



The Epistemology of Testimony

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CHAPTER

4 Liberal Fundamentalism and Its Rivals

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Abstract

Liberal Fundamentalism is anti-reductionist about the justification for testimony-based beliefs. Liberal Fundamentalism holds that it is *a priori* necessary that if a subject *S* (seemingly) comprehends a (seeming) presentation-as-true by a (seeming) speaker that *P*, and if that causes or sustains in the normal way *S*'s belief that *P*, then that confers justification on *S*'s belief that *P*. Whether one finds this position initially plausible or an obvious non-starter depends in large part on one's prior position on the nature of epistemic justification. It is shown that some common arguments against it depend on substantive views on epistemic justification. A weak version is defended against the common objection that the Liberal view is too permissive. The weak version insists that only *pro tanto* justification results from basing beliefs on comprehending apparent presentation-as-true, and that additional supporting reasons are often required for on balance justification. The additional supporting reasons, however, need not be reductive reasons.

Keywords: testimony, foundationalism, justification, anti-reductionism, comprehension

Subject: Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics

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Many hold that perception is a source of epistemically basic (direct) belief: for justification, perceptual beliefs do not need positive inferential support from other justified beliefs, especially from beliefs about one's current sensory episodes. Perceptual beliefs can, however, be defeated or undermined by other things one believes, and so to be justified in the end there must be no undefeated undermining grounds. Similarly for memory and introspection.¹

Testimony-based beliefs are as indispensable as perception, memory, and introspection-based beliefs.² Many of our testimony-based beliefs are epistemically justified. Indeed, most of what we justifiably believe we believe, at least in part, on the basis of comprehending and accepting the word of others.

The testimony debate is largely over whether testimony-based beliefs are epistemically inferential or, like perception, memory, and introspection-based beliefs, epistemically direct. One side holds that a testimony-based belief is justified just in case the hearer has no reason to believe that the speaker is either insincere or unreliable. The other holds that a testimony-based belief is justified only if the hearer does possess positive reasons to think that the speaker is either sincere or reliable or both.³ Advocates of the direct view include Burge (1993, 1997, 1999), Coady (1973, 1992), Dummett (1993), Goldberg (Chapter 6 in this volume), McDowell (1998), Quinton (1973), Ross (1986), Rysiew (2000), Stevenson (1993), Strawson (1994), and Weiner (2003) among others. It goes back to Reid. Those who reject the direct include Adler (2002), Audi (1997, 2002, 2004, Chapter 1 in this volume), Kusch (2002), Lackey (2003, Chapter 8 in this volume), Lehrer (1994), Lyons (1997), Faulkner (2000), Fricker (1987, 1994, 1995, 2002, Chapter 10 in this volume), and Root (1998, 2001), among others. It goes back to Hume.

p. 94 In this essay I articulate and defend a version of the direct view. I shall call it ‘Liberal Fundamentalism’. The Liberal Fundamentalist holds (to be qualified below) that it is a priori necessary that comprehending an attester's presentation-as-true that P confers justification on the recipient's belief that P. There is a Strong and a Weak version. The Strong version holds that (absent defeat) the event or state of comprehending the attester's presentation-as-true that P provides *on balance* justification for the belief that P, whereas the Weak version holds that the justification provided or conferred may fall short of on balance justification (even if undefeated).

This paper has two parts. The first articulates Liberal Fundamentalism and some of its central rivals. The second articulates and defends the Weak version.

The theme of the first part is that what one says about the testimony debate is driven in large part by one's overall theoretical orientation on the nature of epistemic justification, including one's epistemology of epistemology. The theme of the second is that one particular version of the direct view (Weak Liberal Fundamentalism) is more plausible than two of its immediate rivals (Strong Liberal Fundamentalism and Moderate Fundamentalism).

I use three new ideas. The first is a list of different versions of foundationalism. The second is a new taxonomy of theories of epistemic justification. The third is the distinction between *pro tanto* and on balance justification.

Liberal Fundamentalism

Four Versions of Foundationalism

Liberal Fundamentalism is a combination of two doctrines. The first is about *which* epistemic principles (given below) are true, and the second is about *why* they are true. The first doctrine I call ‘Liberal *foundationalism*’ and the second I call ‘Intuitionism’. In the rest of this section I articulate Liberal foundationalism. In the next I explain Intuitionism.

Different versions of foundationalism are defined by which of the following epistemic principles they accept as true:

- (AP) If it seems to S upon understanding P that P is self-evident or necessary, then the belief that P is *prima facie pro tanto* justified.
- (INT) If it introspectively seems to S as if S is occurrently having a sensory, perceptual or otherwise conscious experience such and such, and this causes or sustains in the

normal way the belief that S is experiencing such and such, then that confers justification on S's belief.

- (DED) If S believes P and believes (P entails Q) and believes Q on the basis of inferring Q from P and (P entails Q), then S's belief that Q is conditionally justified.
- (MEM) \hookrightarrow If S seems to remember that P and this causes or sustains in the normal way S's belief that P, then that confers justification on S's belief that P.
- (EIND) If S possesses a sufficiently large and representative (nonbiased) inductive base where all (most) Fs are Gs, then were S to infer that all (most) Fs are Gs on that basis, then S's belief that all (most) Fs are Gs would be conditionally justified by the inference.
- (IBE) If S possesses one explanation that better explains S's evidence than any other available alternative explanation, then S is justified in believing that explanation on the basis of the evidence.
- (PER) If S's perceptual system represents an object x as F (where F is a perceptible property), and this causes or sustains in the normal way S's belief of x that it is F, then that confers justification on S's belief that x is F.
- (TEST) If a subject S (seemingly) comprehends a (seeming) presentation-as-true by a (seeming) speaker that P, and if that causes or sustains in the normal way S's belief that P, then that confers justification on S's belief that P.

One can find four versions of foundationalism embraced in the literature: Reactionary, Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal foundationalism (the labels are new, the positions are familiar). The Reactionary accepts the first three but no more, the Conservative the first five, the Moderate the first six, and the Liberal all seven.

Reactionary: AP, INT, DED

Conservative: AP, INT, DED, MEM, EIND, IBE

Moderate: AP, INT, DED, MEM, EIND, IBE, PER

Liberal: AP, INT, DED, MEM, EIND, IBE, PER, TEST

The Liberal foundationalist thus has three foundationalist rivals. The pure coherentist is a rival to *all* foundationalist views. The pure coherentist rejects the direct/inferential distinction altogether, and so rejects all of the principles listed above. The pure coherentist embraces only COH:

- (COH) If the belief that P is a member of S's coherent set of beliefs R, then S's belief that P is justified to the degree that R is coherent.

