

Virtue and Sensibility (TL 6:399–409)

Ina Goy

I. On the Systematic Importance of Sections XII–XVI of the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue”

Sections XII–XVI from the last third of the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue” can be subsumed under three thematic units of varying importance. Section XII: In the earlier sections of the “Introduction,” Kant argued that the behavior we call virtuous has two a priori conceptual foundations. First, virtuous actions are moral actions that we are obligated to perform on the basis of the categorical imperative of pure practical reason, for virtue is the strength of a person’s maxims in “fulfilling his *duty*” (TL 6:394.15 f., italics I.G.). Second, an action can be virtuous only if it tends to the realization of specific aims or ends consistent with the categorical imperative: “Only *an end that is also a duty* can be called a **duty of virtue**” (TL 6:383.13 f.). There are two kinds of ends that satisfy this condition, those that aim at actions serving one’s own perfection and those that aim at promoting the happiness of others.

After presenting the a priori conceptual preconditions of virtue—let us call them the ‘logic of morals’—Kant turns to the “aesthetic of morals” (TL 6:406.20) in section XII. Here, he treats the question of which if any a priori sensible elements can enter into the foundation of virtue. According to Kant, human beings have four sensible “predispositions of the mind” (TL 6:399.11) that make them susceptible to moral obligation: the predispositions of “*moral feeling*,” “*conscience*,” “*love of one’s neighbor*” and “*respect*” (TL 6:399.6 f.)¹.

The systematic importance of section XII cannot be stressed enough. As is well known, one of the essential if controversial achievements of Kant’s philosophy lies in distinguishing empirical from a priori elements

1 Quotations for which the reference is not given immediately are covered by the following reference.

of sensibility, thus attributing to its a priori form a potential for ultimate justification and grounding. Accordingly, in the first *Critique*, the sensible principles of space and time, together with the categories in their capacity as concepts and the principles as a priori laws, found the theoretical cognition of objects of experience. Accordingly also, in the second *Critique*, the moral feeling of respect as an a priori sensible element, together with the concept of the good and the a priori practical law, founds the moral action.—Analogously, I claim that in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, the four predispositions of the mind mentioned above are a priori sensible principles founding the virtuous action together with certain conceptual ends which are consistent with the a priori law of the categorical imperative.

In returning to issues already treated, section XIII discusses three ‘principles’ supposed to guarantee a scientific² treatment of the doctrine of virtue. First, there are different duties of virtue but only one ground of obligation that serves as their basis. Second, virtue and vice differ in principle, not just in degree. Third: The concept of virtue must be derived a priori, not empirically. While the systematic weight of section XIII is rather low due to its largely repetitive character, it is interesting from a historical point of view in that its second principle inspires one of the rare Kantian responses to Aristotle’s ethics, more precisely, his doctrine of the mean (*mesotes*) which will be discussed again in §10 of the “Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics.”

The following subsection entitled “On Virtue in General” contains a shift of focus directed at the remaining foundational questions of virtue in relation to sensibility in sections XIV–XVI. Here, Kant discusses more deeply why “strength” of will is a presupposition of virtuous actions (TL 6:405.11, 405.15 f.; see also TL 6:394.15 f.).

To answer these questions in sections XIV–XVI, Kant resorts to a criterion of distinction between duties of virtue and duties of right that he developed in both introductions (see MS 6:218.24–220.37; TL 6:379.15–381.17). Virtue, in contrast to obedience to legal laws, cannot be externally coerced, but only internally and through the will of the actor. Thus, acting on strength of will according to the “*principle of inner freedom*” (TL 6:407.4) means that one can only force *oneself* to follow a moral command, just as one can only set ends to *oneself* that are consistent with the moral command (section XIV). Ends that are at

2 Different from our modern use of the word in the natural sciences, ‘scientific’ in Kant’s approach means a pure and a priori, non-empirical grounding or justification of something.

the same time duties compete with empirical inclinations. Two capacities are required to handle these inclinations properly: self-government in dealing with affects and passions (section XV) and moral apathy (section XVI). It is particularly in sections XV and XVI that Kant incorporates influences of the ethics of the late classic period, for instance the ideal of the stoic sage.

According to the weighted assessment given in this introduction, my commentary will deal most extensively with section XII. For further readings about the issues at hand, I recommend: on moral feelings in the *Metaphysics of Morals* in general Guyer, 2010, on love as a moral disposition of the mind Horn, 2008, and Schönecker, 2010, on the predisposition of conscience Timmermann, 2006, on the predisposition of respect Goy, 2007, on inner freedom Engstrom, 2002, and on moral apathy Denis, 2000.

II. Commentary on Sections XII–XVI

II.1 Section XII: A Priori Sensible Foundations of Virtue

In the extraordinarily dense thirteen-line introductory passage of section XII, Kant's thesis is that the human consciousness possesses four "concepts of what is presupposed on the part of feeling [[ä]sthetische Vorbegriffe]" or "antecedent," "natural predispositions of the mind (*praedispositio*)" that enable it to be "affected by concepts of duty": the predispositions of "*moral feeling*," "*conscience*," "*love of one's neighbor*" and "*respect for oneself (self-esteem)*" (TL 6:399.2–12).

II.1.1 General Characteristics of the A Priori Sensible Predispositions to Virtue

Kant describes the predispositions to virtue as aesthetic, prior or preliminary concepts ("[ä]sthetische Vorbegriffe" (TL 6:399.2)). Like in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the first *Critique* (see KrV A21n/B35n), the word 'aesthetic' (from Greek *aisthesis*: sensibility, sensory perception) does not apply to the context of art or taste, but to sensible principles, in this case to the sensible principles of virtue insofar as they are a priori.

Kant uses the notion of 'preliminary concepts' not only in the title of section XII but also in the titles of section IV³ of the "Introduction to the

3 Section III in the Cambridge Edition.

Metaphysics of Morals” (TL 6:221.5) and section XVII of the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue” (TL 6:410.2).⁴ Kant’s use of the notion in these passages strengthens the suggestion that the discussion of preliminary concepts is intended to clarify in principle some important basic concepts of the doctrine of virtue. Thus, section XII would serve to expound the most important a priori sensible concepts of the doctrine of virtue before the actual discussion of the doctrine of virtue starts with the “Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics.” A literal reading of the word “Vorbegriffe” (TL 6:399.2), however, according to which the four predispositions of the mind are moral dispositions prior to *all* concepts, seems implausible, because Kant is very clear in saying that the “[c]onsciousness” of the four predispositions can “only follow from consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on the mind” (TL 6:399.14–16). If “Vorbegriffe,” thirdly, described the preconceptual form in which the consciousness becomes aware of the four predispositions of the mind (aesthetically, as feelings, not logically, as concepts), this would entail a reduplication of the notion ‘aesthetic’ which would be redundant if factually correct.

