Hermeneutical Justice for Extremists?

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Abstract

When we encounter extremist rhetoric, we often find it dumbfounding, incredible, or straightforwardly unintelligible. For this reason, it can be tempting to dismiss or ignore it, at least where it is safe to do so. The problem discussed in this paper is that such dismissals may be, at least in certain circumstances, epistemically unjust. Specifically, it appears that recent work on the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice compels us to accept two unpalatable conclusions: first, that this failure of intelligibility when we encounter extremist rhetoric may be a manifestation of a hermeneutical injustice; and second, that remedying this injustice requires that we ought to become more engaged with and receptive of extremist worldviews. Whilst some theorists might interpret this as a reductio of this framework of epistemic in/justice, we push back against this conclusion. First, we argue that with a suitably amended conception of hermeneutical justice – one that is sensitive to the contextual nature of our hermeneutical responsibilities, and to the difference between understanding a worldview and accepting it – we can bite the bullet and accept that certain extremists are subject to hermeneutical injustice, but without committing ourselves to any unpalatable conclusions about how we ought to remedy

¹ Both authors contributed equally; the order is arbitrary.
these injustices. Second, we argue that bringing the framework of hermeneutical in/justice to bear upon the experience of certain extremists actually provides a new and useful perspective on one of the causes of extremism, and how it might be undermined.

**Keywords:** hermeneutical justice; epistemic injustice; extremism

‘I do not understand. Merry, I do not understand. How did you get from Lyndon Johnson to this? How do you get from point A to point Z, where there is no point of contact *at all*? Merry, it does not hang together.’

‘There is a point of contact. I assure you there is. It all hangs together. You just don’t see it.’

‘Do you?’

‘Yes.’

‘Tell it to me then. I want you to tell it to me so that I can understand what has happened to you.’

‘There is a logic, Daddy. You mustn’t raise your voice. I will explain. It all links up…’

[…]

[I]ntelligence was what he was hearing. Merry’s quick, sharp, studious brain, the logical mind she’d had since earliest childhood…. The intelligence was intact and yet she was mad, her logic a brand of logic bereft totally of the power to reason with which it had already entwined itself by the time she was ten. It was absurd – this being reasonable with her was *his* madness. Sitting there trying to act as though he were respectful of her religion when her religion consisted of an absolute failure to understand what life is and is not.

(Roth, 1997, pp. 245–247)

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2 Thanks to Quassim Cassam for sharing a draft of his recent book on extremism (Cassam, 2022), which inspired our use of this passage from *American Pastoral.*
1. Introduction

Encounters with fanatical or extremist rhetoric can be unnerving or disorienting at multiple levels. Most viscerally, these encounters often have a marked affective impact: the violent or otherwise morally repugnant content of extremist worldviews are apt to leave one feeling upset, angry, or afraid. Equally, though, there can also be something epistemically unsettling about such encounters. Consider our epigraph, from the Philip Roth novel American Pastoral, where Seymour Levov is struggling to make sense of his daughter Merry’s extremist commitments – first to a campaign of political terrorism, and then to a life of ultra-pacifism and ascetic withdrawal. Seymour, with his small-town sensibilities and all-American wholesomeness, is left dizzied by a worldview that could endorse either of these extremities, let alone maintain a connection between them. For all of Merry’s patient attempts at explanation, he is left feeling that she must be ‘mad’, her ways of thinking ‘bereft totally of the power to reason’, and any attempt to reason with her ultimately ‘absurd’.

This interaction between the Levovs is, of course, fictional, but the dynamic it portrays – of an uninitiated who is convinced that an extremist’s worldview is not only morally depraved, but also nonsensical or absurd – is a recognisable one. It is one attested to by Julia Ebner, a researcher and journalist who, after going undercover at a neo-Nazi music festival, reports that the experience left her feeling like one of the few people there who wasn’t ‘completely mad’:

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3 For the purposes of this paper, we take such content – violent, morally repugnant, radically outside the mainstream – to be among the defining features of extremist worldviews. This usage of the label ‘extremist’, whilst perhaps intuitive, elides some important debates, and we do not wish to commit ourselves to the claim that extremism is either necessarily abominable or necessarily fringe. We are therefore open to the possibility that our focus here is really on a subset of extremist views, though as we shall see, it is this subset that raises difficulties for theorists of epistemic justice.
I have never found it more difficult to pretend to belong to a group of people than in the festival grounds of Ostritz. Meeting neo-Nazis in real life did not bring me any closer to their reality… I find it hard to connect with them on a human level, to look past their ignorance towards their own history or to have even the slightest understanding of their ways of perceiving the world. (Ebner, 2020, pp. 205, 207)

This sense of unintelligibility and otherness, criminologist Nigel Fielding remarks, is common amongst researchers of the far right. ‘Reading the American literature on the extreme Right’, he notes, ‘it is impossible not to acknowledge the tone of universal disapproval. The conviction prevails that there is something “weird” or “alien” about the extremist’ (Fielding, 1981, p. 15).

But should the unintelligibility of extremist views concern us? It certainly concerned Seymour Levov, who made a desperate – albeit doomed – attempt to understand Merry’s motivations and ideology. Clearly, though, not all of us have his personal incentive. In fact, given the moral harms encouraged by many extremists, most of us are more likely to use their apparent incoherence as an excuse to ignore them where possible, or as a basis on which to condemn, dismiss, or lampoon them where not. Indeed, sociologist Katherine Blee has suggested that an attitude of dismissive incomprehension partially explains the relative scarcity of ethnographic research on far-right groups, observing that ‘[f]ew scholars want to invest the considerable time or to establish the rapport necessary for close-up studies of those they regard as inexplicable and repugnant, in addition to dangerous and difficult’ (Blee, 2007, pp. 121–122).

