

Fregean versus Kripkean Reference*

Manuel García-Carpintero

RESUMEN

El millianismo es la tesis de que los nombres propios, desde un punto de vista semántico, se limitan a referir: no desempeñan ninguna otra función semánticamente importante. El caso de los indécicos hace patente que la mayoría de las consideraciones en *Naming and Necessity* que los lectores encuentran convincentes son compatibles con la falsedad del millianismo. Además, existen buenas razones para considerar esa tesis falsa. Los millianos aceptan la existencia de información descriptiva asociada con los nombres propios, más allá del referente, de algún modo semánticamente significativa. Defienden su tesis, sin embargo, elaborando una distinción entre propiedades de las expresiones semánticamente relevantes, y propiedades meramente “metasemánticas” que una explicación genuinamente semántica no debe tomar en consideración. En este trabajo examino estas propuestas y doy razones para incluir propiedades de los nombres propios distintas de sus referentes entre aquellas que una teoría genuinamente semántica debe incorporar. Argumento también que mi propuesta es compatible con las ideas centrales de *Naming and Necessity*, indicando que la tesis más importante de esa obra impresionante no es el millianismo, sino una cierta forma de externismo.

ABSTRACT:

Millianism is the view that, from a semantical viewpoint, proper names simply refer; there is no further semantically relevant function they play. As the case of indexicals makes very clear, most of the considerations in *Naming and Necessity* that people find plausible are compatible with the falsity of Millianism. Besides, there are good reasons to consider that thesis false. Millians grant that, over and above the referent, there is descriptive information associated with proper names which is, somehow, semantically significant. Nevertheless, they argue for their views by elaborating a distinction between properties of expressions which are relevant in a truly semantic sense, and features which are merely “metasemantical” and should not be taken into account in a genuinely semantic account. In this paper I take up these proposals, giving reasons to incorporate semantic features associated with proper names over and above their referent in any (genuine) semantic account of natural language. I also argue that my proposal is compatible with the main points made in *Naming and Necessity*, by contending that not Millianism but externalism was the claim most forcefully argued for in that impressive piece of work.

I. A SUSPICIOUS MILLIAN EXEGESIS OF *NAMING AND NECESSITY*

This paper follows a recent hermeneutical trend. It aims to state clearly a thesis about the reference of proper names convincingly argued for in Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* ('*N&N*' henceforth). Perhaps because I believe it correct, and rich in philosophical implications, I regard it as the *main* thesis on the reference of proper names to be found in *N&N*; but this is to a certain extent a matter of personal taste. Analogous theses might be stated for indexicals and some general terms (and analogous arguments might be elaborated for them out of material in *N&N*), so as to obtain a general claim about reference; but only proper names will be discussed here. I intend to pursue my goal by contrasting the exegesis I favour with an alternative one presented in some of those writings establishing the trend I just mentioned. This alternative I find both interesting (biasedly serving a programme in the theory of reference, Millianism, which I believe to be wrong) and in any case flawed as an exegesis.

A convenient route to offering an initial presentation of the two contrasting approaches to the main proposals on the reference of proper names in *N&N* departs from a distinction made in Martí (1995). There she distinguishes two different theoretical strands which, according to her, are confusedly interwoven as part of what people take to be the new views on reference adumbrated by philosophers like Donnellan, Kaplan, Kripke, Perry, Putnam and others. The first strand "is an intuition about *truth makers*, about what it is that is provided by the semantics of a term in the determination of the conditions for truth" [Martí (1995), p. 278]. The proposal in this vein which she takes to be characteristic of new theories of reference has it that the "truth maker" contributed by a genuinely referential expression to the "proposition" which encapsulates the truth conditions of any utterance where it occurs is an object. She calls this claim 'Direct Reference'. The rejected Fregean view would hold, according to her, that the propositional constituent is instead a "qualitative profile" constituting the sense of the term: "The key disagreement between the Fregean and the proponent of Direct Reference revolves around whether terms can contribute objects in the world of reference as truth makers, for the Fregean answer to that question is a rotund no: it is the senses that determine the referent of an expression, and not the referent itself, that shape the conditions for truth or falsity" [*Ibid.*]. The second strand is *Millianism*; now the nature of genuine reference does not have to do with "what determines truth or falsity", but with "the type of connection between term and referent": "a genuinely referential device is one that is used as a pure stand-in for a thing. [...] If meaning is conceived as some mechanism or procedure connecting expression to object, some descriptive

rule or content semantically associated with an expression that determines the systematic connection between linguistic item and object, by virtue of the object's satisfaction of certain conditions, a genuinely referential term is associated with no such thing. The semantic life of a genuinely referential device hangs on its referring to something; genuinely referential terms are *ad hoc* marks" [*Ibid.*, p. 280].

Martí's description of Millianism is analogous to Kripke's: "According to Mill, a proper name is, so to speak, *simply* a name. It *simply* refers to its bearer, and has no other linguistic function. In particular, unlike a definite description, a name does not describe its bearer as possessing any special identifying properties [...] it *simply* refers to its bearer, and has no other linguistic function" [Kripke (1979), pp. 239-240]. This is a view towards which Kripke's writings appear to be clearly sympathetic, although it is not (as far as I can tell) explicitly endorsed by him. On the other hand, Martí's *Direct Reference* seems to be closely related to the thesis that Kaplan's calls by the same name, both in his classic Kaplan (1989) and in his attempt at sorting out these very same issues in the first section of Kaplan (1989a). Martí's "truth makers" would then correspond to Kaplan's sentential "contents", or "what is said" in uttering a sentence in a given context. The main idea captured in both notions seems to be that of the contribution of an expression occurring in a sentence (in context) to the determination of the conditions for the truth of the utterance across possible worlds ("possible worlds truth conditions", henceforth). Direct Reference is thus essentially, in Kripke's terms, the thesis that genuine referential expressions are "*de iure*" rigid designators [see Kripke (1980), p. 21].

According to these taxonomies, new theorists of reference would claim that Direct Reference applies to indexicals and proper names, and Millianism applies to the latter expressions (but not to the former); Fregeans would reject both theses. Now, the exegesis of *N&N* that I find both interested and flawed is very much in harmony with this taxonomy of the views on reference under dispute. This exegesis is very clearly presented in Stalnaker (1997), although I find that essentially the same point is made in the already mentioned first section of Kaplan (1989a). The idea, in a nutshell, is this. Fregeans have traded on the intuitively correct point that there is some explanation for why a given proper name refers to a given individual, and that this explanation belongs to "linguistics" (semantic branch). However, this intuition, as developed by Fregean theorists, involves a confusion of two different types of linguistic explanations. Kaplan classifies them, respectively, as explanations answering to "semantic" and "metasemantic" issues. Stalnaker, for what I take to be corresponding ideas, distinguishes between explanations answering "descriptive questions" and explanations answering "foundational

questions”. The former are explanations attempting to provide a compositional account of how the possible worlds truth conditions of sentences (in context) are determined out of the contributions of their relevant parts and the way they are put together: “A descriptive semantic theory is a theory that says what the semantics for the language is without saying what it is about the practice of using that language that explains why that semantics is the right one. A descriptive-semantic theory assigns *semantic values* to the expressions of the language, and explains how the semantic values of the complex expressions are a function of the semantic values of their parts” [*op. cit.*, p. 535]. Foundational theories, on the other hand, answer questions “about what the facts are that give expressions their semantic values, or more generally, about what makes it the case that the language spoken by a particular individual or community has a particular descriptive semantics” [*ibid.*].

