rise to all our apprehensions and understandings of the worlds of which we are a part. They constrain and are constrained by how much we apply them—or don't apply them— to all the different aspects of our lives, empathetically and ethically. When we do so and they integrate our sense of self with world, they form the ground for iconic motivation, both in everyday life and artistic production.

3. Aesthetic Iconicity in the Arts

Rather than seeing aesthetics as simply taste, beauty, and pleasure in the arts, therefore, I start from a very simple fact. Under normal operation, minding is not schizophrenic. Its ability to reason conceptually, to feel emotionally, and to respond intuitively to sensory impressions are not compartmentalized, but synaesthetically bound, integrated in a unified whole. In this sense, minding is embodied. The experience of art, both in its production and its reception, opens up the possibility of scientifically understanding the workings of minding in unifying feeling (sensations and emotions) and thought (image and concept). An art work exists as a unified whole, a *gestalt*, as does the world of which it is a semblance; one may examine its parts, but the parts remain fragmented if they are not then seen within the framework of the unified whole. Answers to some of the questions cognitive researchers raise in considering aesthetics and iconicity may thus be found in studying the *poesis*, the making, of art.

In poetry, words are made to work, not discursively, to create meaning, but aesthetically, to capture the precategorial essence of experience that makes a poem an icon of felt reality, as we saw in the difference between the two Ozymandias sonnets. The distinction between discursive and aesthetic language is exemplifed in the contrast between two recent translations (Bowersock

2009) of an epigram by Marcus Valerius Martialis (1823: 434-435):

> Dum Phaethontea formica vagatur in umbra,
>
> Inplicuit tenuem sucina gutta feram.
>
> Sic modo quae fuerat vita contempta manente,
>
> Funeribus facta est nunc pretiosa suis.

D. R. Shackleton Bailey (Martialis 1993) translates Martial's epigram almost word for word into discursive prose: "As an ant was wandering in Phaethonic shade, a drop of amber enfolded the tiny creature. So she that was despised but lately while life remained has now been made precious by her death" (qtd. in Bowersock 2009: 37).

Martial's epigram refers to a natural occurrence whereby tree resin is fossilized into the precious stone, amber. In its liquid state, when resin exudes from the tree, it sometimes encases small insects or flowers before it hardens into amber. This hardening process takes millions of years, so that in its own fossilizing it fossilizes whatever is caught in it, which is itself therefore millions of years old. According to one mineraloid website, "The odd inclusions that are often seen in amber usually add to amber's unique look and in many cases greatly increase its value" (Amethyst Galleries 1995-2011). The story Martial's epigram tells blends the fate of the ant encased—inscribed—in amber with the moral that death can make precious what life despises.

A more recent translation by Garry Wills (Martialis 2008) has a pithier, more poetic quality:

> A drop of amber hit an ant,
>
> While crawling past a tree,
>
> A brief and trifling thing preserved
>
> For all eternity. (qtd. in Bowersock 2009: 37)

Both translations preserve the two-part structure of Martial's original epigram. First we are given

a description of the event, then we are invited to consider its significance. While Shackleton Bailey's translation captures Martial's alteration of attitude toward the ant from being despised in life to being made precious in death, it does not replicate the aesthetic effects of the original.

In Latin, the "inscribing" of the ant is rendered in a ponderous metrical form with many polysyllabic words, a form that humorously throws into relief the insignificance of its subject. Wills' translation transforms the original into a poetic form quite different from the original Latin but that takes advantage of the aesthetic possibilities of English. The meter he chose is based on ballad meter, which has the virtue of being ancient and memorable. The poem's aesthetic effects depend on its oral quality, with its short monosyllables and the predominance of the explosive-sounding [t] consonant. These sound effects occur in the transitive verb *hit*, so that we sense more directly the impact of fate on the ambered ant, just as we sense the impact of the apocalyptic apple that dropped on Isaac Newton. The progressive use of "crawling" gives us the event as it is happening (compare "While past a tree it crawled," putting the event in the past). The suffixes of the two-syllable words, *amber, crawling, trifling*, carry weakest stress and thus throw into greater contrast the word *presérved* with major stress on the second syllable. "Preserve" is also a more indirect choice than Shackleton Bailey's "made precious," so that we are drawn into active participation, having to make the additional connection that we only preserve that which we value. The term *presérved* also carries with it the notion of conservation, the idea of the ant fossilized. The poem climaxes on the last word, *etérnity*, with its stressed vowel echoing that of *presérve*, and with its four syllables, the longest word in the poem, simulating the length of eternity.

These suprasegmental effects of syllables and sounds in Wills' translation complement the way the words are working. The preserving of the ant in amber reflects the nature of the epigram

itself as inscription.[6] The physicality of "burial" is captured in Wills' choice of "preserved,"

reflecting Martial's *funeribus* more specifically than had Martial chosen *mortibus*, Shackleton

Bailey's "death." Not the ant's death but its burial rite occasioned the epigram. The scope of the

appositional phrase "a brief and trifling thing" is ambiguous. The phrase obviously refers to the

ant, a lowly, inconspicuous insect with a brief life span. But it can also refer to the event, that is,

the entire preceding two lines. Not only is the ambered ant preserved for all eternity, but its story

is too. In other words, the ambered ant contains within its fossilized preservation the history of

the event, and the forensic geologist who discovers the fossil may "read" its inscribed story

accordingly, just as we do in responding to the poem. Shackleton Bailey reports the event; Wills

enacts it. The drop falls, the ant is ambered, and the story preserved. Wills' poem iconically

dramatizes its happening in an eternal present.

This moment of being in the eternal present for both ant and poem marks the archetypal

occurrence of poetic iconicity. Wills' "for all eternity" reinforces this aesthetic meaning. The

word *eternal* has two meanings. For the sciences, all necessary propositions are eternal in the

sense that they are independent of time—they are unchanging, true for all time, as opposed to

existential (contingent) propositions. For aesthetics, Benedetto Croce notes:

> The present is eternal in quite another meaning. It exists and it comprehends
>
> existence. The temporal present is a present which succeeds a past and exists by
>
> virtue of the non-existence of the past. *The eternal present is the present outside*
>
> *which no existence falls.* The distinction of past from present is not the distinction
>
> of did exist from does exist. The past exists in the present, and the temporal
>
> distinctions then and now, before and after, are determinations within existence.
>
> It is only the abstractions of the mathematical and natural sciences which have

made this doctrine sound contrary to reason. When we reflect on our mind, our

life, our self, our individuality, we perceive that what we apprehend as real

existence is our past acting in the present. This past is carried along in the present,

and cut off from it the present is not the present. Everything which partakes of

the nature of life and mind involves the fact that it is *process or activity*, the

existence of the past in the present. This is the very notion of duration. The

eternal present means, therefore, that reality is one duration which includes past,

present, and future, as distinct from an abstract present which excludes from

itself an abstract past and an abstract future. (Qtd. in Carr 1917: 203; my

emphases)

Experiencing the feeling of being in the moment of a poem's "eternal present" is to

experience the poem as an icon, the semblance of a felt and present reality. It is not always easy

to describe one's feelings when such iconic enactments occur. In Martial's epigram, we may feel

a positive sense of completion, a sense of fulfillment of the ant's otherwise lowly destiny, a sense

of amusement, the comforting recognition that eternity too can belong to the most inconspicuous

of creatures, or indeed all or none of the above. However one might describe them, the feelings

we experience reading Wills' translation are more intensified compared with Shackleton

Bailey's.

4. Aesthetic Evaluation

To understand aesthetics as judgment, we need to consider the kind of tone constrained by the

language of the text, what Roman Ingarden (1973) calls a "preaesthetic reflective cognition" of

the work (337-342). This reconstruction involves being as faithful as possible to the actual

language of the text, paying attention to the sounds, meanings, and structures, "the possible ambiguity of words and groups of words, and syntactic-logical functions among sentences," and to discover either harmonious unity or sources of discord in the text as a whole. Only then can one move to the second step of "concretizing" the text through "reflective cognition of the literary aesthetic object" by constituting the "original aesthetic emotion and what develops out of it in the aesthetic experience" in order to create "direct access to the aesthetically valuable or to the aesthetic values," filling in what has been omitted or is implied in the language of the text itself (304). Application of Ingarden's constraints leads to aesthetic judgment.