This reluctance to engage with extremist ideologies is surely understandable, but it has its costs. One is simply that if we do not understand the logic internal to an extremist view (such as it is), then we may hamper our ability to effectively challenge it – to protect those who are the target of the extremist’s ire, to stop the spread of extremist ideology, and perhaps even to win over the extremists themselves. It was with such intentions that Ebner spent time undercover, immersed in various extremist groups: she wanted to ‘comprehend what is causing the havoc
around us’, in the hope that she would be able to ‘help others protect themselves from being radicalised, manipulated, or intimidated by extremists’ (2020, 2, 6). This motivation for engaging with extremists is an important one, and it is something that we shall touch upon towards the end of this paper. For the most part, however, our aim here is to explore a quite different set of reasons for engaging with at least some extremist views. These are reasons not of prudence, but of epistemic justice.

Thanks to work by feminist and social epistemologists, there is now widespread philosophical acknowledgment that members of certain social groups can face a distinctive form of epistemic injustice – what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls a hermeneutical injustice – when they are prevented from making aspects of their lived experience intelligible, either to themselves or to others. This has proved a powerful insight, which has been applied productively to the experiences of women (Fricker, 2007; Jenkins, 2016; Jackson, 2018), people of colour (Dotson, 2012; Medina, 2013; Anderson, 2017a), people with illnesses or disabilities (Barnes, 2016; Carel and Kidd, 2018; Peña-Guzmán and Reynolds, 2019), and many other groups on the receiving end of society’s injustices. Recently, though, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2016) has argued that the framework typically used to diagnose experiences of hermeneutical injustice also appears to capture at least some of the communicative difficulties faced by adherents of extremist views. That is to say, if we accept this familiar account of hermeneutical injustice, then

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4 Although this label is Fricker’s, epistemological attention to the phenomenon she discusses arguably predates her work (see Dotson, 2012 for discussion). We engage primarily with Fricker because the issue at the heart of this paper – that extremists could face similar injustices – appears in the context of her theoretical framework.

5 For a comprehensive overview of recent work on epistemic injustice, including many detailed case studies, see the essays in Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus, Jr., eds. (2017).
it appears that we must also accept that members of certain extremist groups experience such an injustice when they find themselves unable to make their views communicatively intelligible to the rest of society.

This is an unpalatable result. Things get worse when we acknowledge that if extremists are victims of an epistemic injustice, then epistemic justice would require that we rectify this state of affairs. If we accept Fricker’s picture, then this might seem to require that we make a proactive effort to engage with and take seriously extremist worldviews, with the aim that society at large becomes more accepting of their interpretations of their own experiences. At this point, the pill goes from unpalatable to poisonous. If a theory requires that we all become more engaged with and accepting of extremist views, then we might well conclude, with Romdenh-Romluc (2016, pp. 606, 609), that this theory ought to be rejected.

We believe that the communicative difficulties experienced by members of certain extremist groups likely do meet the conditions of hermeneutical injustice. We make this case in the first half of the paper, where we first provide a framework for understanding a particular kind of hermeneutical injustice – communicative hermeneutical injustice (§2) – and then apply this to examples of various extremist groups (§3). But, our main aim in this paper is to show that this possibility is less concerning than it might initially appear – and in fact, that it actually offers some valuable insights regarding both hermeneutical justice and extremism. First, we argue that the force of this apparent reductio arises only from a particular – and misleading – understanding of the demands of hermeneutical justice (§4). We offer a correction to this picture, one which is sensitive both to the different ways in which hermeneutical injustices might be overcome, and to the highly contextual nature of our ethical-epistemic obligations (§5). We then conclude by suggesting that bringing the framework of hermeneutical in/justice to bear upon cases like these
actually offers a helpful perspective for thinking about extremism, one that might help us better understand how it takes root, and how it might be undermined (§6).

2. Hermeneutical Injustice

When interpreting our social experiences, or those of another, we employ a variety of hermeneutical resources. These include cognitive tools – such as concepts, conceptions, background knowledge, or assumptions – and expressive tools – such as a language or dialect, individual words and phrases, or manners of speaking or registers. When a social group has been unfairly excluded from or sidelined within the social processes by which society generates and shares these hermeneutical resources on a wide scale, that group suffers what Fricker calls hermeneutical marginalisation (Fricker, 2007). For example, women, people of colour, people with disabilities, LGBTQ+ folks, and other oppressed groups are often unfairly underrepresented within the professions and institutions that determine which experiences are widely discussed and understood in society, such as news and entertainment media, politics, law, or academia. This marginalisation can lead to gaps in the widely-shared hermeneutical resources that pertain to distinctive areas of their social experience, gaps that cause these experiences to be ill-understood across multiple social locations. When the subject’s hermeneutical marginalisation leads to a breakdown in understanding of their experience in this way, the subject suffers a hermeneutical injustice, ‘the injustice of having some significant area of one's social experience

\[\text{\textsuperscript{6}}\text{Fricker also identifies the possibility that individuals could be hermeneutically marginalised, independently of their social identities, typically in one-off instances. For ease of exposition we set aside such cases here, though note that this possibility opens the door for hermeneutical injustice to impact a broader range of people – and thus, a broader range of extremists.}\]
A hermeneutical injustice is a kind of epistemic injustice, a class of wrongs done to someone in their capacity as a knower.