I set aside coherentism about testimony in what follows. I intend to treat it elsewhere.

Liberal Fundamentalists are *Liberal foundationalists* that give one of four possible answers to *why* the epistemic principles they embrace are *true*. I characterize the four possible answers next.

Elsewhere I have developed and defended a new taxonomy of theories of epistemic justification (forthcoming). On my new taxonomy, there are four different theories on the nature of epistemic justification. Each theory or perspective provides an answer to *why* any epistemic principle is true. I shall describe and make use of that taxonomy here.

The standard taxonomy relies upon two distinctions: foundationalism vs. coherentism and internalism vs. externalism. Though the standard taxonomy is useful and important, my new taxonomy relies on two different distinctions. The first concerns the relationship between justification and truth. The second concerns the epistemic (a priori or empirical) and modal (necessary or contingent) status of the epistemic principles.

The first distinction involves the relation between justification and truth. Everyone agrees that epistemic justification is connected to truth (Audi 1988; BonJour 1999, 2002; Burge 2004). Disagreement emerges when one asks *how* it is connected to truth. There are two possible answers: either justification *makes* a belief objectively more likely to be true, or justification *properly aims* belief at the truth (Audi 1988). An “Actual Result” theorist holds the former, a “Proper Aim” theorist holds the latter. Actual Result theorists are like consequentialists about moral rightness where an act is right provided that it has good consequences, and Proper Aim theorists are like non-consequentialists. One way to get a grip on the distinction is to reflect on the demon-worlds objection to reliabilism. If you think a subject fooled by an evil demon may still enjoy justified perceptual, memorial, inductive, abductive, and other beliefs (even though they are not *de facto* reliably held), then you are more likely to be a Proper Aim theorist. If, on the contrary, you think those beliefs cannot be justified because not likely to be true, then you are more likely to be an Actual Result theorist. To telegraph, the Liberal Fundamentalist is a Proper Aim theorist.

The second distinction involves the epistemic and modal status of the epistemic principles. The “Fundamentalist” holds that the true epistemic principles are conceptually necessary, a priori knowable truths. The “Non-Fundamentalist” rejects this; the true epistemic principles are contingent, only empirically knowable truths. For example, if PER is true, the Fundamentalist thinks it is an a priori necessary, conceptual truth, whereas the Non-Fundamentalist thinks it is only a contingent, empirical truth. If PER is known to be true, the Fundamentalist thinks this is a piece of philosophical knowledge, whereas the Non-Fundamentalist thinks this is a piece of empirical knowledge, part of the subject-matter of the natural or social sciences.

p. 97 The two distinctions are orthogonal; they determine four possible (and familiar) theories of justification: *Cartesianism, Reliabilism, Intuitionism, and Pragmatism* (see Fig. 4.1) ↪ Using our definitions of the two distinctions, we can define the four positions:

Figure 4.1

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	Actual-Result	Proper-Aim
Fundamentalism	Cartesianism	Intuitionism
Non-Fundamentalism	Reliabilism	Pragmatism

Four Theoretical Perspectives on Justification.

	Actual-Result	Proper-Aim
Fundamentalism	Cartesianism	Intuitionism
Non-Fundamentalism	Reliabilism	Pragmatism

Cartesianism: a belief is justified only if held in a way which is a priori known or knowable to *either* necessarily make the belief true *or* make the belief true more likely than not in all worlds. The way held confers justification only if it is a priori knowable that it is *either* **every-instance** reliable *or* **all-worlds** reliable.

Reliabilism: a belief is justified only if held in a way that **de facto** makes the belief more likely than not to be true in the actual circumstances of use. The way held confers justification only if **de facto** reliable.

Intuitionism: a belief is justified only if held in a way that is a priori known or knowable to constitute properly aiming belief at truth, where “properly aiming belief at truth” means conformity to a priori necessary epistemic principles (listed above), and does not require de facto or all-worlds reliability.⁴

Pragmatism: a belief is justified only if held in a way that *de facto* constitutes properly aiming the belief at truth, where “properly aiming belief at truth” means conformity to our deepest held norms of proper belief formation (where “our” can mean the subject, the discipline, the community, the tradition, or the species).

Although each perspective, as stated, only places a necessary condition on justification, I shall, for the sake of illumination, treat each perspective as placing both a necessary and sufficient condition on justification.

Each perspective places conditions on what it takes for a belief held in a certain way to enjoy justification. Each perspective explains why an epistemic principle is true if true. It will also explain why a principle is false if false. It is easiest to see this in the case of the Cartesian. The Cartesian will only accept, at best, **AP**, **INT**, and **DED**, for only (some) a priori insight, introspection of one's current sensory episodes, and deductive reasoning, are likely candidates for ways of forming and holding beliefs that pass the Cartesian test; they are the only three ways of holding belief likely to be reliable in all worlds. The Cartesian will reject the other principles as false.

p. 98 Which principles the other three theoretical perspectives would accept is much harder to determine. The Intuitionist accepts only those principles that are a priori, conceptually necessary truths, but it is not obvious right at the start which ones pass that test and which ones do not. One aim of this essay is to contribute to sorting out just which considerations are relevant and which ones are not to determining whether **TEST**, for example, is a priori necessary.⁵

The Reliabilist accepts only those principles that govern *de facto* reliable methods of belief acquisition and retention. It is not the job of the philosopher to figure out which ones are reliable, but rather the job of the cognitive scientist. Which ones will show up on the Reliabilist's list is an open question until the empirical inquiry is complete. It is the job of the philosopher to analyze justification and reliability; it is the job of the scientist to discover which processes are reliable.

The Pragmatist accepts only those principles that govern methods of belief acquisition and retention that are individually or socially embraced as the right methods. Which ones will show up on her list, is to be decided by the individual, the sociologist or the anthropologist.⁶

Liberal Fundamentalism and its Rivals

The two pieces are now in place to characterize both the Liberal Fundamentalist and certain rivals. The Liberal *Fundamentalist* is a Liberal *foundationalist* about *which* epistemic principles are true and an *Intuitionist* about *why* they are true; all seven epistemic principles are, for the Liberal Fundamentalist, a priori necessary truths.

