Chapter 5

Divine madness
Exceedance and not-knowing

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ABSTRACT: In the Phaedrus, Plato speaks of various forms of madness having a divine origin, and bestowing virtue on mankind. A similar, though not equivalent, elevation of madness over sanity is found in the Pauline epistles, where Christians are described as fools. Diogenes of Sinope and a number of other Cynics, as well as Christian ascetics, adopted a way of life that could reasonably be described as mad. This challenged received ideas about sanity, and in so doing, emphasized its social aspect. The prophet and the poet were seen in antiquity to disclosed truth, in enigmatic sayings and in odd turns of phrase that stretch everyday usage. This overstepping of reason (logos) links both inspired madness and simulated madness to the lexis of mysticism. They are, in other words, a stance, in relation to knowing, that is shared by philosophy. To use Heidegger’s idiom, the latter is nothing other than a rambling path through the forest, one which often leads nowhere. But sometimes comes to a clearing in which Being itself is made manifest as ek-stasis.

KEYWORDS: ecstasy, Freud, Heidegger, madness, Plato, Apophthegmata Patrum

Even without a complete collocation of the lexicon of madness in Greek literature, it is clear that in antiquity, madness was not always seen in a negative light. Indeed, in a celebrated passage in the Phaedrus, Plato, the “father of psychoanalysis,” says that it is not an evil, nor is it shameful or disgraceful. Rather, certain of its manifestations are of divine origin, superior to sanity and the source of our greatest blessings. Thus, he says, the poetry of a sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madman. Furthermore, Plato thought that the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona and the Sibyl conferred many splendid benefits upon Greece when they were mad but few when they were in their right minds. Indeed, “for him who is possessed of madness a release from present ills is found” and he is safe (Plat. Phaed. 244a–e). It may not be insignificant in this regard that in the Theaetetus, Socrates says that people describe him as atopōtatos – out of place, strange, absurd, disconcerting – and his work, an aporia, a puzzle (Plat. Theaet. 149a). Alcibiades stresses the point by describing
Socrates as someone who evades classification, a misfit who does not conform to any common type of personality (Plat. Symp. 221c–d; cf. Hadot, 1987). Consequently, he was, as Diogenes Laertius pointed out, someone “despised and laughed at” (DL 2.21).

**Foolish wisdom**

Something similar is found in the Pauline corpus where Christian belief is described as a form of madness and believers, fools (mōroi). Once again, it is a divine madness: “let him become a fool (mōros genesthō) that he may be wise” (1 Cor. 3.18). This is particularly interesting. Not only does it contradict things Paul says elsewhere – e.g. when accused of being mad, he replies, “I am not mad (ou mainomai), rather I speak words of sober truth” (Acts 26.25) – but it also reverses the meaning of mōros, as we find it both in its verbal form in the synoptics and in the tradition of the sayings of Jesus, the latter of which broadly fall within the parameters of Old Testament usage (Welborn, 2005). One possible source, according to Gibb (1941), is the logion in which the “wise and learned” (sophōn kai sunetōn) from whom things are hidden, are contrasted with the babes (nēpiois) to whom they are revealed (Matt. 11.25/Lk. 10.21). But it is also possible that Paul had in mind the Cynics, a number of whom, as Diogenes of Sinope, one of the founders of Cynicism, behaved in a very unconventional way, farting, defecating and masturbating in public and generally being socially disruptive (DL VI. 2 passim). Plato famously described him as “a Socrates gone mad (mainomenos)” (DL VI. 54). Fundamental to Cynicism was the idea that doctrine should not be separated from the manner in which a philosopher lived. It was not enough to criticize social conventions and established values; the philosopher had to express this in the way he behaved and in his appearance. Because of this focus on ethics rather than logic and physics, some thought Cynicism not really a philosophy at all, but merely a way of life (enstasin biou) (DL VI. 103). Yet it was for this very reason that Pierre Hadot (1987) considered Cynicism fell within the tradition of philosophy as a spiritual exercise (askēsis). It was a gradual, lifelong conversion (epistrophē) that brought a person to critique received ideas, including what it meant to be sane or insane. Importantly, the Cynic philosopher refused to identify himself as a sage. In this we can see Cynicism coming far closer to the apophatic tradition of not-knowing than we might at first expect. Apophasis, a concept central to mystical discourse, refers to an affirmation of an absence of knowledge about the divinity. Underlying this is the notion that the divinity is beyond being, and thus beyond language or mind. To use Wittgenstein’s idiom, it is an understanding that there are things which are “not a part of the world” – and are consequently unknowable (T. 5.641). Nevertheless, although outside the symbolic (Lacan), the realm of the unsayable (the mystical) nonetheless exists. Thus, Heidegger writes that “even the nothing . . . in the sense that it is thought or spoken ‘is’ something” (Heidegger, 1959, p. 40). It is this paradox, moreover,
that led pseudo Denys to assert that not-knowing or unknowing (agnōsia) surpasses knowing, as the latter is always an inaccurate means of expression (Lossky, 1957). Or as it is expressed in the Socratic paradox “I am wiser . . . as I do not know anything” (Plat. Apol. 21d).