A second twofold characterization of the sensible predispositions to virtue is even more decisive: On the one hand, Kant describes the four predispositions as “*antecedent*,” “natural predispositions of the mind (*praedispositio*) for being affected by concepts of duty” (TL 6:399.11 f., first italics I.G.). They are dispositions which “every human being has,” and “by virtue of them” can “be put under obligation” (TL 6:399.13 f.). They are an essential component of the moral consciousness of every human being, which is why there can be “no duty to acquire them,” as everybody already has them (TL 6:399.4 f.). On the other hand, Kant claims that “[c]onsciousness of them is not of empirical origin” but can only “*follow* from consciousness of a moral law,” as the “effect” it has on the mind (cf. TL 6:399.14–16, italics I.G.). This twofold characterization creates one of the fundamental exegetical problems of Kant’s treatment of the predispositions of the mind: Kant does not distinguish precisely *predispositions* for a priori sensible feelings from the *feelings* generated by them. For at first glance, it seems hard to reconcile the

4 Here we are faced with a problem of Gregor’s translation: Translating “[a]sthetische Vorbegriffe” with “concepts of what is presupposed on the part of feeling” (TL 6:399.2) and “Vorbegriffe” either with “preliminary concepts” (TL 6:221.5) or with “concepts preliminary” (TL 6:410.2), she obscures the exegetical ambiguity of ‘Vorbegriffe’ in Kant’s text.

claim that the four predispositions are “*antecedent*” “predispositions of the mind” (TL 6:399.11, italics I.G.) with the claim that “[c]onsciousness of them” can only “*follow* from consciousness of a moral law,” as the “effect” it has on the mind (TL 6:399.14–16, italics I.G.).

What exactly is the sense in which the four phenomena are *antecedent*, and in which sense (less plainly expounded by Kant) are they nevertheless *subsequent*? They are *antecedent* in that they are present in the subject a priori, as preconditions of the possibility of virtue. They are pure, pre-empirical endowments of the moral consciousness like the pure practical reason. The four predispositions are *subsequent* in that they are only able to generate a priori sensible feelings if they have been affected by the moral law of the pure practical reason, for again: “*moral feeling*,” “*conscience*,” “*love* of one’s neighbor” and “*respect*” are conscious only “as the effect” of a “moral law” (TL 6:399.6 f., 15 f.). Pure practical reason and pure practical sensibility, both being a priori endowments of the subject, constitute two equally fundamental sources of virtuous actions. Their relation, however, is hierarchical with respect to their function, for the a priori sensible *predispositions* are present inside us even before the pure practical reason ever proclaimed its practical law (and applied it to certain ends). But it is only possible to have the respective a priori sensible *feelings* after we have a consciousness of the practical law.

The four predispositions of the mind dispose to *something*. What is this something? Kant provides two varying answers. On the one hand, he says, they dispose to “the mind’s receptivity to concepts of duty as such” (TL 6:399.2 f.), that is, its capacity “for being affected by concepts of duty” (TL 6:399.11 f.). On the other hand, he claims that they are necessary for “receptiveness of the concept of duty” (TL 6:399.9)⁵. For example, he claims that the conscience is “the condition of all duties [Pflicht] as such,” but not of “all *duties of virtue* [Tugendpflicht[en]]” (TL 6:406.34–407.1). The use of the plural in “concepts of duty” seems to point to the fact that the a priori sensible predispositions of the mind enable us to incorporate in our moral consciousness a categorical imperative that has already been applied to different ends. Taken in this sense, the a priori sensible predispositions of the mind would be the foundation of duties of virtue, insofar as the a priori feelings signify the presence of ends that are also duties. On the contrary, the use of the singular in “concept of duty,” and in “duty as such” seems to say that the a priori sensible predispositions of the mind serve to incorporate into

5 Cf. “the law of duty” (TL 6:399.21).

our moral consciousness a categorical imperative that has not yet been applied to specific ends of duties of virtue. In this case, the a priori sensible predispositions of the mind would be the foundation merely of the obligation of virtue, the practical law, but not of duties of virtue, that is, ends which are consistent with the practical law. Only in the first case (the plural, “concepts of duty”) would a priori sensible predispositions in a narrow sense be predispositions to virtuous actions.

Kant treats the four a priori sensible predispositions of the mind in the following order: “*a. Moral feeling*,” “*b. Conscience*,” “*c. Love of human beings*,” “*d. Respect*” (TL 6:399.17–403.6).

II.1.2 The Predisposition to Moral Feeling

A first a priori sensible predisposition to duties of virtue which every human being has “in him originally” (TL 6:399.32) is that of moral feeling. Moral feeling is an aesthetic condition (the Cambridge edition has “state of *feeling*”) of “pleasure or displeasure” caused “merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty.” While we can experience empirical, or, as Kant calls them, “*pathological*” feelings before and independent from perceiving the practical law inside us, the moral feeling of pleasure can only follow the “representation of the [practical, I.G.] law” (TL 6:399.19–27). Moral feeling is the “*susceptibility* on the part of free choice to be moved by pure practical reason (and its law)” (TL 6:400.18 f.).

Other traditional approaches—here, Kant could have in mind the theories of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, or Hume⁶—often use the term “moral *sense* [moralische[r] *Sinn*” (TL 6:400.5) when referring to moral feeling. This expression is misleading from Kant’s point of view, because in his doctrine of theoretical cognition, Kant assumes an inner and an outer sense containing the a priori forms of intuition of space and time (cf. KrV A19–49/B33–73). Describing the moral feeling of practical philosophy as a ‘sense’ as well would introduce an ambiguity into the concept, for, as Kant argues already in the second *Critique*, the a priori sensibility of practical philosophy is not “regarded as a capacity for intuition at all but only as feeling” (KpV 5:90.12–23). This is why Kant prefers to speak of moral feeling rather than moral sense (cf. TL 6:400.5–20).