Just as overlooking the import of affective prosody can lead to misreading as we saw in Chapter 6, so can overlooking authorial intension and affective tone lead to misevaluation. Two commentaries on Matthew Arnold's (1890: 230) poem, "The Last Word" reflect consequences on both counts. Robert Stallman's (1965) comment on Arnold's poem appears in his *Encyclopedia* entry on Intention:

> What Matthew Arnold set out to do in *The Last Word* we know by evidence of the
> poem alone. Also, we know by the poem itself—on evidence of its contradiction
> in *the intended effect or meaning*—that his plan was not reasonable and
> consequently he could not succeed in carrying the poem through to a successful
> conclusion, for the ending of *The Last Word* contradicts the beginning in mood
> and theme. (399; my emphasis)

Christopher Nield's (2007) reading of the poem is more detailed in its analysis than Stallman's brief comment and contrasts with it in identifying both Arnold's intention and tone:

> It's the universal story of the individual against the group. The staunch defender
> of simple truth, for whom geese are happily geese and not anything more, is met

by the splenetic venom of "them"—a shadowy elite, for whom truth is little more than a language game. But, as Arnold reminds us, truth is so much more important than being clever or powerful; and the real hero is the one who has the quiet confidence to turn the other cheek.

[…]

Of course, the tone here is not at all serious; the comparison between the battlefield and the war of words in the Victorian drawing room is arch and playful. Yet in making us laugh Arnold makes us see that human psychology has remained unchanged for millennia, though we may have moved on from the pickaxe to the put-down. Indeed, the drawing room could be the modern office, with its political maneuvering, whispery cabals, and skullduggery behind the smiles.

My reading of the poem refutes both Nield's identification of the poem's tone as arch and playful and Stallman's claim that the poem fails to succeed in what it set out to do.

<div style="text-align:center">

The Last Word

Creep into thy narrow bed,

Creep, and let no more be said!

Vain thy onset! all stands fast.

Thou thyself must break at last.

Let the long contention cease!   5

Geese are swans and swans are geese.

Let them have it how they will!

</div>

Thou art tired; best be still.

They out-talk'd thee, hiss'd thee, tore thee?

Better men fared thus before thee;   10

Fired their ringing shot and pass'd,

Hotly charg'd—and sank at last.

Charge once more, then, and be dumb!

Let the victors, when they come,

When the forts of folly fall,   15

Find thy body by the wall!

Attracted as I am by Nield's reading, I am not convinced that the tone of the poem is as

humorous as he suggests, or that Arnold is advocating turning the other cheek by giving up the

game in the fight for truth. Rather, the following intuitive responses from an informal readers'

survey employ negative terminology in describing the poem: *bleak, angry, desperate, sardonic,*

hopeless, with feelings of exhaustion and resignation, the sad inescapability of accepting defeat

in the face of an implacable opposition. In addition, consideration of Arnold's critical aesthetic

in both his writings and his life shows that "The Last Word" reaches to the very core of the

tensions existing in Arnold's self as he interacted with his world.

The poem's structure is based on the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. Its title indicates

more than one ARGUMENT IS WAR blend operating. For who has the last word? In reading the

metaphor as one between the addressee and his antagonists, the structuring frame for the blend

comes from the war space, and describes the conflict between the addressee and the anonymous

"they" who are attacking him. Reading the metaphor as one between the speaker and his addressee, the structuring frame comes from the argument space, and focuses on their verbal interaction. Significantly, we only hear the speaker; the addressee's responses are only given implicitly in the silence between the stanzas.

At the outset, the speaker has urged his addressee to say no more, to "be still." The speaker controls the scenario by continually demeaning the addressee, both in word choice ("creep"; "narrow"; "vain"; "tired"; "better men"; "folly"). His tone is supercilious throughout. Had he said, for instance, "Rest upon thy ample bed, / Rest, and let no more be said," the effect would have been more gentle, more persuasive. How committed is this speaker to actually helping his addressee? His words are offensive, not conciliatory. Even the last line of the first stanza, "Thou thyself must break at last," carries an insulting image, though not one automatically available to monolingual speakers of English. As a classical scholar, well versed in Latin, Greek, German, and French, Arnold was no doubt aware of the French phrase *casse-toi*, first recorded in 1835, from the verb *casser*, "to break." Its direct translation is "break yourself," but the informal use of the second person singular *toi* in French creates an idiomatic slang expression hard to translate into English, but that basically means "get lost" or "fuck off."[7]

Arnold's speaker focuses not on the advantages of turning the other cheek, as Nield claims, but on how "better men" have failed, how inevitably future victors will triumph. When his addressee refuses to comply with his admonition to concede, the speaker apparently gives up the argument, telling the addressee to go ahead and "charge once more," but notes the effect of doing so will make him "dumb," a surely well-intentioned pun on stupidity and silence. It is, after all, the speaker who has the last word.

Arnold's speaker, then, is not simply the pragmatist who advises retreat in the face of overwhelming odds, but one who himself relishes and plays upon the weakness of his addressee. Under this reading, repetitions of the verbs of admonition take on a different resonance. Whereas "creep" and "charge" are direct commands to the addressee, the four occurrences of "let" become ambiguous. Although at first they give some control to the addressee in encouraging him to acquiesce in the face of his opponents, in the end it appears in the form of its godly use in "Let there be light" in predicting the victors' arrival. It is the speaker who has the power to let things happen. He who has "the last word" will always win, but it is in how that last word is achieved that marks who will have it.

Arnold's own writings provide the greatest clue to his intension in composing "The Last Word." In his final lecture at Oxford entitled "Last Words," in a series "On Translating Homer," Arnold attempts once again, in the face of his critics, to establish the knowledge and principles needed to translate Homer well. Arnold (1914) begins by referring to Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon's attitude toward his critics: "Buffon, the great French naturalist, imposed on himself the rule of steadily abstaining from all answer to attacks made on him" (379). After praising Buffon for not succumbing to "the baneful effects of controversy," Arnold continues: "Buffon's example seems to me worthy of all imitation, and in my humble way I mean always to follow it. I have never replied, I never will reply, to any literary assault; in such encounters tempers are lost, the world laughs, and truth is not served" (380). Given Arnold's lifelong campaign against literary assaults against him, one is led to wonder whether it was simply failure on Arnold's part to heed his own advice, or whether he was being ironic. The answer to that question leads directly to an understanding of Arnold's own minding as it is expressed in "The Last Word."

When Masako Takeda (personal communication), read an early version of my extended analysis of the poem, she asked whether the speaker might be addressing himself in counseling a strategic retreat in the face of his own intransigence. The question then becomes to what extent Arnold as poet and critic actually experienced defeatism in giving up the fight for knowledge and truth in the face of ignorance and falsehood. Or was he being ironic in considering his attempts to answer his critics a total failure? The answer lies in both, or, perhaps better, between the two. That is, although Arnold recognized with ironic detachment the failure of his own attempts to convince his critics of the rightness of his approach, he nevertheless never gave up the struggle against the dangers of intellectual and moral decay he saw in his own country:

> This conviction haunts me, and at times even overwhelms me with
>
> depression; I would rather not live to see the change come to pass, for
>
> we shall all deteriorate under it. While there is time, I will do all I can,
>
> and in every way, to prevent it coming to pass. (qtd. in Coulling 1974:
>
> 21)

I conclude that Arnold in writing "The Last Word" was conflicted between pessimism and hope: pessimism that nothing he could do or say would suffice to break down the forts of folly, but hope that one day if not he, then others would be victorious and make "the forts of folly fall." It is the steadfastness of that hope in the face of overwhelming odds that enabled Arnold to have the last word, both in his writings and in his poem. In this way, "The Last Word" becomes an icon of Arnold's aesthetic principles. Those principles, and Arnold's own feelings of England's intellectual and moral decay, are iconically realized in his most famous poem, "Dover Beach."

5 Iconic Aesthetics in "Dover Beach"

The problems presented in "Dover Beach" concern many of the questions raised in considering

the aesthetic activity of human minding, and critics have not satisfactorily resolved them

(Holland 1968; Kövecses 2010; Lancashire 2009; Robinson 2005). Why does the poem resonate

so strongly with us when its emphasis lies not on the calm scene with which the poem opens, but

on the image of ignorant armies clashing by night with which it ends? How can one (to cite an

oft-raised question throughout the history of art) feel pleasure from the expression of pain? Why

does the poet find it necessary to refer to the literary past of Sophocles and Thucydides? How

can one account for the many dualisms in the poem and the seemingly contradictory stances

taken by its speaker?

   The poem asks us to consider the nature of reality and our relationship to it, as the speaker

moves from the feeling of identification with the external world, to a stage in which

conceptualization creates metaphorical analogy between human culture and world, to the final

stage of alienation, with total disconnect between human emotions and external nature.

<div align="center">Dover Beach</div>

The sea is calm tonight,

The tide is full, the moon lies fair

Upon the straits; on the French coast the light

Gleams and is gone; the cliffs of England stand,

Glimmering and vast out in the tranquil bay.   5

Come to the window, sweet is the night air!

