TAKING SELVES SERIOUSLY
By
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In his inaugural address entitled Multiculturalism: The Politics of Recognition presented at the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University in 1990, Charles Taylor argues that a person suffering from the lack of adequate recognition is an evil that can be ranked in the same echelons of harm as inequality, exploitation, and injustice.¹ This is so, Taylor argues, because people’s identities are established as a function of what can be negotiated in the public sphere. Thus, misrepresentation, or lack of representation, can produce distorted and negative identities that can result in extreme psychological suffering and faulty life plans—something feminists, and others, have been arguing for decades.² It is for that reason, that Taylor argues that due recognition “is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.”³

Having thus made the case that non-recognition or misrecognition, “can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone is a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being,”⁴ Taylor goes on to briefly review the potential clash that this “self fact” sets up between “the politics of equal dignity” (which is based on the idea that all humans are equally worthy of respect, regardless of gender, skin colour, sexual orientation, etc.) and the “politics of difference” which objects to the difference-blind fashion⁵ that the former advocates, and argues instead that “we have to recognize and even foster particularity.”⁶ This, in turn, leads to the notion that, since an individual’s identity may be tied to her culture, cultures (rather than mere individuals) have legitimate claims to recognition. Taylor cites, as an example, the French-Canadian bid for recognition as a “distinct society” which has clashed with the “difference-blind” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Taylor also analyzes how the dynamics of self-recognition makes a serious claim on what counts as adequate educational material. That is, if the struggle for freedom and equality must pass through individual identity-formation, it seems to follow that concerted efforts ought to be made to include, for example, Afrocentric texts in mainly black schools⁷ and authors other than dead white males in university humanities departments. Taylor, and others, goes to considerable length in analyzing the latter issue, i.e., the degree to which the established canon must be modified so as to accede to the demands of multiculturalists.

¹ Taylor 1994, p. 64.
² Thus, Taylor says that people can suffer real damage “if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or contemptible picture of themselves.” Ibid., p. 25.
⁴ Ibid., p. 25.
⁵ Ibid., p. 43.
⁶ Ibid., p. 43.
⁷ Ibid., p. 65.
What is particularly interesting about Taylor’s analysis and, indeed, the whole movement of the “Politics of Recognition” that it has spawned, is that it counts “the integrity of individual self-consciousness” as a genuine human good, along with more obvious physical goods such as lack of overt oppression and equal access to social opportunities. What is distressing, however, about Taylor’s analysis and its associated movement, (which, ironically, may suffer from a “recognition failure” due to “adultist” and “sexist” attitudes) is that it is blind to the enormity and depth of the educational transformation that must be undertaken in primary and secondary school systems (rather than just re-jigging a few materials for university, or even regional school, consumption) if we are going to do more than merely pay lip-service to the fact that the self really is a product of recognition.

Since the notion of “self as dialogue” was systematically articulated by George Herbert Mead in the 1930’s, and discussed at length by John Dewey in his writings about education and democracy around the same period, both these authors have much to say about educational obligations that this notion spawns. Rousseau, also speaks to this issue, as does Piaget, and (tangentially) Ronald Dworkin in his article Liberalism, and his book Taking Rights Seriously—the template of that title being borrowed for this paper.

Using a weave of these authors, along with a tribute to Philosophy for Children founder Matthew Lipman for his heroic efforts to relocate philosophy’s potential transformative power from the exclusive elitist halls of esoteric post-secondary education to the “common kids” in the K-12 system, it will be argued in what is to follow that, if we really are going to take the formation of selves seriously as Taylor would have us do, then, with regard to education, we are obligated to do A LOT more than the sort of window dressing that Taylor and his commentators muse about. If we take “the self as dialogue” seriously, we are going to have to transform our system of schooling from the bottom up so as to create an environment that, in Neil Portman’s words, not only prepares our youngsters for making a living, but as well, for making a life, i.e., we are going to have to create—a dialogical environment that puts youngsters firmly on the road to taking charge of their own self-formation in dialogue with others.

