A Critique of the Standard Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues

Mohammad Bagher Ghomi

Abstract
That i) there is a somehow determined chronology of Plato’s dialogues among all the chronologies of the last century and ii) this theory is subject to many objections, are points this article intends to discuss. Almost all the main suggested chronologies of the last century agree that Parmenides and Theaetetus should be located after dialogues like Meno, Phaedo and Republic and before Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Laws and Philebus. The eight objections we brought against this arrangement claim that to place the dialogues like Meno, Phaedo and Republic both immediately after the early ones and before Parmenides and Theaetetus is epistemologically and ontologically problematic.

Key Words: Plato; chronology; knowledge; being; Parmenides

Introduction
While the ancient philosophers, doxographers and commentators from Aristotle onward considered, more or less, the question of the date and arrangement of the dialogues (cf. Irwin 2008, 77 n. 69), they would not observe a firm necessity to consider the progress of Plato’s theories in dialogues, maybe because they did not think of any essential shift in there.1 We might be able to say, nevertheless, that the most prominent feature of the ancient attitude to Plato was its peculiar attention to the Republic and the Timaeus as the most mature works2 in his philosophy and also the consideration of Laws as a later work. This tendency can be discovered from the general viewpoint of the first chronologies of the early 19th century after starting to deal with the issue. That Schleiermacher observed Republic as the culmination of Plato’s philosophy and as one of the latest dialogues besides Laws and Timaeus could reflex the implicit chronology of the tradition in the first mirrors it found. Another tendency in Schleiermacher is taking the trilogy of Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus as relatively early.

From the last quarter of 19th century onward, stylometry helped scholars to establish a new framework to construct a new arrangement between the dialogues. Based on stylistic as well as literary findings, Campbell (1867, xxxff.) argued for the closeness of the style of Sophist3 and Politicus with Timaeus, Critias, Philebus and

1 PhD of philosophy, University of Tehran, mbqomi@gmail.com
that, especially because of the certain evidence about this last dialogue’s lateness, led to the consideration of all as late dialogues. Almost every other stylistic effort after Campbell approved the similarities between Sophist and Politicus with Timaeus, Critias, Philebus and Laws. The result of all such investigations led to a new chronology that, despite some differences, has a fixed structure in all its appearances.

1. The Standard Chronology of the Dialogues

The chronologies that are now commonly accepted are mostly based on the arrangement of dialogues to three groups corresponding to three periods of Plato’s life, which became predominant after applying stylistic features in assessing the similarities between dialogues. The fact that all the stylometric considerations reached to the similar results about the date of dialogues while they were assessing different stylistic aspects helped the new chronology become prevailing not only among stylistic chronologies but also between those like Fine, Kahn and Vlastos who were inclined more to the content-based arrangements. Even this latter group could not neglect the apparently certain results of using the method of stylometry. This was the main reason, I think, that made what they called content-based chronology be under the domination of stylometry much more than they could expect. The division of the dialogues into three separate groups became something that most of the scholars took for granted so far as Kahn thinks this division 'can be regarded as a fixed point of departure in any speculation about the chronology of the dialogues’ (1996, 44). Thereafter, all the chronologists are accustomed to divide the dialogues to three groups of early, middle and late corresponding to the three stages of Plato’s life. Nevertheless, some of them tried to make subdivisions among each group and introduce some of the dialogues as transitional between different periods and thus reached to a fourfold classification of the dialogues. Although they could never achieve to a consensus about the place of some dialogues, about which we will discuss soon, the whole spirit of their chronological arrangements is the same and thus compelling enough for us to unify all of them with the label of 'Standard Chronology of Dialogues' (SCD). We brought together some of the most famous chronologies in the table below to make a comparison easier and to show how all are approximately of the same opinion about the place of some dialogues.

The following points must be noted about this table:
1. I divided the dialogues to eight groups of early, late early, transitional, early middle, late middle, post-middle, early late, and late. Although none of the chronologists applies this classification, it can be helpful to compare them. In this table, for example, if one of the chronologist’s beholds one of the dialogues as later than all the dialogues of middle group, it is considered here as late middle. Otherwise, if it is emphasized that it is after all of them, it is considered as post-middle. The same is true about the dialogues of the late group in which I regarded the first dialogues of that period as early late only in those who explicitly considered
some dialogues as earlier than others in the late group. Though, therefore, some of the dialogues might have not been considered as forming a distinct class, they are distinguished here.

### Table of the Different Chronologies of SCD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Late</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transitional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early Middle</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Late Middle</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post Middle</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early Late</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Late</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A. SCD’s Early and Transitional Dialogues

The first group of dialogues in SCD includes what is called early or Socratic dialogues. Campbell’s first group of dialogues includes Apology, Charmides, Cratylus, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Menexenus, Meno, Phaedo, Protagoras and Symposium. The first two groups of Brandwood’s four groups corresponding to Campbell’s first group. He distinguished
Cratylus, Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hippias Major (which was absent from all Campbell’s groups), Lysis, Menexenus, Meno, Phaedo and Symposium as the second group. Ledger (1989) also posits four groups. What is noticeable about his two groups of 390s dialogues and 380s comparing Campbell and Brandwood’s, is that he extracts Euthydemus, Symposium and Cratylus from them and puts them besides Republic and other middle period dialogues. Meno and Phaedo are in his 380s dialogues.

When we move from stylistic to content-based chronologies, the homogeneity between the dialogues of each group is more understandable. Guthrie (1975, v. 4, 50) distinguishes three groups, the first of them includes Apology, Crito, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Protagoras, Gorgias and Ion. In addition to Meno, Phaedo and Euthydemus, his first group does not include Cratylus and Menexenus. Unlike Guthrie, almost all the other content-based chronologies of our study desire to distinguish two categories inside the first group of which the latter must be considered as the transitional group leading to the dialogues of the middle period. Kahn distinguishes four groups of dialogues and arranges two of them before middle period dialogues. The first group including Apology, Crito, Ion, Hippias Minor, Gorgias and Menexenus he calls 'early' or 'presystematic' dialogues (1998, 124). The second group he calls the 'threshold', 'pre-middle' or 'Socratic' dialogues including seven: Laches, Charmides, Lysis, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Euthydemus and Meno. Based on Vlastos’ arrangement we must distinguish Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno as 'transitional' dialogues from the 'elenctic' dialogues that are the other dialogues of Kahn’s mentioned first two groups plus the first book of the Republic. Fine also distinguishes 'transitional' dialogues from early or 'Socratic' dialogues, but her transitional dialogues are Gorgias, Meno, Hippias Major, Euthydemus and Cratylus of which she thinks the last two dialogues are 'controversial' (2003, 1). Her Socratic dialogues are all the remaining dialogues of Kahn’s first two groups.

In spite of all the differences between the mentioned chronologies, it can be seen that all of them are inclined to arrange the early dialogues in a way that:

i) Besides the dialogues that are considered as late, it never includes Republic II-X, Theaetetus, Phaedrus and Parmenides.

ii) It intends to consider the dialogues like Euthydemus and Hippias Major that look more critical as later among the earlier dialogues or as transitional group.

iii) Those who do not consider Meno as a middle period dialogue place it in their second or transitional group.

iv) None of the content-based chronologies considers Phaedo and Symposium as early. Stylometric chronologies also intend to put them either as last dialogues among their early ones or as middle.

B. SCD’s Middle Period Dialogues

Campbell listed Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus as his second group of dialogues, an idea that was accepted by Brandwood. Ledger’s middle period
dialogues had *Euthydemus, Symposium* and *Cratylus* in addition to the dialogues that Campbell and Brandwood had mentioned as middle. Among content-based chronologies, Guthrie’s list of middle period dialogues did not include *Parmenides* but some dialogues which had been considered as early in stylometric ones: *Meno, Phaedo, Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus, Euthydemus, Menexenus* and *Cratylus*. Insofar as I know, *Euthydemus* and *Menexenus* have not been considered as middle by other content-based chronologists and Guthrie is an exception among them. That [*Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium* and *Republic* were middle period dialogues almost all the philosophical] chronologists like Kahn, Fine, Vlastos (except *Rep.I*), Irwin and Kraut came along. The dialogues they do not string along about are *Meno, Cratylus, Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*. Those like Guthrie, Kraut and Irwin who did not consider *Meno* as early presumably posit it among middles. The same can be said about *Cratylus* in the suggested chronologies of Guthrie, Kahn, Vlastos and Kraut. Nonetheless, it is different in case of *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*. Whereas all the mentioned stylometric chronologists like Campbell, Brandwood and Ledger set them among middle period dialogues, the philosophical chronologists, it might seem at first, did not arrive at a consensus about them. While Guthrie and Fine put them as the first dialogues of the late group, Vlastos and Kraut set them as the latest of the middle group, as well as Kahn who puts them as post-middle and amongst the late period dialogues. Regardless the way they classify their groups, their disagreement does not affect the arrangement of the dialogues: they all posit *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* after the series of *Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium* and *Republic* and before *Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Philebus* and *Laws*.

To sum up SCD’s arrangement of the middle period dialogues we can add:

v) *Republic* and *Phaedrus* have been considered by all the mentioned chronologists as dialogues of the middle period.

vi) All the philosophical chronologies have reached a consensus about setting *Phaedo* and *Symposium* alongside with *Republic* and *Phaedrus* as middle.

vii) While Stylometric alongside some philosophic chronologists arrange *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* among their middle period dialogues and mostly as the latest among them, other philosophical chronologists put them as the early among the late dialogues. We can conclude then that SCD intends to locate these two dialogues at the boundary between the middle and late period dialogues.