Trystan Goetze (2018) expands on two ways in which this unjust breakdown in understanding might occur. Firstly, the subject might be prevented from understanding their own experience, because they lack the very hermeneutical resources that they need to do so. For example, because LGBTQ+ people are hermeneutically marginalised, the concepts and terms needed to make adequate sense of their distinctive experiences have historically not been widely shared. Because of these widespread gaps, a genderqueer person, for instance, might struggle to understand their own experience as someone with a non-binary gender identity because they have never heard of the possibility of gender identities other than man or woman. These cognitive hermeneutical injustices are harmful because they prevent the subject from achieving knowledge of their own important experiences.

Secondly, the subject’s experience might be obscured from collective understanding at the communicative level. In these instances, whilst the subject of an experience might themselves understand full well that experience’s nature and significance, they are unable to convey that understanding to some important other, because that other lacks the hermeneutical resources employed by the speaker. Luvell Anderson calls these communicative breakdowns in understanding hermeneutical impasses (Anderson, 2017b). Sometimes, hermeneutical impasses are politically and ethically innocent. There is probably nothing unjust about the interpretative

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7 They might, of course, arrive at their own understanding through these difficulties. As José Medina reminds us, with particular reference to LGBTQ+ people, the invention of a standard label for an experience is often ‘a late chapter in that struggle’ (Medina, 2013, pp. 99–100). We return to these processes of hermeneutical resource generation within marginalized groups, a process Goetze (2018) calls hermeneutical dissent, in §6.
breakdown that occurs when someone without a philosophical education misinterprets a reference to David Lewis’s concept of possible worlds, or when someone who has never seen *The Golden Girls* fails to understand what their friend means when they say they are ‘such a Blanche’. But when these gaps become widespread, it is often a consequence of hermeneutical marginalisation.

For example, while concepts and labels for non-binary gender identities are in common circulation in LGBTQ+ communities, due to those social groups’ hermeneutical marginalisation those hermeneutical resources are still not collectively available in many societies. Thus, when a genderqueer person attempts to communicate with others about their experience as a person with a non-binary gender identity, they may encounter a hermeneutical impasse. Such *communicative hermeneutical injustices* are harmful because they impair the subject’s ability to share their knowledge about experiences which are important to them.

Given that our main focus in this paper is the communicative difficulties we encounter when trying to interpret extremist speech, it is the possibility that extremists could suffer *communicative* hermeneutical injustices that will occupy most of our attention. We return to consider the possibility that extremists might also suffer cognitive hermeneutical injustices in §6.

### 3. Marginalised Extremists

Based on the above, we can say that a communicative hermeneutical injustice has two central conditions:

1. The subject’s attempt to communicate about one of their distinctive social experiences ends in a hermeneutical impasse; and,
2. The gap in shared hermeneutical resources that produces the hermeneutical impasse is an effect of the subject’s hermeneutical marginalisation.

In order for the worry about extremists as victims of hermeneutical injustice to take root, it therefore needs to be established that members of extremist groups sometimes satisfy these conditions. In this section, we examine how these conditions apply to several extremist groups, concluding that there is no non-arbitrary way to rule out the possibility that an extremist might suffer hermeneutical injustice with regard to their views. It is important to acknowledge the limited scope of this claim – as we shall explain, our claim is not that all, most, or even many extremists routinely suffer hermeneutical injustices – but the mere fact that it holds for some extremists is enough to cause concern.

The first thing to note is that not every communicative dysfunction indicates a hermeneutical impasse. As Anderson (2017b) argues, the defining feature of a hermeneutical impasse is a break in understanding. Hermeneutical impasses arise, at least minimally, when a listener fails to understand the meaning of a speaker’s utterance, on account of some mismatch in hermeneutical resources. And, importantly, not all disagreements with extremists take this form. Take, for example, an encounter with someone who expresses a bald statement of racist dogma, ascribing different levels of intelligence to different racial groups on account of supposedly immutable racial predispositions. Such utterances unsettle, upset, and perhaps even confuse us, but not because of any mystery about the speaker’s meaning or intentions. There is no failure of understanding here, no hermeneutical resources we are missing that would bring their worldview into clearer focus. If our communication with such groups breaks down it will be because their views are morally abhorrent and based upon demonstrable falsehoods, not because they are unintelligible. Thus, the first condition of hermeneutical injustice is not met.
This is not the case with all extremists. Consider, for example, the various communities that compose the ‘manosphere’, a disparate and sometimes overlapping collection of groups operating primarily through websites, blogs, and forums, and characterised by extreme misogyny, an opposition to feminism and modern gender roles, and links with alt-right ideology (SPLC, 2020). In addition to this general worldview, many of these groups have developed their own distinctive vernaculars and vocabularies – that is to say, they have developed their own hermeneutical resources. One notorious example is the community of ‘involuntary celibates’ (incels), a group of men who feel victimised by society – and by women in particular – for their failure to attract sexual partners. Incels have developed an extensive framework of terminology that they deploy to capture and communicate their worldview: men are categorised as ‘Chads’, ‘betas’, or ‘betabuxx’; women as ‘Beckys’ and ‘Stacys’; and incels themselves as, variously, ‘truecels’, ‘wristcels’, ‘mentalcels’, and more (Squirrell, 2018). A ‘normie’, or non-incel, who encounters such discourse – perhaps directly, if they are being accused of belonging to one of these categories by an incel, or else indirectly, by perusing a message board or reading a manifesto – will likely find themselves at a loss to grasp what is being referred to.

