‘He Only Comes Out When I Drink My Gin’: DID, Personal Identity, and Moral Responsibility

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This essay will explore the topic of Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly called “Multiple Personality Disorder”) with special attention to such *Quadrophenia* masterpieces as “Dr. Jimmy” and “The Real Me.” A number of major philosophical questions arise: Can two or more “persons” really inhabit the same body? How can we hold Dr. Jimmy morally responsible for the reprehensible actions of Mr. Jim? Wouldn’t it be wrong to do so if they are really different people? What is it to be the “same” person over time? Does Dr. Jimmy really have free will? The focus will be on the much discussed and important notions of personal identity, free will, and moral responsibility.

Dr. Jimmy and DID

*Quadrophenia* is the sixth studio album by The Who and was released in 1973. It is a double album and their second rock opera after *Tommy*. A creation of Pete Townshend, it is the story of social and psychological happenings from the perspective of an English teenager, Jimmy, in London and Brighton in 1965. The name *Quadrophenia* is a variation on the medical diagnostic term ‘schizophrenia’ but is really meant to reflect what has come to be known as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), which had previously been called Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD).

Part of the overall theme in *Quadrophenia* is also the way that the four distinct personalities of Jimmy represent the personality of each member of The Who. Like Jimmy, the four members of The Who were known to have personality extremes or significant mood swings.

The liner notes from the album illustrate this concept as follows (names added):

A tough guy, a helpless dancer. (“Helpless Dancer” – Roger Daltrey)

A romantic, is it me for a moment? (“Is It Me?” – John Entwistle)

A bloody lunatic, I'll even carry your bags. (“Bell Boy” – Keith Moon)

A beggar, a hypocrite, love reign o'er me. (“Love Reign O'er Me” – Pete Townshend)

The album title is also a play on the term ‘quadraphonic sound’ which was invented shortly before the album was recorded. Perhaps the most relevant and philosophically interesting song for my purposes is “Dr. Jimmy” which is about how Jimmy reacts when drinking gin. Gin obviously brings out the very worst in Jimmy, perhaps even a different person altogether. “Doctor Jimmy and mister Jim/When I'm pilled you don't notice him/He only comes out when I drink my gin.” There is a fairly obvious connection to the well-known *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* tale of two persons, one good and one evil, inhabiting the same body (from the Robert Louis Stevenson 1886 classic novel). The lyrics suggest that Mr. Jim is hidden when Dr. Jimmy is on medication or taking pills (“When I'm pilled you don't notice him”) but drinking gin brings out the evil Mr. Jim. The lyrics paint a very disturbing picture of a truly evil side to Jimmy who seems at least willing to commit despicable acts of rape: “What is it? I'll take it/Who is she? I'll rape it.” As we shall see, this raises profound questions of moral responsibility and free will. Jimmy even goes so far as to contemplate raping a virgin which only adds to his depravity when drinking. “You say she's a virgin/I'm gonna be the first in.”

There is an unmistakable theme of defiance and a willingness to fight anyone, perhaps reminiscent of the tough upbringing and attitude of Roger Daltrey. “I'll take on anyone/Ain't scared of a bloody nose.” Immediately after the line about a virgin, we are also told that Jimmy – or actually Mr. Jim -- isn’t afraid of any boyfriend (“Her fellah's gonna kill me/Oh fucking will he”). Jimmy has clearly hit rock bottom and may even be having a mental breakdown or psychotic break. The song also includes John Entwistle's theme (“Is it me? For a moment/The stars are falling.”) In any event, Jimmy is “feeling restless” but perhaps wonders if “something stronger…could really hold me down.” It sounds as if Jimmy needs some stronger drugs or pills to avoid turning into Mr. Jim.

