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## **Dogmatism, Seemings, and Non-Deductive Inferential Justification**

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**Penultimate draft. Please do not quote.**

### **Abstract**

Dogmatism holds that an experience or seeming that *p* can provide *prima facie* immediate justification for believing *p* in virtue of its phenomenology. Dogmatism about perceptual justification has appealed primarily to proponents of representational theories of perceptual experience. Call dogmatism that takes perceptual experience to be representational "representational phenomenal dogmatism." As we show, phenomenal seemings play a crucial role in dogmatism of this kind. Despite its conventional appeal to representational theorists, dogmatism is not by definition committed to any particular view of perceptual experience. Naive realists and disjunctivists who hold that perceptual experience is a perceptual relation of direct acquaintance can also endorse dogmatism. Indeed, we argue that they ought to do so. Otherwise, they cannot maintain that relationalism about perceptual experience has an epistemic advantage compared to the representational view. We then show that even if we grant that relationalism has this advantage, only dogmatism that takes perceptual experience to be representational can be extended to account for non-deductive inferential justification. As an account of the latter is required to avoid succumbing to skepticism, relationalism, we argue, does not have the epistemic advantage its defenders claim it has.

**10 Keywords:** acquaintance relation, ampliative inference, closure principle, intuitions, phenomenal dogmatism, phenomenal seemings, non-deductive inferential justification, relational views of perceptual experience, representational views of perceptual experience, skepticism

### **1. Introduction**

Dogmatism – understood as a general thesis – is the view that an experience or seeming that *p* can provide defeasible (or *prima facie*) immediate justification for believing *p* in virtue of its phenomenology (e.g., Pryor, 2013). Dogmatism, as popularized by Jim Pryor (2000), is a thesis about perceptual justification and presupposes a particular view of perception. As we shall see, phenomenal seemings play a crucial role in dogmatism of this kind. However, dogmatism is not by definition a thesis about perceptual justification but can be – and has been – defended for other kinds of justification, including memorial, introspective, and a priori justification (Huemer, 2001; Brogaard, 2013; Chudnoff, 2013).

Furthermore, while dogmatism about perceptual justification has appealed primarily to advocates of representational theories of perceptual experience, dogmatism is consistent with other views of perceptual experience. Naive realists and disjunctivists who hold that perceptual experience is a perceptual relation of direct acquaintance with an external-world fact or object can also endorse dogmatism. Indeed, we will argue that they ought to do so. Otherwise, it is not clear that they can coherently maintain that relationalism about perceptual experience has an epistemic advantage compared to representational views.

After arguing that advocates of relational approaches to perceptual experience ought to be dogmatists, we look more closely at the alleged advantage of relational views over representational views. We then show that even if we grant that relationalism has this advantage, only dogmatism that takes perceptual experience to be representational can be extended to account for non-deductive inferential justification. As an account of the latter is required to avoid succumbing to skepticism, relationalism, we argue, does not have the epistemic advantage its defenders claim it has.

## 2. Seemings and two Forms of Phenomenal Dogmatism

Dogmatism – understood as a general thesis – is the view that an experience or seeming that  $p$  can confer at least some degree of *prima facie* immediate justification on the belief that  $p$  by virtue of its phenomenology.<sup>1</sup>

The terms "immediate" and "prima facie" are crucial to this view of justification. To say that justification for believing a proposition  $p$  is immediate is to say that it's not even partly constituted by justification for believing another proposition  $q$ . For example, if your perceptual experience as of a dog being S-shaped, tall, slim, short-haired, and long-tailed provides justification for believing that the dog is a Greyhound only together with justified background assumptions about what Greyhounds look like, such as the justified background assumption that Greyhounds are S-shaped, then your justification for your belief is *mediate* rather than immediate. This is because your perceptual experience serves as justification for believing that the dog is a Greyhound only together with background assumptions that themselves provide justification for other propositions, for instance, the proposition that Greyhounds are S-shaped. It should be noted that while immediate justification is a form of non-inferential justification, the converse is not true. That is, inferential justification can be a form of immediate justification. For example, intuitions can provide immediate justification for the proposition that  $p$  entails  $p$  or  $q$ .

The question of whether there is immediate justification can be formulated either propositionally or doxastically. Phenomenal dogmatism is a claim about propositional justification, not doxastic justification (Turri, 2010). Where doxastic justification is something beliefs possess, propositional justification is something subjects have for believing a proposition. Propositional justification is also sometimes referred to as a "warrant" or "evidence."