Insofar as an incel finds their ability to communicate with others compromised by a mismatch in hermeneutical resources, they experience a hermeneutical impasse. They thus plausibly satisfy the first condition of communicative hermeneutical injustice. What is less clear is whether this impasse can be traced back to prior conditions of hermeneutical marginalisation. Fully adjudicating this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper, but one thing it seems safe to
conclude is that incels are predominantly, if not exclusively, men. Men, of course, can face conditions of hermeneutical marginalisation, typically in virtue of how their gender intersects with other aspects of their identity, and some incels do claim that it is their status as racialised minorities specifically that makes them less attractive to women. Typically, though, when incels claim marginalisation or oppression, they do so in virtue of their identity as men, and at the hands not just of society at large but also of women (or feminists) specifically. Such claims are plainly false. In patriarchal societies like our own, men qua men are not wanting for hermeneutical power.

As such examples illustrate, not all extremists either confront hermeneutical impasses or else experience hermeneutical marginalisation. The worry, however, is that there are some extremists who do meet both of these conditions. Romdenh-Romluc presents the ‘English

\[\text{\textsuperscript{8}}\] This assumption is supported by a discourse analysis of the now banned ‘Incels.me’ forum (Jaki et al., 2019). Note also the rules on the ‘r/Incels’ message board, which has also been shut down: ‘Most can agree that women can be incel in some rare situations such as extreme disfigurement, but their numbers do not come close to male incels’ (qtd. in Solon, 2017). Interestingly, the term involuntairy celibacy was coined by a woman to express her own frustration in searching for sexual and romantic partners; while she thinks there was some value in identifying a community of people with similar experiences, she repudiates what the incel movement has become (Kassam, 2018).

\[\text{\textsuperscript{9}}\] As Squirrell (2018) notes, this observation does in fact ‘come remarkably close to a structural critique of racism and white supremacy’. The underlying reasoning, however, ‘is almost always grounded in the evolutionary psychology of women, rather than socially constructed structures of oppression’.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{10}}\] It might be objected that some incels claim marginalization not simply qua men, but qua ‘unattractive’ or ‘undesirable’ men, and that this subset of men has been marginalized by society. If that’s right, then incels plausibly do experience hermeneutical injustice. But note that this argument relies upon three separate claims: that attractiveness can play a role similar to (for example) racial or gender categories in delineating social groups, that the group of unattractive men have in fact been historically oppressed or marginalized, and that the community of incels is composed wholly or largely of men who are unattractive in the ways that are relevant for this kind of marginalization. Each of these claims raise philosophical and sociological complexities that we cannot examine here, though all three strike us as at least controversial.
Defence League’ (EDL) as one plausible example (Romdenh-Romluc, 2016). The EDL gained national visibility in the UK in the early 2010s, when they staged a series of highly visible protests and demonstrations against what they perceived to be the ‘Islamification’ of England.

Central to the EDL’s worldview, Romdenh-Romluc notes, was a perception of Islam as a pernicious threat to British culture and values, with Islam construed not just as a religion but as a ‘social and political ideology’. Nonetheless, their mission statement also professes a refusal to ‘tolerate the intolerant’, and the view that the ‘demonization of Muslims…adds nothing to this vital debate’. In fact, the EDL took themselves to be standing for human rights: ‘the right of English people to their own country’ (EDL, 2016).\(^\text{11}\)

Needless to say, the majority of the English public disagreed both with the EDL’s interpretation of Islam’s place within British society, and with the EDL’s conception of their own identity. Far from being tolerant and civic-minded, the EDL were viewed as hateful and Islamophobic. Far from a human rights organisation, they were viewed as far-right racists.

Whilst a significant part of this communicative impasse was due to basic factual disagreements – about the impact of immigration on society, or the influence of Islam within the UK, for example – Romdenh-Romluc’s key claim is that there are also differing sets of hermeneutical resources at play. In particular, the EDL took themselves to be making a claim about human rights: namely, the right of racial and ethnic groups (in this case, the white English) to their own country, culture, and institutions, without influence from other cultural groups. This was not understood as a rights issue by society at large, however, for the simple reason that the dominant conception of human rights does not include any such right. Whether the EDL had a different conception of

\(^{11}\text{The EDL’s website, last accessed by the authors in August 2019, is now defunct. We provide a link to an Internet Archive snapshot in the bibliography.}\)
human rights, a different set of background beliefs or assumptions about the sorts of considerations that can justify a rights claim, or a different worldview under which they interpreted rights claims, the differences between the notion of human rights they invoke and the conventional understanding of human rights bears many of the hallmarks of a hermeneutical impasse.\textsuperscript{12} Given this misalignment of hermeneutical resources, the EDL were unable to communicate the nature of the ‘harm’ they took themselves (and, moreover, English society) to be suffering.\textsuperscript{13}

Further to this point, Romdenh-Romluc notes that the EDL’s membership draws primarily from groups that have, in fact, been marginalised within British society. EDL members are predominantly men from relatively deprived parts of England. They are mostly young, working class, and with limited post-secondary education or training. A large majority of donors to the EDL reside in areas with above-median levels of unemployment, and almost a quarter reside in areas with the worst 10\% of unemployment rates in England and Wales (Burn-Murdoch, 2013, p ). An analysis of EDL Facebook fans found evidence of disproportionately

\textsuperscript{12} An alternative explanation is that the EDL are simply disingenuous in their appeals to human rights, employing this language for rhetorical impact without holding themselves to its underlying principles. Although plausible, this interpretation could also be construed as embodying precisely the lack of charity that hermeneutical justice cautions us against. For the sake of argument, we therefore take the EDL to be sincere in these claims.