DID, Memory, and Personal Identity

In philosophical circles, many of Dr. Jimmy’s lyrics would bring to mind the problem of personal identity. Any such discussion in Western Philosophy tends to begin with the work of John Locke whose account of personal identity through time famously appealed to consciousness and memory.[[1]](#endnote-1) On his view, a later person (P2) is identical to an earlier person (P1) just in case P2’s consciousness “can be extended backwards” to P1. This is taken to mean that P2 *remembers* P1’s thoughts and experiences, which is often called the psychological account of personal identity. My personhood goes with my mind and especially with my consciousness and memory, not necessarily with my body. The basic idea is familiar enough: I have memories from my first campus visit to the University of Southern Indiana, to experiences back in graduate school, and so on. You don’t have those same memories so my having them makes me the same person as those previous persons (as opposed to you). They are *episodic* memories, that is, I remember them as experienced from the first-person point of view. Episodic memory is different, for example, from what is sometimes called “procedural memory,” that is, memory for skills and abilities like playing the piano or riding a bike.

Of course, Locke is not saying that a fifty-year-old person must (episodically) remember *everything* from one’s previous life since there is some normal forgetting of one’s past. Indeed, I probably don’t remember anywhere near the majority of my graduate school experiences, not to mention my childhood experiences. However, Locke did seem to hold that if one did have total, or near total, amnesia due to trauma or brain injury, then one is literally a different person. Although this is somewhat controversial, there is some plausibility to it. For example, if we have an elderly person suffering from severe Alzheimer’s disease, it might indeed be reasonable on some level to think that she is literally no longer the same person as she was prior to the disease.

In the case of Dr. Jimmy and Mr. Jim, we apparently have a case of DID where there would seem to be a person (or we might say, a single body) having at least two sharply distinct personalities. Mr. Jim is an “alter” with profoundly different character traits and desires. Importantly, different alters within one body can fail to have memories of or to be aware of the others even though there can be some interaction between them. It is difficult to assess what the dynamic is between Dr. Jimmy and Mr. Jim, but perhaps it makes sense to suppose that this is a case of one-directional awareness, that is, Dr. Jimmy is somewhat aware of Mr. Jim since he knows to some extent about Mr. Jim’s evil thoughts, but Mr. Jim is unaware of Dr. Jimmy since Mr. Jim *only* comes out when Dr. Jimmy drinks gin. Indeed, severe short-term memory loss is very common even in non-DID instances of heavy drinking. If the continuity of consciousness and memory becomes so separated between Dr. Jimmy and Mr. Jim, then we might have a genuine case of DID with literally two persons inhabiting one body. Further, if they are really different persons and, say, Dr. Jimmy has no significant memory of Mr. Jim, then it is difficult to make sense of holding Dr. Jimmy morally responsible for Mr. Jim’s actions (or thoughts).

It should be pointed out that the very diagnosis of DID is somewhat controversial. Back when it was called multiple personality disorder (MPD), there was a clear problem of over-diagnosis especially in the 1980’s perhaps stemming from the publication of the book *Sybil* which, along with the subsequent film, had a great impact on the pop culture of the time. But even in the psychiatric community there has been a great deal of disagreement about the causes, and even existence, of DID. Some even argue that DID (and MPD previously) does not really exist at all while others point to cases of irresponsible therapists who encouraged their patients to believe that they had been abused as children and of even implanting such memories via hypnosis. Significant controversy still surrounds the diagnosis of DID but it remains as a category in the *American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, or DSM-IV.[[2]](#endnote-2) Most today hold that DID results from repeated childhood abuse and that dissociating is a way to cope with and distance oneself from traumatic experiences. For The Who this theme can also be found in their first rock opera, *Tommy*, where the main character endures significant childhood trauma and abuse to the point of a psychosomatically induced blindness and deafness. In “Go To The Mirror, Boy,” Tommy’s father also expresses puzzlement about Tommy’s state of mind “I often wonder what he's feeling….Look at him now in the mirror dreaming/What is happening in his head?”

