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# Fascism in Peru

## *From Revolutionary Union to Legionary Action and Ethnocacerism*

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### Abstract

Contemporary fascism is an understudied phenomenon in Latin America. As a contribution to this understudied area, this article analyzes the evolution of fascist thought in Peru from its interwar history to the twenty-first century. Following Roger Griffin's influential 'new consensus' approach to fascism studies based on a fascist minimum, this study explores Peruvian fascism and will argue that fascism developed new expressions in the years after 1945. It will develop the terms 'neo-fascism' and 'post-fascism', based on Griffin's fascist minimum, to clarify the nature of the fascist movements to be analyzed. It will conclude that historically Peruvian fascism was exemplified by the *Partido Unión Revolucionaria* [Revolutionary Union Party], while in the postwar period, it took two parallel directions: the uniquely Peruvian neo-fascism of *Acción Legionaria* [Legionary Action] and the ethnocacerist or Andean post-fascism of Antauro Humala.

### Keywords

Peru – fascism – neo-fascism – post-fascism – *Partido Unión Revolucionaria* (1931–1956) – *Acción Legionaria* (2013–2016) – ethnocacerism (1987–)

The study of the contemporary radical right has paid attention mainly to North American and European actors, politicians, parties and movements such as Donald Trump, Andrejz Duda, Víktor Orban, Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Mel-

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oni, *CasaPound*, *Fratelli d'Italia* and north American white nationalist movements.<sup>1</sup> Some have analyzed contemporary Latin American politicians using Cas Mudde's radical right populism theoretical framework for conceptualizing the far right.<sup>2</sup> Although it is often said that radical right-wing populists constitute a form of fascism,<sup>3</sup> in Latin America it is difficult to classify any group or politician as fascist, since the term 'fascist' has become a pejorative adjective lacking substance, rather than an objective academic classification,<sup>4</sup> and none of the contemporary actors or movements denounced as 'fascists' identify themselves as such or have explicit fascist ideas.<sup>5</sup>

When strictly talking about Latin American fascist movements, academic contributions have focused for the most part on historical or interwar period examples.<sup>6</sup> In Peru, far from being a marginal phenomenon, fascism was rel-

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- 1 Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, *National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy* (London: Pelican, 2018); Patrik Hermansson, et al., *The International Alt-Right: Fascism for the 21st Century?* (Abingdon [etc.]: Routledge, 2020).
  - 2 Cas Mudde, *The Far Right Today* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019).
  - 3 César Castillo-García, 'The Crooked Timber That Bore Fruit: Peruvian Fascist Intellectuals of the 1930s and the Echoes of Their Influence Nowadays,' *The New School for Social Research Working Paper*, no. 6 (2022), <https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:new:wpaper:2206>. Castillo-García uses neo-fascism as an explicit label to classify descriptively the right-wing and conservative political media and sectors that opposed the electoral presence of Peru Libre Marxist party candidate Pedro Castillo during the polarized elections of 2021. Armando Boito, 'The Rise of Fascism in Brazil,' *Latin American Perspectives* 50, no. 1 (2022): 14–31, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X221140419>.
  - 4 James Gregor, *The Search for Neofascism: The Use and Abuse of Social Science* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–2; Joe Mulhall, *Drums in the Distance: Journeys into the Global Far Right* (London: Icon Books, 2021), Introduction, Kindle; Robert Paxton, 'The Five Stages of Fascism,' *The Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 1 (1998): 8–9; Bruce Kuklick, *Fascism Comes to America: A Century of Obsession in Politics and Culture* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2022), 1–5. It is important to say that Kuklick denies the existence of 'elemental fascism' or empirical features of it, an idea that is not shared in this paper. However, the book, as stated in the Introduction, focuses mainly on the way in which the concept has been misused as an umbrella term to insult adversaries in American politics.
  - 5 That is why, as was described, other denominations like 'alt right' (Mulhall, *Drums in the Distance*) or 'Latin-American right-wing neoconservatism' (Piero Gayozzo, 'Agustín Laje y el neo-conversadurismo latinoamericano de derecha,' *Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política* 1, no. 29 (2022): 306–344, available at <https://publicaciones sociales.uba.ar/index.php/revistaargen tinacienciapolitica/article/view/8097>), have been proposed to understand and distinguish political actors and movements that have been erroneously labeled as fascists in Latin America.
  - 6 E.g., Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (London: UCL Press, 1995), 340–349; António Costa Pinto, *Latin American Dictatorships in the Era of Fascism* (New York: Routledge, 2020); António Costa Pinto, 'Corporatism and Authoritarianism in Latin America: The First Wave,' in *The Right and Radical Right in the Americas: Ideological Currents from Interwar Canada to Contemporary Chile*, ed. Tamir Bar-On and Bárbara Molas (London: Lexington Books, 2022), 41–58.

evant in popular, academic and political terms in the 1930s.<sup>7</sup> One of the most significant analyses of fascism in Peru is José Ignacio López Soria's classification according to the origin and scope of the intellectuals and fascist movements in Peruvian history.<sup>8</sup> He distinguished between 'aristocratic fascism', represented by José de la Riva Agüero, which served as a new expression of the traditional political ambitions of the Peruvian oligarchy; 'mesocratic fascism', born from the middle classes of Lima, primarily developed by the ideologue Raúl Ferrero Rebagliati and anchored in the colonial experience and conquest, while trying to maintain a discourse of mestizo identity and a strong link to Catholicism; and finally, 'popular fascism', embodied in the *Partido Unión Revolucionaria* [Revolutionary Union Party], its black shirt cadres and its Supreme Leader, Luis Alberto Flores Medina. Although Lopez Soria's analysis is useful for understanding the social origins of Peruvian fascism, it did not cover the entire fascist phenomenon throughout Peruvian history nor the ideological changes or additions that fascism adopted in subsequent years. In the decades following López Soria's work, Peruvian fascism had new faces.

In 1998, Roger Griffin proposed an emerging consensus about the definition of fascism and corroborated this in a 2002 article in which he analyzed the criticism that his claim produced among scholars.<sup>9</sup> Later, in 2012 he continued arguing in favor of the existence of this consensus.<sup>10</sup> This article adopts Griffin's claim regarding a consensual definition of fascism. It will also consider his call regarding the need for a new consensus to understand the new wave of radical right movements and use, for the first time in fascist studies applied to Peruvian cases, a fascist definition based on Griffin's 'fascist minimum' to understand historical Peruvian fascism and post-1945 Peruvian fascist movements, to complement Lopez Soria's analysis. The research approach is descriptive and typological and aims to show the evolution of fascism in Peru by identifying the substantive ideology, or fascist minimum, of three Peruvian fascist movements, rather than examining how they were perceived or researching the

7 Tirso Molinari, *El fascismo en el Perú: La Unión Revolucionaria 1931–1936* (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, 2009).

8 José Ignacio López Soria, 'Notas para el estudio del fascismo peruano,' in *El Pensamiento Fascista*, ed. José Ignacio López Soria (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1981), 9–37.

9 Roger Griffin, 'The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus within Fascist Studies,' *Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 1 (2002): 21–43, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220094020370010701>.

10 Roger Griffin, 'Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age: From New Consensus to New Wave?' *Fascism* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–17, <https://doi.org/10.1163/221162512X623601>.

organizational continuity among them. It will also address the question asked by Juan Carlos Nalvarte: Where do we find fascism in Peru today?<sup>11</sup>

### Fascism, Neo-Fascism and Post-Fascism

According to Griffin, there is consensus among fascism scholars that ‘fascism is a revolutionary form of nationalism which assumes unique ideological, cultural, political, and organizational expression according to the circumstances and national context where it takes shape’.<sup>12</sup> Griffin defines fascism through a set of core ideas that he terms the ‘fascist minimum’, a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism that aims to construct an alternative modernity.<sup>13</sup> This approach draws attention to how fascism conceives the nation as an entity or system in a state of decadence that must recover its historic greatness (palingenesis) and recreate the social project that modernity has denied to it. Following Griffin’s work, Chamsy el-Ojeili states that fascism can be widely described by five criteria:

- i. Organic and transcendent palingenetic nationalism, or the assumption that there is a pure national or ethnic identity.
- ii. Conspiracy theories and social cleansing, which point to an alternative modernity through narratives in which external forces oppose the nation, thus necessitating the cleansing of society of some harmful elements.
- iii. Charismatic authority that contemplates the notion of authoritarian democracy. It is the claim that authority represent the popular will while criticizing the oligarchies that condemned the nation to its decadent state.
- iv. The use of counter-revolutionary/violent reactionary politics, especially against the revolution of the left sector.
- v. Militaristic masculinity that emphasizes paramilitary use, uniforms, weapons, intimidation and the glorification of war.<sup>14</sup>

El-Ojeili’s proposal is not a fascist minimum akin to Griffin’s but comprises a clear set of features or concepts adjacent to the fascist minimum that can

11 Juan Carlos Nalvarte Lozada, ‘Apuntes sobre el fascismo peruano,’ *Blog Humanitas Universidad Católica San Pablo*, November 9, 2020, accessed October 25, 2024, <https://blog-humanitas.ucsp.edu.pe/apuntes-fascismo-peruano/>.

