Abstract. With this article, I seek to examine Krause’s analysis of the self in Analitische Philosophie, and in particular in Vorlesungen über die Psychische Anthropologie (1836/1848). But I do so through the texts that the Spanish Krausists devoted either to translating or to discussing and disseminating Krause’s ideas in dialogue with the philosophies of the time. In my exposition and examination of the doctrine of the self, I focus on its embedding in a particular existence through embodiment, and argue that these are aspects with which Krausism can still illuminate the debate about human subjectivity.

I. INTRODUCTION

The intuition of the self (Krause’s Selbstschauung)\(^1\) or primordial self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) as the foundation of science or knowledge (Wissenschaft) is the core of the metaphysical anthropology of Spanish Krausism, which is expressed in Krause’s Analystische Philosophie, mainly through the Vorlesungen über die Psychische Anthropologie (1848). For its examination, I primarily follow Sanz del Río\(^2\) in his Sistema de la filosofía: Metafisica. Primera parte: Análisis (1860), a work known in Spanish criticism as Analítica,

\(^1\) Although Ego is the orthodox translation of the German Ich, I use “self” instead of “ego”, not only because it has a stronger connection with contemporary philosophy and the modern mind, but also because a better logical foundation seems to be established between self and self-consciousness as a non-reflective consciousness or intuition of the self (Selbstbewusstsein). Nevertheless, from the outset I make it clear that the words that “self” translate are the German Ich and the Spanish yo.

\(^2\) Julián Sanz del Río (1814 - 1869), a native of Torrearévalo (Soria), studied philosophy at the Seminary of Córdoba and graduated in Law in Granada. He first came into contact with Krausist thought through the philosophy of law of H. Ahrens, a disciple of Krause living in Brussels, who had disseminated the master’s doctrine through the Curso de Derecho natural, a work translated
and I also follow some of the most deeply rooted Krausists, those who formed the group that originally disseminated Krause’s doctrine in Spain: Federico de Castro, Nicolás Salmerón, Francisco Giner de los Ríos and Hermenegildo Giner de los Ríos.³

Sanz del Río’s *Sistema de la filosofía*, translated and derived from Krause’s *Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie* (1828), is divided into two parts: one of subjective criteria, from consciousness; and the other, of objective criteria, from God (*Or-Omwessen*, the supreme being as both transcendent and constitutive of the world).⁴ The one that interests us for our enquiry, and the one that was most popular among the Spanish Krausists is the first one, and this perhaps because it provides the essential tools for a complete analysis of reality from a human perspective in which absolute reality is assumed in one way or another. The process of knowledge starts from one’s own self or consciousness before reflection, which gives psychological science a great importance in the Krausist doctrine, something that will be present in its approach to all sciences as well as in the insistence of the Krausists on the teaching of psychology as a philosophical subject in secondary schools.⁵ From consciousness -source of certainty for the subject- one gains access to knowledge of oneself and of other bodies and beings until one reaches God, who is ultimately the Being presupposed in all objects of knowledge.⁶ Sanz del Río explains the path as follows:

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⁴ For this concept of “*Or-Omwessen*”, see Orden Jiménez, “La antropología panenteísta de Krause y su recepción en España”, 81–82.


For, in our own consciousness we are to recognise, if possible, the principle of science, we are to begin with the knowledge of ourselves, of our mind [espiritu] in its total properties, in its inner opposition, in its faculties, functions and operations. Contemplating hereafter the external world around us, we shall observe how and under what criterion of truth we receive in our consciousness the particular objects, and the individual minds [espiritus] with whom we communicate through the body and the senses, and being attentive in our enquiry to observe the permanent elements and assumptions of our knowledge, we must recognise, if possible, the absolute foundation and principle which we seek.  

The immediate, non-reflective knowledge of oneself, i.e. the fundamental intuition of the self, is the beginning of science (Wissenschaft), which can be understood as total knowledge or wisdom in general. And this is the beginning because it must be a truth and a certainty for everyone; a truth whose evidence is immediate and which does not, therefore, presuppose a prior truth: “immediate certainty, absolute certainty for us, common certainty.” Thus, after discussing this intuition of the self in Krause's system through the Spanish Krausists' works, I devote the following sections of this article to successively explore the primary and secondary constitutive properties of the self and the importance of its embodiment and embedding in historical and social existence.