C. SCD’s Late Dialogues

SCD’s biggest consensus, both in style-based and in content-based chronologies is about the late dialogues. Campbell listed *Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Critias* and *Laws* as his late group. Brandwood’s list has *Epinomis* and *Epistles* in addition and Ledger’s has *Clitophon*. That all the dialogues of Campbell’s list are late dialogues, all the mentioned philosophical chronologies are of the same opinion. The only difference is about locating *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* as the first
dialogues among late group or the latest among middle group. We can then say that in SCD:

viii) *Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias* and *Laws* are considered by all as late.

IX) All the above six dialogues must be dated after *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*.

**SCD’s Scheme**

[Diagram of SCD's Scheme]

---

IX) All the above six dialogues must be dated after *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*.
Based on the above results out of a brief comparing of the chronologies, we are, I hope, permitted to draw the scheme of the standard chronology that can reflect the spirit of the current chronology. The aim of drawing this scheme is to determine the essential features of the current chronologies. We need SCD to be nearly determined because we need to have a fixed subject to challenge. We will try, however, to refer to the different ideas whenever it seems necessary. Now, let us draw a hypothetical scheme of SCD on the basis of the mentioned points of (i) to (ix) in the scheme above.

The following points must be noted about this scheme:
1. I did not bring dialogues like *Alcibiades I* and II, *Clitophon* and some other dialogues their authenticity have been doubted by some of our chronologists.
2. The arrangement of the dialogues that are listed under column I shows the results of points (i) to (ix) above.
3. The dialogues mentioned in column II are those that have been considered by the scholars either as early or as transitional but never as middle or late.
4. The dialogues of column III are those that have been taken either as early, transitional or middle but never as late.

**Stylometric Evidences of the Standard Chronology**

Both the scheme we drawn out in the previous section and the fact that it is the result of the stylometric evidences are points almost agreed upon:

Since the advent of stylometry … all the parties to the dispute over the nature of Plato’s development would agree that the *Euthyphro* is an early dialogue; that the *Phaedo* and *Republic* are dialogues dating to Plato’s middle period, and that the *Phaedo* is the earlier of the two; that the *Parmenides* post-dates the *Republic*, and that the *Sophist* is among Plato’s latest works. (Prior, 1985, 168)

That there must be some kind of stylometric development in Plato’s writing through the dialogues is beyond doubt. Nonetheless, there is, I think, a reasonable doubt about the role the stylometric evidences play in supporting SCD. It is generally agreed that SCD owes much to the stylometric evidences as its first versions were suggested because of stylometric findings. This is what we are to examin here: How much SCD is right in relying on the stylometric evidences? I shall try to examine some of the stylometric evidences in this section emphasizing only on what each evidence alone implies and not necessarily on what each scholar derives from every evidence.

i) By calculating the increased use of the technical terminology of *Timaeus, Critias* and *Laws* in Plato’s other dialogues, Campbell (1867) found that the number of occurrances of those technical words in *Sophist* and *Politicus* are close to them.

ii) Dittenberger’s examination of the use of ἔμπνησις with certain other phrases showed that while *Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Charmides, Laches, Hippias Major, Euthydemos, Meno, Gorgias, Cratylus* and *Phaedo* are free from any use of
all three phrases of τί μήν, ἀλλὰ ... μήν and γε μήν, the number of their use in other dialogues are as follows:

a) τί μήν: Ly.(1), Par.(6), Phds.(11), Sph.(12), Tht.(13), Pol.(20), Phil.(26), Rep.(34), La.(48)
b) ἀλλὰ ... μήν: Tim. and Criti.(0), Tht. and Phdr.(1), Sym., Par., Phil., Sph. and La. (2), Pol.(3), Ly.(4), Rep.(11)
c) γε μήν: Ly.(0), Sym., Phds., Tht. and Criti.(1), Rep.(2), Par. and Sph.(5), Tim.(6), Phil.(7), Pol.(8) and La.(24).

These occurrences are not sufficient to authentize one to say that Sym., Ly., Phds., Rep. and Tht. make a group earlier than Par., Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim., Criti. and La. Suppose that we accept his explanation that Plato took τί μήν from Dorians in Sicily, what about Tim. and Criti.? Furthermore, the suggested order for Par. later than Phds., Tht. and Rep. cannot be consistent with these evidences.

iii) Dittenberger’s calculation of καθάσπευκ and its preference to ὀσπευκ in some dialogues sounds conclusive because the use of this word in Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim. and La. (orderly: 27,14,34,18,148) is incomparable with its use in other dialogues like Sym., Phds., Rep. and Tht. (orderly: 2,4,5,2) and might be reasonably as its preference to ὀσπευκ. What is confusing for Dittenberger is the case of Parmenides in which there is no use of the word. Besides the problem of Parmenides that, I think, is due to the orthodox belief about its lateness which is more based on a need for a consistent story than stylometric evidences, all that the use of καθάσπευκ proves is that Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim. and La. are close to each other. This result is very close to the result of Campbell’s evidence, adding Phil.

While the occurrences of ἐως(πευκ) is seen in most of the dialogues, μέχοιτευκ occurs only in Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim., Criti. and La. (orderly: 1,1,3,4,1,16) which approves the same result mentioned about καθάσπευκ. Though ignored by Dittenberger, this result, with two exceptions of Criti in which there is no occurrence and Ap. where we have one occurrence, is approved again by the number of occurrences of τάχα ἴσως in Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim. and La. (orderly: 3,2,3,1,11). To sum up Dittenberger’s evidence, while I think μήν-phrases does not prove anything, the occurrence of καθάσπευκ, μέχοιτευκ and τάχα ἴσως indicates that Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim., Criti. and La. must be considered as close to each other. This result is almost the result of Campbell evidence by the only difference of adding Phil. The surprising fact is that in spite of the abnormalities of Par., it is still considered by Dittenbergeramong the dialogues of the late group.

iv) Schanz’ calculation of τῷ ὄντι, ὄντως, ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀληθῶς, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ and ἀληθείᾳ showed that:

a) There is no occurrence of τῷ ὄντι in Phil., Pol., Tim. and La. where the use of ὄντως is considerable (orderly: 15, 11, 8, 50). If we add Sph. and Epi. where there is
only one occurrence of τῷ οὖντι and a considerable number of occurrences of ὅντως (Sph.(21), Epi.(16)), we will have six dialogues of Phil., Pol., Tim., La., Sph. and Epi. as dialogues which are close to each other in this regard.

b) The case is a bit different with ὧς ἀληθῶς and ἀληθῶς. Besides Phil., Pol., Tim. and La., we have also H. Ma., Mene. and Meno as the dialogues where there is no occurrences of the former. While the number of occurrences of the latter in the first four dialogues (orderly: 7, 4, 3, 6) is more than all other dialogues (with at most two occurrences), save Sph. with six occurrences, the problem is that unlike those four, Sph. has also three occurrences of ὧς ἀληθῶς. None of the phrases occurs in Epi.

The result of this comparison is, thus, like the previous one but with a less certain conclusion.

c) The occurrence of τῇ ἀληθείᾳ has no significance except its more occurrences in Grg.(6) and the last books (VIII-X) of Rep.(9) besides its absence in Meno and Phil.and some other early dialogues. The use of ἀληθείᾳ in four dialogues of Phil.(1), Tim.(1), La.(3) and Epi.(1) (ignoring the 3 occurrences in Pr.because of being quotation) can bring forth only a very slight approval of the previous results. The final conclusion we can draw out of Schanz’ evidence, however, is that Phil., Pol., Tim., La. and somehow Sph. and Epi. are closer to each other than other dialogues.

v) Ritter’s list of forty three linguistic features of the late dialogues, mostly including reply formula in order to find how many of them have occurred in each dialogue, got to this arrangement: La.(40), Phil. and Pol. (37), Sph. (35), Rep. (28), Tht. (25), Phds. (21), Par. (17), Epi. (12), Cra. and Ly. (8), Phd.(7), Lach. (5), Euthd., Pr. and Mene. (4), Sym., Ch., Grg., H.Ma. and Ion. (3), Ap., Criti. and Meno (2), and Euthp.(1)

What this comparison is supposed to mean? How can we compare different dialogues on the basis of the number of reply formula used in them while not only are they different in their number of pages, but also in their being dialogue? Many dialogues like Sym. and Phds.as well as some books of Rep.do contain less questions and answers and thus less features and also many other considerations. The case is almost the same with Lutoslawski’s (1897) assessment using more than five hundred features.

vi) Janell’s examination of hiatus showed that the frequency of objectionable hiatus in La. (with the average of 4.7 per page), Epi. (2.8), Tim. (1.2), Criti. (0.8), Sph. (0.6) and Pol. (0.4) is extraordinarily lower than all other dialogues, e.g., Ly. (46), Euthd. (45.1), Phd. (41), Meno (38.3), Rep. (35.3), Tht. (32) and Phds. (23.9). Besides the first obvious conclusion that those six dialogues are close to each other, it can also mean that these dialogues are the latest dialogues since it is not understandable that Plato, who avoided the objectionable hiatus in them has forgotten to avoid them in the dialogues later than them. Comparing with the other evidences, Janell’s evidence is more authentive in considering the late dialogues as late.
vii) The investigation of the clausulae of Plato’s writing in *Laws* and comparing it with *Pol.*, *Phil.*, *Tim.* and *Crit.* on the one hand and *Ap.*, *Pr.* and *Cr.* on the other hand in Kaluscha’s examination showed that the prose rhythm of *La.* is similar to that of the first group. This was another approvement of all past evidences of similarity between *La.* and late dialogues.