12 Griffin, ‘Studying Fascism,’ 14.

13 Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

14 Chamsy El-Ojeili, *The Utopian Constellation: Future-Oriented Social and Political Thought Today* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 84–85.

be used to analyze the extent and nature of Peruvian fascism in more detail.<sup>15</sup> Griffin also noted that, as a political ideology, fascism can evolve through time, changing and modifying some of its adjacent and peripheral concepts while preserving the ineliminable and core ones (the fascist minimum),<sup>16</sup> becoming not only a transatlantic phenomenon but also a kind of transhistorical one.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, fascism has evolved, and new faces and features have emerged in the years after 1945. As Mudde described, the radical right has manifested itself in many ways and waves throughout history, with the twenty-first century representing a period of growth for right-wing radical populism.<sup>18</sup> Despite this, while not all those on the far right are fascists, fascism remains alive in the current century.<sup>19</sup>

Griffin also recognizes the upsurge of these movements and considers them a ‘product of the disenchanting modernity of liberal democracy/capitalism in crisis and the quest for an alternative modernity’ and states it is possible to identify continuity between interwar fascism and its newer forms.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, he makes a call for the study of the new forms of illiberalism. To achieve such an analysis of post-1945 fascism in Peru, in response to Griffin’s call, two varieties will be considered in this paper: neo-fascism and post-fascism.

As Richard Wolin points out, fascism was a phenomenon whose realization was possible thanks to the historical conditions in which it developed, so to persist over time it had to adapt.<sup>21</sup> Neofascism will be depicted following Roger Eatwell’s and Anna Cento Bull’s definitions, according to which it is a nostalgic perception of historical fascism and can be seen in the attempt of some groups to reproduce fascist projects in the same way as before and during the Second World War, with no or little variation in the post-1945 period.<sup>22</sup>

15 Roger Griffin, ‘The “Post-Fascism” of the Alleanza Nazionale: A Case Study in Ideological Morphology,’ *Journal of Political Ideologies* 1, no. 2 (1996): 123–145, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569319608420733>.

16 Griffin, ‘The “Post-Fascism” of the Alleanza,’ 128–129.

17 Enzo Traverso, *The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right* (London and New York: Verso, 2019).

18 Mudde, *The Far Right Today*.

19 Tamir Bar On, *Rethinking the French New Right: Alternatives to Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

20 Griffin, ‘Studying Fascism,’ 15.

21 Richard Wolin, *The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism: From Nietzsche to Postmodernism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 259.

22 Anna Cento Bull, ‘Neo-fascism,’ in *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism*, ed. R.J. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 604–625; Roger Eatwell, ‘Fascism,’ in *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, ed. Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 169–191.

Regarding post-fascism, El-Ojeili's work will be drawn on over Enzo Traverso's, identifying it as a phenomenon in transition, a kind of fascist matrix that is still changing. El-Ojeili's work is based upon Griffin's fascist minimum, and, therefore upon what Griffin called the 'consensus about fascism definition', but also recognizes four other distinctive elements of fascism that in post-fascism have changed through time, showing the adoption of new syntheses and elements of the post-fascist constellation.<sup>23</sup> In post-fascism, palingenetic ultranationalism adopts an identitarian, supranational and ethnic approach that is recognized as sovereignism that can also adopt a supranational feeling. This is a call for pure ethno-states, or the association of common ethnic communities, into supranational or civilizational entities. This perspective is linked to a narrative that shapes the new conspiracy theorizations with feelings of sovereign decline by foreign forces, such as globalization, political correctness, 'Islamization', and multiculturalism, among others. Authoritarian democracy and charismatic leadership have turned into populist advocacy of a 'true democracy' against elites and corruption, as well as the defense of free speech in order to avoid being banned and to create direct communication channels with the people. Post-fascism continues its criticism of the left but also adopted some of its strategies and theoretical frameworks, such as ethnopluralism and the right of differentiation. However, it retains hostility to left-leaning ideas of progress and inclusion, such as LGBTQ+ rights, feminism and egalitarianism. Finally, militaristic masculinity manifests itself under the discourse of sex realism and gender role differentiation.

What follows will develop Griffin's culturalist understanding of fascism, assuming its transhistorical and transnational nature. Nevertheless, to apply Griffin's fascist minimum as an operational concept in a more detailed way, as this will be the first time using Griffin's framework in Peruvian cases, El-Ojeili's adjacent features will be also considered.

### Fascism in Peru

Historical fascism in Peru has been studied in ways that let us identify at least two types of manifestations: fascism in Peru and Peruvian fascism. The first refers to the study of the roles of foreign communities in Peru during the interwar and Second World War period, while the second refers to the analysis of local fascist actors.

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23 El-Ojeili, *The Utopian Constellation*, 88.

Regarding the proliferation of imported fascism in Peru, many studies have analyzed the critical role of Italian and German communities in the creation of local fascists and national socialist cells. This includes the case of the Fasci movements in Lima and Tacna, led by Italian migrants Toto Giurato and Massimo Castagnola, respectively,<sup>24</sup> as well as the local Nazi party that recruited almost two hundred members of the German ethnic population of 2,200 who were living in Peru, as estimated by German diplomatic authorities during the 1930s.<sup>25</sup>

Regarding Peruvian fascism, as mentioned before, López Soria made a classification of fascist actors based on economic and social origin, identifying their aristocratic, mesocratic or popular origin. It is a useful starting point that the present paper will attempt to build upon. Additionally, three types of fascist actors of the 1930s can be identified following their activities: intellectuals, propagandists, and politicians. What follows offers a brief approach to 1930s Peruvian fascism in accordance with these categories.

Concerning fascist intellectuals, two of the most prominent and prolific figures were Raúl Ferrero Rebagliati and José De la Riva Agüero.<sup>26</sup> Ferrero's main theoretical work was the thesis for his law degree, entitled 'The Nationalcorporatist State', in which he exposed critics to communism and put forward the necessity for a 'nationalist and spiritually reborn' nation through the adoption of a fascist corporatist political order.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, De la Riva Agüero adopted a stance in defense of fascism (especially Italian and Spanish fascism) after living in Europe for many years, thus aiming to unite right-wing and fascist groups into a unified counter-movement against communism.<sup>28</sup> Both tried to contribute to the development of a fascist theoretic framework in Peruvian society, although López Soria considers De la Riva Agüero more as a communicator of fascist feelings than an ideologue.<sup>29</sup>

24 Alfonso Vargas Murillo, "Fasci All'Estero": Apuntes sobre la colonia italiana de Tacna durante el régimen de Mussolini (1930–1934), *La Vida & la Historia*, no. 5 (2015): 49–62, <https://doi.org/10.33326/26176041.2015.5.395>.

25 Milagros Martínez-Flener, 'La colonia austríaca en el Perú durante la época del fascismo europeo (1933–1945)', *Bulletin de l'Institut français d'études andines* 34, no. 1 (2005): 81–102, <https://doi.org/10.4000/bifea.5622>.

26 Castillo-García, 'The Crooked Timber', 4.

27 Raúl Ferrero Rebagliati, *Marxismo y Nacionalismo: Estado Nacional Corporativo* (Lima: Editorial Lumen, 1937).

28 Juan José R. Villarías Robles, 'El intelectual liberal vuelto fascista: El caso de José de la Riva-Agüero y el fascismo peruano', in *Ciencia y fascismo*, ed. Rafael Huertas and Carmen Ortiz (Madrid: Ediciones Doce Calles, 1997), 41–60.

29 López Soria, 'Notas para el estudio', 19–22.

In his paper about Peruvian fascist intellectuals, César Castillo-García also identifies Víctor Andrés Belaunde as one of the most prominent fascist scholars of the 1930s,<sup>30</sup> although, as he acknowledges, numerous authors have analyzed Belaunde's ideology with many concluding that he was a conservative and social-Christian ideologue, not a fascist.<sup>31</sup> Castillo-García's argument for Belaunde's fascism revolves around the fact that Belaunde criticized Mussolini rather than dictatorship as a type of government, that he wrote against Marxism, that he had many fascist books in his personal library, and that he endorsed corporatism in his works.<sup>32</sup> Naturally, none of these features are necessarily fascist by themselves, such as dictatorship or having fascist books, and can be included as peripheral or adjacent concepts to the fascist minimum, such as anti-Marxism and corporatism respectively.<sup>33</sup>

Fascist propaganda also flooded the national media. In the 1930s, as Pinto noted in his brief analysis of the literary contributions made by scholars and journalists in Peruvian newspapers such as *La Crónica*, *La Prensa* and *El Comercio*, the influence of fascism was well known.<sup>34</sup> Two popular propagandists were Miró Quesada Laos, founder of the newspaper *El Comercio* who wrote in favor of Spanish Falangism in the national press, and dramatist Felipe Sassone, who did the same in the international media.<sup>35</sup>

With regard to politicians, it has been argued that *Acción Patriótica* [Patriotic Action],<sup>36</sup> a party founded by fascist intellectual José de la Riva-Agüero, as well as Óscar R. Benavides's government during the 1930s,<sup>37</sup> were also fascist-like. However, there are problems with these interpretations. With respect to Patriotic Action, it can be argued that its dynamics were not fascist, but conservative, because it aimed to reunite Peruvian traditional right-wing actors, in which oligarchs and fascists were included, as an alternative to communism and socialism, something their leaders perceived as a left-wing threat.<sup>38</sup>

30 Castillo-García, 'The Crooked Timber,' 15.

31 Osmar Gonzales Alvarado, 'Víctor Andrés Belaunde y el pensamiento socialcristiano,' *Revista de Sociología*, no. 27 (2018): 209–238.