According to Stalnaker’s exegesis, the main contribution in *N&N* concerning the reference of proper names does not lie in the specific answers its author provides for those questions: Millianism and Direct Reference for descriptive questions, and the causal theory for the foundational question. Kripke’s real contribution lies in developing a framework in which the questions are carefully separated: “[Kripke’s] most important philosophical accomplishment is in the way he posed and clarified the questions, and not in the particular answers that he gave to them. I will suggest that we might buy Kripke’s philosophical insights while rejecting all of the theses” [*op. cit.*, p. 537]. Stalnaker’s exegesis has thus a deflationary flavour; contrary to what is usually thought, “Kripke’s theses about proper names and reference do not presuppose any metaphysical theses that ought to be controversial” [*op. cit.*, p. 534].

Now, as several writers have pointed out (see, for instance, Evans (1982), pp. 60-63), there is a fundamental difficulty with the taxonomy on which this exegesis is based. The problem derives from the fact that there does not seem to be anything fundamentally incompatible between Direct Reference and the core Fregean views. A first, rather obvious indication of the difficulty is the following. In his formulation of the descriptive question, Stalnaker resorts to a *single* notion, that of the *semantic value* of a singular term. He characterizes the concept in this way: “The term “semantic value”, as I am using it, is a general and neutral term for whatever it is that a semantic theory associates with the expressions of the language it interprets: the things that, according to the semantics, provide the interpretations of simple expressions, and are the arguments and values of the functions defined by the compositional rules that interpret complex expressions” [*op. cit.*, p. 535]. The Fregean, however, appears to contend that the “semantic value” of singular terms (the contributions they make to the truth-conditional import of

the whole) may differ, depending on whether or not they appear inside or outside an “indirect context”. Stalnaker’s characterization of the Fregean answer to the descriptive question is that “the semantic value of a name is its sense, which is a concept that applies to at most one individual in each possible world (the kind of concept that might be expressed by a definite description)” [*op. cit.*, p. 541]. This, like Martí’s description of the view that the Fregean opposes, according to her, to Direct Reference, implies that in Stalnaker’s view Fregean senses are the Fregean semantic values for singular terms in *ordinary (non-indirect) contexts*. The immediate problem that this creates is to find a different Fregean “semantic value” for indirect occurrences of singular terms, or to argue away the appearance that one is needed to fairly capture the complexity of Fregean views.

In brief, the Fregean may be seen as unequivocally addressing only *descriptive* issues, while insisting that *two* different (but related) “semantic values” should be ascribed to singular terms: both a “general profile”, the sense, and an individual, the referent. Two reasons would be adduced for this, a more superficial one (senses are needed as ingredients of the conditions for the truth of sentences including “indirect context”), and a deeper one (what is semantically meant is what would be understood by a competent speaker, and senses are required to account for the understanding competent speakers have even of simple sentences).

A thorough examination of this line of argument conducted in the light of Gottlob Frege’s writings would require a much longer paper than this can be. What would make such an enterprise problematic springs from the fact that Stalnaker’s “semantic values” (like Kaplan’s “contents”, and Martí’s “truth-makers” and their ingredients) are theoretical terms closely tied to an idea which does not play, in Frege’s consideration (explicitly at least), the role it undoubtedly deserves, namely, that of the possible worlds truth conditions of utterances. However, contemporary writers who defend views which on the face of it merit being considered Fregean, like Michael Dummett, John Searle, and the already mentioned Gareth Evans, have persuasively argued that Fregean theories can be formulated so that they can agree on the predictions about possible world truth conditions constitutive of Direct Reference. (See, in addition to the previous reference to Evans’s work, Dummett (1973), pp. 110-151, and Dummett (1981), pp. 557-600; also, ch. 8 in Searle (1983).) Fregean views, therefore, can be framed so that they too subscribe Direct Reference. The behaviour of indexicals and referentially used descriptions (another range of expressions that satisfy Direct Reference, as new theorists of reference have argued) should in any case have made this obvious. They show clearly that some singular terms may well be such that a theoretical account answering *descriptive* questions should assign them *two*

sorts of semantic properties, while on the other hand they behave so as to satisfy Direct Reference.

This helps explain why I characterize the Stalnaker-Kaplan exegesis (and taxonomies like Martí's) as interested. For Direct Reference is a claim that seems to be confirmed by the semantic intuitions on which any semantic theory answering "descriptive" concerns empirically relies. However, matters are altogether different regarding Millianism. Even if we concede to Kripke, as we should, that the usual suggestions by Fregeans regarding the senses of proper names cannot be correct, Millianism still counts with little, if any, intuitive support. Now, by linking Millianism to Direct Reference, Millians are making matters too easy for themselves. For there appears to be no easy argument from Direct Reference to Millianism, as the apparent compatibility of Direct Reference with Fregean views seems to show. By effecting that linkage, they give a spurious force to a very controversial doctrine.

The reason why the exegesis is in addition flawed is not that no support for it can be found in *N&N*. I have already said that Kripke's work is at least sympathetic to Millianism; besides, Kripke's distinction between "meaning-giving" and "reference-fixing" descriptive material can be seen as anticipating the views I am challenging. It is flawed because, even when we grant to Fregeans like Searle and Dummett that their views are compatible with Direct Reference, there is still something characteristically Fregean in their views which *N&N* seems, if not to refute, at least to make deeply problematic; we would miss this real source of philosophical trouble made salient in *N&N* if we concentrated on the spurious issue of Millianism. This is, essentially, an internalism about content which is a natural concomitant of an antirealist metaphysics. In missing this, the exegesis I am disputing puts in jeopardy a proper appraisal of the true merits of *N&N*'s proposals on reference. Moreover, and also contrary to the tenor of Stalnaker's exegesis, those Kripkean proposals depend on deeper metaphysical presuppositions than his deflationary interpretation suggests. Kripkean Reference, the thesis in my view really contraposed in *N&N* to Fregean Reference as understood by writers like Searle and Dummett (and Frege too, as I read him), is a thesis that rejects the following contentions by Dummett, which I take to be a constitutive part of Fregean Reference: "reference is not part of the meaning — it is not part of whatever is known by anyone who understands the expression" [Dummett (1991), pp. 123]. "Reference, as Frege understands it, is not an ingredient in meaning at all: someone who does not know the reference of an expression does not show thereby that he does not understand, or only partially understands, the expression" [Dummett (1973), pp. 84]. Kripkean Reference is on the other hand compatible with anti-Millianism and thus independent from Millianism (even if arguments for both Kripkean Reference

and Millianism can be found in *N&N*). It is compatible with, and indeed close to, the neo-Fregean views of Evans and McDowell.