The Liberal Fundamentalist has a number of rivals. Within the Intuitionist camp, the Reactionary, the Conservative, and the Moderate Fundamentalist are all rivals. A Coherentist that accepts Intuitionism (and so AP as well as COH) is also a rival. So too is the Pure Coherentist. Any non-Intuitionist view is, by definition, a rival; Cartesians, Reliabilists, and Pragmatists are *ipso facto* rivals, even if they are sympathetic to, or even embrace, TEST. Any Non-Fundamentalist view is, by definition, a rival; if you don't believe epistemic principles are a priori knowable conceptual truths, then *a fortiori* you don't believe TEST is a priori necessary. If you are a Coherentist (Adler), a Reactionary (Fumerton), a Conservative (BonJour, Feldman), a Moderate (Pollock, Huemer), a Cartesian (Fumerton), a Reliabilist (Goldman), or a Pragmatist (Foley, Kusch), the Liberal Fundamentalist is one of your rivals.⁷

p. 99 An interesting rival is the Moderate Fundamentalist. This is for three reasons. Firstly, there are many Moderate Fundamentalists; it is a live position. Secondly, the “testimony debate” (described at the opening) receives a sharp formulation when characterized as the debate between the Moderate and the Liberal Fundamentalist; the Liberal thinks (many) testimony-based beliefs are direct, the Moderate thinks they are all (necessarily) inferential. Lastly, the Moderate is a close rival to the Liberal. If there is a deep and convincing reason to think the Liberal cannot be right, it is a reason the Moderate should be able to articulate consistent with her position. Moderate Fundamentalism is thus a live position that is a clear occupant of one side of the testimony debate, and if there is a reason not to be a Liberal, the Moderate should be able to advance it.

In the rest of this section I say more about the Moderate-Liberal debate. In the next I explain why the Moderate is not entitled to make four particular arguments against the Liberal. This shows that whether something is a good reason for (or against) an epistemic principle is largely a function of which theoretical perspective is true. If Intuitionism is true, some considerations are relevant, others are not.

To better understand the Moderate-Liberal debate, consider first the parallel disagreement between the Conservative and the Moderate. The Conservative rejects PER; the Moderate embraces it. The Conservative thinks perception is *epistemically neutral*: a perceptual representation is, *in itself*, no reason or ground to believe anything at all about the external environment. For the Conservative, a perceptual belief is justified only if it can be inferentially supported by other, non-perceptual beliefs. Traditionally this means the subject must be able to infer that the way things seem to her in perceptual consciousness is best explained by the real world hypothesis. She cannot essentially rely upon any perceptual beliefs as premises. She needs to be able to infer that how things introspectively seem to her corresponds to the way they are in the world. If she can, she will have epistemically “reduced” perceptual beliefs to beliefs based on introspection and reason. Perceptual beliefs are, for the Conservative, epistemically inferential. The Moderate, on the other hand, is not so demanding. Perceptual beliefs are, for the Moderate, epistemically direct. The Conservative is a “reductionist” about perceptual beliefs; the Moderate is an “anti-reductionist”.

The Moderate-Liberal disagreement is analogous. The Moderate holds that testimony-based beliefs, if justified, are justified inferentially on the basis of non-testimony-based beliefs; comprehending the presentation-as-true of another is, *in itself*, *epistemically neutral*. It is, *as such*, no reason or ground to believe that what the speaker said is true (Pritchard 2004: 328–30). The subject must be able to infer from non-testimony-based beliefs that testimony-based beliefs are, for the most part, reliable or justified in order for her testimony-based beliefs to be justified. The qualification “non-testimonial” is essential. The hearer

cannot appeal to testimony-based beliefs about the reliability of testimony in an ineliminable way for that would presuppose that (at least some) testimony-based beliefs are justified without inferential support. If A's say-so that P is, in itself, no reason to believe P, then B's say-so that A is trustworthy is, in itself, no reason to believe A.

p. 100 The natural way to “reduce” (inferentially support in the required way) testimony would be for the hearer to appeal to his own first-hand experience of the reliability of the particular speaker, or speakers of that kind, or of testimony \hookrightarrow in general.⁸ The hearer would have to (be able to) “reduce” his testimony-based beliefs to beliefs purged of testimonial reliance, using either enumerative induction or inference to the best explanation. If she could do it, her testimony-based beliefs would thereby epistemically “reduce” to inductively based (reasoned) beliefs, beliefs inferred from or based on a non-testimonial induction base; justified testimonial beliefs *just are* beliefs “reductively” justifiable.

The Moderate is more demanding than the Liberal, just as the Conservative is more demanding than the Moderate. The Liberal does not require the subject to “reduce” testimony-based beliefs to non-testimony-based beliefs; the Liberal is an “anti-reductionist” about testimony while the Moderate is a “reductionist.”

There are two standard objections to reductionism about testimony. They parallel two standard objections to reductionism about perception. The first is the “paucity of evidence argument”. The argument is that the reduction is not possible, for actual agents do not possess enough first-hand evidence to carry it out. Hence if ordinary testimony-based beliefs are, by and large, justified, then “reductionism” (Moderate foundationalism, Fundamentalist or not) is false (Coady 1992; cp. Fricker 1994, 1995; Lipton 1998; Lyons 1997). The second is that even if the reduction is possible, requiring it is overly demanding; the requirement to reduce hyper-intellectualizes testimonial justification (Burge 1993; Strawson 1994; cp. Adler 2002). These two objections parallel objections to reductionism about perception. The first is that the “reduction” cannot succeed; subjects cannot derive the justification for perceptual beliefs from non-perceptual beliefs. The second is that the “reduction”, even if it is possible, is too demanding on ordinary subjects.

So far I have introduced two new ideas: the four versions of foundationalism defined in terms of the epistemic principles, and the four theories of the nature of epistemic justification. I used those new ideas to describe the Liberal Fundamentalist and her rivals: Cartesians, Reliabilists, Pragmatists, coherentists and other foundationalist Intuitionists. I then compared the Liberal to a close rival, the Moderate Fundamentalist. In the next section I show why four possible arguments against the Liberal are ineffective on the assumption that at least the first six principles (the ones the Moderate embraces) are a priori necessary truths; i.e. on the assumption that Intuitionism is correct. This will show that what one thinks about which principles are true is largely a function of which of the four theoretical perspectives one employs. The next section concludes the first main part of the paper.

Four Arguments Against Liberal Fundamentalism

Let us assume that Intuitionism is correct, and also that at least the first six epistemic principles are all a priori necessary truths, but that it is still an open question whether TEST is also a priori necessary. In this section I explain why four arguments against TEST are ineffective on that assumption.

p. 101 The first argument goes like this. Testimony is not a necessarily reliable process; error and deceit might outnumber truth and sincerity (Graham 2000a). Hence it cannot be a priori necessary that comprehending the presentation-as-true of another confers justification on belief in what the speaker presented-as-true (cp. Adler 2002; Bonjour 2002; Fricker 1994; Faulkner 2000). This argument is ineffective on the assumption that Intuitionism is correct, for necessary reliability is not a necessary condition upon justification (either direct or inferential justification). The Cartesian places this condition upon justification; the Intuitionist

(and so the Moderate Fundamentalist) does not. If Intuitionism is true (and so Cartesianism is false), the mere fact that testimony is not necessarily reliable is neither here nor there.