6 Cf. Shaftesbury, 1699, p. 173; Hutcheson, 1728, p. 109; Hume, 1739/40, III.1.2.

II.1.3 The Predisposition to Conscience

A second a priori sensible disposition to virtue lies in the conscience which every human being is “originally” endowed with “as a moral being” (TL 6:400.24 f.). Kant treats of the conscience in two places in the *Doctrine of Virtue*: in the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue” (TL 6:400.21–401.21) and in the “Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics” (TL 6:437.29–440.34). Both the fact that Kant introduces the concept of conscience in both places and that, in the latter place, he calls it an “original[ly] intellectual [...] moral disposition” (TL 6:438.24 f.) (as opposed to an *aesthetic* one), could lead to the assumption that Kant wants to expound the a priori sensible features of the conscience in the “Introduction” and its intellectual features in the “Doctrine of the Elements.” This interpretation would be intuitively convincing for a phenomenology of conscience, as it contains traits of both sensible perceptions, for instance the feeling you have when your conscience is clean or guilty, and those of propositional sentences appearing in the form of admonitions like ‘you should have done this’ or ‘if only you hadn’t done that.’

This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that the nature of the a priori sensible features of the conscience as expounded in the “Introduction” is unclear. For even though Kant very clearly ranks the predisposition of conscience among the aesthetic phenomena, he defines it as “practical reason holding the human being’s duty before him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a law” (TL 6:400.27 f.). This definition removes the difference between pure practical reason and the conscience as an a priori sensible predisposition: “[C]onscience is practical reason” (TL 6:400.27 f., italics I.G.). Difficulties rather grow when Kant claims in the following sentence, that in the conscience the “moral feeling” (!) is being affected by an act of “practical reason” (TL 6:400.27–30). This in turn removes the distinction between the a priori sensible predisposition of moral feeling and that of the conscience. Timmermann assumes a kind of identification of the conscience with moral feeling to be the reason why, for Kant, conscience falls under the heading of aesthetic moral conditions.⁷ But what exactly would, then, be the *differentia specifica* between the predisposition of moral feeling and that of conscience? A genuine description of the conscience both as an a priori sensible predisposition and as a feeling derived from this predisposition, is not given in Kant’s text.

7 Cf. Timmermann, 2006, p. 297.

The rest of the passage merely provides clarifications of the scientific as opposed to the colloquial account of conscience. As the predisposition of conscience is an “unavoidable fact” (TL 6:400.30 f.), two kinds of perfunctory parlance need correcting. First, the statement that someone ‘has no conscience’ can only be intended to mean that the respective person tries (ultimately in vain) to ignore the unavoidable voice of conscience. In the same vein, there is no real “[u]nconscientiousness” but only a “propensity to pay no heed” to the “judgment” of conscience (cf. TL 6:401.3–18).

II.1.4 The Predisposition to Love of One’s Neighbor

A third a priori sensible predisposition to virtue lies in “love of one’s neighbor” (TL 6:399.6 f.). An interpretation of this predisposition is made difficult by the vast ambiguity of the concepts of love Kant mentions in the two short relevant passages introducing it (cf. TL 6:399.4–16, 401.22–402.26). This ambiguity raised the question as to which of the forms of love mentioned is the relevant predisposition of the mind.⁸ Schönecker considers it to be “*delight (amor complacentiae)* [Liebe des Wohlgefallens]” (TL 6:402.22).⁹ Horn, however, argues that all forms of love are emotional, and cannot be enforced, so that every form of love is inadequate to morality in its strict sense, because all moral actions rest on constraint. But, he says, we might interpret ‘*benevolence (amor benevolentiae)* [Liebe des Wohlwollens]’ as a form of love emerging from the practice of doing good to others. In this way, it would be possible to claim that love is adequate to morality, if only indirectly as a habit evolving subsequently.¹⁰ Horn more or less rejects the claim that any sensible predisposition of the mind is given a priori.

First we have to say that there is an a priori conception of love in Kant’s philosophy, and that the only form of love explicitly addressed as a predisposition by Kant is “love of one’s neighbor” (TL 6:399.6 f.), mentioned as one of the four a priori sensible predispositions of the mind in the introductory paragraph of section XII. All other forms and kinds of love introduced by Kant in his commentary on the predisposition of love in sub-section “c. Love of human beings,” such as “[l]ove” as “a matter of feeling,” “*benevolence (amor benevolentiae)*,” and “*delight (amor*

8 Cf. Horn, 2008; Schönecker, 2010.

9 Cf. Schönecker, 2010, pp. 133, 135.

10 Cf. Horn, 2008, p. 154.

complacentiae)” (TL 6:401.22–402.26), are not being referred to as predispositions. Thus, any interpretation of the moral predisposition of love must cope with the fact that Kant calls the a priori sensible predisposition of love that of “love of one’s neighbor.” Taking Kant literally in reading this passage, however, and following his claim that the moral predisposition lies in “love of one’s neighbor,” requires the qualification that Kant is not trying to introduce the denominational Christian contents of charity (neighborly love) into the sensible foundation of virtue (such as the theological motivation for imitating God’s love in one’s own acts of love), but merely to reconstruct the core of neighborly love that consists in a particular structure of moral motivation, which displays exactly those features that Kant intends an a priori conception of love as a foundation of virtues to have.

How is this structure of moral motivation to be conceived of? What is the predisposition to love one’s neighbor a reaction to and what kind of feeling emerges from this predisposition? Kant explains the generation of the *feeling* of love of one’s neighbor in the context of an ethical (not a theological) interpretation of the Christian commandment to love one’s neighbor:

So the saying ‘you ought to *love* your neighbor as yourself’ does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, *do good* to your fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general) (TL 6:402.16–21).

As already mentioned, this second passage, unlike the first, does not call love of one’s neighbor an a priori predisposition of the mind, but merely describes how the respective feeling is being generated. In the context of said passage I would like to propose the following reconstruction of this sentence:

The a priori sensible predisposition to love one’s neighbor is such that it will be stimulated, when the desire of “*benevolence (amor benevolentiae)*” (TL 6:401.27) to another human being has been transformed into a maxim of beneficence which has been tested against the practical law and has become the determining ground of the action.¹¹ Once such a maxim of beneficence stimulates the *predisposition* of love of one’s neighbor in singular cases, the respective form of love is produced as a *feeling* of love of one’s neighbor wrought a priori. Frequent repetition

11 On the notions of benevolence and beneficence: cf. especially TL 6:452.23–30.

of this process transforms the individual feeling of love of one's neighbor into a general love of human beings which in turn will be reflected in "an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general" (TL 6:402.20 f.). Kant later explains "*aptitude (habitus)*" to be an acquired "facility of acting and a subjective perfection of *choice*" (TL 6:407.5 f.); it designates an attitude which has become part of a person's character, enabling him to act accordingly without difficulty. Kant claims that we possess an a priori sensible predisposition to love our neighbor which produces a feeling precisely in the case when the desire to act to the benefit of another has been transformed into a moral maxim of beneficence that we act on. The feeling we develop thereby is love of one's neighbor; repetition of the respective behavior turns this feeling into love of human beings (love of all other human beings as our neighbors). Experiencing this feeling in turn makes it easier to choose to act beneficently in the future, thus initiating the development of a character attitude of love of human beings.