I hope this brief evaluation of the stylometric evidences can clearly show that all that stylometric evidences can prove is that the dialogues *Sophist*, *Political*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Philebus*, *Laws* and *Epinomis* must be close to each other and probably later than other dialogues. What stylometry at most can do for the arrangement of the dialogues is, therefore, only assuring us of a late group that does not include *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* both stylometrically far from other dialogues of SCD’s late group. What stylometry cannot construct is a middle group since none of the stylometric evidences can prove such a group of dialogues. ‘It is a fact often forgotten’, Tarrant says, ‘that the modern notion of a middle period in Plato’s work is an artificial construct that has no stylometric basis’ (2000, 140). Stylometric evidences, on the other hand, are strongly against SCD’s consideration of *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* as the dialogues close to the late dialogues.

2. Objections against the Standard Chronology

The standard chronology of dialogues that we tried to articulate in the previous section, is the subject of many objections most of which have been presented by the same scholars who accepted the framework of SCD in their own versions. Here we are going to discuss some of the main, mostly ontological and epistemological, problems of the standard chronology under three groups of objections.

A. First group of objections: middle dialogues after early ones

To consider the middle dialogues like *Meno*, *Phaedo* and *Republic* immediately after the early dialogues has some epistemological and ontological problems. Our first group of objections, then, intends to show that there must be some problems with SCD’s tendency to put the middle dialogues immediately after the early ones.

Objection I: The distinction of knowledge and true belief

Contrasting to the early dialogues in which there is no serious hint to the distinction of knowledge and true belief, this distinction is strongly at work in the middle one as something already accepted or previously demonstrated. In the early dialogues, about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective statuses: knowledge and ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The Socrates of the early dialogues never lets anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is. We can obviously see in the middle period dialogues that the
distinction of knowledge and true belief is at work as an already demonstrated distinction (cf. *Meno* 85c6-7; 97b5-6 ff.; 97b1-2; 98b2-5; *Phaedo* 76b5-6, 76c4, 84a8).

A turning point between these two situations must be wherever true opinion is accepted as a distinct epistemological status from knowledge. Since the distinction of knowledge and opinion is an important result of *Theaetetus’* long discussion about knowledge, it can be the best turning point. Socrates’ refusing of both the second suggestion that knowledge is true opinion (187bff.) and the third suggestion that knowledge is true opinion plus an account (201dff.) proves that knowledge and opinion must be considered as different things. *Meno* is another dialogue discussing the distinction, but it more takes it for granted than proving it and, therefore, it is obviously after making the distinction. When it is said at 85c-d that the slave boy has true opinion about the same things he does not know, the distinction is presupposed. The interrelated theories presented about the distinction with the use of the myth of Daedalus (97d-e) and the theory of *anamnesis* (98a) also presuppose the distinction. Even at 98b Socrates surprisingly says that if he can claim to know anything, which about few things he does, he claims that knowledge and opinion are different. Hence, we cannot regard *Meno* as the turning point when we have *Theaetetus* in which the distinction is demonstrated. While *Theaetetus* looks as the epistemological turning point here, the problem is that based on SCD, it cannot be posited amongst the early and the middle dialogues.

**Objection II: The possibility of being of not being**

While the Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being is predominant in the early dialogues (e.g., *Euthydemus* 284b3-5), *Republic* (476-477) speaks of that which both is and is not.

The turning point must obviously be the acceptance of the being of not being. This occurs deficiency in the second part of *Parmenides* (hereafter: *Parmenides II*) and sufficiently in *Sophist*. At *Parmenides* 161e-162b the being of not being is discussed and at 163c it is said that not being is the absence of being. It is, however, denied there and also at 164b. In *Sophist* (257b) it is strictly said that not being is not contrary to, but different from, being and at 258b-c the peculiar character of not being and also the Form of not being are discussed (cf. 258d). After explicitly rejecting the principle of 'father Parmenides' (258d), not being is connected, more obvious than before, with the notion of difference and introduced as each part of the nature of difference that is set over against being (258e). There is no contrary of being and, thus, not being cannot be its contrary. At 260b not being is considered as a Form that is scattered on being. The problem is that while *Parmenides II* and *Sophist* look as the ontological turning points here, based on SCD we must regard them as post-*Republic* dialogues.

**B. Second group of objections: Late period dialogues after middle ones**
This group of objections aims to show how problematic it is to locate some of the SCD’s late group of dialogues like *Theaetetus*, *Sophist* and *Laws* after dialogues like *Meno, Phaedo* and *Republic*.

**Objection III: Problems of the lateness of *Theaetetus***

If we accept SCD’s arrangement for *Theaetetus* as a late or late middle dialogue after *Meno* and *Republic*, we cannot explain how Plato who had spoken before about belief as distinct from knowledge in *Meno* (85c-d, 97a-b, d-e, 98a-b) and had taken this distinction for granted in *Republic* V (477e-478e), upon which he relies the ontological distinction between Forms and particulars (476c-d, 477e-478e,479d), suddenly comes to the elementary state about the relation between knowledge and opinion in a later dialogue asking whether knowledge is distinct from opinion or not. How can we understand Theaetetus’ suggestion at 187b that knowledge is true opinion and Socrates’ all efforts to reject it and prove that knowledge is different from opinion as a later suggestion and effort? Although Fine brings three reasons to call the revealing of the discussion in *Theaetetus* ‘surprising’ (2003, 19-23), the problems of considering *Theaetetus* as a late dialogues are best discussed in Sedley’s list of six problems (1996, 84-5):

1- While in *Republic* and *Timaeus* knowledge is distinguished by its objects, namely Forms, *Theaetetus* tries to treat with empirical objects and is far from observing Forms as the objects of knowledge.

2- That the strong contrast between epistēmē and doxa in *Republic* and *Timaeus* gives way in *Theaetetus* to the theory that knowledge is a kind of opinion. Even the way that the earlier suggestion (without adding logos) is rejected, Robinson (1950, 4-5) claims, seems actually to deny *Republic*’s view. What is said at 201b as the reason of the rejection of their identity, namely that jurymen can achieve a true opinion about the facts that only an eyewitness could know about. This implies that we can know through our eyes while *Republic* strongly held that knowledge is only of the invisible Forms. He also points to 185e and 208d as other evidences of this.

3- The theory of anamnesis that Plato had set out in *Meno, Phaedo* and *Phaedrus* is never invoked in the *Theaetetus* even when he theorizes different models for the acquisition of knowledge there. Sedley notes (p.85) that in the Aviary model, Plato has to accept that an infant’s mind is empty (197e) which is 'apparently in flat contradiction of the innateness doctrine' of anamnesis (cf. also: Robinson, 1950, 4. He calls it 'out of harmony' with the doctrine). Cornford (1935, 28) thinks that never abandoning the theory, Plato could not mention it there because it presupposes the answer to the question about knowledge.

4- Appearance of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge in *Theaetetus* after the long activity of a constructive Socrates in the middle dialogues.

5- Noting to the fact that *Theaetetus* fails in finding out what knowledge is, Sedley asks: 'can this really be the same Plato who in the *Republic* made knowledge the distinguishing mark *par excellence* of the philosopher?' (ibid)
6- Theaetetus fails even to mention Meno’s most admired theory of aitias logismos.\textsuperscript{19}

Sedley presents three interpretations as possible solutions of the problem.\textsuperscript{20} According to the first interpretation, Theaetetus is silent about the middle-period doctrine.\textsuperscript{21} Whereas based on the second interpretation, unlike the epistemology of Republic and Timaeus which have Forms as their objects, Theaetetus does address only to the sensible world, the third interpretation tries to make the Meno the canonical text and interpret the Theaetetus accordingly (p. 93f.). The way Robinson (1950, 5-6) speaks about the problem of Theaetetus is noteworthy:

Is the inconspicuousness of the Forms in the Theaetetus due to Plato’s not having believed in them when he wrote it? The answer yes was easy to accept in the days before stylonmetry, when one could hold that the Theaetetus was an early dialogue, written before the theory of Forms was thought of and expressed in the Phaedo and the Republic.

Neither holding a dialogue as earlier than Phaedo and Republic can allow us to say it belongs to the period that the theory of Forms has not been thought; nor the stylonmetry, as we discussed, does say that its place after those dialogues is a more acceptable place.

