# Dialogues

Dialogue 1

**Daniel**: can existence be defined without effecting the experience of existence?

**Erin**: I can change my mind.

**Daniel**:That implies there is a concept of mind witch is correct?

**Erin**:My mind is implicit in the act of responding to your post.

And so is yours incidentally.

A human mind identifies perceived existents.

**Daniel**:but that is the "apparentia" of the mind, I am talking more of an "exapperentia "

**Erin**:Please elaborate

**Daniel**:we can both percive this with the same visual manner, but the background where we interpellate the result might differ

**Erin**: It is NOT clear to me that we perceive it in the same visual manner.

What's clear to me is that we both know English

Think about the facts which gave rise to the need for a concept of definition in the first place. Think about the problems that definition helps solves.

Then think about how human experience begins with distinguishing somethings against some changing background. Think about how you can't even properly (visually) perceive without changing the point of fixation.

When I want to know what I'm looking at, I try to change my point of view.

My mind pieces together the offerings of experience in search of a greater whole

**Daniel**: then the "problems" are the identity of experience ?

**Erin**:the problems that definition helps solves?

**Daniel**: yes

**Erin**: Well why do we bother defining terms? What is the cognitive benefit?

For me, there's an obvious benefit to explicitly identifying relationships among what I call my concepts.

Genus-differentia definitions can help relate a group of similar things to the things of a wider group.

Operational definitions can help ground my use of abstruse concepts of measurements to the task of experiment.

And so on.

It seems that the cognitive role of definition can often be helpful in validating and re-defining terms as needed.

It also seems to me that the act of definition will bring to mind relationships among perceived existents.

It also seems to me that understanding a definition one read entails reminding one of perceptual-concretes which were features of past experience.

**Daniel**:and what is a problem then?

**Erin**:I am not using any special technical definition of that term

In my view, we form new concepts in part because we are trying to solve problems in the real world.

**Daniel**:then I will define problems as obstacles; meaning etymologicaly: contrary stances

**Erin**: contrary to what?

**Daniel**: to the "stantia "

without stantia there is no "existentia"

**Erin**: not sure what your'e doing here

**Daniel**: I was trying to argue that the experience of definition needs an effect on existence

**Erin**: I'm not sure what the phrase "the experience of definition" is doing for us.Are you trying to talk about something broader than an explicit definition stated in the form of a sentence? e.g. identity maybe? Or awareness of a sort of thing in the world? or something like a question of the form "What is it?"

**Daniel**: maybe by " experience of definition" I wanted to say that the idea of definition is only perceptible in the remanation of a memory

similar of what you said about understanding a definition.

**Erin**: Since a proposition applies concepts, I'd say that anything you propose about existence can potentially and subsequently affect how you think about existence later.

I think of propositions as summarizers and record-keepers.

Dialogue 2

**Daniel:** Is acting using understanding different from acting upon an accident?

**Neg:** seems so

**Daniel:** then you should be able to understand an action that does not have a cause

**N**eg**:** don't follow.

**Daniel:** because accidental actions have a cause right?

**Neg:** yes.

why can't accidental and not accidental actions have causes?

**Daniel:**

because if you are interpelling an understable action that have a cause; as I percieve understanding it is connected by meaning to a accidental action by the root of the cause.

**Milkman:** An accidental doing should still have a cause, but it won't have a cause that makes the doing rationally intelligible. If I accidently step on Neg's foot, presumably my doing has a cause, but it is not rationally intelligible in terms of my mental states.

**Daniel:** but the accidental step is autonatically rationalized when you percieved even on a basic level for example: when I step is on neg's foot.

**Milkman:** I'm not sure what you mean but that doesn't seem right, unless by "perceived action" you mean something like rational action.

**Danileo:** imagine I hit you and your body responds. Thats an accidental action that is not rational, but is rationalized

**Milkman:** You mean you would try to rationalize what you did?

**Daniel:** yes but I think is not optional

**Milkman:** I mean people don't always rationalize accidents. If I accidentally step on Neg's foot, I don't necessarily try to be like "I thought there was a giant spider on your foot."

**Daniel:** well I think rationalization is encompassed with the grade of impact of the accidents.

Dialogue 3

**Daniel:** could consciousness be proved if someone wants to eliminate all possible existences?

**Topaz:** Can you explain what it means to eliminate all possible existences?

**Daniel:** to ensure that nothing could exist in the future.

**Topaz:** Do you mean a literal elimination of something that currently does exist, or a theoretical elimination where you say "actually that was never a thing"?

**Daniel:** a literal elimination that will not allow any other existence.

**Topaz:** So what does "proving" consciousness have to do with that?

**Daniel:** how could you explain biologically that someone want to do that

**Topaz:** Oh, so was your first question "How could we be justified attributing consciousness \*to\* a being, supposing that being wants to eliminate everything?"

**Daniel:** exactly.

**Topaz:** I'm not sure it's an explicitly metaphysical question, but you could say "Some beings experience acute pain or despair, acute pain or despair can lead to destructive urges (for various reasons), and a maximal destructive urge might be universal destruction. That would be a very extreme state for a being to reach, but doesn't necessarily preclude consciousness, because the state's less-extreme analogues have little to do with the presence or absence of consciousness."