Against Horn, I maintain that Kant is not of the opinion that all kinds of love are emotional (read: 'empirical?') feelings, because both the predisposition of love of one's neighbor and the succeeding feeling of love of one's neighbor are doubtlessly wrought a priori. The sentence that leads Horn to his assumption that all forms of love are emotional, is at the beginning of sub-section "*c. Love of human beings*": "*Love* is a matter of *feeling*, not of willing, and I cannot love because I *will* to, still less because I *ought* to [...]; so a *duty to love* is an absurdity" (TL 6:401.24–26). Almost the same wording can be found when Kant characterizes the "*love of one's neighbor*" in the introductory passage of section XII as a moral trait which presupposes "no duty to acquire" it, because it belongs to those predispositions the possession of which "cannot be considered a duty" (cf. TL 6:399.5–13). But do both statements mean the same thing, and if so, would the predisposition to love one's neighbor then be emotional/empirical as Horn claims?

It is quite clear that Kant sees two different reasons as to why certain forms of love do not fall under duty: First, one cannot and does not have to be obliged to follow an *a priori* sensible predisposition of love of one's neighbor as it, being a *predisposition*, is always present a priori in every subject's moral consciousness. Still, the development of the *feeling* deriving from this predisposition presupposes the consciousness of a concept of duty. This is because the feeling of love for human beings is only brought about by the impact of the practical law (a concept of duty) on the a priori sensible predisposition for love of one's neighbor.

Concerning love as “a matter of *feeling* [Empfindung]” (TL 6:401.24), it can be said that there is an according a priori predisposition in the subject as well, so that there is no duty to acquire a predisposition for empirical feelings of love either, because everyone already has it! In the case of love as a matter of feeling, however, the feeling deriving from the respective disposition is *independent* from the concept of duty as well, as it is *no* effect of the impact of the practical law, but of empirical stimuli of the senses. It is precisely because of this difference that the love of one’s neighbor deriving from the according predisposition is indicative of morality and virtue while love as a matter of feeling is not indicative of morality but rather an empirical feeling.

What seems to argue against Schönecker’s thesis that the predisposition we are looking for is that of “*delight* (*amor complacentiae*) [Liebe des Wohlgefallens]” is Kant’s definition of it as “a pleasure joined immediately to the representation of an object’s existence” (TL 6:402.22–24), which could be understood as an empirical reference of love to the object. Not only does an *existing* object possess factual reality, but it is also an object of experience. If it causes pleasure, then this love is empirical. Schönecker wants us to understand this “pleasure” in “the representation of an object’s existence” as a pleasure of the perfection of others. However, the perfection of another person is precisely the idea of his end, but in a strict sense the *existence* of an idea is hard to comprehend. Besides, speaking loosely of “an object” seems vague in light of the fact that the specific object at hand is the perfection of others.

A further weakness of this interpretation is that “a pleasure joined immediately to the representation of an object’s existence” could also be a pleasure one feels about oneself. While the love of one’s *neighbor* as a moral predisposition of the mind by definition rules out the self as a permissible object, no such exclusion is given in the definition of delight. Thus, if we take delight to be the moral predisposition to love, then there is no way to preclude the possibility that the person so predisposed is affected by pleasure for the self. Consequently, the moral predisposition of love could be a predisposition to an unmoral self-love and hence be a self-contradiction.

II.1.5 The Predisposition to Respect for Oneself (Self-esteem)

A fourth a priori sensible predisposition to virtue lies in the predisposition of “*respect* for oneself (*self-esteem*)” (TL 6:399.7). Just like the other three predispositions, the feeling of “*self-esteem*” (TL 6:402.35)

emerges precisely in the case when the practical law has an impact on the predisposition of the actor and “unavoidably forces from him *respect* for his own being” (TL 6:402.36–403.1). Together with the practical law (or, more precisely, a maxim of ends consistent with the practical law), the feeling of self-esteem of a person “is the basis of certain duties, that is, of certain actions that are consistent with his duty to himself” (TL 6:403.2 f.). Quite correctly, Forkl has pointed out that, in section XII, Kant only speaks of a predisposition to respect for *oneself*, and that this respect is only used to found duties of virtue to *oneself*.¹² The inadequacy of Forkl’s comment, however, lies in his uncritical acceptance of Kant’s text and the resulting implicit assumption that Kant had sound systematic reasons for restricting the predisposition of respect to respect for oneself and to the grounding of duties to oneself. But doesn’t the opposite seem to be the case? Does it not seem strange, considering that the *Doctrine of Virtue* as a whole discusses extensively the concept of respect in the context of duties to others, that Kant conceives of the a priori sensible moral predisposition exclusively as a predisposition to respect oneself? Could he not instead have described it more widely as a predisposition of respect for oneself and for others, thus making it a possible foundation of duties of virtue both to oneself and to others? I can give no explanation for this systematic imbalance.

Before ending my presentation of Kant’s account of the a priori sensible predispositions of the mind, I would like to address certain other interpretative problems which I cannot discuss here at length. The a priori sensible predispositions Kant expounds—moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for oneself—seem to form a very heterogeneous group of phenomena. What is their relation to each other? Are they of the same rank, are they divided into two pairs of closely related phenomena or is one superior to the rest, moral feeling, for example, as a generic term not describing any particular feeling while love and respect are specific feelings? Why does Kant treat of these four predispositions and feelings and of no others?—It remains equally obscure how the foundation of virtues arising from these predispositions impacts the different duties of virtue developed later in the “Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics.” As can be seen with respect to the virtue of gratitude, which is a duty of virtue of *love* of others but which, as Kant says, also presupposes the feeling of *respect* (cf. TL 6:454.33), an all too straightforward correlation is

12 Cf. Forkl, 2001, p. 93 f.

impossible. Furthermore, apart from the short reference in the “Introduction,” moral feeling, as opposed to the other three phenomena treated of, has *no* theoretical place of its own within the doctrine of the duties of virtue, even if it could be considered as a generic term for the other three phenomena. Hence, one could ask whether the concept of moral feeling is no more than a terminological ‘relic’ from earlier stages of Kant’s moral philosophy, one that lost its systematic importance for Kant when he discovered that the moral feeling as a sensible grounding of virtue can be replaced by more idiosyncratic phenomena like love of one’s neighbor, respect, and conscience.