Only, from the long line of spray

Where the sea meets the moon-blanched land,

Listen! you hear the grating roar

Of pebbles which the waves draw back, and fling,   10

At their return, up the high strand,

Begin, and cease, and then again begin,

With tremulous cadence slow, and bring

The eternal note of sadness in.

Sophocles long ago   15

Heard it on the Aegean, and it brought

Into his mind the turbid ebb and flow

Of human misery; we

Find also in the sound a thought,

Hearing it by this distant northern sea.   20

The Sea of Faith

Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore

Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.

But now I only hear

Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,   25

Retreating, to the breath

Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear

And naked shingles of the world.

Ah, love, let us be true

> To one another! for the world, which seems   30
>
> To lie before us like a land of dreams,
>
> So various, so beautiful, so new,
>
> Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
>
> Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
>
> And we are here as on a darkling plain   35
>
> Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
>
> Where ignorant armies clash by night.

According to manuscript evidence, the nine lines of the last stanza were written in 1851, while Arnold and his wife were visiting Dover Beach to celebrate their recent marriage, whereas the first 28 lines were not composed until fifteen years later (Lancashire 2009). With the exception of the truncated meter of its first and last lines, the last stanza is constructed in iambic pentameter, following the standard rhyme scheme that Arnold uses for practically all his sonnets. It may well be that he had first conceived the poem in sonnet form. The finality of the last three lines, ending with a couplet form reminiscent of the Shakespearian sonnet, makes it difficult to imagine how the poem might have been continued. One can read the final stanza, therefore, as a failed sonnet, and this might partially explain why Arnold abandoned it for fifteen years before taking it up again and adding the preceding lines.

The poem in its final form falls into two almost equal parts. The first part describes the scene at Dover, the second introduces the metaphorical analogy of "the Sea of Faith." Both parts end by bringing the historical past—first of Sophocles, the Greek poet and dramatist, and then of Thucydides, the Greek historian—into the present moment. Embedded in this two-part structure is a tripartite structure reflecting variations of the sonnet form. The first stanza forms a complete

sonnet in itself. The next two stanzas also comprise fourteen lines, but with the sestet occurring first, and this octet-sestet reversal crosses the divide of the two-part structure. The final stanza I have already remarked upon as an incomplete sonnet. These changes in form move from the "calm" of the first line, through the "cadence" of the ebbing tide, to the "clash" of the last, and reflect the three stages of human emotional relationship with the world of sensory impressions, ending in the fracturing of that relationship, marked by Vico's final age of man in the darkness of barbarism.

The poem opens with a speaker whose sensory perceptions are attuned to the scene before him. It shifts from Germanic ballad meter into Romance iambic pentameter at the introduction of the "French coast" compared with the "cliffs of England." This transitional moment is reflected in the way sensory perceptions move from images of sight in the opening lines, through the synaesthetic invocation to taste the sweetness of the night air in the second quatrain, to images of sound in the sestet. Arnold creates a scene in which what we see, taste, and hear create in us certain emotional responses, feelings that we project back onto the sources of our sense impressions to create a sense of identification between human "subjectivity" and "objective" reality, just as the "grating roar" of the pebbles creates in the listener "the eternal note of sadness." Zoltán Kövesces (2010) says of lines 13-14 in Arnold's poem, "of course we know that waves cannot actually *bring in* sadness or *notes of sadness* – they can only be metaphorically responsible for our sad mood when we hear the *tremulous cadence slow*" (671; original emphasis).

The ability to keep separate emotion and sensory impressions while still metaphorically fusing them within the imagination is the aesthetic activity in operation. Arnold is careful to make a similar distinction. In describing the "grating roar" of the wave-driven pebbles, Arnold

first wrote "With regular cadence slow," and then modified the adjective to "mournful." This

became, in the published version, "With tremulous cadence slow." The progression of Arnold's

thinking is illuminating. The notion of regularity serves as a commentary on the preceding line,

"Begin, and cease, and then again begin," identifying the continuous ebb and flow of the tide.

The term "mournful" anticipates the following lines, "and bring / the eternal note of sadness in."

The question is why Arnold chose to substitute "tremulous" for "mournful." The adjective

mournful indicates that the sound of the pebbles' roar is itself mournful, an example of Ruskin's

(1856) pathetic fallacy. By contrast, the adjective *tremulous* can apply to both the turbulent

action of the waves and the physical trembling of an emotional response.

By choosing the word *tremulous*, Arnold hits upon a description that is iconically true of the

natural things of the world including ourselves. That is, as the movements of sound of the wave-

driven pebbles vibrate and shake, so we too can experience vibrations and shakings when we

physically tremble. The phrase "tremulous cadence" creates a synaesthetic identity between

movement and sound, just as "grating roar" does, and these identity connections cause a similar

reaction in the respondent. Arnold's speaker is not committing the pathetic fallacy that the waves

themselves are sad; he is claiming that sensory impressions can leave emotional traces in our

minds. Kövesces's phrase "metaphorically responsible" reflects domain crossing between the

physical sound and its emotional affect on the listener; the causality it represents is real, not

false. That is, the aural receptivity of our brains transforms the force dynamics of physically

representing the sound of the waves into an emotional feeling in our minding, a metaphor of

cross-domain causality which cognitive neuroscientists have discovered is factually real

(LeDoux 1996; Damasio et al. 2000).

According to Lakoff (2006), certain neural circuits in the brain structure sensory-motor observation, action, and stimulation and include image schemas and force dynamic schemas. Through the CAUSES ARE FORCES metaphor, which "maps *forces that result in motion* onto *causes that result in change*" (163; original emphasis), the sound of the retreating tide that is registered through the auditory system of our brains produces a feeling of sadness. The first stanza achieves this connection through the CONTAINER schema of out-in, reflecting the idea of the sensory sound of a tide flowing *out* in the world bringing *in* a feeling of sadness into the mind.

Like Wills' "for all eternity," Arnold's "eternal note" also carries the aesthetic meaning of duration in Croce's eternal present, as evidenced by the invocation immediately following of a Sophoclean past in which the same sound produces a similar emotional response in the Greek poet. The relation between sensory impressions and emotions is created by the imagination that all human beings share, according to Vico's concept of *universale fantastico* (imaginative universal), a concept which depends on Vico's understanding of *sensus communis*. Often translated as "common sense," it is better understood as "consensus," the sense of what is held in common (Verene 1981):

> In Vico's view, common sense, or *sensus communis*, is not a proto-scientific form
> of knowledge, but the common way of experiencing the world present in the life
> of a people. It is not a set of consciously formed cognitive or empirical beliefs.
> The *sensus communis* of a people is rooted in a common way of feeling, speaking,
> and symbolizing meaning in the world. (53)

That common way includes practical judgment and arises from the poetic wisdom from which all knowledge springs and which is based on universal imagination. By connecting the

speaker's own experience with historical memory of what Sophocles also heard and how he responded, Arnold invokes the natural quality of the sound to potentially produce the effect it does wherever and whenever it occurs. Vico's theory of *memoria*, or recollective understanding, places poetic wisdom at the beginning of human thought and not as an incidental or accidental afterthought. It also explains how an imaginative expression that is unique in its individual particularity can nevertheless invoke the archetypal imaginative universals established by the *sensus communis* of universal human experience. Metaphors that invoke knowledge of the *sensus communis* are imaginative universals, and thus aesthetically create icons of human experience.

The experience of Arnold's poem lies in its expressions of mutability, of change that brings about feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. Though the poem opens with the image of a tide at full, its fullness is only momentary; as soon as high tide occurs, it immediately begins to recede, and it is this withdrawing that is the subject of the poem, not the rising, but the falling, of the tide. In similar vein, the moonlight is itself not static; just as the light "gleams and is gone" from the coast of France, so the moonlight gives way to the "night-wind" and the "darkling plain" of the poem's conclusion. Although Holland (1968) notes a contrast between "sweet sight and disillusioning sound" (116) in the poem, the relationship of sight and sound is closer and more complex. Both are subject to change; just as the tide turns, moonlight gives way to darkness, bright faith at the full must inevitably retreat in "melancholy, long, withdrawing roar" to the darkness of the "night-wind." The world that "lies before us" at the full like the "Sea of Faith" that "lay" at the full "like a bright girdle" has in fact "no light," and we are left, like Sophocles' victims who cannot escape their doom, with Sophocles' "human misery" that accompanies us "here" on Thucydides's "darkling plain" of the world.