32 Castillo-García, 'The Crooked Timber,' 15–16.

33 Griffin, 'The "Post-Fascism" of the Alianza,' 128–129.

34 Willy Pinto Gamboa, *Sobre Fascismo y Literatura* (Lima: Editorial Cibeles, 1983).

35 Osmar Gonzales Alvarado, 'José de la Riva Agüero y Felipe Sassone: Dos pensadores sociales y el fascismo en el Perú,' *Discursos del Sur*, no. 6 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.15381/dds.voi6.19324>.

36 Castillo-García, 'The Crooked Timber,' 4.

37 Orazio Ciccarelli, 'Fascism and Politics in Peru during the Benavides Regime, 1933–39: The Italian Perspective,' *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 70, no. 3 (1990): 409, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2516615>.

38 Emilio Candela, 'La Acción Patriótica: Un movimiento doctrinario en una época polar-



According to López Soria and Eduardo Gonzáles Calleja, Riva Agüero tried to unite the right-wing parties through fascist ideology,<sup>39</sup> but this resulted in an unsuccessful attempt that was incapable of conciliating the differences between popular and aristocratic fascist movements, such as the anti-aristocratic discourse of the former.<sup>40</sup>

Regarding Óscar R. Benavides's government, it is possible to identify some suspicious actions and attitudes that could have created the image of Benavides as a fascist sympathizer. For example, Benavides's government opted for the strengthening of links with the Italian Army and Benavides even, according to Italian Minister Vittorio Biachi, expressed admiration for fascist Italy and his intention to rewrite the Peruvian constitution in the Italian corporatist style.<sup>41</sup> Even scholars like Antonio Zapata have identified Benavides's Government as fascist, because of how the State implemented social policies to strengthen the link with the population, for example, the creation of Education and Health Ministries.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, other scholars have characterized it as populist and nationalist with a particular focus on undermining the influence of left and fascist parties, such as *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria de América* [APRA; American Popular Revolutionary Alliance] and *Unión Revolucionaria* [UR; Revolutionary Union], respectively, on the popular masses, by introducing health and labor regulations and benefits.<sup>43</sup>

Nevertheless, as alluded to earlier, Peru did have a fascist party during the interwar years. As Tirso Molinari discusses, there was a large and mainstream openly fascist party that came very close to getting into power: Revolutionary Union.<sup>44</sup> The messianic and quasi-religious way in which their followers conceived its founder figure, Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro, has been documented in previous historical investigations, as has the role and configuration of this party in the Peruvian political scenario during the 1930s.<sup>45</sup>

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izada (1935–1936); *Elecciones* 10, no. 11 (2011): 165–194, <https://doi.org/10.53357/Elecciones.2011.v10n11.06>.

39 López Soria, 'Notas para el estudio,' 21; Eduardo Gonzáles Calleja, 'La derecha latinoamericana en busca de un modelo fascista: la limitada influencia del falangismo en el Perú (1936–1945),' *Revista Complutense de Historia de América*, no. 20 (1994): 248.

40 Villarías Robles, 'El intelectual liberal vuelto fascista,' 57.

41 Ciccarelli, 'Fascism and Politics,' 417.

42 Antonio Zapata, *Pensando a la Derecha* (Lima: Planeta, 2016), 87.

43 Emilio Candela, 'El régimen de Óscar R. Benavides (1933–1939) ¿una experiencia populista? Definiciones y nuevos planteamientos en torno a su accionar político (MA thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2013), <http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12404/4622.203>.

44 Molinari, *El fascismo en el Perú 1931–1936*.

45 Tirso Molinari 'Carisma, mesianismo político y religiosidad popular en la década de 1930:

Revolutionary Union turned to fascism after the assassination of its leader, president Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro, and developed a complex political apparatus composed of militias, a propaganda system, and a section for women. As Latin America did not suffer the horrors of fascism and there was not an open process of defascistization or denazification as in Europe, Revolutionary Union continued its political activities after the end of the Second World War. However, despite the best efforts of its leaders, the organization decayed and never recovered the popularity it gained in the 1930s, and did not survive beyond the end of the Cold War.<sup>46</sup> Castillo-García mentions the existence of a short-lived fascist movement called Legión Peruana.<sup>47</sup> However, due to the scarce literature about this organization and its minor role, compared to the significance of UR, the latter will be used as the paradigmatic case of historical Peruvian fascism to be discussed in the following analysis.

After 1945, new actors emerged in Peruvian fascism. From the 1980s, an Andean movement developed within the Peruvian army and reclaimed the legacy of the national hero Andrés Bello Cáceres as part of its ethnic and nationalist ideas, adopting the name of *etnocacerismo* [ethnocacerism]. During the ending of Alberto Fujimori's dictatorship and the return to democracy in 2001, ethnocacerism became visible. After two armed uprisings and the release of its leader, Antauro Humala, ethnocacerism returned to the political sphere in 2022 with a fascist discourse that aims to recreate a New Tahuantinsuyo (a new Inca Empire), based on the defense of the indigenous people, or 'copper race' as Humala called them.<sup>46</sup> It did not hesitate to threaten to restructure the Peruvian Republic by force.<sup>48</sup>

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Del sanhecerrismo al liderazgo fascista de Luis A. Flores,' in *Políticas divinas: Religión, diversidad y política en el Perú contemporáneo*, ed. Fernando Armas Asín, Carlos Aburto Cotrina, Juan Fonseca Ariza and José Ragas Rojas (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2008), 309–328; Paulo Drinot, 'El Comité Distrital Sanchezcerrista de Magdalena del Mar: Un ensayo de microhistoria política,' *Revista del Archivo General de la Nación* 23, no. 1 (2001): 333–351, <https://revista.agn.gob.pe/ojs/index.php/ragn/issue/view/15/25>; Alfonso Vargas Murillo, 'Los orígenes del partido Unión Revolucionaria en Tacna: Los clubes Sánchez Cerro y los comités del partido Unión Revolucionaria (1931–1934),' paper presented at the xxvii Coloquio Internacional de Estudiantes de Historia, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017, <https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/166961>.

- 46 Enrique Chirinos Soto, *La Nueva Constitución y los partidos* (Lima: Centro Documentación Andina, 1984), 64.
- 47 Castillo-García, 'The Crooked Timber,' 4.
- 48 Piero Gayozzo, 'Antauro Huamala vs Dina Boluarte ¿El etnocacerismo contraataca?' previously published in *Lucidez* (Lima), December 16, 2022, available at *El Progreso*, <https://www.diarioelprogresoperu.com/post/antauro-huamala-vs-dina-boluarte-el-etnocacerismo-contraataca-1>.

Meanwhile, in 2013, the youth organization *Acción Legionaria* [AL; Legionary Action] aimed to revive the fascist legacy of Revolutionary Union. Unlike Peruvian neo-Nazi fringe groups, such as the *Movimiento Nacional Socialista Despierta Perú* [National Socialist Movement Awake Peru] or the *Vanguardia Nacional* [National Vanguard],<sup>49</sup> Legionary Action was active for four years, abandoned secrecy, and developed visible figures as spokespersons. It also gained attention in online media, formed militant squads, developed ideological production, maintained various digital dissemination portals, and carried out face-to-face activism on several occasions.<sup>50</sup>

### Historical Peruvian Fascism: Revolutionary Union

The Revolutionary Union Party (UR) was a mass movement with significant political activism during the period from 1931 to 1936. It was founded by Commander Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro (later General), a military figure responsible for overthrowing autocrat Augusto B. Leguía in 1930 through a military coup d'état from Arequipa city. UR was originally conceived as a vehicle to lead Sánchez Cerro to the presidency by democratic means in the elections of 1931, which it ultimately did. After his assassination in 1933, the UR experienced a split that led the majority faction, under Luis Alberto Flores Medina's command, to turn to fascist ideology and begin an opposition to the succeeding government headed by General Óscar R. Benavides. After a period of internal struggles following the death of Sánchez Cerro, the party reorganized in a fascist style with the creation of a complex propaganda apparatus, political formation schools, black shirt legions, women's committees, indigenous delegations and corporatist labor unions. This process culminated in the Fascist Assembly or Congress of 1935.

In 1936, UR participated in the presidential elections and came in third place. The elections were annulled due to alleged interference of an international party, APRA,<sup>51</sup> hence the Congress extended Benavides's term as president. The actions of Revolutionary Union against the annulment of elections were force-

49 El Comercio, 'Unas ocho agrupaciones afines al nazismo captan a jóvenes en el país,' *El Comercio*, August 16, 2009, [https://archivo.elcomercio.pe/sociedad/lima/unas-och-agrupaciones-afines-al-nazismo-captan-jovenes-pais\\_1-noticia-328657](https://archivo.elcomercio.pe/sociedad/lima/unas-och-agrupaciones-afines-al-nazismo-captan-jovenes-pais_1-noticia-328657).