The second argument has two versions. The first goes as follows. Perceptual beliefs are *de facto* more reliable than testimony-based beliefs, hence perceptual justification is direct and testimonial justification is inferential. The second goes like this. Testimony-based beliefs inferentially backed by non-testimony-based beliefs are more reliable than testimony-based beliefs without such backing. Hence testimony-based beliefs without inferential backing from non-testimony-based beliefs are not justified but beliefs with such backing are. Hence testimonial justification is inferential and not direct. Both versions rely upon the principle that differences in *degree* of reliability determine differences in epistemic *kind* (inferential vs. direct) (cf. Goldman 1979, 1992; Pritchard 2004: 343–4). But if the Moderate is right this principle is false. This is because introspection may be more reliable than perception, and perception may be more reliable than memory (with or without backing), but introspection, perception, and memory are all, according to the Moderate, epistemically *direct*. The Moderate does not reason from differences in *degree* of reliability to differences in epistemic *kind*. *A fortiori*, if perception supported by other beliefs is more reliable than perception without such support, it does *not* follow that perceptual-beliefs without such support enjoy *no* justification (that they are epistemically *neutral*). And so, if testimony-based beliefs epistemically supported by other beliefs are more reliable than beliefs without such support, it again does not follow that beliefs without such support enjoy no justification as such, that they are epistemically neutral.

The third argument goes like this. **TEST** is true only if testimony without inferential backing is a *de facto* reliable belief-forming process. However, it is not. Hence **TEST** is false. But the Moderate Fundamentalist cannot argue this way, for the Moderate is not a Reliabilist. At best he can offer defeaters by appeal to *de facto* reliability considerations. If Intuitionism is correct and Reliabilism is not, considerations of *de facto* reliability do not in themselves determine what necessary *a priori* epistemic principles are true. Reliability considerations must play a part in a *complete* treatment of testimony (especially for testimonial *knowledge*), but if Intuitionism is correct, *de facto* reliability (itself) does not enter into whether a source does or does not confer *justification*.⁹

p. 102 The fourth argument goes as follows. Justified perceptual beliefs sometimes defeat testimony-based beliefs. Hence perceptual beliefs are “epistemically prior” to testimony-based beliefs. Hence testimony-based beliefs depend upon positive epistemic support from perceptual beliefs for justification; testimony is inferential and not direct. The principle this argument relies upon is that if a belief from source N sometimes defeats a belief from source M, source M cannot be direct but must be inferential. The Moderate Fundamentalist, however, must reject this principle. That is because the Moderate accepts that perception, memory, and introspection are all sources of direct justification, but also must accept that perceptual beliefs sometimes defeat memory beliefs, that memory beliefs sometimes defeat perceptual beliefs, that introspective beliefs sometimes defeat perceptual beliefs, that perceptual beliefs sometimes defeat introspective beliefs, that introspective beliefs sometimes defeat memory beliefs, and that memory beliefs sometimes defeat introspective beliefs. The Moderate accepts **INT**, **MEM**, and **PER**, and so holds that these sources produce justified beliefs. If they do, they also produce defeaters for other beliefs, sometimes beliefs from those very sources. That a source is a source of defeaters for beliefs from another source, or even from itself, does not show that the other source depends for justification on inferential support from another source, or even from itself. Applied to testimony, this means that the argument does not show that testimony depends upon non-testimonial sources for justification. The fact that my perception defeats your testimony does not show testimony is inferential and not direct. Indeed, the fact that testimony-based beliefs sometimes defeat perceptual beliefs does not show that testimony is prior to perception. For example, you say you see a VW coming over the horizon and I correct you. Then my testimony would defeat your perceptual belief. But that possibility, though familiar, clearly does not show that you must inferentially support (derive) all of your perceptual beliefs from testimony-based beliefs.

These four arguments all fall short if we assume that the first six epistemic principles are a priori necessary, that at least Moderate Fundamentalism is correct. They all also fall short even if we assume Conservative Fundamentalism, for the Conservative does not rely upon necessary reliability, differences in degree of reliability, *de facto* reliability, or relations of defeat to determine epistemic kinds.

What if we were to assume Cartesianism (and so assume Reactionary Fundamentalism, for instance) instead of Intuitionism? That *would* show that **TEST** is false, for testimony is not necessarily reliable (BonJour 2002). But it would also show that **PER** and other sources of direct and inferential justification are false. It would not give us a reason to think that **TEST** *itself* is suspect.

p. 103 What if we were to assume Reliabilism or Pragmatism? Then, possibly, some of the arguments just listed would show that there are (contingent) differences in epistemic kind; they could show that while perception, memory, and introspection (or certain kinds of perceptual belief forming processes and methods, and so on for memory and introspection) are direct, testimony is inferential. If testimony is not *de facto* reliable but perception is, or perception is considerably more \hookrightarrow reliable than testimony, then perception confers justification without inferential backing (according to the Reliabilist) but testimony does not. Or if testimony-based beliefs without inferential backing are held by the relevant community to fall short of justification but beliefs with such backing are held to pass the test, then (according to the Pragmatist), perception is direct but testimony is inferential (Goldman 1979, 1992).

What one thinks about the epistemic status of testimony is thus largely a function of what theoretical perspective one holds about the nature of epistemic justification generally and further what one thinks about the relevant facts. If you *are* an Intuitionist, certain familiar considerations, I have just argued, do not undermine Liberal Fundamentalism. But if you are *not* an Intuitionist, then you think Liberal Fundamentalism is *ipso facto* false and **TEST** is not a priori necessary. **TEST** may still be an empirical contingent truth, but that depends upon which rival perspective is correct and how the facts turn out. What you think about testimony is driven in large part by what theoretical perspective on epistemic justification you think is correct. It will largely determine what considerations lead you to embrace or reject **TEST**. If you are *not* an Intuitionist, certain considerations are *relevant*. But if you *are*, those very considerations may be neither here nor there.

