Names in Strange Places[1]

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This paper is about how to interpret and evaluate purported evidence for predicativism about proper names. I aim to point out some underappreciated thorny issues and to offer both predicativists and non-predicativists some advice about how best to pursue their respective projects. I hope to establish three related claims: (1) That non-predicativists have to posit relatively exotic, though not entirely implausible, polysemic mechanisms to capture the range of data that predicativists have introduced (sections (1)-(3)); (2) that neither referentialism nor extant versions of predicativism can offer a very plausible account of the interpretive possibilities for singular unmodified definite descriptions containing names (sections (4)-(5)); and (3) that the most plausible version of predicativism would treat bare names as non-anaphoric definite descriptions (sections (6)-(8)).

1   TAXONOMY

We can give a taxonomy of approaches to proper names by representing them with respect to a few foundational choices. The first choice concerns whether names are lexically ambiguous. The same name can be used to refer to different individuals: should we think of this as a kind of lexical ambiguity? Call a theory which answers the question in the affirmative a kind of *homonymism* (following (*Recanati*, 1997)), and a theory which answers the question in the negative a form of *contextualism*. I suggest the label 'contextualism' because a theory which denies that a name is ambiguous as many ways as it has bearers treats the referential variability of names as a kind of context-sensitivity.

The second choice concerns the lexical semantic type of proper names: are proper names individual-denoting expressions or predicates in the lexicon? Call those that hold that names are individual-denoting expressions in the lexicon *referentialists* and those hold that names are predicates *predicativists**. On the homonymist side, referentialists hold that names are individual constants in the lexicon - that is context-invariant individual-denoting expressions (this is the traditional philosophical view). If a speaker knows a number of different Alfreds, then her lexicon contains that number of distinct individual constants pronounced 'Alfred'.[2]

Referentialist contextualism holds that names are context-sensitive individual-denoting ex-

[2]I ignore the view which, on this taxonomy, would be called homonymist predicativism (the view that for each different Alfred, there is a distinct predicate pronounced 'Alfred' in the lexicon true of only that individual). I'm not aware of anyone who proposes this as part of theory of proper names in natural languages.

pressions (see (*Recanati*, 1997), (*Pelczar and Rainsbury*, 1998), (*Fiengo and May*, 2006), (*Cumming*, 2008), (*Maier*, 2009), (*Rami*, 2014b), (*Schoubye*, Forthcoming)). Views of this kind model the meaning of proper names on the meaning of pronouns. They hold that for a given generic name[3] - say 'Alfred' - there is a single lexical item which corresponds to that name. An occurrence of that lexeme refers to a particular bearer of the name. Which bearer of a name is the referent of an occurrence of name is determined by features of the utterance context (it should also be noted that according to some such views - *e.g.* (*Cumming*, 2008) - some occurrences can be bound by other operators and so do not refer). Varieties of referentialist contextualism - below I'll distinguish indexicalism and variabilism - involve different accounts of the dependence of name-reference on context, and of way that the name-bearing relation operates as a semantic/pragmatic constraint on reference.

Following the literature I'll reserve the term 'predicativism' for what, according to this taxonomy, is strictly speaking contextualist predicativism. Predicativism holds that, lexically, a name *N* is predicate which is true of individuals who bear the name *N*. They hold that this predicate is semantically involved in acts of reference to different bearers of *N*. Types of predicativism can be distinguished by their conception of this semantic involvement. Predicativism requires a story about how names, though predicates in the lexicon, can appear as apparent arguments. In standard approaches, name-predicates are semantically involved in acts of reference in virtue of being constituents of a complex determiner phrase. So predicativism involves both a morphosyntactic and a semantic/pragmatic element. A morphosyntactic element is required because there are languages, English among them, in which names functioning in their canonical way - to achieve reference to particular individuals - appear as grammatical arguments (call these *bare occurrences* of names). The standard story posits an unpronounced determiner in bare occurrences, thus harmonizing the syntactic structure of bare occurrences with that of determiner phrases more generally. Different forms of predicativism correspond to different accounts of the semantics/pragmatics of the unpronounced determiner. Burge (1973) held that the unpronounced determiner is a demonstrative; contemporary predicativists tend to posit an unpronounced definite article.

Another possibility - or really a range of possibilities - involves positing an unpronounced determiner which does not have the meaning of either the demonstrative or definite article - call this *idiosyncratic predicativism*. We might hold that it is only possible to capture the significance of bare names by positing an unpronounced determiner with its own idiosyncratic meaning (I'll allow myself to talk this way, but it is slightly misleading. When I'm being more careful I will say that idiosyncratic predicativism holds that the morphological rule which phonologically reduces the determiner in bare occurrences signals an idiosyncratic meaning). This approach is less common in the literature. Segal (2001, pg 551) suggests that the unpronounced determiner is the "referential 'the' ". He thus holds that the bare names are always interpreted referentially as opposed to attributively (he assumes a semantic account of that distinction). This is tantamount to the idiosyncratic position, because it holds that bare names do not have the same range of possible interpretations as definite descriptions with overt articles. One of the arguments of this paper will be that predicativists ought to adopt the idiosyncratic version.

The taxonomy looks like this:

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[3]For difficulties in individuating names see (*Sainsbury*, 2014), (*Gray*, 2015).

Homonymism   Contextualism

         Contextualist Referentialism   Predicativism

              Variabilism   Indexicalism

                                    Definite   Demonstrative   Idiosyncratic

2   THE MASTER ARGUMENT FOR PREDICATIVISM

We will start by reviewing the central argument for predicativism. It has both a syntactic and a semantic side. To take the syntactic side first:

The choice between referentialism and predicativism is the choice between treating the lexical semantic type of names as individual-denoting or as predicative. Given standard assumptions about the relationship between lexical semantic type and syntactic well-formedness we should be able adjudicate the issue by appealing to the syntactic distribution of proper names. If they are individual constants, they should appear as syntactic arguments to expressions which take individuals as arguments. And if one's total knowledge of the syntactic distribution of names came from reading papers in the philosophy of language from a certain era, this might seem basically right. Philosophical attention to names typically resolved around examples in which names appear in copular environments, equative constructions, or as arguments to verbs, as in (1 a)-(1 b).

(1)   (a) Socrates is wise.

    (b) Hesperus is Phosphorous.

    (c) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.

From these sorts of example, it would be easy to conclude that the syntactic distribution of names provides decisive support for the referentialist hypothesis.

Predicativists, starting with (*Sloat*, 1969), argue that this impression is misleading. Sloat claims that names and common nouns exhibit nearly complete overlap in their distribution. If we look at the way that names and common nouns can appear in determiner phrases we note only two divergences. The chart below represents, on the left, a determiner phrase containing the common name **man**, and on the right a determiner phrase of the same form with the name **Smith** substituted for the noun (this is an slightly altered/abbreviated version of the chart in (*Sloat*, 1969, pg. 27)).