Today’s relevance of returning to Krause’s analysis of the self (Ich) can be understood both from the interest of the history of philosophy and from the current understanding of the constitution of consciousness as embodied and embedded in a particular existence. From the philosophical perspective, I show not only how it enters into discussion with nineteenth-century thought, but also how it anticipates later currents in aspects such as the distinction of total and actual consciousness, something that would be taken up by phenomenology and Gestalt in the twentieth century. On the other hand, regarding its importance for our understanding of consciousness, Krausism's insistence on the unity of consciousness with the body is crucial, so that we are essentially the synthetic compound of the two, whereby one and the other

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7 Julián Del Sanz Río and Karl C. F. Krause, Sistema de la Filosofía. Metafísica. Primera parte. Análisis (Imprenta de Manuel Galiano, 1860), 24. The translations of the Spanish texts are my own. Where there is ambiguity in any word or expression, I add the original.

are in constant reciprocal relationship. Therefore, all our activity, i.e. thinking, feeling and willing, is expressed through both equally. Moreover, it is maintained that the self can only be realised as such embedding itself in a social and historical context, through its activity in the world and in communication with others. Currently, all these questions are highly relevant in phenomenology as well as in the cognitive psychology of enactivism and other social sciences.

II. THE INTUITION OF THE SELF

The only immediate knowledge is that of oneself, prior to the distinction between subject and object. This beginning of enquiry is of the utmost importance, for it does not only begin with a total knowledge of one’s own being whose properties and essence will be inferred as from the whole to the parts, but it is accessible by means of a pure intuition or immediate, non-speculative knowledge, and therefore common human experience. By translating and echoing Krause’s doctrine, Sanz del Río is also showing the influence of Fichte in this doctrine, since in the insistence on the intuition of the self as the beginning of knowledge is latent Fichte’s effort to base human knowledge on self-consciousness, as he explains in his Wissenschaftlehre (1889), with which he tried to overcome the Kantian duality between pure reason and practical reason and to advance with respect to Reinhold. In this intuition there is no judgement, nor are there subject and object, but the indistinction proper to the primordial unity: “In the immediate, simple, undivided intuition of the self [indivisa percepción, yo], we do not yet think of the particular properties or relations of which I may be the subject, nor does this intuition [percepción] imply the totality of these properties or relations.” This intuition of the self precedes any other. In Federico de Castro’s words, this intuition, which he takes as internal perception, is prior both to the idea I have of myself and to

9 Tom Rockmore, “Fichte, German Idealism and the Thing in Itself”, in Fichte, German Idealism and Early Romanticism, ed. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (Rodopi, 2010).
10 I have translated percepción as “intuition”, since it refers to an act of consciousness and not of the senses. In any case, the Spanish Krausists used the word with the meaning of internal perception, a translation of Krause’s Selbstschauung.
11 Sanz del Río; Krause, Sistema de la filosofía, 39.
the judgement: I am I, “in whose identical unity [unidad idéntica] the identity of the subject and the attribute is seen and affirmed.”\textsuperscript{13} But it is equally prior to the temporal experience of my self, thereby rejecting that such intuition “is a temporal knowledge that I only acquire as I experience my self from act to act, as Kant taught.”\textsuperscript{14} Finally, it is prior to and presupposed in all argumentative reasoning insofar as the intuition of the self is implicit in “the judgement I thinking, I knowing [yo pensando, yo conociendo].”\textsuperscript{15}

In the philosophical tradition, this means a departure from the systems of rationalism and idealism. Sanz del Río contrasts this perception with the Cartesian perception of “I think therefore I am” and concludes that this presupposes the most intimate and radical perception of the self, whereas Cartesian philosophy founds existence on a single quality of the self, namely, thinking (“I think”), giving rise to a partial human being, or one in permanent divorce from the rest of his being, which is taken as a forerunner of German idealism. The criticisms of Hegel are recurrent, while recognising the importance of his philosophical construction. According to Sanz del Río, Hegelian idealism forgets the subject and the object, and focuses on the pure activity of thinking: “the pure ideal, pure thinking is, without the thinker and the thought, a pure abstract without motive or value.”\textsuperscript{16} This danger is averted in the Krausist system precisely because of this first intuition, prior to all discursive thought and assumed in the subject-object relation. This beginning of knowing is especially relevant for understanding the activity of the self, for this activity is never only one of its properties, but the self, as an undivided whole, is determined in it, and can legitimately be said “I act”, where this “act” is not only one of its properties, for example, thought or will, but is realised with the whole being, with all its properties and essence, and in intimate collaboration of mind and body, as we will examine below.

Consciousness elaborates the data of knowledge into unity. This important premise of Krausism became a battle horse against empiricism and part of positivism, which in general terms shared the philosophical position of the aggregate or series of ideas of sensory origin, thus denying the existence of an

\textsuperscript{13} Castro y Fernández, Metafísica, 20; Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (Philosophical Library, 1956), 53.

\textsuperscript{14} Castro y Fernández, Metafísica, 20.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Sanz del Río; Krause, Sistema de la filosofia, LIX.
organ or centralising capacity that would give them unity. That is to say, they basically denied consciousness as the possibility of a phenomenal or substantial entity prior to experience itself. Castro discusses this position, drawing especially on the contemporary discoveries and findings of positivism, such as those of the psychophysics of Wundt, who reinvent the Kantian concept of “apperception” as a psychic phenomenon to explain the unitary sense of our sensations. Already in those years there was agreement in the neurological field, albeit with different interpretations, that it was the nervous system with its main organ, the brain, which reorganised the sensory data and configured the experience as a unit. What positivism denied was that consciousness was an entity distinct from perceived phenomena.