Lines 18-20 mark a transition to the second stage of human thought, from sensory identification to conceptualization, as the speaker also finds in the sound, not an emotion, but "a thought." This transition is marked by the semi-colon dividing the two parts at the same time they are related within one line: "Of human misery; we," serving as a bridge between the first and second stages of human development, from sensory metaphors of attribution to conceptual metaphors of analogy. The third stanza makes this "thought" explicit as the speaker transforms the emotive images of the first stanza into a conceptual metaphor of analogy. Thus the actual fullness of the tide described in the opening lines becomes the metaphorical high point of the "Sea of Faith." This second stage in the development of human thought occupies only three lines of the entire poem, since it already begins to transition into the final and decadent stage, just as the tide when it reaches its highest and fullest point immediately begins to recede. The speaker no longer experiences an emotional response to the sound of the retreating tide; he "now [...] only" hears in the sound an analogy to the melancholy loss of faith.

Through the schema of TRANSFORMATION, the images of the first stanza darken: the cadence of the continuous ebb and flow of the pebbles is now heard as a withdrawal, long and melancholy; the sweetness of the night air is transformed into the more ominous "breath / of the night-wind," the cliffs that stood out "glimmering and vast" have become "the vast edges drear"; the shingles are naked and barren. The withdrawal of a faith that enabled the calmness and moonlit land of the opening scene to be seen as "the folds of a bright girdle" investing—in the sense of adorning—the world prepares for final loss in the last stanza.

But why are Arnold's armies in the final line of the poem ignorant? He could have chosen "hostile" or "warring" or some other two-syllable adjective to describe more literally the nature and function of armies. By choosing "ignorant," Arnold is penetrating through external, prosaic

description to capture an inner, more explanatory notion of something lacking, something absent in these armies. We are led to ask what it is that they don't know, to realize that perhaps their not knowing is the cause of their hostilities. The adjective opens up a range of ideas and possibilities beyond words, revealing, in Ruskin's (1856) words, "a more essential truth than is seen at the surface of things." It is no accident that Arnold ends his poem on this note, since it invokes Vico's age of barbaric darkness, a darkness far more invidious than that which our earliest ancestors experienced. In this age, we have been made ignorant of the truth of human existence that it is intimately connected to the natural world through the relation of sensory impressions to emotional feelings. So Arnold's call to "be true / To one another!" works ironically in forcing us back into the truths the poem presents in tracing what has been lost to humankind in the modern, scientific age. The overall impression we receive is an holistic and immediate feeling of an iconic "presence." As George Gleason comments:

> For me, there is no progression in the poem from beginning to end; rather it is all
> encompassed in a 'present' image of life, at least as the poet was then
> experiencing it. Whatever logic sequence there is in its progression from
> beginning to end, it is overwhelmed by the immediacy of its emotional impact.
> (personal communication)

The structural patternings of the various images I have traced in "Dover Beach" reveal the capabilities of the poetic mind as it imaginatively creates a unified and harmonious whole that underlies the seemingly contradictory attitudes of the speaker that lie on the surface of the poem. By fusing the otherwise separate elements of sensory impressions and emotional feelings within the imagination of the poem's speaker, Arnold simulates for the hearer/reader a felt reality. This imaginative identification does not depend primarily on conceptual, analogical reasoning, but on

gestalt intuition arising from Vico's principles of *verum factum* and metaphysical truth, summarized as follows:

1. Both poet and hearer/reader engage in aesthetic activity in creating and responding to "making" (*poesis*) the images of "Dover Beach" present to the mind. The knowledge that results comes not from experimentation, as in the sciences, but from experience.

2. Art-as-making enables Vico's *certum factum* of philology expressed through the descriptions of the concrete images of the scene at Dover beach to transform into the *verum factum* of knowing the cause of things through recollective understanding (*memoria*).

3. The conceptual analogy that creates the "Sea of Faith" metaphor through the CONTAINER schema of out-in is built upon the intuitive fusion of subjective feelings that arise from memory and imagination. Thus, Arnold's poem focuses on the *a priori* status of intuition, without which conceptualization is not possible.

4. The scientific analysis of forms and structures in what is made (*poesis*) reveals the patterns and repetitions of imaginative invention (*ingegno*). Examining these patterns and repetitions within the context of a gestalt intuition of the whole poem shows the unity of perception that underlies the superficially irregular form of Arnold's poem.

5. The *sensus communis* of the imaginative universal makes possible the synthesis of past memory with present experience. Arnold creates a metaphysical, "eternal" truth about communal human experience, not as generalization but within the particular rendering of imaginative identity.

When a poem like "Dover Beach" achieves such cultural universality, it is destined to last.

In being the means by which iconicity motivates the semblance of a felt reality, aesthetic activity accounts theoretically for the relation between emotional and sensory experiences. It explains the intuitions of literary critics about the emotional significance of a particular poem, and shows how those intuitions may be described in cognitive terms. Langer (1953) expresses it this way: "To create the poetic primary illusion, hold the reader to it, and develop the image of reality so it has emotional significance above the suggested emotions which are elements in it, is the purpose of every word a poet writes" (245). Sometimes that purpose fails because the poet has failed—not necessarily entirely, but essentially—to realize the import of the inspiration that motivated the poem. Sometimes, poetic purpose fails when the text reduces to reportage rather than creating the illusion of life, as in Smith's sonnet on Ozymandias. And sometimes failure lies in the reader who imposes interpretations of meaning on a poem rather than experiencing what it is doing. Finally, then, the aesthetic experience of art inevitably includes a matter of discrimination and judgment and thus may be analyzed and evaluated according to scientific aesthetic principles. In this sense, Baumgarten's notion of perfection—as defined by the extent to which sensate representations are awakened—forms the basis of the principle of aesthetic iconicity. The more sensory-motor-emotive metaphoring creates an emotional identity with minding, the closer it brings us to a knowledge of nature, not as observers, but as participants of reality.

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1. See "Environmental Aesthetics" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/environmental-aesthetics/.)

2. Paying attention in close observation is one of the primary functions of the aesthetic faculty (Cavalcante and Militão 2015).

3. The essays in Hans Adler (2002) discuss the distinctions and integral connections between *aesthetics* and *aisthesis* as they have been understood historically.

4. That the aesthetic faculty is not innate but acquired speaks to the importance of pedagogical attention to aesthetic activity in education.

5. Croce's comment reflects many similar statements historically by philosophers, scientists, and artists as they have expressed the relation of their work to the worlds, both known and unknown.

6. The word epigram comes from the Greek *epigramma*, inscription, and from *epigraphein*, meaning to write on or inscribe, reflecting Vico's observation that language may have arisen from the physical form of written characters (see also Hiraga 2005).

7. The phrase received notoriety in France when its then president Nicolas Sarkozy used it to insult a fellow citizen who refused to shake his hand. Hervé Leon, an unemployed worker, was arrested for using the phrase on a banner protesting the president's visit to Laval: "*Casse-toi, pov'con. Et c'est Nicolas Sarkozy qui le dit.*" (Chibber 2014)

AFTERWORD

Throughout this book, I have attempted to take up Archibald MacLeish's challenge to show how poets succeed in carrying the world in all its complexities into the human mind, in enclosing boundless space in a square foot of paper, and in how deluge can pour from the inch space of the heart. I have had to challenge many assumptions that linger in the multidisciplinary adoptions of specifically defined terminology. By exploring the workings of the cognitive sciences in approaches to poetry and reevaluating the nature of aesthetics as a faculty basic to both the sciences and the arts, I hope to have shown how a poem that works creates an icon of the felt being of reality. Such a focus precludes coverage of other notable and broader aspects of poetry, such as its role in social, cultural, and discourse contexts. Rather, my study focuses on the significance of the phrase "Art for Art's sake" in exploring what it is that makes art last. As a final note, answers to MacLeish's questions lie, not in assuming the existence of a complete and static world but with a world that, in its never-ending changes and transformations, provides ever new horizons for seekers of knowledge and wisdom. Art in all its forms takes a necessary place along with the sciences in the human expressions of aesthetic cognition by iconically understanding the being of an infinitely changing reality.

Iconicity, as I have described it, is not simply a linguistic feature that poets utilize in making words work, but a means whereby a poem that works creates an icon through which respondents might cognitively access and share in the felt reality of in-visible being. Although I focus on poetic cognition, this principle informs all the arts, as many studies of iconic representation in various art forms suggest. It is my hypothesis that, by breaking down sensate cognition into its

various components, one can determine the various elements that constitute the complex structure of an icon. I hope to have shown that iconicity manifests itself in many guises and for many purposes. More importantly, it is, I believe, a dynamic process that informs an artist's creative work, understood not as a product of the artistic endeavor, but as a working through of the artist's motivation and intension in formulating and expressing truths of the self-world.