Most important for my purposes, however, is an often cited link between personal identity and moral responsibility. After all, it would seem to be wrong to punish or blame (or praise, for that matter) one person for the actions (or thoughts) of another person. We are justified in holding a person responsible for some past action only if the person is identical to the person who performed that action. Locke agrees and argues that one is justifiably held accountable only for those actions performed by a person to whom one’s present consciousness extends. This would apply not only to a person whose alter had committed crimes but presumably also to an elderly inmate who has lost memory of committing a crime simply due to long term aging. If we are convinced that Dr. Jimmy has no specific memories of Mr. Jim’s evil deeds or thoughts and that this is a genuine case of DID, then we shouldn’t hold Dr. Jimmy responsible for them.

The Real Me and the Family Genes

Early in the movie *Quadrophenia* (1979), there is the wonderfully hard driving and intense song “The Real Me” with some incredible bass from John Entwistle. This is arguably the best song on the album.[[3]](#endnote-3) Jimmy eventually tires of going to his doctor and even seems to want another psychiatrist at one point (“I went back to the doctor/To get another shrink”). Perhaps armed with some degree of skepticism about the psychiatric profession, we hear “Can you see the real me, doctor?” One interesting issue raised in the song and movie is whether or not some psychiatric disorders might be passed down in some genetic or biological sense: “I went back to my mother/I said, ‘I'm crazy ma, help me’/She said, ‘I know how it feels son/ 'Cause it runs in the family.’” Jimmy also asks: “Can you see the real me, mother?” The implication is that there is perhaps a genetic marker for some psychopathologies or at least for aggressive and violent behavior. A similar theme is referenced in the film *Quadrophenia* when Jimmy’s father talks about Jimmy’s mother as having had schizophrenia and his uncle attempting suicide.

It is worth noting that schizophrenia is not the same as DID which, as we have seen, describes a condition in which a person displays multiple distinct identities (known as ‘alters’), each with its own pattern of perceiving and interacting with the environment. Schizophrenia, on the other hand, is a mental disorder characterized by disintegration of thought processes and of emotional responsiveness. It most commonly manifests itself as auditory hallucinations, paranoid or bizarre delusions, or disorganized speech and thinking, and it is accompanied by significant social or occupational dysfunction. Schizophrenics sometimes experience what they take to be “thought insertion,” that is, the delusion that some thoughts are not one’s own and are somehow being inserted into one's mind.

In addition, we encounter the theme of depression which can underlie many other psychological problems and, again, with Jimmy’s uncle having attempting suicide. Depression can be controlled much better now with the use of certain medications but there are no guarantees and even incredible fame and fortune can’t overcome it in some cases (witness comedian/actor Robin Williams’ suicide). In any case, Townshend explains that “when, at the end of the album version of the *Quadrophenia* story, Jimmy steals a boat and takes it out to a rock in the middle of the sea, his anguished but jubilant cry, ‘Love reign o’er me,’ suggests that he has finally been able to integrate his multiples selves. Even as author and composer I realized I had no right to decide whether or not Jimmy should end his own life. I let Jimmy decide for himself.”[[4]](#endnote-4) This seems at first to stand in contrast to the movie where Jimmy drives his motorcycle over a cliff at the end of the movie (though it seems that Jimmy did not really kill himself). Nonetheless, Jimmy has still “had enough” of pills, girls, and street fights. This is again not to say that there are never brief glimpses into Jimmy’s better days on *Quadrophenia*, such as in the more optimistic “I’m One” (“But I'm one, I am one/And I can see that this is me”). Perhaps Jimmy is able, at times, to feel somewhat more unified with a degree of peace of mind.