II.2 Section XIII: The Foundation of Virtue Must Follow from Pure Principles

Section XIII comprises two parts that return to general discussions of the concept of virtue. The first part reconsiders the assumptions that should be made in order to render the concept of virtue scientific and “*pure*” (TL 6:403.9), i. e., independent of empirical conditions. Here, Kant first presents three pure principles [Grundsätze] that he maintains himself (cf. TL 6:403.10–405.2), contrasting them at the end of the section with three opposite assumptions taken from earlier philosophical doctrines (cf. TL 6:405.2–9). Kant’s theses are: There are many duties of virtue but only one duty (ground of obligation of virtue); virtue and vice differ in principle, not just in degree; the concept of virtue must be grounded *a priori*, not empirically.

In the second part of section XIII, entitled “Of Virtue in General,” Kant discusses the question, to what extent virtue presupposes strength of will. After having discussed the *a priori* sensible predispositions of virtue in section XII, this passage leads to the final important issue of the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue”: How should a person who strives to be virtuous handle *empirical* sensibility adequately (cf. TL 6:405.10–406.25)?

II.2.1 Three Principles (*Grundsätze*) of a Scientific Treatment of a Pure Doctrine of Virtue

Kant’s introduction of his three principles of “handling a *pure* doctrine of virtue” (TL 6:403.9) and their opposite principles (cf. TL 6:405.2–9) is systematically imbalanced and cryptic in parts. The respective antitheses

do not match well with the theses and are thus particularly in need of discussion. In what follows, T denominates Kant's thesis, while A stands for the antithesis Kant draws from the philosophical tradition and rejects.

The first principle

T 1: "For One duty only one *single* ground of obligation can be found" (TL 6:403.10 f., trans. I.G.).

A 1: "There is only one virtue and one vice" (TL 6:405.5).

Juxtaposing these principles in this manner shows that it does not become instantly clear how these sentences are supposed to be "opposed" (TL 6:405.4). In case of a real opposition T 1 would read: 'There is not only one virtue and not only one vice.' Consider, however, how the text continues from T 1: "and if someone produces two or more proofs for a duty, this is a sure sign either that he has not yet found a valid proof or that he has mistaken two or more duties for [O]ne" (TL 6:403.11–13, emendation I.G.). It seems that the antithesis aims at the singularity and uniqueness of virtue, while Kant's thesis makes a claim about the singularity and unambiguousness of the ground (justification) of obligation of virtue while allowing for a plurality of duties of virtue. Precisely how is the content of T 1 to be reconstructed both to make it match the theory of virtue, argued for up to here in the introduction, and to contradict A 1?

One could read T 1 to mean that it is in the practical law that every single duty of virtue has the same ground of obligation. The opposite of A 1 would then lie in the specification that while there is only one ground of obligation, there can be many different duties of virtue. Alternately, T 1 could be understood to imply that every single duty of virtue also has a specific ground of obligation, each consisting in a particular maxim itself tested against the practical law. The opposite of A 1 would then be that there can be many different duties of virtue that come about through universalization of different respective maxims. Both ways of reconstruction sit well with Kant's account. Their difference lies in putting the emphasis regarding the conceptual aspect of the grounding of virtue either on the practical law or on the maxim of the virtuous action tested against the practical law. In both readings, Kant's criticism of A 1 adds up to the claim that in the account of virtue one has to distinguish between a singular ground of obligation, the practical law, different maxims of duties of virtue—each of which comes about by different material choices of ends—and different duties of virtue resulting from these concepts.

Kant's explanations of T 1 and A 1, however, shift the emphasis of his criticism in yet a different direction:

For here Kant claims that there has to be one singular and unambiguous "ground of obligation" for every single duty of virtue precisely because "moral proof" has to be effected "philosophical[ly]," "drawn only by means of rational knowledge *from concepts*," and is unlike mathematical proof, which, following from a "construction of concepts" in "a priori intuition," allows for ambiguity (TL 6:403.10–21). Kant expounds this reasoning in extreme brevity. What does he mean? Having shown a priori sensibility to be a part of the foundation of virtue in section XII, he can't be interpreted to deny it now. All he wants to say here is that the a priori sensibility in the foundation of virtue does not cause the same ambiguity as the a priori sensible moment does in mathematics.

Kant's distinction of the mathematical from the philosophical method of cognition reverts to a subtle theorem Kant expounds in the "Doctrine of Method" of the first *Critique* (cf. KrV A712–738/B740–766): To Kant, mathematical cognition is synthetically a priori, that is, it rests on propositions that include an extension of cognition independent of all experience. This a priori extension is grounded in the construction of mathematical concepts in a priori intuition. The concept of a triangle, for example, must be conceived of as a right, acute, or obtuse triangle as soon as it is constructed in a priori intuition, thus adding to the concept of a triangle the quality of being right, acute, or obtuse (cf. KrV A721 f./B749 f.). Put differently (and emphasizing Kant's actual point), the concept of a triangle becomes ambiguous as soon as it must be exhibited in pure intuition. In the first *Critique*, Kant denies that in philosophical (as opposed to mathematical) cognition, the "transcendental" concepts and propositions could become ambiguous by their representation in intuition. For "transcendental concept[s]" or propositions such as "reality" or "substance" are not related to "intuition[s] that exhibit[] the concept [...] *in concreto*" but rather to the very ability of being intuited, such as to "time-conditions in general" (KrV A722 and note/B750 and note).

Can these explanations be useful for an understanding of this passage in the *Doctrine of Virtue*? A grounding of duties of virtue depends, first, on the practical law, second, on a maxim of the choice of ends consistent with this law, and, third, on a priori sensible elements. How can the latter guarantee a grounding of duties of virtue which is different for different duties, yet unambiguous for each? How is the uniqueness of the ground-

ing of the duties of virtue safeguarded by the a priori sensible aspect of virtue when it allows for ambiguity in the realm of mathematics?