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A man stopped by	A Smith stopped by
Some man stopped by	Some Smith stopped by
Few men stopped by	Few Smiths stopped by
Men must breathe	Smiths must breathe
All men stopped by	All Smiths stopped by
That man stopped by	That Smith stopped by
Four men stopped by	Four Smiths stopped by
The man stopped by	# The Smith stopped by
The men stopped by	The Smiths stopped by
# man stopped by	Smith stopped by

The pound sign marks ill-formedness, and so here indicates the places where the distributions diverge. We have complete overlap, according to Sloat, excepting two divergences. Singular unmodified common nouns cannot appear without a determiner, proper names can (this is what, above, we called a bare occurrence of a name). A name cannot occur in singular unmodified form with the definite article, common nouns can (I will call this last generalization into question in the second half of the paper).

Common nouns have predicative semantic values. So the fact that names can systematically appear as arguments to determiners suggests that they have predicative meanings. The question for theorists, then, is which occurrences to take at face-value. Should we take names to have the same lexical semantic type as common nouns and attempt to explain away the divergences? Or should we take names and common nouns to have different lexical semantic types and explain away the overlap?

The master argument for predicativism is simply that one of these explanatory directions should be preferred because it involves fewer *ad hoc* stipulations. Sloat suggests that predicativism offers the basis for a simple account of the distribution of proper names. If we hold that names have the same semantic type as common nouns, we can see the two places where the distributions diverge as stemming from a single source. We need only hold that that a morphological quirk requires that the singular unmodified occurrence of a name with a definite determiner be pronounced as the bare occurrence. That is, we need only posit a phonologically null form of the definite article which selects for proper names. The idea is that the syntax of (2 a) involves the structure (2 b) (simplifying massively).

(2) (a) Alfred admires the dean.

  (b)

According to Sloat, the two arguments in (2 a) have the same structure - each consists in the definite article and a predicate. The difference is that the definite article is phonologically null when it occurs with the predicate **Alfred**. This assumption unifies bare and predicative occurrences of names by treating all occurrences as predicative.

Sloat says little about the alternative approach - the approach which would treat names and common nouns having different semantic types and try to explain away the overlap. He notes - following (*Chomsky*, 1965) - that this approach would need to posit an interpretative procedure

by which names could be "used as" common nouns'(1969, pg. 27). He says little about this approach but the suggestion is that it would be difficult to make it concrete in a way that would make determinate predictions, or fit into a systematic theory. We will return to this shortly.

Treating names as having predicate-type semantic values is not yet to say anything about their meaning. Supposing they are predicates, what properties do they express? The semantic side of the master argument for predicativism starts with a claim about the truth-conditions of predicative occurrences. Predicative occurrences of names can be closely paraphrased by replacing a name *N* with a complex predicate like **individual named 'N'**.[4] For example, (3 a) can be paraphrased with (3 b).

(3)　　(a)　At least three Alfreds have insulted me today.

　　　　(b)　At least three individuals named 'Alfred' have insulted me today.

We'll say in predicative interpretations a name *N* expresses a name-bearing property. Burge (1973) argues that taking this meaning as lexically basic allows for a semantic unification of bare and predicative occurrences (just as taking the predicate-type meaning as lexically basic allowed for a syntactic unification of those occurrences).

To see how, note the following (putative) relation between bare and predicative occurrences: a bare occurrence of a name can only refer to an individual who possesses the corresponding name-bearing property. Predicativists find evidence for this claim in the apparent validity of inferences which trade on semantic uniformity across predicative and bare occurrences[5], for example in:

Every Alfred is English.
Alfred Tarski is a logician

∴ There is an English logician

Burge (ibid. pg 429) puts the point by claiming that bare and predicative occurrences of names have "the same conditions for literal application to an object"

Here the syntactic and semantic sides of the master argument argument dovetail. An individual can be the referent of a bare occurrence of a name just in case it satisfies a predicative occurrence of the same name. To capture this relationship we need only posit the presence, in bare occurrences, of a semantic device which takes a set of individuals and returns an individual from that set.[6] Burge (ibid. pg 432) holds that bare occurrences of names have "the same semantical structure" as complex demonstratives. Contemporary predicativists have tended to follow Sloat in holding that bare occurrences are interpreted as definite descriptions, but the result is the same: bare occurrences refer to salient individuals in the extension of the corresponding predicate in virtue of the contribution of an unpronounced term-forming operator.

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[4]Alternative paraphrases are available. I make no commitment to the synonymy of any paraphrase with the predicative interpretation. There are predicative occurrences of names which do not express metalinguistic properties. These are discussed, for example, in (*Burge*, 1973),(*Boer*, 1975), (*Jeshion*, 2014). This poses an important challenge for the purported simplicity of the predicativist approach, but one which there is not space to go into here. See also (*Fara*, 2013) and (*Jeshion*, 2015).

[5]For a discussion of these arguments, see (*Hornsby*, 1976), (*Sawyer*, 2009, pg 342), (*Hawthorne and Manley*, 2012, Chp 6), (*Leckie*, 2013, pg 1144), (*Rami*, 2014a), and (*Schoubye*, Forthcoming).

[6]Or a more complex relation - for example a device which takes a set of individuals and returns the set of sets of individuals which contain a member of the original set - which would have the same truth-conditional effect.

Together the syntactic and semantic uniformity arguments appear to offer a consideration in favour of predicativism. They suggest that predicativism can find syntactic and semantic uniformity where referentialism must posit diversity. Syntactically, referentialists must posit some mechanism which allows singular terms to appear in predicative positions. Semantically, they must posit an ambiguity which allows *N* sometimes to refer to a salient bearer of the name and sometimes to pick out a class of people which bear the name. Predicativists need only posit a single predicate, and a simple morphological quirk.

Sloat and Burge don't argue that predicative occurrences of names *refute* the traditional approach to names. They only suggest that predicativism can offer a simpler, more unified account of the full range of possible interpretations. To judge the extent to which considerations of simplicity favour predicativism, we need a more determinate sense of how non-predicativists propose to explain the full range of name-occurrences and, in particular, to what extent those explanations posit ad hoc interpretive mechanisms. This will be the topic of section (3).