Such an environment would be in sharp contrast to the hedonistic, hyper sexualized, treacherously balkanized, conformist inducing, materialistic, drug soaked, mindless, self-stultifying and often literally dangerous environments that our youngsters are presently required to negotiate, often to their peril.

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8 Thus, for example, in her introduction to Taylor(1994), Gutman says that “a primary aim of liberal arts universities is not to create bookworms, but to cultivate people who are willing and able to be self-governing in both their political and personal lives,” p. 17. In light of the fact that only a small fraction of the world’s youngsters spend a significant amount of time in liberal arts departments of universities, and in light of the fact that those who are there are already adults and hence have already established strong habits of mind, one wonders why it is not evident that merely focusing on what should be taught in liberal arts universities is short-sighted. And elsewhere Gutman says “Colleges and universities can serve as models for deliberation by encouraging rigorous, honest, open, and intense intellectual discussions, both inside and outside the classroom, p. 23. Is this not closing the barn door after most of the herd has left?

9 Postman 1995, p. x.

10 In emphasizing this “self fact,” Taylor says: “We need relationships to fulfill, but not to define, ourselves,” 1994, p. 33. And “We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometime in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us,” p. 33. And “My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others,” p. 34.
The self as a function of others

It is crucial that we begin our analysis by noting that when Mead claims that the self develops as a result of dialogue, he is not saying merely that one’s self-evaluation is influenced by the judgment of others (a thesis that sometimes seems to waft through discussion of the Politics of Recognition). What Mead is saying, rather, is something much more profound and that is that self-consciousness as such quite literally develops because of, and only because of, social interaction. Without interaction, in other words, there would be no self-consciousness—a theory, by the way, that is empirically supported by experiment carried out by Gallup\(^\text{11}\) who showed that the self-consciousness evident in chimps as measured by mirror-related activities is absent in chimps that are raised in isolation.

In what, though, precisely, does this emerging self-consciousness consist? Mead describes this emerging self-consciousness as an emerging awareness that there is a correlation between the changing affect (or response) of the other and particular units of one’s own behaviour. A young child, in other words, becomes aware of her actions through the fact that a change in the behaviour, verbal response, and/or attitude of the other sends the message that her actions are positively or negatively valued by that other. Thus, according to Mead, self-consciousness, rather than being some mysterious metaphysical exudate of the brain, is rather an awareness of one’s behaviour through the fact that it is valued either positively or negatively by others. And Mead goes on to say, as is an inevitable corollary of his original hypothesis, that self-conscious is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but is, rather, a matter of degree, and that that degree is a function of the number of different evaluative viewpoints that the agent can entertain at any one time.

We can turn to Piaget for a physical analogical look at what Mead had in mind with regard to the development of the self. In Piaget’s famous conservation experiment,\(^\text{12}\) if a young child, before approximately six years of age, let’s call her Janie, watches the same amount of water being poured first into a tall slim glass and then into a short fat glass, and is then asked which glass has more, her answer will depend on which dimension is more salient: height or width. But Janie will definitely say that either the taller glass has more or the wider has more, despite the fact that she saw the same amount of water being poured into each glass.

After the age of six, when Janie is able to take into account more than one dimension at any one time AND because she has acquired a more sophisticated vocabulary, she will say that the amount in the different glasses has the same volume, despite the fact that they look dissimilar. What is important to note here is that to move to this level, Janie needs to be able to hold at least two dimensions in her mind at the same time (i.e., height and width) AND she needs a vocabulary that can move her to a higher level of abstraction (i.e., the concept of volume). This change in perception that is picked up in Piaget’s conservation experiment parallels Mead’s theory of the development of the self which he describes as moving from the play stage,\(^\text{13}\) when a child can take into account the viewpoint of only one

\(^{11}\) Gallup 1977.
\(^{12}\) Ginsberg and Opper 1969.
\(^{13}\) Mead 1934.
other at any one time, to the *game stage* in which the child can take into account a number of viewpoints through plugging them into an abstract game plan. This development of the self, or perhaps more precisely, this development of reflected evaluative self-perception, can be described as a process of *quantitative expansion and qualitative upgrading*.\(^{14}\)

If this analysis of self-consciousness is correct (a version of which Taylor and his commentators seem to accept), then it has radical consequences for the point and motivation of taking the viewpoints of others into account. That is, it suggests that advocates for the Politics of Recognition are **missing the point** when they argue that we ought to communicate across divides because to do so is what is demanded by the moral command that we **respect others**. The deeper message that this social theory of self-consciousness sends is that we ought to communicate across divides **also** because to do so is what is demanded by the moral command that we **respect ourselves**, i.e., because this is the communicative engine that fuels self-development.