As the a priori sensible elements in the grounding of virtue consist in nothing but non-conceptual representations of maxims of the setting of ends consistent (or inconsistent) with the practical law, the feeling facilitated by the respective sensible predisposition will unambiguously either be generated or not. To Kant, a certain maxim (for instance a maxim of gratitude, beneficence, respect for others) tested against the practical law constitutes a distinct yet unique conceptual ground of obligation for the respective duty of virtue. The a priori sensible elements, however, only indicate whether the maxim of the setting of ends that serves as the ground of obligation is consistent with the practical law or not. Despite the indispensability of a priori sensible representations they do not change anything about either the content or the moral status of the respective maxim of a virtuous action. Even if there are different duties of virtue grounded in an a priori conceptual and an a priori sensible element, it is not the ambiguity of the feeling that causes different duties of virtue but the difference of the maxim which prescribes unambiguously what a duty of virtue requires for each maxim.

The second principle

T 2: “The distinction between virtue and vice can never be sought in the *degree* to which one follows certain maxims; it must rather be sought only in the specific *quality* of the maxims (their relation to the law). In other words, the well-known principle (Aristotle’s) which locates virtue in the *mean* between two vices is false” (TL 6:404.3–7).

A 2: “Virtue is the observance of the middle way between opposing opinions” (TL 6:405.6 f., trans. I.G.¹³).

Kant’s second principle of a pure and thus scientific treatment of the doctrine of virtue states that there is no way leading from vice to virtue except that which consists in changing the “*principle*” (TL 6:404.33) on which one’s disposition is based. This is so, he claims, because virtue lies in the strength of a person’s maxim in *observing* the practical law, while vices result from including a principle of the *non-observance* of the practical law into one’s maxim of action. Virtue and vice differ in principle, not in degree.

13 The editors of the Academy Edition consider replacing ‘opinions’ in the first edition with ‘inclinations,’ while the Cambridge edition simply speaks of ‘vices.’

If, on the contrary, the antithesis A 2 were valid, virtue and vice would be distinguished only by degrees, and virtue could be attained by a gradual reduction of its opposing vices. One could then, for example, attain an appropriate economic activity by disengaging oneself from avarice and spending more money, or by curbing one's propensity to wastefulness and living a thriftier life (cf. TL 6:404.8–15; see also TL 6:432.19–25).

On the basis of the second principle, Kant disputes the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean and its aphoristic Roman reception (cf. TL 6:404.6–22, 404.27–37, 409.3–5). This passage is of particular historical importance, since Kant is often charged with failing to deal with systematic challenges from classical Greek ethics (especially Aristotle), a charge extended even to the allegation of concealing pertinent Aristotelian (and Platonic) alternatives to his own theory in systematically central passages (such as KpV 5:39.5–41.38).

In the second book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle develops his famous thesis that virtues are those human character dispositions promoting a good life which are preserved by what is “proportionate”¹⁴ while being destroyed by “defect[s] and excess[es]”¹⁵. The “mean”¹⁶ (*mesotes*) which the virtues consist in does not describe a ‘mediocrity’ but “in a sense an extreme”¹⁷, an optimum.

Kant's criticism of this position is based on an over-simplification, maybe even a misunderstanding of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. For Kant seems to interpret Aristotle to consider ‘mean’ as arithmetical—so that an appropriate economic activity would be a mean between avarice and prodigality attainable by a “diminution” (TL 6:404.10) of prodigality and an “increase of spending” (TL 6:404.11)—, an idea which Aristotle explicitly repudiates. *Mesotes* does not denote an arithmetical mean in Aristotle's philosophy but an “intermediate relatively to us”¹⁸ to be measured against complex normative conceptions of what is good for the actor and the aims of his actions. It neither calls for a halving of defective extremes nor an identical mean for all human beings, but rather for an adequacy of action relative to the individual person and rel-

14 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1104a17.

15 Ibid., 1104a12.

16 Ibid., 1104a26.

17 Ibid., 1107a23.

18 Ibid., 1106a31.

ative also to “the right times”¹⁹, “the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way”²⁰.

Kant was intimately acquainted with the multifaceted Roman transformations of the doctrine of the mean, probably already since the many years of his Latin studies at the Fridericianum. This is exemplified by Kant’s *impromptu* quotation in the footnote (see TL 6:404.27–37, 409.3–5) of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*: “medio tutissimus ibis”²¹ (in the middle is the safest path), of two of Horace’s aphorisms from the *Sermons*: “est modus in rebus”²² (there is measure in all things) and the *Epistles*: “insani sapiens nomen ferat aequus iniqui—ultra quam satis est Virtutem si petat ipsam”²³ (let the wise man bear the name of madman, the just of unjust, should he pursue Virtue herself beyond due bounds). In addition, Kant mentions late classic variations of the *mesotes*-principle, the sources of which are unclear, such as “medium tenere beati” (happy are those who keep to the mean) or “omne nimium vertitur in vitium” (every excess turns into a vice) (TL 6:404.28 f.). A maxim very similar to the last formula can be found in Seneca’s *On tranquillity of mind*: “[v]itiosum est ubique quod, nimium est”²⁴ (excess in anything becomes a fault). Kant dismisses these adaptations of a theory of the mean like their Aristotelian original as “a superficial wisdom which really has no determinate principles” (TL 6:404.29 f.), because it considers virtue and vice to differ merely in degree.

The third principle

T 3: “[The] moral capacity must be estimated by the law, which commands categorically, and so in accordance with our rational knowledge of what they ought to be in keeping with the idea of humanity, not in accordance with the empirical knowledge we have of them as they are” (TL 6:404.23–26, 405.1 f.).

A 3: “Virtue (like prudence) must be learned from experience” (TL 6:405.8 f.).

Trying to learn virtue from experience according to principle A 3 would necessarily lead to failure, because, according to Kant, experience in many

19 Ibid., 1106b21.

20 Ibid.

21 Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, II 137.

22 Horace, *Sermons*, I.1.106.

23 Id., *Epistles*, I.6.15 f.

24 Seneca, *On tranquillity of mind*, IX.6.

concrete cases will show nothing but a human being's imperfection in following his moral duties. A doctrine of virtue both scientific and based on pure principles cannot orientate itself towards human beings as they *are*—for “how could one expect to construct something completely straight from such crooked wood?” (RGV 6:100.26–28; cf. IaG 8:23.22–24)—but has to take for a measure instead the idea of humanity as it *ought* to be conceived as a final end and ideal.

