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ABSTRACT

Calvin’s political doctrine stems from his ecclesiology, in response to both the Papal doctrine on the delegate power of the magistrates and the Lutheran subordination of the Church to the civil authorities. He was not concerned with discussing the best possible form of secular government, but rather with preparing a theological justification of civil power that would make it depend exclusively on God, not on the people. I will hold that Calvin regards the people’s function as merely instrumental: they accept the authority chosen by God, but do not institute it. Political vocation and the transmission of power that is indispensable to it both derive uniquely and exclusively from God. The discrepancies apparent in different authors’ interpretations can be clarified by recovering the context of his argumentation. This is the central objective of this article.

KEYWORDS

John Calvin; Geneva; modernity; protestant reformation; resistance theory

1. Introduction

Each century has its own interpretation of the political theology of John Calvin, the Genevan reformer. During the last 150 years we may distinguish at least two broad approaches. Since the end of the nineteenth century and until the 1940s, Calvin was most often described as a theocrat, mainly by francophone European scholars. From the 1940s onwards, and mostly in the English-speaking world, Calvin came to be known as a forerunner of constitutionalism. My goal in this paper is to suggest a third way, but first I shall provide some examples of these alternative approaches as benchmarks for my own interpretation.

The theocratic Calvin was the subject of the pioneering work of Eugène Choisy, who defined Geneva as a bibliocracy, in which the Bible governed the city. Charles Mercier, for his part, considered the political theory of the French reformer to be based mainly on the idea of authority. Emile Doumergue, after saying that Calvinian doctrine tended toward democracy, admitted that the foundation that the reformer attributed to civil society and, therefore, to its laws, was none other than the Decalogue. This is something that Edouard Chenevière also insisted on when he recalled that the reformer accepted neither popular sovereignty nor the idea of individual rights and, even less, the theory of natural law.

Among more recent anglophone scholars, Calvin is represented instead as one of the men who forged republicanism and democracy, or even as a revolutionary, because he
insisted that divine obedience preceded political obedience and so became a source for radical political resistance, as Roland Boer claims. In his multiple works on Protestant law, John Witte links the reformer’s thinking to the appearance of modern constitutionalism. Matthew Tuininga asserts that Calvin’s political theology leads to liberalism; Mark J. Larson, for his part, situates him among the fathers of republicanism and of the American Revolution. Similarly, Dale Van Kley states that, because Calvin’s theology was strongly desacralized, it would have promoted the criticism of divine right monarchy, and Calvin therefore could be considered to be one of the fathers of the French Revolution.4

Ralph Hancock is perhaps the interpreter who has most strongly defended the link between Calvin’s work and democracy. According to Hancock, it is enough to read the Institutes to discover in it the justification found by some monarchomachs for their theses about politics and popular sovereignty. Also, he argues that Calvin was able to reconcile reason and faith by presenting both as the work of God, while simultaneously holding that these were separate spheres, so that all believers could pursue their worldly objectives, but confer a religious-moral meaning upon them at the same time.5

I am going to argue here for a third way, in which Calvin ceases to be a pioneer of democratic constitutionalism without becoming a theocrat. Instead, I am going to argue that Calvin’s interest in political theory, in itself, was absolutely minor in relation to his effort to create a new (dogmatic and legal) ecclesiastical model that could replace the Roman Catholic one. My claim is that Calvin’s crucial concern in politics was to find a public place for his Genevan church that didn’t reduce it to its minimum institutional expression, as Luther proposed.6 Calvin’s solution was to argue that the State had to adapt to divine law, as this was the only way in which the role of politics could be positively justified.7 All this happened, of course, in a particular historical landscape. The implantation of Calvin’s ecclesiastical model was not straightforward, and was only achieved after years of open struggle with the “republican” Enfants de Géneve, who favored maintaining political control over the religious and moral affairs of the city. This tension with the political model of the Genevan magistracy shaped Calvin’s view of religion and politics in a way that is often neglected by non-contextual interpreters.

I will first present the religious and political framework that Calvin found upon arrival in Geneva, paying special attention to the ecclesiastical model operating in the city, which prompted Genevans initially to reject Calvin’s alternative view (§2). I will discuss why the Genevan magistrates were compelled to request Calvin’s help, despite that first rejection, and the subsequent consequences for the organization of the city’s church. Calvin only accepted on the condition that a number of legal reforms on religion and morals would be implemented. From this historical context emerges a third way between the ecclesiastical models of Catholic cities, on the one hand, and Bern, on the other. Calvin’s political stance stems from his ecclesiology, in response to both the Papal doctrine on the delegate power of the magistrates and the subordination of the Church to the Swiss civil authorities. Then I will discuss the foundations of Calvin’s politics (§3): the origin of power and its legitimacy, as well as the functions performed by the magistrate as interpreter and executor of God’s will. The last section (§4) addresses resistance theory and the role the people play in it; a crucial point to understand the purported Calvinist origins of modern democracies. Finally, I will discuss both the conceptual articulation of this doctrine and its historical context, showing in the closing section how Calvin’s resistance theory was interpreted by his contemporaries who revolted against civil authorities (§5).
2. The triumph of the Calvinian political-religious model

On 21 May 1536, the Genevans adopted the reformed faith by unanimous vote of the General Council. On 7 August 1536, just one-and-a-half months after the adoption of the Reformation, the Republic of Geneva was constituted politically. Following the lead of the Swiss cities, Geneva handed all the old episcopal functions, including the ecclesiastical organization of the new religion, to the civil powers. This is the main reason why Guillaume Farel, even though he had been preaching in Geneva since 1532, had not managed to establish an ecclesiastical organization capable of participating in decision-making regarding morals and customs in the city. In the month of July in 1536, at Farel’s request, Calvin arrived equipped with the first edition of the *Institutes of the Christian Religion* and with an ecclesiology that was quite different from those in effect in Geneva. On 10 November 1536, a *Confession of Faith* that indicated the need for *Ordonnances ecclésiastiques* was presented to the Geneva Small Council. Among the areas that he intended to recover for the Church were marriage and, of course, excommunication: a sacred measure instituted by God to punish thieves, rebels, assassins, drunks, and idolaters, according to Calvin. These are not minor attributions, as both the institution of matrimony and the authority for excommunication were crucially important in civil life. In fact, in Lutheran countries, excommunication was the prerogative of the civil powers. The German jurist theologians who succeeded Luther, such as Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Johann Oldendorp (c.1486–1567), and Johannes Eisermann (c.1485–1558), held that both regulating the visible Church by means of laws and paying, supervising, and disciplining the Church’s ecclesiastical officers were functions of the magistrate. However, where Luther only accepted one power of the Church, namely the doctrinal power linked to preaching and administering the sacraments, Calvin claimed that the Church could make its own laws and judge whether its members (both clergy and laity) were acting according to these laws. Indeed, the function of the pastor, as described in the 1541 *Ordinances*, was not only to preach the gospel and administer the sacraments but also to participate in maintaining order and discipline.