\textsuperscript{13} There is, of course, a very important sense in which the EDL’s interpretation of this as a human rights issue is simply \textit{false}, given the established national and international frameworks of human rights operating at the time. As Romdenh-Romluc (2016, 206–8) argues, however, the truth or falsity of claims about social facts – including facts about human rights – are dubious grounds on which to disbar a diagnosis of hermeneutical injustice. After all, a key insight from this literature is how social facts can be shaped by the powerful in society, often to the detriment of the marginalized.
high levels of unemployment, and disproportionately low levels of social capital (Bartlett and Littler, 2011).

In light of this analysis, Romdenh-Romluc concludes that members of the EDL could plausibly claim the following. First, that the rest of society lacks the hermeneutical resources that are necessary for the EDL to adequately communicate some significant area of their social experience (viz. changes to their communities as a consequence of multiculturalism and their efforts to counter these changes). And second, that the reason their hermeneutical resources are out of kilter with the rest of society’s in this way is due to the historical and continuing hermeneutical marginalisation of working-class communities. In short, it seems like the EDL could plausibly claim that they suffer from a hermeneutical injustice.

That Islamophobes, racists, and other dangerous extremists might be classed as victims of an injustice when they find themselves unable to communicate their noxious worldviews is an unwelcome result. A natural response would therefore be to try and push back against Romdenh-Romluc’s analysis, and argue that members of the EDL do not, in fact, satisfy the two central conditions: either that they are not hermeneutically marginalised; or, more promisingly, that the communicative difficulties that they experience do not constitute a hermeneutical impasse. Ultimately this is an empirical matter, though it is certainly the case that some – even many – actual disagreements with EDL members likely don’t involve a hermeneutical impasse, and will instead be cases where we understand what they’re saying but reject it on other grounds. Still, we would urge two points of caution to those who believe this strategy might provide a way to entirely close off this unpalatable possibility.

First, one lesson from the literature on hermeneutical injustice is that those with comparatively more hermeneutical power should exercise intellectual humility when interacting
with those with less hermeneutical power. Indeed, as we shall discuss shortly, this disposition is central to the virtue of hermeneutical justice that Fricker proposes as a remedy to hermeneutical injustice. That we think we understand what a marginalised group is trying to communicate about their own experience does not necessarily mean that we actually do.

Second, and more importantly, even if a response along these lines could fend off worries about the EDL, we still lack reason to think that this strategy will succeed in closing off each and every case that might be raised about an extremist worldview. To be confident that hermeneutical injustice will never arise in the context of extremist groups, we would need a priori grounds to show that extremism is somehow incompatible with one or other of the conditions just discussed.\[^{14}\] These conditions, though, pertain only to the amount of hermeneutical power enjoyed by a group, and the fact that their worldview is not shared by society at large. They are silent on the content of the views that those who have been marginalised by society might develop. So long as it is possible for hermeneutically marginalised groups to develop extremist views, it is possible that their expression of these views will be impeded by hermeneutical injustice.

4. Justice for Extremists?

How worried should we be about the possibility that members of extremist groups, like the EDL, might suffer communicative hermeneutical injustices? To a significant extent, this will depend on what we are required to do to remedy such injustices. For injustices – epistemic or otherwise –

\[^{14}\] Another option would be to identify a further condition on hermeneutical injustice that excludes extremist views. Two prima facie plausible candidates are that one cannot suffer a hermeneutical injustice if one’s views are either harmful or false. Both possibilities are rejected by Romdenh-Romluc (2016, 606–8; see also our fn. 17).
are by definition wrong and unfair, and therefore they typically generate corrective demands. So, how do we right the wrong of a hermeneutical injustice?

For Fricker, an important part of the remedy for hermeneutical injustice is an ethical-epistemic virtue she calls *hermeneutical justice*. This virtue centrally consists in ‘an alertness or sensitivity to the possibility that the difficulty one’s interlocutor is having as she tries to render something communicatively intelligible is due not to its being a nonsense or her being a fool, but rather to some sort of gap in collective hermeneutical resources’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 169). Minimally, exercising this virtue might require granting a subject one suspects of suffering a hermeneutical injustice the benefit of the doubt regarding the intelligibility of their testimony: just because something didn’t make sense *to me*, doesn’t mean it makes no sense at all. When we have the time and resources, however, hermeneutical justice requires going further than this: we must proactively engage with the subject to create an environment in which they can develop, explain, and share their hermeneutical resources.