To say that your justification is *prima facie* is to say that it is defeasible, that is, you have evidence that **can** weaken or wholly undermine your justification. A defeater is evidence that

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<sup>1</sup> For thinkers sympathetic to something like dogmatism, see e.g., Pollock & Cruz (1999), Pryor (2000, 2004, 2012, 2013), Sillins (2008, 2013), Tucker (2010a), Chudnoff (2012, 2013, 2014), Brogaard (2013, 2018, 2021, *In Press*), Ghijsen (2015), Moretti (2015), Fuqua (2017), Pace (2017).

you come to possess, which directly or indirectly calls into question your justification for believing a proposition. A rebutting defeater undermines by *directly* providing justification for an opposing proposition. For instance, if Junior has a perceptual experience as of the ashtray being square but Lily tells him that it's round, then what Lily said directly provides justification for the proposition that the ashtray is round, which opposes the content of Junior's seeming that it is square. An undercutting defeater undermines by undercutting the support otherwise provided by one's justification. For instance, if Junior has an experience as of the ashtray being square but his doctor tells him that his shape vision is defective, then the doctor's testimony undercuts his experience's justificatory status. Defeaters can be misleading, which is to say that they are inaccurate unbeknownst to the subject yet still defeat the subject's justification to the same extent as non-misleading defeaters. For example, suppose Junior has an experience as of the ashtray being square, but Lily tells him that it's round. Unbeknownst to Junior, Lily's testimony is inaccurate. In this case, Lily's testimony provides Junior with a misleading defeater of his experience's justificatory status. Since defeaters can be misleading yet still defeat a subject's justification to the same extent as non-misleading defeaters, all justification is defeasible.

Dogmatism, as advanced by Jim Pryor (2000), is a thesis about perceptual justification and presupposes a particular view of perception. However, the scope of dogmatism is not limited to perceptual justification but can be – and has been – applied to other kinds of justification, including memorial, introspective, and *a priori* justification (Chudnoff, 2013, 2014; Brogaard, 2013).


Since Pryor (2000) gave currency to the theory, dogmatism about perceptual justification has been taken to involve a representational account of perceptual experience. Representational theories hold that perceptual experience fundamentally is a matter of representing how things phenomenally seem to be. Proponents of representational views take the phenomenology of perceptual experience to consist exclusively or mostly of representational phenomenal properties, such as the property of representing something as being oval (e.g., Chalmers, 2004; Siegel, 2012; Brogaard, 2018). Thus understood, representational theories are compatible with the view that some of the phenomenal properties of perceptual experience are non-representational. For instance, it may be said that while appearance properties such as colors, extension, or texture are reflected in the experience's representational character, experiential properties such as imprecision or salience are reflected only in the experience's non-representational character (Block, 2015).

Call dogmatism about perceptual justification that takes perceptual experience to be representational "representational phenomenal dogmatism." On a representational view, perceptual experience makes the external world phenomenally seem a certain way to a perceiver in virtue of its phenomenology, and it is in virtue of how its phenomenology makes the external world seem that it provides justification for believing a proposition. Accordingly, we can render representational phenomenal dogmatism about perceptual justification in terms of phenomenal seemings as follows:

*Representational Phenomenal dogmatism (Perceptual Justification)*

If *S*'s perceptual experience makes it phenomenally seem to *S* that *p*, then *S* thereby has at least some degree of *prima facie* immediate (propositional) justification for believing that *p*.

Phenomenal seemings differ from epistemic seemings in that the former normally are evidence-insensitive, whereas the latter are not. An evidence-insensitive seeming persists even when you have counterevidence suggesting that the seeming is inaccurate (Chisholm, 1957; Brogaard, 2018). In the Müller-Lyer illusion (Fig. 1), the two lines phenomenally seem to you to have different lengths even if you know that they have the same length. As your seeming persists in spite of you possessing counterevidence suggesting that it is inaccurate, it is evidence-insensitive and thus phenomenal.



**Figure 1: Müller-Lyer Illusion.** While both lines have the same length, the line with the arrows pointed inward (top) phenomenally seems longer than the line with the arrows pointed outward (bottom).