As a result, my focus has been not so much on detailing the various types of iconicity that researchers have identified and studied with illuminating results, but on the major elements that comprise a theory of poetic cognition. These are semblance, metaphor, schema, and affect. In considering each of these elements, I have employed theories and methodologies drawn from cognitive scientific approaches that include aesthetics, linguistics, phenomenology, psychology, and the neurosciences in order to show how, in poetic forms, iconicity provides the means by which, through the material, we emotionally access and identify with the immaterial and spiritual as we experience the "presence of absence" of the anima: the life force of being.

1. Poetry in Context

I am quite aware that Peircean scholars do not share my view of the icon as I have described it in this volume. However, I like to think that if Descartes, Kant, Peirce, and Langer were alive today, they would engage in a lively discussion over coffee (or wine?) one evening as to how modern neuroscientific explorations into the workings of the brain and minding might refine their understandings of human creative cognition.[1]

Not all poems are icons as I conceive of it in this study, nor do they necessarily aspire, in Coleridge's "high desire," to be so. My attention to the cognitive processes of poetic iconicity is narrowly focused. I do not wish to imply that it alone characterizes, in Eduardo Galeano's words,

"a living memory of reality […] a life that sings with multiple voices" (qtd. in Engler 2018: 31).

Poetry, in all its forms, "sings with multiple voices." Missing from my account is the broader

dimension of poetry in the context of the situational, social, and political circumstances of its age

in different cultures throughout the world. A reviewer noted that "embodiment can be seen as a

type of context and that there are three additional context types that need to be recognized for

metaphorical 'minding': the situational, the discourse, and the conceptual-cognitive concepts"

(cf. Kövecses 2015 for a fuller exposition in *Where Metaphors Come From*). It is beyond the

scope of my thesis in exploring art for the sake of art to engage more specifically in these issues,

though the poems I discuss attest to the unavoidable presence of such characteristics.

The fact that poetry has re-emerged in our current era as apotheosis of a vibrant and living

culture—expressed through the multitudinous poetry readings in local libraries, coffee shops,

bookstores, as well as on the public stage—is evidence of the power of poetry to iconically

resonate with its audience, regardless of genre, class, or venue. A recent controversy in the pages

of the *Nation* (2018) over the publication of Anders Carlson-Wee's poem "How-To" (July

30/August 6) reflected in letters to the editor (September 10/17) attests to how much language in

poetry can speak to a divisive nerve in human social and racial relations. In February 2003, over

13,000 poems were submitted to Poets Against the War to protest George W. Bush's invasion of

Iraq. In the aftermath of 9/11, poetry spread across the internet as people shared their grief. For

me, such passionate responses to the way poetry is being written, performed, and read is an

encouraging sign of its ability to speak to the challenges of our times. However, considering the

fleeting concerns of contemporary attention to social, political, racial, and economic forces

across the world, it nevertheless behooves us to consider what it is that lasts—whether it is the

Chinese poetry of the T'ang Dynasty or poems in the English tradition of the canon, categorized

in its various forms as Mediaeval, Shakespearean, Augustan, Romantic, Modern, and so on.[2]

That such poetry endures depends, to my mind, on whether it captures the very iconicity of the

human condition that seems not to change despite the immediate concerns of an age, culture, or

era. I hope that my exegesis might give some insight into why and how such poetry endures.

    Poetry is simultaneously the most complex and most difficult of art forms whose medium is

language. As I noted in Chapter 6, Jakobson's (1987) definition of the poetic function

distinguishes between use of language that creates automatic, transparent identification between

sign and object and that which draws attention to itself in giving weight and value to "their

composition, their meaning, their external and inner form" in relation to reality (378). To further

understand that distinction, imagine, if you will, a blended space in which a philosopher and a

poet debate the nature of language in writing. The French philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty

(1962), says:

> The wonderful thing about language is that it promotes its own oblivion: my eyes
>
> follow the lines on the paper, and from the moment I am caught up in their
>
> meaning, I lose sight of them. The paper, the letters on it, my eyes and body are
>
> there only as the minimum setting of some invisible operation. Expression fades
>
> out before what is expressed, and this is why its mediating role may pass
>
> unnoticed. […] This certainty which we enjoy of reaching, beyond expression, a
>
> truth separable from it and of which expression is merely the garment and
>
> contingent manifestation, has been implanted in us precisely by language. (401)

The English poet, William Blake (1972[1810]), responds:

> Every Man has Eyes, Nose & Mouth; this Every Idiot knows, but he who enters
>
> into & discriminates most minutely the Manners & Intentions, the ~~Expression~~

Characters in all their branches, is the alone Wise or Sensible Man, & on this

discrimination All Art is founded. I intreat, then, that the Spectator will attend to

the Hands & Feet, to the Lineaments of the Countenances; they are all descriptive

of Character, & not a line is drawn without intention, & that most discriminate &

particular. As Poetry admits not a Letter that is Insignificant, so Painting admits

not a Grain of Sand or a Blade of Grass Insignificant—much less an Insignificant

Blur or Mark. (611)

From Merleau-Ponty's perspective, the eyes through which I perceive the world are invisible to

me. The fingers with which I type fade from consciousness as I concentrate on what it is I want

to say. When I read, the physical words on the page "disappear" in Drew Leder's (1990) sense,

displaced by the ideas and images they generate. Through cognitive processes not yet fully

understood, the activities of minding engage in conceptual projection from the concrete world of

my sense experiences to the abstract realm of thought. The physical marks on the page, the

combination of letters and the order of words are, in Merleau-Ponty's words, "merely the

garment and contingent manifestation" of a linguistic expression whose particular characteristics

recede before the meanings they generate. When it comes to works of art, however, Merleau-

Ponty's "merely" becomes Blake's "most minutely." Blake urges us to focus on the very marks

and lines that Merleau-Ponty claims are "there only" to mediate abstract thought. By looking *at*

rather than *through* the lens we apply to language, we delay categorization by making the absent

present, thus bringing the subliminal accoutrements of meaning to the forefront. However, the

distinction between the philosopher and the poet in these two passages is more apparent than

real. For access to the immaterial in Merleau-Ponty's terms can only exist through the materiality

of the text. In describing the body as a work of art, Merleau-Ponty (1962) comments on the

importance of the poetic text: "the poem is not independent of every material aid, and it would be irrecoverably lost if its text were not preserved down to the last detail" (151). In other words, body and art exist both within and beyond their materiality.

Art, then, constitutes the immaterial sensory-motor-emotive feelings we experience through its material forms. In the presence of art we experience the presence of a reality that comes alive for us, that animates, in Coleridge's (1951[1817]) words, "the whole soul of man into activity":

> It has been before observed that images, however beautiful, though faithfully
>
> copied from nature, and as accurately represented in words, do not of themselves
>
> characterize the poet. They become proofs of original genius only as far as they
>
> are modified by a predominant passion; or by associated thoughts or images
>
> awakened by that passion; or when they have the effect of reducing multitude to
>
> unity, or succession to an instant; or lastly, when a human and intellectual life is
>
> transferred to them from the poet's own spirit [...]. (272)

In this sense, art complements the work of the sciences in exploring the presence of reality. As I have tried to show, the aesthetic faculty—that capacity for memory, imagination, attention, discrimination, expertise, and judgment—potentially underlies all human cognitive activity. When we exercise the aesthetic faculty, we manifest all the power of human cognition in reaching beyond the frontiers of the unknown, about ourselves and the worlds of which we are a part. Those worlds are both visible, in being open to the senses, and beyond our perceptions, existing in the realms of the in-visible. Just as the artist explores and comes to experience the unknown dimensions of the possible, so the scientist explores and comes to know the hidden dimensions of our biological, chemical, and physical worlds. However, the extent to which it is possible for our human cognitive faculties to "know" the realities of the natural, social, cultural,

and spiritual worlds is a question still very much with us. In Chapter 1, I introduced Archibald MacLeish's challenge to explain the mystery of the arts. Is there something that exists "that we can never know"?

1. Eve's Dilemma

The Biblical story of Eve's temptation is instructive when perceived from the perspective of human cognition. When Eve was tempted to eat the apple of the tree of knowledge, in her innocence she would have had no concept of the serpent's words concerning "good and evil." For that matter, she would not have understood what God meant by saying death would result from eating of the tree, since she had no concept of death. Adam revealed his disobedience when he admitted knowledge of his nakedness. So what was it that tempted Eve? The serpent's temptation, in the words of the King James Bible, are: "God doth know that in the day ye shall eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil" (Genesis 3.5). The serpent's metaphor of opening eyes would also be cognitively incomprehensible to Eve, since according to her awareness of concrete senses, her eyes were already open. What is left in the serpent's temptation is "ye shall be as Gods." That's what tempted Eve. Living in the Garden of Eden with Adam, as first humans, she was already aware of things other than herself. She lived in God's presence, and could sense the difference. The next verse tells us two things: that she responded with her senses, seeing "the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes," and with desire "to make one wise" (3.6).[3] Here lies the apparent paradox of the cunning serpent's temptation. To be "as Gods" indicates omniscience and the power that comes with it. But to be "*as* Gods" is not the same as to "be God." Was the wisdom that we received not God's, but the recognition that there is something we can never

know, that human cognition is inevitably limited in its scope?