Before turning to referentialism, we should go into more detail about the structure of predicativism so as to be in a better position to assess the relative complexity of predicativist and referentialist approaches. Let's start with a simple objection to predicativism's purported simplicity. In what sense is predicativism simpler than referentialism? Doesn't it trade one explanatory multiplication (positing meaning shift) for another (positing an unpronounced definite determiner)? Theorists after Sloat have noted that we have independent reason to hold that names are morphologically quirky. There is intralinguistic variety in which names can appear bare; in English names of geographical features often require a determiner.[7] There is also cross-linguistic variety in the presence of bare names. There are languages in which proper names do not have bare occurrences; that is, there are languages where names always occur as a constituent of an overtly complex determiner phrase. In some such languages, the typical use of a proper names in reference involves a definite determiner. In others, there is a unique *preproprial* article (for a discussion of these points in relation to predicativism, see (*Elbourne*, 2005, pg 74) (*Larson and Segal*, 1995, pg 355), (*Matushansky*, 2006, 2008) and (*Ghomeshi and Massam*, 2009)).

Predicativists hold that whatever we say about names, we have to hold that they are morphosyntactically quirky in relation to the determiner system.[8] We need either say that when they cannot appear bare they are accompanied by a semantically vacuous overt determiner. Or we have to say that when they do appear bare, they are accompanied by a phonologically null determiner. So the predicativist and the referentialist each require their own assumption about the morphological quirkiness about names. And the referentialist requires, in addition to that, a story about how names, though individual-denoting in the lexicon, can occur in predicative positions.

Ideally we could get traction here by evaluating the plausibility of each proposal relative to morphosyntactic considerations. I won't do that here.[9] But I will mention some complexities in

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[7] For a discussion of these cases, and their possible relation to predicativism see (*Rabern*, 2015).

[8] A reviewer points out that this way of characterizing predicativism is, to some extent, parochial. The literature on predicativism has tended to focus on languages which have determiner systems, and thus the question about names has been framed in terms of the relation between names and the determiner system. If there are languages, as there appear to be, which do not contain determiners, the referentialism/predicativism debate will have to be reframed. It would be salutary for the debate to explore these questions. I'm not in a position to do that here.

[9] There are serious problems with the hypothesis that bare names are syntactically complex. (*King*, 2006) notes that the claim that bare names have the syntax of definite descriptions predicts that they can license 'one'-anaphora. 'One'-anaphora is licensed by the presence of an appropriate predicate in the preceding discourse. In (4 a), the predicate **dog** in the definite description acts as an antecedent for **one**. But the bare occurrence of **Alfred** doesn't

capturing the correct descriptive generalizations. Sloat points out that the null determiner cannot occur with restrictive modification (1969, pg 28). If a name occurs with an overt definite article, a relative clause following the name can be interpreted restrictively - as in (6 a). If a relative clause follows a bare name, it must be interpreted non-restrictively, as in (6 b).

(6)   (a) That's the Jones who lives next door.

       (b) That's Jones, who lives next door.

Sloat asserts the same thing about prenominal adjectives. Noting that **young** is interpreted restrictively in (7 b) and non-restrictively in (7 a).

(7)   (a) I talked to young Martin about it.

       (b) I talked to the young Martin about it.

Matushansky (2006, pg 292ff) called Sloat's generalization into question, pointing out that constructions like (7 b) can be interpreted non-restrictively. And, more than that, many adjectives require an overt article for even the non-restrictive reading. Fara (2015a) provides an extensive discussion of the patterns here, arguing that we should see adjectives that can appear prenominally without an overt article as isolated exceptions to a general principle which requires the definite article to be null when it has a proper name as its sister. I won't take a stance on this matter here. In section (4) I will introduce a complication which applies equally to Mathushansky and Fara's descriptive generalization.

3   DEFLATIONARY ACCOUNTS OF PREDICATIVE OCCURRENCES

The basic response on the part of referentialism towards the Sloat/Burge data is *deflationary*. Its goal is to show that the data can be accounted for while maintaining the names are individual-denoting expressions in the lexicon. I will offer an overview of possible deflationary strategies,

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supply an appropriate antecedent in (4 b), which it should if it is the articulation of a description of the form **the Alfred**.

(4)   (a) The dog$_i$ barks whenever he sees another one$_i$ coming up the street.

       (b) # Alfred$_i$ is excited whenever he meets another one$_i$.

This a serious worry for predicativism. One strategy which I have explored elsewhere - see (*Gray*, 2012, chap 3), (*Gray*, ms.) - is that bare names are not, in fact, syntactically complex. Rather they are the result of a lexical rule - modeled after the one that (*Hankamer and Mikkelsen*, 2002) use to account for suffixal definite descriptions in Danish - which turns predicates into intransitive determiners. This would mean that although names are predicates in the lexicon, they enter the syntax as syntactically-simple determiner phrases and so do not provide an appropriate antecedent for 'one'-anaphora. Something similar happens in the way that the predicate **grandmother** can appear bare, as in (5 a) but does not license 'one'-anaphora in (5 b) ((*Hawthorne and Manley*, 2012, pg 235).

(5)   (a) Grandma is in the kitchen cooking pies.

       (b) # Grandma$_i$ is in the kitchen cooking pies, and another one$_i$ is in there baking cakes.

This idea, that bare names have the semantics of complex determiner phrases without having the syntax actually seems to be what Burge initially had in mind, though he didn't provide an account of how this might be.

with an eye towards evaluating the relative complexity of these proposals with respect to predicativism. Different varieties of referentialism, given their different conception of the lexical semantics for names, have different resources from which to attempt to generate the Sloat/Burge data. So we will have to take each in turn. Of particular interest is the question of whether any can account for the data by employing mechanisms that are needed to explain other phenomena.

We can start by discussing a deflationary account which is not taken seriously by anyone: a brute ambiguity account. It would be possible to hold that a sign 'Alfred' is simply ambiguous between a referential and predicative interpretation. Somewhat more precisely: we could hold that the interpretation of a sign N as a predicate true of things named N and as a determiner phrase referring to some particular thing named N are not connected via any interpretive principles. Call this *brute ambiguity deflationism*. I use the deliberately vague term 'interpretive principles' to mark the fact that this approach denies *any* systematic connection between referential and predicative interpretations of names - it denies any sense in which either is linguistically derived from the other. The two interpretations, on this model, stand in the same relation as the financial and fluvial interpretations of 'bank'. No feature of linguistic competence - broadly construed so as to include pragmatic and polysemic connections - connects the two kinds of interpretation.

This view is a non-starter because it flies in the face of the systematicity and productivity of the connection between the interpretations (see (*Boer*, 1975), (*Hornsby*, 1976), (*Gray*, 2012) (*Leckie*, 2013), (*Schoubye*, Forthcoming)). Speakers who can interpret a referential use of a name can, easily and reliably, interpret a predicative occurrence. Names can occur predicatively in (just about) any construction in which a common noun can (as the Sloat chart shows). This seems to be the case as a matter of cross-linguistic regularity[10]. These facts are not consistent with a brute ambiguity approach.