This notion that respect for others and respect for oneself are fused finds an echo in W.F. Lofthouse’s book, *Ethics and the Family*.\(^{15}\) Written in 1912, and foreshadowing Mead’s theory of the social inception of the self, Lofthouse argues that we misunderstand humanity by our individualistic interpretation of human nature which inevitably leads us to assume that egoism and altruism are incompatible. Lofthouse argues that if we recognize that humans are *essentially* social, then seeking the justified approval of others (which appears egoistic) will push us to seeking ever expanded and increasingly impartial perspectives of both one’s own and others’ viewpoints since, in so doing, we will create for ourselves a larger space to do as we like without bumping up against the justified disapproval of others. (It is important to keep in mind here that it is *justified* disapproval, not just disapproval *per se*, that wounds—or that should wound.) Lofthouse asks us to look at the family which, at its best, nurtures an “attitude which is neither egoism or altruism, but something deeper and higher than both.”\(^{16}\)

**Educational implications of a social self.**

This notion that self-development is fuelled by *reflectively considering different viewpoints* has radical implications with regard to *early schooling*. Indeed, given the fact that Taylor references Mead in the article under consideration, and given the fact that, in his book *Sources of the Self: The Making of The Modern Identity* written a year earlier, he explicitly says that “a self exists only in ‘webs of interlocution’”\(^{17}\) and that “We find the sense of life through articulating it,” and that “how much sense there is for us depends upon our power of expression,”\(^{18}\) it is odd that he fails to speak to the educational implications of self-identity *except* insofar as they inform decisions about what university Humanities Departments ought to include in their curricula. This oddness is exacerbated by his frequent reference to Rousseau who was so famously concerned about what kind of people childhood—not universityhood—produces.\(^{19}\) Indeed, Rousseau seems to have

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\(^{14}\) Gardner 1981.  
\(^{15}\) Lofthouse 1912, p. 164.  
\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 168  
\(^{17}\) Taylor 1989, p. 33.  
\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 18.  
\(^{19}\) Rousseau 1993.
contemporary education directly in mind when he says (quoted by Taylor)\(^\text{20}\) that if we are serious about combating the desire for the kind of preferential esteem that solidifies divides, we have an urgent moral obligation to rectify the personality-changing atmosphere of our schools which feed into hierarchical honour systems in which “one person’s glory must be another person’s shame, or at least obscurity.”

In his book *Democracy and Education*, John Dewey likewise argues that *personality transformation* ought to be the focus of our schools. He argues that primary/secondary schooling systems that focus mainly on information transfer and preparation for the workplace have lost their legitimacy. It is absolutely critical, rather, that schooling systems recognize that, whether they like it or not, they are in the business of self-creation.\(^\text{21}\)

Another way of putting Dewey’s point would be to say that if we are concerned about the kind of selves that are being created in childhood, as well as the habits of mind that strive to communicate across that which divides us (these two being flip sides of the same coin), then we must focus on the *process* that feeds the educational experience, and in particular, we need to enhance the quantity and quality of intersubjective interchange throughout our school systems.\(^\text{22}\)