50 Carlos Cabanillas, 'Los Hombres de Negro,' *Caretas* (Lima), July 18, 2013.

51 Tirso Molinari, 'La Unión Revolucionaria 1931–1939: Una aproximación a la historia del fascismo en el Perú' (MA thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2004), 537, <http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12404/129>.

ful: on one hand, its parliamentary faction demanded that Benavides be put on trial before the Constitutional Court, and on the other, it called on the armed forces to rebel against Benavides. The military government did not forgive these calls and began the prosecution, imprisonment, and criminalization of the party and its militants, facts that distanced the UR faction led by Flores from political action until the end of Benavides's regime.

As Molinari notes, UR was not a marginal phenomenon in Peruvian politics. It achieved the organization of committees and militants in Lima and in other regions, as evidenced by the indigenous committees,<sup>52</sup> an active propaganda apparatus (including five newspapers: *Acción*, *La Batalla*, *Crisol*, *El Legionario*, and *El Observador*), mass rallies, such as the closing of Flores's campaign in 1936, and about 6,000 members in its paramilitary forces.<sup>53</sup>

UR was not only a fascist movement by designation but was also configured as such. Its corporatist and nationalist ideology sought to construct an 'authentic nationalism' that would reconcile social classes and labor with capital in a true fascist style.<sup>54</sup> By appearing to oppose defeatism and seeking the defense of territories under dispute,<sup>55</sup> as well as adopting the regeneration of Peru as the 'sacred mission to achieve',<sup>56</sup> UR sought to position a nationalism that defended the vital interests of the country and directed the nation towards the realization of its great destiny (or palingenesis).<sup>57</sup> Its founder, Sanchez Cerro, was popular because of the coup he led against Augusto B. Leguía's autocratic and corrupted government and how he judged and arrested Leguía's senior officials. Therefore, during its first, non-fascist stage, UR's political program and position on nationalism was focused mainly on the opposition to Leguía's regime and followers (anti-Leguíaism) and in favor of the constitutional demands Sánchez Cerro called for in the Arequipa Manifesto during his revolt. Nevertheless, when it became fascist, UR's nationalism turned from anti-Leguíaism and opposition to corruption and communism to an ultranationalism built upon the figure of Sánchez Cerro as the savior of Peru, and the need

52 Ibid., 164.

53 Molinari, *El fascismo en el Perú*, 133–134.

54 Crisol, 'Nacionalismo Auténtico,' in *El pensamiento fascista*, ed. José Ignacio López Soria (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1981), 205–207.

55 Molinari, *La Unión Revolucionaria*, 344; Luis Alberto Flores Medina, 'Manifiesto a la nación del Dr. Luis A. Flores, Jefe del Partido Unión Revolucionaria,' *Acción* (Lima), December 8, 1933; *Acción*, 'Han comenzado las conferencias en Río de Janeiro,' *Acción* (Lima), October 28, 1933.

56 *Acción*, 'Puntos básicos del Programa del Partido Unión Revolucionaria,' *Acción* (Lima), October 24, 1933.

57 Molinari, *El fascismo en el Perú*, 187.

to fulfil his political program (Arequipa Manifesto) and desires to achieve the resurgence of the country. In fact, in UR convictions there was a call to revenge the assassination of Sánchez Cerro as a synonym of 'justice for the people'.<sup>58</sup> Thereafter, the palingenetic myth for a fascist UR was linked to the fulfilment of its caudillo's will and, as a consequence, the overcoming of decadence, with a corporatist and totalitarian state as the only way to achieve it.

Before its fascist stage, when Sánchez Cerro was still President of Peru, APRA was the main opposing force to the government. APRA was a local left-wing party self-identifying as anti-communist but which aimed to recruit the Peruvian working class. During Sánchez Cerro's government, APRA led an armed insurgence in Trujillo that resulted in the killing of soldiers, APRA militants and the banning of the party. Sánchez Cerro was killed by an APRA member in 1933, making the scenario even more complex. This background helps explain the aversion that UR expressed for APRA during those years. In fact, denouncing APRA as part of a communist conspiracy to destroy Peru was also a strategy to deal with its most antagonistic force, a party which competed for the representation of the middle and popular classes.<sup>59</sup> In general, Marxism was seen as a menace to religion as well as the nation. To illustrate this, UR took the Spanish Civil War as an example. In a 1936 pamphlet, pictures of Spanish communists shooting at religious statues were used to denounce the intentions of Marxists.<sup>60</sup> Following the same line, García-Rossell, UR's black shirt leader, wrote in the propaganda newspaper *Acción* about the tragedy of Spain and the sacrifice of Primo de Rivera, and used them as a call for considering UR as the only way to avoid the horrors of Marxism.<sup>61</sup>

Nevertheless, through the UR's lens, communism was not the only force threatening the country. In Peru, immigration from Asia started in 1850 and continued in various waves through the following decades. For local intellectuals and elites by the 1920s, Asian migration was viewed as negative due to the 'inferiority of the yellow race' and its negative impact on the 'national race'.<sup>62</sup> Following the pattern of searching for a scapegoat in an appeal for social cleansing, UR paid attention to these claims and feelings about Asian communities and used them for political purposes. According to UR, the illegal immigra-

58 *Acción*, 'Del Ideario de la "Unión Revolucionaria"', *Acción* (Lima), March 18, 1934.

59 Flores Medina, 'Manifiesto a la nación.'

60 Molinari, *El fascismo en el Perú*, 314.

61 Carlos García-Rossell Suárez, 'España y el Perú,' *Acción* (Lima), November 5, 1936.

62 Carlos Contreras and Marcos Cueto, *Historia del Perú contemporáneo*, 5th ed. (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2015), 236.

tion of Asians was not only affecting Peruvians because of job displacement,<sup>63</sup> and the destruction of industry,<sup>64</sup> but was also corrupting their lifestyle. The UR's propaganda apparatus described Japanese and Chinese communities as immoral and vicious. In 1934, the newspaper *Acción* denounced Lima's Chinatown, claiming the existence of illegal opium consumption and gambling houses,<sup>65</sup> as well as brothels and unhealthy restaurants,<sup>66</sup> and that these were corrupting Peruvian youth.<sup>67</sup> With slogans such as 'Every Japanese who enters the country is a Peruvian who joins the ranks of the unemployed', and the creation of anti-Asian organizations and the promise to fight against 'yellow invasion',<sup>68</sup> UR was calling for a violent revolt against Japanese commerce as well as using this contempt to coalesce collective identity for mestizo and indigenous members.<sup>69</sup> The conspirative strategy of UR to attract more followers was clear: the country was under siege by communism and Asian immigration, and UR was the only one that could save the country.

The way in which Sánchez Cerro was elevated to a quasi-saint figure, and the subsequent configuration of the Supreme Leadership position, reveal the populist and authoritarian nature of the movement. Sánchez Cerro's popularity was based on the military coup that he led against Augusto B. Leguía. His rejection of Leguía, his defense of Political Constitution, as expressed in his Arequipa Manifesto, and his non-aristocratic origin inspired people to create many clubs in his name ('sanchezcerristas' clubs) and outlined his charismatic leadership. His leadership was exemplified in a 1933 cover of UR's newspaper *Acción*, in which Sánchez Cerro was presented as the 'new Liberator of Peru',<sup>70</sup> and claimed the existence of a Sánchez Cerro version of the Christian Creed.<sup>71</sup> After his death, Sánchez Cerro's image served as a symbol to unite the party against his political opponents in a kind of eschatological crusade that would pit his followers, or the true nationalists, against the communists.

63 Antonio Alba, 'El gravísimo escándalo: De la inmigración clandestina de chinos y la casa de juego que funciona en el restaurant Kuong Tong,' *Acción* (Lima), March 11, 1934.

64 Crisol, 'Sigue la escoba japonesa barriendo a los peruanos de la industria y el comercio,' *Acción* (Lima), December 28, 1935.

65 Alba, 'El gravísimo escándalo.'

66 Antonio Alba, 'Hoteles, cafetines, pulperías y tiendas japonesas que falsifican y suplantán la legitimidad de la denominación,' *Acción* (Lima), March 18, 1934.

67 *Acción*, 'Visiones macabras se ven a diario en los fumadores de Opio del Barrio Chino limeño,' *Acción* (Lima), November 30, 1934.

68 Salatiel Silva Alcántara, 'Apoya nuestra campaña antiasiática,' *Acción* (Lima), March 11, 1934.

69 Molinari, *El fascismo en el Perú*, 224 and 245.

70 *Acción*, 'El nuevo Libertador del Perú,' *Acción* (Lima), December 8, 1933.

71 Molinari, *El fascismo en el Perú*, 25.

Flores's charismatic and authoritarian leadership was developed following this logic, presenting him as a kind of apostle of Sánchez Cerro who would continue his heroism and legacy.<sup>72</sup> In doing this, Flores took advantage of Sánchez Cerro's leadership, of which he was a true follower, and strengthened his position, adopting a messianic persona inside the party and becoming the symbol of fascists multitudes;<sup>73</sup> as such, in a 1936 pamphlet, Flores was designated as 'chosen by God and the Peruvian people to save Peru'.<sup>74</sup> Described as having the ideal fascist personality, full of sacrifice and confrontation,<sup>75</sup> Flores knew how to fulfil the void left by Sánchez Cerro and, at the same time, invigorate fascist feelings within his comrades under his charismatic leadership.