3.1 VARIETIES OF FLEXIBILITY

Referentialists have nonetheless been generally sanguine about predicative occurrences, chiefly, one supposes, because it is easy to assume that they can be assimilated to one of the variety of systematic interpretive mechanisms which are well-attested in natural language. They have pointed to the fact that natural language exhibits a range of systematic semantic and syntactic flexibility as precedent for the interpretive mechanism which would be required to account for predicative occurrences of names (this is the main thrust of (*Leckie*, 2013)).

To fix our terms: we will call a function which maps the meaning of some expression to a new meaning a *projection* function. When for some projection function f and lexical item e with meaning $[\![e]\!]$, e is interpreted as expressing the meaning $f([\![e]\!])$ we will call it a polysemic projection of e (*cf* (*Nunberg*, 1995, pg 112)). Linguistic competence involves the ability to apply a variety of projection functions. I make no assumptions here about the precise nature of this ability, or even whether it has a uniform source. It seems likely, as we will see below, that some projection functions come along with the grammar of the language, while others may be stable semantic conventions, and still others might be *nonce* interpretative strategies.

If referentialists can generate predicative interpretations of names by appealing to independently attested projection functions, or projection functions which are of a piece with those that are attested, they can rightly claim that their overall account of the interpretive possibilities for

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[10]Importantly, (*Schoubye*, Forthcoming) notes that the predicative interpretations are either not available, or difficult to access, in Danish. This is an important challenge for predicativists, but one I will not take up here.

names is not unduly complex. If they cannot, the predicativist accusation that referentialism involves special pleading will be validated. Before addressing that question, a quick tour of kinds of semantic flexibility will give us a sense of the tools which referentialists might appeal to.

There are various ways in which an expression with a basic lexical meaning can be interpreted as expressing a related meaning. We can note two dimensions along which we can locate polysemic projections. The first is whether the projection of one meaning to another can be characterized *formally* (here I am following (*Partee*, 1987, pg 122)). Some systematic forms of flexibility take an input meaning and produce an output meaning in a way that can be characterized using only logical vocabulary. The core type-shifting principles explored by Partee are like this. Take for example, IDENT and LIFT, which raise individual-denotations into predicate and generalized quantifier denotations respectively (for now we can start with extensional versions of these operations, we will have to consider intensional issues shortly).

(8)   (a) IDENT: $\lambda x \lambda y\ x{=}y$

       (b) LIFT: $\lambda x \lambda P\ P(x)$

These rules project a meaning into a new type without adding any content. Principles like this are employed to get a meaning to fit into a particular syntactic/semantic environment. For example, referentialists have employed LIFT to allow a name - which they treat lexically as individual-denoting - to be coordinated with a quantifier phrase. Theoretical frameworks which employ projection functions of this kind - as opposed to syntactic or lexical fixes to the same problems - generally hold that the deployment of such devices is unconstrained. It is supposed to be part of a speaker's general competence with the type-machinery of the language and the syntax that they adjust lexical meanings accordingly to fit expressions into the syntactic/environment in which they find themselves. Given that, from the perspective of the referentialist, predicative interpretations of names involve type-flexibility, it might seem like they can be understood on this model. And this indeed would allow them to say that they can explain predicative interpretations of names without any special pleading. We will see shortly that this is not the case.

Other forms of systematic semantic flexibility introduce substantive content to output interpretations. There is a productive mechanism which allows nouns which are true of products (*i.e.* fruits or nuts) of a tree to be interpreted as true of the trees of which they are products (*Leckie*, 2013, pg 1145). This principle would look something like (9)

(9)   (Product-to-tree) : $\lambda P_{fruit/nut}\lambda x$ *x belongs to a type which generically produces products y such that P(y)*

The availability of this interpretive principle is supposed to explain the fact that the interpretation of **walnut** in (10 a) can be projected onto its interpretation in (10 b).

(10)   (a) I made a walnut salad.

       (b) They are chopping the walnut down today.

This principle is non-formal. It invokes the *is-a-product-of* relation which holds between fruits/nuts and the trees that (generically) produce them. It is clearly a 'content-adding' interpretive rule.

The second dimension along which interpretive mechanisms differ is the extent to which their application is dependent on context of utterance. Some interpretive mechanisms are context-invariant in that they do not depend on features of the context to be applied. The formal type-shifting rules described above are context-invariant in this sense. They can be applied whenever

the syntactic environment of an expression requires it, and when applied they yield the same result. Non-formal mechanisms seem to be to some degree context-dependent. It is easy to imagine a context in which **walnut** in (10 b) is interpreted with its basic meaning (this is easier if we imagine either a giant nut or miniature people). But the interpretation does seem easily accessible, with only minimal semantic priming required to make it salient.

Moving towards more context-sensitivity, we see kinds of polysemic projection that are heavily dependent on context. Nunberg-style cases of 'meaning-transfer' are good examples here (*Nunberg*, 1995). In the right context - namely, a context in which there is salient mapping from lunches to the individuals that ordered them - **the ham sandwich** can be interpreted as referring to the salient individual who ordered a ham sandwich.

(11)   The ham sandwich left without paying.

In examples of this sort, features of the communicative situation, combined with general world-knowledge make the relevant interpretive transfer salient. And although that projection requires a quite specific conversational setting to be licensed, there is at least this much systematicity: there is a general possibility of exploiting salient mappings between objects to interpret individual-denoting expressions as referring to individuals distinct from their 'literal' referent.

With this range of precedents to choose from, it might seem very likely that referentialists will be able to offer deflationary accounts of predicative occurrences of names on the model of some independently attested mechanism. But the situation is not completely straightforward.

3.2   HOMONYMIST DEFLATIONARY ACCOUNTS

Recall that homonymist referentialists treat names as contextually-invariant individual-denoting expressions - they hold that the lexicon contains a unique referential expression for each different bearer of a given name. So a lexicon might contain expressions like the following.[11]

(12)   (a) $[\![$ Alfred $_1]\!]$ = Tarski

(b) $[\![$ Alfred $_2]\!]$ = Nobel

(c) $[\![$ Alfred $_3]\!]$ = Hitchcock

Can we think of a predicative interpretation of **Alfred** as a polysemic projection of these expressions? While it would be possible to do so, it would require a set of *ad hoc* assumptions (this has been rejected for related reasons in (*Leckie*, 2013), (*Rami*, 2014a), and (*Matushansky*, 2015)).

Note first that we cannot reach the meaning of a predicative interpretation of **Alfred** by any formal type-shifting operation. The property of *being called 'Alfred'* is not formally recoverable from any particular individual. The transfer function would have to be content-adding. Already, then, the thought that predicative interpretations of names are generated merely by all-purpose type-shifting principles must be abandoned.

An initial attempt on behalf of the homonymist would posit a function from an individual to the property of sharing a name with that individual, as in (13).

(13)   (Bearer to Name): $\lambda x \, \lambda y \, y$ shares a name with x

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[11]It is important that we interpret the indices here as merely in the metalanguage, they have no role in the syntax or semantics of the homonymist picture.