And the problem is not just that reflective self-governance is endangered by our lack of emphasis on quality cooperative enquiry in our school systems. The more serious moral indictment is that we are quite literally stunting the growth of our youngsters’ selves through lack of genuine reflective exposure to alternative perspectives that would nudge our youngsters toward what Gadamer refers to as the “fusing of horizons.” And it is this fact, that selves can only grow as a function of *quantitative expansion and qualitative upgrading*, that this call for this kind of educational transformation is, importantly, immune to the charge that this is merely a Western Imperialist stunt that is motivated by the goal of further entrenching dominant and hegemonic power interests. The point of promoting free and open inquiry with regard to all ways of seeing the world is not, or not just, about enhancing greater ethical understanding of the sort that Amy Gutman refers to in the Preface to Taylor’s article\(^\text{23}\). The point is to create an environment that quite literally nudges the growth of selves.\(^\text{24}\)


\(^{21}\) “The school has the function also of coordinating within the disposition of each individual the diverse influences of the various social environments into which he enters. One code prevails in the family; another, on the street; a third, in the workshop or store; a fourth, in the religious association. As a person passes from one of the environments to another, he is subjected to antagonistic pulls, and is in danger of being split into a being having different standards of judgment and emotion for different occasions. This danger imposes upon the school a steadying and integrating office,” Dewey, 2007b, p. 21. “Beware of disciplinary training rather than personal development,” Ibid., p. 73.

\(^{22}\) “Were all instructors to realize that the quality of mental process, not the production of correct answers, is the measure of educative growth something hardly less than a revolution in teaching would be worked,” Ibid., p. 133. “Education in a democracy cannot be justified solely by its potential for material output,” Ibid., p. 93.

\(^{23}\) Gutman 1994, p. xiii.

\(^{24}\) Though it should be noted that Gutman herself notes that changing to a multicultural curriculum will do little in terms of promoting cross-cultural understanding if these books are not taught in the spirit of free and open inquiry. And she goes to say that “liberal education fails if intimidation leads to blind acceptance of those visions or if unfamiliarity leads us to blind rejection.”
In his article *Liberalism*, and in his book *Taking Rights Seriously*, Dworkin argues that a liberal society ought not to espouse any substantive view of what counts as the good life, but rather ought to remain firmly committed to the procedural commitment to treat people with equal respect, thereby allowing what counts as a good life to evolve out of dialogue. Given the framework outlined here, it is interesting to note that this distinction between substantive and procedural ethical commitments appears to collapse because the commitment to a dialogue-enhancing procedure becomes, from the point of view of self-development, a substantive view of what counts as a good life, i.e., one that maximizes self-development, though not one tied to any particular culture.

**Answering our educational responsibility**

This then, surely is the clarion call for *Philosophy for Children* (referred to by its advocates as P4C), a pedagogical initiative founded by philosopher Matthew Lipman. Unlike its postsecondary parent that tends to focus on information-transfer (i.e., information about the history of philosophy), *Philosophy for Children* anchors its pedagogy in a process called a *community of enquiry* in which students, under the tutelage of a philosophically-trained facilitator, engage in (returning to Dewey’s words, this time from his book *How We Think*), “Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends.” As well, and this is key, the topics discussed are always those picked by the participants. By thus focusing on issues that challenge participants where they live, an environment is created in which participants learn to articulate reasoned support for what they actually believe and, as well, are required to hear differing viewpoints, defended often passionately by others, thus creating an atmosphere which is precisely the kind that bumps up self-transformation of the sort described by Mead and tangentially advocated by scholars of the Politics of Recognition. This also, however, paradoxically, is P4C’s weakness because those who associate philosophy with discussions of Aristotle, Kant, and Hume, apparently can’t seem to help but look down with derision on a practice that would have its participants scrutinize such topics as whether it is OK to snitch on a classmate, or gossip about a friend, or engage in physical or verbal bullying, or cheat on an exam. This derision, of course, is compounded by the fact that working with young minds that are housed in bodies not old enough to gain membership in the honoured elitist institution of the university is seen as of little consequence either simply because they are children and/or because working with children is seen as women’s work (hence the original charge that it is adultism and/or sexism that prevents advocates of the Politics of Recognition from recognizing that the source-point of the river of recognition must begin in the waters of childhood).