Within the literature, the moment at which these injustices are finally overcome is typically presented as the moment at which society at large becomes more *accepting* of the meanings and interpretations developed by the marginalised community. This comes through in Fricker’s own discussion of what we’ve been referring to as communicative hermeneutical injustice, where she explores the experience of Black Caribbean immigrants to post-war Britain finding their self-conception as Black British citizens unexpectedly at odds with the racialised consciousness of the white majority. Here, Fricker argues, it seems evident that ‘the sooner the new conceptualisation could become widely entrenched in the shared hermeneutical resource the better’ (Fricker, 2016, p. 168). To take another example, in a discussion of hermeneutical injustices caused by rape myths, Katharine Jenkins argues that prevalent conceptions of rape and
domestic violence should be replaced by those developed jointly by feminists and policy-makers (Jenkins, 2017). And, to return to an example touched upon in §2, it seems plausible that the hermeneutical injustices suffered by members of LGBTQ+ communities will only be fully alleviated once society at large embraces the hermeneutical resources they employ to make sense of their own gender identities and sexual orientations. When discussed in the context of the liberatory struggles of women and LGBTQ+ folks, this familiar picture of hermeneutical justice seems entirely appropriate. But when we acknowledge that marginalised extremists might also generate demands of hermeneutical justice, it begins to look more problematic.

First, as we observed in §1, few of us are inclined to engage with extremists in the proactive and constructive way that seems to be required by the virtue of hermeneutical justice. This reluctance stems not (or not just) from prejudice or laziness, but rather from a frequently accurate perception of danger. While not all extremists are prone to violence, many are. And while not all extremists make hatred of a target group a cornerstone of their ideologies, many do. The personal sacrifice in terms of time, emotional labour, and personal safety needed in order to engage with extremists to the degree required by the virtue of hermeneutical justice is far too demanding, particularly for people from the groups targeted by extremist ideologies.

Second, this picture would seem to require that we work towards accepting extremist views. This is the source of Romdenh-Romluc’s concerns regarding groups like the EDL, since she interprets hermeneutical justice as including obligations to accept the beliefs, endorse the use of the concepts, and otherwise take on board and actively use the hermeneutical resources that are developed by hermeneutically marginalised subjects. It is at this point that the full force of the reductio appears. If the framework of hermeneutical in/justice commits us to the conclusion that we must not only become more engaged with extremists, but also more accepting of their
views, then we might well conclude – with Romdenh-Romluc – that this framework should be rejected.

5. The Demands of Hermeneutical Justice

We think that this is too hasty. The problem is not with the framework of hermeneutical in/justice, nor with the implication that extremists, qua members of marginalised groups, might suffer from these injustices. Rather, the problem is with the understanding of hermeneutical justice just presented. We propose that, by making two amendments to how we understand hermeneutical justice, these worries can be defused. On our view, it is possible to bite the bullet on extremists as victims of hermeneutical injustice without importing any unacceptable practical implications.

First, it is important to understand hermeneutical justice not (only) as a virtue cultivated by individual people, but (also) as a state to be achieved. Something like Fricker’s virtue of hermeneutical justice is undeniably important on an individual level, but it is essentially a palliative, rather than a cure. While it may mitigate the harmful effects of particular hermeneutical injustices, it nevertheless leaves more-or-less intact the underlying conditions that produced them. A more comprehensive solution would be to target those conditions directly – namely, working to eliminate hermeneutical marginalisation, and making marginalised subjects’ hermeneutical resources sufficiently available such that hermeneutical impasses do not occur or can be overcome.

15 Rae Langton (2010), Linda Alcoff (2010), and Elizabeth Anderson (2012) make similar points in their responses to Fricker’s work. For her part, Fricker acknowledges the importance of structural as well as individual solutions to epistemic injustice in the introduction to Epistemic Injustice (2007, 8).
Consider first the elimination of hermeneutical marginalisation. This would require structural changes in society, with the aim of allowing subjects of hermeneutical injustice and those similarly situated to participate fairly in the processes by which their hermeneutical resources may become widely shared. Doing so will typically involve some combination of long-term projects to remove systematic barriers to equitable hermeneutical participation, along with affirmative action and outreach programmes within hermeneutically powerful professions, such as academia, law, or the media.

As applied to extremists, this approach would require looking past crude generalisations of these groups and identifying what connections there might be – if any – between a given extremist group and various, potentially overlapping, axes of marginalisation. For example, consider the communities that largely compose groups like the EDL, whose hermeneutical marginalisation stems largely from social divisions of class and educational attainment in the UK. Eliminating their marginalisation may involve, \textit{inter alia}: the erosion of classist barriers to entry in various professions; greater access to educational opportunities, particularly in economically depressed parts of the country; and affirmative action to improve the representation of working-class people in hermeneutically powerful professions.

Projects to eliminate conditions of hermeneutical marginalisation in society are an important part of the struggle for hermeneutical justice. They are, however, decidedly long-term endeavours: they might eventually prevent further hermeneutical injustices from afflicting the target group, but they do little to address the injustices that members of that group face in the meantime. In the short term, the more pressing demand of hermeneutical justice is to address the symptoms of unjust epistemic relations – in particular, to eliminate the communicative impasses caused by hermeneutical marginalisation.
At this point, the worry that we may be required to accept extremist views rears its head. But recall that a hermeneutical impasse is, fundamentally, a break in understanding. What is at stake is not whether the hearer comes to share the speaker’s interpretation of their social experience, but whether the hearer can intelligibly and accurately interpret the speaker’s assertions in the first place. This brings us to our second clarification of hermeneutical justice: to defeat the hermeneutical impasse in communicative hermeneutical injustices, it is not necessary that we accept the speaker’s hermeneutical resources, as suggested by the examples canvassed in §5. It suffices for us to understand what the speaker says. And understanding does not entail assent.