Like the content of degrees of belief, the content of epistemic seemings is merely probable. On a Bayesian model, the subjective probability, or credence, of a hypothesis  $H$  is the product of the *likelihood* of  $H$ , given your new evidence, and the probability of your *prior* beliefs about the world (the "prior").<sup>2</sup> In the case of epistemic seemings, their content is the hypothesis, and the seeming attributes a high subjective probability of that content. Say that you are listening to an episode of the Podcast *The Rewatchables*, and the host Bill Simmons says that his favorite movie of all time is *E.T. The Extra-Terrestrial*. Given Bill Simmons' testimony, you take it to be subjectively probable that his favorite movie is *E.T.* As your credence is higher than 0.5 but lower than 1, it comes to epistemically seem to you that his favorite movie is *E.T.* As the content of your seeming is merely subjectively probable, it easily yields to defeating evidence. Suppose at the end of the roundtable discussion, Bill Simmons says "Actually, when I said I couldn't stop rewatching *E.T.*, I was just kidding. My favorite movie of all time is, of course, Michael Mann's *Heat*." Assuming you are rational, you will update on your new evidence, and it will no longer epistemically seem to you that Bill Simmons favorite movie of all times is *E.T.* Instead, it will come to epistemically seem to you that his favorite movie is *Heat*.

Although dogmatism about perceptual justification has appealed primarily to advocates of representational accounts of perceptual experience, the dogmatist thesis is consistent with

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<sup>2</sup> Subjective probability, or credence, refers to the degree of belief, which is specified by a real number in the  $[0,1]$  interval, where 0 indicates certainty that a proposition is false and 1 indicates certainty that it is true.

other accounts of experience. Naïve realists, disjunctivists, and reliabilists, for instance, can also adopt dogmatism about perceptual justification as long as they hold that perceptual justification is immediate and defeasible (Pryor, 2013; Brogaard, 2013, 2021). Most forms of naïve realism and disjunctivism are relational views, viz., views that hold that perceptual experience fundamentally is a matter of being directly acquainted with an external-world fact or object (Brewer, 2011; Allen, 2016). Relationalists do not normally use the term "dogmatism" to characterize their views of the epistemic role of perceptual experience. However, one of the main motivations for relationalism is that this sort of view of experience is required to provide an adequate account of perceptual justification (McDowell, 1982; Fumerton, 1995; Fish, 2009). The gist of their argument is this: on non-relational representational views, perceptual experience directly acquaints us only with an intermediary between us and the external world (Brewer, 2011; Allen, 2016). But if we are only directly acquainted with such intermediaries, then it's hard to see how we can have epistemic access to the external world, which leaves the representational views vulnerable to skepticism about perceptual justification. Relationalists take this to suggest that only experience that directly acquaints us with an external-world fact  $p$  can provide justification for believing that  $p$ .<sup>3</sup>

Note, however, that for this argument to be compelling, relationalists cannot say that perceptual experience only provides *mediate* justification for propositions. Suppose otherwise. Then advocates of representational views could say that the experience provides *mediate* justification for propositions together with justified background assumptions guaranteeing that the right sort of relation obtains between us and the external world. This way advocates of representational views would avoid the relationalists' skeptical argument against them. This move by the representational theorists would even the score. The relational views would thus lose their epistemic advantage over representational views. So, it seems that relationalists must hold that experience provides *immediate* justification for believing a proposition. Moreover, because defeaters can be misleading, all justification is defeasible. So, even though relationalists are not in the habit of referring to their view of perceptual justification as a form of dogmatism, they have compelling motivation for their account of perceptual justification only if they commit to a form of dogmatism, which is committed to the possibility of *immediate* justification arising from perceptual experiences.

Relationalists take perceptual experience to provide perceptual justification for a proposition by virtue of the experience's relational phenomenology, which they argue puts us in direct contact with an external-world fact. As phenomenal seemings have propositional content and thus do not put us in direct contact with the external world, relationalists must reject that experience provides justification for propositions in virtue of how it makes things phenomenally seem to us. Call dogmatism about perceptual justification that takes experience to be relational "relational phenomenal dogmatism." This view can be glossed as follows:

*Relational Phenomenal dogmatism (Perceptual Justification)*

If  $S$  stands in a perceptual relation of direct acquaintance to  $p$ ,  $S$  thereby has at least some degree of *prima facie* immediate (propositional) justification for believing that  $p$ .

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<sup>3</sup> Not all relationalists hold that we are directly acquainted with facts, e.g., Brewer (2005).

In the next section, we look more closely at how the two forms of phenomenal dogmatism propose to solve the standard skeptical challenge about perceptual justification.