But is it really true that violence or psychopathology has a genetic component that can be passed down to one’s descendants? Is there any evidence for this view? Could some of Jimmy’s grandmother and uncle’s genes have been passed down to Jimmy? Sure. Scientists have not of course found, say, a “violence gene” or a “schizophrenia gene” automatically dooming its unlucky owners to a life of misery and crime. Instead, they are attempting to tease out the complex interactions among genetic (and environmental) influences and violence. The idea at best is that certain genetic traits, when combined with certain repeated life experiences (such as childhood abuse), can propel a person toward a life of crime or mental instability. Even if there is a genetic “component” predisposing one to violence or depression, this would seem to be far different than, say, a gene for one’s eye color or gender. In the latter case, the resulting trait is *guaranteed* to follow from having the requisite gene – not so for violence or schizophrenia, which suggests that there are environmental factors which also play a part in their development in particular cases. Some genes also regulate the production of important neurotransmitters (which are chemicals in the brain) that, in turn, may cause abnormal symptoms later in life. There is also the possibility that personality type plays an indirect role in one’s subsequent behavior, that is, one’s personality may, in turn, make manifesting certain psychopathologies more likely. For example, a generally more aggressive person may be more likely to succeed in business and achieve one’s life goals but may also be more prone to violence, depending on upbringing. Personality traits, such as irritability, impulsivity, and a desire for thrills, lead one to be crime-prone but one’s environment can either dampen or aggravate violent impulses and genetic predispositions. Some have also argued that a particular variation of the MAOA gene called ‘2R’ were very prone to criminal and delinquent behavior.[[5]](#endnote-5) Some recent work on the extent to which crime is inherited comes from twin studies, adoption studies, and molecular genetic studies. There is some data to suggest than there is “more crime among adopted children whose biological parents are criminal than among adopted children whose biological parents are not criminal.”[[6]](#endnote-6)

Regarding schizophrenia, some family statistics would seem to indicate that it does have a significant genetic component. Those who have a relative of “three degrees of separation” with schizophrenia are twice as likely to develop schizophrenia as those in the general population. Those within a second degree of separation have a several-fold higher incidence of schizophrenia than the general population, and first degree relatives have an incidence of schizophrenia an order of magnitude higher than the general populace. Interestingly, the correlation of schizophrenia between identical twins, who have identical genomes, is about one-half (48%).[[7]](#endnote-7) Although this is quite high compared to the general population, it again indicates that schizophrenia cannot be *entirely* a genetic disease (like, say, Down’s Syndrome). Further, twins are typically raised in very similar environments so it might be difficult to separate out the genetic causes from the common environmental influence. It seems that there are, at best, a number of genes that contribute to a predisposition for schizophrenia, but none exhibit full responsibility for the psychopathology. Schizophrenia may be more like diabetes which is caused by a number of genetic and environmental factors. I would venture to say that much the same is probably true for DID.

Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility

It is worth going even further with regard to free will, determinism, and moral responsibility. Whether or not Dr. Jimmy and Mr. Jim are a genuine case of DID, we might also simply suppose that Jimmy does evil things (or at least has evil thoughts) when drinking gin, perhaps more like your average vicious rapist or killer. We can then ask whether or not Jimmy has free will and would be morally responsible for such actions. Of course, many philosophers and scientists deny that *any of us* ever have free will, even aside from the presence of any psychopathologies. Perhaps all of our actions, even in everyday normal life, are really not free in at least some sense of the term. Our actions result from a wide range of causes, such as our conscious mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, preferences, fears, etc.) but also any relevant *unconscious* motives and desires, biological and genetic factors, and past experiences. This would be true of all of our actions and decisions, even the most trivial. I decide to bring my umbrella to work *because* of my *belief* that it will rain and my *desire* to keep dry. My belief and desire, in this somewhat oversimplified case, *causes* and *explains* my action. Further, if our actions at any given time are caused by brain activity and our mental states are really just brain states (which seems reasonable to many), then it is difficult to see where “free will” fits in the brain.

In philosophical circles, the notion of free will has two main definitions, one much stronger than the other. The stronger “libertarian” free will is perhaps what most people tend to have in mind and seems presupposed in most legal systems and world religions.[[8]](#endnote-8) On this view:

A person P does act A freely when, and only when, P could have done some other action B at that same time *and* P had some control over doing A.