To give a justification for my own exegesis of *N&N* and the rejection of those I have so far considered with some chances of being convincing, I will outline in the following section a view of reference which shares important aspects with neo-Fregean accounts, and I will offer some reasons for it and against Millianism. Then, in the last section I will spell out in more detail the claims that I take Kripkean Reference and Fregean Reference to be. Let me insist that my purpose is merely exegetic; I do not intend to give arguments for Kripkean Reference in the course of this paper, for then it would outstretch reasonable limits.

II. OUTLINE OF AN ANTI-MILLIAN VIEW

I will start by summarizing a form of argument for the nonnegotiable Fregean views which will give a concrete focus to my discussion. The traditional Fregean argument starts from intuitively plausible assumptions about the significations (a better translation of ‘Bedeutung’ suggested by Kurt Gödel, which I will use hereinafter, alternating it with the more traditional ‘reference’) of certain singular terms as they appear in *ordinary* sentences. It starts from the assumption that, when identity-claims involving two referential expressions are true, their significations are the same. (In agreement with Frege’s Context Principle, the signification of a term is to be understood as that entity, semantically associated with the term, relative to which the truth-value of utterances including the term is determined.) The argument then goes on to advocate attributing to referential expressions a further semantic property, involved in the determination of their significations, on the basis that competent speakers may take different cognitive attitudes to utterances differing only in referential expressions with the same signification. Only after the distinction between sense and reference has allegedly been thus established, is it used to argue about the reference of singular terms in non-ordinary contexts, particularly “indirect” ones.

Heck (1995) offers an interesting variation on this traditional Fregean argument, going in the opposite direction. Heck argues against what he calls “hybrid views”, which strive to combine a Millian account of the behaviour of proper names in ordinary contexts with a theory along the lines of what Schiffer has called in Schiffer (1992) “the hidden indexical” view of their behaviour inside indirect contexts. Given the Millian line taken in exegeses like the ones I am disputing — that in the case of proper names differences in cognitive significance have to be accounted for at the level of “founda-

tional” or “metasemantical” explanations but not (as required by Millianism) at that of descriptive, semantical explanations — Heck’s argument can be persuasively deployed to engender doubts in those who are persuaded by Kripke’s arguments for Millianism, but who are less convinced by his considerations in Kripke (1979) to acquit Millianism of the main responsibility regarding counterintuitive consequences for attitude-ascriptions.

“Hidden indexical” theories, which I take to be on the right track, claim that there is a hidden form of context-dependence in indirect discourse, so that an expression inside an indirect context can help contribute different entities to the truth-conditions of the whole utterance: its ordinary referent, a property of modes of presentation, or a specific mode of presentation. Different theorists explain the context dependence involved here in different ways: Richard (1990) postulates an index attached to the verb governing the indirect context, Crimmins and Perry (1989) posit a non-verbalized referential constituent, and a Sellarsian tradition — developed in Boër and Lycan (1986) — contemplates a peculiar form of quotation in that-clauses. I myself favour the latter version, but this is of no concern for present purposes. These views are not strictly speaking Fregean: Frege contended in effect that singular terms inside indirect contexts refer only to their senses, which are different from what they refer to in ordinary contexts; while the views in question claim that they can manage both to refer to what they ordinarily refer to, and to help contribute a reference to their senses, or properties thereof. In fact, it will become clear in the next section that while “hidden-indexical” views of attitude-ascriptions are natural, given the form of Fregeanism which subscribes to Kripkean reference advocated here, they are deeply incompatible with traditional Fregean views. These accounts of indirect contexts are Fregean only in a weaker sense, insofar as they posit senses, or epistemic values, as (somehow) contributed by expressions inside those contexts.

Heck claims in effect that hybrid views are inconsistent. As I understand it, the argument runs as follows. According to hybrid views, the *beliefs* attributed by placing ‘Hesperus is a planet’ and ‘Phosphorus is a planet’ inside an indirect context may differ, so that one attribution can be *literally* true while the other is *literally* false. This difference cannot depend on the states of affairs which are the truth-makers of the attributed beliefs — on the “Russellian propositions” that new theorists of reference would associate to those sentences to capture the directly referential behaviour of genuinely referential expressions — because they are one and the same. It has to depend only on differences related to some epistemic values somehow associated (in the context of the utterances) with the singular terms¹. These differences point towards differences in the *justification* which believers might be expected to provide for their beliefs about the obtaining of those states of af-

fairs, which are thought to contribute to the individuation of each belief's content. They might be justified, for instance, in believing a state of affairs to obtain which is constituted by Venus and planethood if the belief's content is such that the first constituent is presented under the mode of presentation suggested by 'Phosphorus', while the thinkers would not be justified in believing the same condition to obtain if their belief reached Venus under the mode of presentation suggested by 'Hesperus'.

Now, although not every act of meaning has this property, there are *literal* acts of meaning (reports, assertions, etc.) made with utterances of ordinary sentences like 'Hesperus is a planet' and 'Phosphorus is a planet' whose conventional point is the transmission of belief; that is to say, their point is that the audience, on the basis of the utterance and through the proper rational mechanism, forms a judgment he had not previously formed: that he judges the propositional content asserted in uttering those sentences². The conventional point of these acts is not however *just* that the audience forms a true belief; for that, it would be enough if the act secures that he forms a belief representing the state of affairs whose obtaining in the world the speaker purported to assert. Their point is rather that the audience forms a *justified* belief: a belief justified on the basis that he has obtained it from someone who already had a justified belief with that same content. This conventional purpose might not be achieved even if, on the basis of the utterance, the audience forms a belief representing the same condition.

Heck illustrates this by means of an example. I quote:

Suppose Eric Blair were to become amnesiac and check himself into a hospital. The doctor, Tony, deciding that she needs to have *some* name by which to call him, dubs him "George Orwell". And suppose further that Alex says — *not* intending to refer to Tony's patient — "George Orwell wrote *1984*" and that Tony forms, in reaction to Alex's assertion, the belief she would express to other members of her staff as "George Orwell wrote *1984*". This belief is true: Tony's new patient happens to be Eric Blair, that is, "the other" George Orwell. But surely it would not count as knowledge, even if Alex knows that George Orwell wrote *1984*: it would not even count as justified [Heck (1985), p. 95].

A crucial felicity condition for the transmission of *justified* belief seems thus to involve, on the part of the audience, not just identification of the truth-condition that the speaker intends to assert, but also of the sort of epistemic access to it which the speaker presents himself as having in uttering this form of words. And, insofar as the beliefs attributed by putting 'Hesperus is a planet' and 'Phosphorus is a planet' inside indirect contexts are different, this requires taking into consideration the epistemic value of

the relevant expressions. There need not have been communication (transmission of justified belief) when I am induced to form the judgement that I would express with ‘Phosphorus is a planet’ on the basis of someone’s utterance of ‘Hesperus is a planet’. In cases such as the one described, communication requires what for the Fregean properly counts as knowledge of reference: not only identifying the referent, but identifying it through the epistemic value by means of which the speaker presents it. Therefore, to the extent that the contents of the beliefs attributed by placing ‘Hesperus is a planet’ and ‘Phosphorus is a planet’ inside an indirect context differ — not in the represented states of affairs, but in aspects related to the way the ascribed beliefs are supposed to be justified — the preceding considerations give us reasons to conclude that the propositional contents asserted in reports made with those very same ordinary sentences differ too, in aspects having to do with the epistemic values of the singular terms.