In its fascist stage, and under the leadership of Luis Flores, UR denounced the decadence it saw in democracy, as well as claimed both liberalism and democracy were old doctrines,<sup>76</sup> adopting corporatism as an alternative for Peru. Indeed, this was an important requirement to achieve national palinogenesis. UR sought to build a corporative state opposed to liberal democracy and Marxist politics, composed of civil associations or corporations that would replace the party-political system.<sup>77</sup> Through its integral and totalitarian corporatist policy,<sup>78</sup> as well as through its 'Conciliarity State' role,<sup>79</sup> parties would not be required to exist anymore, allowing the popular will to be expressed truly through corporations and a system they called 'Organized Democracy'.<sup>80</sup> These features reflect the authoritarian democratic ideal of the movement. Through the appeal of strong leadership, the population would be able to actualize its will and use the Corporatist State as a means to express its ideas without the need for a corrupted, democratic system. For UR, the Corporatist State was the true embodiment of the national will.

Mimicking Italian Fascism, and taking advantage of the chaotic scenario of Peruvian politics, UR organized its own black-shirted squads. Their first major appearance was on 30 December 1933 during a public training exercise in Limatambo under the command of retired military men, such as Carlos García-

72 Molinari 'Carisma, mesianismo político,' 321–326.

73 Molinari, *El fascismo en el Perú*, 321–335.

74 *Ibid.*, 314.

75 *Ibid.*, 177.

76 Molinari, *La Unión Revolucionaria*, 225.

77 *Ibid.*, 254.

78 Molinari, *El fascismo en el Perú*, 451–454.

79 U.R. Secretaría General de Prensa y Propaganda, 'El Estado conciliador,' in *El Pensamiento Fascista*, ed. José Ignacio López Soria (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1981), 208–210.

80 Molinari, *La Unión Revolucionaria*, 441–442.

Rosell and Lieutenant Zamora.<sup>81</sup> These public exhibitions were organized continuously in Lima and other regions and were far from a marginal phenomenon in UR history. The intention of creating a political paramilitary group engaged with a truly national feeling was embodied in the Decalogue of the Combatant of the Revolutionary Union,<sup>82</sup> in which the call to fight and the assumption of the militant as the defender of national feelings reflected the militaristic and heroic masculinity featured by the party. Indeed, these ideas were present in many texts, such as the 'Ideario de la Unión Revolucionaria,' a list of party convictions according to which all UR members were called to be martyrs because they must 'know how to fight and know how to die for the ideal of a great and strong country.'<sup>83</sup> Such ideas were also extended to female members through the women's section led by Yolanda Coco.

The black shirt squad served as both a support for the government against communism and also as a reminder that UR was an organic and independent force ready to defend the country even against the government if necessary. On one hand, this paramilitary apparatus was a political force ready to make fierce opposition to the menace of both APRA and Marxism. As can be read in a 1933 *Acción* newspaper cover, UR declared that APRA was brewing a conspiracy, and stated 'fulfilling its mission of peace and order, it is ready to act in defense of public institutions' (by way of the black shirt squads).<sup>84</sup> On the other hand, to understand how paramilitary forces could go against the government, it is important to remember that after a period of support between the Benavides regime and UR, thanks to the fascist sympathies of the then Prime Minister, Riva Agüero, the relationship became aggressive because of the annulment of the 1936 elections.

Regarding the activities of UR after the war, Flores recovered the leadership of the party and declared its reunification as well as a revision of its ideology in August 1945.<sup>85</sup> This can be seen in its postwar publications, in which UR declared its loyalty to the 1930 Arequipa Manifesto, the continuation of a nationalist enterprise in its program (resumed in its 'Peru above everything' slo-

81 *Acción*, 'Los camisas negras se organizan bajo la dirección de sus instructores,' *Acción* (Lima), January 6, 1934.

82 Molinari, *La Unión Revolucionaria*, 190–191.

83 *Acción*, 'Del Ideario.'

84 *Acción*, 'Se ha tramado y se trama un vasto complot revolucionario,' *Acción* (Lima), December 23, 1933.

85 *El Heraldo*, 'Partido Unión Revolucionaria,' *El Heraldo* (Lima), September 6, 1945.



gan),<sup>86</sup> and to be against communism, plutocracy and APRA.<sup>87</sup> Although UR did not declare itself as fascist again, its opposition to communism and its intention to cooperate with plutocrats only if they ‘turn into more comprehensive and human’, in a clear reference to capital exploitation, as well as its intention to create Factory Committees to encourage the cooperation between the labor force and capital in combination with its cult of national sovereignty,<sup>88</sup> give some indication of the preservation of a third position approach in its ideology. In fact, a Molinari interview with Lazarte Ferreyros, a member of UR during the 1930s, shows that Flores, after returning from exile in 1945, continued supporting fascist ideas despite the end of the war.<sup>89</sup> Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that, during its last years, the UR was fascist. That assumption could be inferred through the manifestation of the need for a doctrinal revision,<sup>90</sup> and the response of its leader about the respect for the democratic order when asked about the political stability of those years.<sup>91</sup> Even under Flores’s leadership, the UR survived the Second World War not as a fascist party, but as a nationalist and populist one, so there was no official intention to create a neo-fascist party or neo-fascist stage for the party after the war.

Everything points to Revolutionary Union sharing all the features of classic fascism and configuring itself as fascist. This can be seen in its black shirts’ militaristic ethos, its conspiracy theorizing, its quest for cleansing society of undesirable individuals, its counterrevolutionary attitudes and its search for a ‘true’ democracy. These were all present in its discourse and strategy and are features of El-Ojeili’s model. Nevertheless, it might be highlighted that its nationalist doctrine was not built on the claim of returning to a historical era or reviving the memory of a traditional hero of Peruvian history. Revolutionary Union tried to keep alive the memory of a relatively recent past: the Arequipa revolution or *coup d’état* (1930), the episode that ended Leguía’s authoritarian regime, and its deceased leader, Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro. This meant that its palingenetic nature was more of a discursive strategy evidenced in slogans of national and spiritual rejuvenation inspired by Sanchez Cerro’s legacy than a

86 La Opinión, ‘Definición de Nuestra Posición Doctrinaria,’ *La Opinión* (Lima), March 30, 1958.

87 La Opinión, ‘La U.R. y su Posición Política,’ *La Opinión* (Lima), April 29, 1961.

88 La Opinión, ‘Síntesis ideológica y programática del partido “Unión Revolucionaria”,’ *La Opinión* (Lima), March 14, 1961.

89 Molinari, *El Fascismo en el Perú*, 330.

90 El Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, ‘Definición de Nuestra Posición Doctrinaria,’ *La Opinión* (Lima), March 30, 1958.

91 La Opinión, ‘Así definió la prensa nacional al Jefe del Partido: Flores,’ *La Opinión* (Lima), March 30, 1958.

theoretical call for the resurgence of a previous, glorious era or stage of Peruvian history, which may be a consequence of the short period of time it was active before being persecuted by Benavides. With only three years as a self-identifying fascist organization, with internal disputes during the transition to fascism and focusing on the Presidential elections of 1936, it is suggested that Revolutionary Union probably did not have enough time to fully mature into a Peruvian expression of fascism, and so did not move beyond being a regional copy of Italian Fascism before its proscription.

### Neo-Fascism in Peru: Legionary Action

Legionary Action was an organization with an openly fascist and corporatist ideology founded on 5 January 2013 by former members of Peruvian neo-Nazi organizations. It appeared as an alternative to the political polarization that Peruvian society was experiencing during those years. In 2011, after many efforts of right-wing and conservative parties to prevent left-wing parties from rising to power, Ollanta Humala, a former military officer, was elected, and with him a coalition of left-wing politicians made its way into the Executive, leading what will be known as the 'Great Transformation' Government.<sup>92</sup> Due to the lack of a structured ruling party, Humala's regime had to cover the technical and bureaucratic posts with progressivist activists, provoking the implementation of progressivist policies related to gender equality, feminism and abortion.<sup>93</sup> At the same time, the government started to lose the confidence of the radical left-winged sector due to its support of neo-liberal policies and its turn from radical discourse to a more market-friendly one.<sup>94</sup>

Legionary Action was a response to the rise of progressivist policies and activism, as well as to the capitalist regime that since the last decade of the twentieth century was considered responsible for national decline. Since its foundation, Legionary Action launched an aggressive propaganda and visibil-

92 Ricardo Alberto Del Rosario Zárate, 'Análisis del tratamiento informativo de los diarios El Comercio y La República sobre las políticas de inclusión social impulsadas durante los primeros 100 días del gobierno de Ollanta Humala' (BA thesis, University of Lima, 2016).

93 Zoila Beatriz Leiva Rioja, 'La reglamentación del aborto terapéutico en el Perú: Una necesidad postergada,' *Politai: Revista de Ciencia Política* 12, no. 22 (2022), 25–26, <https://doi.org/10.18800/politai.202101.002>.

94 Abelardo Sánchez León, Francisco Durand, 'Humala: Entre la izquierda y la derecha: Una entrevista a Francisco Durand,' *Quehacer*, no. 194 (2014): 6–19.

ity campaign in social networks against both left and right parties, arguing for national rebirth and in favor of the legacy of fascist authors. Through its propaganda apparatus, Legionary Action claimed the status of a successor to the Revolutionary Union tradition in modern Peru, as well as heir to its political program.