### 3. The Relationalist Argument Against the Representational View of Perceptual Experience

Defenders of representational phenomenal dogmatism argue that their view rebuts a standard skeptical challenge to internalist views of justification (e.g., Pryor, 2000, 2004). For example, your experience as of having hands provides at least some degree of *prima facie* immediate justification for believing that you have hands. As skeptical alternatives, e.g., the hypothesis that you are a handless BIV, are merely possible, they do not defeat your experience's justificatory status. Whether the Moorean reasoning from the belief that you have hands to the belief that you are not a handless BIV is admissible is a further question.<sup>4</sup> Even if the Moorean reasoning is no good, this doesn't by itself show that your experience as of having hands cannot provide at least some degree of *prima facie* immediate justification for believing you have hands.

Relationalists about perceptual experience, however, argue that their view has an epistemic advantage compared to non-relational views of experience (e.g., McDowell, 1982; Fumerton, 1995; Fish, 2009). If the relationalist argument is sound, it follows that representational theories cannot fend off the skeptical challenge to perceptual justification. The relationalist argument runs as follows: on non-relational accounts, perceptual experience directly acquaints us only with an intermediary interposing between us and the external world. Unlike sense-datum theories, representational theorists do not take the intermediary to be a sense-datum, but rather a propositional content that represents the world as being a certain way (Siegel, 2012; Brogaard, 2018). Representational views thus entail that perceptual experience does not provide direct conscious access to the external world. But if experience doesn't do that, then it can make it phenomenally seem that things are a certain way when they are not. Given a representational view, if your perceptual experience were to make things phenomenally seem a certain way to you, then it would also make things seem that way had a skeptical alternative been true. So, your experience does not provide epistemic evidence against skeptical alternatives. But in that case, representational views succumb to skepticism after all. Or so the argument goes. For illustrative purposes, let's consider a particular instance of this argument:

Premise 1: S's perceptual experience as of having hands makes it phenomenally seem to S that S has hands.

Premise 2: If S had been a handless BIV, S's perceptual experience would also have made it phenomenally seem to S that S has hands.

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<sup>4</sup> For arguments that Moorean arguments are question-begging, see e.g. Wright (2002, 2007), Davies (1998), McLaughlin (2000), Dretske (2005). For arguments that they are not, see e.g., Pryor (2004, 2012, 2013), Tucker (2010b).

Intermediary Conclusion: A perceptual experience that makes it phenomenally seem to S that S has hands provides no evidence for the proposition that S is not a handless BIV.

Premise 3: A perceptual experience as of  $p$  can provide some justification for  $p$ , only if it provides some evidence against skeptical alternatives that also make it phenomenally seem that  $p$ .

Conclusion: S's perceptual experience as of having hands does not provide any justification for the proposition that S has hands.

Relationalists take the vulnerability of non-relational views to skepticism to suggest that only experience that directly perceptually acquaints us with an external-world fact  $p$  can provide perceptual justification for believing that  $p$ . According to relationalists, their view fares better than representational theories, because experience directly phenomenally acquaints us with an external-world fact. As our experience directly acquaints us with the external-world fact that we have hands, but our experience does not directly acquaint us with this fact in the skeptical scenario where we are handless BIVs, the relational view can explain the epistemic asymmetry between the non-skeptical and skeptical scenarios, thus blocking the skeptical argument against the evidential role of perceptual experience.

In the next section, we argue that relationalists face even greater difficulties than those they attribute to representational theories. In particular, we argue that relationalism cannot be extended to account for ampliative inferential justification.

#### **4. Relationalism and Ampliative Inferential Justification**

Ampliative arguments are non-deductive, which is to say that their conclusion contains information not contained in the premises. Consider the following ampliative arguments:

(1)  
Every time Sara gets solicitation emails, she deletes them without reading them.  
So, Sara doesn't like reading solicitation emails.

(2)  
All 10,000 times we flipped this coin, it came up heads.  
So, this coin is rigged.

(3)  
Wes was planning to surprise Sylvia with an engagement ring.  
Sylvia is wearing an engagement ring today.  
So, Wes and Sylvia must have gotten engaged.

(4)  
The German professor told Lily that the German word "Krankenschwester"  
means nurse.

So, the German word "Krankenschwester" means nurse.

(5)

99.99% of students at the French Art Academy are French.