I have discussed only four arguments against the Liberal here. There are a number of other possible arguments. I shall discuss one such argument in the next section. I have discussed some other arguments elsewhere.¹⁰

I have now concluded the first main part of this essay. I have described Liberal Fundamentalism and (some of) its rivals and shown that certain arguments against it are ineffective on the assumption that Intuitionism is correct. I have not, however, argued that Intuitionism *is* correct. That is a very large topic best treated at length on another occasion. Nor have I argued that the Liberal is correct. That too is a large topic for another time. However, I do say a few things in defense of the Liberal in the next part of the paper.

Weak Liberal Fundamentalism

In this part I make use of the third new idea, the distinction between *pro tanto* and on balance justification. I use it to distinguish Strong and Weak readings of the epistemic principles, and then two versions each (Strong and Weak) of both Moderate and Liberal Fundamentalism. I compare Weak Liberal Fundamentalism with its Strong Liberal and Moderate rivals. I then respond to an objection against the Liberal. The objection does not require the falsity of Intuitionism for its force; it is an objection the Moderate is free to lodge against her Liberal rival. The Weak version *prima facie* avoids the objection while the Strong version does not. Weak Liberal Fundamentalism thus emerges as the more plausible variant.

In this section I distinguish between *pro tanto* and on balance justification. I should first say a few words about *prima facie* justification.

It is customary to qualify principles governing justification with the phrase “prima facie”. Each principle given above thus should include “prima facie” in between the words “confers” and “justification”. *Prima facie* justification is *defeasible* justification. Further information may undermine or override the justification one holds for a belief. So if I seem to see a red apple on the picnic table, then the experience, many would hold, confers perceptual justification on the belief that there is a red apple before me. But if I am told or have reason to believe that it is a fake, or if I remember taking mind-altering drugs just before coming to the picnic, then my justification has been defeated. In order to regain the justification from the perceptual experience I would need to defeat the defeaters with even further information. I would have to have a reason to believe that you are fooling, or that it is probably is not a fake, or a reason to believe that the mind-altering drugs have no effect on how well I see things. If there are no defeaters in the first place, or if the defeaters present have been defeated in turn by further information, then the *prima facie* justification I enjoy is not defeated (defeat is absent).

Is lack of defeat sufficient to convert *prima facie* justification into *on balance* justification? The standard view is that it is. Witness Alston and Huemer:

I have proposed an account of the *prima facie* epistemic justification of beliefs . . . The justification will be *ultima facie* provided there are not sufficient overrides from within the subject's knowledge and justified beliefs. (Alston 1988: 227)

When a belief is said to be *prima facie* justified . . . the belief's justification can be defeated by countervailing evidence. . . . The appearances are presumed true, unless proven false. This means that when it seems as if P and no evidence emerges contravening P, it is reasonable to accept P. (Huemer 2001: 100)

Though commonplace, I believe this is incorrect, at least for both perceptual and testimonial justification. Undefeated *prima facie* justification is not *a priori* equivalent to *on balance* justification. I distinguish *pro tanto* from *prima facie* justification. I then distinguish Strong from Weak versions of both Moderate and Liberal Fundamentalism. The Strong view holds that undefeated *prima facie* justification necessarily converts to on balance justification. The Weak view does not. In the rest of this section I shall focus on perception, turning to testimony in the sections following. The Weak view for perceptual justification is supported by the examples that mark the distinction.

p. 105 “Pro tanto”, as I understand it, means “as far as it goes” or “to that extent”. I contrast it with “on balance”. A *pro tanto* justification is a consideration in favor of a certain belief. If a certain belief is *pro tanto* justified by a perceptual ↵ experience it does not follow that the belief is justified *on balance*. A *pro tanto* justification may only justify the belief to a certain *degree*. Epistemologists have shown sensitivity to this distinction (e.g. Audi 2001; Pritchard 2004). Those sensitive to the distinction, however, have not marked it. Its significance should not be overlooked.¹¹

The distinction between *some* evidence and *enough* is obvious in the case of inductive reasoning. The distinction between *some* and *enough* also applies to cases of psychologically non-inferential, *prima facie* justified, perceptual beliefs. I will here show by a series of steps that the justification one has for an empirical perceptual belief comes in degrees. This is, of course, widely believed. But it implies that there is a point at which the justification converts from *pro tanto* to *on balance* justification, for it is also widely believed that many perceptual beliefs—beliefs held roughly as strongly as each other—are on balance justified, but not that *all* of them are (Goldman 1979).

Imagine looking through a narrow steel pipe and seeming to see only the outlines of a red apple. Here your visual experience is focused in on a single object and you have no other information about any other objects and relations before you. The rest is, as it were, all dark; you can't see anything else because the pipe is too narrow. Here it seems all you have justification for is that there is probably a red apple out there, and little justification for beliefs about its particular size or distance, whether it is sitting on something or being held up, and so forth, *from the experience itself*. You normally use other information that is presently lacking to help figure those things out. Suppose the experience causes you to believe (automatically and non-inferentially in the normal way) that there is a red apple of ordinary size a certain distance away. The experience confers *prima facie pro tanto* justification on the belief, but surely not *on balance* justification.

Now imagine removing the pipe and picking up more information. You can now see much more of the scene; your experience represents a good deal more than before. The visual experience of the red apple continues to confer some justification on the belief. The other parts of the enlarged experience confer more justification, and do so in two ways. First, they confer justification on related *beliefs*, such as that there is a table below the apple, a tree to the left, and so forth. All of these beliefs in turn confer some justification on the belief that there is an apple on the table by *integration*. And second, other parts of your visual field indirectly confer justification on the belief. The more the rest of the visual field makes intelligible the existence of a red apple before you, the more justified your belief is. All of your visual (and other sensory) experiences and beliefs *fit together*.

Consider third moving around the table. Then you will have a number of additional and distinct experiences of, and beliefs about, the apple. These will confer additional justification. Consider fourth the experiences retained in memory. They will also contribute. Consider also possible interactions with other people \hookrightarrow who also seem to see the apple. If they act as if all is normal, or talk about the apple, or pick it up and eat it, all of this confers additional justification on your belief.

All of this “evidence” is evidence “in the foreground”. But consider also all of your background knowledge about apples, picnic tables, medium sized-dry goods, the nature of vision and light, and so forth. These beliefs also contribute to the justification of your belief. These beliefs make up your evidence “in the background” (Adler 2002).

Your first visual experience through the pipe confers some justification on your belief that an apple is there. It looks like an apple. Additional experiences and beliefs then confer additional justification. Moving around the apple furthers this process. Touching it, eating it, talking about it, and so forth, makes a difference. It feels like an apple, tastes like an apple, and everyone agrees that it is an apple. At some point your *pro tanto* justification converts to *on balance* justification. Indeed, you go from *some* (less than enough) to *more than enough*.