Legionary Action was essentially a university and youth movement. Members it recruited were mostly part of private universities and belonged to the middle and upper social classes. The most popular members were three of its founders: Israel Lira (Supreme Leader), Javier Aliaga (National Commander)—both of whom had previously been involved in neo-Nazi organizations in Peru<sup>95</sup>—and Enzo Fernández Ciotola (National Leader of Press and Propaganda).<sup>96</sup> Although not a mass movement like Revolutionary Union, Legionary Action appeared across different media due to its political activism,<sup>97</sup> established numerous regional cells, developed paramilitary black shirt squads, created a propaganda apparatus,<sup>98</sup> and published prolific array of ideological work. Its leader made an effort to produce a developed ideology, which was mainly set out in the publications *Fundamentos del Nacionalcorporativismo* [Foundations of Nationalcorporatism],<sup>99</sup> and *Manifiesto del fascismo peruano* [Peruvian fascism manifesto].<sup>100</sup>

In contrast to other far-right or neo-fascist groups, Legionary Action did not adopt clandestine activism and carried out street propaganda campaigns as well as organized public meetings during the time it was active. Nevertheless, after four years of political and social activism, Legionary Action ended with the declaration that it was disbanding during its fourth National Congress in

95 Alexi Velásquez, 'Detienen a 4 universitarios neonazis,' *La República*, May 23, 2019, <https://larepublica.pe/sociedad/414826-detienen-a-4-universitarios-neonazis/>.

96 Carlos Cabanillas, 'Lima: ¿Quiénes son "Los Hombres de Negro" que admiran a Sánchez Cerro y Mussolini?' *Peru.com*, July 18, 2013, <https://peru.com/actualidad/mi-ciudad/lima-quienes-son-hombres-negro-que-admiran-sanchez-cerro-y-mussolini-noticia-152358/>.

97 Correo, 'Aparecen afiches instando a no sufragar mañana,' *Diario Correo* (Lima), October 4, 2014, <https://diariocorreo.pe/peru/aparecen-afiches-instando-a-no-sufragar-mana-2602/>; Marco Sifuentes, 'Fascistas apoyan marcha por la vida,' *Útero* (Lima), March 6, 2014, <http://utero.pe/2014/03/06/fascistas-apoyan-marcha-por-la-vida/>; Cabanillas, 'Lima: ¿Quiénes son.'

98 *Crisol y Acción*, available at the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, <https://web.archive.org/web/20160302104836/http://www.crisolyaccion.com/>.

99 Israel Lira, *Fundamentos del Nacionalcorporativismo*, tomo I (Lima: Partido Fascista Peruano Acción Legionaria, 2014); Israel Lira, *Fundamentos del Nacionalcorporativismo*, tomo II (Lima: Partido Fascista Peruano Acción Legionaria, 2014).

100 Israel Lira, *Manifiesto del fascismo peruano* (Lima: Partido Fascista Peruano Acción Legionaria, 2014).

2016.<sup>101</sup> Originally, the Legionary ideology was called Nationalcorporatism, but over the years, and due to the evolution of its theoretical development, it was renamed as Crisolismo,<sup>102</sup> thus assuming ‘the historical work of finally creating a youthful and new ideology, discarding everything old, reviving what is salvageable and building the foundations of this new edifice of national identity and pride’.<sup>103</sup>

Nationalcorporatism was supposed to be a new way to understand Peruvian-ness, as developed by Legionary Action leaders. Its core ideas were the notions of ‘authentic nationalism’, ‘unity in diversity’ and the project of a social, economic and political Corporatist State. It was based on conspiracy theorization claiming that foreign forces have surrendered the nation to decadence in economic, social, political and spiritual terms through the false political claims of liberalism and Marxism. Therefore, it expresses a palingenetic form of ultranationalism, assuming the monopoly of national sentiment or the thesis of ‘authentic nationalism’ as the only way to return Peru to its lost greatness and to re-establish the Republic through a material and spiritual revolution that would potentially be peaceful, but if necessary violent, to make the desired transformation.<sup>104</sup> Palingenetic change in Legionary Action’s culture aims to replace corrupt political figures with a fascist and heroic youth truly committed to the country.

Originally inspired by the ‘Peruvianness’ thesis of Peruvian historian José Antonio del Busto Duthurburu and later, during its rebranding as Crisolismo, drawing in Victor Andrés Belaunde’s work on Peruvianness, Legionary Action’s nationalism owed its novelty not to the adoption of the Peruvianness thesis or mestizo identity, but to the unique way it was assembled. Indeed, it was possible due to the belief that Peru was ‘a country with imperial vocation’.<sup>105</sup> Legionaries believed that the prior existence of empires in what now consti-

101 ‘Acción Legionaria,’ *Metapedia*, accessed March 19, 2024, [https://es.metapedia.org/wiki/Acci%C3%B3n\\_Legionaria](https://es.metapedia.org/wiki/Acci%C3%B3n_Legionaria).

102 Crisolismo was the name of Legionary Action ideology during its last year when Nationalcorporatism was renamed as Crisolismo. Nevertheless, after Legionary Action was disbanded, many of its members regrouped into a new project called *Centro de Estudios Crisolistas* in which they declared Crisolismo as a new Peruvian ideology that was no longer fascist, but was supported by the Fourth Political Theory project of Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin.

103 Israel Lira, ‘Nueva Doctrina Nacional: El Crisolismo,’ *Crisol y Acción*, March 16, 2016, available at the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, <https://web.archive.org/web/20160605144136/http://www.crisolyaccion.com/16-03-2016/nueva-doctrina-nacional-el-crisolismo/>.

104 Lira, *Manifiesto del fascismo peruano*, 5.

105 Lira, *Fundamentos I*, 35.

tutes Peruvian territory was enough to sustain a vision of national pride and calls for the return of its greatness. For Legionaries, Peruvian origins as a nation could be traced to the site of Caral and nearly five thousand years of ancestral and imperial historical heritage.<sup>106</sup> Another of its main ideas was the principle of ‘unity in diversity’, which underlies the bicultural, or Andean and Hispanic lineage, and the multicultural nature of Peru—a melting pot of ethnicities derived from African, European and Asian immigration.<sup>107</sup> In contrast to Belaunde’s Peruvianness theses, which focused on Catholic religion and Spanish language as its core features,<sup>108</sup> Legionary Peruvianness tried to give the same importance to both lineages—Indigenous and European—as a countermeasure against pure indigenous or pure Hispanic national identities. A further feature of its novelty was its rejection of chauvinism, or superficial expressions of nationalism, such as pride in local soccer or even gastronomic identities.

In terms of its state project, Legionary Action defined it as a totalitarian one and the state was supposed to ensure ‘the proper functioning of an entire organizational, integrative and systemic apparatus’.<sup>109</sup> The idea of meritocratic organization of the party, as opposed to the democratic representative party order, and the principle of a true embodiment of the popular will in a non-liberal democratic state, are also present in its ideology. Both are expressions of the authoritarian democratic calling of the movement. Although Legionary Action’s leadership was never charismatic, it united both the advocacy of corporatism as a political device capable of conciliating the social and economic forces (Conciliatory State),<sup>110</sup> and the embodiment of the true popular will under the concept of ‘authentic democracy or corporatist democracy or meritocratic democracy’.<sup>111</sup>

This Corporative State would work by always putting national interests first, but without leaving aside particular and collective interests because ‘first [are] your sacred duties to the homeland that will inevitably have repercussions on your family’.<sup>112</sup> This committed devotion and heroic feeling of the nation was complemented by rituals such as the Legionary Oath, the use of black shirts and leadership ranks, and the planning of urban propaganda campaigns, all of

106 Ibid., 36.

107 Ibid., 44.

108 Castillo-García, ‘The Crooked Timber,’ 22.

109 Lira, *Fundamentos II*, 19.

110 Ibid., 12.

111 Acción Legionaria, ‘Nuestro Ideal: Nacionalcorporativismo,’ *La Legion*, 2016, available at the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, <https://web.archive.org/web/20161021225302/http://lalegion.pe/nuestro-ideal>.

112 Ibid.

which were used to fuel its paramilitary organization. The case of Legionary Action is interesting because it tried to promote a certain original value in fascism, to resolve the poor level of theoretical fascist development that followed the defeat of the Axis powers of the Second World War, and to move it away from the social perception of fascism as an anti-ideology.

Legionary Action was a neo-fascist organization not only because it met Griffin's fascist minimum, but also because it sought to recreate a project very similar to that of its peers in the 1930s and continue this legacy in the twenty-first century. Some sociological and discursive elements inspired by UR could be found in Legionary features. For example, the creation of their blog *Crisol y Acción* [Crisol and Action] tried to repurpose symbolically UR's newspapers *Crisol* and *Acción*. Naming the second black shirt squad Luis Alberto Flores Medina and organizing an annual pilgrimage to the tomb of Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro, were also ways in which Legionary Action attempted to strengthen the legacy of UR leaders in its culture. With regards to Legionary doctrine, its 'Authentic Nationalism' and 'Conciliatory State' projects were both inspired by the same named projects of Revolutionary Union, although they were not directly cited nor mentioned. Despite this, Legionary Action included more elaborate Peruvianist and State theses than that of Revolutionary Union and tried to explain in more detail the causes of national decadence. Concerning the work of fascist intellectuals of the late 1930s, no references to authors such as Raúl Ferrero Rebagliati can be found in Legionary Action political writings.