Rose is a student at the French Art Academy.

So, Rose is French

(6)

Eddy's car has never been stolen from the condo garage the past 10 years.

So, Eddy's car will not be stolen from the condo garage today.

(7)

All the 1,000 black candies I tasted from this urn are licorice-flavored.

So the next black candy from the urn I taste will also be licorice-flavored.

(8)

There is a 99.99% risk of getting injuries from an electrical shock.

Zari will get an electrical shock this afternoon.

So, Zari will get injured this afternoon.

There are two kinds of ampliative arguments, abductive and inductive.<sup>5</sup> (1)–(4) are abductive, also known as inferences to the best explanation (see e.g., Douven, 2021). They are the kinds of arguments we use to explain ordinary phenomena such as people's behaviors in light of their mental states. We also rely on abductive arguments to arrive at empirical hypotheses that can then be empirically tested more thoroughly. (5)–(8) are inductive arguments. What makes an argument inductive is not merely the fact that it's based on empirical or statistical data. Rather, the difference between abductive and inductive arguments is that the former implicitly or explicitly appeal to explanation, whereas the latter merely appeal to empirical or statistical data.

Unlike deductive arguments, ampliative arguments are not said to be valid or invalid, but rather strong, moderately strong, or weak, depending on how much the premises, if true, would increase the likelihood that the conclusion is true. The fact that the premises of a valid deductive argument entail the conclusion corresponds to an *a priori* necessary truth of the form " $P \Rightarrow C$ ."

Likewise, the fact that the premises of a reasonably strong ampliative argument support the conclusion corresponds to a probable, contingent *a posteriori* truth of the form " $P(A|B) > 0.5$ ," which roughly means that A makes B probable. For want of a better term, call necessary *a priori* truths and probable, contingent *a posteriori* truths of this kind "inferential truths," or "inferential facts."

When " $P \Rightarrow C$ " is *a priori*, it is plausible that we can stand in an experiential relation of direct acquaintance with the fact that  $P \Rightarrow C$ . So, relational phenomenal dogmatists can maintain

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<sup>5</sup> Some argue that all good inductive arguments are in fact instances of abductive arguments. See, e.g., McCain (2016). Addressing this question here, however, would take us too far afield.



that we have *a priori* inferential justification for *a priori* inferential facts by virtue of standing in an experiential relation of direct acquaintance to those facts. Relationalists evidently cannot take the immediate justification for *a priori* inferential facts to be perceptual in nature. However, they could take immediate justification for *a priori* inferential facts to be intuition experiences.<sup>6</sup> Intuition experiences, as we shall use the term, are distinct from beliefs and inclinations to believe (Huemer, 2005; Chudnoff, 2013, 2014). They are *sui generis* experiences that in principle can be construed as having either a representational phenomenology or a direct relational phenomenology just like perceptual experience, although they are not themselves perceptual. The most natural option for relationalists is to take intuition experiences to consist in experiential relations of direct acquaintance between the subject and an inferential fact. If they adopt this view of intuition experiences, dogmatism about intuitive inferential justification can be formulated as follows:

*Relational Phenomenal dogmatism (Intuitive Inferential Justification)*

If S stands in an intuitive experiential relation of direct acquaintance to *p*, S thereby has at least some degree of *prima facie* immediate (propositional) justification for believing that *p*.

Now, consider the simple deductive argument in (9) below:

- (9)  
The tray is square.  
So, the tray is either square or round.

Let's say that Hector has a perceptual experience of the tray being square, and an intuition experience of the fact that necessarily, if the tray is square, then the tray is either square or round. Assuming a relational view of both perceptual experience and intuition experience, Hector's perceptual experience provides *prima facie* immediate justification for the premise that the tray is square. Moreover, Hector's intuition experience provides *prima facie* immediate justification for the deductive inferential fact that necessarily, if the tray is square, then the tray is either square or round. As we can reasonably assume that *prima facie* immediate justification is closed across deductive entailment supported by intuition experiences, it follows that Hector has *prima facie* immediate justification for believing that the tray is either square or round.

However, although it is intuitively plausible that we can be immediately aware of deductive inferential facts, it is rather implausible to think that we can immediately "see" or "grasp" ampliative inferential facts (Ramsey, 1926; Fumerton, 1995: 218). After all, unlike deductive inferential facts, ampliative inferential facts are *a posteriori* rather than *a priori*.