For many, the core ideas of “could have done otherwise” and “control” over actions are essential for free will and for holding someone morally responsible for an action. After all, if one really couldn’t do otherwise, then how could we blame, punish, or otherwise hold that person morally responsible? For example, if Jimmy or anyone were to violently rape a woman, he was compelled to do so given his state of mind at that time. But if he really *couldn’t* have done otherwise, how can we really hold him morally responsible for the action? He can still of course be *guilty* of the crime in the sense that *he caused it* and is thus *legally* responsible for it but that is different than a more robust kind of moral responsibility. Thus, libertarian free will is often thought to be incompatible with both moral responsibility and determinism. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the libertarian does not think that *all* of our actions are free; only some of them are. But the very same action cannot both be free and determined.

Determinism, in this context, might be defined as follows:

Given the entire conscious and unconscious psychological make-up of a person P at a particular time (which results jointly from P’s heredity *and* past experiences), P is compelled to do what P actually does *at that time*.

The example above of bringing an umbrella is an oversimplified but still instructive case. How could one have those same beliefs and desires and yet still not decide to bring the umbrella? Of course, no one could be expected to *know* every possible cause of another’s, or even one’s own, action. But the plausibility of determinism gains support from a more general view about cause and effect in nature such that given the state of the universe (or any causally closed part of it) at any given time and the laws of nature, the next state of the universe (or part of it) is uniquely fixed. That is, there is only one physically possible future. The common idea is that causes *necessitate* their effects – in the case of human actions, the causes once again are conscious mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, preferences, fears, etc.) but also include any relevant unconscious motives and desires, biological factors, and past experiences. Determinists thus hold that all human actions are determined. In any case, if all of one’s actions are determined, then one can never do other than what one actually does at any time and so we can’t have libertarian free will.[[9]](#endnote-9)

Like the libertarian, many determinists (often called ‘hard’ determinists) believe that free will and determinism are incompatible, that is, the very same action cannot be both free and determined. This seems to follow from the above definitions. Furthermore, libertarian free will begins to sound very mysterious and even “supernatural” in the sense that humans are somehow supposed to have a special power to alter the physical world, including our bodies. We somehow “stand above” nature in a way that would be hard to understand. And, again, to use another example, how could I have had *the very same* beliefs, desires, preferences, etc., as when I decided to have pizza for lunch, but then *at that same time* have chosen to do something else (e.g. eat a cheeseburger instead)? If I then choose to eat a cheeseburger the next day for lunch, mustn’t there have been *something different* about my state of mind at that later time? The same would go for any of Jimmy’s illegal or unethical actions, such as rape and violent assault. Given the way Jimmy was at the time, he couldn’t have done otherwise. Jimmy is compelled to behave that way at that time.

Does this mean that Jimmy or, say, a serial rapist shouldn’t be punished? If determinism is true, then it may be that we should rethink the point of punishment. Instead of treating it as some kind of *retribution* based on libertarian free will, perhaps the focus should only be on *deterring* others (and criminals themselves) from committing future crimes. Most people in a society will fear, and thus wish to avoid, incarceration and will behave accordingly. But for those who do harm others, incarceration is at least one way to keep them away from the general population. The first priority still has to be public safety and so some will treat the matter on the model of a quarantine.[[10]](#endnote-10) Someone with a contagious disease, acquired through no fault of their own, should rightly be kept away from others simply because of the danger. The safety of others in society must similarly take precedence with respect to violent criminals. By analogy, we normally don’t think that wild animals have libertarian free will but it doesn’t follow that we should allow them to live among us to wreak havoc. Maybe serial killers and pedophiles really can’t help what they do and really aren’t morally responsible, but that doesn’t mean that we should invite them over for a family barbecue or let them all out of prison. Just keep them away from everyone else! *Something* obviously causes them to behave in such a way.[[11]](#endnote-11)