2. A Theory of Everything?

The theoretical physicist, Stephen Hawking, who died Wednesday, March 15, 2018, as I was writing this afterword, said that finding "a theory of everything" would allow us "to know the mind of God." In *A Brief History of Time* (1988), he wrote: "A complete, consistent unified theory is only the first step: our goal is a complete understanding of the events around us, and of our own existence." As scientists continue to probe more deeply into the nature of both ourselves and the universe of which we are a part, we come to greater understanding and further knowledge. But as everything that exists is in continual change, so knowledge and understanding change too, in a never-ending procession of illumination.

MacLeish spoke of "the meaningless and silence of the world." James P. Carse (1986) speaks of the consequences of the unspeakability of nature: "The silence of nature is the possibility of language" (130). Just as the arts attempt to express the inexpressible, and, in MacLeish's words, make "the non-Being BE," so do the sciences attempt to discover the essence of being that lies in nature's silence. The metaphoring of iconicity—the mapping between that which is and is not—is the means by which we participate in the infinity of being. Carse notes: "It is not the role of metaphor to draw our sight to what is there, but to draw our vision toward what is not there and, indeed, cannot be anywhere. Metaphor is horizonal, reminding us that it is one's vision that is limited and not what one is viewing." (130-131) It is not that we "can never know"; it is that there will always be something beyond, as we reach further and further toward the distant and ever-changing horizons of nature and our being. In that journey, we are all engaged, both scientists and artists alike.

3. Poetry as an Icon of the Being of Reality

We are naturally disposed toward assuming that there is a bottom, that it is not true that "it is

turtles all the way down"; we have "a sense of an ending," the search for closure. Readers of

Henry James' *The Portrait of a Lady* are often disturbed by the openness of its ending in terms of

Isabel's future. Readers of John Knowles' *The Magus* were so upset by its open ending that

Knowles published a revised version. Ironically, the openness still remains in his novel and in

our world. It is what enables iconicity to occur: to create an icon of the openness of the infinite

possibilities of being.

As physicist and novelist, Alan Lightman (2018) both knows and experiences the

infinitesimally large reaches of the universe and the infinitesimally small dimensions of the

particulate matter of which we—nature and human—are made. As scientist, Lightman describes

the processes by which what was formerly understood as the basic unit of the universe, the atom,

was blown apart by the discovery of even smaller units of matter: "[A]toms were the ultimate

Oneness of the material world: perfect in their indivisibility, perfect in their wholeness and

indestructibility. Atoms were the embodiment of truth. They were, along with the stars, the

material icons of the Absolutes. Atoms also unified the world." (36) As scientists search for the

smallest element of reality, the possibility arises that "time and space no longer exist in a way

that has meaning to us" (40). As artist, Lightman understands the impossibility of assuming we

can capture a unified picture of ultimate reality, that space becomes "so thin that it dissolves into

nothingness" (40). For a poem to become an icon of reality, therefore, it must recognize that

"reality" exists only in possibility; that what it is bringing into being is MacLeish's non-being.

To be is not the same as to exist. To understand Hamlet's famous soliliquy as purely a

contemplation of suicide is to portray a Hamlet in doubt, a Hamlet impotent to act. But to understand that Hamlet's "To be or not to be: that is the question" is rather a meditation on two different forms of being—to suffer or to take action—is to recognize that bringing an end to existence is to "lose the name of action"; it is to see Hamlet engaged in making something *be*, the very characteristic of poetic creativity.[4]

Matthew Arnold's "ignorance" in "Dover Beach" is not Eve's innocence. It is a refusal to entertain the truth of our existence as part of the limitlessness of a natural world that is forever changing. I believe that poets who understand that truth and attempt to capture it in their work will endure. The Irish poet Nigel McLoughlin (2009) quotes from *Timaeus*, Plato's account of the formation of the universe, in the epigram to his collection of poetry called *Chora:*

> Chora never alters its characteristics. For it continues to receive all things, and
> never itself takes a permanent impress from any of the things which enter it,
> making it appear different at different times. Plato *Timaeus* 50. 52

In commenting on this passage, Zeyl and Sattler (2017) note:

> Timaeus does not use any descriptive word that can suitably be translated as
> "matter" or "material"; he does, however, use the word, "space" (*chôra*). And its
> function of providing a "seat" (*hedra*, 52b1) reinforces the conception that its role
> is to provide a spatial location for the things that enter it and disappear from it
> (49e7-8, 50c4-5, 52a4-6).
>
> There has been considerable discussion about whether the receptacle is to be
> thought of as matter, or as space, and whether it is possible to think of it
> coherently as having both of those roles.

If we think of chora as both, it is that which enables Plato's being-becoming distinction:

Some things always are, without ever becoming (27d6);

Some things become, without ever being (27d6-28a1). (Burnet 1902; qtd. in Zeyl and

Sattler)

Zeyl and Sattler also note:

In his prefatory remarks Timaeus describes the account he is about to give as a

"likely account" (*eikôs logos*) or "likely story" (*eikôs muthos*). The description is

a play on words: the subject of the account is itself an "image" (*eikôn*) and,

Timaeus avers, "the accounts we give of things [should] have the same character

as the subjects they set forth" (29b3-5).

The notions of chora, being and non-being, and icon resonate with all I have attempted to

describe. In his preface, McLoughlin describes chora as "a pre-lingual, pre-symbolic stage close

to the materiality of existence, or 'the Real'." And that's what I find in his poems. McLoughlin

attempts to capture the gap, the break, the *between* that exists as the generating force of life itself

in all its many forms and ramifications. It runs through all the poems, from the light that

"sublimes" in the first poem, to the entering of a morning "vast and blank" and the "page in the

head" that "is vast and blank / and pregnant" in the last poem, itself called Chora. I find it in the

poem, "The Science of Signs":

Lightning strikes a tree

with all the love one jagged thing

can muster for another — out here

the sound cracks around the cavities

and the gap where the storm found me

where the wind searched

in every crevice and the rain clung

to the crevassed mountain.

> Somewhere out beyond the hoop
>
> of the fire — somewhere deep
>
> in the ochre night I hear trees ramify
>
> sway unstruck, enact the oscillations
>
> between the sign of themselves
>
> and what it is they signify.

From a blending perspective, chora operates as I describe creative metaphor: that which generates the fusion of images and forms to create the emergent structure of the poem as an icon of something beyond itself, of the possibilities of an always becoming reality.

In quoting Emily Dickinson's lines, "Nature" is what We see - / The Hill - the Afternoon - / Squirrel - Eclipse - the Bumble bee - / Nay - Nature is Heaven -" (*H119, F721/J668)*, Lightman (2018) writes:

> In the last of these lines, the poet leaps from the finite to infinity, to the realm of
>
> the Absolutes. It is almost as if nature in her glory wants us to believe in a heaven,
>
> something divine and immaterial beyond nature itself. In other words, the natural
>
> tempts us to believe in the supernatural. But then again, nature has also given us
>
> big brains, allowing us to build microscopes and telescopes and ultimately, for
>
> some of us, to conclude that it's all just atoms and molecules. (35)

Lightman's description of the human self makes clear its manifold unity, not simply as material, but also as immaterial being. As he contemplates at the end of his essay the way space "dissolves into nothingness" as we search for "the smallest element of reality" (40), Lightman notes that "the realm of the Absolutes" is *beyond* words; realms that only poets can reach *through* words by creating an icon of that infinite reality.

Emily Dickinson speaks for all artists when she writes: "The Poets light but / Lamps - /

Themselves - go out -" (*A91-13/14, F930/J883*). Writing in the nineteenth century before electric

lighting was invented in 1878, Dickinson uses the image of "stimulating" wicks and adds a

cautionary note. Only "If vital Light / Inhere as do the / Suns -" as a result of the poet's activity,

will future ages be a lens through which poetry may disseminate, seed the "Circumference" of its

aesthetic activity. In other words, if the animating spark of life-giving truth is made to *be*, it

becomes an icon for future generations to disseminate. That's what makes certain art last. The

living vitality of Dickinson's "vital Light" *is* the iconic aesthetic experience. It's what makes us

human. We ignore it at our peril.