A relationalist may reply that it is possible that ampliative inferential truths are contingent *a priori* truths (e.g., Fumerton, 1995: ch. 7).<sup>7</sup> If that is indeed the case, then we can plausibly be immediately aware of these truths.

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<sup>6</sup> We borrow the term "intuition experience" from Chudnoff (2013).

<sup>7</sup> Sympathizers with the view that we can be directly aware of the fact that the truth of the premises of an ampliative argument makes the truth of the conclusion probable include, e.g., Keynes (1921), Bonjour (1998, 2005), Beebe (2009), Hasan (2017).

By way of reply, it is doubtful that ampliative inferential truths are *a priori* rather than *a posteriori*. First, ampliative inferential truths are very different from paradigm cases of contingent *a priori* truths, such as "Phosphorus is visible in the morning sky" and "Jack the Ripper murdered and mutilated female prostitutes in London in 1888." "Phosphorus" and "Jack the Ripper" are singular terms introduced by definite descriptions that conceptually guarantee that the predicates " $\lambda x$  (murdered and mutilated female prostitutes in London in 1888( $x$ ))" and " $\lambda x$ (visible in the morning sky( $x$ ))" are true of their referents, viz., Venus and the Whitechappel Murderer, respectively.

Ampliative inferential truths also differ from paradigm cases of *deeply* contingent *a priori* truths. A deeply contingent proposition  $p$  does not by itself guarantee that there is a fact that confirms  $p$  in the actual world. In other words, it is conceivable that while  $p$  is true in some possible world,  $p$  is false in the actual world. As confirming  $p$  would require empirical investigation, deeply contingent truths do not seem to be *a priori* (Evans, 1985). Even so, John Hawthorne (2002, pp. 11–12) has argued that there could be deeply contingent *a priori* truths. Suppose that you have not had any experiences yet, but that you anticipate a variety of experiential life histories,  $H_1, H_2, \dots, H_n$ , and you conceive of various theories  $T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n$  that describe possible structures of the actual world. Suppose further that you possess an innate body of true principles you can apply to determine whether a theory about the actual world is the best explanation of an experiential life history. Now, whether you have justification to believe that if  $T_n$  is true, then  $H_e$  is true depends on whether  $T_n$  is the best explanation of  $H_e$ , which is something you can determine on the basis of your innate principles. For example, if  $T_1$  best explains  $H_8$ , then you have justification for believing  $T_1 \rightarrow H_8$ . But the material conditional  $T_1 \rightarrow H_8$  is a deeply contingent *a priori* truth. Although you are able to conceive of any such material conditional as false, this does not undermine the justification you have for believing the conditional. So, you can thus come to have justification for believing a deeply contingent truth on purely *a priori* grounds.

While Hawthorne makes a compelling case for the possibility of deeply contingent *a priori* truths, his argument doesn't support the thesis that we can come to have justification for all ampliative inferential truths on purely *a priori* grounds. To assess whether an ampliative inferential proposition is intuitively plausible, we need to draw on our prior experiences, including our past experiences of co-occurrences of events, testimonial evidence, and explanatory principles we have committed to memory. For example, to assess the intuitive plausibility of "If the sky is completely dark, then it will rain," we may be able to draw on our past experiences of co-occurrences of a dark sky and subsequent rain. As assessing the intuitive plausibility of ampliative inferential propositions normally requires drawing on prior experience, we cannot come to have justification for their truth on purely *a priori* grounds. But if we cannot come to have justification in this way, then we must reject the suggestion that we can stand in intuitive experiential relations of direct acquaintances to ampliative inferential facts.

At this point, relationalists may bite the bullet when it comes to intuition experience and insist that even though they hold that perceptual experience does not have a representational structure, this does not prevent them from taking intuition experiences to have this structure. In other words, relationalists could in principle agree with the representational theorists about

intuition experience but not about perceptual experience. Representational phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive inferential justification can be glossed as follows:

*Representational Phenomenal Dogmatism (Intuitive Inferential Justification)*

If  $S$  has an intuition experience that makes it phenomenally seem to  $S$  that a deductive or ampliative proposition  $p$  is true, then  $S$  has at least some degree of defeasible immediate justification for believing that  $p$ .