The substantial problem with Theaetetus’ position as later than the middle dialogues, as the above-mentioned problems clearly show, is an epistemological one. While one might agree that from a modern point of view, it might be even more developed than the epistemology of Phaedo and Republic\textsuperscript{22} but can it be still the case from Plato’s point of view? The fact that Theaetetus was a fresh start, as Vlastos (1991, 77) calls it so, after the Parmenides’ attacks against the theory of Forms, in which I am entirely in agreement with them, cannot justify SCD’s dating of it after middle period dialogues. Theaetetus can, however, be accepted as a fresh start after Parmenides but still prior to the Meno, Phaedo and Republic.\textsuperscript{23}

**Objection IV: Problem of taking Sophist and Parmenides II as later than Republic**

While SCD’s arrangement for Theaetetus was epistemologically problematic, the place it gives to Sophist makes ontological problems. In the earlier parts of Sophist we are still committed to the Parmenidean principle (237a) and cannot find that which not being can apply to (237b) because not being cannot be applied to those that are (237c). This is the ontological side of the problem of false belief that is being discussed in Sophist, a long discussion which finally brings about an important ontological turn, namely its going beyond Parmenidean principle (258d), accepting the being of not being and considering not being as different and thus not as something contrary to being (258ef.). How can we understand now Republic’s admission of what both is and is not (476e-477a-b), which is obviously taken as something that has been proved before, prior to Sophist? The main reason based on which SCD is inclined to date Republic earlier than Sophist is that the stylistic
features of Republic are far different from the so-called late dialogues to which Sophist is stylometrically so close. Before stylometry, it was almost a somehow agreed point that Sophist would have been before Republic.

The same objection is appliable, though not with the same strength, to the lateness of the second part of Parmenides where an incomplete version of solving the problem with the notion of 'difference' can clearly be seen (143b, cf.162d). Parmenides II is not as successful as Sophist in completing the solution and leads at the end to the absolute denial of the being of not being.

Objection V: Problem of Laws and Politicus after Republic

It might look strange, at first sight, to make this objection against SCD’s arrangement because it has always been admitted as the most evident that Laws must be set after Republic. Moreover, our only external evidences of the dialogues, the testimony of Aristotle (Politics II, 6) is in favor of this arrangement. The problem that Laws’ political theories are unacceptably neglecting, or unaware of, Republic’s philosopher-king and, as Sounders says, it is vanished in Laws ‘without trace’ (1992, 465). About onto-epistemological issues, the differences between two dialogues are so huge that leads Saunders to believe that:

It is very hard not to feel that one has entered a different world, in which the cutting edge of Plato’s political thought, metaphysics, has been lost. (ibid)

Owen thinks that the Laws ‘embodies no consistent reversion’ (1998, 264) to the political theories which we face in Republic. Although Laws is empty from the theory of philosopher-king, it has, however, some reference to other theories of Republic. The objection we brought forth is, then, the question that if Republic antecedates Laws, why Plato is neglecting the theory of philosopher-king in there? The only solution SCD can propose is that, as Owen for example says, Laws is 'designed to modify and reconcile political theories which he had advanced at different times' (1998, 264). Those parts of Republic which are neglected in Laws, namely the theory of philosopher-king and Republic’s ontology are from the same books of Republic, from the latest pages of the book V to the end of book VII, where the being of what both is and is not is admitted (the subject of objection II). Politicus is also devoid of the theory of philosopher-king though it says that rulers must have αληθως ἐπιστήμωνας (293c5-7). This seems to be a more elementary, and the prior step, of the theory of philosopher-king of Republic and not vice versa.

C. Third group of objections: Parmenides

As we tried to show in the first part above, the position of Parmenides in SCD is a determined position in relation with some dialogues. It is definitely dated (i) after Meno, Phaedo and Republic (II-X) and (ii) before Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus and Critias. What our third group of objections is going to attack is only the first point that is SCD’s arrangement of Parmenides after middle period
dialogues. These objections are more determinative than all other objections and are capable to prepare us for a new attitude towards Plato’s development and the chronology of his dialogues.

**Objection VI: Problems of considering *Parmenides* as referring to the middle period dialogues**

The biggest presumption of all Plato’s commentators is that *Parmenides*’ objections against the theory of Forms refer to the theory that had been formerly offered in some or even all (cf. Prior, 1985, 51) of the middle period dialogues. Cornford (1939, 70-71), for instance, points to this general agreement about *Phaedo* as the subject of *Parmenides*’ problems. Palmer emphasizes that what Socrates is advocating in *Parmenides* is ‘a theory that in all essential respects is a version of Plato’s own middle period theory’ (1999, 180). Meinwald, on the other side, criticizes the traditional consideration of *Parmenides* 135 as Plato’s comment ‘on the status’ of the middle period theory of Forms. The portrait *Parmenides* draws of the middle period theory, Meinwald asserts, is not containing a ‘fully and adequately developed theory of Forms’ (1992, 372). The main problem, however, is that the middle period dialogues already contain the solutions of *Parmenides*’ problems. As Dorter says, *Parmenides*’ objections ‘are easily answered on the basis of the features of the theory which were prominent in the middle dialogues’ (1989, 200) and ‘not only the answers but the problems themselves’ were anticipated in those dialogues. Gonzalez (2002, 56-7) discusses several problems of the assumption that the critics are referring to the middle period dialogues focusing on the multiplicity of the theory both in the middle dialogues and in *Parmenides*.

Among those who take *Parmenides*’ objections valid, the general opinion about the relation of the theory of Forms in the middle period dialogues with *Parmenides*’ objections can be read in Kahn’s words (1996, 329):

> The classical doctrine of Forms, as developed in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, is subjected to rigorous criticism by Plato himself in the *Parmenides*; and the objections raised against it there are never answered.

We are not to claim thus that Plato answers directly to these objections in the middle period dialogues because such answers cannot be found anywhere in Plato’s corpus, neither in his middle nor in his late period dialogues. In fact, none of Plato’s dialogues directly discusses the issues of other dialogues. What we want to prove here is that the epistemological and ontological grounds of the theory of Forms as is represented in the middle period dialogues is deliberately constructed so as not to be broken by those criticisms anymore. We can find no answer to the objections because instead of providing answers to the problems, Plato changes, first, the epistemological and, then, the ontological grounds of the theory of Forms in order to be protected from the objections. We suggest, thus, that not only *Parmenides*’ problems are not referred to the middle period dialogues but they are intentionally
resolved there. Before discussing the problems and the way they are resolved in the middle period dialogues, let me point to some notes about Parmenides.

1) Based on SCD’s arrangement, Plato who had introduced an old or at least adult Socrates presenting and, if we are allowed to say, defending his theory in all those well-done dialogues including Republic, suddenly and for the first and last time, makes this character very young to answer to the problems caused by the theories of Socrates ‘in his maturity or even on his deathbed’ (Dorter, 1994, 19). The character of a young Socrates, one might say, is only a dramatic necessity because if Plato wanted to make Socrates part of the conversation with Parthenides, it could hardly has happened otherwise. Even if we accept this dialogue’s actual occurrence, to speak about the dramatic necessity about the dialogues that have Socrates as their character, is far from the spirit of Sōkratikōi logos genre. The youth of this character, on the other hand, is not mentioned only dramatically at the first part of the dialogue or by a slight reference somewhere in the dialogue, but is used specifically and purposefully with too much emphasis. Both of the indications at 130e and 135c-d show that the dialogue wants to emphasize the fact that the theory of Forms under consideration has been offered by a young man who, though is intelligent and able to present noble and divine arguments (135d2-3), has not yet been gripped (αντειληπται) by philosophy or properly trained (135c8) as will be in the future (130e2). Having pointed to the possibility of attaching some kind of significance to Socrates’ youth, Gosling asserts that ‘it might be that we are being given a critique of either early arguments for the Forms, or arguments of neophytes’ (1973, 192).

2) Parthenides’ theory of Forms is a more elementary theory than that of Phaedo and Republic. Both the details of the theory and the way it is defended by Socrates, if we can call it defence, show that the theory is introduced as a not well-thought one. We are not to discuss the probable changes of the theory of Forms here. Either Plato tries to change the theory in its details or not, he changes the epistemological grounds of the theory in Meno, Phaedo and Phaedrus and the ontological grounds in Parthenides II, Sophist, Timaeus and Republic among the middle dialogues. These changes of the grounds are, as we will argue, because of the problems of the Parthenides. I categorize these problems first into six main problems:

1. Problem of Forms for all, even worthless, things (130c-d)
2. Problems of participation (131)
3. Problem of Third Man (132a-b)
4. Problem of considering Forms as thoughts (132b-c)
5. Problem of Forms as paradigms (132d)
6. Epistemological problems of taking Forms as separated from particulars (133a-135a)

Let put aside the first problem. Maybe we cannot show that Plato in the middle dialogues did not consider Forms for all things, as we cannot show this in his other dialogues. Nonetheless, Aristotle’s criticism that from some of the proofs for the existence of the Forms, it follows that there must be Forms ‘even of those things of
which they think there are no Forms' (Metaphysics 1079a6-7) might be an evidence for the fact that either Plato or the Academy or both did not use to posit Forms for all things. The fourth problem is also specific to the suggestion of Forms as thoughts and is not necessarily a problem related to Plato's own theory of Forms. There remain four problems. The third and the fifth problem has the same basis, namely the regress problem or the problem of Third Man. Since we think the Third Man difficulty arises from a certain relation between a Form and its participants, we will discuss the third and the fifth problems besides the second problem. We will therefore try to argue that i) the problem of participation and also the Third Man problem are not applicable to the theory suggested in Republic and thus the second, third and fifth problems are resolved there; and ii) the epistemological problem cannot be applied to Meno, Phaedo and Republic as well as Phaedrus and, thus, the sixth problem is resolved in these dialogues.

i) Problems of participation and Third Man in the Republic

It has been taken for granted by a number of commentators that the Third Man problem (TM) as it is suggested in Parmenides and referred to repeatedly by Aristotle has Self Predication (SP) as its basis. If the Form of F is itself F, as all the participants of F are F, it will necessarily lead to TM. Based on this presumption, scholars made a direct and fixed relationship between SP and TM. On the contrary, what I will suggest is that though Plato accepts SP in all the periods of his philosophical life, it does not necessarily leads to TM in Republic while it can lead to it in the other dialogues of the middle period.