In this respect, and in dialogue with Hartmann’s philosophy of the unconscious, Castro enunciates the concepts of total consciousness [conciencia total] and actual consciousness [conciencia actual], of the utmost importance for the whole Krausist system, with which he rejects the explanation of the conscious-unconscious relationship. This distinction is based on the fact that the present consciousness is a determination or moment of the total consciousness, in which one is present to oneself, without the division that thought introduces. In principle, the latter is a rational and real assumption in order to be able to have a particular consciousness, that is to say, to pay attention to an object. The total consciousness is understood as that in which perceptions are given, providing them with unity and a frame of reference. It is a background knowledge that, as we recognise it in consciousness, we give it actuality and it becomes a knowledge that is known:

The distinction between the unconscious and the conscious is thus reduced to that of total consciousness and actual consciousness. Present to myself I am present to all that I am; but in order to know myself of what I am particularly in each case I need to pay particular attention to it, and in this actualisation of the total consciousness (...) we will reach more or less according to the degree of intensity of the attention we pay.

Some years later, the phenomenological tradition, and in particular Sartre’s ontological phenomenology, would find in this distinction not only an overcoming of the Freudian unconscious but also an explanation of how the in-

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17 Castro y Fernández, Metafísica, 41–42.
18 Ibid., 47–48.
19 Castro y Fernández, Metafísica, 48–49.
tentional relation of our consciousness with respect to the world is possible. Sartre calls them respectively pre-reflexive consciousness or non-positional consciousness and reflexive consciousness or positional consciousness.\textsuperscript{20} Today, cognitive psychology has also validated this distinction.\textsuperscript{21} With this concept of total consciousness and actual consciousness, Castro integrates and resolves Hartmann’s notion of consciousness as a discontinuous act or fact. Therefore, the Krausist philosopher argues: “if my consciousness is a fact, and a discontinuous fact, I am a phenomenon or a series of phenomena,”\textsuperscript{22} this would lead, he continues, to the absurdity that, eliminating consciousness’ substantiality and thought-enabling function, thought would become independent of it, giving rise to a thought without a thinking subject, or, even more, to the paradox that one could only know that one thinks by observing in others the same behaviour that one has when one thinks. It is interesting to note here contemporary positions close to Hartmann’s, such as that of New Realism,\textsuperscript{23} according to which everything is a fact, “thoughts about facts are just more facts.”\textsuperscript{24} In this respect, from Krausism, this position could still have the same response that Castro offered to Hartmann.

In the unity of the self, two opposing but necessarily complementary properties are found, that of selfhood [seidad] and that of wholeness [todeidad],\textsuperscript{25} namely, identity of the self with itself and totality or possession of everything contained within the self.\textsuperscript{26} In other words, on the one hand, the self in relation to itself as the principle of differentiation by which the essence is what it is and not something else, and, on the other hand, the being as a whole in relation to its content before the differentiation of the latter, i.e. as the integrating principle of the essence, by which the essence embraces all that is.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Jean-Paul Sartre, \textit{Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology} (Philosophical Library, 1956), 53.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Robert Hanna and Michelle Maiese, \textit{Embodied Mind in Actions} (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), 32.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Castro y Fernández, \textit{Metafísica}, 49.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Markus Gabriel, \textit{Why the World Does Not Exist} (Polity Press, 2015).
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 6.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Terms that translate krause’s concepts of \textit{Selbsheit} (Selfhood) and \textit{Einheit} (Unity or wholeness) respectively.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Giner de los Ríos, Hermenegildo, \textit{Resumen de Ética para los alumnos de 2\textdegree{} enseñanza} (Librería Española de Antonio López, 1903), 17.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Castro y Fernández, \textit{Metafísica}, 115–116.
\end{itemize}
Principles, after all, that make it possible for unity to appear to consciousness before plurality, and the whole before the parts:

The union is subdistinguished from the original unity, within which it is given, and which affirms its essence as such even in the union itself. Thus we think of the different limbs in the unity of the human body and the different men in humanity as being united.\(^{28}\)

The relationship between being, essence and existence, unavoidable concepts of metaphysics, has a special importance in the configuration of the Krausist conception of the self, and therefore deserves clarification here. It should also be noted that it was precisely on the definition and use of these terms that much of the controversy with the most representative philosophical systems of the time in Spain, especially with Scholastic neo-Thomism, was founded. Being is defined as essence, which, in turn, is what being is, its properties. Existence is the mode in which the essence is posited (or affirmed), i.e. the determination of the essence. It follows that there is no real separation between essence and existence, but that the latter depends on the positing of the former \([\text{depende del ponerse del primero}]\), so that “in being, if it is really seen as such, one immediately discovers essence, and in it which is \([\text{lo que es}]\) and is posited \([\text{y se pone}]\), existence.”\(^{29}\) In this affirmation of the simultaneity of being and existing he agrees with the philosopher Jaime Balmes,\(^{30}\) although for different reasons, since, in Krausism, this position depends on its conception of being as a real concept, whereas Scholasticism based its metaphysics on the “empty concept of entity” (Latin \(ens\)-\(entis\)).