**Dissipating relativism**

Adultism and sexism, however, may not be the only or even the most effective poison that keeps killing Dewey’s plea, made over 100 years ago, that, in our school systems, we ought to focus on process thinking and character formation rather information transfer and

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25 Quoted by Taylor 1994, p. 56.
26 Dewey 2007a, p. 7.
skill enhancement. The real killer may be the worry that wafts through and around Taylor’s claim that “a person suffering from the lack of adequate recognition is an evil that can be ranked in the same echelons of harm as inequality, exploitation, and injustice.” If identity claims are indeed as crucial as Taylor attests, then it would seem, if we are to avoid perpetrating inequality, exploitation, and injustice that we are called upon to recognize others as they define themselves. But if this is the case, putting philosophy in the hands of children could be characterized as the psychological equivalent of arming them with weapons of mass destruction. After all, children engaged in genuine inquiry will undoubtedly seriously question the values that underpin the identity of others, which, in turn, could potentially shred the attitudes of acceptance that Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition appear to advocate. It is much safer, is it not, to send out a clear message that we all ought to be maximally tolerant, i.e., that none of us ought to stand in judgment of others—an attitude, by the way, that our youngsters have embraced in spades, as is evidenced by a 2009 survey of Canadian teens, reported in the August 14 edition of The Vancouver Sun, that disclosed that 64% of Canadian teens agreed with the statement that “what’s right or wrong is a matter of personal opinion”27—an attitude that is materially reflected in the decision made by David Cash, a Berkeley University engineering student, who, in 1997, chose to turn the other way as his friend raped and then drowned a 7 year old girl, and who then proudly proclaimed that what his friend did had nothing to do with him and that it was not his place to judge.28

This is the ugly flip-side of the Politics of Recognition that has fed into the post-modern relativist message that carries the implicit assumption that all selves, and all cultures with which selves identify, must be of equal worth because there is no objective standard by which to differentiate some selves or viewpoints as more worthy than others. “Respect for persons,” therefore, demands that we all ought to forswear from the odious practice of standing in judgment over anyone else.

The difficulty with this otherwise laudable goal of trying to respect all persons is that refusing to recognize that selves can have more worth than others is to refuse to recognize that selves can develop, and it is to refuse to recognize that the notion of development carries with it the implicit assumption that the more development the better. This notion of development, in other words, carries the message that we are sorely misguided if we focus on selves as static things that require maintenance through mirroring. This notion of development, rather, argues that we must recognize that present selves are a product of past communication, and that for all selves, the ultimate good is not the preservation of its present mosaic, but, rather, the goal is for all selves to acquire the capacity and courage to engage in the sort of communication which maximizes the potential for growth. Or, to put a Deleuzian twist on it, one might say that there is always something outside our identifications as subjects or persons, which we play out through complexifying encounters29—that living together well requires creation30 and bold experimentation31 rather than the sad withered task of ratifying the status quo.32

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30 Ibid., p. 134.
31 Ibid., p. 68.
32 Ibid., p. 57.
Communication that nudges mutual self-development, of course, is tough stuff. This is not the namby pamby, self-esteem boosting, mutual-ego-messaging of everyone’s opinion being as good as everyone else’s. Nor is it the sort that gives greater worth and welcome to opinions expressed by members of victimized groups thereby assuaging the guilt of those not similarly harmed. This is, rather, the sort of communicative action of which Habermas speaks in which the offering of justification is the ticket of admission for any opinion, and the potential prize of mutual acceptance is not a function of good will but rather a function of the degree to which opinions withstands falsification. This, interestingly, is not far from Taylor’s own words when he says, in his Sources of the Self, that frameworks (which define who we are) supersede one another in error-reducing moves, i.e., that selves develop as a function of epistemic gain.34