It is also important to note that to say that Jimmy is determined does not necessarily mean that he is “legally insane” which is a far more narrow notion. In the United States at least, to be legally insane has more to do with “not understanding the difference between right and wrong” or “not understanding the consequences of one’s actions” which is a very high hurdle for a defense to prove. Simply taking steps to avoid getting caught seems to indicate that a criminal recognizes the immorality, or at least illegality, of an action. The same goes for some relatively rare criminal cases involving genuine “mental illness” where a juror or judge might reasonably conclude that a mental illness is the main cause of an illegal act. For example, even though the vast majority of schizophrenics don’t commit any crimes, some *paranoid* schizophrenics can tend to violent behavior. Legal insanity is far narrower than being determined.

Nonetheless, there is also a long tradition of what is called “compatibilism,” sometimes also called “soft determinism.” Compatibilists do agree with determinists that that there is no such thing as libertarian free will but they argue that a very important notion of freedom (and moral responsibility) remains, which is indeed compatible with determinism. As odd as it might sound, the very *same* action can be *both* free and determined. Thus, for various reasons, they argue that “freedom” is really best understood as something more like “the absence of external constraint” or “acting in accordance with one’s desires and beliefs.” Jimmy’s actions are determined by internal causes but he is not being coerced by someone else and he is acting in accordance with his (albeit, twisted) desires and beliefs. He is, for example, doing what he wants to do at that time.

So, for a compatibilist, “a person P does action A freely” means that “P is not compelled to do A by external causes at the time of the action.”

Thus, a free act can be both free (in this sense) and determined because P would still be compelled to do A by *internal* psychological causes, as any determinist maintains.

Libertarians will of course not be satisfied with compatibilist free will and will likely view it as too weak. However, compatibilists will rightly point out just how important, as a very practical matter, their notion of free will has been to people throughout history. Being able to do what one wants to do and not to be controlled by an oppressive government, for example, has been the motivating force behind many revolutions and wars (including the American Revolution). Being free from another’s control or domination is surely an important aspect of liberty, autonomy, and self-determination. What is so awful about being a prisoner, held hostage, or afraid of a violent stalker? Precisely that one cannot do what one wants to do under such conditions where significant excessive external constraints are present. Why have so many risked their lives to make it to the United States from Cuba? Same answer. Throughout all of this, it seems almost silly to ask “yeah, but does the Cuban refugee or prisoner have *libertarian* free will?” or “Could they really do otherwise?” What we arguably really want is compatibilist free will.

Compatibilists about free will and determinism also then, perhaps not surprisingly, tend to be compatibilists about free will and moral responsibility. Suppose Jimmy actually rapes a girl. Did he act according to his desires at the time? It would seem so. Did anyone else coerce him into committing the rape? No. For the compatibilist, this is pretty much enough to conclude that Jimmy is morally responsible for the action after all.

It is worth mentioning that the notion of freedom and liberty is a staple of many classic rock songs, sometimes as a metaphor for rebellion or just doing what we want (such as Billy Joel’s “My Life”). Others perhaps emphasize a kind of American free and patriotic spirit (such as in John Mellencamp’s “Pink Houses”: “ain’t that America/home of the free”). The Who song “I’m Free,” while not about Jimmy since it is on *Tommy*, asserts that “…freedom tastes of reality” and then proclaims that “I'm free, I'm free/And I'm waiting for you to follow me.” Janis Joplin famously sings “Freedom’s just another word for nothin’ left to lose….” in “Me and Bobby McGee.” While clearly not a philosophical definition of freedom, one senses the importance of being able to do what one wants, which very much echoes a kind of compatibilist freedom.