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1. Haley (1988) provides a convincing analysis in his chapter "Under the Peircean Microscope"

of the way Peirce's view developed through time, especially with regard to the "aesthetic turn" in

his approach to poetry and science (27-30). Problematic assumptions underlying the term

"representation" are taken up by Fuchs (2018: 160-164).

2. The existence of the "canon" in any culture depends upon changing social, cultural, and

political values. It should not therefore, be assumed that entry into any canon indicates a poem as

icon, nor that only poems in a given canon can be considered as such.

3. Not knowing how to scan the word *wise*, I consulted Emmylou Grosser, a Biblical specialist in

2. The existence of the "canon" in any culture depends upon changing social, cultural, and

political values. It should not therefore, be assumed that entry into any canon indicates a poem as

icon, nor that only poems in a given canon can be considered as such.

3. Not knowing how to scan the word *wise*, I consulted Emmylou Grosser, a Biblical specialist in

Hebrew, concerning the accuracy of the KJV. She shared with me many of her thoughts on the

Genesis passage, including a most recent translation by Robert Alter (2018) in which "he is able

to capture certain nuances of the Hebrew and has some helpful notes where he deviates fromother

standard translations" (personal correspondence). In particular, Grosser writes: "He translates 'to make

wise' as 'to look at.' He then comments on the correlation between seeing and knowing—with respect to

that word—although the connection between seeing/knowing iswoven throughout the story."

4. The importance of applying a cognitive analysis to Hamlet's soliliquy can be found in Shurma and Lu (2016). Although they focus on the life-death interpretation, they note: "*Online Etymology Dictionary* traces the word to Proto-Indo-European root *bheue- 'to be, exist, grow, come into being', Sanskrit *bhavah* 'becoming' and Old English *beon, beom, bion* 'be, exist, come to be, become, happen'. Originally, the word referred not only to physical existence, but also to eventfulness." (13)

GLOSSARY

Aesthetic

The faculty that underlies all human cognitive processing that incorporates memory, imagination, attention, discrimination, expertise, and judgment**.**

Although aesthetics had been restricted in the modern period to taste, beauty, and pleasure in the arts, the aesthetic faculty underlies all human cognitive activity engaged in understanding ourselves and the world of which we are a part. It is therefore as much a part of scientific creativity as it is of the arts. Although German scholars have distinguished between aisthesis *(perception) and* aesthetics (science of perception) *in redefining the terms from a cognitive, neurobiological perspective (Adler, ed. 2002), my definition of aesthetic collapses the two into an integrated whole.*

Anima

The *élan vital*, the life force or "spirit" that motivates the living organism.

The anima of a living organism is the immaterial **Essence** *of its* **Being***, shaped by both inner and outer forces in the course of the life of the organism, and constituting the sensory-motor-emotive-conceptual integration of its embodied subjectivity. See* **Conation**.

Artifact [*Brit.* **Artefact]**

Any object made by human ingenuity, skill, and workmanship.

From the Latin arte + factum*, an artifact, broadly speaking, refers to anything materially made; more narrowly, to an object made with special attention to design. In my usage, I refer also to immaterial artifacts; that is, human activity that creates cultural, social, political, economic, and educational institutions.*

Aseity

Underived or independent reality.

The term underived *refers to something that exits in itself, not caused by or dependent on another; hence in theology to describe God's self-sufficiency. Use of this term historically is*

related to Aristotle's notion of self-movement and to Kant's ding an sich. *In my usage, it refers to existence of* **Being** *that does not depend on human cognition. See* **I-seity**.

Being

The essence of all that is, both visible and invisible, material and immaterial, in continuous flux and change.

> *John Dewey argued that being is not static, but forever changing; that human experience is the result of interacting processes between body and world. For Hegel, being is a process of becoming, and thus both is and is not. There is no such thing as "being as being"; in Aristotle's terms, there are only different ways of studying the aspects of being. The "essence" of being is thus, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, the existence of that which is in-visible, unseen.*

Binding

The integration of two or more elements into a unified whole.

> *The term is used somewhat differently in linguistics, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience. There is some controversy over whether the term is synonymous with mapping, or if semantically different, over whether they reflect one-way or two-way directional processes (https://stackoverflow.com/questions/11597049/difference-between-binding-and-mapping). For me, binding is the more accurate term to characterize the integration of the various "levels" of cognition into a unified whole. See also* **Mapping** *and* **Resonance**.

Blending

A conceptual integration network of mental spaces that enables new information to be created from old.

> *Formulated by Fauconnier and Turner (2000), the theory of blending provides a means whereby* **Metaphoring** *may be understood as more than simply the relation between two unlike elements. It is a dynamic process that involves projection from two or more input spaces into a "blended" space to create emergent structure that exists in none of the original spaces. Blending is a significant element in understanding poetic creativity.*

Ception

A cognitive process, both conscious and unconscious, that includes proprioception, perception, and

conception: the sensory-motor-emotive-conceptual activities of **Minding**.

> *Coined by Leonard Talmy, I use "cept" to replace the misleading distinction between form and content, image and diagram, neither of which can exist without the other. It is rather a question of seeing an entity from different viewpoints. See* **Struction***.*

Cognition

All the processes of human minding, including the subliminal sensory-motor-emotive activities of sensate cognition, as well as the conscious conceptual properties of thought.

> *Historically, the term has been restricted to conceptual awareness, specifically applied to the rational, logical processes of human thinking as opposed to the irrational, emotional elements of sensory feelings, and thus obscuring modern phenomenological awareness of the role played by subliminal elements of* **Minding***. Cognition has many aspects: scientific, linguistic, poetic, sensate, and so on. I therefore propose that it be used, not in adjectival but in nominalized form, as in poetic cognition, aesthetic cognition, etc.*

Conation

From Latin *conatus*: endeavor, effort, drive, urge. Described by Fuchs (2018) as the "spontaneous and autonomous activity of life [that] springs from an elementary drive, an impulse or motive for something" (71).

> *In a footnote, Fuchs notes that the concept "dates back to Stoic philosophy and was later used by Hobbes and Spinoza in particular to denote the living being's striving for self-preservation (conatus sese conservandi), in close connection with affective-volitional life" (71, n.3). Conation is the direct result of* **Anima***, the mainspring of the living organism.*

Deixis

A linguistic expression that refers to the location, time, or social, etc. relationship between speaker and context of utterance.

> *Deictic utterances occur as a result of the ground or reality space of the speaker. Thus, objects are seen from the speaker's perspective as being near or far; time references to the speaker's present are past or future; pronouns themselves are deictic—for example, "I" can*

only refer to the speaker. (https://glossary.sil.org/term/deixis)

Distributed Cognition

A shared collaborative activity between minding and world.

Originally coined by Edwin Hutchins in 1995 to refer to the way humans navigate in the world, distributed cognition has developed as part of the theory of extended mind, whereby relations are made among individuals, artifacts, and the environment (Clark 2008).

Domain

A spatially and temporally structured idealized cognitive cultural model consisting of a coherent knowledge structure.

The term is used differently in various disciplines, including medicine, cyberware, and education. In neuropsychology, cognitive domains are aspects of the brain involved in such activities as attention, memory, language, emotions, sensory-motor and visual-spatial functions. In cognitive science, domains are models of the experienced world, ranging from the larger domains of space and time to the minutest level from which elements may be projected in the operations of **Mapping** *across* **Mental Spaces***.*

Embodiment

The many aspects in which the activity of minding occurs in the context of its situated, bodily relatedness to human and natural worlds.

Recent work in cognition has identified such aspects as 4e cognition: embodied, embedded, enacted, extended; or DEEDS: dynamical, embodied, extended, distributed, and situated; or the amalgamated mind. Through the activity of physiological, sensate, and conceptual processes, we exist as part of the being of reality.

Ententional

Deacon's (2012) term for "all phenomena that are intrinsically incomplete in the sense of being in relationship to, constituted by, or organized to achieve something non-intrinsic. This includes information, meaning, reference, representation, agency, purpose, sentience, and value." (549)

By "non-intrinsic," Deacon refers to phenomena that fundamentally relate to something absent, a teleological possible "end." The challenge is to explain how ententional phenomena can have physical consequences. See **Intension / Intention.**

Entropy

The stasis of evenly distributed forces that eventually lead to decay.

Entropy is not meant as conservation of energy as in physics, but as disintegration of energy to nothingness. This definition may have its source in Tait's (1868: 29) statement that "We shall use the excellent term Entropy in the opposite sense to that in which Clausius has employed it; viz., so that the Entropy of the Universe tends to zero" (OED).

Essence

That which constitutes the intrinsic character or feature that identifies **Being**.