The corollary of this claim that self and truth are tied tightly together is, of course, that communicating across divides may not be possible. If like a young Piagetian child, I perceive amounts by estimating height only, while you perceive amounts in terms of volume, your perception of the world is more adequate than mine. And it also follows that if I refuse to engage in communication that would reveal the inadequacy of my viewpoint, then, unhappily, there is no way that our “horizons are going to be fused.” We must, in other words, take the words of Martin Buber seriously when he says in lovely book I and Thou35 that we can only meet in the in-between, i.e., that respect does not demand that I try to manipulate myself into accepting your worldview despite the fact that I find it faulty—it does not mean that open-mindedness is the same as empty-mindedness, or in Dewey’s words, it does not mean that we carry around a sign saying “Come right in; there is no one at home.”36 Respect, or what Dewey refers to as “hospitality,” requires, rather, that I am willing to welcome you into my world view and that I am equally willing to accept a similar offer from you, but that ultimately, the best that I can do is to wait for you on the bridge of genuine communication—a territory, by the way, at least according to Axel Honneth, that can be one of genuine struggle.37

Summary

34 Ibid., p. 72.
35 Buber 1958.
36 Dewey 2007b, p. 133.
37 According to Honneth (1995), “the history of the human spirit is to be understood as a conflictual process (or, referencing Hegel as “a series of rectifications of destroyed equilibria) in which the ‘moral’ potential inherent in natural ethical life . . . is gradually generalized” (15). And “It is not the case, therefore, that a contract puts an end to the struggle for survival. Rather, inversely, this struggle leads, as a moral medium, from an underdeveloped state of ethical life to a more mature level of ethical relations” (17). And I must be prepared to show that I will die for who I believe that I think I am. This is “a life and death struggle” (23). And “it is only because human subjects are incapable of reacting in emotionally neutral ways to social injuries—as exemplified by physical abuse, the denial of rights, and denigration—that the normative patterns of mutual recognition found in the social lifeworld have any chance of being realized” (138).
Let me summarize, then, against the words of Amy Gutman who says at the end of her introduction to Taylor’s article, that “Mutual respect requires a widespread willingness and ability to articulate our disagreements, to defend them before people with whom we disagree, to discern the difference between respectable and disrespectful disagreement, and to be open to changing our minds when faced with well-reasoned criticism,” and—that “the moral promise of multiculturalism depends on the exercise of these deliberative virtues.”

The points that I am trying to make here are tangential to Gutman’s position in six ways: I am claiming that

1) It is not multiculturalism and or increased understanding across divides that is the primary justification for nurturing deliberative virtues, but rather the potential for self-development and, therefore that

2) The emphasis implicitly put on the importance of other-recognition by the Politics of Recognition potentially undermines its motivation in that it carries the arrogant implication that I am doing you a favour by listening to you, rather then explicitly recognizing that such interchange, if successful, will be mutually self-beneficial, i.e., that it is through the self-development spawned by genuine communication that altruism and egoism collapse, to say nothing of the fact that

3) The emphasis put on other-recognition by the Politics of Recognition can be dangerously misleading in its tendency to fuel an over-acceptance of the unfounded positions of others and an under-acceptance of the obligation is to genuinely challenge (though its mirror virtue, paradoxically, of accepting challenge seems widely recognized), and that

4) We ought to expect that all positions may not be equally valid and that therefore the dream of a liberalist heaven on earth in which all that all cultures have to offer are found to be mutually acceptable is no more plausible or honorific than a world in which everyone’s opinion is as good as everyone else’s, but that

5) Because this kind of tough communicative interchange that challenges and accepts challenge and in which the least worthy options are dropped off the table is necessary for the development of the self, promoting such communication all around, and particularly in our youngsters, is immune from the charge that this is merely a mirror of a Western imperialist liberal idiosyncratic culture; and finally that

6) If we really are going to take the development of the self as a primary good and hence a human right, as the Politics of Recognition seems to advocate, and if we take rights seriously as Dworkin would have us do, then we need to take selves seriously and ensure that the pedagogical atmosphere in which the selves of the next generation are developing is the sort in which the deliberative virtues necessary for the development of the self are nurtured. We should, in short, demand that access to programs such as Philosophy for Children is a human right.

40 “Results (external answers and solutions) may be hurried; processes may not be forced. They take their own time to mature. Were all instructors to realize that the quality of mental process, not the production of correct answers, is the measure of educative growth something hardly less than a revolution in teaching would be worked,” Dewey 2007b, p. 133.
Reference list