Simulated madness

We can distinguish two schools within Cynicism; one ascetic, the other mystical (Oltramare, 1927 cited in Attridge, 1976, p. 17. n 33). Aspects of both schools passed over into Christianity, and we find Origen (C. Cels. 2. 41) and Basil (Ep. 4) praising the Cynic way of life. This carrying over is particularly evident in the monastic tradition (Goulet-Cazè, 1986). There are examples of monks behaving in an intentionally provocative and anti-social way in the *Apophthegmata Patrum*. These are collections of oral anecdotes from the 4th and 5th centuries (Bousset, 1923), redacted in the sixth, from the Egyptian monastic centers of Nitria and Scetis (Špidlík, 1963). Here, in a kind of reversal, Abba Antony is reported to have said that a time was coming when men will go mad, and when they see someone who is not mad, they will say: “You are mad (mainē), you are not like us” (Apoph. Pat. Antony 25). This element of difference or otherness permeates the discourse of madness through the ages. Guillaumont (1996) has argued that madness was assumed by Christian monks as a form of withdrawal from the world (anachorēsis), which was a key aspect of askēsis. Askēsis referred not just to physical training in endurance, but to an interior work (to ergon tēs psuchēs) (Apoph. Pat, Theodore of Pherme 10, 11). This notion, fundamentally Cynic, was probably transmitted to the Church Fathers via Philo, who was instrumental in developing the notion that mystical experience was a kind of “sane madness” (sōphrōn mania) (Dudley, 1937). When people came to see him, it was said of abba Ammonas that he used to feign madness. “A woman standing near him said to her neighbour, ‘The old man is mad.’ Abba Ammonas heard it, called her, and said, ‘How much labour have I given myself in the desert to acquire this folly’” (Apoph. Pat. Ammonas 9). A number of other desert fathers were called fools (e.g. Apoph. Pat. Moses 8). Palladius describes a nun in the monastery at Tabennisi who was *salos* (Pall. h. Laus. 34: 3–7), a word that can mean imbecile, half-witted, a fool, or mad (Lampe, 1961, p. 1222). Although its etymology is obscure, Špidlík suggested it may come from the Syriac sakla because of its use in the Peshitta to translate the Greek mōroi.

The tradition of “fools for Christ,” as they became known, continued into the Byzantine period. In the 6th century, John Rufus describes a monk in Silvanus’s monastery near Eleutheropolis in lower Egypt, who pretended to be mad (prospoi-umenos mōrian). He laughed when others came near him. When three visitors came to the monastery and asked to see all the monks, Silvanus told them not to try to see the mad one (salos) because he would scandalize them. However, they demanded to see him and found him in his cell, where he was putting pebbles into
two baskets. He answered their questions by laughing at them (Pleroph. 178–179). We find examples of other ascetics walking around naked, living on the streets, behaving disruptively and saying strange impenetrable things. The 7th-century life of Symeon the Fool by Leontius of Neapolis (Festugière, 1974) is probably based on that of Diogenes of Sinope (Rydén, 1963). It depicts the saint dancing licentiously with prostitutes, gorging himself on cakes during a period of fasting, and defecating and farting in public. His intention may have been prophetic, in the sense that by his behavior, Symeon aimed at challenging what he saw as hypocritical distinctions between what was acceptable and unacceptable, sane and insane. In so doing, he confronted false self-knowledge, a knowledge based on the ego, and realized what Lacan calls savoir (which he distinguishes from connaissance), a genuine form of self-knowledge, which is simultaneously a not-knowing. Later, this tradition of foolishness is translated into a Russian idiom (yurodivy) and continued there well into the 19th century, and we find it famously referenced in characters in novels by Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy.

Yet, although a prophetic element may have been intended, we should not lose sight of the fact that this madness was artificial, a pretense. Despite the clear similarities, Cynic philosophers and Christian monks chose to adopt a subversive and unconventional “mad” lifestyle. They acted as if they were mad. This radically separates these traditions of “foolishness” from the divine madness of which Plato spoke. The latter was, above all else, something that happened to a man. Madness seized him, fell upon him, “without him choosing it or knowing why” (Dodds, 1959, p. 218). This latter kind of madness functioned in the way grace functioned in religious discourse. Nevertheless, there was still present in the faux madness of the Cynic philosopher and the Christian ascetic, a belief that their madness would bear fruit in the form of certain “blessings” the most notable of which was apatheia (impassivity; the disappearance of pathé). This ideal described a state of mind, which comes with a wisdom not disturbed by the passions.

**Inspired madness**

While in Socrates’ first speech in the *Phaedrus* (Phaed. 237a–241d), madness is opposed to nous (intelligence; awareness; intuitive intellect) and sophrosyne (soundness of mind; temperance), the antithesis is maintained in the second (244a–257b). Here, Socrates praises madness as infinitely superior to rationality (North, 2019). He identifies four forms of divine or positive madness – prophetic madness, telestic or ritual madness, poetic madness, and erotic madness. Each is inspired by its own god – Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses and Aphrodite. By describing some forms of madness as a gift of the gods, Plato is at once implying that there are other, forms of madness, the origins of which are physical rather than inspired. What distinguished the two kinds, is that divine madness is always a cause of good.
The most important of the mysteries were those of Demeter and Persephone at Eleusis. The cult of Dionysus, god of wine, which we read about in Euripides, certainly involved ecstatic dancing and wine induced trance (Linthorpe, 1946b). This was probably the prototype of telestic, orgiastic madness. Dionysus is represented in Greek literature and in myth as an outsider, and women and slaves were prominent in the cult which brought about “mad” states through disinhibition in which a casting off of the ego seem to have allowed some kind of temporary social emancipation and catharsis (Dodds, 1959). Such cultic “letting go” may have served a social function of releasing irrational impulses that might otherwise have come out in more destructive forms. Above all, ritual madness was directed toward a cure.26