Although the example involves an apple, the example is a standard one of perceptual belief. However, being an apple might not be a perceptible property. If not, the example can be substituted with a red solid sphere at a certain distance. A first quick glance from one eye with few surrounding distance cues of a partially occluded sphere may automatically and normally cause a belief that there is a red sphere at a certain distance. Binocular vision would confer more information and justification. Walking up to the sphere, walking around it (seeing all sides), touching it, and so on, all contribute justification. The first quick glance, though sufficient for belief, is not on its own sufficient for *on balance* justification.

It is clear that “coherence” (very broadly understood) plays an important role in converting *pro tanto* to *on balance* justification. Integration is essential. Many of the various visual and other perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs present the same “content”: that there is an apple. It is conceivable that *on balance* justification for a belief is only conferred on a belief that comes in a “cluster” of other beliefs, or comes along with a cluster of sensory or other relevant experiences (cf. Sosa 2002). A belief not inferentially based

on another may receive epistemic support from other beliefs, or from other “experiences”, from one or more sources, where the beliefs and experiences are all appropriate to the content of the target belief. Perhaps no on balance justified belief is an island.

This view of perceptual justification, though perhaps not entirely novel (cf. Haack 1993), is motivated by what moves both the foundationalist and, I think, the coherentist, without embracing the idea that justification somehow emerges from relations of mutual inferential support (where P justifies Q and Q justifies P), or that only a belief can confer justification on another belief. True, justification starts with experiences as the foundationalist supposes. True, such justification is often not enough as the coherentist supposes. False, I claim, that experience alone or inferential support from other beliefs *alone* is typically sufficient for on balance perceptual justification. Clusters of experience and belief convert *pro tanto* to on balance justification, at least for many ordinary perceptual beliefs.

Psychologically non-inferential beliefs are (or at least can be), from the epistemic point of view, both direct and indirect. They do not depend upon other beliefs for *prima facie pro tanto* justification, and so in that sense are immediately justified: direct. But they positively, and not just negatively, depend upon other beliefs for *on balance* or *sufficient* justification, and so in that sense are mediately justified: indirect. Thus the Moderate Fundamentalist should be an epistemic *inferentialist* about *on balance* justification, while remaining a *non-inferentialist* about *prima facie pro tanto* justification.

One might deny, or at least try to deflate the significance of, the distinction between *pro tanto* and on balance justification by distinguishing between either all-out-belief from degrees of belief, or belief that definitely P from belief that probably P, and then claiming that all *pro tanto* justification for a belief amounts to is just on balance justification for a belief that P held to a certain degree, or for a belief that P is likely to a certain degree. But this move would confuse the psychological with the epistemic. A wise man may proportion his belief to the evidence, but a tentative endorsement that P may still be strongly justified, and a resounding endorsement of P may only be weakly justified. We need terms to mark these facts.

The logical distinction between *prima facie* justification and *pro tanto* justification is this. *Prima facie* justification is necessarily defeasible. *Pro tanto* justification is not; indefeasible *pro tanto* justification is a conceptual possibility. There is a further contrast. Undefeated *prima facie* justification does not necessarily *imply* a possible falling short of on balance justification. Undefeated *prima facie* justification *could*, for some source of justification, *ipso facto* count as *on balance* justification. *Pro tanto* justification, however, just means justification that *may* fall short. ‘*Prima facie*’ means *defeasible* justification, ‘*pro tanto*’ means *some* justification.

I will not here try to say what exactly converts *some* justification into *enough*, or when *some* is enough. This is a complicated issue. I hope to discuss it elsewhere.

We can now state Strong and Weak readings of **PER**.

- (PERs) If S's perceptual system represents x as F (where F is a perceptible property), and this causes or sustains in the normal way S's belief of x that it is F, then that confers *prima facie* justification on S's belief.
- (PERw) If S's perceptual system represents x as F (where F is a perceptible property), and this causes or sustains in the normal way S's belief of x that it is F, then that confers *prima facie pro tanto* justification on S's belief.

The Weak Moderate foundationalist embraces **PER_w** without commenting on its modal status, and the Intuitionist version, the Weak Moderate Fundamentalist, embraces **PER_w** as a priori necessary. With the distinction between *pro tanto* and on balance justification in hand, and the corresponding distinction

p. 108 between ↪ Strong and Weak readings of the epistemic principles, I am now in a position to state and defend Weak Liberal Fundamentalism in the next section.

Weak Liberal Fundamentalism

Just as there are two possible versions of **PER**, so too there are two possible versions of **TEST**:

- (TESTs) If a subject S (seemingly) comprehends a (seeming) presentation-as-true by a (seeming) speaker that P, and if that causes or sustains in the normal way S's belief that P, then that confers *prima facie* justification on S's belief that P.
- (TESTw) If a subject S (seemingly) comprehends a (seeming) presentation-as-true by a (seeming) speaker that P, and if that causes or sustains in the normal way S's belief that P, then that confers *prima facie pro tanto* justification on S's belief that P.

I favor the weaker version. I say why below. Weak Liberal Fundamentalism, however, is not the standard version of Liberal Fundamentalism. The distinction between Weak and Strong versions has not been marked (Burge 1993: 467–8, 1997: 21, 22, 45 n. 4; Dummett 1993: 423; McDowell 1998: 435; Weiner 2003: 257; cp. Fricker 2002: 379; Lackey 1999: 474).¹²

Weak Liberal Fundamentalism is a position intermediate between Strong Liberal Fundamentalism and Moderate Fundamentalism (either Weak or Strong). The Strong Liberal Fundamentalist holds that a hearer's belief that P based on comprehending a presenter's presentation-as-true that P enjoys on balance justification absent defeat. The Strong position holds that *on balance* justification is (absent defeat) *direct*. The Moderate Fundamentalist, on the other hand, denies that testimony *as such* confers *any* justification on belief. Testimony is, according to the Moderate Fundamentalist, evidentially neutral. If any testimony-based belief enjoys any justification, its epistemic status is entirely inferential. Not only that, the inferential support must be of a certain sort; the reasons supporting the belief must not be ineliminably and wholly testimonial; the reasons must be *genuinely* “reductive” reasons. The Strong Liberal Fundamentalist denies that testimony-based beliefs must be supported by reasons, *a fortiori* by reductive reasons. And the Moderate Fundamentalist denies that *any* justification, *pro tanto* or on balance, for testimony-based beliefs is direct; *a fortiori* it denies that testimony enjoys direct *pro tanto* justification.

p. 109 The Weak Liberal stands in between these two positions. She agrees with the Strong Liberal that reductive reasons are not necessary for on balance justification. She agrees with the Moderate that testimony-based beliefs do not *as such* enjoy on balance justification (absent defeat). But she disagrees with the Strong Liberal that additional epistemic support is not often needed for on balance justification for testimonial beliefs, and it disagrees with the Moderate that genuinely reductive reasons are always required for any justification for testimony-based ↪ beliefs. The Weak Liberal holds that no additional support of any kind (reductive or non-reductive) is required for *prima facie pro tanto* justification, but also that additional support (whether reductive or non-reductive) is often required for on balance justification. When it comes to *pro tanto* justification, the Weak Liberal holds that testimony is epistemically *direct*. But when it comes to *on balance* justification, it holds that testimony is epistemically *inferential*. Weak Liberal Fundamentalism is weaker (it claims less about on balance justification) than Strong Liberal Fundamentalism but stronger than Moderate Fundamentalism.