It is not entirely surprising that the literature on hermeneutical justice has seen this slippage between understanding and acceptance. After all, this literature has largely focused on the epistemic resistance of and hermeneutical innovations precipitated by feminist, anti-racist, and other liberatory social movements, groups whose epistemic advances we usually have good reason – socially and epistemically – to accept. However, we also understand perfectly well all sorts of claims that we disagree with – indeed, even claims that employ expressions or concepts or background beliefs that we would repudiate. Consider, for example, widely rejected concepts like ‘witch’ or ‘phlogiston’. As Sabina Lovibond points out, you may ‘know as well as anyone else in your linguistic community what counts as [a witch or a phlogisticated substance], but regard the concept itself as a vacuous one (cf. “phlogiston”) and perhaps also as a pretext for evil (cf. “witch”)’ (Lovibond, 2015, pp. 136–37). Or consider Oscar Wilde’s famous retort when asked if a particular story was blasphemous: ‘I think it is horrible. “Blasphemous” is not a word of mine.’ Wilde knows what ‘blasphemy’ means, of course, but he refuses to go along with the
application of that concept, perhaps because he believes (to put it bluntly) that blasphemy is not a thing.

Maintaining a similar distance from and disagreement with extremist views, even whilst working to overcome the hermeneutical impasses that extremists confront as they try to express those views, is by no means impossible. Consider the efforts of Hilary Pilkington, an ethnographer who has studied the EDL. Even as she developed a rapport with her research subjects, she ‘[made] clear that the EDL was not a movement I would ever join’, stressing that her ‘aim was “to understand” rather than represent the movement either in a positive or negative light’ (Pilkington, 2016, p. 24, emphasis added). This is an aim which, on the basis of her text, she appears to have met: she and her research subjects were able to reach a consensus on how to understand the views espoused by the EDL, even if there remained many disagreements regarding whose views were right.

Of course, as the studies produced by Pilkington and others show, it can take a substantial amount of on-the-ground work to reach the point of mutual comprehension at which a hermeneutical impasse is overcome. It is this point that prompts concerns about the demandingness of hermeneutical justice for extremists, especially if the suggestion is that we all must engage in such work. However, this is another area where focusing on hermeneutical justice not as an individual virtue but as a state to be achieved – one in which the perspectives of the marginalised are intelligible to society at large, if not uncritically accepted – can prove helpful. Under this approach, it would not be necessary for each and every person to work towards improving our understanding of extremist rhetoric. Rather, all that is required is that the necessary hermeneutical resources are available within society. And there is space for a division of labour here, with the burdens falling most heavily on the most powerful. As Iris Marion
Young argues, it is those people with greater power and greater ability to further social justice – and, in particular, those who benefit most from unjust arrangements – who have greater responsibilities to pursue it (Young, 2011). The upshot is that those in the hermeneutically powerful professions – and especially those in positions of power within those professions – have a greater responsibility to strive for an understanding of marginalised interpretations.

When it comes to extremist organisations, such as the EDL, those well placed to do this kind of extended interpretative work include investigative journalists and scholars in the social sciences and humanities. Again, Pilkington’s ethnography of the EDL (Pilkington, 2016) and Ebner’s infiltration of far-right networks (Ebner, 2020) are instructive examples. Both works present the ideologies of the groups in which the researcher was embedded in a comprehensible, though unsympathetic, light. Through this kind of work and the responsible practice of others in positions of hermeneutical power – those working in the media, in law, and in governance – the relevant hermeneutical resources can follow the familiar paths of other epistemic innovations in filtering through to the rest of society, without requiring specific interventions on behalf of all individuals. Hermeneutical impasses can thus be dissolved in a way that requires neither uncritical acceptance of extremist views, nor dangerous engagement with extremists on the part of the most vulnerable in society.

6. Hermeneutical Marginalisation as Catalyst for Extremism

With this more nuanced conception of hermeneutical justice in place, we can see that biting the bullet and accepting that some extremists are subject to hermeneutical injustice is less painful than it would initially appear. In this final section, we wish to go further, to illustrate what is to be gained by acknowledging this possibility. Specifically, we believe that Fricker’s framework of hermeneutical injustice offers a way to think about extremism that can shed light on some of
the mechanisms that underpin the acceptance of extremist views, and how these views might be undermined. In particular, we want to suggest that hermeneutical marginalisation may be a contributing factor in the development and spread of extremist views.

To begin, recall the distinction we established in §2 between two different kinds of hermeneutical injustice. So far, we have focused primarily on the communicative injustices that extremists might face, where a marginalised individual is rendered unable to make some significant area of their experience communicatively intelligible to important others. In the early literature on hermeneutical injustice, however, at least as much attention was focused upon cases of cognitive hermeneutical injustice, where an experience is not fully intelligible even to the person undergoing it. Consider Fricker’s central example, Carmita Wood’s struggle to make sense of her experience of workplace sexual harassment in a time when the wrongs of such behaviour were inadequately understood by society at large (Fricker, 2007, p. 149ff.). Wood certainly did face debilitating communicative injustices, but there is also a sense in which the epistemic injustice she faced ran deeper than this. This is because the prejudices in the hermeneutical economy were such that Wood herself lacked the hermeneutical resources necessary to make adequate sense of her experience. She of course knew that there was something wrong with how her employer was treating her, but, because society as a whole lacked the concept of sexual harassment, she could not fully comprehend what.16

It is no coincidence that the experience that Wood found obscured from collective understanding – namely, the experience of being sexually harassed – was itself an experience of

16 For an alternative reading of this example, which identifies Wood’s case primarily with communicative injustices, see Mason (2011).
injustice and oppression, since such experiences are especially vulnerable to being omitted from the collective hermeneutical resource. As we have already seen, processes of hermeneutical marginalisation (and corresponding facts about hermeneutical power) ensure that our shared pool of meanings and interpretations largely reflects the interests of the powerful and privileged in society. By definition, however, members of powerful groups do not directly experience the injustice that they perpetuate, and nor do they typically have much interest in working toward understanding it. As such, where systematic hermeneutical marginalisation is pervasive and entrenched, the nature and mechanisms of society’s injustices is one area of experience that is especially likely to be obscured from collective understanding (Pohlhaus, 2012).