### **Ethnocacerism, Andean Fascism?**

The third case is that of Ethnocacerism, a movement whose origins date back to the 1980s within the Peruvian army and which advocates a Peruvian version of ethnonationalism. The ideology was created by lawyer Isaac Humala, and later developed by his son Antauro Humala, brother of former Peruvian President Ollanta Humala. The term 'ethnocacerism' is a combination of the prefix 'ethno' (referring to ethnicity) and the last name of Pacific War general Andrés Avelino Cáceres.

The ethnocacerist movement's first appearance was during the Locumba armed uprising that was led by the Humala brothers, Antauro and Ollanta, in 2001. This action sought to end the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori, but failed. When democracy returned that same year, the brothers were granted amnesty. Ethnocacerism received renewed media attention in 2005 when Antauro Humala took up arms for the second time in Andahuaylas. This

episode led to a brief armed confrontation in which four police officers were killed. As a result, Antauro and the ethnocacerist leaders were sentenced to almost twenty years in prison. Since then, the ethnocacerist project has been divided into two strands, one of a nationalist nature led by Ollanta Humala, who became president in 2011, and the other of a fascist nature led by Antauro Humala.<sup>113</sup>

From 2016 to 2022 Peru faced a long political crisis. The first part took place during the regime of elected president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK) and was boosted by the unceasing clash between the Congress and the Presidency, as well as the constant uncovering of corruption scandals involving politicians.<sup>114</sup> After the resignation of PPK in 2018, vice-president Martín Vizcarra assumed the leadership of the government. Nevertheless, the confrontation with Parliament intensified and ended with the closure of the Parliament by President Vizcarra in 2019 and the call for new Parliament elections for 2020–2021. During these extraordinary elections, nine ethnocacerists were elected as congressmen, leading to public concern about their advocacy for the liberation of Antauro Humala and their intention to modify the Political Constitution.<sup>115</sup> Despite this, none contributed to the ethnocacerist movement during the year they were in charge. The second part of the crisis followed the 2021 Presidential elections won by Pedro Castillo, candidate of Perú Libre, a far-left Marxist party. It was caused by corruption involving his government as well as the opposition of both right-wing parties and the business class to Castillo's political decisions. During the 2021 elections, Pedro Castillo claimed that he would pardon Antauro Humala if elected as president,<sup>116</sup> and in return, Humala offered him the support of ethnocacerism.<sup>117</sup> However, on 19 August 2022 the *Instituto Nacional Penitenciario del Perú* [INPE; National Penitentiary Institute of Peru] announced that Antauro Humala would be released after serving a sentence for

113 Iván Mendieta, '¿Qué es el movimiento etnocacerista?' *Ideele*, no. 290 (2019), <https://revistaideele.com/ideele/content/%C2%BFqu%C3%Ag-es-el-movimiento-etnocacerista>.

114 Franklin Canaza-Choque, 'El último día del presidente Martín Vizcarra, Perú 2020: Perder la corona y el poder en un final turbulento,' *DIKÉ: Revista Peruana de Derecho y Ciencia Política* 2, no. 2 (2022): 1–16.

115 Aramis Castro, 'Unión por el Perú: Congresistas buscan libertad de Antauro Humala,' *Ojo Público*, January 31, 2020, <https://ojo-publico.com/1596/union-por-el-peru-congresistas-buscan-libertad-de-antauro-humala>.

116 Redacción, 'Antauro Humala pide el indulto a Pedro Castillo a través de una carta,' *Gestión*, August 5, 2021, <https://gestion.pe/peru/politica/antauro-humala-pide-el-indulto-a-pedro-castillo-a-traves-de-una-carta-pedro-castillo-nndc-noticia/>.

117 *Gestión*, 'Antauro Humala expresa apoyo a Pedro Castillo,' *Gestión*, May 5, 2021, <https://gestion.pe/peru/politica/antauro-humala-expresa-apoyo-a-pedro-castillo-nndc-noticia/>.

redemption of the penalty.<sup>118</sup> After his release, Antauro Humala began a process of reorganization of the movement, and he dared to offer rallies throughout the Peruvian territory.<sup>119</sup> Only a few months after his return to political life, his discourse became more radical and he threatened to close the Peruvian Parliament by force. This turned the rallies he called for into a means of convening what he considered 'the forging of the road to the Second Republic', a kind of Lima Putsch to solve the political crisis that the country was going through.<sup>120</sup>

Ethnocacerist ideology has been catalogued as a form of radical populism,<sup>121</sup> and neo-militarism;<sup>122</sup> however, these characteristics fail to encompass the true nature of the movement. For this reason, Mendieta suggested that it is fascist,<sup>123</sup> since its project and strategy correspond to the characteristics he defines as typical of fascism: radical nationalism, protectionism, statism, caudillismo, and militarism.<sup>124</sup> Although Mendieta approaches the essence of ethnocacerism, he does not analyze it in a precise way due to the limited theoretical framework he uses to define fascism. This research follows the consensus regarding a fascist minimum, but it is recommended to discard the 'fascist' denomination when analyzing ethnocacerism because fascism, as such, belonged to a particular time period. In this sense, it would be more appropriate to analyze ethnocacerism as a form of neo-fascism.

118 'INPE otorga libertad para Antauro Humala por cumplimiento de condena,' *Peruano*, August 19, 2019, <https://www.elperuano.pe/noticia/184003-inpe-anuncia-otorgamiento-de-libertad-a-antauro-humala-por-cumplimiento-de-condena>.

119 Piero Gayozzo, 'Etnocacerismo: Una amenaza para la democracia,' previously published in *Lucidez* (Lima), October 29, 2022, available at *El Progreso*, <https://www.diarioelprogreso.com/post/etnocacerismo-una-amenaza-para-la-democracia>.

120 Piero Gayozzo, '¿Putsch de Lima? Antauro Humala y la Segunda República etnocacerista,' previously published in *Lucidez* (Lima), November 26, 2022, available at *El Progreso*, <https://www.diarioelprogresoperu.com/post/putsch-de-lima-antauro-humala-y-la-segunda-rep%C3%BAblica-etnocacerista/>.

121 Mariana Alvarado, 'El etnocacerismo como populismo radical,' *Revista de Ciencia Política y Gobierno* 1, no. 1 (2014): 115–129.

122 Joanna Ostrowska, 'Hombre andino contra hombre occidentalizado: El etnocacerismo de los Humala,' *Itinerarios: Revista de Estudios Lingüísticos, Literarios, Históricos y Antropológicos*, no. 11 (2010): 85–101.

123 Mendieta, '¿Emulando a Robespierre? Antauro Humala y el etnocacerismo,' *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* (Lima), November 10, 2022, <https://iep.org.pe/noticias/critica-y-debates-emulando-a-robspierre-antauro-humala-y-el-etnocacerismo-por-michael-mendieta/>.

124 Iván Mendieta, 'Camisas verdes en el Perú: El proyecto de Estado del etnocacerismo, modernidad y nacionalismo' (MA thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2011), 66, <http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12404/4659>. In his thesis on ethnocacerism, Mendieta does not cite any theoretical framework to define fascism. He simply noted a list of supposed fascist features to compare and classify ethnocacerist discourse as such.



According to the definition of neo-fascism, ethnocacerism should have adopted some pre-1945 fascist project, such as (in the case of Peru) that of the Revolutionary Union and tried to materialize it. However, it is curious that ethnocacerism does not fulfil this characteristic since it possesses a fundamentally different ideological corpus. Indeed, ethnocacerist ideology meets the fascist minimum as it possesses an ultra-nationalist palingenetic doctrine that aims to build an alternative modernity, but from a different reference point. Assuming the existence of multiple human races, it affirms that the 'copper race' must recover the reins of Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador and rebuild the Tawantinsuyan empire that was interrupted by Spanish colonization.<sup>125</sup> To this end, it uses conspiracy theories such as claiming Peru is a puppet country of neo-colonizing forces and that a purge of investment and foreign participation is needed.<sup>126</sup> In his speeches, Antauro Humala also condemned immigration and a foreign labor force in Peru, especially the Venezuelan one, and argued in favor of their concentration in a large-scale refugee camp.<sup>127</sup> Both features fit El-Ojeili's proposal about post-fascism by elevating the nationalist feeling to a supranational one in which the 'copper race' reclaims its natural territory and explains its decadence as being due to foreign forces and institutions.