This quick summary cannot do justice to Heck’s rich argument, but I trust that it captures its core. The intended conclusion is the inconsistency of “hybrid views”, which combine the hidden indexical theory of attitude-reports with a Millian account of proper names. According to them, (*) ‘Cicero was bald’ and (#) ‘Tully was bald’ have the same linguistic meaning and express the same proposition (this follows from Millianism), but ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ can help make different contributions to belief-ascriptions, so that ‘S believes that Cicero was bald’ and ‘S believes that Tully was bald’ may have different truth-values (this follows from the “hidden-indexical” view of attitude-ascriptions). Thus, the beliefs which (*) and (#) help to attribute differ. Moreover, the difference in these beliefs is of consequence for epistemic appraisal; the difference is such that S may be justified in the belief we attribute to him with (*), while, with the same epistemic basis, he might not be justified were he to hold the belief we attribute with (#). Now, the conventional point of some speech acts is precisely the transmission of knowledge, or justified belief. It follows from this, always assuming the hidden-indexical view, that communication might not be achieved if the speaker says ‘Cicero is bald’ while the hearer takes him to have uttered, and accepts as a result, ‘Tully is bald’. Therefore, semantic theory itself (theories answering *descriptive* questions) has to attribute different semantic properties to (*) and (#); for semantic theory is concerned with that which is the conventional point of expressions to mean. And this is inconsistent with Millianism.

Notice that, as we are presenting his views, the anti-Millian accepts that, of course, a competent speaker must know the reference of any singular term he uses correctly. His point is that such a competent speaker must necessarily know *also* the term’s sense, and so he must think of the referent in a

specific way. There is a nice way of putting this, and it is, in fact, Dummett's (see Dummett (1975), p. 123-126, and Dummett (1978), pp. 124-132). The anti-Millian accepts that a speaker S who uses 'Hesperus' would not know what he says if he did not know that the reference of 'Hesperus' is Hesperus. A competent user of 'Hesperus' has to know, in other words, what 'Hesperus' refers to. Moreover, the Fregean accepts that this attribution of knowledge of reference to a competent user of 'Hesperus' is also true when taken relationally (in the sense of Quine (1956)): thus, if S knows that the referent of 'Hesperus' is Hesperus, then he knows, of what 'Hesperus' refers to, that it is the referent of 'Hesperus'. This entails, given the extensionality of relational attributions, that S knows, of Phosphorus, that it is the referent of 'Hesperus'. What the Fregean denies is that it further follows from this *that S knows that the referent of 'Hesperus' is Phosphorus*. Accepting this further entailment requires accepting that knowledge of reference is *all* that is required to be a competent user of a singular term, and this is what the Fregean denies. He accepts that understanding requires knowledge of reference; but he denies that understanding requires *just* that. As Dummett puts it, the Fregean argument seeks to reduce to absurdity the supposition "that an understanding of an expression consists in a *bare* knowledge of the reference" [Dummett (1975), p. 126; his emphasis].

Heck's argument is convenient in that it challenges Millians who are not happy with the consequences of Millianism for indirect speech; and there are many of them. In so far as we are not prepared to accept the consequences of strict Millianism for attitude-reports, Heck's argument gives us an argument for some form of Fregeanism. As Dummett says, "If language is to serve as a medium of communication, it is not sufficient that a sentence should in fact be true under the interpretation placed on it by one speaker just in case it is true under that placed on it by another; it is also necessary that both speakers should be aware of the fact" [Dummett (1978), p. 133]. The argument makes it clear that the Hybrid View is an unstable position: a semantic theory accepting the intuitions about the truth-conditions of belief-ascriptions subscribed by its defenders is forced to discriminate among the semantic properties of ordinary utterances differing only in including two singular terms with the same reference, against the Millian proclivities which are also part and parcel of the Hybrid View. True Millians should rather take the tack suggested by Kripke (1979), and accept the intuitively unappealing consequences of Millianism for belief-ascriptions. But few people are prepared to do that, in spite of the subtle considerations in Kripke's paper.

B. Loar gave long ago another example involving indexicals, which serves to make essentially the same point:

Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on television is someone they see on the train every morning and about whom, in the latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says ‘He is a stockbroker’, intending to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith to be referring to the man on the train. Now Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified Smith’s referent, since the man on television is the man on the train; but he has failed to understand Smith’s utterance. It would seem that, as Frege held, some ‘manner of presentation’ of the referent is, even on referential uses, essential to what is being communicated [Loar (1976), p. 357].

What neither Heck nor Loar do for us, however, is to say anything specific regarding what the difference may be between ‘he is a stockbroker’ and ‘George Orwell wrote *1984*’, as understood by the speaker and his audience respectively in Loar’s and Heck’s examples, or between ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, which could answer the well known arguments by Kripke and other writers against traditional Fregean proposals about the senses of proper names and indexicals. In short, they do not confront this Kripkean challenge: “[...] what [...] *conventional* ‘senses,’ even taking ‘senses’ to be ‘modes of fixing the reference rigidly’, can plausibly be supposed to exist for ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ [...]? Are not these just two names (in English) for the same man? Is there any special *conventional, community-wide* ‘connotation’ in the one lacking in the other?” [Kripke (1979), p. 244]. This failure is, I believe, the only reason still supporting Millianism, in spite of convincing arguments like the one I have just rehearsed.

In related work (see García-Carpintero (1996), ch. 7, for a brief presentation) I have tried to answer these concerns, by offering an account of the senses of indexicals and proper names which takes incorporates what I take to be correct in Kripke’s criticisms. I can only sketch the proposal here, to give the reader its flavour. The account crucially resorts to Reichenbach’s notion of *token-reflexiveness*. Reichenbach said that indexicals are “token-reflexive” expressions, in that it is to token-expressions that signification is ascribed, and the referring tokens themselves play a crucial role in the determination of their referents. The referent of ‘the Morning Star’ is determined as the brightest heavenly body seen at dawn in a certain region; the referent of a token of ‘he’ is determined as an entity related in a certain way to that very token. The token itself is involved, and thus “reflected” in the determination of its contribution to truth conditions. There is a linguistic rule associated with the type ‘he’, which goes something like this: “for any token *t* of ‘he’, the referent of *t* is the male who has been made salient by a pointing gesture or any other means of demonstration at the occasion of the pro-

duction of \mathbf{t} ”; analogously, the linguistic rule associated with the type ‘I’ is this: “for any token \mathbf{t} of ‘I’, the referent of \mathbf{t} is the speaker who has produced \mathbf{t} ”. But it is only tokens that have sense and signification, on the basis of conventional rules like these and the contextual identification of the specific tokens³.