That Plato accepts SP is agreed by many commentators like Vlastos (1954, 388), Fine (2003, 36), F. C. White (1977) and Ryle (1939, 138) so far as Meinwald calls SP 'one of the most evident and characteristic features' (1992, 363) of Plato's works. Vlastos says that Plato 'neither could convince himself that the Third Man Argument was valid, nor refute it convincingly' (1954, 342). Plato could not have thought of TM as valid because this is a problem that, as Vlastos says, destroys the 'logical foundations' of all his theory (1954, 349). The case is different with Cherniss: not only TM is invalid and thus harmless to Plato's theory but also Plato did know that it is invalid when he put it in Parmenides' mouth (1998, 294). He thinks that Plato shows himself to be aware of TM in the Republic and Timaeus and he did not, undoubtedly, believe TM to be destructive (1944, 294-5) for if Plato considered TM fatal, he must have abandoned that theory at least as early as the Republic (1944, 294).

Allen argues that though, for Plato, the just itself is just and the beautiful itself beautiful, this does not imply SP because for this, the function "... is F" must be applied univocally to F itself and F particulars. This univocal application of F to F itself and F particulars, Allen says, can be correct only if both of them 'have identically the same character' (1998, 58) which obviously is not the case:
To say that justice is just and that any given act is just would be to say two quite different (though perhaps related) things and the difficulties inherent in self-perdition could not possibly arise. That is, the character of Forms would not be assimilated to that of particulars. (ibid)

While the function "… is F" for F itself is, in Allen’s point of view, 'identity' statement, it is for F particular only a 'relational' statement (ibid, 59). He points that for Plato, both in the early and middle dialogues, Forms are paradigms or standards, that is they are 'things characterized not characters' (ibid, 64) and Plato did not thought of them as common characters. It is, therefore, based on his rejection of univocal predication of F on F itself and F particulars that Allen rejects TM (1998, 68). He correctly points that the fundamental difficulty underlying TM is ontological instead of linguistic. 'Not only the regress arguments', he says, 'but all of the objections to participation in the Parmenides posit an identity of character between Forms and particulars' (ibid). The rejection of the identity of F in F itself and F particulars based on the theory of Forms as paradigms in the original-copy model is justified because Forms stand to particulars 'not as predicates stand to instances of predicates but as originals stand to shadows or reflections' (1961, 333 cf. 335).

We have then two related points: that (1) TM arises from taking the F of the Form and that of its particulars identical; and (2) in the original-copy theory of Forms they are not identical and, therefore, TM cannot be applied to it. F. C. White rejects the second point and thinks that the original-copy theory cannot be helpful in meeting TM (1977, 208). His reason is that if images are images at all, it is due to the fact that their properties are 'univocally in common with their originals' (ibid, cf.199). He points that appealing to the model of original-copy cannot be helpful to avoid SP while there are some 'independent reasons' that Plato was committed to it (ibid, p.211). White points to Phaedo and Republic where he thinks (1) the relation between Forms and particulars is not described as similar to the relation between originals and shadows, and (2) particulars are not seen as totally dependent on Forms or 'pure reflections' (1977, 211-212). He thoroughly, and I think appropriately, rejects any common theory in the middle dialogues concerning the nature of Forms and particulars or the relation between them (ibid). Sedley (2006) shows that even in Phaedo, the resemblance and 'striving to be like' is never crucial in Plato’s relationship between Forms and particulars. He notes (311) that even if we accept this as the correct relationship in Phaedo, it cannot be considered as an integral component of Plato’s philosophy.

My own point of view is that while TM is not appliable to Republic, it is appliable to all the other middle dialogues. I agree with White that i) there is no common theory in the middle dialogues about the nature of the relation between the Forms and their participants; ii) the original-copy model is not appliable to Phaedo; iii) the original-copy model cannot be helpful regarding SP. Nonetheless, I absolutely disagree with him about its help to TM. What I think is that while Plato has always been committed to SP, he tried in Republic to present the original-copy model, which
is completely helpful against TM. Plato does not try to reject TM by rejecting SP as some think, but he tries to reject TM while maintaining SP. Because of the difference between original and its shadow, the original-copy model of the theory of Forms, as Allen noted, escapes TM. The reason is that by this theory, the nature of participation changes in away that the identity of a Form and its participants is not the case anymore.\textsuperscript{41} We are not being said here of a character which is present in a Form and its participants but of a character which originally and really belongs to the Form but is applied in a different way and thus not univocally to its copy. Based on Plato’s ontology in \textit{Sophist}, \textit{Timaeus} and \textit{Republic}, it is only a man who is really and originally a man and if we call his reflection in a mirror or his shadow a man and say "it is a man", we do not use this 'is' univocally. This ontology, amongst so-called middle dialogues I confine to \textit{Republic}, changes the nature of participation so that neither \textit{Parmenides}' problem of participation nor TM will be applicable anymore. Not only does not it reject SP but it even strengthen it. It is primarily and completely the Form of F which is F; a participant’s being F must be understood in a different way. White’s objections that participants are not totally dependent or 'pure reflections', is not the case about this ontology. Whether we consider them so or not, this ontology can work for it does not necessarily say that particulars are 'pure reflections'. All that is being said here is that a Form and its participant are the same thing (F) but in different ways. Although Plato’s use of \textit{mimesis} instead of \textit{metexis} in \textit{Republic} can correctly be interpreted based on this new ontology, I do not intend to take it so because to rely on Plato’s use of different words is neither possible nor convincing.\textsuperscript{42}

A paradigm of F is the perfect example of being F.\textsuperscript{43} The paradigm of F is not F-ness but F itself. The difference between F-ness and F itself can become evident if we examin SP about them: While SP is correct and meaningful about F itself, it looks bizaare and unacceptable about F-ness. Large itself, the paradigm of Large, its perfect example, is obviously large because it is nothing but this being large and thus SP is obviously meaningful here. But about F-ness: 'Largeness is large' or 'beauty is beautiful' looks completely unacceptable because F-ness or the concept of F cannot itself be F. TM is also based on the assumption that Plato’s theory of Forms makes a Form necessary when there is a common thing between some things. It is only by understanding the Form of F as F-ness, a universal concept which is in common between a Form and its participants that the necessity of the existence of what is common between them is followed. If Forms are not universal concepts but originals of which all participants are shadows, there will be no necessity for a third thing to represent the common feature. Therefore, Plato’s original-copy model of his theory of Forms changes the relation between a Form and its participants in a way that none of the problems of participation and regress arguments of \textit{Parmenides} can be effective anymore. The case is different about \textit{Phaedo} because the original-copy model and the theory of Forms as paradigms are not yet theorized there.\textsuperscript{44}

(ii) The Epistemological Problem

19
Besides the distinction of knowledge and true belief that can clearly be helpful for the epistemological problem, Plato’s three famous doctrines, the theory of *anamnesis*, the method of hypothesis and the theory of Forms as causes, as I hope to show, do substantially aim at solving the epistemological problem resulted from the *chorismos* between the Forms and their particulars.45

a) The theory of *anamnesis* in *Meno*, where it was introduced for the first time, does obviously intend to solve Meno’s paradox, the problem of knowing what one knows or does not know. It is Meno’s question, ‘How will you search that thing when you do not know at all (ὁ μὴ οἴσθα τὸ παράπαντα) what it is? (80d5-6), that is formulated by Socrates as the paradoxical problem of searching either what one knows or does not know (80e2-3). After leading to the theory of *anamnesis* at 81bff, it resolves Meno’s problem by the theory that ‘the whole of searching and learning is indeed anamnesis’ (81d4-5).

The first appearance of the theory is not about Forms but about all the things of both this world and the underworld (81c5-7) and leads to the result that there is nothing that the soul has not learned (c7). It is *Phaedo*, however, where this epistemologic function of the theory is straightly directed to the Forms. Allen’s view in linking between the theory of *anamnesis* and the 'epistemological problem entailed by the separation of Forms and particulars' worths noting. He thinks that if the theory is an answer to this epistemological problem, it is not reasonable to say that the theory in *Meno* is not directed to the problem.46 I admit Allen’s note that the difference of the theory of *anamnesis* in the *Meno* and *Phaedo* is that the theory in the *Phaedo* solves problems generated by a χωρισμός between Forms and particulars which Plato, when he wrote the *Meno*, was perhaps groping for, but had not yet clearly formulated (1959, 174).