This is not to imply that there is one individual "essence" that underlies all of the being of reality. Rather, it is the term used to indicate the individuality of separate modes of reality. The essence of being lies in the manifold aspects of life in all its various manifestations. Both material and immaterial elements of **Being** *are subject to constant change influenced by both outer and inner forces. Even the seemingly most stable of material objects, such as rock, are not immune to change. See* **Anima***.*

Faculty

Cognitive activities acquired by the education of experience and intelligent design to diversify naturally endowed functions.

The term refers to the powers, abilities, and skills acquired through a combination of cognitive resources, including memory, imagination, and reason. See **Function***.*

Function

The capabilities with which all life forms are naturally endowed.

The term refers to the particular form of activity associated with anything, physical or mental that fulfills its purpose. Thus, hands are functionally equipped to grasp, ears to hear, eyes to see, lungs to breathe, neurons to receive, process, and transmit information. See **Faculty***.*

Icon

A material artifact, such as art, poetry, sculpture, architecture, through which we feel an affective connection with something else, the reality of being, whether material or immaterial in essence.

In order to be an icon in this sense, a poem must evidence in its language and form the iconological, symbolic significance of the iconographic elements of sound, sense, and structure. This definition is not the same as the term is understood in Peircean semiotics, though it shares with it the features of metaphor, image, and diagram, together with the notion of pure possibility.

Illusion

In art forms, illusion is an invention or appearance of something that seems to be but is not.

Not to be confused with its meaning of purely the result of hallucinations or other mistaken images, concepts, or ideas, it is rather a fiction of the imagination. See **Semblance***.*

Intension / Intention

The signaling of purposive sensory-motor-emotive experiences, which, if successfully expressed, evoke affective responses of presence in the hearer/reader.

The term intention *used in reference to creative writers should not be understood simply as the communication of meaning "intended" by the author but rather in its meaning of intensity, the force of emotive concentration that leads to expression. I use the term* intension *to distinguish it from the more general meaning of intention. See* **Entential** */* **Motivation***.*

I-seity

The state of **Being** as self identity, or "i-ness."

In i-seity, the self has multiple roles. These can be in relation to other human beings (mother, sister, friend), to society (democrat, educator, writer), or to the physical world (swimmer, home-owner, gardener). "I-seic manifestations" are the values of these roles. Thus a mother can be caring or uncaring; a writer can be a poet, a novelist, a journalist; a swimmer can be fast or slow, clumsy or graceful. The development of cultural intersubjectivity results in "i-seic representations" that are accepted and assumed as values for a given role within the

domain of a culture. Thus, a mother is supposed to be nurturing, caring, responsible,

competent, etc., and an individual's i-seic manifestations will determine the type of mother

she is. See **Aseity***.*

Isomorphism

In mental space theory, the structural relations between elements in separate domains that enable

blending to occur.

The term isomorphism *was first used in mineralogy to describe the discovery that elements of*

different minerals were related analogically by sharing the same crystalline form (OED).

That is, it is the structures or forms that are isomorphic, not the relation between the

compounds and their forms. If one adopts the original meaning of isomorphism as shared

structure, then it's not simply a question of mapping form onto content, but a question of how

similar forms may generate meanings.

Mapping

In cognitive science, a correspondence between the domains of two mental spaces that assigns to

each element in one space a counterpart in the other.

Mapping is, as Fauconnier (1997) explains, "at the heart of the unique human cognitive

faculty of producing, transferring, and processing meaning" (1). Unlike **Binding***, mapping*

preserves a distinction between elements brought into corresponding connection and

therefore occurs at the conceptual rather than the pre-conscious level. See **Resonance***.*

Mental Spaces

Temporary, dynamic, abstract constructions of minding that enable mappings across domains.

The introduction of mental space theory (Fauconnier 1985) was a crucial development in

exploring the global workings of human **Cognition** *as more than simply the operations of*

logic and reason in understanding the way we think.

Metaphoring

The process by which new meaning arises from a transformation of meaning across unlike

domains.

In contrast to the traditional notion of metaphor as creating similarity between unlike

elements, the process *of metaphoring becomes the means by which new ideas are generated.*

In poetry, metaphoring is the structural principle that enables iconic relations.

Minding

The activity of our cognitive capacities, both conscious and unconscious, that reflect the

integration of our sensory-motor-emotive-conceptual experiences, both internal and external.

My use of the term minding *avoids the trap of reification, thinking of the mind as an object*

by nominalizing the activities and events of cognitive processing. See **Cognition/Resonance**.

Modularity

The separating and combining of components of a system.

In cognitive science, the term is used to describe areas of the brain that are specialized for

particular functions that are also distributed across other areas of the brain. Applying

modularity to the mind arises from the reification of the mind as object. See **Minding**.

Motivation

The inner sensory-motor-emotive drives that subliminally inspire a poet's creativity.

The term is used in linguistics in opposition to the notion of arbitrariness. In iconicity studies,

it refers to the non-arbitrary relation between the language sign and the conceptualized real

world. However, to explain these relations as motivated does not explain what it is that

makes a sign non-arbitrary in this way. Motivation, as Lehmann (2007) notes, can be more

generally understood as related to human acts and goals so that the question for language

becomes on what basis a sign is motivated in relation to its producer and respondent (23). In

cognitive studies, motivation refers to the generating force of the **Anima.** *See*

Conation/Intension/Intention.

Neurocognition

The examination of cognitive processes from the perspective of brain function.

The neurological aspects of cognition have a role to play in investigating the processes of

Minding. *It is a more accurate term than neuroaesthetics, a provocative term when it is used*

to assert that all aesthetic functions are subsumed by brain processes alone. In contrast, the

Aesthetic *faculty underlies specific cognitive functions.*

Nothing

Conventionally understood as that which does not exist, it also refers to "no thing," that is, the existence of an immaterial, in-visible entity. See **Ontology**.

The apparent paradox of the sentence "Nothing exists" complicates the question of ontology. Poets play upon the paradox, philosophers examine its possibilities, and cognitive scientists are paying renewed attention to such entities as the discovery of zero (Lakoff and Núñez 2000) and the existence of absence (Deacon 2012). In phenomenological terms, as Merleau-Ponty (1968) describes it, "Nothingness is nothing more (nor less) than the invisible" (258).

Ontology

The philosophical study of the nature of **Being**, becoming, existence, or reality.

Ontology raises questions concerning the nature of entities, what and how they may be said to exist. The primary issue raised is whether or not only material things may be scientifically examined and proven, with the existence of the intangible, the immaterial ultimately shrouded in mystery and speculation. Such a formulation has traditionally dominated the distinction between the sciences and the humanities. However, with the rise of the cognitive sciences in the twentieth century, new attention is being paid to the parallel tradition in Western thought, from the metaphysics of Aristotle on, into the possibilities of scientifically establishing the reality of all that is, both material and immaterial.

Resonance

The circular "loop" interaction of brain and body that creates, in Damasio's (2010) terms, "a functional fusion of body states and perceptual states" in a unified organism (273).

Resonance is thus opposed to the concept of mapping, which implies separate representation. Bodily resonance, as Fuchs (2018) notes, "serves as the medium of our affective engagement in a situation" (124, original emphasis). See **Binding***.*

Schema

Schemata are elements of shared structure, with internal structure of their own, that reveal the unity of sensate-conceptual cognition as well as participatory engagement of the self/world.

The operations of schemata are not independent entities functioning between two separate entities but the isomorphic structures that bind them as a unity of being. Schemata thus operate as structuring functions that underlie sensate, conceptual, and linguistic **Metaphoring***. They also structure the cognition-environment link that reveals their* **Binding** *relationship as co-responding participating elements of self/world.*

Self

We are more than we consciously know.

Dan Zahavi (2002) explains the self as follows: "Phenomenologists have typically argued that self-awareness cannot be reduced to reflective (thematic, conceptual, mediated) self-awareness. On the contrary, reflective self-awareness presupposes prereflective (unthematic, tacit, nonconceptual, immediate) self-awareness." (13) Damasio (1999) explains the tripartite self as being composed of the proto-self, core consciousness, and extended consciousness. See **I-seity**.

Semblance

The simulation of a felt reality of in-visible being.

Not to be confused with copy, imitation, or resemblance, semblance is the active simulation of some aspect of the in-visible being of reality through material forms. See **Being/Binding/Resonance**.

Struction

A scalar parameter that crosses the categorial boundary between bodily and mental cognitive processes.

My term for Talmy's (2000) theoretical framework of parameters "that recognizes a cognitive domain encompassing traditional notions of both perception and conception" (139). By crossing the boundary between the two it replaces the misleading form-content, image-diagram distinction in literary studies and semiotics, respectively. See **Ception**.

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