Ethnocacerism is also an authoritarian movement that describes itself as neither right-leaning nor left-leaning. Its leader, Antauro Humala, is seen as a charismatic authority who represents the Peruvian ideal of indigenous people. In his book about the Neotawantinsuyan Church, Humala explains the need for the resurgence of the Inca religion as a revolutionary strategy, as well as the upsurge of an Andean messiah. For Humala, the status of messiah or Inkari is granted to the one who personifies Andean leadership and opposes the actual colonial and decadent order following the emancipatory example of indigenous leaders such as Manko Inka or Túpac Amaru II.<sup>128</sup> Naturally, Humala would be the new Inca or Messiah. This has never been explicitly expressed, but it can be inferred because of his role as an ethnocacerist leader and his call for Tawantinsuyan resurgence. In fact, in 2024 during a rally full of symbolism in Vilcashuamán city (Ayacucho, Peru), Antauro Humala was dressed

125 Antauro Humala, *Etnonacionalismo, Izquierda y globalidad* (Lima: Ediciones Antaurpi, 2011), 295–313.

126 Ibid.

127 Antauro Humala, 'Entrevista en ronda política de C.T.C.PE—Cusco 12/11/2023,' *YouTube*, November 15, 2023, at 17:10, [https://youtu.be/Gf33-6Fw\\_4Q?si=O67dXt19uUwQxS7Z&t=1030](https://youtu.be/Gf33-6Fw_4Q?si=O67dXt19uUwQxS7Z&t=1030).

128 Antauro Humala, *De la Guerra Etnosanta a la Iglesia Tawantintusyana: La reivindicación de los 'demonios' y el color insurgente de la fe* (Lima: Corporación Editora Chirre 2012), 72.

like an Inca Emperor and appointed as the successor of Tupac Amaru II by attendants.<sup>129</sup> Another factor to consider is the transition from violent ways of achieving power to democratic ones. Antauro Humala once declared his intentions of using force to succeed to power and close the Parliament. Despite this, months later and accepting the democratic scenario, an ethnocacerist party was registered.<sup>130</sup>

In line with El-Ojeili's reported features of post-fascism, the paramilitary cadres of the ethnocacerist movement were comprised of veteran followers of ethnocacerism (mainly retired military personnel and reservists).<sup>131</sup> Many of them were part of the army uprisings of Locumba and Andahuaylas. Ethnocacerism has also called for stratification of duties by genre, but in a pre-Colombian style that is fundamentally different to the patriarchal Western tradition.<sup>132</sup> These features are part of its totalitarian project that aims to recover the Andean cosmovision and de-Westernize it to create a truly 'copper race' cultural identity.<sup>133</sup>

For these reasons, Mendieta's analysis is not wrong, but is incomplete. Ethnocacerism is related to fascism, but for historical reasons, it does not belong to historical fascism, and for ideological reasons it cannot be considered a form of Peruvian neo-fascism. If we add to this the resonances it has with post-fascist theoretical projects such as those of Guillaume Faye's Archeofuturism and Alain de Benoist or Aleksandr Dugin's ethnopluralism,<sup>134</sup> it is suggested that another label, in this case, post-fascism, can be used to describe and categorize ethnocacerism.<sup>135</sup> Although this theoretical framework can better explain this movement, this needs deeper exploration in future research as the

129 Combi Tv Perú, 'Antauro Humala hoy desde Vilcas Huamán Ayacucho un gran recibimiento por parte de toda la población,' *YouTube*, November 12, 2022, at 20:10, [https://youtu.be/J94bT5uR5z0?si=\\_7hd7o4zJ0qKFsY2&t=1210](https://youtu.be/J94bT5uR5z0?si=_7hd7o4zJ0qKFsY2&t=1210).

130 Fernando Rodríguez Patrón, 'Jurado nacional de elecciones: Registro de organizaciones políticas asiento de inscripción,' *El Peruano*, December 22, 2023, available at <https://alianz.anacional.pe/archivos/ElPeruanoAsientoRegistro.pdf>.

131 Alexander Lavilla Ruiz and Rosa Chávez Yacila, 'Cálculo y uso político de los licenciados y reservistas de las Fuerzas Armadas,' *Ojo Público*, October 23, 2022, <https://ojo-publico.com/politica/calculo-y-uso-politico-los-licenciados-y-reservistas-las-ff-aa>.

132 Antauro Humala, 'Escuela ideológica política de mujeres "Tomasa Tito Condemayta"—05/02/2024,' *YouTube*, February 6, 2024, at 13:44, [https://youtu.be/19X4\\_xxD0dk?si=D7uiiXWkulgRt7Nr&t=824](https://youtu.be/19X4_xxD0dk?si=D7uiiXWkulgRt7Nr&t=824).

133 Humala, *De la Guerra Etnosanta*, 20.

134 Piero Gayozzo, 'Etnocacerismo: Arqueofuturismo y ethnopluralismo en el postfascismo andino,' *Pensar*, February 2, 2023, <https://pensar.org/2023/02/etnocacerismo-arqueofuturismo-y-ethnopluralismo-en-el-postfascismo-andino/>.

135 Gayozzo, 'Antauro Huamala vs Dina Boluarte.'

ethnocacerist ideology is too complex and wide-reaching to be covered in this article. Although its main ideologist, Antauro Humala, does not cite or recognize explicit inspiration from the aforementioned authors, similarities with post-fascist features are evident.

### Discussion and Conclusions

As has been demonstrated, fascism in Peru was not a marginal phenomenon but rather has been a real political alternative that encompassed a considerable part of the population, at least during the 1930s in which it obtained its highest popularity. Moreover, since its first appearance in the 1930s, fascism has taken a variety of different manifestations in Peru.

With regard to the study of fascism, López Soria gave a class-oriented analysis that has been useful in understanding historical fascism. In fact, in the 1930s many authors and movements considered fascism as a potential solution for political crisis, and not all of them were part of the same social class. Revolutionary Union was the fascist mass movement that came closest to achieving power through democratic means, but its members were mainly from working-class origins, while the middle and upper classes were related to Christian organizations and acted primarily as intellectuals rather than as politicians. In this paper, neo-fascism and post-fascism denominations have been added to this narrative and have been discussed with examples. This complements the classification proposed by López Soria in order to understand fascism not only through a class membership variable but also as a transhistorical phenomenon. In doing so, the continuity of such a system of thought can be identified in different stages of Peruvian history.

Defining fascism precedes the analysis of fascism in the history of Peru. This research followed Griffin's new consensus model regarding a fascist minimum. Chamsy El-Ojeili's five core features for fascism, which include Griffin's minimum, were used to describe features adjacent to fascism that allow for a wider understanding of three Peruvian movements and so neo-fascism and post-fascism were also defined. Neo-fascism refers to an older-style fascist project modified to modern contexts; conversely, post-fascism is defined as a fascist matrix of movements and actors developing distinct features and ideas that build upon the fascist minimum. These latter two definitions were applied to the cases evaluated in order to give greater consistency to the typology with which each was identified.

Regarding historical Peruvian fascism, its paradigmatic party manifestation was adopted by the Revolutionary Union and its black shirted project in the

1930s. This mass movement participated in democratic life but was prosecuted almost to extinction. While it declared itself as fascist, the way in which it developed its ideology, formation and ethos invites us to suggest that Revolutionary Union was a fascist movement by its agenda and approach to politics.

In the postwar scenario, and answering Nalvarte's question 'where do we find fascism in Peru today?', contemporary Peruvian fascism may exist, but it has adopted two ideological variations that developed in parallel, each one with its own paligenetic myth. On the one hand, this article has explored the neo-fascism of Legionary Action, a project aimed at recreating a corporative state and promoting a mestizo Peruvian identity. This youth movement had a short life span, but it was notable for bringing together a group of members from the middle and upper class and for belatedly hoisting neo-fascism onto our continent. As a representative of Peruvian neo-fascism, the fascist features are also present in its ideology and configuration, a condition that it fulfils and by which it is defined as such. Its uniqueness was in its effort to create a complex and consistent ideology through a mestizo nationalist theoretical corpus, as well as a complex corporatist state approach. On the other hand, the ethnocacerism of Antauro Humala is a movement that has created an ideology that defends indigenous identity, in contrast to any republican or mestizo one, and seeks to rebuild a New Tawantinsuyo. This movement has an organized presence in the country, mainly among peasants and popular regions, and seeks to take power either through violence or through democratic means. It should be noted that, as indicated, its ideology contains a particular fascist matrix but also includes divergences that should be analyzed in more detail and perhaps under a different theoretical framework. In this article, it is suggested that it should be included within the denomination of post-fascism.

Peruvian fascism, then, had three stages throughout its history: First, Peruvian historical fascism, in which its political manifestation was mainly composed of lower-class members and was embodied in the Revolutionary Union party, a paradigmatic case. It was inspired by Italian Fascism and was anchored to a Republican identity, mainly through the figure of Sánchez Cerro and his political will. Second, neo-fascism, which was embodied in mesocratic group Legionary Action, a party that was inspired by the historical fascism movement and advocated for a mestizo identity and imperial vocation of Peru. Curiously neo-fascism did not emerge directly from the Revolutionary Union agents who survived persecution by Benavides's regime and the end of the Second World War. It was a continuity reclaimed much later by university students and youth activists. Lastly, post-fascism, which emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century as ethnocacerism, uniting the lower peasant and former military classes, embracing an Inca or pure indigenous identity. Distinct from Revo-

lutionary Union and Legionary Action's palingenetic myths, founded around mestizo traditions, ethnocacerism focuses its palingenetic myth mainly on the return of an exploited and subsumed population: the 'copper race'.

While this research has contributed theoretically to the study of fascism and understanding of fascism in Peru, a more detailed evaluation of the history and ideology of Revolutionary Union after the war, as well as of Legionary Action and the post-fascist nature of ethnocacerism, remains to be completed.