After distinguishing the equal itself (ἡ ἴσοτης) from equal things (αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα) in *Phaedo* (74c1-2), Socrates says that deriving (ἐννενον) and grasping (ἐληφας) the knowledge of the equal itself from the equal things is *anamnesis* (74c6-d2). The prior knowledge of the Forms does obviously intend to solve the problem of knowing separated Forms.47 This theory, hence, can help us to bridge from the particular things to what is distinct and separated from them because 1) we understand that the particular things wants to be like (βουλεταὶ ... εἶναι οἴον) the Forms but fall short and cannot be like them and 2) we have prior knowledge (προειδότα) of the Forms (74d9-e4). These two points are essential parts of the theory of *anamnesis* by which Socrates tries to solve the problem of getting knowledge of the Forms from the particulars and knowledge of the particulars from the Forms. He continues:

Necessarily, then, we must know in advance (προειδέναι) the equal (τὸ ἴσον) before that time we first saw the equal things and realized that all these objects strive to be like the equal but are deficient in this. (74e9-75a2)
By this theory, our knowledge is not restricted to our own world anymore and it cannot be said, as is claimed at Parmenides 134a-b, that none of the Forms are known by us and thus the knowledge of Forms is not a problem any longer. They are not still in us and, therefore, do not have their being in relation to the things that belong to our world strictly as it is said at Parmenides 133c-d. Consequently, the theory of anamnesis suggests a solution to the problem of knowledge of Forms while keeping them separated. The gap between Forms and things is as complete and huge as it is in Parmenides 133e. Here they are even more separated than ever. Phaedrus’ elaborate story of the companion of the soul with Gods through the world of truths that is indeed the story of the process of anamnesis, evidently proves the function of the theory in respect of knowledge of the Forms (133e-135a). Only those souls who have seen the truth in the upper world, Socrates says, can take a human shape because human beings must understand speech in terms of general Forms proceeding from many alike perceptions to a reasoned unity (249b5-c2).

b) As the doctrine of anamnesis is presented as a solution to Meno’s problem, the method of hypothesis is suggested as another solution to the problem:

It seems we must inquire into the qualities of something the nature of which we do not yet know (ἐξικε οὖν σκέπτεσθαι εἶναι ποιών τί ἐστιν ὁ μήπω ἴσμεν ὅτι ἐστίν). However, please relax your rule a little bit for me and agree to investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of hypothesis (ἐξ ὑπὸθέσεως); I mean the way geometers often carry on their investigations. (86d8-e5)

After an example of how geometers make use of the method in their investigations (87a-b), Socrates continues:

Since we do not know either what it is (ὄφι ισμεν οὔθ ὅτι ἐστίν) or what qualities it possesses, let us investigate it by means of a hypothesis whether it is teachable or not. (87b3-4)

The relation of the method with Meno’s paradox in the mentioned passages is obvious enough. Phaedo’s more complicated and better-constructed method which is not simply applying geometers’ method as it was in Meno, but a more philosophical and specified one, is still related with the problem of investigating something that is out of the region of our knowledge. Socrates’ warning about the danger of watching directly an eclipse of the sun (99d-e) before discussing the method (100a f.) can throw light on this relation. Socrates who is searching for the causes is afraid of his soul completely being blind if he looks at things directly as someone who watches an eclipse of the sun might become blind in his eyes. As the one who wants to watch the eclipse must first see its reflection in water and similar things, Socrates who wants to find the aitiai, i. e. Forms, must use the hypotheses.
Therefore, the method of hypothesis is to be, firstly, a method of getting the knowledge of the Forms (100a6). Immediately after the definition of the method at 100a, its relation with Forms becomes apparent at 100b f.

The use of the method in the allegory of Line in Republic is also related with the Forms, though, contrary to Meno and Phaedo, it has nothing to do with anamnesis. While this method is not used in the dialectical proceeding from images to sensible things and then to the mathematical objects, the hypotheses are needed to proceed from them to the Forms and then to the first principle. Socrates’ reference to the method of geometers saying ‘they make these their hypotheses and do not think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to everyone’ (510c6-d1), indicates his intention, i.e. using Forms in an epistemological construction which, though has knowledge as its result, is not forced to explain Forms themselves. This is strictly directed against the epistemological problems arisen in Parmenides 134a-c.49

c) Phaedo’s theory of Forms as causes has clearly the epistemologic function of the Forms as its purpose. Forms are the only things that can be the aitia of things (101c2-6) but the problem is that to take Forms as explanation may be misleading because one thing can share in opposite Forms (102b3-6). Referring to the Forms, therefore, cannot necessarily result in the explanation of things because everything can share many Forms and it cannot be meaningful to say something is so and so because it shares a Form and it is such and such because it shares another Form, the opposite to the first one. Things might happen to have (τυγχάνει ἔχει) some characters that are not due to their own nature (102c1-4). It is only tallness that has tallness as its nature as it is only shortness that has shortness as its nature (102d6-8). The opposites themselves (and not what have them by accident) cannot accept each other while they are themselves. This gets to a crucial point: only what that shares in a Form by its nature, refuses its opposite while it is itself. It means we can explain a thing by not only a Form but also what always has its character (103e2-5). Everything that shares in a Form by nature is always called with that Form and can never be called by the opposite: It cannot ‘admit that Form which is opposite to that which it is’ (104b9-10). This helps him to reach to some kind of necessary opposition between things that are not the opposites (105a6-b1) which enables him to extend his previous safe and foolish theory of explanation by Forms to another another not foolish but still safe theory of explanation (105b6-c6). Socrates’ effort to show how Forms, without themselves being the explanation, can help us to reach to a safe explanation of things is against Parmenides’ problem (133c-134a) that Forms cannot help to the knowledge of particulars.

Objection VII: Problem of considering Parmenides’ objections as invalid

Parmenides’ objections against the theory of Forms can be considered either as serious and fatal or as invalid.50 Let us see the problem of the latter first. Based on this alternative, while Plato might have been aware of the fact that his theory had some
problems, all or the majority of Parmenides’ problems were fallacious and thus unable to damage the theory. As, for example, Cornford says, ‘it is naïve to conclude that Plato himself regarded the objections as seriously damaging his theory’ (1939, 95). Referring to Republic 596a, 597c and Timaeus 31a, he asserts that since both of the dialogues are later than Parmenides and the Forms are posited in both of them, Plato undoubtedly did not believe TM as destructive of his theory (1944, 294-5). Referring repeatedly to Philebus 15b-c as restatement of the dilemma of participation in Parmenides, Allen concludes that at least one of the criticisms is not to be regarded as valid (1997, 106).

Thinking that though the arguments raise serious problems, they are not fatal (1989, 184), Dorter brings some reasons for his opinion (ibid, 199-200). As Dorter himself objects, if Plato did not consider the arguments fatal, why did he change his way of treating with the theory and even put aside his favorite personage, Socrates, in the dialogues which, based on SCD, immediately follow Parmenides, namely Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus? In these dialogues, as Dorter points out, Plato seems to be ‘exploring alternatives’ for his theory (ibid). Robinson (1950, 5) notes that the general empiricist and even subjective atmosphere of Theaetetus’ tone in the absence of the religious tone to which we have been accustomed in the middle period dialogues, is ‘unfavorable’ to the theory of Forms. Cornford (1935, 28) believes that ‘Forms are excluded in order that we may see how we can get on without them… [that] without them there is no knowledge’.

Moreover, not taking the problems as valid, Plato’s odd way of speaking about the friends of the Forms at Sophist 246b-d f. cannot easily be understood. Most importantly, if the problems were not valid, what on the world Plato meant by them? If they are to be considered as invalid, why should Plato choose Parmenides, the most respected figure to present it? Why at Theaetetus 183e and Sophist 217d, as Allen notes (1997, 107), he is praised for the noble depth he displayed and the magnificence of the arguments he employed on the occasion?

Objection VIII: Problems of taking Parmenides’ objections as valid

There are, on the other hand, some commentators like Ryle (1939, 129-130) who think that the arguments of Parmenides against the theory of Forms must be taken as serious and valid. Based on this view, Plato who might have been aware of the difficulties from the beginning manifested these problems in Parmenides and changed his direction from the middle period dialogues, which were based on the theory of Forms to the late period dialogues Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus, obviously far from the previous predominance of the theory. This interpretation does not necessarily imply that Parmenides’ objections are correct objections, but that Plato took all or some of them as valid and thus became somehow disappointed with his theory of Forms as the dialogues after Parmenides show. If we agree with this interpretation and accept its general conclusion, as Runciman (1959, 151) does, the following problems will rise.
1. The first problem is that the theory of Forms is seen, as Dorter notes, 'still intact' (1989, 183) in some of the later dialogues like *Timaeus* and *Philebus* which in SCD are generally taken as post-*Parmenides* dialogues. Burnet (1928, 44) claims that except 'in a single sentence of the *Timaeus*', 'there is no other words about the "forms" in any dialogue of later date than the *Parmenides*'. Reminding that the text in *Timaeus* (51c) is 'a long and emphatic paragraph' instead of a sentence, Cherniss (1962, 5) asserts that even this single text would be an exception 'important enough' to invalidate the general negation of the theory after *Parmenides*. He also points to *Laws, Philebus* and two of the *Epistles* where the theory appears.

If Plato did revise his theory of Forms, how could he restate the theory in the dialogues after *Parmenides? Timaeus* and *Philebus* cannot consistently be dated after *Parmenides* if we regard the objections valid. I think this was one of the main reasons for Owen who tried to change what Cherniss later called an opinion 'as old as Plutarch' (1998, 273) namely the opinion that *Timaeus* was one of Plato’s latest works. Owen thinks that *Parmenides* must be read 'as following and not as paving the way for the *Timaeus'* (1998, 251).