The debate from the standpoint of Scholasticism, in Castro’s view, is based on “the opposition between the concepts of the entity \(\text{ente}\) (the being that is not or at least is indifferent to being) and the being \(\text{ser}\) (that which is).”\(^{31}\) And the entity \(\text{ente}\) is not (has no being) because it is only a concept of the understanding, an abstraction made of being and of the real, a mere form of thought -which will be taken by Hegel to his conception of absolute idealism-. Therefore, Castro will end up arguing that “considered being without being can be considered being without essence and essence without existence, which is thinking backwards, but thinking rightly, the being that is can-

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28 Ibid., 125.  
29 Ibid., 92.  
30 Manuel Suances Marcos, Historia de la filosofía española contemporánea (Síntesis, 2006), 37.  
31 Castro y Fernández, Metafísica, 95.
not be conceived without essence nor its essence without existence.”

Hence, the whole problem lies in the scholastic concept of entity (being without being), whereas Krausism founds the real in being (not in the abstract being), which is the first intuition, the original and founding intuition. That being is identified with essence and implies existence, because what is, exists, and does so in its own way.

It must then be emphasised that the self which is grasped in self-consciousness and which is prior to the distinction between subject and object corresponds to Being, the essence of which is realised in existence through the determination of the properties of the self. This is crucial to understand why Krausism is not a mere idealism, and why, in fact, it can be said to have an important existential component, for every being is embedded in their existent. The self is always embedded, and this brings us to the way in which it posits or affirms itself in existence through its activity (section 4) and with its body (section 5).

III. THE EMBEDDED SELF: THE POSITING OF THE SELF IN EXISTENCE

The self qua essence does not exhaust in its determinations; its potentiality is its essence, which is driven by the duty [el deber] to make itself effective in time. Essence becomes effective through change [el mudar], that is, “that property by means of which a being, while remaining always the same in its essence, becomes another at each point in its determination.”

Change [el mudar] is a formal property, which enables the realisation of the self in its essence. Hence, this concept is important to understand the progress of humanity in terms of vital and social changes, making each one’s being effective. But in order to understand this issue, it is necessary to go deeper into the mechanism of change and time. As mentioned above, in a quotation from Hermenegildo Giner, there are three fundamental points to which attention is paid: the changing, the being that remains, and the being that becomes other in its determination. The one is permanent and the other temporary. The first is the foundation of the second, so there are two modes of the same be-

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32 Ibid., 96.
33 Giner de los Ríos, H., Resumen de Psicología para uso de los alumnos de 2ª enseñanza, 38.
ing, just as consciousness could be divided into total and actual, namely, the
being that does not change, but remains as foundation and possibility; and
that very being determined in reality, realised in a factual and effective way
in time. The former is the essence, which does not change but is always the
same, which gives unity and continuity to being; while the latter is the mate-
rialisation of that essence, always taking place in time, now in one way, then
in another, creating a succession of determinations in which there is room for
opposition and relative negations. This succession is made possible by time
-before, after- and, in its totality, is what shapes the life of each human being:

A being does not change [muda] in its being or in its properties, but in the
individual determination of its properties (...) the relative being and non-
being of the change [mudar] is only concerned with the particular states of
the subject, and this successively, through time.  

In reality, the essence or the permanent being is the supposed foundation
of the determinations or of the temporal existence of the subject, that is to say,
human nature is founding subjects’ activity at every moment, the latter being
the most evident for the testimony of the senses. Krausism at this point estab-
lishes a relation of duty or obligation between permanent being and temporal
existence. The question that arises is why the essence has to be made effective,
i.e. from where does this necessity come. In Sistema de la filosofía: Análisis,
the following answer is given:

If at some point or state of my thinking I knew everything there is to know,
at that point I would not need to think any more, my thinking would be
immutable (...) because, in each present will I propose a determined end,
and not others, that is why I need to change, passing from one thought to
another, from one feeling to another, from one will to another, so that my
thinking, my feeling, my will are filled, so that my limitation expands, so that
I am more real and effective [para que yo sea más real y efectivo] in my life.  