**Erōs and an exceedance of language**

It is clear from Aristotle that unlike many of the hypostatizations that appear in the early cosmogonies, Eros is not so much a state but a force (Met. 1071b). Sexual love is raised to the cosmological level. This is still in evidence in Plato’s extensive treatment of love in the *Symposium*. Here, we find Socrates portrayed as a figure of Eros and as such transformed into an ideal (Patzer, 1987). Yet at the same time, Socrates, who proclaims “I know nothing, save about erōs” (Plat. Theag. 128b), functions as a mediator between a transcendent ideal of wisdom and human reality (Hadot, 1987).27 In the *Lysis* and in the *Symposium*, he describes love as a consequence of desire (epithumia) and directed toward filling a lack (endeia; Symp. 200e–201b). As divine madness (theia mania), erōs is necessarily spiritual in the sense that it is concerned with the soul (psuchē) as well as with the body.28 In this it brings a unity to man as he is in his bodily, sexual self and in his desire for transcendence. It involves an idealization of the beloved which suggests that the object of love is not exactly the visible reality of the beloved but the invisible or divine. The real object of desire is another reality of which the beloved is merely an image or reflection (Plat. Phaed. 249c). Here, divine erōs contrasts with an erotic love that is restricted to the visible beauty of the body. The latter may become a delirium but that would, in Plato’s terms, be a human form of madness rather than a divine madness. The result of desire without regulation (Plat. Phil. 63c. 45e, 47c).29

As we have seen, in the *Phaedrus*, Plato counted poetic ecstasy as one of the effects of divine madness.30 “Possession by the Muses, and their madness, invade . . . [the] psyche, awaken it, and bewitch it with . . . poetry; and by glorifying countless deeds of our forefathers, educate posterity” (Plat. Phaed. 245a). Although Plato developed this view, it was by no means uniquely his.31 Indeed, the words gathered up by the poet seemed to many in antiquity to have their source elsewhere. Plato had inherited it from the pre-Socratic philosophers, particularly Heraclitus and Empedocles (Delatte, 1934).32 Democritus held that the finest poems were written with inspiration and a holy breath (enthousiasmou kai
hierou pneumatos) (Billault, 2002). Later, Cicero refers to the poet as holy precisely because his words are divinely inspired. This was surely nothing other than a reaction to the utter profundity of the poet’s verse, which suggested to the listeners that the source of the poetic logos lay beyond the imaginary or specular (Lacan, 2006). Beyond the ego. In its earliest form, the poet is seen merely as the messenger of the Muses (see Plat. Theag. 769). But this intuition deepens in the transition that has already taken place by Plato’s time, where the Muse is thought to be actually inside the poet (Plat. Crat. 428c).

This way of thinking is not too dissimilar to the early modern understanding of mystical verse, in which the poet feels he has been taken out of himself in rapture. An outstanding example of this is found in the work of the 16th century Spanish Carmelite, John of the Cross (Campbell, 1972). Like other mystics, he adopts an erotic vocabulary to speak of ecstasy. Lacan considered that the poetry of John of the Cross was able to open up another dimension of experience to the reader, of which he was not conscious. This gave it, he thought, an authentically religious “tone” (l’accent) (Lacan, 1993, p. 77). The notion that the poem might open up another dimension of experience is reminiscent of what Heidegger referred to as disclosure (Erschlossenheit), in which new horizons of meaning are laid open. Disclosure is a concept that Heidegger develops in 1927, in his unfinished magnum opus Sein und Zeit, in relation to a particular understanding of alētheia (truth) (SZ 33). Truth here does not refer to the acquisition of factual knowledge but an opening in intelligibility. A manner of speaking about the way in which being, previously concealed, is unfolded. After the Second World War, turning increasingly to questions of language in its manifold forms, and particularly poetry – largely represented by the work of Hölderlin and Rilke – Heidegger wrote that it is only when the poet risks being mad, that he can hear the message of being and disclose it (Tsai, 2018). This, he considers, is an everyday process but not one that is accomplished through reason. Rather, it is the event of transcending oneself and the world. In fact, Heidegger describes the self and being-in-the-world as somehow brought together in such a way that being appears as their unique unfolding, as “the transcendens pure and simple” (Schürmann, 2008, p. 93). He says this points back to the ontological principle in Parmenides where, incidentally, it is set out within a poem. Following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas developed this idea.

Thomas is engaged in the task of deriving “transcendentia” – those characteristics of Being which lie beyond every possible way in which an entity may be classified as coming under some generic kind of subject-matter (every modus specialis entis), and which belong necessarily to anything, whatever it may be. Thomas has to demonstrate that the verum is such a transcendens. (SZ 14)

To refer to the self in this way is to be reminded that we cannot speak coherently about the self in terms of a person’s pregiven inner states or subjective or spiritual
apparatus, but only as a task yet to be achieved (SZ 115, 117). That is to say, the self must be understood as already engaged in a world, in relation to being-there (Dasein) and thus in relation to others.