Of course, that there is a gap in society’s collective hermeneutical resources need not entail that an individual has no hermeneutical resources to draw upon in making sense of their distinctive experiences. As has been emphasised in much recent work on hermeneutical injustice, our processes of meaning generation are not exhausted by the dominant processes from which marginalised groups are frequently excluded (Mason, 2011; Dotson, 2012; Medina, 2013; Goetze, 2018). Rather, different communities can and do develop their own hermeneutical resources and expressive tools for interpreting their distinctive social experiences, which may or may not pass into the collective resource. This process – which Goetze (2018) terms hermeneutical dissent – might leave them perfectly well-equipped to understand these aspects of the social world, even whilst they struggle to communicate this understanding to people outside of their own community. This was the position in which Wood and her fellow activists found themselves after generating the concept of sexual harassment.

It is just this possibility of hermeneutical dissent, however, that creates the potential link between hermeneutical marginalisation and extremism. First, recall that we are interested only in
those extremists who are, in virtue of their social identities, themselves hermeneutically marginalised. Second, note that these extremists’ views often *directly concern* the nature, causes, and potential responses to these background conditions; indeed, Quassim Cassam has recently argued that a pre-occupation with grievance and victimisation is a central component of what he calls the ‘extremist mindset’ (Cassam, 2020). To be sure, not all extremists are *right* to claim victimisation, a point that we discussed in connection with incels in §3. Sometimes, though, they are. The ideology and worldview of the EDL is undoubtedly both morally abhorrent and factually mistaken, for example, but at least in some cases it is plausibly driven by a sense of injustice that is entirely apt for undereducated and impoverished working-class men in contemporary Britain.

However, note that, as an experience distinctive of marginalized subjects, the typical EDL member’s sense of victimisation is precisely the sort of experience that is especially likely to be obscured from collective understanding. The collective hermeneutical resources available in a capitalist, class-riven society like England, where the wealthy and connected enjoy disproportionate access to the levers of hermeneutical power, is likely to feature blind spots concerning the causes, mechanisms, and extent of the social domination experienced by the working class. For the reasons just noted, this does not entail that such groups will lack access to *any* hermeneutical resources regarding these experiences; again, there is the possibility that they could engage in hermeneutical dissent, developing or acquiring non-mainstream hermeneutical resources. But it is this very fact that gives extremism an opening. For, though the hermeneutical in/justice literature has focused thus far on cases where marginalised communities achieve an *improved* understanding of their social experience, there is no guarantee that this will be the
Either organically or else through opportunistic manipulation, the hermeneutical lacunae borne of marginalisation might be filled by meanings and interpretative tropes that reflect an extremist view of the world. Hermeneutical marginalisation, in other words, can create a gap in comprehension in which the distorted worldviews characteristic of extremism might flourish.

We want to be clear about the strength of the claim we are making here. It is clearly not the case that most or even many people who belong to marginalised communities turn toward extremism. Hermeneutical gaps that produce cognitive hermeneutical injustices are likely a pervasive feature of oppressive societies, and there are a variety of ways in which they can be filled. It likely takes highly specific social and epistemic circumstances for an extremist miscomprehension to be the outcome of this process. Equally, we are not making the claim that hermeneutical marginalisation is necessary for extremism. Indeed, we should be sceptical of any attempt to provide a reductive, one-size-fits-all characterisation of the causes or motivations of extremist organisations. As Cassam has argued, it seems likely that ‘there are multiple highly personal and idiosyncratic pathways’ to radicalisation (Cassam, 2018, p. 199), rather than a single confluence of factors that we can identify as the radicalisation process.

What we are suggesting, then, is simply that cognitive hermeneutical injustice might partially constitute one of these pathways towards extremism, at least for certain groups and

17 Even if there is reason to think that the marginalised might have a privileged insight into their own situation (Pohlhaus, 2012; Medina, 2013).
18 This is a possibility that Medina also notes in connection with the phenomenon of white ignorance: ‘there are cases of white ignorance in which…underprivileged white subjects are unable to understand predicaments they share with racially oppressed subjects…think, for example, of white subjects living under conditions of poverty and being seduced by white ignorance to understand their situation as resulting from illegal immigration’ (Medina, 2017, p. 44).
individuals. By prejudicing the collective hermeneutical resource in ways that prevent the marginalised from achieving an adequate understanding of the causes, mechanisms, and extent of their oppression, it creates an opening for them to acquire an *ina*dequate understanding of their social experiences – and, particularly, their experiences of genuine social disadvantage. If this is right, then it provides an insight not only into the causes of extremism, but also its remediation and prevention. By building a society that is more epistemically just – and, in particular, by placing a commitment to reducing hermeneutical marginalisation at the heart of this – we will also be building a society that is less conducive to extremism.

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