It is, thus, the limitation of the effective or actual existence [existencia efec-
tiva], in contrast to the infinity of essence, which compels, whether we want
it or not, this constant determination. Human beings, therefore, thus con-
sidered, live somehow a “double life”: the permanent and the temporal, from
whose harmony or composition the realisation of themselves as an integral

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34 Sanz del Río; Krause, Sistema de la filosofía, 133.
35 Sanz del Río; Krause, Sistema de la filosofía, 137.
part of humanity is expected “in such a way that the changeable expresses the permanent, albeit determined and concrete.”

That the essence determines itself in its inner change also means that the self determines itself in each of these changes, and that these changes contain the previous ones, accumulating and making the subsequent ones possible. The essence that is thus determined is no longer the same, and cannot return to its previous state. This idea does not appear in Sistema de la filosofía: Análisis, but it can be read in Castro’s Metafísica: “The entirety of my self is determined [todo yo me determino] in every change, however small it may be (…) the possibilities of change is a mode of being within my permanent essence [lo mudable es, y es dentro de mi esencia permanente] (…) The essence, once determined, does not return to its previous state of indetermination: as my own, every state in me remains.”

According to what has been transcribed above, the self is self-determined in such a way that it follows a progress without the possibility of pause or return. This self-determination—in terms of realization of its potentiality or dar de sí as the so-called School of Madrid with Ortega y Gasset at its head will put it—is realised by means of temporary states which 1) cannot be repeated identically in subsequent moments, and 2) for this very reason, in turn, conditions the essence in its subsequent self-determination until the totality of its possibilities have been realised. This is the metaphysical and anthropological foundation of the linear and ascending progress that Krause and Spanish Krausism maintain, which is of great interest for a full understanding of human behaviour in history and society. In later Spanish thought, specifically in that of Ortega y Gasset, this conception of the determination of being continues as an accumulation in which particular determinations act by reducing the possibilities of future determinations: “Here is a new dimension of that strange reality which is life. Before us are the various possibilities of being, but behind us is what we have been. And what we have been acts negatively on what we can be.”

36 Hermenegildo Giner de los Ríos, Resumen de Ética para los alumnos de 2ª enseñanza (Librería Española de Antonio López, 1903), XVII.
37 Castro y Fernández, Metafísica, 293.
38 José Ortega y Gasset, Historia como sistema (Espasa-Calpe, 1971), 49.
As for time as the constitutive form of change, it is the Krausist version of the Aristotelian definition: “time is the measure of movement.” In fact, it is the succession of the inner changes of the self that makes time. Thus, common experience can testify that the change of position of the body creates a succession of before and after, whereas when one does not move in space, time does not seem to pass, because according to the Krausist explanation, one has not made one’s own time—although one has unfailingly made it with other determinations such as that of thought-. The analytical part of the Sistema de la filosofía, as can be inferred from what is written above, can only prove or show the subjective truth of time, in relation to the self. However, although it cannot go further, it postulates ideas of reason to get out of the pressing solipsism to which this leads, in this case, the idea that all men “make common and coincident times, living in a common duration and present.”

From the notions of change and permanence of the self are inferred those of foundation and cause. Krausist metaphysics, like all nineteenth-century systems to a large extent, is substantialist. It wonders about the foundation of those realities that it comes to know or discovers in its consciousness. The idea of foundation is inferred from the idea of change as a property of the self—since the self finds its properties—; understanding by foundation “that of which it is, and in which it is something determined, as given and contained in it, that is, as founded.” But, in this definition, the self is only expressed as the foundation of its properties, namely the property of changing. However, the self in relation to its particular changes is also considered as founding them, i.e. causing them; since the cause is the foundation in its action of determining the founded according to itself: “the cause [la razón de causa] expresses the foundation as determining, active.” In this causing of the self with respect to its changes, potentiality and activity are also at play, the former as the essence of the self in its unlimited content, i.e. its possibility, and activity, the self as the cause of its determinations:

Besides being the eternal foundation [debajo de ser yo fundamento eterno] of my temporal possibility, I am also the temporal foundation of my

40 Sanz del Río; Krause, Sistema de la filosofía, 157.
41 Ibid., 159.
42 Sanz del Río; Krause, Sistema de la filosofía, 163.
effectiveness each time (...) And, just as in the first instance [percepción] I know myself and call myself substantively potentiality [potencia], I call myself in the second instance with the same meaning and categorical name: activity.\textsuperscript{43}

In the passage from potentiality to actuality or effectiveness [efectividad], the self is determined in three different ways: thinking, feeling and willing. These three activities make up the constant actualisation of the self. They are therefore inner activities, prior to outer action, which requires the help of the body to realise them. However, it must be emphasised that these types of “spiritual” activity are considered human actions, so that a physical act, for example, giving a speech, is as much an action as is thinking or feeling such a speech. Both are activities, although it is the inner ones that direct the outer ones, which have their origin in the former. The analytical law of knowledge follows from the whole to the part, from the inner to the outer.