Perhaps the most explicitly philosophical song lyrics on free will can be found in Rush’s “Free Will,” written as usual by Neil Peart. For example, it is said that “If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice…I will choose a path that's clear, I will choose freewill.” On the one hand, this seems to indicate strong support for libertarianism. However, as we have seen, the question of free will is really just pushed back one step to the issue of whether or not I can choose freely in the first place. We all make choices and decisions but aren’t they also determined by antecedent causes? The determinist will answer yes. After all, the determinist must be consistent: One’s choices, decisions, and even beliefs in free will or determinism are also determined.[[12]](#endnote-12)

This theme is also part of Lynyrd Skynyrd’s classic “Free Bird” which includes the well-known and raw guitar-playing freedom on display during the second half of the song. But the lyrics are also interesting: “‘Cause I'm as free as a bird now/And this bird you cannot change”…“Lord knows, I can't change.” This is somewhat paradoxical if the idea is that my acting freely (or *feeling* free) itself cannot be changed, that is, I am determined to feel that I am free. If one’s actions and thoughts about freedom are determined, then I cannot change feeling free.

In conclusion, then, if it is reasonable to suppose that Dr. Jimmy really does have DID, then it also seems right to suppose that he is not morally responsible for Mr. Jim’s thoughts or actions since they are literally different “persons” inhabiting the same body. Although it is not entirely clear that violence or DID has been shown to have a genetic basis, it does seem that certain genetic markers along with some personality traits and environmental factors can make one crime-prone. In addition, even if Dr. Jimmy does not have DID, one might of course still argue that he (and none of us, for that matter) really acts freely in the “libertarian” sense which, in turn, may also call into question moral responsibility for any action. Compatibilist freedom and moral responsibility is perhaps the most that we actually have.

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NOTES:

1. John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*. ed. P. Nidditch. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1689/1975). On DID in particular, see for example Jeanette Kennett and Steve Matthews, “Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder,” *Philosophical Psychology* 15 (2002): 509-526. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. American Psychiatric Association. *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 5th edition. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 2013). But also see J. Poland, “Deeply rooted sources of error and bias in psychiatric classification,” in *Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds,* eds. H. Kincaid and J. Sullivan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. If you haven’t seen Pearl Jam’s wonderful version of this song on VH1 Rock Honors The Who, check it out at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jnQ3XVXMyk> [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Pete Townshend, *Who I Am* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2012), p. 250. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Guang Guo, Michael Roettger, and Jean C. Shih, “Contributions of the DAT1 and DRD2 Genes to Serious and Violent Delinquency among Adolescents and Young Adults,” *Human Genetics* 121 (2007): 125-136. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Francis Cullen and Robert Agnew eds. *Criminology Theory: Past to Present, 4th edition*, Oxford University Press, 2011), especially pp. 32-85. The quote is from p. 34. See also Lee Ellis and Anthony Walsh, “Gene-Based Evolutionary Theories in Criminology,” in the same volume, pp. 43-58. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. See the following academic based webpage for much more on these studies as well as further references: <http://www.schizophrenia.com/research/hereditygen.htm> [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. The term ‘libertarianism’ in this context has nothing to do with the more political connotation. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. One might suppose that the bizarre random happenings at the quantum or subatomic level physics shows that determinism is false (at least at that level) and thus might support the case for libertarianism. However, as has been pointed out my many others, this does not really help the libertarian case for free will because if, say, one of my actions (e.g. doing A instead of B) results from a random (uncaused?) quantum event in my brain, then I would not really have any *control* over such randomness and genuine free will requires that I do have control. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. See, for example, the defense of “hard determinism” in Derk Pereboom, *Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. For a nice representative and fairly recent collection of readings on free will and determinism, see R. Kane ed. *Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd edition*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). There are also numerous excellent entries on most of these topics, including moral responsibility, on-line at the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://plato.stanford.edu/>) and *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://www.iep.utm.edu/>). The literature is enormous overall. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. For a nice discussion of this theme in Rush’s work, see Neil Florek, “Free Wills and Sweet Miracles,” in *Rush and Philosophy*, eds. J. Berti and D. Bowman (Chicago: Open Court Press, 2011), pp. 138-155. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)