An analogy may be helpful. Suppose an on balance justified belief that P costs a dollar. The Strong view holds that comprehending a presentation-as-true that P provides the hearer with an entire dollar. Absent other fees (defeaters), the hearer can buy the on balance justified belief. The Weak view holds that comprehending a presentation-as-true that P often fails to provide the hearer with an entire dollar, but for all that it provides the hearer with some money. With a little more money to spend, the hearer can buy the on balance justified

belief. The Moderate Fundamentalist, on the other hand, thinks comprehending a presentation-as-true that P is like a check. In itself it is worthless. Unless there is money in the bank backing up the check, you can't buy anything with it. And the money in the bank, according to the Moderate Fundamentalist, can't come from testimony either (just as you can't pay your credit card bill with that very same credit card). The Strong Liberal view holds that comprehending the presentation-as-true of another that P *as such* provides *enough* justification (absent defeaters). The Weak Liberal view holds that it provides *some*. The Moderate view holds that it provides *none*.

Is Liberal Fundamentalism Too Permissive?

I now discuss an objection to Liberal Fundamentalism. It is an objection the Moderate Fundamentalist (among others) is entitled to make, unlike the four objections discussed above. The objection is that Liberal Fundamentalism is too strong or too permissive, that it would entail that many testimony-based beliefs without inferential support would be justified where, intuitively, they are not. Merely comprehending another's presentation-as-true is not, the objection goes, sufficient for justified belief in the content of what was presented, at least in very many cases, even absent defeat. Additional support is necessary for on balance justification.¹³

This objection clearly targets Strong Liberal Fundamentalism. Strong Liberal Fundamentalism is also the standard version of the view in print, as noted above. But it is not clear that this complaint applies to Weak Liberal Fundamentalism. The complaint is that acceptance without additional support is too permissive. The Strong view disagrees: undefeated acceptance without support is fine. The Weak view leaves that question open. It is entirely consistent with Weak Liberal Fundamentalism that additional support is necessary for on balance justification. Hence the objection seems to have no, or at least considerably less, force against the Weak position. Since I think (though have not argued here) that there are good prima facie reasons in favor of the Liberal view generally, and since the Weak view is more defensible than the Strong, I prefer Weak Liberal Fundamentalism. It seems defensible against a standard complaint.

Perception and Testimony Compared

I now want to make a point about the comparison between perception and testimony. I believe the right account for both is the Weak account, PER_w and $TEST_w$. Both principles are supported by the data. Just as the justification from testimony as such often fails to confer on balance justification for a testimony-based belief, so too (I argued above) that justification from perception as such often fails to confer on balance justification for a perceptual belief. The right accounts of perception and testimony, I believe, parallel one another.

There is, however, a tendency in the literature to compare perception and testimony unfavorably. Just having a perceptual experience of something being so and so is supposed to be *enough* for on balance justification in the perceptual case, but *not* enough in the testimonial case. Hence it is inferred that there must be a fundamental difference in kind between perception and testimony (e.g. Pritchard 2004: 343–5).

This inference, I believe, is based on a mistake. I think some are led into thinking there is such a contrast because they fail to see that in the perception case there are a large number of interlocking experiences and beliefs that individually confer *pro tanto* justification and collectively confer on balance justification, but in the testimony case only one piece of *pro tanto* justification is in focus, the one presentation-as-true whether P. For instance, compare looking at an apple on a table and being told that there is an apple on a table in the park over yonder hill. In the visual case, over a relatively small portion of time, one will have a number of distinct but interlocking experiences of, and beliefs about, the apple. One's belief that there is an apple will enjoy plenty of justification; its justification on balance will, most likely, be over-determined (Conee and

Feldman 1985: 29–30). Now compare the hearer who is told by a speaker (a speaker that the hearer doesn't know first-hand and knows very little about otherwise) that there is an apple on the table yonder. Here all the hearer may have in favor of the belief is this one presentation-as-true. There may be no, or only a very little, additional support. There is thus a difference between the perceptual case and the testimony case. The *perceiver* (with many experiences and other related beliefs to go on) will enjoy on balance justification for that same belief, but the *hearer* (with only one presentation-as-true to go on) will only enjoy *pro tanto* justification for the belief that there is an apple on the table. I grant this (de facto) difference. But it is no reason to compare perception and testimony unfavorably. All this difference shows is that typically in the perceptual case enough justification is present for on balance justification, but that in many testimonial cases only *pro tanto* justification is present.¹⁴ If we were to compare just one perceptual experience with one presentation-as-true that might help bring the analogy between the epistemologies of perception and testimony into sharp relief. One report may really be like just one perceptual experience.¹⁵ Both are some, but often not enough, for justification on balance. Comparing memory with testimony reinforces this point. Remembering something may be just as good, all else being equal, as being told.

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Additional Supporting Reasons

If the Weak Liberal is right, on balance justification for testimony-based beliefs will often require additional support. No on balance justified testimony-based belief, the slogan would go, is an island. Additional support, obviously, can come from a number of sources. You tell me it is an apple, and I take a look myself. But additional support can also come from other testimony-based beliefs. There are four ways this might happen.

First, additional presentations-as-true may fit together with the original presentation, though they are about different things. Suppose you meet someone on a plane and you start a conversation. She tells you that she is a highly trained mathematician working for Xerox in Palo Alto engaged in pure research. You may find this an unlikely occupation, but you do not disbelieve her. During the conversation she starts talking about Palo Alto, about other researchers at Xerox, and where she studied mathematics, and engages you in a discussion about the nature of numbers and sets. You may only have been *pro tanto* justified in believing that she is a mathematician doing pure research at Xerox at the start of the conversation. Indeed, if that was all she said and then she turned away, you might only have been justified on balance in believing that she said she was a mathematician. But at the end of the actual conversation it seems that you are on balance justified in believing that she is a Xerox employed mathematician.¹⁶

The second, and perhaps more obvious way additional presentations may help, is by going directly to the fact that the original presentation-as-true is about. A witness may tell you that he saw the killer drive away in a red van. Another, independent witness, may tell you the same thing. And so on. The more independent witnesses, the Liberal holds, the better. At some point, presumably, the justification the hearer's belief enjoys converts from *pro tanto* to on balance justification.