Indexicals, understood as token-reflexives, provide a very useful guide to understanding how proper names work inside a Fregean framework, but the application of what we have said so far to proper names cannot be immediate. Indexicals are essentially context-dependent expressions; they are expressions such that no two instances of them are linguistically required to have the same referent. Proper names, obviously, are not like that. It is true that different people (different things) share the same proper name; but this is an accident: compatible with the practice of using proper names as we do (although with important practical difficulties and to no sensible purpose), we could have tried to follow the principle *one thing, one word*; and, in any case, it is obvious that when we restrict ourselves to a specific discourse, proper names are used as non-indexical words: whenever an instance of the same proper name is used in a discourse with no indication to the contrary, it is assumed that the same referent is intended.

The token-reflexive view of proper names has it that, even though proper names are not indexicals, they are, like indexicals, token-reflexive expressions, defining their referents relative to relations with some referring tokens. When examining the issue of proper names, it is natural to be unduly obsessed with a specific type of proper names, proper names of people; but this is in my view potentially confusing. To make my view understood, I propose to focus first on other proper names whose semantic functioning we undoubtedly also understand; for instance, proper names of hotel rooms (numbers, usually), of streets, cinemas and so on. Imagine that a visitor asks the receptionist at some hotel where a friend of his is lodged, and he is told that his friend is “in 103”. The term ‘103’ is a proper name referring to a specific room. Now, how is a competent user of the proper name supposed to think of the referent?

As is the case with indexicals, the referring expression is the specific token which the receptionist has produced. On the basis of their common linguistic mastery, the receptionist and the visitor share the following knowledge: that there is in their linguistic community a very specific procedure that would allow the performance of what I call *acts of calling* involving concrete instances of the expression-type ‘103’, a token of which the receptionist has produced. An “act of calling” is a specific linguistic act, whose conventional purpose is to define a term, to explain its meaning. We can conceive of these acts as ritually made by means of the following form of

words: “this is called N ”. This is, of course, just a convenient abstraction, a regimentation of our much more variegated appellative practices. The procedure that both the receptionist and the customer know, which is essential to help speakers to perform proper acts of calling, is of course very commonplace: it involves the “tagging” of a certain room with a physical token of the type ‘103’. It is similar with street and city names, with names of cinemas and so on. Biologists following a given population of animals for their scientific purposes also have recourse to similar tagging procedures, to help them to refer to the particular animals they want to communicate about by means of proper names. A given animal is somehow branded with a token of a given type N , in the understanding that when one later uses in ordinary speech acts a token t of that type N one will be referring to that particular animal to which, with the help of the tagging procedure, one could point and say “this is called N ”. This is the linguistic rule that in my view captures faithfully the way we understand proper names in general: “for any token t of a proper name N , the referent of t is that entity referred to in the acts of calling associated with N on which the speaker relies in uttering t ”⁴.

Rules like this give us, relative to specific contexts in which a relevant token is identified, a token-reflexive mode of presentation, a conceptualization which defines the entity we want to say something about by discriminating it with respect to every other entity relative to a property of the referring token we use. Once we admit, as ingredients of senses, entities (expression-tokens) not conventionally associated with expression-types, it is natural to accept also other ingredients also obtained from the context in which utterances are produced on the basis of something else than knowledge of linguistic conventions. As with indexicals, token-reflexiveness is essential to understand how this sense can properly determine a referent, in spite of the correct considerations by Kripke and others. There are many different hotel-rooms branded ‘103’, and many different receptionists that could use tokens of the same type as the one in our example to refer to different rooms. It is also true that, even if we followed the practice of never using, to the best of our knowledge, the same name for different entities, we could not be sure that some other community uses the same type for other purposes. None of this challenges our intuition that proper names usually have a definite reference. Even if every human hotel-room were branded by law with a different tag, but there were another planet in which people, uninterested in our laws, used ‘103’ to name something in their environment, when we said ‘103’, we would still refer to our hotel room with that tag. The explanation of that intuition is that reference is determined relative to a specific property of the *tokens* we produce: the property these tokens have of relying on our *concrete* appellative practices.

There is at least a mild departure from traditional Fregean views in answering the Kripkean arguments by including, as ingredients of senses, entities only contextually associated with linguistic expressions; in the last section, I will show that behind this mild departure there lurks a philosophically deeper one. With his example of ‘the Morning Star’ and ‘the Evening Star’ (and with his remarks about proper names), Frege at least suggests that the concept or sense associated with a proper name is something general, the sort of thing that can be associated with an expression-type once and for all: some general defining property for whose specification we do not need to make reference to anything as particular as a token. Kripke is right that there is nothing like that the knowledge of which is required to be a competent user of a proper name. One does not need to know, and does not usually know, any defining purely general property of the room numbered ‘103’, which distinguishes it from any other hotel room, to understand uses of that name. When proper names suggest properties of these sort, these properties are irrelevant to a correct understanding of how the name works. As John Stuart Mill pointed out and Kripke reminds us, ‘Dartmouth’ would still name Dartmouth long after the city has ceased to be in the mouth of the river Dart; and, although some paintings are called ‘Without Title’, the fact that they have title, and one provided precisely by those very words, does not make the name an oxymoron. The name does not pick its referent in the way that Frege seems to think. In this sense, as Mill said, proper names are “mere tags”. But this does not imply that names relate to their referent without the intervening mediation of an essentially predicative way of thinking of that referent, which operates as a cognitive bridge by means of which competent speakers represent that referent for themselves and their audiences.

This is not the place to assuage the legitimate worries this brief sketch of an anti-Millian account of reference undoubtedly raises. For present purposes, it was only necessary to outline an account able at least to suggest a rejoinder to the only persuasive argument for Millianism by Kripke and his followers, namely, that for many referential expressions with a definite referent, Fregeans cannot produce a sense capable of determining that referent. This is only so if we limit ourselves to include general properties in the relevant modes of presentation, forgetting the role of particulars (tokens)⁵.

III. THE INTRINSICNESS OF REFERENCE

What about the other main consideration for Millian views, namely, the modal arguments? We already disposed of them in the first section. Modal considerations only establish Direct Reference; but accounts of reference

like the one suggested in the previous section, which are Fregean in that they associate with referential expressions at the descriptive, semantical level of explanation a (not purely general) property which determines the term's signification, are compatible with Direct Reference. There are different ways of achieving this. The one I favour assimilates the *semantic* behaviour of genuinely referential expressions to the (perhaps non-semantic, "pragmatic") behaviour of definite descriptions in so called "referential" uses.