If, however, relationalists regard intuition experiences as representational experiential states, then they become vulnerable to the same sort of skeptical challenge that they claim representational views of *perceptual* experience succumb to. On a representational view of intuition experience, the representational content is an intermediary interposing between us and the inferential fact. A representational view of intuition experience thus entails that intuition experience does not provide direct conscious access to inferential facts by virtue of its phenomenology. But if intuition experience doesn't do this, then an intuition experience can make it phenomenally seem that an inferential fact obtains, when it doesn't. But given a representational view of intuition experience, if an intuition experience makes things phenomenally seem a certain way to us, it would also have made things seem the same way had a skeptical alternative been true. So, given a representational view of intuition experience, intuition experience does not provide evidence against skeptical alternatives. But if experience doesn't provide such evidence, then representational theories of intuition experience succumb to skepticism. For illustrative purposes, consider the following argument. Let  $F$  be the inferential fact that because Rosalinda's dog Fido never bit any of her 1000 past visitors, Fido will not bite her next visitor, which should have a high credence.

Premise 1:  $S$ 's intuition experience makes it phenomenally seem to  $S$  that  $F$  has a high likelihood of being true.

Premise 2: If  $S$  had come into existence 4 seconds ago complete with all her current experiences and memories, then  $S$ 's intuition experience would also make it phenomenally seem to her that  $F$  has a high likelihood of being true.

Intermediary conclusion: An intuition experience that makes it phenomenally seem to  $S$  that  $F$  has a high likelihood of being true provides no evidence against the skeptical alternative that  $S$  came into existence 4 seconds ago complete with all her current experiences and memories.

Premise 3: An intuition experience as of  $p$  can provide some inferential justification for  $p$ , only if it provides some evidence against skeptical alternatives that also make it phenomenally seem that  $p$ .

Conclusion:  $S$ 's intuition experience as of  $F$  having a high probability of being true does not provide any inferential justification for the proposition that  $F$  has a high probability of being true.

So, if relationalists take this route of rendering intuition experiences to be representational, then they cannot also push their perceptual account's alleged virtue, viz., that it has an edge over a representational view when it comes to the skeptical challenge to perceptual justification. But

this then would raise the question of what motivates the relational view in the first place. So, relationalists would face a dilemma. They can take intuition experience to be either relational or representational. If they take the first horn of the dilemma, and thus hold that intuition experiences are experiential relations of direct acquaintance between a subject and an inferential fact, then they cannot account for ampliative inferential justification. If they take the second horn of the dilemma and thus hold that, unlike perceptual experience, intuition experience is representational rather than relational, then they can no longer coherently maintain that their view of perceptual experience has an epistemic edge over a representational view. These considerations thus give us reason to reject the relational views of perceptual experience and the correlated epistemic thesis of relational phenomenal dogmatism.

In the next section, we argue that the representational views of experience don't run into the same kind of trouble as the relational views of experience.

## 5. Intuition Seemings and Representational Phenomenal Dogmatism

For proponents of the representational view of perceptual experience, the most natural account of intuition experiences is one that takes them to be structurally analogous to perceptual experiences. If intuition experiences are representational states, then representational phenomenal dogmatism is true not only for perceptual justification but also for intuitive inferential justification. Here is representational phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive inferential justification again:

*Representational Phenomenal Dogmatism (Intuitive Inferential Justification)*

If *S* has an intuition experience that makes it phenomenally seem to *S* that a deductive or ampliative proposition *p* is true, then *S* thereby has at least some degree of defeasible immediate justification for believing that *p*.

Because the representational view treats intuition experiences analogously to perceptual experience, it avoids the challenges facing the relational view when it comes to ampliative inferential justification. This is because, unlike the relational view, the representational view does not take intuition experiences to involve an experiential relation of direct acquaintance. The representational view is, therefore, not subject to the objection that we cannot be directly phenomenally acquainted with merely probable truths.

Some have argued that intuitions can only provide justification for *a priori* truths (e.g., Bealer, 1998). Thus, it may be thought that proponents of the representational view should defend the claim that intuition experiences can provide immediate justification for merely probable *a posteriori* truths.

By way of reply, the hypothesis that our human psychology makes us capable of undergoing intuition experiences that make it phenomenally seem to us that certain merely probable propositions are true is an empirical claim. So, it would need to be *empirically* justified. But, in fact, we do have empirical evidence to justify this claim. For example, it will likely phenomenally seem to competent speakers on intuitive grounds that the following ampliative arguments are cogent:

(10)

Only 1 in 10,000 students at the German Film Academy are non-German.

Bella is a student at the German Film Academy.