It is noteworthy for the matter at hand that these activities, determined and grounded in the self, are in a certain sense the self itself, hence they are perceived as properties of the self, by which its potentiality is realised in the succession of time we call life: “I myself, in my potentiality [potencia] and activity to realise my essence as my good constantly (by principle) during my life, know, feel, will; I am intelligence, sensibility, will.”\textsuperscript{44} The whole is in each of its parts, so that when one thinks, it is the self that thinks and does so with the infinite possibilities of its essence. This realisation of the essence through one’s own activity is called the good: “we recognise here that the Good is the law of our total activity, and that it must also be so for each determined state and at all times.”\textsuperscript{45} It is an Aristotelian teleological concept, by which it is understood that the end of human beings is to fulfil in themselves the idea of their nature;\textsuperscript{46} a fulfilment that is identified with the individual good and, in Krausism, at the same time, with the good of humanity.\textsuperscript{47} Hence, the impor-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 183.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 208.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Nicolás Salmerón, “Concepto de la Metafísica y plan de su parte analítica”, Boletín-Revista de la Universidad de Madrid 2, no. 24 (1870): 1670.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Salmerón, “Concepto de la Metafísica y plan de su parte analítica”, 1667.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Ricardo Pinilla Burgos, “Krausismo y humanismo: la idea de la humanidad en la filosofía de Krause”, in Teoría del humanismo, ed. Pedro Aullón de Haro (Verbum, 2010), volume 7.
\end{itemize}
tance of activity with respect to human beings and the society or societies in which they develop.  

Properties are temporarily determined always and even if one does not want to: “I need to think, to feel, to want continuously, and every time, whether I want to or not; and although we can determine each of these actions in new and various ways, we cannot cease to determine it, to suspend it.” It is not possible to stop determining oneself; it is only possible to choose how to do so. So the self cannot refuse to think, but it can change the object of its thinking. The realisations of the essence follow one another, always changing, creating time, which Krausism explains by means of the concept of continuity: “unity of the whole in multiplicity [la unidad del todo en la multiplicidad].” This continuous activity of the self could give the impression of describing the self as pure activity, a criticism made of Fichte and the French eclectics in Sistema de la filosofía: Análisis. However, the self for Krausism is something more than activity, as has been shown above; it is also its foundation, the potentiality or essence as the possibility of determination in activity. In order for the self to be recognised as activity, it would first have to be recognised as potentiality, and in a higher sense, it would have to be recognised as a unitary whole. That is, all activity is related to an essence, actualising or realising it. The Fichtean absolute idealist concept of the self as pure activity (its essence is its activity), derived from the Aristotelian pure act or entelechy, is thus rectified in Krausism, so that in the three types of permanent activity of the self, the self as potentiality becomes effective: “I thus enter into myself from potentiality to actuality [de potencia a acto], from being to fact, in knowing, feeling, willing, applying at each time my forces and means to realise my essence as my good by reason of end, in the form of law, as long as I live.”

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49 Sanz del Río; Krause, *Sistema de la filosofía*, 212.
51 Sanz del Río; Krause, *Sistema de la filosofía*, 186.
53 Sanz del Río; Krause, *Sistema de la filosofía*, 213.
IV. THE EMBODIED SELF THROUGH ITS ACTIVITIES

The self knows itself immediately as mind and only mediately as body. This is the first distinction that the self finds within itself, as part of its content: “Within myself [yo en mi interior], and in particular, I am body and mind [espíritu]54, as a man.”55 Although it constitutes a unitary whole with the mind, the body is perceived as merely united with the mind, it does not know its essences and properties directly and only some of its states are determined in it by the mind, while the latter is identified as substantially one, its own and all of itself, the cause of its states.56 The mind is reflexive and free to direct itself towards itself in its activity, while the body is bound to nature.57 From this first knowledge of the content of the self (mind and body) and of their union, one comes to consider man (human being) the composite of both and, in turn, by analogical reasoning, one passes to the knowledge of other men (as minds and bodies together). Therefore, the knowledge we may have of others “is in all its terms and degrees linked and conditioned with our own knowledge.”58 This problematic aspect of the knowledge of others comes to qualify the Krausist optimism of their theory of knowledge, that is, the identification of subject and object in rational consciousness, for “in order to know an external world and our relation to it, this world must be found in some way in us, that is, known in reason and represented in fantasy (which refers to mental images).”59 In this way, he who wants to know other men as real in this world discovers an insurmountable limit, which is that “the limit of his human knowledge measures his judgements and social feelings.”60 The recognition of intersubjectivity in Krause and Spanish Krausism starts from the analogical argument, as Husserl’s phenomenology will partly do precisely until the appearance of the concepts of flesh or Lieb (lived-body) and körper (object-body) in a primordial sense, which constitute his attempt at surpass-