Everydayness (Alltäglichkeit), does not refer to the surface of things in the sense of what is superficial, as Section 27 of Sein und Zeit shows (SZ 126). Gadamer, in relation to Celan, also argues explicitly in favor of the everydayness of poetry. “The ‘hidden’ language that the poet brings out into the open,” he says, “is not anything occult, subterranean, or otherworldly . . . It is only the quotidian speech of ordinary mortals, language in all its human facticity, the word in everyone’s mouth.” (Gadamer, 1997, p. 5). In other words, a poem can be made of anything. “It doesn’t have to be ‘poetical’ to be poetic” (ibid). In the course of some very dense arguments, Heidegger demonstrates that the reason why the subject encounters himself in everyday existence is precisely because that existence is prescribed by others. This emphasis on the everyday correlates, to some extent, with Lacan’s description of the unconscious as outside rather than interior or deep, because it is linguistic and therefore intersubjective. Indeed, it is part of the everyday, as the exteriority of the symbolic in relation to man (Lacan, 2006, p. 469).

Yet while Plato described the poet as mad, in the sense that he is inspired by the Muses, he also established an inseparable connection between the poetic, paideia (education, culture) and aretē (virtue) (Jaeger, 1973, p. 428 n. 12). For in the classical understanding of poetry, the ethical or educative dimension was dominant and was only later displaced – principally by Christian authors – by an aesthetic view. In other words, what made a good poem in the ancient world was the effect it had on educating society and generating virtue, rather than how beautiful it sounded. This ethical dimension binds poetic discourse and the poet himself to tradition, in its original sense of a handing on (paradosis), within a discourse addressed to a specific community. For while the inspired word comes from a private, secret place, a poem is not a hermetic, sealed-off discourse. In other words, poetry is still language and therefore, however ambiguous or obscure it may be, a poem is not gibberish or nonsense but something intelligible, for the poet constructs and brings to birth a world that is dependent on the community from which he himself has received language.

However, although a poem uses words, it alters our relationship to language by stretching everyday usage. It demands a suspension of known terms – including the term poetry itself. Furthermore, our associations force us beyond the sense the poet intends, as he does not have the power to completely fix the meaning of a word from the flow of everyday usage (Lang, 1997). As the navel in Sigmund Freud’s dream, there is always a part of the poem to which we remain deaf, not because we have not yet worked it out, but because it is too close an intimation of the mystical, of what is outside language. That is to say, the text becomes, in some sense, an absurdity because, by pointing beyond itself, it touches on that to which remains unsaid (T 6. 45). For this reason, we can say that madness signifies
something essential in all poetic utterance. Namely, the fact that speech is always talking about something that is not manifest (SZ 32).

**Prophecy and ecstasy**

Twice in *Ion* (553d–536d), Plato refers to the frenzied dancing of corybantic possession as an analogy of poetic inspiration (*enthousiasmos*) (Linforth, 1946a).\(^{40}\) Philo says that aided by music the devotees lose consciousness of everything. A belief in prophecy and divination (*mantikē*) was common in antiquity (Murray, 1912). And the figures of the prophet (*theios mantis*) and seers — “spokesmen of the supernatural” (Dodds, 1965, p. 53 n. 2) — occupied an important place in ancient Greece, and were both institutional and peripatetic (Fascher, 1927).\(^{41}\) They were distinct from those who learned how to read the future from natural phenomenon, like the behavior of birds (augury) or the entrails of animals. Often, the seer functioned as a dissident, criticizing politicians and being critical of the status quo. Seers could see the truth and declaim it but were not able to enforce change. In this sense, although they were always right, they were, at the same time, powerless. They spoke enigmatically, and thus their messages needed interpretation, and we find a number of examples of conflicting interpretations. They were powerless, despite being in possession of a truth that they received from elsewhere. Here, in respect to prophecy, madness is a way of speaking about how to access a truth as yet unknown. This truth mostly concerned knowledge about the future. Indeed, the oracular is one of the things that distinguishes the prophet from his audience, which can only really speak about the past by drawing on memory. Thus, Foucault categorizes prophecy as a form of *parrhēsia* or “truth-telling,” thus linking it to the tradition of spiritual exercises or *askēsis* (Foucault, 2014, p. 38). Often this foretelling presented, in the form of a riddle, a choice about the future direction the recipients can take in their lives.

**Ecstasy, temporality, and thinking**

As Dodds pointed out, the Greek word *ekstasis* and its cognates have a very wide range of applications including a state of awe or stupefaction, hysteria and insanity, and possession — whether divine or demonic (Dodds, 1965, p. 70–72). The Septuagint renders the deep sleep (*tardema*) of Abraham (Gen. 15.12) and Daniel’s trembling (Dan. 10: 7) an *ekstasis*. In fact, the word *ekstasis* occurs twenty-seven times in the Septuagint to translate eleven different Hebrew words. It is only with Plotinus that it comes to signify mystical union and probably entered the Christian lexicon with Tertullian, who uses it in his *Adversus Marcionum* (VI. 22. 5).\(^{42}\) He defines it, in relation to dreams, as an *amentia*, a flight of the mind (*De Anima* MPL II: 725b) (cited in Gilson, 1940, p. 215, n. 6; cf. De Brabander, 2012). With Bernard of Clairvaux and the early Cistercians, this flight becomes an *excessus* which signifies, in a general way, exceeding limits, specifically in
order to attain the mystical state. This includes taking a person beyond thought itself (*abduction interioris sensus*) (Gilson, 1940, p. 237, n. 156). With William of St Thierry, the experience of the mystical is understood as something that develops gradually and is intrinsically a part of faith (Brooke, 1964). Recently, Cristiana Cimino has suggested that “the theme of ‘ecstatic’ opening pervades the entire 20th century” (Cimino, 2017, p. 17).

For Heidegger, the primordial ecstasy or “out-of-oneself” is temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*).

The future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the “towards-oneself,” the “back-to,” and the “letting-oneself-be-encountered-by.” The phenomena of the “towards . . . ,” and “to . . . ,” and the “alongside . . . ,” make temporality manifest as the ἐκστατικὸν pure and simple. Temporality is the primordial “outside-of-itself” in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomenon of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the “ecstasies” of temporality.

Heidegger says that ecstasy allows time to emerge (*entspringen*) or unfold in an interwoven threefold structure of past, present, and future (SZ 329). While dwelling in time is the fundamental way in which Dasein transcends itself, by choosing the Greek word *ekstasis* to describe originary time, as opposed to sequential time (our everyday way of thinking about time), Heidegger is suggesting that displacement or “stepping beyond itself” is a key function of being, the meaning of the ground of Dasein. In other words, to say we exist “ecstatically” is to refer to the way in which being opens and transcends itself (SZ 338). In fact, the word existence itself comes, via the Latin *existere* (to appear; to become), from *ex-stare* (to stand out). That is to say, its etymology exactly parallels the Greek *ekstatikon* (*ek-stasis*). Yet this fundamental aspect of existence as transcending is normally overlooked.

This view may, at first, seem antithetical to that of Aristotle, as in keeping with medical writers, he habitually uses the word *ekstasis* to mean what Plato would consider human madness. However, Aristotle also makes clear the link between the ecstatic as displacement, and time (Arist. Phys. 22b.15, quoted in Krell, 2016).

According to Fann (2016), in the *Phaedrus*, philosophy itself is presented as a kind of madness. That is to say, it is not just that philosophy may sometimes be considered madness by people that do not understand it, but that the philosophical soul is not entirely in rational control of philosophical thought but in a state of mind that can fairly be defined as madness – and that the philosophical life is arranged in order to visit or revisit this state of mind. In other words, madness is at the center of the best human life; namely, the philosophical life. The madness of philosophical thought involves not knowing what to do (*aporein*) (Arist.
Top. 145b 16). It is a kind of puzzle which the philosopher is trying to solve (Arist. N.E. 1145b 2). But *aporia* also means the absence of a way through as, for example, in the case of rugged terrain. This idea of not knowing what to do or coming to a dead end, is reflected in Heidegger’s work as a whole which, in Schürmann’s words, is “unified solely by a path in thinking, a path that, in a sense, leads nowhere” (Schürmann, 2008, p. 63). In the epigraph to Heidegger’s *Holzwege* (woodpaths), the title he gave to the fifth volume of his collected works, we read:

In the wood are paths which mostly wind along until they end quite suddenly in an impenetrable thicket. They are called “woodpaths.” Each goes its peculiar way, but in the same forest. Often it seems as though one were like another. Yet it only seems so. Wood cutters and forest rangers are familiar with these paths. They know what it means to be on a woodpath.

(Heidegger, 1950, p. 1, quoted by Schürmann, 2008, p. 63)

Hannah Arendt considered that the metaphor of woodpaths hit upon something essential in Heidegger’s philosophy. What Schürmann added to this was the idea that this was true not only in relation to Heidegger’s itinerary of thinking but also in terms of the itinerary of being.

The “itinerary of Being” – Heidegger is particularly fond of phrases like this, but they are not without traps – would itself be something like a woodpath . . .

That the itinerary of the question of Being resembles woodpaths also means that the entire path of philosophy since the Greeks is in errancy – not an error, but a wandering. This, too, has tremendous consequences, which I only gesture toward here: “Who thinks greatly must err greatly” (Heidegger *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, GA 13, p. 81).


Woodcutters do not intentionally make paths in the forest. They come about merely as a result of felling trees. The clearings they open up are not designed to lead anywhere, though some may. But others lead to a dead end. Heidegger is suggesting that thinking philosophically opens up tracks in which one might get a hint or indication of that mystery which permeates the everyday world, but generally goes unnoticed because of its “simplicity and familiarity” (P.I. 129).

And that the reason for being on the “path of thinking” is not to arrive at a specific destination, because the direction thought takes is always unknown. Thinking about being does not have a *telos* in mind and does not proceed logically. It is a kind of wandering, meandering form of thinking, not dependent solely on what is conscious. Yet here, as it were, one might stumble across a clearing in which we are able to catch a glimpse of things in the light of our understanding of being (*die Lichtung des Seins*).
Conclusion

The question of madness is always a question about exceedance, and thus of limits. This not only connects it to Oedipus, a point that Lacan brought into full view (foreclusion), but also ties it to the question of the mystical (de Certeau, 2013). In so doing, something of the mystery and transcendence of being is revealed. This is seen in the way the rules of language are transgressed in an attempt to grasp the ungraspable.\textsuperscript{49} Indeed, mystical texts are often inscrutable, at times aphoristic, frequently indirect, deeply ambiguous and obscure, recurrently inaccessible and unfinished (cf. Lévy-Valensi, 1956). These literary characteristics are part of a peculiar way of speaking in which “knowing” is gradually eclipsed. The disappearance of meaning that penetrates these texts, nevertheless, has its own peculiar logic, which points beyond itself thus opening up a new perspective “at the limit of the world” (T 5.632).

For Plato, prophecy and participation in the mysteries disclose this “beyond,” as both overstep the limit of rationality (logos). In ambiguous, enigmatic utterances, the prophets were thought to speak a truth that was not fully accessible but was, nonetheless, able to be interpreted and made relevant to everyday events within a specific community. The Oracle spoke, that is to say, a “word” for the here and now. Likewise, the catharsis which resulted from the trances induced during the sacred rites (the mysteries) was probably not unconnected to the temporary liberation from social difference that the devotee experienced. That is to say, it had an impact (a blessing) in terms of everyday life. The development of an inspirational theory of poetry, which begins mildly and is only later seen as a frenzied state, is first mentioned by Democritus in fr. 17,\textsuperscript{18} (Dodds, 1959, p. 101 n.125) and may well itself have been influenced by the Dionysian rites. The Muses were thought to endow the poet with a knowledge of the truth, which likened him to the prophet (Vicaire, 1963). Yet even here, the true value and “blessing” of poetry, in antiquity, lay in its ethical dimension (paideia).

The passion of good erōs mirrors the kind of thinking that is central to philosophy. Of course, philosophy – as its conventional etymology would suggest – is a kind of love (philia). But it is also a form of madness, because it necessarily leads us to ‘step beyond’ (ek-stasis) rationality (Schürrmann, 2008, p. 83). But it is a ‘sane madness’ and a ‘wise foolishness’ (St Paul), as the uncharted course that it follows, allows something other than conscious thought to show itself. Moreover, if Heidegger’s development of Aristotle is legitimate, time – which is constitutive of being – is not really sequential but a simultaneous movement from the past to the present to the future. The present moment, from inside of which we view our existence, is fundamentally ecstatic.\textsuperscript{50}

More often than not, those possessed of madness are written off by the wise and learned. Their utterances, as those of the poet and the seer, in antiquity, seem obscure; their behavior, like that of the ascetic, frequently strange and challenging. “Touched,” absurd and out of place, they may be ridiculed and derided, as
indeed was Socrates, as well as many of the Old Testament prophets, and the “fools for Christ.” Yet might not these “outsiders,” in their fragility, open up to us manifold new paths of thinking, new horizons, and something of the unboundedness of language? And in so doing, might they not clear a space for a glimpse of the “truth of unreason,” to use Foucault’s idiom, to emerge; and for being itself, in its primordial transcending, to be disclosed in the mystery of the everyday? For “to be” means, pre-eminently, to be “out-of-it.”

**Abbreviations**


Freud SE II  

Freud SE VII  

Freud SE XII  

Freud SE XIII  

Freud SE XIV  

Freud SE XVIII  

Freud SE XX  

Freud SE XXIII  

GA  

SZ  

PI  

T  
Notes

1 The expression is that of the classical scholar Werner Jaeger (1943, p. 343) who formed this opinion based on an analysis of the Republic 571–572. Here “the divine Plato,” to use Freud’s expression, describes the way incestuous desires surface in dreams. Given that Freud constructed psychoanalysis in relation to Greek myth (Oedipus) and that, more than any other philosopher — including Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes and Immanuel Kant — Plato played a vital role in his work, it may be worth considering seriously his view of divine madness and its gifts (Rottenberg, 2019).


3 ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.

4 Mōros can mean dull or sluggish and in relation to the mind, stupid, silly, foolish; mōria, folly.

5 For the verb mōrainō (Matt. 5.13/Lk. 14.34); for the condemnation of mōre (Matt. 5.22); for the evaluation of the builders and virgins in the parables (Matt. 7.24–27; 25.1–13); for the description of the Pharisees as mōroi kai tufhloi (fools and blind) (Matt. 23.17).

6 Cynicism seems to have started in the second half of the 4th century B.C. and continued to develop, through a number of different phases, to the end of the Roman empire. Dudley (1937) shows its breadth and complexity and makes it clear that it would be a mistake to imagine it was limited to the vagrant ascetic form associated with Diogenes.

7 This sets Cynicism firmly within the famous Socratic dictum “know thyself.” As Pierre Hadot puts it: “Se connaître comme non-sage (c’est-à-dire non comme sophos, mais comme philo-sophos, comme en marche vers la sagessè), ou bien se connaître en son être essential (c’est-à-dire séparer ce qui n’est pas nous de ce qui est nons-mêmes), ou bien se connaître en son veritable état moral (c’est-à-dire examiner sa conscience)” (Hadot, 1987, p. 31; on the background to the term “know thyself,” see Courcelle, 1975). The refusal by the philosopher to identify himself as a sage also has some resonance with Lacan’s notion that imaginary self-knowledge must be challenged, as it is fundamentally a misrecognition based on the ego (Lacan, 2006).

8 In fact, an apophasic note can be detected throughout the Tractatus. There we read, for example, “My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them — as steps — to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (T. 6. 54–7).

9 Caputo noticed how close Heidegger’s view of the nothing (das Nichts) was to that expressed by Meister Eckhart’s in his treatise Von Abgeschiedenheit (on detachment). Cf. Caputo (1986, pp. 10–11, 271, n. 4).

10 The very notion of mystical discourse brings to the fore the question of how we might speak about that which lies beyond the bounded whole (Wittgenstein) cannot be symbolised (Lacan). As pseudo Denys puts it: “This is why we must not dare to resort to words or conceptions concerning that hidden divinity which transcends being . . . Since the unknowing of what is beyond being is something above and beyond speech, mind, or being itself, one should ascribe to it an understanding beyond being”; and “if all knowledge is of that which is and is limited to the realm of the existent, then whatever transcends being must also transcend knowledge” (DN 588A; 593A).

11 Both in its provenance and in its meaning, the expression, which appears in a wide variety of versions, is fraught with difficulty. It is even uncertain whether it originates with Socrates. For a fascinating and erudite review of the matter, see Fine (2008).
12 Dibelius (1937) suggested a Cynic background to I Thess. II. More recently, Bornkamm lent his support to this idea (cited in Malherbe, 1970).
13 E.g. Theodoret (Rel. Hist.) gives examples of a number of Syrian monks dressing in rags or skins, living in the open air or in caves or holes in the ground, wearing chains, and sleeping on the ground. They could be threatening and even dangerous in their criticism of the intuitional Church (Urbainczyk, 2002).
14 Bousset did the pioneering work in analyzing the Apophthegmata in its various collections, though not the Arabic version. Further work was done by Guy (1962). As a genre, these sayings may have a direct link to the chreiae associated with Diogenes and the other Cynic philosophers.
15 The notion of interior or psychic “work” was one of the many fundamentally religious ideas taken up by Freud. This family resemblance, to use Wittgenstein’s phrase (Wittgenstein P.I. 65–71), between the “work of the soul” and psychoanalysis can be seen clearly not only in the way Freud referred to unconscious “working through” (Durcharbeitung or Durcharbeiten; cf. SE II, pp. 288, 291; SE XII, p. 155; SE XX, p. 159) and the “work of mourning” (Trauerarbeit; cf. SE II, p. 162; SE XIV, pp. 245, 255), but more fundamentally in his choice of the word Psychoanalyse itself. Psuchë is usually translated as soul (anima in Latin) to distinguish it not only from the body (soma) – or when described in a pejorative sense, from the flesh (sapr – but also from nous (Latin mens, intellect). Freud seems to have been aware of this ambiguity and grappled with it in his discussion of the equivalence of the German Geist (spirit) and Seele (soul), terms he uses almost interchangeably (cf. Strachey’s note in SE XXIII, p. 114).
16 A number of the Church Fathers, including Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa, contrast the drunkenness of madness caused by drinking wine with the nēphalios methē (sober drunkenness) or “sane madness” of mystical union. This was discussed in a monograph by Hans Lewy (1929).
17 The Latin is rendered in Migne’s edition as “stultum simulabat . . . fatuis est . . . fatui-tatem acquirerem.”
18 For an unusual reading of this text, see de Certeau, 1982, p. 48ff).
19 Špidlík’s (1963) derivation of salos from the Syriac was repeated by Bartelink in 1974, but Guillaumont was not convinced. More recently, Ivanov (2006; originally published in Russian in 1994) has reviewed the literature and others, notably Krueger (1996), largely repeat his conclusions.
20 Nau translates it as l’idiot (n. 1, p. 178).
21 We find this apophatic view of knowledge and not knowing, which we have already noted in the Cynics and in Plato’s Socrates, significantly developed in a number of monastic writers in late antiquity, notably in Evagrius Ponticus. What is described here as a descent into the unlimited or infinite ignorance is, according to Wensinck, synonymous with the unconscious. For differing readings of this concept and particularly in its relationship to apophasis, see Guillaumont (1985), Wensinck (1923), and Hausherr (1959, 1960).
22 There were, of course, cases of genuine insanity among the early monks, including sexual obsessions and ‘pathological cases of hatred’ (Clim. scal. 8, cited in Brown 1988, p. 230), symptoms of which were often accompanied by hallucination (Canivet, 1962).
23 Krueger (1996) gives some examples in which salos is used to describe genuine as opposed to simulated madness. But it seems to me that he does this principally in order to build his argument that the fool cannot be thought a distinct category of asceticism. However, when the wider context of mad behaviour is taken into account, particularly in the context of Cynicism, his argument here seems rather weak.
Divine madness

24 Apatheia plays an important role in ethics from the Cynics on. It is particularly developed by Stoic writers, and then taken up again in Neoplatonic thought, in Evagrius and Dorotheos of Gaza.

25 The Roman physician, Caelius Aurelianus, refers to this dual idea of madness (duplicem furorem), set out by Plato in the Phaedrus: *Unum fieri mentis intentione ex corporis causa vel origine, alterum divinum sive immissum* (Drabkin, 1950, p. 265).

26 Indirectly, the cult of Dionysus is linked to that of Asklepios, in which cures were sought through the ritual of incubation (Wickkister, 2008). It was a practice that continued in Christianity. For cures by Christian martyrs according to the Coptic passions, see Banmeister (1972). Later, we find Bernard of Clairvaux describing mystical ecstasy as a kind of sleep (dormitio, somnus, sopor) (Gilson, 1940).

27 For the figure of Socrates as the lover (erotikos), see also Xen. Mem. 11, 6, 28.

28 For Plato, the soul (psuchē) is divided into three parts. He calls these the rational (logistikōn), the spirited (thumoeidēs) and the appetitive (epithumētikon) (Rep. ix, 580d–581a; Phaed. 246a–b, 253c–255b; and Tim. 9d–72d).

29 Freud, in the preface to the 1920 edition of the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* wrote that he considered Plato’s erōs a notion identical to the libido of psychoanalysis (*‘Sexualität der Psychoanalyse mit dem Eros des göttlichen Plato zusammentrifft’* Freud SE VII, p. 134). He repeated this again in 1921 (SE XVIII: 91) and in 1924 (SE XX: 24). He relied heavily, for this position, on a grossly inaccurate paper by Nachmansohn (1915), which he cited, and to a lesser extent on one by Pfister (1921) which was largely derivative of it. Nachmansohn’s description of Plato’s doctrine was based almost exclusively on a discussion of the Symposium, and his conclusions are not supported by a scholarly reading of Plato’s work (Stok, 2007). Specifically, he made no mention of the distinction between erōs and philia. As Santas notes, “Freud did himself no favour relying on these papers” (Santas, 1988, p. 155).

30 In a fascinating paper, Boysen (2018) reads Plato’s position both as a development in his philosophy and as parallel to the notion of the pharmakon as both poison and medicine (Derrida, 1968).

31 See e.g. Crat. 396–397; and Phaed. 265.

32 For the literary background, see Sikes (1931), Tigerstedt (1970) and Vicaire (1963).

33 “And yet we have it on the highest and most learned authority that while other arts are matters of science and formula and technique, poetry depends solely upon an inborn faculty, is evoked by a purely mental activity, and is infused with a strange supernatural inspiration (quasi divino quodam spiritu inflari). Rightly, then, did our great Ennius call poets ‘holy’ (sanctos), for they seem recommended to us by the benign bestowal of God” (Cic. Pro Archia VIII. 18).

34 Although it is not easy historically to draw a sharp line between Christian and Platonic mysticism (Festugiére, 1954) or eroticism (Armstrong, 1961), Origen and Gregory of Nyssa seem to have been the first Christian authors to adopt erotic imagery to describe the mystical life. But in keeping with biblical symbolism, this is set firmly within the context of the relationship between the community (Israel; the Church) – rather than the individual soul – and the divine (Crouzel, 1961). This social, ecclesial dimension re-appears in Bernard’s sermons on the Canticle.

35 Lacan, however, would not see this as madness. In fact, he thought Schreber’s text totally lacked the quality he admired in John of the Cross.

36 Hölderlin did, in fact, suffer from bouts of madness (Hamburger, 2004). Rilke, much of whose poetry has a mystical dimension, had a relationship with Lou Andreas-Salomé from whom he gained a knowledge of psychoanalysis.

37 See Laplanche (1961). This idea is mirrored in Foucault’s notion that it is the artist’s excess in which the madness in which the work of art is engulfed.
The fragments are published in Diels (1906) I, pp. 113–126, and Coxon (1986) gives the text with translation and commentary.

The key texts in Thomas are VI, 1–2 and ST I, q. 16. Nathan Strunk (n.d.) reviews this passage in Heidegger very usefully, citing Aertsen (1991): transcendens suggests a kind of surpassing. “What is transcended are the special modes of being that Aristotle called the ‘categories,’ in the sense that the transcendentals are not restricted to one determinate category. ‘Being’ and its ‘concomitant conditions,’ such as ‘one,’ ‘true’ and ‘good,’ ‘go through (circumeunt) all the categories’ (to use an expression of Thomas Aquinas)” (Aertsen, 1991, p. 130).

Plato makes explicit references to Corybantic rites in six of his dialogues. Wasmuth (2015) notices that in all but one an analogy is drawn between these rites and some kind of logos. Plato’s use of Corybantic analogies is thus quite extensive. Indeed, according to Linforth (1946a), Plato is our “principal witness concerning Corybantic rites and their function.” Ecstatic features, including frenzied dancing also characterised some of the early Old Testament prophets who gave the impression of being mad. But gradually, ecstasy gave way to focus on the word e.g. 1 Sam. 10.10f, 19.23f.

On ekstasis, see p. 7, 58, 68, 75, 119f, 160f, and 203.

Gilson points out that Bernard rarely uses the word extasis. “He uses it, however, to designate the state in which the corporeal senses cease to exercise their functions. In this sense it belongs to the genus excessus” (Gilson, 1940, p. 237, n. 156).

The meaning of the Greek word philosophia, and its kindred terms, is remarkably elastic. We can see, from its first known use in fragment 35 of Heraclitus (Diels, 1906) right through to John Chrysostom, that neither of its component parts remained static for very long (Malingrey, 1961).

This volume contains his published works from 1910–1976.

While Arendt considered that while the metaphor of the woodpath indicated something essential in Heidegger’s thought, it was not because the paths of thought came to dead ends. “Not, as one may at first think, that someone had gotten into a dead-end trail, but rather that someone, like the woodcutter whose occupation lies in the woods, treads paths that he has himself beaten; and clearing the path belongs no less to his line of work than felling trees” (Arendt, 1971, p. 51).

For Heidegger, language is most eminently itself in poetry because in poetry, language speaks for itself. The poet is only the transmitter of language (D’hert, 1974).

Heidegger calls the present the moment of vision (Er meint die entschlossene, aber in der Erschlossenheit gehaltene Entrückung des Daseins an das, was in der Situation au besorgbaren Möglichkeiten, Umständen begegnet SZ 338). See Macquarrie’s note 2 (SZ: 387) on entrücken (“to move away,” “to carry away,” or figuratively, “to be carried away” as in rapture).
References