Though I might agree up to a point with Owen that 1) *Timaeus* must be regarded as the 'crowning work not of the later dialogues but of the *Republic* group' (1998, 253); 2) it represents the culmination of a period of growing confidence (ibid, 266); and hence 3) must be posited at the end of the *Republic* group. I am not to accompany him in his final conclusion that *Timaeus* antecedesates *Parmenides*. What Owen’s survey shows is, most of all, that SCD’s arrangement is problematic about the position of *Parmenides* in between two groups of the middle period and the late period dialogues. It implies the fact that we cannot put *Parmenides* unproblematically between *Republic* and *Timaeus*.

2. The second problem with considering *Parmenides' arguments valid is that Aristotole (and even the Academy) read Plato as if he has not criticized his own theory of Forms. That Aristotle’s first years in Academy must have been passed as a faithful adherent of the theory of Forms or, as Cornford says, under 'overwhelming influence of his master' (1939, 109) is something we can be sure about. His numerous critiques of the theory in his works, some of which were not directed only against Plato but to the Academy also, shows, on the other hand, that there is some problem with dating *Parmenides* as later than *Republic* and still taking its critiques valid. If we accept the general opinion about the date of Aristotle’s joining, i.e., 366 or 367, we should agree that at least until some years in which Aristotle became able to write his first works, Plato and Academy were still supporting the theory. Based on SCD, Plato must have published *Parmenides* before Aristotle’s joining or at least before his first writings. The problem is that we cannot admit that *Parmenides’ arguments were written as valid arguments in these years that must reasonably be considered as Plato’s faithful years to the theory.

The emergence of Plato’s theories in Aristotle has always been a matter of confusion. Just as some of the doctrines Aristotle ascribes to Plato cannot be found in
Plato’s works (e.g., the relation of Forms and numbers or the theory of great and small), Aristotle’s way of criticizing the theory of Forms is such that it seems none of the difficulties were mentioned by Plato himself, while some of Aristotle’s objections are drawn out in *Parmenides*. Not only does Aristotle neglect *Parmenides* neither mentioning nor referring to Plato’s self-criticism, but he does not consider any development or change in Plato’s philosophical life.

**Notes**

1. Plato first became familiar with Heraclitean doctrine of flux and the impossibility of knowledge of changing things, Aristotle says, and had the same idea in his later years (*Met.* 987a32-b1). Aristotle’s way of treating with the theory of Forms can be a good evidence for this. He thinks, it seems to me, that all the reasons Plato provides for his theory must be considered as coexistent efforts alongside each other, none of them substituting the other. Even when he criticizes the theory of Forms as paradigms which, I think, has the echo of implying its being a later solution (*τὸ δὲλέγεινπαραδείγματααὐτὴνεἶναι...* *Met.* 991a20-22), he does not take the change serious.

2. It is an irresistible tendency even in modern chronologists. Cf. e.g. Thesleff, 1989, 11 about *Republic*.

3. The abbreviations for the dialogues are so: *Apology* (Ap.), *Charmides* (Ch.), *Clitophon* (Clit.), *Cratylos* (Cra.), *Critias* (Cri.), *Criton* (Cr.), *Epinomis* (Epi.), *Epistles* (Eps.), *Euthydemus* (Euthd.), *Euthypophon* (Euthp.), *Gorgias* (Grg.), *Hippias Major* (H. Ma.), *Hippias Minor* (H. Mi.), *Laches* (Lach.), *Laws* (La.), *Lysis* (Ly.), *Menexenus* (Mene.), *Parmenides* (Par.), *Phaedrus* (Phd.), *Philebus* (Phil.), *Politics* (Pol.), *Protagoras* (Pr.), *Republic* (Rep.), *Symposium* (Sym.), *Theaetetus* (Tht.), *Timaeus* (Tim.)

4. Mackay (1928) points to the danger of taking threefold division of the dialogues as a warranted chronological order.

5. Regarding the label ‘standard’, as Irwin notes (2008, 77), it is a description of the new trend of arranging Plato’s dialogues used mostly by the scholars who want to criticize or reject it. Irwin, however, defends it.

6. Maybe we have to neglect Campbell as the only exception.

7. Also Epistle 13

8. Here I use both the words content-based and philosophic as the same and as distinct from stylometric chronologies.

9. Among *Epistles* Ledger mentions only Epistles seven, three and eight as late.

10. Comparing with my SCD, Debra Nail’s (1998, cf. the table at p.173) endeavor to measure each of the style-based, Philosophy-based and content-based separately and to bring forth their uncontroversial results seems too stern. There are, in her conclusion, only three uncontroversial dialogues: *Apology* as early, *Phaedrus* and *Republic II*-X as middle. The reason for this conclusion is that she brings Thesleff’s arrangement in his comparison (cf. the table at p.169) and also Leskey’s as a philosophical chronology. Though Leskey’s chronology has much in common with both stylistic and content-based chronologies, when she combines it with that of Thesleff, the outcome of the comparison of philosophical chronologies become completely different and, thus, does not present notable similarities between all kinds of chronologies. If, therefore, we exclude Thesleff’s and compare Lesky’s with other chronologies, the similarities will show up. Another reason for the difference between my similarities with that of Nail is that whereas she takes the classifications too strict, I try to pay more attention to the arrangements and
not to the fixed boundaries of different groups. In my attitude, then, if, for example, *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* are considered as the latest of the middle period in a chronology and as the earliest of the late period in another one, we took them as similar because this classification does not affect the arrangement. Consequently, the result of our categorizing is more about the place of some dialogues than the similarities between different groupings.

11 Brandwood (1990, 249f.) distinguishes between 'earlier' stylistic development which was slow and gradual and a 'later' which was sudden and rapid happening when Plato was about sixty.

12 In doing this, I was benefited so much from Brandwood’s (1990 and 1992) tables and comparisons. Also cf. Dorter’s table (1994, 7).

13 That stylometric evidences are not sufficient to decide about chronology was noticed by many scholars. Cf., e.g., Cooper, 1997, xii f.; Kahn, 1966, 44-5; Young, 1998, 39; Arieti, 1998, 274.

14 Cooper (1997, xiv) says: 'It is safe to recognize only the group of six late dialogues’

15 The anomalous style of the *Parmenides* was so unconceivable in SCD’s framework that made Ritter to doubt its authenticity.

16 By *Parmenides II* I mean the second part of Parmenides including the part from 137 to the end of the dialogue where Parmenides’ One is discussed.

17 Rickless (2007, 245) thinks that it is 'of a shock' and 'of a puzzle' to see *Theaetetus*’ three epistemic theories which, in his point of view, are all incompatible with two worlds theory. That Plato gives these theories at 'the time of day in the *Theaetetus* and does not simply dismiss them' is the cause of puzzle for him.

18 Robinson (1950, 3-4) mentions Léon Robin (1939) notes that the only one who was claiming the existence of some evidences of the theory in *Theaetetus*, appealing to, for instance, 185c-d, 186b-c or 197e, was whose references he calls 'certainly wrong'. Kahn (2006, 127) thinks that some 'echoes or analogues' to anamnesis can be recognized in *Theaetetus* though he accepts that it 'makes no use of' the theory (p. 129).

19 Tarrant thinks that *Meno* ‘allegedly supplies the answer to the question posed by the *Theaetetus*’ (2000, 37).

20 Wolfsdorf’s suggestion (2014, 161-162) that *Theaetetus* supersedes *Meno* because while the latter does not intend to consider the 'epistemological status of the aetiological account itself', the former criticizes 'decompositional and differential accounts on epistemological grounds', seems at least convincing.

21 Nicholas P. White (1976, 157-8), for example, thinks that the epistemological question of *Theaetetus*, namely that what knowledge is, had occupied Plato since the beginning of his career, but it was only in 'muted form' in the middle dialogues.

22 I think it can be one of the reasons why the modern thinkers of 20th century were more inclined to accept *Theaetetus* as a late dialogue.

23 SCD’s problem about the place of *Cratylus* is somehow related with its problem about *Theaetetus* (cf. Runciman, 1962, 2). While *Cratylus* looks close to the early dialogues, it has some unignorable similarities to *Theaetetus*, which is considered by SCD far from the early and after the middle period dialogues.

24 Owen thinks that there is no evidence that any part of the *Laws* was written after every dialogue (1998, 277, n.76).


26 Dorter claims that Plato recognized all these problems at the beginning but did not felt that they could vitiate his theory (1989, 200).

27 Guthrie (1975, 347) thinks that this dialogue must have happened about the year 450 B.C. Allen (1997, 72) dates it between 452 and 449 B.C., if ever happened. He notes (p.74), however, that the conversation reported in *Parmenides* is fiction.
Palmer notes that Parmenides’ young Socrates resembles the person described at Republic VII 534b-3-4, someone who is ‘unable to give an account of something, either to himself or to another’, cannot be acceptable.

Though maybe not about the names, the classification of the problems to these six problems is something almost agreed. Cf., e.g. Gill 2006

What is said at Sophist 254c-3, ‘Let’s not talk about all Forms. That way we won’t be thrown off by dealing with too many of them. Instead, let’s choose some of the most important (μεγίστον) ones’, might be observed as a try to avoid this problem.