Consider a case of this sort. Someone is giving a talk about Wittgenstein, and eventually says: 'The author of the *Tractatus* wrote a letter to Russell from Cassino in 1918'. It is clear in the context that he uses the description 'the author of the *Tractatus*' just as a stylistic variant of 'Wittgenstein', on the assumption that it is common knowledge between him and his audience that Wittgenstein wrote the *Tractatus* (this is, in one of the senses of this term, a *presupposition* in the context). Cases like this are the clearest examples of so-called "referential uses" of definite descriptions (this is even more clearly so when the description is also an incomplete one — like 'the Austrian philosopher', uttered in the same context where 'the author of the *Tractatus*' was imagined to have been uttered before). In my view, it is cases like this that constitute the very paradigm of singular reference⁶. What, in Stalnaker's terms, is the "semantic value" of 'the author of the *Tractatus*', its contribution to "the possibilities that, if realized, would make the statement true"? The answer is clear: it is the author of the *Tractatus* in the actual world, Wittgenstein himself, not the descriptive sense of the term. For, according to the speaker's contextually indicated intentions, it is relative to how things are with *Wittgenstein* that his utterance is to be evaluated at other possible circumstances — and not relative to how things are with whoever could possibly have written the *Tractatus* with respect to them. This proposal, therefore (no matter how it is theoretically implemented), makes Direct Reference compatible with the limited Fregeanism defended in the previous section.

So far, we have only needed to revise traditional Fregean views in one respect: we have found it necessary to include among the ingredients of the senses of indexicals and some proper names elements which Frege did not envisage, elements of a sort which cannot be conventionally associated with expression-types. They include expression-tokens and other contextual material which is mutually known by language users not as a part of their shared linguistic knowledge, but as part of their shared "knowledge of the world". This is as yet a minor revision; for it is independently required to account for other semantical facts: features like the domain of discourse, the class of reference for attributive adjectives and adverbs, the boundaries of determinacy for vague terms, and so on and so forth, which are elements in a full deter-

mination of truth-conditions, are in part dependent on contextual factors. However, this minor revision is the tip of the iceberg constituting the real distinction between Kripkean and Fregean Reference.

Stalnaker says: “It should also be conceded that according to the Millian semantics, as contrasted with the Fregean semantics, speakers do not know what they are saying when they use a name if they do not know who the referent of their name is” [*op. cit.*, p. 545]. I have been arguing that the implication in this text, that on an anti-Millian approach a speaker does not need to know a singular term’s reference to know what he is saying in using it, is wrong. The defender of the limited Fregeanism outlined in the previous section insists that, of course, a competent speaker must know the reference of any singular term he correctly uses. His point is that such a competent speaker must necessarily know *also* the term’s sense, and so he must think of the referent in a specific way. However, Stalnaker is not being unfair to Fregeans like Dummett and Searle, as the quotations I provided at the end of the first section witness.

The real distinction between Kripkean and Fregean Reference already came to the fore in the famous exchange between Frege and Russell on the snows of Mont-Blanc: “I believe that in spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition ‘Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high’. [...] In the case of a simple proper name like ‘Socrates’, I cannot distinguish between sense and meaning; I see only the idea, which is psychological, and the object. Or better: I do not admit the sense at all, but only the idea and the meaning” [Frege (1980), p. 169]. Russell is answering the following remark by Frege: “Truth is not a component of a thought, just as Mont Blanc with its snowfields is not itself a component part of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high” [*Ibid.*, p. 163]. Analogous remarks appear throughout this correspondence, and throughout Frege’s writings. In the following text, Frege supports one of them with an argument:

Now a class cannot be the sense of a sign, but only its meaning, as Sirius can only be the meaning of a sign, but not its sense. [...] Can any class whatever be a component of a thought? No more than the planet Jupiter can. A class (or the corresponding concept) can be defined in different ways, and to a different definition corresponds a different sense of the class name. Now the thought that an object belongs to a class as defined in one way is different from the thought that an object belongs to a class as defined in another way. Consequently, a class cannot itself be part of the thought that an object belongs to it (for the class is the same in both cases); but only the sense of the class name can be part of this thought. If the class was part of the thought that an object *p* belonged to it, then the change in the sense of the class name would not affect the

thought, provided that the class itself remained unchanged [*op. cit.*, p. 157].

Although the argument is here given regarding the significations and senses of predicates, it seems safe to assume that a similar one would be provided for singular terms. What exactly is Frege's contention? The difficulty lies in understanding what is conveyed by the metaphor of "components of thoughts". I think Dummett's interpretation is correct: for the Fregean, "a theory of meaning is a theory of *understanding*. What we have to give an account of is what a person knows when he knows what a word or expression means, that is, when he understands it. [...] Thus what we are going to understand as a possible ingredient in meaning will be something which it is plausible to say constitutes part of what someone who understands the word or expression implicitly grasps, and in his grasp of which his understanding in part consists. [...] To claim that reference is not an ingredient in meaning is, therefore, to claim that our understanding a word or an expression never consists, even in part, merely in our associating something in the world with that word or expression" [Dummett (1973), pp. 92-3].

It is worth noting a difficulty in understanding the role played by the word 'merely' in the last sentence of this quotation. Given the meaning of 'merely', the sentence 'our understanding a word or an expression never consists merely in our associating something in the world with that word or expression' conveys that our understanding of an expression does not *only* consist in our associating it with something in the world, but leaves open whether it is in some cases *also* necessary to characterize such understanding *in part* by our associating the expression with something in the world. However, the latter possibility is in fact foreclosed by Dummett's use of the qualification 'even in part'. But then, the intended meaning would have been properly expressed by omitting 'merely'. The fact that 'merely' is, at best, redundant – that Dummett's considered interpretation of the Fregean metaphor that ordinary references are not parts of thoughts is the contention that our understanding of an expression *never consists, even in part*, in our associating something in the world with it — is further confirmed by claims like the ones I quoted earlier, at the end of the first section. However, the fact that the misleading 'merely' has been smuggled in is perhaps indicative of Dummett's uneasiness; for the argument on the basis of which he and Frege attempt to support the thesis that reference cannot be involved in a correct account of understanding only authorizes the weaker claim that we have been supporting, namely, that references cannot be the whole story⁷. The classic argument by Frege, as the argument by Heck we presented in the preceding section, only establish that, against the Millian, senses are *necessary* to account for the understanding that a competent speaker has of singular

terms with objective references. What reason is there for the stronger claim that Frege and Dummett sustain, that they are necessary *and sufficient*?

Dummett attributes two different arguments to Frege. One would conclude only the weaker claim, that “a *bare* knowledge of reference” cannot explain understanding: senses are necessary for it. The other, however, tries to sustain the stronger claim: “Frege’s first argument says that we must ascribe *more* to a speaker than just a knowledge of the reference of a word; the second says that we cannot ascribe to him *as much*” [Dummett (1978), p. 130]. The argument he gives for this, however, depends on an intuitively too strong, unacceptable assumption: “this argument depends upon assuming that, if one knows the references of two terms, one must know whether or not they have the same references” [Dummett (1978), p. 131]; (see also Dummett (1973), p. 91; Dummett (1975), p. 126, and Dummett (1991), p. 122-134, particularly pp.131-2.) Although there is textual support for the assumption in Frege’s writings⁸, its wild implausibility makes it difficult to take it to provide the rationale behind the Fregean claim. The real motivation behind the Fregean claim that objective significations are not “ingredients of meaning” or “parts of thoughts” (and the real argument for it), is in my view aptly expressed by McDowell in the following quotation:

The Fregean view would have to seek its support in the idea that thought relates to objects with an essential indirectness [...]. Whether the object exists or not would then be incidental to the availability of the thought. Underlying that idea is the following line of argument. When we mention an object in describing a thought we are giving only an extrinsic characterization of the thought (since the mention of the object takes us outside the subject’s mind); but there must be an intrinsic characterization available (one which does not take us outside the subject’s mind), and that characterization would have succeeded in specifying the essential core of the thought even if extra-mental reality had not obliged by containing the object [McDowell (1977), p. 153].