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This is inadequate. The fact that individuals can bear more than one name means that applying this function would yield the wrong property. Suppose an individual o had two names, say 'Peter' and 'Carl'.

(14)　(a)　⟦ Peter ⟧ = o

　　　(b)　⟦ Carl ⟧ = o

Applying (Bearer-to-Name) to o would yield the property of sharing a name with o. One can share a name with o by being named 'Peter' or by being named 'Carl'. But no predicative interpretation of either **Peter** or **Carl** has this interpretation (that is: a predicate true of individuals named either 'Peter' or 'Carl').

　　This might seem like only a minor inconvenience. We saw above that some transfer functions are only available in virtue of being made salient in a context. So perhaps we could think of a transfer-function schema - as in (15) - which, in a context, exploits the salience of a particular name to generate a property.

(15)　(Bearer to Name)$_c$: $\lambda x\,\lambda y\,y$ shares the name of x that is salient in c

But this is no help. First note that it still represents the predicative interpretation of a name as generated by applying a transfer function to an individual. Thus it predicts that relativized to a particular context c, given that ⟦ Peter ⟧ = ⟦ Carl ⟧, (Bearer to Name)$_c$(⟦ Peter ⟧) = (Bearer to Name)$_c$(⟦ Carl ⟧). But there is no context in which predicative interpretations of **Peter** and **Carl** have the same meaning.

　　One can imagine ways of trying to finesse the theory here. Perhaps it would be possible to hold that though it is true that relative to the same context, the predicative interpretations of **Peter** and **Carl** are the same, no actual context actually involves predicative interpretations of both. Perhaps we could hold that in uttering one of the names we thereby make it salient and thus effect a change in context. So in a sentence like (16) there is a context shift which accounts for the different interpretation of **Peter** and **Carl**.

(16)　I always knew he was a Peter, but I just found out he was a Carl.

I offer no comment on the plausibility of this move because there is another way to see that the basic strategy is on the wrong track. The strategy here is to think of predicative interpretations of a name as polysemic projections of referential lexical items. It suggests that a predicative interpretation of 'Alfred' is derivative of a particular lexical item which refers to a particular Alfred (*i.e.* either **Alfred**$_1$, **Alfred**$_2$, **Alfred**$_3$, *etc*). But a predicative interpretation of 'Alfred' expresses the property that Alfreds have in common (that is, *being called 'Alfred'*). So if we look at some particular predicative interpretation of 'Alfred' and ask *which* referential lexical item it is derived from, the answer would be *it makes no difference.* Each referential lexical item stands in the same relation to the predicative interpretation. Yet on our current proposal, the interpretation must be derived from one particular referential lexical item. But what could possibly determine an answer to this question? It is perfectly felicitous for predicative interpretation to occur in a context which makes no particular bearer of the name salient, or which makes more than one salient. Call this the problem of *source-arbitrariness*. Also note that speakers can generate predicative interpretations for names which are such that they have no corresponding referential lexical items.

The problem of source-arbitrariness suggests a solution: rather than think of predicative interpretations of names as derivative of proper names, we should think of them as derivative of an expression which refers to the articulation of a name - that is, a quotation of the sign (This is the structure of the initial response to Burge given in (*Boer*, 1975, pg 395). It is also the strategy in (*Leckie*, 2013) and mentioned as a possibility in (*Jeshion*, 2015, pg. 381)) .

We could posit a transfer function like (17).

(17)   (Sign to Name): $\lambda x_{sign} \lambda y \exists e$, e is a name articulated as x, & $y = [\![e]\!]$

(Sign to Name) takes a sign as input and returns a property that collects all of the denotations of names articulated with that sign. This gets the correct result.[12]

Is it *ad hoc*? This is a little less clear. It depends on whether there is independent attestation of projection functions of this kind. And here the evidence is somewhat murky. We can find other broadly metalinguistic polysemic interpretations, but it's unclear whether 1) they are as systematic and productive as predicative interpretations of names seem to be, and 2) they are metalinguistic *in the same sense* that predicative interpretations are (relative to homonymist referentialism assumptions).

In his early response to Burge, Boer notes the metalinguistic interpretation of "thirteenth-floor" in (18)(1975, pg. 392) .

(18)   Most twenty-story buildings do not have a thirteenth-floor.

Interpreting **thirteenth-floor** in this construction consistent with its lexical meaning (as true of floors which are thirteen stories above ground level) would lead to contradiction. The natural reading is one on which **thirteenth-floor** is interpreted as true of floors which are *called "thirteenth"*. This certainly has the superficial appearance of a metalinguistic interpretation that is analogous to a predicative interpretation of names. But this is only an appearance. The appearance is generated by the superficial similarity between glossing the meaning of a predicative interpretation of a name *N* as meaning *called N*, and the metalinguistic interpretation of **thirteenth** as *called "thirteenth"*. But if we move beyond an informal gloss, it is easy to see that the projection function required to generate the two interpretations would have to be very different. The metalinguistic interpretation of thirteen in (18) cannot be captured by a projection function structurally analogous to (Sign to Name). (Sign to Name) collects the denotations of a range of expressions with the same articulation features. The metalinguistic meaning of **thirteenth** in (18) does not have that structure. No other expressions are relevant to that interpretation. The truth-conditions of (18) simply have to do with how some *particular expression* is typically used. A perspicuous representation of the truth-conditions of (18) would be (19).

(19)   Most twenty-story buildings are such that the expression which is true of floors which are thirteen floors above ground level is not typically used to refer to any floors in those buildings.

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[12]A reviewer asks why we can't take a more direct route and eliminate reference to names. Why not simply characterize the function in terms of a relation of 'calling' that holds between individuals and *sounds*? This will get the wrong results, simply in virtue of the fact that the same sound can be the articulation of a name and a non-name. For example there is a both a name **King** (the name which, for example, the philosopher Jeff King bears) and a common noun **King** (true of monarchs). Some monarchs, we can suppose, are called 'King' but they are not thereby in the extension of a predicative interpretation of the name **King**. Reference to the expression-type *name* is ineliminable in characterizing the transfer function.

Other examples which homonymists have offered as attestation of metalinguistic interpretations are analogous. In (20) "awesome" is used to refer to occurrences of itself. But again, this meaning, though it is metalinguistic, has little to do with the structure posited by (Sign to Name).

(20) Four ''awesome''s is more than enough in one blog-post. (*Jeshion*, 2015, pg 381)

Other examples are closer to what is required. (*Leckie*, 2013, pg 1157) notes that the following exchange is reasonably natural (similar examples can be found in (*Gray*, 2012, pg 34, 69-70)).

(21) (a) A: Let's meet by the bank.