Moreover, Aristotle points in several places that based on the arguments from the existence of sciences, there must be Forms at least for all things of which there are sciences (e.g. Metaphysics 990b12-14, 990b24-27, 1079a7-9) and thus even for non substances (cf. 990b22-24, 1079a19-21) which might have the same echo.

Because of the date of Parmenides in SCD, Allen’s suggestion (1997, 167ff.) that the theory of Forms as thoughts is the rejection of Aristotle’s answer is not compatible with SCD’s arrangement.

Although he lists Ly. 217d, Pr. 330c-d and H. Ma. besides middle dialogues as places where SP is implied (1954, 388), he indicates that Plato never asserted it in his writing because if he ever did, Aristotle would have known it (1954, 339).

What Cherniss says about the difference of being ζῶον in a Form and its participants in the Republic and Timaeus is noteworthy: ‘In the language of the Republic they would have the idea but would not be ὀ ἐστι ζῶον’ (1944, 296). He also refers to Timaeus 39e and 30c5-8 where the difference between having ζῶον and being ζῶον is persisted upon.

Owen (1998, 255) strongly disagrees with Cherniss on this point. Conford thinks that Plato’s statement at Republic 597c that the divine creator made only one ‘Bed’ might refute TM because 'the Form and the individual beds are not entities of the same order and alike. The Form, Bed, is not a bed; and it is not true that it has the character in the same way that individual beds have it' (1939, 90). By comparing Republic 597c with Timaeus 31a, Cornford concludes, as we said about Cherniss, that Plato could not be blind that Parmenides’ assumption that Largeness is a large thing is fatal (ibid). Cherniss names Taylor as the only one who denied that the passage in Timaeus (31a) could be a reference to the "regress argument" (1944, 295-6).

Allen argues that to say that F-ness is F is nothing but saying an identity statement. He concludes that ‘Plato’s apparently self-predictive language’ does not result in SP (1998, 59). His reason is that, firstly, to say "F-ness is F" is not a predicative statement and, secondly, "... is F" function does not mean the same about the Form and its particulars.

Thinking that there is a ‘partial or relative’ identification of universals and paradigms, Gerson (1998, 138) criticizes their complete distinction.

White believes that it is not plausible to suppose that Plato who was aware of the implications of the original-copy theory of predication for the TM problem, hesitated to spell out its relevances (1977, 208). White’s suggestion, I think, cannot be admitted about a philosopher like Plato who even did not speak about his main theory, i.e. theory of Forms, as a theory.

He also rejects the suggestion that Plato’s notion of primary and secondary derivative designates of Forms in Phaedo could entail that the Forms are not subjects of SP (1977, 208-9).

Allen (1997, 106) mentions Phaedo 74b-75d as an evidence for the theory of paradigm in this dialogue. About Republic Von which White insists, I am not convinced since I think there are not enough about the case in this book that approves White’s suggestion. White brings the use of μετέχειν or κοινωνία or the use of παράγματα and μετέχοντα as evidence (1977, 201-2) which, I think, prove nothing.

We know that Aristotle (Metaphysics 991a20-22) does not accept such a change and takes it only as poetical metaphors that change nothing.
Gosling (1962, 27-8) warns out the danger of such relying on terminology and passing from the similarity of terminology to the similarity of problems.

Bluck’s point about *Parmenides* is worth noting:

> Plato means us to infer from the *Parmenides* that the positing of a further Form is not necessary. All that is necessary is that there should be one Form to be the 'standard' even if we happen to be treating that Form as (qua an X) a member of the group of X things. (1957, 124)

Annas mentions *Phaedo* 74e (besides *Republic*, *Euthyphro* and *Theaetetus* (176e ?)) as one of the places in which Forms are considered as paradigms (1974, 278, n.50). Although it might be close to paradigm-based understanding of Forms, I am not certain about taking it so. That Form is something that participants want to be like (βούλεται ... εἶναι οἶον) but fall short, cannot necessarily mean that the Form is a paradigm here. Though the relation of Forms and participants in *Phaedo* might be directed towards what it will be in *Republic*, I do not think that we are allowed to assume them the same. About the mention of paradigm in *Euthyphro* 6e the best suggestion is, I think, that it is not, as Fujisawa (1974, 43) says, 'a case of genuine paradigmatism we find in later dialogues'.

Listing the anamnesis in *Meno*, the method of hypothesis in *Phaedo* and the non hypothetical principle in *Republic* as three answers to the question of the knowledge of the Forms, Sayre reasonably thinks that the first one is the simplest. (2005, 299)

It would appear to be a highly unlikely view of Plato’s development to hold that he accepted an answer, and only later found a question to fit it' (1959,172).

Allen (1959, 168) calls the filling of the gap the 'core' of *Phaedo’s* argument for the theory of anamnesis at 74b ff. (1959, 168).

It is the big presupposition of many Plato’s commentators that he must have tried to diminish or eliminate the chôrismôs had he wanted to resolve the epistemological problem of *Parmenides*. Based on this presumption, Plato should have chosen the first and most simple way of solving problem. So we can see while the theory of anamnesis is so much obviously directed to the epistemological problem, no one tends to take it as post*Parmenides* thesis.

Rickless’ opposite viewpoint about the theory of hypothesis seems to me an oversimplified view.

He thinks that the method of hypothesis in the middle period is 'perhaps' because of Plato’s all negative method in the early period dialogues and Plato wants to 'repair' this defect of those dialogues (2007, 11).

Believing that the disjunction 'valid or invalid' is unsatisfactory in its consequences, Allen (1997, 108) thinks that the criticism are put as aporiai which 'must be faced and thought through if philosophy is to be pursued'. He mentions *Parmenides* 129e, 130b, c and 135e as evidence where the criticisms are referred as aporiai and not as refutations. I actually agree that they must be taken as aporiai but I think that aporiai in any sense of the term in Plato and even Aristotle, as is used in the Book Beta of his *Metaphysics*, are serious problems that must be resolved and, thus, will be fatal if not solved.

This can be tenable only if we observe no difference between the situation of the two dialogues as SCD maintains. A problem can be fatal in one and resolvable in another dialogue if they do not belong to the same period and, thus, there be the possibility of a later resolution.

Dorter (1994, 4) mentions 15b, 58a, 61d-62a, 64a as passages in *Philebus* that 'recapitulate earlier dialogues’ assertions about the theory of forms'.

One might say that what is said in our last section namely that *Parmenides’* objections are resolved in the middle period dialogues must be applicable to *Timaeus* and *Philebus*. Though this is not wrong to say that the problems are already resolved in these dialogues, the difficulty is that they do not have anything to do with the solutions. Neither the original-copy model nor theories like anamnesis, hypothesis and the distinction of knowledge and true belief are initiated in and belong to them.
I say 'to a point' because the place Owen considers for *Timaeus* I give to *Republic* but I think, however, that Owen is right in that *Timaeus* is more similar to *Republic*.

Though the sustained fragments from *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus* approve Plato’s influence on Aristotle, they have no sign of Aristotle’s approval of the theory of Forms having nothing against it too (cf. De Vogel, 1965, 261-298; Lloyd, 1968, 28–41). These works could not, however, belong to Aristotle’s first years in Academy though not impossible to belong to the period before Plato’s death.


This date is the best consistent date with the famous story that Aristotle was Plato’s pupil for 20 years. The Academy must then have been founded before 367. Ryle (1966, 8) thinks that its date must be before 369 when *Theaetetus*, one of its teachers, perished.

Kahn (1996, 81) thinks that it 'probably' must have 'recently' been completed before Aristotle arrived. In his suggestion, amongst the dialogues that have Socrates as their main speaker, only the *Philebus* was composed after his arrival. (ibid)

Some of the resemblances are not deniable: e.g., the problem of Third Man at *Par.* 132a-b and at *Met.* 990b15-17, 991a1-8, the problem of complete distinction of knowledge of Forms with that of sensible things at *Par.* 134c and *Met.* 991a9-19, the problem of third pattern at *Par.* 132d with the problem of several patterns at *Met.* 991a26-29, 1079b33-1080a2. Cherniss (1944, 9) points to the resemblance of *Topics* 113a24-32 and *Par.* 132b-c.

**Works Cited**


Barker, Ernest, 1918, *Greek Political Theory, Plato and his Predecessors*, Routledge University Press

Bluck, R. S., 1957, *Forms as Standard*, Phronesis, V. 2, N. 2, pp. 115-127


Burnet, Jhon, 1928, *Platonism*, University of California Press


--------, 1962, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, University of California Press, reissued by Russel&Russel


Fujisawa, Norio, 1974, *Ἐχεῖν, Μετέχειν, and idioms of 'Paradigmatism' in Plato*, Phronesis, V. 19, N. 1, pp. 30-58


Lutoslawski, Wincenty, 1897, *The Origin and Growth of Plato’s Logic*, George OlmsVerlag


Sayre, Kenneth M., 2005, *Plato’s Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved*, Parmenides Publishing
Sedley, David, 1996, *Three Platonist Interpretations of the Theaetetus*, in: Gill Christopher and MacCabe, Mary Margaret (eds.), Form and Argument in Late Plato, Oxford, pp. 79-104
---------, 2006, *Form-Particular Resemblance in Plato’s Phaedo*, Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held in Senate House, University of London
White, Nicholas P., 1976, *Plato on Knowledge and Reality*, Hackett Publishing Company