The ultimate Fregean motivation lies thus in the possibility of sense without reference, which the Fregean takes to be wholly general: “Each of our beliefs must be possible for a being who is a brain in a vat” [Searle (1983), p. 230]; “the meaning of words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world, for we can still describe the world even if the facts alter. Yet the existence of ordinary objects — people, cities, etc. — is contingent, and hence the existence of any meaning for their names is contingent” [Searle (1969), p. 164]. Less sweeping remarks to similar effect occur throughout Frege’s and Dummett’s writings⁹. Dummett thinks that to regard “objects as constituents of thoughts” is “to adopt a conception of sense which renders it impossible for a name lacking a referent to have a sense”,

and that “[f]rom this standpoint, it is an internal, not an external, feature of the thought that it is about an object; it must be for that reason that there cannot be a thought that purports, but fails, to be about one” [Dummett (1981), pp.137-8]. He is more sympathetic than Searle towards the rationale for such a standpoint, but concludes from his examination that “the temptation to make a mystery of senses without corresponding referents vanishes: it no longer appears to be constitutive of any thought that it is really about a particular object” [Dummett (1981), pp. 244]¹⁰. Let us say that an *intrinsic* semantic property of an expression belonging to a certain language is one such that a language in which the same expression lacked it would not be the same language; an *extrinsic* semantic property of an expression is one such that this condition does not apply. Languages are here understood as in the “synthesis” in Lewis’s “Languages and Language” between *languages*, “functions from strings of sound or of marks to sets of possible worlds, semantic systems discussed in complete abstraction from human affairs” and the *language* “used by, or [...] of, a given population [...]”, “a form of rational, convention-governed human social activity [...]” [Lewis (1983), p. 166]. With a crucial qualification: because of the token-reflexive nature of some referential expressions, propositions cannot be the values of ‘strings of sound or marks’ — which I take to be sound- or mark-types — but must be the values of *actual and possible utterances*. The properties constitutive of the identity of a language are those required to posit to fulfil the explanatory aims in which languages play a role — namely, to give a systematic account of such a peculiar “form of rational, convention-governed human social activity”¹¹. Fregean Reference is then the claim, motivated on the basis of considerations like the ones we have been discussing, that reference is an extrinsic semantic property. Kripkean Reference is the opposite claim, that reference is intrinsic.

What reasons there are for Kripkean Reference? Fregean Reference and Kripkean Reference are modal claims; they are claims about which properties are linguistically essential for the semantical individuation of the actual and potential utterances constituting a given language (or system of thoughts). Fregean Reference is a very strong claim, for which nothing we have considered so far gives straightforward support. As Evans and McDowell have pointed out, reference failure may be an essentially derivative phenomenon, to be understood relative to a framework of reference-individuated utterances. Evans and McDowell have provided some more positive considerations for the thesis that I am calling Kripkean Reference¹². In my view, *N&N*’s main contribution on these issues lies in its independent support for that thesis.

Kripke has been accused of pulling contentious metaphysical rabbits

out of apparently mild semantic hats. He does nothing of the sort (I agree with Stalnaker on this point). What he does is to show how little basis there is for the semantical doctrines to which the philosophers he is arguing with appeal. Thus, by discrediting the *traditional* forms of the descriptive theory of names (and natural kind terms), he makes salient the lack of support for the empiricist view, which passed as unchallenged dogma when he wrote, that objects and kinds have essential properties “only under a description” — that only *de dicto* modal claims make sense. He thus makes acceptable again the Aristotelian view, plausible on intuitive grounds, that objects have or lack essential properties independently on the ways we represent them. He thus makes it compelling that an utterance may express a (“metaphysically”) necessary truth, even if this can only be known *a posteriori*. Thus, where ‘N’ is schematic for a proper name (other genuinely referential expression would do), an utterance of ‘N is P’ may well attribute to the referent of ‘N’ one of its essential properties, even though no *a priori* analysis of the term would reveal this. (This is why *it is necessarily the case that N is P* can be taken to express a *de re* truth: substituting ‘N’ by any other designation of the same referent cannot affect its truth value.)

Now, a Millian view of names would vindicate this metaphysical picture, as it would of course take reference to be an intrinsic property of expressions. The neo-Fregean, anti-Millian picture we have defended in this paper has, however, the same effect. The reason is firstly that only Direct Reference is needed to legitimize *de re* modal claims. But secondly, and more deeply, the descriptions under which competent speakers, according to the picture presented in the second section, hook onto the referents of genuinely referential expressions cannot be taken to provide essential traits of their referents, no matter how deflationary our views on modality are. They just constitute highly contingent but very convenient ways by means of which we secure a determinate subject matter for our thoughts and discourse, so that we can then go on to investigate and discuss the really important properties of that subject-matter.

Kripkean Reference is the thesis that reference (signification) is an intrinsic semantic properties of singular terms. This view makes it possible to state essentialist claims, to endorse or at least to consider *de re* modal contentions. This was deemed absurd by philosophers like Quine, and its absurdity as vindicating Fregean Reference and the traditional view of senses that goes with it. *Naming and Necessity* contains fully persuasive arguments against this, and in favour of some of those modal claims that were deemed absurd, and in so doing gives indirect but compelling support to Kripkean Reference. Stalnaker’s accurate and terse characterization in the following lines is thus absolutely right: “What is essential to Kripke’s picture, I think,

is the idea that the content of speech acts and mental attitudes may be determined as a function of particular things (and kinds) with which the speakers and thinkers interact" [*op. cit.*, p. 553]. What I disagree with is the suggestion that this favours Millianism, embodied in Stalnaker's claim that to ascribe an intrinsic descriptive sense to a proper name *even in addition to its equally intrinsic referent* has to be the result of a confusion between descriptive and foundational questions. We have seen that it needs not, and also that the intuitively plausible considerations against Millianism do have theoretical force. But with Evans, I would like to subscribe in closing the following words: "This is not, ultimately, a very significant departure from Kripke, since I do not think any support for the theories to which Kripke is opposed can be derived from it" [Evans (1982), p. 387].

Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència
Universitat de Barcelona
C/ Baldori i Reixach s/n, E-08028 Barcelona
E-mail: garcia@cerber.mat.ub.es

NOTES

* A previous version of this paper was read during the *VII Seminario Interuniversitario de Ciencia Cognitiva*, held on Robert Stalnaker's work at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, May 12-14 1995, which benefited from his presence. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Stalnaker for his helpful remarks. I also thank the participants for their comments, in particular Josep Macià, some discussions with whom greatly helped to clarify my views. Research for the paper has been partially funded by the DGES, Spanish Ministry of Education, as part of the research project PB96-1049-C03-01.