54 In Spanish, the term “espíritu” literally translates the German “Geist”.
55 Sanz del Río; Krause, Sistema de la filosofía, 67.
57 Giner de los Ríos, H., Resumen de Psicología para uso de los alumnos de 2ª enseñanza, 17–18.
58 Sanz del Río; Krause, Sistema de la filosofía, 97.
59 Ibid., 50.
60 Ibid., 98.
ing the “analogizing transfer”\textsuperscript{61} by introducing the self into the shared world through the experience of its own body coexisting with others.\textsuperscript{62} In Krausism, however, the analogy is only provisional, for its truth is established from the knowledge of God in the synthetic part of its doctrine. However, in the analytical part, the knowledge of others is realised through the determinations of the self, that is, not only thinking or rationally considering the analogical existence of the other, but also more practically by feeling and willing towards each other insofar as the self is body as well as mind. This embodiment or irreducibility of the body to the mind, and moreover, essential union of the two as constituents of the self,\textsuperscript{63} is definitely a Krausist insight in which later philosophical positions could be reflected.

Nevertheless, Castro discusses the apparent difficulty of knowing one’s own body, given that only the mind has direct and immediate intuition of it, as well as the paradox of the union of non-exclusive opposite realities such as mind and body. What happens is that the body communicates immediately and totally with the mind in a co-ordinated and organic way, which means that even involuntarily the mind and the body are one and the same unitary being, like the head and the arms, both parts of the same organism. However, the way of knowing the body and the mind are different: the one is exterior, the other interior; to know the one “I put it as it were in front of me, I project it outwards, I exteriorise it, while to know myself as mind [espíritu] I put myself more and more in myself [me pongo cada vez más en mí], I interiorise myself, I concentrate.”\textsuperscript{64} Just as in consciousness I know myself as a whole and properly as a mind, the body refers its knowledge to nature, just as the part to the whole, and it has already been shown that for Krausism the latter is rationally prior to the former, so that it follows that for a full knowledge of the body one must first know nature; however, from consciousness, any knowledge of it must necessarily be provisional, not real or objective,\textsuperscript{65} hence the unavoidable difficulty of knowing one’s own body and even the body of

\textsuperscript{61} Edmund Husserl, \textit{Cartesian Meditations} (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), 111–113; regarding this issue in Husserl’s thought, see also the recent comments of Christoph Durt, “The Embodied Self and the Paradox of Subjectivity”, \textit{Husserl Studies} 36, no. 1 (2020), 69–85.

\textsuperscript{62} Husserl, \textit{Cartesian Meditations}, 119 (in the Fifth Meditation).

\textsuperscript{63} Göcke, \textit{The Panentheism of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause}, 73.

\textsuperscript{64} Castro y Fernández, \textit{Metafísica}, 177.

\textsuperscript{65} Castro y Fernández, \textit{Metafísica}, 179.
others; the only thing that can be known is the idea we have of it: “I do not see nature, then, except in relation to my body, nor of it except the latter’s states in relation to those of the former, or rather those of the latter in the relation in which I suppose them to be in relation to those of the former.”

Let us now turn to the second question, that of the impossibility that two opposite elements can be found together without excluding each other. As we know, body and mind are opposites within the unity of the self, and this affirmation put on alert above all those who judged from the Aristotelian categories (whether from Scholasticism or from Hegelianism); but the judgement that denies the possibility that these two elements can exist at the same time, is the one that understands the principle of contradiction as a purely principle of thought, that is, an abstraction of the intellect, with no correspondence in reality. For, this logical principle enunciated by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* as “a thing cannot at the same time be and not be” and in the *Logic*: “affirmation and negation cannot be true at the same time and of the same subject,” is not real, since in reality there is no contradiction, i.e. there is no absolute negation of one term by another, but only relative negation: “for there to be such a thing it would be necessary for being and non-being to be given together (…) it requires the absence of any middle ground between the contrary elements.” An example of this would be to say that there is a contradiction between black and white, because in reality there are opposite colours, between which there is an innumerable range of shades, one does not absolutely negate the other, which is why the two can go together. The absolute negation of black, which is physically the total absence of light, would be, for example, the absolute whiteness of a luminous beam, but this logical contradiction, between the presence and the absolute absence of light, cannot be predicated of any real subject simultaneously. This idea, as far as the self is concerned, in his analytical perception is that “I, considered in myself, have no contrary, but inwardly I show myself in two beings, which I equally am, my mind [espíritu] and my body, relatively contrary, and as long as and to the extent that I am the one I am not the other.”

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66 Ibid., 187.
68 Sanz del Río; Krause, *Sistema de la filosofía*, 207.
conclude, mutually limit each other in the self, but they do not cancel each other out; each is what the other is not, and therein lies their finitude so that “the mind [espíritu] is what I am without what my body is, and reciprocally.”