So, Bella is German

(11)

Carl has been on time every day for the past 10 years.

So, Carl will be on time today

As it will likely phenomenally seem to competent speakers on intuitive grounds that ampliative arguments like (10) and (11) are cogent, there is evidence to suggest that our intuition experiences can provide immediate justification for merely probable *a posteriori* truths.

Now, consider the simple ampliative argument below:

(12)

The sky is completely dark

So, it will rain soon.

(12) arguably is a reasonably strong abductive argument. Let's say that Oscar has a perceptual experience that makes it phenomenally seem to him that the sky is completely dark, and an intuition experience that makes it phenomenally seem to him that it is probable that if the sky is completely dark, then it will rain soon. Assuming a representational view of both perceptual experience and intuition experience, Oscar's perceptual seeming provides *prima facie* immediate justification for believing that the sky is completely dark. Moreover, his intuition seeming provides *prima facie* immediate justification for the ampliative transition from the premise to the conclusion. For one-premise ampliative arguments, we can safely assume that *prima facie* immediate justification is closed across ampliative inference for which we have *prima facie* immediate justification. So, Oscar has immediate justification for believing it will rain soon.

The question here arises, however, whether we can also safely assume that immediate justification is closed across ampliative inference in multi-premise ampliative arguments. Consider the multi-premise ampliative argument below.

(13)

Premise 1: On this occasion, overwatering my succulent led to root rot.

Premise 2: On this occasion, overwatering my succulent led to root rot.

...

Conclusion: Overwatering succulents leads to root rot.

(13) is a reasonably strong inductive argument. But one may worry that the representational phenomenal dogmatist cannot safely assume that immediate justification is closed across an ampliative transition in multi-premise ampliative arguments. Representational phenomenal dogmatism, the objector may remind us, holds that seemings are immediate justifiers. But "it seems" fails to agglomerate with conjunction. For example, it may seem to Oscar that lottery

ticket 1 will win, that lottery ticket 2 will win, and that lottery ticket 3 will win. Yet it may not seem to Oscar that all three tickets will win.

By way of reply, "it seems" fails to agglomerate in the envisaged case because it ascribes *epistemic* seemings to Oscar. As we have seen, epistemic seemings assign a probability higher than 0.5 but lower than 1 to their contents. But suppose that it epistemically seems to Oscar that ticket 1 will win, because he implicitly assigns a 0.6 probability to the proposition that *ticket 1 will win*, that it epistemically seems to him that ticket 2 will win, because he implicitly assigns a 0.6 probability to the proposition that *ticket 2 will win*, and that it epistemically seems to him that ticket 3 will win, because he implicitly assigns a 0.6 probability to the proposition *ticket 3 will win*. In that case, Oscar rationally ought to assign probability 0.216 to "All three tickets will win." So, if he is rational, it will not epistemically seem to him that all three tickets will win.

Unlike epistemic seemings, phenomenal seemings *do* agglomerate with conjunction. This is because phenomenal seemings do not modify their contents' apparent certainty, which is the feature that grounds their evidence-insensitivity. For example, if it phenomenally seems to Beatrice that car 1 is red, it phenomenally seems to her that car 2 is red, and it phenomenally seems to her that car 3 is red, then it will phenomenally seem to her that all three cars are red. As phenomenal seemings agglomerate with conjunction, we can safely assume that immediate justification is closed across ampliative inference in multi-premise ampliative arguments. So, if you have immediate perceptual justification for each of the premises in (13), and you have immediate intuitive justification for thinking the premises make the conclusion likely, then you have immediate justification for thinking that the conclusion is true. Given that representational views can be extended to accommodate ampliative inferential justification, representational views fare better than relationalism.

## 7. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored two forms of phenomenal dogmatism about perceptual experience. One is the standard view that presupposes that experience has representational character. The other is one that presupposes relationalism, which holds that perceptual experience is a perceptual relation of direct acquaintance between us and the external world. Phenomenal seemings, we have argued, play a crucial role in representational phenomenal dogmatism but not in relational phenomenal dogmatism. The main aim of this chapter has been to show that even if we grant that relationalism has an alleged epistemic advantage over representational views when it comes to perceptual justification, only the form of dogmatism that takes experience to be representational can be extended to account for non-deductive inferential justification. As an account of the latter is required to avoid succumbing to skepticism, relationalism, we have argued, does not have the claimed epistemic virtue.<sup>8</sup>

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