　　(b) B: Which bank do you mean: the river bank near my house or the branch of HSBC on Cornmarket?

But if this is a sensible exchange, the occurrence of **bank** in the first sentence in B's response must have a metalinguistic meaning. It must be a predicate whose extension is the union of denotations of the financial and fluvial predicates.[13] This is structurally analogous to a predicative interpretation of a name. A predicative interpretation of **Alfred** collects all of the denotations of names articulated with 'Alfred'. The interpretation of **bank** in (21 b) collects all of the members of all of the denotations of common nouns articulated with 'bank'. We can think of the interpretation of bank is the result of a function like (22), applied to 'bank'.

(22) (Sign to Property):$\lambda x_{sign} \lambda y \exists e, e$ is a common noun articulated as x, & $y \in [\![e]\!]$

So here we have an interpretation which looks like independent precedent for (Sign to Name).

A preliminary point: It seems that the metalinguistic interpretation of **bank** needs a fair amount of contextual support. In Leckie's example, it is not until one reaches the material after the colon that one recognizes that a metalinguistic interpretation of the initial occurrence of **bank** is required. Contrast this with (23 b).

(23) (a) A: Let's meet with Alfred.

　　(b) B: Which Alfred do you mean?

No special supplementation is required here. The predicative interpretation of **Alfred** in (23 b) is accessed easily.

Having said that, a natural explanation is available to the homonymist. In the case of **bank,** the metalinguistic interpretation is *competing* with the two lexical interpretations (*i.e.* the financial and fluvial predicates), in the sense that an utterance which employed either of those predicates would have the same articulation. Predicative and referential interpretations of names do not stand in the same relation, because they differ in semantic type. There is no way to read **Alfred** in (23 b) as an articulation of a referential lexical item - doing so would result in a type mismatch. This means that the predicative interpretation is the only one available. We could hold that some special indication is always required to access metalinguistic interpretations, but

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[13]A reviewer notes that this is not strictly necessary. In this case we could think of the first sentence as equivalent to something like "Which expression pronounced 'bank' do you mean?". In this case **bank** would be a predicate true of expressions pronounced 'bank'. I agree. But if we alter Leckie's example slightly - if we imagine the first sentence of the response as "Which bank would you like to meet at?" - we remove this possibility. To my ear, the altered version is no less natural than Leckie's.

that with predicative interpretations of names that support is built in - because the semantic type difference makes the lexical interpretation unavailable.

It is not clear this story should be convincing. First, it predicts that we should find it relatively easy to access metalinguistic interpretations of pronouns which have been forced into predicative positions. This isn't the case (as we will see in section (3.3)).

Moreover, the interpretation in these examples is importantly disanalogous to predicative interpretations of names. Consider the domain of the quantifiers in (Sign to Name) and (Sign to Property). In (Sign to Name) we clearly want the quantifier to range over expressions which are not in the lexicon of the speaker or audience. That is, the extension of a predicative interpretation of a name contains bearers of that name that are wholly unknown to anyone in the discourse (this observation is first made in (*Hornsby*, 1976, pg 231) and is also discussed in (*Sawyer*, 2009, pg 9)). To convince ourselves of this, take an example. If I am speaking about a room of people I don't know, and I make a bet by uttering (24).

(24) There are exactly two Alfreds in this room.

The truth of my claim depends on facts about idiolects other than my own.

The metalinguistic interpretation of **bank** in (21 b) isn't of this kind. This is perhaps less easy to see given that the particular sentence. But consider an extension of the dialogue in (25).

(25) A: Either works for me. I always visit exactly two banks every day.

The truth of (25) doesn't depend on how anyone other than the speaker and audience use the sign "bank". If there is another idiolect - perhaps even of a different language - in which that same sign were used as the articulation feature of a predicate true of, say, discotheques, this would have no bearing on the truth of (25). So, from the point of view of the homonymist, the metalinguistic interpretation of **bank** in (25) and the metalinguistic interpretation of **Alfred** in (24) have important disanalogies.

Consider the modal status of the two metalinguistic interpretations. Predicative interpretations of names have different extensions relative to different worlds. Consider (26).

(26) If the first royal baby had been a girl, there would be a lot fewer Georges around right now.

This is intelligible, and even plausible. But this means that we must be evaluating the extension of **Georges** relative to the counterfactual situation introduced in the antecedent of the conditional. How do we capture this with an intensionalized version of (Sign to Name)? Referentialists hold that names have world-insensitive denotations, so we cannot recover the modal profile of a metalinguistic interpretation of a name by considering the modal profile of the lexical items over which that interpretation generalizes. Rather, what is going on from the point of the referentialist is that predicative interpretations of names must be sensitive to the denotation of *merely possible* lexical items. So taking intensional matters into account, the referentialist should modify (Sign to Name) as follows (taking it now as function from signs to a function from worlds to predicate extensions).

(27) (Sign to Name): $\lambda x_{sign} \, \lambda w \, \lambda y \, \exists e$ in w, e is a name articulated as x, & $y = [\![e]\!]$ [14]

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[14]Here I assume that lexical items exist in some worlds and not in others. This is probably not a good assumption. We could replace talk of lexical items existing in some worlds with them being part of a speaker's lexicon in some worlds.

Returning to metalinguistic interpretations of other expressions, it appears that we have found another disanalogy. It is especially difficult to access world-sensitive metalinguistic interpretations of other expressions. If we try something analogous to (26), we get something like (28).

(28)   If nobody could pronounce the letter "b", there wouldn't be any banks.

This is very difficult to hear as plausible, though it is structurally similar to (26). So this is another disanalogy.

If we look hard enough, we can almost find interpretations that fit the bill. According to legend, Abraham Lincoln told a joke of the form in (29 a)-(29 b).

(29)   (a) Q: If legs were called tails, how many tails would a dog have?

(b) A: One. Calling something a tail doesn't make it a tail.

The logic of the joke depends on recognizing at least the temptation to give **tails** a world-sensitive metalinguistic interpretation in the consequent of (29 a). But even here - as good as it gets for the homonymist - speakers cannot fully endorse that interpretation. The punchline in (29 b) works because it is *true* - calling something a tail doesn't make it one. Contrast this with the attempted joke in (30 a)-(30 b).

(30)   (a) Q: If Ringo were named George, how many Georges would be in the Beatles?

(b) A: One. Naming someone George doesn't make him a George.

The punchline here falls flat. The world-sensitive metalinguistic interpretation of **George** is so natural that (30 b) is just straightforwardly false.