In A 3, Kant implicitly criticizes the identification of virtue with prudence as a knowledge arising from experience. Such an identification can be found again in Aristotle, where prudence (*phronesis*) is one of the six intellectual virtues, and is specified by the fact that it presupposes experience of life, as it is not only “concerned with universals”²⁵ but also with “the ultimate particular fact”²⁶ which is an object of “perception”²⁷, i. e. experience. To Kant, prudence pertains primarily to the realm of hypothetical imperatives, especially pragmatic ones. It is concerned with the skilful choice of means for hypothetical ends (cf. GMS 4:416.2–5, 416.19) and is thus not a concept of moral philosophy.

II.2.2 Transition to the Problem of Strength of Will as a Foundation of Virtue

The second part of section XIII is entitled “Of Virtue in General.” This is a quite astonishingly fundamental claim, given that it is in the title of a mere sub-section, and considering that Kant has already expounded virtue's essential aspects in the preceding sections. The only plausible reading of this title seems to be that Kant now does not intend to speak of the a priori (and thus most strictly scientific) foundations of virtue only but also about those preconditions of virtue which every person has to acquire during the development of his character, above all strength of will. While this process is grounded a priori, it unfolds historically, as a part of the moral biography of a person. “Of Virtue in General,” then, does not mean ‘Of the essence of virtue’ but ‘Of virtue in a broader sense,’ ‘Of what is left to say about the preconditions of virtue.’

Already in the second *Critique*, it was Kant's view that virtue is “moral disposition *in conflict*, and not *holiness* in the supposed *possession* of a complete *purity* of dispositions of the will” (KpV 5:84.33–35) which

25 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1141b14.

26 *Ibid.*, 1142a24.

27 *Ibid.*

is only due to gods and angels. Being non-sensible rational beings, gods and angels are never virtuous in the actual sense of the word (cf. TL 6:405.11–18). The obstacles *for a human being* to acquire a pure will are his empirical inclinations—insofar as they oppose the moral law. To have strength of will in moral matters means to follow the demands of pure practical reason even in the face of empirical inclinations. This is what the moral “*courage (fortitudo moralis)*” of a person’s will consists in, which in turn serves to realize “the *final end* of his existence on earth,” for it strives “for the ideal of humanity in its moral perfection” and is thus a part of “*wisdom* in the strict sense, namely practical wisdom” (TL 6:405.25–406.1).

II.3 Sections XIV–XVI: Of Strength of Will as a Foundation of Virtue

Let us recall Kant’s definition of virtue: Virtue is the “*strength* of a human being’s maxims in fulfilling his duty” (TL 6:394.15 f., italics I.G.).

How does a person acquire the strength necessary as the basis of virtue? What is it that is strong about her? What is the respective strength aiming at and what is it aiming against? Can a human being ever be certain of her strength? Kant dedicates the remaining sections XIV–XVI of the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue” to these questions.

According to Kant, strength in following one’s duty rests on three components: First, it presupposes inner freedom, that is, an aptitude of the will “to determine oneself to act through the thought of the law” (TL 6:407.13 f.) (section XIV). Second, strength of will implies a capacity of governing oneself. This is necessary when dealing with empirical inclinations in the form of affects and passions (section XV). Third, strength of will presupposes moral apathy, that is, the consciousness of a duty to follow the a priori, not the empirical sensible motivation in situations that require acting ethically (section XVI).

II.3.1 Section XIV: Strength of Will Presupposes Inner Freedom

After referring back to the principal difference between the doctrines of right and virtue respectively (cf. MS 6:214.13–30, 218.9–221.3; TL 6:379.3–12), Kant announces an elucidation of “*inner freedom*” as “the condition of all *duties of virtue*” at the beginning of section XIV (TL 6:406.32–34). Inner freedom is more than just “*aptitude*”, that is, a “facility in acting and a subjective perfection of *choice* [Willkür]” (TL

6:407.5 f., cf. TL 6:383.33). After all, this very facility in acting could have been acquired by long practice and uniformity of behavior and thus be based on thoughtless repetition and heteronomy rather than inner freedom. Nor does inner freedom denominate a capacity of subjective “*choice* [Willkür]” to decide between this or that subjective reason for acting. Rather, inner freedom consists in the property of the “*will*” to determine oneself “to act through the thought of the law” (TL 6:407.13–15).²⁸

For a human being to act on the basis of a will determined by the notion of the practical law, two subordinate capacities are necessary: First, the command of reason must not be covered by affects and passions; a person must be “*ruling oneself*” (TL 6:407.21). Additionally, her mind should be calm, reflected, and resolved so that she is her “own *master* in a given case” (TL 6:407.20), that is, in a morally relevant situation, thus enabling her to accept the command of reason. Both capacities taken together constitute what Kant calls a “noble,” elevated as opposed to a “mean” (TL 6:407.23–25), ignoble, and slavish character.

II.3.2 Section XV: Inner Freedom Entails a Capacity to Govern Oneself

The first component of inner freedom that Kant turns to in more detail is the capacity to govern oneself (cf. TL 6:407.21). This capacity is supposed to keep in check affects and passions. Affects and passions like anger and hatred are two distinct phenomena. Affects are a part of “*feeling*” (TL 6:407.30); they are quick and vehement but never run deep. Parallel passages in the *Anthropology* (§§74 f.) call the “affect” a “surprise through sensation, by means of which the mind’s composure” is “suspended.” Affects temporarily weaken reason and understanding, and lead to rashness. Passion, however, is deeply rooted and calculating. It “takes its time and reflects, no matter how fierce it may be,” it is “deceitful and hidden,” and “persistent” to “the point of dementia” in the pursuit of its ends (cf. Anth 7:252.3–36).

Affects are less opposed to virtue than passions because they only temporarily weaken reason and understanding while passions accept evil into the maxim “as something premeditated” (TL 6:408.12 f.) and tend to manifest themselves in vice. Although Kant conspicuously expounds the difference between affect and passion, the two objects of governing oneself, he does not supply an explanation of *how* they can be governed.

28 See the subtle remarks in Engstrom, 2002.

For the systematic difference between the two objects should account for a nameable systematic difference of the respective forms of governing oneself, say, whether, as in the case of affects, reason and understanding are only temporarily clouded by sensible excitement, or as in the case of passions, reason has to facilitate a change from immoral to moral maxims in principle.