¹ I assume here that the Fregean framework is not only part and parcel of a theory of linguistic meaning, but also of a theoretical characterization of mental content. Several modifications should be made; there are not mental *utterances*, but mental *occurrences* and *capacities*; and mental states *types* do not entirely coincide with act-of-meaning *forces*. But the modifications, I believe, are not of substance.

² This point is nicely developed in Burge (1993). Cf. also Evans (1982), p. 310: "communication is *essentially* a mode of the transmission of knowledge".

³ Kaplan (1989) (the contemporarily generally accepted account of indexicality) includes several objections to this sort of theory. I offer replies in "Indexicals as Token-reflexives", unpublished ms.

⁴ This view is developed in my "The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names", unpublished ms. There I show that it is free from the charge of circularity that Kripke levels against this sort of view. (The main fact to see why is to realize that only demonstratives and definite descriptions are *used* to refer in acts of calling.) Even if

proper names are according to the present view token-reflexive expressions, they are not indexicals. Indexicals are token-reflexive expressions that rely on fleeting properties of the linguistic context in which they are produced; properties that it is linguistically assumed may change whenever a new token is produced. Proper names, however, as the rule makes clear, depend on features that are more stable; this is why we can assume that, at least in the course of one and the same discourse, tokens of the same proper name have the same referent: they are used relative to one and the same appellative practice. If they can be taken to be, in some sense, “context-dependent”, it is a sense according to which expressions like ‘water’ are context-dependent too, one the careless use of which will obscure the crucial semantic difference between indexicals and other expressions.

⁵ One of the marks of a deep, careful thinker is that it is very difficult to point out a clear-cut mistake in what they authorize to publish. The presupposition in Kripke’s question in a text quoted above, “Is there any special *conventional, community-wide* ‘connotation’ in the one lacking in the other?” is that senses are to be conventionally associated with expression-types. The presupposition, as I have indicated, is historically legitimate. The present proposal rejects it, and therefore is not presented as a criticism of Kripke.

⁶ I take this to be compatible with the view that only at the level of what the speaker *means* (through Gricean mechanisms), and not at that of what his utterance *says*, is this a genuine case of singular reference. A straightforward Russellian theory accounts in my view better for what the speaker’s words *literally* say.

I think that Dummett is making the point in the main text when he says: “We could say that, in this respect, Frege wrongly assimilated definite descriptions to proper names, rather than the other way round, as he is accused of doing [Dummett 1981, p. 183]. What Frege really missed is the fact that definite descriptions, as opposed to proper names, can take narrow scope in certain contexts. See also McDowell (1986), p. 144.

⁷ This is a point Stalnaker correctly notes; see *op. cit.*, pp. 545-8.

⁸ Remember the famous passage in “On Sense and Reference”: “The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs; but this serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the thing meant, supposing it to have one. Comprehensive knowledge of the thing meant would require us to be able to say immediately whether any given sense attaches to it. To such knowledge we never attain” [Frege (1984), p. 158].

⁹ Gareth Evans gives reasons to belittle the importance of the relevant texts as they occur in Frege’s writings, to sustain what is in fact a neo-Fregean view as his preferred interpretation. Evans’ Frege would have rejected the Fregean claim, as indeed Evans himself correctly does. See Evans (1982), ch. 1. I think, with Dummett, that this interpretation is too strained and does not fit the evidence. See Dummett (1981), ch. 6.

¹⁰ Dummett’s discussion of this issue between the two quotations I give in the main text is actually very interesting. In the end, I think that he fails to fully appreciate the consequences of his own suggestive arguments. Unfortunately, I lack the space to examine it here.

¹¹ If I explain what I mean by an intrinsic semantic property relative to a language, instead of relative to individual utterances, it is because of the anti-atomistic view that semantic properties are not possessed by isolated utterances. (This is not to be equated to a holistic view of the sort supported by Quine.)

¹² See Evans (1982), ch. 5-7, and McDowell (1984) and (1986).

REFERENCES

- BOËR, S.E., and LYCAN, W. (1986), *Knowing Who*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
- BURGE, T. (1993), "Content Preservation", *Philosophical Review*, vol. 102, pp. 457-488.
- CRIMMINS, M. and PERRY, J. (1989), "The Prince and the Phone Booth", *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 86, pp. 685-711.
- DUMMETT, M. (1973), *Frege: Philosophy of Language*; 2nd. edition, 1981, from where I quote, London: Duckworth.
- (1975): "What Is a Theory of Meaning?", in Guttenplan, S. (ed.), *Mind and Language*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 97-138.
- (1978): "Frege's Distinction between Sense and Reference", in his *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, pp. 116-144.
- (1981), *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*; London, Duckworth.
- (1991), *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
- EVANS, G. (1982): *The Varieties of Reference*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- FREGE, G. (1980), *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*, Gabriel, G., Hermes, H., Kambartel, F., Thiel Ch., and Veraat, A. (eds.), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
- (1984), *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy*, McGuinness, B., (ed.), Oxford, Blackwell.
- GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, M. (1996), *Las palabras, las ideas y las cosas*, Barcelona, Ariel.
- HECK, R. (1995), "The Sense of Communication", *Mind*, vol 104, pp. 79-106.
- KAPLAN, D. (1989), "Demonstratives", in Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), *Themes from Kaplan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1989a), "Afterthoughts", in Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), *Themes from Kaplan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 565-614.
- KRIPKE, S. (1979), "A Puzzle about Belief", in Margalit, A. (ed.), *Meaning and Use*, pp. 239-83, Dordrecht, D. Reidel.
- (1980), *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
- LEWIS, D. (1983), "Languages and Language", in D. Lewis, *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- LOAR, B. (1976), "The Semantics of Singular Terms", *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 30, pp. 353-77.
- MARTÍ, G. (1995), "The Essence of Genuine Reference", *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, vol 24, pp. 275-289.
- MCDOWELL, J. (1977), "On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name", *Mind*, vol. lxxxvi, pp. 159-185. Reprinted in Platts, M. (ed.) *Reference, Truth and Reality*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 141-166, from where I quote.

- (1984), “*De Re Senses*”, in Wright C., (ed.), *Frege: Tradition and Influence*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 98-109.
- (1986), “Singular Thoughts and the Extent of Inner Space”, in Pettit, P. and McDowell, J. (eds.), *Subject, Thought and Context*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 137-168.
- QUINE, W.V.O. (1956), “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 53. Also in W.V.O. Quine *The Ways of Paradox*, New York, Random House, 1966, pp. 185-196.
- RICHARD, M. (1990), *Propositional Attitudes*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- SCHIFFER, S. (1992), “Belief Ascription”, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 89, pp. 499-521.
- SEARLE, J. (1969), *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P.
- (1983), *Intentionality*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- STALNAKER, R. (1997), “Reference and Necessity”, in Wright, C. And Hale, B. (eds.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 534-554.