The wounds inflicted on the city by the episcopal power were still too fresh, however, and so it was not only the Genevan magistracy but the citizens themselves who refused to submit themselves to the dictates of a Church, even if it was no longer the Catholic Church. Faced with Farel’s and Calvin’s refusal to preach according to Berne theological inspiration, they were expelled from Geneva on 23 April 1538. Their expulsion was confirmed on 26 May. Calvin’s exile did not last long, however. Taking advantage of the confusion caused in the Genevan Church by Calvin and Farel’s departure, the Roman Cardinal Iacopo Sadoleto tried to stir up the people against their ministers via a letter in which he exhorted them to recover their former Catholic faith and bow down to the papacy. In order to defend their doctrinal – and political – independence, the Genevans appealed to the people of Berne, who, in turn, asked Calvin to write a response to Sadoleto. Their fundamental goal was to prevent Catholic countries from terminating Geneva’s independence. Political and religious independence went hand-in-hand: theological debates had practical implications. Sadoleto not only wanted to save the Genevans’ souls but also to win back the city for the Catholics. Despite being an exile, Calvin agreed to defend them, thus making his return to the city possible. He received the invitation to return to Geneva on 13 September 1541. Encouraged by Farel and the pastors in Zurich,
he decided to accept the invitation, but not without imposing certain conditions: he would only return if the magistracy committed itself to granting the city an ecclesiastical constitution. On 20 November 1541, the General Council approved the Ecclesiastical Ordinances (Ordonnances ecclésiastiques), conceived and drawn up by Calvin himself to give the Church of Geneva its own organization. Considering the motives for his expulsion, what is surprising is that his petition was accepted. Therefore, the dispute between Calvin’s supporters and his detractors never depended on the acceptance of the Protestant Reformation, or on the need for the existence of a censor of the city’s morals and customs, but on whether this censor was a civil or an ecclesiastical body, as Höpfl points out.

Therefore, to obtain this authority for his Church, Calvin needed to obtain political support. He obtained it from an increasingly large number of French refugees with political asylum in Geneva who had become members of the bourgeoisie. It is important to remember that Genevans obtained citizenship by birth, a fact that entitled them to participate in the city’s political institutions, while the members of the bourgeoisie obtained the same rights – with the exception of the possibility of entering the city Senate or Small Council – by donating a considerable sum of money or through their services as lawyers or ecclesiastical ministers. In fact, given their superior training, there were more and more French pastors in Geneva. Many Genevans began to be concerned about this, as control of the pulpits was decisive when it came to shaping public opinion.

Indeed, during the first 20 years of the Reformation in Geneva, 250 new members of the bourgeoisie were admitted; during the following three years, bourgeois rights were given to 460. Their children, born in the city, obtained this recognition automatically. From 1546 onward, the incipient majority that was forming on the pastors’ side was obvious to the old Genevans. In 1555, this support benefited Calvin at the ballot box and the city councils were occupied mainly by Calvin’s supporters. Berne, for its part, interceded in favor of Calvin’s political opponents by granting them safe conduct, banned Calvin’s books, and, in 1556, refused to renew its alliance with Geneva. Faced with the threat of invasion by the Duke of Savoy, these circumstances forced them to retract their decision. A new agreement between Berne and Geneva was signed in 1558. In 1559, Calvin applied for Genevan bourgeois status and, in 1561, the new Ecclesiastical Ordinances consolidated the church’s prerogative regarding excommunication.

In fact, excommunication had been a bone of contention between civil and ecclesiastical authorities for over 20 years. Calvin’s adversaries were not opposed to the Reformation, but to the Calvinian ecclesiastical model, quite different from the Berne (Lutheran) model regarding ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It is not surprising, then, that the former members and family relations of the Enfants de Genève party were the ones who became defenders of a civil monopoly on excommunication. The issue was not resolved until 1560, when an Edict of Excommunication was published, in which the Church’s jurisdiction over this issue was finally acknowledged. The reformer’s ecclesiological model was no longer a theoretical project; it had become a historical reality. As historian Alain Dufour points out, Geneva, which, until then, had been a city allied with the Swiss, entered history as Calvin’s city.

This is the context in which the French reformer revisited his first edition of the Institution de la religion chrétienne, published before Calvin arrived in Geneva. His greatest concern was not to discuss the best possible regime, however, but to prepare a theological justification of civil power that would make it depend exclusively on God, not on the
people. The consequence would not be to free the rulers from the influence of the theologians but exactly the opposite: to articulate their functions and obligations as protectors of the true religion.

3. The foundations: political doctrine

When John Neville Figgis published his essay on The Divine Right of Kings in 1896, he described political theoreticians’ rejection of the doctrines that stated that the Pope was the only legitimate repository of political power, as only he could be considered the Vicar of Christ. In response, the theoreticians of the divine right of kings held that all power has a divine origin and that the mediation of the Church or of the people was not necessary in the process of political legitimation, as God himself delegated it directly. Then, they added the absence of authorities’ responsibility to third parties, except for God himself, and, finally, the prescription of non-resistance. It is true that this last aspect would be modulated by the Protestant theoreticians, but the main nucleus of the doctrine can be applied to them without a problem. At least, this is true in the case of Calvin.