We can sum up the situation like this: Though it appears that there are some general polysemic mechanisms which result in metalinguistic interpretations of lexical items, names seem to magnetically attract what, from the point of view of homonymist referentialism, is one among many possible metalinguistic predicative interpretations (a world-sensitive union of the denotation of co-articulated lexical items). And without some story about why names naturally attract such an interpretation while other expressions seem to repel it, the homonymist referentialist will have to rely on some degree of special pleading.[15]

Some intermediate conclusions: homonymists must hold that predicative occurrences of names are generated by quotative polysemic mechanisms.[16] There is some linguistic precedent for interpretative mechanisms of this kind, though this precedent is neither as robustly productive, nor as precisely analogous, to predicative interpretations of names as we might have hoped. This is not a decisive problem for homonymism but must be included in the final judgment about relative complexity.

3.3   REFERENTIALIST CONTEXTUALIST DEFLATIONARY ACCOUNTS

The variety of contextualist referentialist approaches makes it difficult to give a complete survey of deflationary possibilities here. These approaches hold that names are context-sensitive

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[15]An approach I have not considered here is Jeshion's (2015, pg. 380) attempt to explain predicative interpretations by appealing to Kaplan's "generic names". I largely agree with Rami's (2014b, pg 124ff) insistence that "it is questionable whether we can assign to generic names a coherent and meaningful explanatory status."

[16]I offer an independent argument in favour of the plausibility of this approach in (*Gray*, 2015).

individual-denoting expressions and that reference of an occurrence of a name is constrained by the distribution of the corresponding name-bearing property (so an occurrence of **Alfred** can only refer to an individual named 'Alfred'). They differ with respect to how they understand the contextual determination of reference of an occurrence of a name, and the way that the name-bearing property constrains that contextual determination. I distinguish indexicalism - for example in (*Recanati*, 1997) and (*Pelczar and Rainsbury*, 1998), and (*Maier*, 2009) - from variabilism - for example in (*Fiengo and May*, 2006), (*Cumming*, 2008), (*Rami*, 2014b) and (*Schoubye*, Forthcoming)[17].

Indexicalists model names on the way that so-called "automatic indexicals" (**I**, **here**, **now**,...) are treated in a Kaplanian framework. Contexts of utterance are modeled as sequences of parameters, each of which represents a feature of a conversational situation. Indexicals are expressions whose interpretation at a context is linked to a particular parameter of the context. For example, a context contains a parameter, c_a, for the *agent* of that context, and relative to a context and world of evaluation the first person pronoun **I** refers to the agent of the context, as in (31)

(31) $[\![\, \mathrm{I} \,]\!]^{c,w} = c_a$

Indexicalists propose a similar structure for the interpretation of names. They hold that social or psychological facts determine for a given name which individuals are bearers of that name. And that a context contains a parameter, c_n, for each uttered name N which represents which bearer of the name is 'salient' in the conversational setting, as in (32).

(32) $[\![\, \mathrm{Alfred} \,]\!]^{c,w} = c_{alfred}$

It would seem as though indexicalists are in a better position than homonymists to posit projection functions which would generate predicative interpretations of names. According to indexicalists, the name-bearing properties which are expressed by predicative interpretations of names play a semantic (or pre-semantic) role in reference determination for occurrences of names.

In fact, the situation is somewhat complicated. The basic idea would be to recover predicative interpretations of names according to the following scheme: to be an Alfred is to be the referent of an occurrence of **Alfred** relative to some context. This idea is complicated by a simple fact: an individual can bear a name without ever being referred to with that name (See (*Bach*, 2002), (*Gray*, 2014) for a defense of this claim.). This means that to determine the extension of **Alfred** relative to a world, we need to consider contexts of utterances which are merely possible relative to that world. But in other worlds, individuals bear different names. So the mere existence of a non-actual context in which an individual is the referent of **Alfred** is not enough to make someone an Alfred. So when we consider contexts which are merely possible relative to a world at which we are evaluating a predicative interpretation of a name, we need to restrict our attention to possible contexts in worlds which match the name-bearing properties of the world of evaluation. The projection function will look something like (Character to property).

(33) (Character to property): $\lambda C \, \lambda w \, \lambda y \, \exists c$ such that w and w_c agree with respect to the distribution of name-bearing properties $\& \, C(c,w) = y$

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[17] In fact, I am somewhat reluctant to put Cumming and Fiengo & May clearly in this category. It is unclear to me to what extent they endorse a metalinguistic view of names (*i.e.* a view according to which the distribution of name-bearing properties constrains the referential assignment for occurrences of the variables that names introduce). We should take their inclusion in this taxonomy as tentative.

This function is decidedly non-formal. Metalinguistic content is added by the projection function itself. So it turns out that merely rejecting homonymism doesn't mean that you can recover the predicative interpretation of name merely from the the lexical meaning. One has to posit tailor-made metalinguistic projection functions.

On the other hand, Indexicalism avoids some of the problems plaguing the homonymist referentialist - it avoid source-arbitrariness and so can treat predicative interpretations of names without employing the dual-layer quotative process employed by the homonymist referentialist.

More bad news: there is little independent evidence of analogous projection functions being available for other indexicals. If there were a polysemic possibility of recovering properties from the character of indexicals we would expect to see analogous readings with other indexicals and pronouns. For example, a similar function could recover the property of *being a speaker* from the indexical **me** (something is a speaker just in case it is the possible referent of **I**). But there does not seem to be any reading of (34 a) where it expresses what (34 b) does.

(34)   (a) # Every me made an excellent point.

         (b) Every speaker made an excellent point.

Similarly for **you** and the property of *being addressed* - consider (35 a) and (35 b).

(35)   (a) # Each you was listening intently.

         (b) Each person being addressed was listening intently.

It is difficult to generate predicative interpretations of indexicals at all. It is just possible, given the right contextual support. But the resulting interpretation is content-driven rather than character-driven. For example, if in a context it is common knowledge that there are a number of people disguised as me speaking with different reporters, I could utter (34 a) with intent of communicating (36).

(36)   Every person who dressed as me made an excellent point.

And though slightly coerced, the interpretation is available. But note that the source for this interpretation is not the character of **me** but rather its content relative to the context. Much the same effect could have been achieved by using any other term with the same referent in the context. There isn't any generally available mechanism for generating properties on the basis of the character of indexicals. So if (Character to property) exists, it is *sui generis.*

Variabilists hold that an occurrence of a name is associated with a particular variable, and that the reference of an occurrence is determined by a variable assignment. A variable assignment counts as proper relative to the occurrence of a name *N* just in case the associated variable is assigned to an individual who bears *N*. Schoubye's (Forthcoming) recent proposal is by far the most explicit about these issues, so I will focus on his approach. Schoubye models the lexical meaning of names on that of third-person pronouns. On a standard textbook treatment, pronouns are individual variables. A conversational setting will determine a variable assignment - which will determine the referent of free variables in an utterance. The lexical meaning of a pronoun places a constraint on variable assignments - for example, the meaning of **he** requires that a variable which instantiates it be assigned to an individual who is a male.