The third and certainly very common way additional presentations often help is by going to the trustworthiness of the target interlocutor. That is, if you are talking to A, being told by B that A is trustworthy will confer some additional warrant on trusting A.

A fourth way is by answering defeaters. Suppose I have reason to think C is not trustworthy. D can tell me that she is generally trustworthy, or that she has an adequate reason in this case to be sincere. Or suppose I have reason to think E, though obviously sincere, does not know what he is talking about. F can tell me that, appearances notwithstanding, E really does know what he is talking about.

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Justified beliefs are often supported by experiences and beliefs from a number of different sources. They all work together. Testimony-based beliefs support perceptual beliefs; perceptual beliefs support memory

beliefs; memory beliefs support testimony-based beliefs, and so on. According to the Liberal, perception, memory, introspection, testimony, and reason all as such confer justification on the beliefs they normally cause and sustain.

My overall goal in this essay is to bring more clarity to the testimony debate. Although I favor the Liberal position, I have not argued for it directly here. Hopefully the clarity speaks in its favor, or at least removes some sources of opposition. Given one's overall point of view in epistemology, the Liberal position may be a non-starter, or it may be a rather plausible extension of what one already believes. Making explicit one's overall point of view should reveal why one might reject it off the bat, or reveal why one might find it a plausible accounting for our justified reliance upon the word of others.

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Notes

1. Robert Audi distinguishes between (a) basic or direct belief (belief not inferentially based upon another belief), (b) sources of basic belief, and (c) basic sources, sources of belief that do not operationally depend upon other sources of belief. He holds that testimony-based beliefs are direct, that testimony is a source of basic beliefs, but denies that it is a basic source, for it operationally depends upon perception. See Audi (1997, 2002, 2004, and Chapter 1 in this volume). As I am using the terms “direct” and “basic”, I mean to imply epistemic independence, that a belief does not depend upon another for *prima facie pro tanto* justification. I mean what he means by the “a priori authority” of a source.
2. I have characterized testimony-based beliefs elsewhere (Graham 2000a).
3. The disjunctive phrase “either sincere or reliable or both” is meant to accommodate “hybrid” views like Faulkner's (2000) that require only positive inferential support for sincerity, but not for reliability. Fricker sometimes suggests she is OK with sincerity, but not with reliability (1994).
4. Though it is consistent with the requirement that the way held is *per se* reliable: reliable in normal conditions when functioning normally (cf. Burge 2004 on “reliably veridical”).
5. I hope to discuss the Intuitionist on **PER** on another occasion.
6. The principles the Reliabilist or the Pragmatist accepts may be (some of) the principles listed above, close analogues, distant cousins, or wholly new. It is unlikely, however, that some of the principles, or close analogues, would not show up on either the Reliabilist's or the Pragmatist's list at all.
- p. 115 7. Elizabeth Fricker's position, elaborated in a number of papers (1994, 1995, 2002), is complex; it defies easy categorization. I hope to discuss it at some length on another occasion. For some discussion, see Weiner (2003).
8. Another way one might “reduce” testimony is to demand that the hearer be able to show *a priori* that the speaker is trustworthy. I will not discuss this route in what follows.
9. *De facto* reliability surely matters for knowledge (as opposed to justification). And, again, as above, *per se* reliability may be required for justification (I remain neutral here), and this is *consistent* with Intuitionism.
10. One commonly made argument against the Liberal is that there is a fundamental epistemic difference in kind between perception and testimony because perception is a natural process operating according to natural laws but testimony goes through the will of the speaker, i.e. the speaker may always choose to lie or mislead. This fact in turn generates a number of different arguments against the Liberal when combined with other premises. I have discussed one of these arguments in Graham (2004).
11. Burge uses the phrase ‘*prima facie pro tanto*’ as well (1993: 467–8; 2003: 463). However, he seems to use ‘*prima facie*’ and ‘*pro tanto*’ interchangeably. I do not.
12. Pritchard (2004) may be an exception. He distinguishes a “modest” version of “credulism” (the Liberal view) from a “bare” version. From what he says, the modest version may parallel the Weak Liberal view as here defined. He does not defend such a view. In fact, he argues against it. See n. 15.
13. I have heard this objection many times. Something like it seems to drive Fricker's rejection to the Liberal view in her “Against Gullibility” (1994) and elsewhere. Pritchard states it explicitly (2004: 328–30). It seems to be widely shared.
14. However, if one were to look to the background for support in the testimonial case, there would be a good deal there as well (Adler 2002; Fricker 2002). The difference seems to be that in the perceptual case in the foreground lots of additional support is obvious, but that is not as clearly so in the testimonial case.
15. Pritchard disagrees. He says if A sees his car in the driveway, but had no reason to believe it would or would not be there, then A's belief is (on balance) justified. But if A is told that his car is there, and has nothing else to go on, then his belief is not (on balance) justified. “In the perceptual case, it does seem entirely plausible to suppose the agent is justified in

forming this belief. . . . The situation is very different, however, when it comes to the [testimony-based belief that the car is in the driveway]. . . . Intuitively, without independent . . . grounds this . . . belief is not justified” (2004: 342–3). Pritchard does not consider the additional support the perceptual belief enjoys from the entire visual field over time, as I do in my case of the apple, and he does not consider comparing the two cases for equivalence in pro tanto justification. Perhaps he might change his mind after taking these facts into consideration. He appeals to differences in the extent and nature of the *reliability* of perception versus testimony to support his conclusion that perception and testimony differ (2004: 343–4). I have replied to this kind of argument above. It does not, I think, support his conclusion.

16. This example is due to Audi (1997).

Notes

An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title “Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism about Testimony”. Another version circulated under the title “Fundamentalism and its Rivals”. I have significantly altered the terminology from previous versions. I hope I have also made a number of improvements. For comments that led to changes, I am grateful to Jonathan Adler, Jennifer Lackey, Paul Hurley, Ted Hinchman, Brian Keely, Peter Thielke, Duncan Pritchard, and especially Peter Kung and Robert Audi. The two referees for this volume indirectly prompted substantial changes. I'm grateful to both.