When those who bear the office of magistrate are called gods, let no one suppose that there is little weight in that appellation. It is thereby intimated that they have a commission from God, that they are invested with divine authority, and, in fact, represent the person of God, as whose substitutes they in a manner act. (IRC IV, 20, 4)

As can be seen, Calvin holds that all authority, whether political, ecclesiastical, or domestic, receives its power directly from God. This is the reason why political authorities can be called vicars and divine deputies. He goes so far as to say that their function is sacred (tressacrée) and that politics is not an effect of sin, but rather the will of Providence. Even more, the main role of the magistrates is to carry out the providential government of God on Earth as the rulers are his instruments, his hands. This delegated power is why they can and must dictate laws (legislative power), pass edicts (executive power), and carry out justice (judicial power).

These ideas are a constant in the reformer’s work, beginning with his first commentary in 1532 on Seneca’s De Clementia. Indeed, in his commentary on the Spanish philosopher’s text, Calvin’s attention is not concerned about the model of government but about the origin and function of the authority, as such. Of course, when Seneca speaks of fortune, Calvin assumes that he is speaking of God, but he has no problem accepting that the prince (the political authority) obtains his power from the gods and that, precisely because of this, he is accountable only to the divinity.

At the same time, the text says that political authority is, above all, the guardian of public affairs, defined by its function, independently of its name or the kind of government that it leads: the authorities could be kings, dictators, emperors, consuls, or something else. The content of this political function will now be discussed in detail.

3.1. The legislative function of the magistrate

For Calvin, the State is a divine institution, the means chosen by God to maintain order in the world and to facilitate human coexistence by punishing villains and protecting the virtuous. In order to fulfill this function of protection and order, the magistrate acts as a
legislator. The law consists of two clearly differentiated parts: one is the letter of the law, and the other refers to the fairness with which it must be applied. Thus, the Calvinian magistrate, as Irena Backus shows, is obligated to adapt the law to the circumstances. That means a non-literalist application of the law. However, the Christian State is not only a State that has fair and equal legislation but also a State in which the laws conform to Christian doctrine.

Calvin acknowledges that, if sin did not exist, knowledge of natural law would have provided human beings with knowledge of God’s own law and, therefore, of our moral and religious obligations. However, since the Fall, natural law does not empower people to recognize their obligations to God or to their fellow men; only Scripture does this. Therefore, even though the main purpose of civil law must be to follow this second set of the Ten Commandments (promoting the public articulation of love toward one’s fellow man), something more is, however, required in a Christian society: fairness must be subordinated to pietas, the objective of the First Table of the Law, which summarizes the primacy of God. It is vain, therefore, to talk of righteousness apart from religion. Such righteousness has no more beauty than the trunk of a body deprived of its head. Nor is religion the principal part merely: it is the very soul by which the whole lives and breathes. Without the fear of God, men do not even observe justice and charity among themselves. [...]

By linking moral virtue to faith, Calvin opens an abyss between natural law and divine law, between natural ethics (a term Calvin would have rejected) and revealed ethics. This is a delicate matter, because it means denying that true morality, and therefore true justice, are possible apart from religion. Clearly, when Calvin denied that natural law has any ethical function for believers, he had to appeal to revelation as the foundation of his morality. After Christ’s advent, the written law replaces natural law, as it presents what natural law cannot express, i.e. the divine will. Similarly, faith replaces reason in the process of knowing moral rules. Whereas Aquinas could say that divine law does not abolish, but rather perfects, natural law (as grace perfects nature), Calvin, like the whole Scholastic neo-Augustinian tradition before him, claims that divine law (moral law) replaces natural law (grace substitutes for nature).

Therefore, the Christian magistrate must not only legislate but must also shape into laws the maxims contained in Christian moral law. Thus, Calvin insists on the need for rulers to read the gospels, and to hear sermons and listen to preachers frequently. In the Institution, Calvin provides examples of the magistrate’s legislative function. It is well-known that divine law prohibits homicide; therefore all countries punish homicide, even though they do not do so in the same way. Divine law prohibits theft and so it is punished in all nations, although in some cases the guilty person is whipped, in others he is exiled, and in some the robber is even condemned to death. That is, moral law indicates the ends, while fairness gives them different forms depending on the country in which and the time at which the legislation is created, and positive law consists of this last aspect. The form of the law does not really matter. What is important is that it respects the reason for which it was given, its final objective. Thus, legislation can be inspired by the Bible as a
whole, as a political document to compare with, as Calvinian hermeneutics has shown is possible when divine precepts are interpreted as synecdoches.\textsuperscript{39}

The influence of these ideas can be observed in Genevan legislation, as Calvin himself participated actively in creating the \textit{Civil Ordinances} adopted by the General Council on 23 January 1543.\textsuperscript{40} The ordinances that were passed contained legal measures that, according to Calvin, involved the existence of an evangelical freedom that is possible only in the city of Geneva, a sufficient reason to encourage immigration.\textsuperscript{41} As the reformer himself acknowledged, the Kingdom of God is present in Geneva, although not exclusively;\textsuperscript{42} and it was in Geneva that the magistrate did, in fact, become the defender of the Tablets of the Law: he preserved the tranquility and public order, favored common peace, and defended the honor of God to the same extent to which he protected his church:

\begin{quote}
\begin{raggedright}
\it{it is assigned, so long as we live among men, to foster and maintain the external worship of God, to defend sound doctrine and the condition of the Church, to adapt our conduct to human society, to form our manners to civil justice, to conciliate us to each other, to cherish common peace and tranquility.}\textsuperscript{43}
\end{raggedright}
\end{quote}

3.2. The magistrate, executor of the divine will

Indeed, together with legislative power, the magistrate acts as judge and executor of justice: not only does he pass edicts and laws but he also pursues those who do not follow them and punishes the guilty parties appropriately. Calvin does not cease to insist that magistrates are the only holders of coercive power (\textit{ius gladii}), the objective of which is to defend those who live according to the gospel and punish transgressors, as he reminds the reader in his comments on the First Letter to Timothy.\textsuperscript{44} Judging is, then, a function that the magistrates carry out in the image of God-the-judge. Thus, they are even granted the authority to impose the death penalty.\textsuperscript{45}