II.3.3 Section XVI: Inner Freedom Entails the Capacity for Moral Apathy

The second component of inner freedom is “*moral apathy*” (TL 6:408.30). The word *apatheia* is of Greek origin,²⁹ consisting of the privative prefix ‘*a*’ and the word ‘*pathos*’ (from Greek: passion, affect), and meaning something like insensibility, sedateness or absence of affects. ‘*Apatheia*’ is a fundamental concept of late classic ethics: Introduced into Stoic philosophy via the Cynic Antisthenes³⁰, it is a presupposition for the attainment of the highest ethical good, the imperturbable soul, which is a sign of the sage for both schools of thought. Differences about the reach of the concept of *apatheia* arose early on. In a moderate sense, it was understood to mean the repelling of and rule over passionate, destructive emotions; in a more radical sense, it was interpreted as a complete extinction of affects and emotions. This radical interpretation of *apatheia* was repudiated by Cicero, among others, who argued that a person without passions resembles a “rock”³¹ more than she does a human being.

Kant refers to discussions about the extension of the concept of *apatheia* in the beginning of section XVI, when he writes that the word “has fallen into disrepute, as if it meant lack of feeling and so subjective indifference with respect to objects of choice [Willkür]; it is taken for weakness” (TL 6:408.26–28). Kant agrees with the opinion that indifference against *all* feelings and subjective desires is unnatural and exaggerated. For there are any number of “*adiaphora*,” things that are “*morally indifferent*,” and questions which undoubtedly allow a person to follow her empirical feelings and preferences deriving therefrom without violating ethical commands (cf. TL 6:409.13–17). Kant mentions issues such as “whether I eat meat or fish, drink beer or wine” (TL 6:409.13–17).

29 Cf. Aristotle, *De anima*, 429a29.

30 Cf. Diogenes Laertios, *Lives*, I.VI.1, pp. 13 ff.

31 Cicero, *Tusculum*, III.12.

He recommends a purified apathy (cf. Anth 7:253.19–254.25), that is, a behavior aloof of one's own empirical inclinations, *whenever moral decisions are concerned*. It is only this interpretation of the concept as a "strength" that Kant calls "*moral apathy*" (TL 6:408.24, 30). It implies an "absence of affects" concerning "feelings arising from sensible impressions" if and only if another feeling, namely the a priori feeling of "respect for the law is more powerful than all such feelings together" (cf. TL 6:408.29–33)³².

Besides, Kant remarks that an exaggerated "affect, even one aroused by the thought of *what is good*," is detrimental to "the state of *health* in the moral life" (TL 6:409.10–12). A pathologically excessive enthusiasm, even if it is directed at virtue, is wrong; on the one hand, because a strong feeling is followed by an according exhaustion, rendering the enthusiast of virtue even more apt to a subsequent non-observance of virtue, on the other hand, because the person who does not acknowledge the existence of morally indifferent things, "would turn the government of virtue into tyranny" (TL 6:409.19). Grounding virtue on inner freedom includes not having oneself enchained by exaggerated virtuousness.

Remark

Kant sums up the double character of virtue in aphoristic acuteness: "Virtue is always *in progress* and yet always starts *from the beginning*" (TL 6:409.21 f.). Virtue's paradoxical features emerge from an interplay of an objective and a subjective trait. When measured against its objective ideal of an unchallenged compliance with duty, virtue is always in progress. When measured against the subjective reality of a compliance with duty, which is permanently challenged by empirical inclinations and personal preferences, virtue starts from the beginning again and again.

References

- Aristotle [1995a], *Nicomachean Ethics*, in: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 1729–1867.
- Aristotle [1995b], *De anima*, in: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 641–692.

32 Cf. Denis, 2000, pp. 52 f.; Wood, 1999, p. 252.

- Betzler, Monika (ed.) (2008), *Kant's Ethics of Virtue*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius [1971], *Tusculan Disputations*, in: *Works*, vol. 17, Eric Herbert Warmington (ed.), trans. by Justin E. King, Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press.
- Denis, Lara (2000), "Kant's Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy", in: *Kantian Review*, vol. 4, pp. 48–73.
- Diogenes Laertius [1972], "Antisthenes", in: *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, vol. 2, Eric Herbert Warmington (ed.), trans. by Robert D. Hicks, Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 2–23.
- Engstrom, Stephen (2002), "The Inner Freedom of Virtue", in: Mark Timmons (ed.), *Kant's 'Metaphysics of Morals': Interpretative Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 289–315.
- Forkl, Markus (2001), "Die Abschnitte XII–XVII. Kants Tugendepistemologie", in: id., *Kants System der Tugendpflichten: Eine Begleitschrift zu den 'Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Tugendlehre'*, Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, pp. 87–105.
- Goy, Ina (2007), "Immanuel Kant über das moralische Gefühl der Achtung", in: *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, vol. 61, pp. 337–360.
- Guyer, Paul (2010), "Moral Feelings in the 'Metaphysics of Morals'", in: Lara Denis (ed.), *Kant's 'Metaphysics of Morals': A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 130–151.
- Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus) [1999], *Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica*, lat.-engl., Eric Herbert Warmington (ed.), trans. by H. Rushton Fairclough, Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press.
- Horn, Christoph (2008), "The Concept of Love in Kant's Virtue Ethics", in: Betzler (ed.) (2008), pp. 147–173.
- Hume, David (1739/40) [2000], *A Treatise of Human Nature*, David Fate Norton/Mary J. Norton (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hutcheson, Francis (1728) [1999], "Illustrations upon the Moral Sense", in: *On the Nature and the Conduct of the Passions with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, Manchester: Clinamen Press, pp. 107–165.
- Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso) [1925], *Metamorphoses*, vol. 1, lat.-engl., Eric Herbert Warmington (ed.), trans. by Frank Justus Miller, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus [1965], "On tranquillity of mind", in: *Moral Essays*, vol. 2, lat.-engl., Eric Herbert Warmington (ed.), trans. by John W. Basore, Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 202–285.
- Schönecker, Dieter (2010), "Kant über Menschenliebe als moralische Gemütsanlage", in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 92, pp. 133–175.
- Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper (1699) [1999], "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit", in: id., *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 163–230.
- Timmermann, Jens (2006), "Kant on Conscience, 'Indirect' Duty, and Moral Error", in: *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 46, pp. 293–308.
- Wood, Allen W. (1999), *Kant's Ethical Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.