However, in doing or acting [con el hacer], the correspondence of properties in the mind and the body is realised. That is to say, the external fact is brought about by this perfect link between the elements of the self, so that my activity of wanting to lift an arm corresponds to the lifting of this arm, just as thinking corresponds to the activity of the brain and feeling to the organs and vital functions. These voluntary movements, according to the analytical psychological doctrine of Giner brothers, are “the means by which we fulfil our resolutions in any order of life: in our body, in Nature, or in society with men.” The above-mentioned are called partial movements (arm, voice, eye, hands...); there are other types of movements where the joint action of the mind and the body can also be appreciated: they are the total ones (change of the whole body): within this we find the transitory ones [estacionales] or ways of being (standing, sitting, etc.), the attitudes (combination of limbs in each position or state) and the movements called locomotion (they are properly speaking changes of place).

The relation between the mind and the body in feeling would consist primarily in sensation, which, in addition to providing information for knowledge, is related to feelings of pain or pleasure, depending on the accommodation with the sense organs. Apart from sensation, this relation is posited in phenomena of common experience such as the fact that a feeling affects a person’s countenance, whether by altering the pulse or the circulation of the blood, or by an increase in saliva or bile, or by paralysis, fainting and convulsions. Furthermore, he notes that every feeling is accompanied by a physiological or muscular reaction, such as smiling, twinkling of the eyes, laughing and crying, etc. In the same way the body affects the state of the mind by exciting it to joy or sadness according to its state of health or the chemical substances to which

71 Ibid., 210.
72 Sanz del Río expressly mentions the semantic differences of Spanish words in relation to activity, thus, “hacer” is taken as that which represents external activity, see Sanz del Río; Krause, Sistema de la filosofía, 184.
73 Giner de los Ríos, H., Resumen de Psicología para uso de los alumnos de 2ª enseñanza, 173; see also Francisco Giner de los Ríos, Lecciones sumarias de psicología, in Obras Completas. Volumen 4 (La Lectura, 1920), 230.
it is subjected. He concludes with the thought that the bodily organism and the reactions of the mind mutually reproduce each other in the state of mind as their effect. Psychosomatic phenomena have a charter under Krausism.

The relationship of body and mind under knowing is defined as the modification or alteration of our thinking as a function of our bodily state, for example in health or illness. So too, thought is reflected in the body, by signs of what one thinks, either in meditation, or during the very development of intelligence, which, they point out, is seen in changes of physiognomy. Other relations between body and mind in thinking are based on the extension or restriction with which the body acts in knowledge: thus the body takes us out of our solipsism, allowing us to communicate with others through language, or it provides information to our thinking through its senses, completing and contrasting our ideas. The latter is one more way of expressing the embeddings of the self in a particular existence and among others as constitutively body or embodiment. However, the body can be an impediment to concentration in thinking, due to the attention we pay to sense and the physical needs of rest and nutrition, delaying the fulfilment of humans’ rational purpose in meditation and reflection: “the relation of the mind to the body limits also our intellectual sphere, and sometimes hinders the fulfilment of its end.”

The latter, qualified by the recognition of the attention required to sense and body, clearly stamps an idealistic tone, for it emphasises the rational and spiritual part of human beings, showing the body as an impediment. An idea that in other writings of Krausism is contemporised with the inexcusable defence of the co-operation of the body for the ultimate end of human beings.

Therefore, it must be said that the establishment of these restrictions of the body with respect to the mind is preceded by the advantages that the latter experiences from cooperation with the former: “Thought receives an extension of its activity from the body, inasmuch as it is only through its senses that it comes to know everything individual that exceeds our mind [espíritu].” What seems at all times evident is the rational end of human life for which the body seems to occupy a secondary, ancillary position. However, as mentioned above, mind and body maintain an indissoluble relationship in which each, from its

74 Giner de los Ríos, Francisco, Lecciones sumarias de psicología, in Obras Completas (La Lectura, 1920), 201–4.
75 Ibid., 151.
76 Giner de los Ríos F, Lecciones sumarias de psicología, 150.
properties, reproduces the activities of the self, for “each quality of the self is in the mind as proper and absolute, in the body as total and continuous.”

V. CONCLUSION

If Krause’s philosophy meant an advance in the understanding of the self with respect to that of contemporary thinkers, it is fundamentally in conceiving that it is simultaneously potentiality and actuality, or rather, an essence whose temporal existence, although distinguishable, forms with it a synthetic unity. Spanish Krausists precisely emphasised this existential aspect of the human being as self in a particular reality in which we communicate with other selves and in a body which we also consider to be an essential part of us. If the analogical argument was used in the analytical part to justify the knowledge of others as beings of consciousness like the self, it is nevertheless in the activity that we direct towards others in the world, through the will, feelings and sensations of our body, that we obtain this practical certainty of intersubjectivity. This conception of the self that is determined in its essence through its activities in the world opened the door to an unceasing work in the field of pedagogy, politics and culture, which sought precisely the recognition first, that both body and mind had to be cultivated harmoniously, and second, that both the self and others shared the same essence and therefore the same end towards which they had to cooperate.

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