In fact, sin is not the reason for the foundation of the State, but the reason for the existence of the authority and the coercion of the penal law, the end of which is to control the effects of evil on the social body. This fact is particularly important, as it must not be forgotten that Calvin also defended the existence of a properly ecclesiastical penal law (\textit{dis-}\textit{cipline}).\textsuperscript{46} Calvin does not, however, accept that ecclesiastical laws involve the conscience of the faithful or that they have any relation to Christians’ salvation in light of \textit{sola fides}. No legislation is admitted other than that which is based on Scripture. Penal disciplinary law is not coercive other than in a spiritual sense, and its norms are not universal, in contrast to Catholic penal legislation.\textsuperscript{47} However, whereas Luther only acknowledged the power linked to preaching and the administration of sacraments as the Church’s authority (a restatement of the power of order), Calvin also acknowledged a judicial and legislative power that recovered part of the jurisdiction formerly granted to civil power in the Lutheran tradition.\textsuperscript{48}

Indeed, Calvin felt that the Church could, on its own, purge the sins committed by the faithful and, to this end, considered that it should exercise the power of excommunication. However, Calvinian ecclesiastical coercive authority is exclusively of a spiritual order: the Church was empowered to reprimand and excommunicate – that is, expel the sinner from the community of faith momentarily until he was rehabilitated – but had no material or physical coercive power to apply sentences such as torture, prison, or death. These were punishments imposed by the civil power alone, even though, many times, what the civil
power did was to use civil sentences to reinforce the cases previously judged by the Church.

Both institutions, therefore, the State and the Church, are titleholders of civil penal law and disciplinary penal law, respectively. But only one of these penal systems can claim the exercise of corporal punishment; the other can only claim spiritual punishment. *Ius gladii* belongs exclusively to the State, so the Church cannot claim it for itself. 49 Nor can any private person do so.

**3.3. The people**

The first duty of subjects towards their rulers, is to entertain the most honourable views of their office, recognising it as a delegated jurisdiction from God, and on that account receiving and reverencing them as the ministers and ambassadors of God. 50

The quotation that begins this section makes the obligation of every private person in relation to his or her rulers quite clear. It is justified by the Pauline mandate presented in Rom. 13, but also by invoking the Forth Commandment regarding filial respect; that is, appealing to the moral law of the Decalogue. 51 Therefore, it does not matter whether the authority is familial, domestic, political, or ecclesiastical: the obligation to respect its authority remains unscathed and it must be followed, not through fear of a superior but through respect and fear of God. 52

No one can resist the authorities without at the same time resisting God. Consequently, it is not strange that Calvin holds that it is impossible for a private person to confront or resist public authority. 53 Calvin’s perspective, of course, does not imply that the people and the magistrates do not have mutual obligations. This obligation, however, does not depend on a contract: the people’s obedience to political authorities is an obedience that is mediated by the obedience due to God’s law, just as the magistrate’s good government is a duty contracted with the people by divine imposition. The final reason for this mutual obligation is theological: man was thrown out of paradise for being rebellious, so only God can restore subordination to authority and only He can be, in turn, the guarantor of the exercise of public power.

It is necessary to add political motives to the general theological foundation of obedience. The mistrust that the political authorities showed toward Reformed ideas was quite well founded, in view of the effects of the Anabaptist subversion in Europe. The dilemma that Calvin faced was to present a political doctrine that made it possible to save spiritual and ecclesiastical freedom and, at the same time, to manage to reinforce Christian subjection to the political powers. In order to achieve this aim, he declared the divine character of political authority and founded the duty of obedience in moral law (the Fourth Commandment). 54 With these conditions, it was hard to justify resistance to the magistrate, even if he did not fulfill his obligations. Therefore, private and popular insurgencies were condemned as a matter of principle. Following Christian tradition, the exception was if divine authority itself was questioned or the true church persecuted. The duty of obedience had to be weighed against the biblical mandate to obey God before human beings (Acts. 5, 29).

**4. Institutional resistance**

According to Calvin, if people are victims of a bad magistrate, all they can do is pray and accept his government as a divine punishment for their sins. 55 But if the ruler turns against
divine law, his very legitimacy is questioned. Nevertheless, resistance against an impious ruler would not be by particular individuals or popular revolt, but always institutional, led by public authorities legitimately exercising their functions. One impious leader invested with divine authority can only be opposed by another equally invested leader. As Calvin observed when he commented on the Pauline Epistle to the Romans, the apostle refers to authorities in plural when he speaks of the granting of divine power, not of authority in singular. Therefore, the act of resistance pertains exclusively to the authority, in this case, of the inferior magistrates:

For when popular magistrates have been appointed to curb the tyranny of kings (as the Ephori, who were opposed to kings among the Spartans, or Tribunes of the people to consuls among the Romans, or Demarchs to the senate among the Athenians; and perhaps there is something similar to this in the power exercised in each kingdom by the three orders, when they hold their primary diets). So far am I from forbidding these officially to check the undue license of kings, that if they connive at kings when they tyrannise and insult over the humbler of the people, I affirm that their dissimulation is not free from nefarious perfidy, because they fraudulently betray the liberty of the people, while knowing that, by the ordinance of God, they are its appointed guardians (tuteurs).

This passage constitutes a *locus classicus* for those who attempt to find arguments in favor of a constitutionalist theory of resistance in Calvin. The contribution of the Reformation to the theory of resistance has, for example, recently been defended by Mario Turchetti, based on a study of Protestant ideas regarding tyrannicide. The key to this contribution, according to Turchetti, is to be found in a novel exegesis of the Pauline passage in the Epistle to the Romans, in which it is established that obedience is only due to the authorities who work in favor of the general interest. Thus, the ruler who works to his own benefit can be identified as a manifest tyrant. In this way, a constitutionalist theory of resistance would be consolidated, a theory that would confer upon the Estates General the authority to rebel against the tyrant. The *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* (1579), attributed to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay and Hubert Languet, is a canonical example of this position. Other authors, particularly Quentin Skinner, hold that the Protestant contribution to the theory of resistance depended on canonical Roman medieval bases. Thus, for example, the statement that the inferior magistrates had *ius gladii* would derive from the interpretation that medieval jurists had given of the Roman *merum Imperium* in constitutional terms: if all the electors of the Empire had coercive power as had the emperor, then they could resist him when he failed to observe the terms of his general oath. In this way, the popular magistrates studied by Calvin were officers elected by the people, with a direct responsibility to their electors.

The Carlyles argued that the constitutionalist character of Calvin’s position was doubtful. Roy Benert, for his part, went so far as to hold that, from 1550 onward, Calvinist political literature unanimously accepted the right to resistance against kings, with the representative institutions mediating. This representation could be done by admitting that the community as a whole had the original power of resistance, by introducing the mediation of ordinary judges with authority to make sure the king’s actions are lawful, or by having a representation of nobles and other officials when it was necessary to rebel against the tyrant, depending on the case.

Walter Ullmann insisted that we should take into account the Roman juridical sources to interpret Calvin’s words about this issue. As Ullmann shows, the use of the concept
guardian – tutores in the Latin version of the passage – suggests, rather, a thesis that is opposite to the one held by those who assumed the presence of a popular or private sovereignty in Calvin. Given his legal training, the French reformer can be assumed to have known how to use the concept tutor with its proper legal meaning, as was common in medieval canonists and romanists, which had converted the magistrate into a tutor regni. This meant giving political meaning to the function of protection and of guardianship that a superior exercises over an inferior or, in Roman legal terms, that an elder holds over a younger person. With that in mind, Calvin must have been aware that, when he applied the term tutor to the inferior magistrate, he was alluding to the legal incapacity of the minor who was under his guardianship; in other words, the political incapacity of the people. Because of this, even if it is true that Calvin holds that God uses the people to elect the political authorities, their function is merely instrumental. The people accept the authority chosen by God, but they do not institute it. At the same time, the kind of government through which political authority acts does not matter at all, in Calvin’s eyes, as it depends on the circumstances and context. The only really relevant thing is that both political vocation and the transmission of power that is indispensable to it derive uniquely and exclusively from God. It is very hard, therefore, to attribute a democratic character to his doctrine.

This understanding of Calvin’s political doctrine also sheds light on what appears to be, on the surface, his changing attitude towards the right to resistance. Nijenhuis has argued that the reformer’s thought went through a considerable evolution, from the negation of all resistance to the private citizen’s right to resistance. He draws on Calvin’s Sermons on Melchizedek in particular, in which a certain power to resist is attributed to Abraham. Although the figure of Abraham is exceptional, and it is difficult to interpret the rights given to him as an individual by the Scripture as general rights, Nijenhuis affirms that Abraham’s case could be regarded as the first step in the evolution of the reformer’s thought towards private resistance. As will be shown, however, Calvin’s doctrine was not the result of an evolution, caused by circumstance, towards a belief in the right to private resistance, as Nijenhuis affirms. Instead, it reflected a theoretical-practical coherence over time, and it consistently rejected theories of popular sovereignty and resistance. This is particularly evident in Calvin’s differing reactions to two major events: the conspiracy of Amboise and the so-called affaire de Maligny.

5. The practice of resistance

The death of Henry II left his son Francis II, a 15-year-old adolescent who governed with the support of his mother, Catherine of Médici, in power. Catherine of Médici, in turn, was supported by the house of Guise, nobles who did not belong to the lineage of the princes of the blood (princes du sang) as a way to check the aspirations of Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, to the throne. During Francis’ reign, various anti-Protestant edicts were published and the Amboise conspiracy and the affaire de Maligny (the Lyon conspiracy) took place. The so-called conjuration d’Amboise (March 1560) was the answer to the problem of the minority of the king: if the king is a minor and, therefore, has not yet been legitimately established on the throne, can he delegate a power which he does not have? If the answer is negative, the next question appears right away: if the king’s ministers (the Guise) lack legitimacy – not being princes of the blood and with the king unable to
delegate a power which he does not possess – is it obligatory to obey them? The religious and the political causes come together. What made the Guise politically hateful to many was not only their illegitimacy or their solitary way of governing – disregarding the parlements – but their project to return to religious homogenization.

The Amboise conspiracy was not backed by either Antoine de Bourbon or his brother, Louis de Condé. It was guided by Jean du Barry, lord of La Renaudie, a noble from Périgord. It also was not a conspiracy encouraged by Calvin. The reformer trusted in the conversions of nobles as a motor to introduce the Reformation. For example, during 1558, Jean Macar (husband of one of Calvin’s nieces) served as the intermediary between the reformer and François de Coligny, lord of Andelot and elder brother of Gaspard de Coligny. What is more, pastors of noble origin were trained to be sent to the courts that agreed with the new ideas: François Morel, lord of Collonges, was sent to the court of the Duchess of Ferrara, where he became chaplain, and François Le Gay, lord of Boisnormand, was sent to the court of Jeanne d’Albret (Joan III of Navarre) to reinforce the queen’s commitment to the Reformation. Theodore Beza was in charge of visiting the court of Navarre on numerous occasions. Calvin was, therefore, convinced that it would be much easier for the nobles to listen to pastors from their own social background and that their conversion or sympathy would help to bring the new doctrine into their countries of origin and consolidate it peacefully. As Kingdon has said, the Amboise conspiracy represented the failure of Calvin’s project because, for the first time, the reformer lost control of the process of politicization of the French Reformation movement. The issue is also that, despite his absolute refusal to support the uprising, many of the conspirators were nobles who were refugees in Geneva and maintained contact with the aristocrats of the city during the rebellion: Ardoin de Maillane and Charles Ferré, as well as Adrien de Briquemault, lord of Villemongis, for example, lived in the city and were in daily contact with the Genevan pastors and with Calvin himself.

The Amboise conspiracy ended with 1,500 dead and the Duke of Guise (Francis I of Lorraine) appointed general lieutenant of the kingdom on 17 March 1560. This is the context of Calvin’s Sermon on Genesis, preached on 23 March 1560. Its French editor, Max Engammare, stated that it constituted a justification of armed resistance to an idolatrous tyranny. In fact, the concept monarchomachs, which Engammare introduced in the title of his article, might lead us to believe that Calvin accepted popular intervention. However, in both the Genesis text and in the letter that Calvin sent to Admiral Gaspard de Coligny in April 1561, the reformer made it clear that he refused to support any violent revolt, although he did indicate one exception: if it were led by princes of the blood (or inferior magistrates). In addition, in this specific case, he added that the nobility had to obtain the agreement of Parliament. Without these conditions, the insurrection was not justified and was an absurd spilling of blood that did not follow God’s laws:

I admitted, it is true, that if the princes of the blood demanded to be maintained in their rights for the common good, and if the Parliament joined them in their quarrel, that it would then be lawful for all good subjects to lend them armed assistance. The man afterwards asked me, if one of the princes of the blood, though not the first in rank, had decided upon taking such a step, we were not then warranted to support him. I again gave him an answer in the negative with regard to this supposition.

Nevertheless, while Calvin did not support the Amboise conspiracy because it was not headed by princes of the blood but by La Renaudie (despite the support of Adrien de
Briquemault), he did support the affaire de Maligny, as its promoter was the king of Navarre, Antoine de Bourbon. This fact explained the difference in the reformer’s attitude. It must not be forgotten that Antoine was the first prince of the blood royal and Navarre, for Calvin, was always the great hope of the French Reformation. Only he could transform a private rebellion into a public military operation with a view to the salvation of the French State. Only by assuming that the Navarrese king had agreed to lead this military missive can the active collection of funds to support the revolt among the churches in France be understood; a collection that was carried out by the reformer himself and to which he added considerable sums from his own assets.

The problem was that action was not taken promptly enough in Navarre, added to which in Lyon (Maligny), on the contrary, it was too precipitate. In addition, halting the offence once it had been started was very complicated, with more than two thousand soldiers mobilized in the city, and the result was an absolute failure: the annihilation of the rebels and prison for Louis de Borbón, prince of Condé, Antoine’s brother.

After the death of Francis II, things became even more complicated. The policy of tolerance toward the Protestant religion demonstrated by Catherine de Médici in the Edict de Janvier, 17 January 1562, was an attempt at pacification that was roundly rejected by the Duke of Guise, instigator of the first clash of the Wars of Religion, known as the massacre of Vassy (March 1, 1562), in which more than 50 Protestants died and another 100 were wounded while they worshipped. After the massacre of Vassy, Antoine de Boubon decided to cast his fate with the Catholic side, although no one really knows what his intention was when he made this decision. What is known is the following: 10 years of religious wars ended in the massacre of the Night of Saint Bartholomew in 1572, which symbolized the brutality of the persecutions.

There is no doubt that these wars and the religious persecution of Protestants by the French Crown are what explain the turning point in the Calvinian doctrine of resistance after the reformer’s death in 1564. From that time onward, the political doctrine of the French Protestants was not the same, and the theory of popular power changed considerably the theory of resistance held by Calvin until then. However, the fact that they are different doctrines does not mean that they were not at all influenced by the French reformer. The evolution of ideas does not preserve them intact, but modifies, and even inverts, them. This was necessary, given that Theodore Beza, François Hotman, and Duplessis Mornay had to respond to the problems of their time, which were different from the ones that Calvin had faced.

6. Conclusion

As we have shown throughout this article, it is impossible to link Calvin’s political theology to theories of democracy. Calvinist doctrine and Calvin’s political action have to be analyzed together if we want to recover, at least partially, the intention of the reformer. The aim has been to relate Calvin’s texts to his politico-ecclesiastical practice in Geneva. His fundamental theology finds immediate application in the practice of resistance. This affirmation only makes sense, however, when linking his doctrinal affirmations with events the reformer was directly involved in. The analysis of the conditions in which the Amboise conspiracy developed clarifies the reasons for Calvin’s rejection of resistance, which are no more than that they were not headed by princes of the blood. In the same
way, when the way the *affaire de Maligny* plays out, we see that members of the French Crown are implicated in the plot, which explains why the reformer lends his support to the revolt, as proven by his correspondence. The importance of his role in these events, on the other hand, can only be understood if we think of the enormous influence that the reformer had on Geneva and France through his pastoral care. Calvin’s authority was enormous in Geneva, not only because of his role as a moral and ecclesiastical judge but also as a result of his role in drafting the civil legislation of the city. Calvin’s theoretical proposals, which do not include a belief in popular sovereignty or a popular right of resistance, cannot be understood if these contextual elements are ignored.

**Notes**

1. As Georges Goyau responded, however, what was under discussion was not only the political inspiration of doctrine but also who was responsible for interpreting scripture. Goyau, *Une ville-église: Genève*, vol. 1, 46.
3. For Robert Kingdon, however, it was the analogy between the ecclesiastical model and the political model, developed by Theodore Beza and Jean Morely, that inspired the origins of democratic Calvinian doctrines. See Kingdon, “Calvinism and Democracy: Some Political Implications of Debates on French Reformed Church Government, 1562–1572”; Kingdon and Linder, *Calvin and Calvinism: Sources of Democracy*?
5. However, this retrospective reading of Calvin by his ideological heirs leaves important questions unanswered. For example, why restrict the analysis of the reformer’s political doctrine to the *Institutes*, if it quantitatively does not represent more than a small portion of his written work? Likewise, how do we respond to questions of the political importance in the work of an author without attempting to articulate the coherence between their doctrines and their public actions? In his work, Hancock does not respond to the role that the princes of royal blood play in the armed revolts or mention what type of magistrates are legitimated to propose a change of government. Hancock’s proposal has been severely criticized, as much for ignoring completely Calvin’s political action in Geneva as for its interpretation of doctrinal questions, e.g. those of moral autonomy: Kingdon, *The Journal of Modern History*. See also: Donnelly, *The American Historical Review*; Pavlischek, *Sixteenth Century Journal*.
6. This is not the proper place to refer to Calvin’s ecclesiology, but the reader should keep in mind that his political thinking can only be understood in a more general dogmatic and ecclesiological context. Regarding ecclesiastical law, see: García-Alonso, “Calvin and the Ecclesiastical Power of Jurisdiction”.
7. Among the authors who defend this interpretation of Calvin are Höpfl, *The Christian Polity of John Calvin*, and Chenevière, *La pensée politique de Calvin*.
8. The Council ordered 1,500 copies of the *Confession* to be distributed throughout the city so that the people could become familiar with its contents. *Confession de la foi* (CO 22, 85–96). CO sent to Calvin, *Joannes Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia* (CO).
9. Cf. Section 17 of the *Confession* (*Confession de la foi*: CO 22, 92).
10. Cf. Section 19 of the *Confession* (*Confession de la foi*: CO 22, 93).
11. Article 4 (CO 10, 13–14). From his sojourn in Basel, his refuge after fleeing France, his native country, he had learned both the need to implant ecclesiastical discipline (including
excommunication) and the inappropriateness of allowing the political power to assume these functions. According to Kuhr, both doctrines appear in the theology of the Basel Reformer Johannes Oecolampadius (1482–1531). See Kuhr, “Calvin and Basel: The significance of Oecolampadius and the Basel Discipline Ordinance for the Institution of Ecclesiastical Discipline in Geneva”.


13. Unlike Luther, for whom the only ecclesiastical powers were the authority to preach and teach, Calvin not only acknowledges the magisterial and sacramental powers of the church but also considers a jurisdictional power (jurisdictio fori) with legislative and judicial capability. This jurisdictional dimension is the key to explaining the role played by the Calvinist church vis-a-vis the State and its differences with respect to other Protestant creeds.

14. Sadoleto’s letter is dated 18 March 1539, and titled Ad senatu populumque genevensem. Calvin’s response was published in Strasbourg in September of that same year. A recent edition of Calvin’s letter: (Calvin 1995) See Millet, Oeuvres choisies. An analysis of the controversy can be read in Cadier “Sadolet et Calvin”.

15. The pastors of Zurich insisted on reminding Calvin of Geneva’s strategic importance for the Reformed faith given its location between Germany, France, and Italy, (CO 11, 86–188: letter dated 4 April 1541).

16. The initial draft of the text of the 1541 Ordonnances ecclésiastiques can be found in the complete works of the reformer (CO 10, 15–30). This is the edition promulgated by the magistracy and that included additions to Calvin’s project that were meant to guarantee the primacy of the civil power in matters of discipline. This edition, altered by the magistracy, can be read in Calvin, Calvin, homme d’Église, 27–46. Similarly: http://www.regard.eu.org/Livres.5/Calvin.homme.d.Eglise/00.Table.php (last access on February 2018). However, the magistracy added an article to Calvin’s original project that insisted on reducing ecclesiastical jurisdiction to preaching the gospel. This article was not included in Calvin’s original project and was added in its entirety by the magistrates to the official text (Ordonnances ecclésiastiques in Calvin, Calvin, homme d’Église, 45).


18. Regarding the importance and consequences of the admission of the French into the bourgeoisie, cf. Naphy, Genevan Reformation, 121 and ff. Regarding the negative image that Genevans had of the French, see Lambert, Preaching, Praying and Policing, 495 and ff.

19. Any man who had been excommunicated could not be a godfather at a baptism, and that involved an enormous difficulty on social relations among families in the sixteenth century (cf. Lambert, Preaching, Praying and Policing, 260–1). Also, the ministers hold extreme social control over the children, to the point that the parents of the newborns had to give biblical names to their children, under threat of excommunication, despite the fact that, previously, autochthonous names, related to the Catholic tradition and the list of saint’s feast days, had predominated there. Clearly, this measure could not be pleasing to Genevan citizens, who saw their ancestral onomastic family links disappear as a result of the measures adopted by the pastors. Regarding the problem between the magistracy and the pastors about the imposition of biblical names, cf. Naphy, Calvin and the Consolidation of the Genevan Reformation, 144 and ff.

20. This fact is widely acknowledged by historians: Lambert, Preaching, Praying and Policing, 495; Naphy, Genevan Reformation, 43; Monter Calvin’s Geneva, 70.

21. According to Kingdon, civil interrogation was an inquisitorial process based on insistence and the repetition of questions about the case, not on a comparison of the reasonings of the accused and representatives of the community, in the style of the English courts: Kingdon, Adultery and Divorce in Calvin’s Geneva, 22 and ff.


25. IRC IV 20, 6–7; IRC IV 20, 9. IRC: *Institution de la religion chrétienne*. The critical English edition of Calvin’s *Institutes*, in *John Calvin Collection*, has been used. Book, chapter, and paragraph will be cited. These concepts also are included in Sermon 2 on Samuel and the Commentary on Isaiah: Pellerin, “Calvin: Militant or Man of Peace?”, 55–6. The same expressions are used by Luther: the magistrate is called the deputy of God, while his function is described as divine, father of the community, image and figure of Christ’s authority, pious jurist: cf. Witte, *Law and Protestantism*, 111 and ff.

26. IRC IV 20, 6.

27. The critical English edition of Battles and Hugo, *Calvin’s Commentary on Seneca’s De Clementia* in the *John Calvin Collection* has been used. Regarding Seneca: Stacey, *Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince*; Griffin, *Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics*.


29. “Therefore, the prince should consider that he has received his administration of the people from the gods, and is sometime to render an account thereof to them” (Calvin’s Commentary on Seneca’s De Clementia, I, 1.4, 28).

30. “As for example, kings, emperors, dynasts, tetrarchs, marquises, satraps; or in our own time, emperors, kings, dukes, barons, counts, viscounts; and among free peoples, consuls, praetors, dictators, censors, and the like” (Calvin’s Commentary on Seneca’s De Clementia I, 4.3 67).

31. See Backus, “Calvin’s Concept of Natural and Roman Law”; Bohatec, *Calvin und das Recht*, 128–9. Evidently, this is not a novel contribution by Calvin, as the concept of fairness is shared by the entire Western legal tradition, although with differences and degrees in its application and interpretation.

32. IRC II, 2, 24; IRC II, 3, 5. In this sense, Fuchs defines Calvinist ethics as *biblical ethics*: Fuchs, *La morale selon Calvin*, 113.

33. Calvin affirms our incapacity to know and want what is morally good, as expressed by natural law. Such incapacity is compensated by the biblical mandates that, according to Calvin, should be incorporated into the positive legislation of Christian republics. However, even if we agree that natural law mainly fulfills this function in Calvin’s theology, we also believe that Calvin gives it a positive role, even if it affects non-Christians exclusively. See García-Alonso, “Biblical Law as the Source of Morality in Calvin”.

34. IRC II, 8, 11.

35. If one concedes, as Ralph Hancock does, that the practical program of the *Institution* is based on the impossibility of wanting and knowing what is good, Calvin can only be described as modern if we dissociate modernity from the claim that the subject can govern himself rationally “in virtue of his own goodness.” See Hancock, *Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics*, 108.

36. I am grateful to J. Coleman for correcting my assessment of the continuity between Calvin and the Franciscan theological tradition (namely Ockham) in this particular respect: for further details about this latter, see her “Using, Not Owning- Duties, Not Rights: The Consequences of Some Franciscan Perspectives on Politics”, 65–84.

37. This insistence is palpable in his *Sermons sur le V livre de Moyse nommé Deutéronome*, some 200 sermons given by Calvin from Wednesday, 20 March 1555 to Wednesday, 15 July 1556, which fill five volumes of his complete works (CO 25–29). Despite being directed toward the Genevan public and not toward scholars, they constitute, in a way, a short theological treatise on legislation according to Jean Carbonnier: Carbonnier, “Droit et théologie chez Calvin”. Also, Pitkin “Calvin’s Mosaic Harmony: Biblical Exegesis and Early Modern Legal History”.

38. IRC IV, 20, 16.

39. Calvin denied the literal interpretation of the Bible (IRC IV, 20, 14), which does not mean that the Bible cannot be taken as a political document in which to find inspiration. In this
sense, Craig analyzes the *Geneva Bible* and the notes in the margins that authors such as Knox, Goodman, and Gilby made on issues such as obedience or the role of women in government, referring to the regimes of Queen Mary Tudor and Elizabeth: Craig, “The Geneva Bible as a Political Document”.


41. Letter to M. de Falais: October 14, 1543 (CO 11, 628–31) and letter to Mme de Falais: October 14, 1543 (CO 11, 631–32).

42. See his letter to a French dignitary (perhaps Charles de Jonvillers): 18 October 1548 (CO 13, 61–3).

43. IRC IV 20, 2. It is noteworthy that this paragraph, in which Calvin attributes the functions of defender of God and his Church to the magistrate, does not appear in the 1545 IRC, but was added in the 1559 *Institution*, once Calvinian doctrine and the reformer’s ecclesiological model were a reality in Geneva.


45. Cf. IRC IV, 20, 6 and 10.

46. According to John Witte, the goals of ecclesiastical discipline could have inspired the organization of the Anglo-Saxon public penal law. Under the assumption that legal systems should have a moral foundation, the goal of penal law will be to punish any breach in the shared values of a society. Through penal law, the State, in defense of such shared values, will accomplish prevention, retribution, and rehabilitation. According to Witte, these three guiding principles of modern penal law in Anglo-Saxon countries would originate in the Calvinist uses of moral law (civil, theological, and pedagogic). Cf. Witte “The Three Uses of the Law: a Protestant Source of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment?”, 464–5.


49. With William of Ockham (*Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico*) and Marsilius of Padua (*Defensor Pacis*), Calvin is also a precursor of the Weberian thesis according to which the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force belongs to the State: Weber, *The Profession and Vocation of Politics in Weber*, 310.

50. IRC IV, 20, 22.

51. Regarding the forth commandment: IRC II, 8, 36.

52. IRC IV, 20, 22.

53. IRC IV 20, 23.

54. IRC IV, 20, 27, 28 y 29.

55. IRC IV 20, 29.

56. IRC IV, 20, 32.

57. IRC IV, 20, 7. This exegesis is also followed by Theodore Beza: Vaillancourt, “Le recours à la Bible: les versets tyranniques au XVVe siècle”.

58. IRC IV 20, 31.


61. A full exposition of this discussion can be found in Onory, *Fonti canonistiche dell’idea moderna dello stato*, 61 and ff.

62. A similar point of view on Calvin’s thesis can be found in McNeill, “The Democratic Element in Calvin’s Thought”. Also, Strohl, “Le droit à la résistance d’après les conceptions protestantes”.

63. Carlyle, *History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, vol. 6, 266.


66. Calvin studied Roman and possibly canon law in Orléans and Bourges. For an evaluation of this formation, see Monheit, “Guillaume Budé, Andrea Alciato, Pierre De L’Estoile: Renaissance Interpreters of Roman Law”; also, Monheit, “Young Calvin, Textual Interpretation and Roman Law”.


68. IRC IV 20, 8.

69. Ibid. 74.

70. See NiJenhuys, “The Limits of Civil Disobedience in Calvin’s Last Known Sermons: Development of his Ideas on the Right of Civil Resistance”, 84 ff.

71. The power of the Guise in the French court stemmed from Francis II’s marriage to Mary Stuart, niece of the Guise. Through this marriage, the Guise became uncles of the young king and, after his death, lost their influence.


74. This is the Sermon on Genesis included in this volume. Regarding its interpretation, see: Engammare, “Calvin monarchomaque?”.

75. In this letter, Calvin was defending himself against accusations that he had in fact supported the conspiracy. I want to thank Karin Maag for this comment.


77. As can be seen in the letter in Latin that Calvin wrote to Beza on 10 September 1560 (CO 18, 177–180, Num. 3243). A complete reconstruction of this correspondence between Calvin and Beza and its context can be read in Dufour, “L’affaire de Maligny”.

78. Later freed, Condé led the Protestant troops in the first religious war of 1562. It is because he was its leader, as a prince of the blood royal, that Kingdon considers this war to have been accepted by the group of reformed Protestants and accepted without reservation by Calvin (Cf. Kingdon, *Geneva and the Coming of the Wars*, 69). Also, Kingdon, “Calvin’s Socio-Political Legacy: Collective Government, Resistance to Tyranny, Discipline”, 199 ff. Similarly, Dufour, “Le mythe de Genève au temps de Calvin”, 506–7. In the same sense, Turchetti, *Tyrannie et tyrannicide*, 409–15.

79. The religious wars lasted 36 years (1559–1598), but they worsened after the Saint Bartholomew massacre. Regarding this massacre, see Jouanna, *La Saint-Barthélemy*.

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