**Daniel:** and if you scan my brain and no emotional related signal appears and I start destroying everything?

**Hakislav:** i don't think a reflection on consciousness would require modal commitments of any kind, and after bracketing all possible contents of pure intuition (in your case, existences of a various, imaginative kind) you would still be left with an empty residual of consicousness within the epoche

although I am not sure what your criteria of provability is, given if you seek some naturalist justification this would definitely not be the route for such

**Daniel:**  the problem, I think, is that destroying everything is not understandable.

**Hakislav:** destroying, as in annihilating their factual presence in a continuum of some reality, yeah

suspending judgements about real things is conceivable

**Daniel:** and if I take responsabilities for other possible existences; That would be an act of consciousness?

**Erin:** that sounds like an act of consideration?

**Daniel:** and what is the diference?

**Erin:** Valuing involves several actions of consciousness as well as practical action in the real world.

**Daniel:** and where is the limit between a promotive consciousness and a conscious reduct.

**Erin:** promotive how? reduct how?

**Daniel:** for example a promotive consciousness creates the consideration and then my body taking action is a reduct of that; but, my body by itself does not have conscious. Is more clear if for example I throw a rock; that rock is a reduct.

**Erin:** I don't understand the purpose of such a distinction

You possess consciousness. But you are not your body. You have a body.

I am not my brain. My brain is part of what constitutes myself.

**Daniel:** but you have a body, in the same manner that you have a rock but the rock does not promote conscious acts.

**Erin:** No, the rock isn't part of me

I just don't see what the problem is here

**Daniel:** Why you are not.

**Erin:** Are you asking where I end?.

**Daniel:** It might be a way to put it.

**Erin:** I attribute my throwing to myself.

What am I throwing? a rock

I'm not throwing myself.

**Daniel:** and when you spit saliva?

Dialogue 4

**Kit:** Reality is pain

**Daniel:** if the quality of pain is changing to other pain, then, understanding the contrary pain and acting against the other pain in the same amount; will revoke the quality of pain

**Kit:** Is the quality of pain changing to other pain?

**Daniel:** well if each type of reality has its own pain; then if pain makes you act on reality with an inevitable change on reality.

**Ro:** Is the idea here that pain consists in its changing into another pain, and so to act against this other pain is to reverse or stall the changing which defines pain and therefore to alleviate the pain?

**Daniel:** well is more like this: imagine that you touch fire: then pain tells you the "reality change" making you move your hand. But if you, understand the "reality change" you can act against it, in this case, thouching fire. Therefore a type of pain can make you act upon different types of reality. Then pain does not equal reality.

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Dialogue 5

**Nav:** the important part of what i say is that you are trying to match your concepts with your perception of reality. this is a basis for solving a lot of problems wrt things like numbers, properties, and propositions. matching 'with reality' is not important to me so numbers being 'imposed' in that way is not a problem.

**Glich:** i think at this point youre restating your commitment to the view that number is subjective and i guess good if thats your view but i still dont know how that overcomes the issue that what we can "impose" supposedly, is still restricted by the world in a way that is explained very well if instead we didnt impose.

**Daniel:** To Glich; the world explanatory" corollarium" is weak conclusive; since any type of scope could possibly explain the world in a certain way related to the scope. For example: if I measure entities in relation of how they affect me, I can also understand the world.

Dialogue 6

**Neg:** numbers per se are grounded in the entities that ground thinking things, or in the entities that ground non-thinking things too?

**Daniel:** a hard explanation of numerical non-thinking things could be the existence of them in other representations. Considering that other representations of not thinking entities are not in numerical representation.

Dialogue 7

**Daniel:** should not gold have a power that is not caused by their elements to demonstrate the independency of the essence of gold ?

Dialogue 8

**Matze:** A little old already but I think perception of modality isn't that weird, like, isn't that what the phenomenological tradition points at that we can, in some experiential sense, can connect to the potentialty of objects. That a chair looks like something one could sit on, for instance. I think there should be some attempt to resist the description of the reductionist that wants to frame modality as spooky.

**Daniel:** Does that means the equalness between conceptions and phenomenology is not the same that the equalness between perceptual entity types or even entity-tokens ? Is something I ascribe but can certanly explain.

**Matze:** could you rephrase:

**Daniel:** If objectifying procedures that help observers to purify their beliefs from subjective errors have been correctly employed, the observation is objectified2.

objectified2: according to which observation is achieved as a result of practical activities of observers.

then objectified2 entity requiers being subjectly in acordance with reality (subject equalness)

this entails that "purifying" an entity consist of a subject equalness check between entity and the reality.

 a subject equalness whose obervable reality is: entity; determines that subject equalness is independent of property entities.

Dialogue 9

**Tav:** im not sure this addresses my question - i was asking something more like, what is the difference between being 'indeterminately identical' and 'indeterminately distinct', as it is indeterminate either way. and again if it is indeterminate how could you get the 'x=y' for the 'iff' in the first place?

**Daniel:** Might be that 'inderminately identical' corresponds to things that overlap in properties but not in exact perception/sense .