(37) $[\![\,\text{he}_i\,]\!]^{c,g,w} = g(i)$, if $g(i)$ is a male in w_c

$\qquad\qquad = $ undefined otherwise

$\qquad [\![\,\text{she}_i\,]\!]^{c,g,w} = g(i)$ if $g(i)$ is a female in w_c

$\qquad\qquad = $ undefined otherwise

Schoubye treats names analogously. Names enter the syntax as variables, conversational situations determine a variable assignment which determines the reference of occurrences of names. Names differ lexically with respect to the conditions they place on proper variable assignments, in particular requiring that the referent of a name N bear the associated name-bearing property.

(38) $[\![\,\text{Alfred}_i\,]\!]^{c,g,w} = g(i)$, if $g(i)$ is called Alfred in w_c

$\qquad\qquad = $ undefined otherwise

$\qquad [\![\,\text{Helen}_i\,]\!]^{c,g,w} = g(i)$, if $g(i)$ is called Helen in w_c

$\qquad\qquad = $ undefined otherwise

Schoubye holds that on his view the predicative and non-predicative interpretation of names share a "crucial component of meaning" (Forthcoming, pg 20). This faces the same issue as indexicalism. Though it might look as though *being called Alfred w*as a component of the meaning of **Alfred**, this is just a feature of the metalanguage used to specify the meaning of **Alfred**. The meaning of **Alfred** is simply a function from contexts, variable assignments, and worlds to individuals.[18] And just like with indexicalism, to recover the class of bearers of a name relative to w, we need to consider the reference of **Alfred** relative to contexts in worlds distinct from w. The analogous function to (Character to property) would be (Variable meaning to property).

(39) (Variable-meaning to property): $\lambda C\,\lambda w\,\lambda y\;\exists c,g,w'$ such that w_c and w agree with respect to the distribution of name-bearing properties $\&\,C(<c,g,w'>) = y$

This is a function from variable meanings to functions from worlds to functions from individuals to truth values. Relative to a world w, an individual x is an Alfred just in case there is a context c in a world w' which agrees with w about name-bearing properties, and a variable assignment g such that x is the referent of **Alfred** relative to c and g.[19]

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[18]I'm ignoring the role of the index here because I'm not sure how to incorporate it. We might treat the meaning of a name as a function from an index, assignment, context, and world to an individual. But this is a strangely metalinguistic meaning (an index is a part of the language, not part of the model). Perhaps that isn't a problem. If we don't do that, it is unclear how we could characterize the lexical meaning of names in a way that could be manipulated by projection functions.

[19]It might appear that I'm being obtuse here. I'm insisting that the indexicalist/variabilist capture the extension of the predicative interpretation by recovering it from the *character* of names. And I'm then noting that to recover the extension from the characters that the indexicalist/variabilist posits, we need to employ projection functions which themselves 'add' metalinguistic content. Presumably, the natural thought would be that in, some sense, the way that speakers *grasp* the character of a proper names involves a more direct grasp of the associated name bearing properties than is reflected in that character. The character is just a function from contexts (or in the case of variabilists, contexts and variable assignments) to objects. But the way a speaker grasps some particular function of this kind might involve the ability to deploy a concept like *bearer of N*. And perhaps it is this 'mode of presentation' of the character that is relevant to generating predicative interpretations of names.

Two points about this:

As with indexicalists, variabilists must posit a projection function which adds metalinguistic content. Variabilism, though, is in a slightly better situation with respect to precedent for functions of this kind. There is some evidence that reference-filters of pronouns can be projected into property-interpretations. The dialogue in (40 a)-(40 b) is perfectly felicitous (cf (*Rami*, 2015), (*Schoubye*, Forthcoming)).

(40) (a) A: Sam cut his hair today.

(b) B: Sam is a she, not a he.

And in (40 b), **he** is interpreted as a predicate true of males, and **she** a predicate true of females. So this is a case where a pronoun is interpreted as a predicate true of individuals who satisfy the presupposition of the pronoun. This is some precedent for a similar mechanism which produces predicative interpretations of names.

On the other hand, there is reason to worry that the interpretations in (40 b) are idiomatic. Combinations with other determiners are less obviously acceptable. There are borderline cases like (41 a) and substantially worse ones as in (41 b)-(41 d).

(41) (a) ? The class has two she's and three he's.

(b) # Every she in the class got an A.

(c) # At least five thems failed.

(d) # Few us's took the test.

This is in contrast with predicative interpretations of names, which occur easily with (nearly) any determiner.

There is a connection between the content-adding nature of the projection function and the non-systematicity of the interpretations. In general, content-adding projection functions are less systematic than formal ones. Consider, for example, the function which takes nouns denoting containers (*e.g.*, **bottle** in (42 a)) to verbs which denote the action of filling those containers *e.g.*, (**bottle** in (42 b)).

(42) (a) The beer is placed into bottles.

(b) The beer is bottled.

There is some generality to this projection - we see the same thing with **can**, **box**, and **bag**, for example. But not every container word has a corresponding verb - take **cup** and **bowl**, for example.

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1) If this is what indexicalists/variabilists intend, they should say so. It would be going out a limb. I don't think we have a very clear grip on, say, what concepts a speaker deploys in grasping the character of **I** or **you**, for example. Should we assume that competent speakers have the concept *agent* as it is used in the metalanguage of Kaplan's theory, and that they are reliably able to identify the referent of **I** relative to a context because they deploy their *agent* concept and their concept of a *context* in some way that lines up with the character of **I**. Perhaps that's how it goes, but I don't see any reason to assume that it is.

2) Deflationary strategies attempt to generate predicative interpretations by appealing to well-established genres of polysemy. But these involve projection functions which operate on the semantic properties of expressions, not on the conceptual features of how those semantic properties are grasped. So going down this road would be to abandon the attempt to find clear precedent for the polysemic mechanisms needed to generate predicative interpretations. This would be a substantial theoretical cost.

It's no surprise, then, that the content-adding projection which generates the presupposition-filter reading of **he** and **she** is not fully systematic. If, as seems to be the case, predicative interpretations of names are systematically available, variabilists owe us an explanation of why this should be.[20]

Note that we can imagine contexts in which predicative interpretations of pronouns can occur with other determiners. Consider (43 a-43 b).

(43) (a) A [pointing to a number of different people]: He cut his hair, and he cut his hair, and he cut his hair...

  (b) B: Every he you mentioned is a she.

But note that this, like the original examples in (40 a-40 b), is echoic. The speakers in (40 b) and (43 b) are explicitly commenting on a previous utterance, noting a word that was misused in it. The literature on metalinguistic negation suggests that echoic contexts generally support metalinguistic interpretations which would otherwise be unavailable (*Carston*, 1996). And this seems to be what is occurring with predicative interpretations of third-person pronouns. