everyday lives as lived from the inside are nothing but a tragic metaphysical hoax, for every sane person is a 'phenomenal libertarian' for whom it at least feels like ordinary choices are such that she could have done or willed otherwise. Furthermore, autonomy and along with it our noumenal ability to do or will otherwise are required by the very nature of an autonomy-based morality to be real, not merely self-conceptions that we have to believe in. So-called 'soft determinism', or contemporary compatibilism, which says that 'internal' or 'agent-centred' freedom of the will and moral responsibility are consistent with a complete inability to do or will otherwise, cannot be the metaphysical basis of either Kant's ethics or a Kantian ethics. So it appears that Kantian ethicists should either stop avoiding metaphysics and produce a philosophically acceptable theory of noumenal willing, or stop being Kantians.

Robert Hanna
University of Colorado, Boulder
robert.hanna@colorado.edu


This impressive volume of new essays offers a stimulating and wide-ranging discussion of many key issues related to Kant's central notion of 'anthropology' intended to serve as a companion both to the recently published Akademie edition of Kant's lectures on anthropology as well as to the forthcoming translation of many of Kant's anthropological works in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain have gathered a notable line-up of leading Kant scholars for this volume: Werner Stark, Allen Wood, Robert Louden, Reinhard Brandt, Paul Guyer, Howard Caygill, Susan Meld Shell, as well as an introduction and individual contributions by the editors themselves. The essays are broad-ranging in nature, treating Kant's ideas about anthropology from a variety of viewpoints, including their overall relationship to his theoretical philosophy, practical philosophy, aesthetics, and philosophy of history. For present purposes, I want to closely examine what I take to be the two most relevant issues for those interested in gaining a better understanding of Kant's practical philosophy: first, the relationship of Kant's anthropology to his overall critical philosophy; and second, the relationship of Kant's anthropology to his ethical theory in particular.

Before proceeding, however, it is worthwhile to provide some historical background on Kant's relationship to anthropology more generally. As Jacobs and Kain state in their introduction, Kant's focus upon human nature is perhaps the only theme which appears consistently in all Kant's major writings. Kant first taught a lecture course on anthropology in the winter semester of 1772–73 and continued to offer it for over two decades until his retirement in 1796. Shortly afterwards, in 1798, Kant compiled his notes from his widely popular lectures in order to eventually publish them as a textbook entitled *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Despite his long-standing interest in this topic, however, Kant's attitude toward anthropology has not always been wholly affirmative. Several essays in this volume, especially those by Jacobs and Kain, Stark, Louden, and Brandt, draw attention to
the deeply problematic relationship between Kant's critical system and anthropology. The main worry is this: Granted his basic conception of philosophy in the early critical writings, it seems that anthropology has no place at all within Kant's own philosophy. Let us call this the 'paradox of philosophical anthropology'. Indeed, as Kain and Jacobs insightfully remark, the idea of 'philosophical anthropology' seems, at least on Kantian grounds, to be in fact an oxymoron, insofar as Kant insists in the 1781 *Critique of Pure Reason* that philosophy must be entirely rational and non-empirical, whereas anthropology is purportedly merely empirical (p. 3). In Chapter 5, Brandt affirms this view, contending that what Kant calls 'pragmatic anthropology' can neither belong to philosophy strictly speaking, nor can it be articulated as a kind of system based upon reason (p. 85). As Brandt points out, in contrast to earlier thinkers, Kant's interest in anthropology is innovative insofar as it opposes both (a) a purely 'physiological' investigation of humans (à la Ernst Platner) and (b) a purely metaphysical account of human nature (à la rationalist thinkers). Nevertheless, it is still the case that Kantian anthropology occupies an uncomfortable middle position in his philosophy insofar as it is supposed to be of great philosophical import and yet somehow only consist in empirical investigations.

The matter seems even worse when we turn to the second main topic of discussion, namely, the relationship of anthropology to Kant's ethical theory. Kant's official label for his distinctive conception of anthropology is 'pragmatic anthropology', which focuses upon 'what the human being as a free agent makes, or can and should make, of himself' (7:119). This notion, however, is complicated by three facts. First, as Louden argues, Kant also refers to many other types of anthropology, including 'practical anthropology', 'moral anthropology', as well as 'anthropology simpliciter' (cf. Louden, p. 61). Second, as Wood points out, 'pragmatic anthropology' is to be understood in at least four different senses: negatively speaking, as opposed to (1) physiological and (2) scholastic anthropology, and positively speaking, regarded as (3) useful and (4) prudential. Third and lastly, as Jacobs argues, there are at least three different perspectives from which we can view Kantian anthropology: (1) as an aspect of Kant's critical system as a whole; (2) as an 'encyclopaedic' science (which, Jacobs argues, although mentioned by Kant, is never fully developed and has no determinate place in his system [pp. 114-15]); and (3) as the subject matter for popular lectures. To sort out all these various and even conflicting textual claims, we might summarize Kant's distinctive account of anthropology as follows. Broadly speaking, Kantian anthropology deals with humans regarded as in some sense 'free', where this includes two principal forms: (1) 'practical anthropology' as mentioned by the 1785 *Groundwork*, which is later apparently termed 'moral anthropology' in the 1797 *Metaphysics of Morals*, dealing with the application of moral principles to human beings in the sense of knowing how best to inculcate morality in humans, granted the particular constitution of our natures; and (2) 'pragmatic anthropology', which is directed not at moral principles, but rather at the desire to achieve certain subjective ends, or what Kant calls a 'doctrine of prudence' (see Jacobs, pp. 112-13, but cf. Stark, p. 21).

The main problem with this basic taxonomy, however, is that it inevitably raises the question: Given Kant's strict rigorism concerning the 'purity of the moral law' in the *Groundwork*, how can anthropology ever be considered a genuine part of morals? Call this the 'paradox of practical anthropology'. As Kant writes in the *Groundwork*, a metaphysics of morals must be 'pure' and 'carefully cleansed of
everything empirical' (4:389). If this is so, however, then what relation, if any, can anthropology have to Kantian ethics at all? The essays by Brandt and Louden most directly address this worry, albeit from opposed viewpoints. On the one hand, Louden provides two arguments in defence of Kantian moral anthropology. First, Louden sketches out what one might call an 'indirect' approach, arguing that anthropology is instrumentally valuable for somehow making 'morality work effective' in the lives of human beings. It achieves this aim by, for example, identifying subjective hindrances to fulfilling our duties, offering us a better understanding of our dispositions and better resources for making informed moral judgments, and specifying, in a teleological sense, the moral destiny of the human species (a theme which Guyer also prominently focuses upon in his essay). Second, Louden offers a more direct argument for the moral import of anthropology, arguing that moral anthropology qualifies as 'practical' in Kant's strict sense of the term since 'the use that human beings are to make of these empirical precepts is free (determined by pure practical reason)' (p. 78). That is, a moral imperative lies behind our acquisition of knowledge of our own nature insofar as we can only realize the demands of freedom in the sensible world if we use our knowledge of nature—in particular, our knowledge of human nature—to promote moral goals. On the other hand, Brandt unequivocally maintains that for Kant, strictly speaking, anthropology has nothing to do with ethics at all, insofar as free action—a distinctively noumenal event—can never be the proper object of empirical observation of human beings (p. 86).

How should we view the two central paradoxes identified here, namely, the 'paradox of philosophical anthropology' as well as the 'paradox of practical anthropology'? The essays in this collection adopt one of three basic strategies. First, Stark simply embraces the paradox, arguing that (1) Kant in fact never fully reconciles this deep tension between pure philosophy and empirical anthropology, between 'nature' and 'freedom'. As Stark writes, 'anthropology and ethics must be separated, and yet, at the same time, neither can be thought independently of the other'—an approach which simply reflects, Stark insists, Kant's fundamentally dualistic view of human nature itself (p. 25). Second and third, as already seen, we might simply accept either (2) that ethics and anthropology can be fully reconciled (Louden) or (3) that ethics and anthropology are irreconcilable (Brandt). I want to suggest here, however, a fourth option which is in general neglected in these essays, namely, that Kant himself comes to gradually change his doctrinal views about anthropology over time. Note that doctrines like 'aesthetic taste' and 'virtue' which Kant had previously dismissed as merely 'empirical' in the 1781 *Critique of Pure Reason* (cf. A21/B35 and A55/B79) are now offered a fully *a priori* analysis in the 1790 *Critique of Judgment* and 1793 *Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason*, respectively. It seems a fruitful exercise to investigate whether Kant's basic idea of 'anthropology' itself underwent a similar transformation, one which the essays surprisingly overlook even though they offer a detailed historical analysis of many other doctrinal changes—e.g., Jacobs on Kant's views about 'moral character', Guyer on Kant's views about 'aesthetic taste', and Shell on Kant's views about the relationship of happiness and morality.

There are two important textual considerations in support of this interpretative strategy. First, with respect to his ethical theory in particular, Kant seems to allow much more empirical content into an *a priori* ethical system in his 1790's moral writings than he previously permitted in the *Groundwork*. For example, in describing the purity of the moral law in the *Groundwork*, Kant writes:
Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground of an obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the command ‘thou shalt not lie’ does not hold only for human beings, as if other rational beings did not have to heed it, and so with all other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the human being or in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in concepts of pure reason.... (4:389, emphasis added)

And a little later on, Kant explicitly affirms this same point, writing:

For, by what right could we bring into unlimited respect, as a universal precept for every rational nature, what is perhaps valid only under the contingent conditions of humanity. (4:408/20-21)

But, by the time of the 1797 *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant apparently gives up this rigoristic demand, now defending the duty of beneficence thus:

Therefore the selfish maxim conflicts with itself when it is made a universal law, i.e., it is contrary to duty. Consequently, the altruistic maxim (that one should give assistance toward those in need) is a universal duty of men: this is so because they are to be regarded as fellow men, i.e., as needy rational beings, united by nature in one dwelling place for mutual aid. (8:453/117, emphasis original)

In justifying this duty, Kant fully acknowledges that the moral obligation here rests entirely ‘upon the circumstances in the world in which humans are placed’, that if we did not possess these entirely contingent features of our specifically human nature—that is, if we were not finite, needy, and united in one dwelling place—we would presumably not even be subject to such imperfect duties. In this way, Kant’s actual Metaphysics of Morals seems to be, as Mary Gregor put it, a metaphysics of human morals, rather than what Kant had previously envisioned as a metaphysics of morals that applies to all rational beings as such.

A parallel change occurs with respect to Kant’s attitudes about anthropology. In the 1781 *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant explicitly asserts that we must ‘purify’ metaphysics of all anthropology insofar as the latter can be based only upon empirical principles, whereas metaphysics only deals with pure a priori cognitions (A841-844/B869-872). Accordingly, his famous list of the main questions of philosophy includes only three basic issues:

1. What can I know?
2. What should I do?
3. What may I hope? (A805/B833)

But, by the time of the *Jäsche Logic*, first published in 1800, Kant famously adds a fourth question, viz.:

4. What is man? (Was ist der Mensch?)

And in stark contrast to his earlier declarations in the First Critique, Kant now explains that: ‘Metaphysics answers the first question, morals the second, religion the third, and anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one’ (9.25). As this quote makes clear, later on in his career, Kant came to eventually believe that anthropology somehow encompassed the entirety of his philosophical project. In this way, just as Kant’s projected metaphysics of morals has now become, as
noted above, a metaphysics of human morals, so too now philosophical reflection in general has become philosophy of human nature, thereby bringing to full consummation Kant’s so-called ‘Copernican Revolution’, and the turn to the human subject as the main topic of philosophical investigation as initiated by the 1781 *Critique of Pure Reason* itself.

Overall, this collection represents an impressive, in-depth exploration of an area of Kantian ethics typically neglected by the standard literature. This is a welcome addition to Kant scholarship, with its chief merits consisting not only in its philosophically and historically informed treatment of a wide range of issues, but also in the fact that it leaves intriguingly unresolved many debates between the commentators themselves, thereby providing ample room for further exploration of these issues as well as raising many new questions for future investigations of Kant’s anthropology in general.

Ernesto V. Garcia
Syracuse University
evgarc01@syr.edu


*Reason and Value* is a superb collection of fifteen original papers on themes from Raz’s moral philosophy. Following is a sample of some of the valuable contributions.

In ‘Shared Valuing and Frameworks for Practical Reasoning’, Michael Bratman discusses one kind of framework for practical reasoning: shared policy concerning what to treat as a justifying reason. In what Bratman calls ‘the core case’, the following holds in a context of common low knowledge:

(a) we each intend
   (i) that we give weight to $R$ in relevant shared deliberation, and
   (ii) that (i) proceed by way of each of our (a)(i) intentions and their meshing sub-plans.
(b) there is mutual interdependence between each of our (a) intentions.
   
   (pp. 21-22)

Such mutual interdependence requires that each has the relevant intention partly because others do. Bratman emphasizes that this does not require agreement in value judgment. Sometimes the interdependence will be a result of the need to fix on a group policy in the face of divergence in the relevant value judgments of the individuals. Moreover, the core case allows for the possibility that the participants recognize the value of alternative policies (pp. 22-24).

Bratman asks whether we should say that such shared policies in the core case are a kind of *shared valuing*. His ‘tentative proposal is that we see such shared policies in the core case as a form of shared valuing, but also recognize that it may be important whether or not there are also other forms of agreement. Shared valuing that also involve agreement in the valuing and/or value judgment of the participants may have a special significance in certain important contexts—for example, in the context of certain kinds of friendship’ (pp. 24-25).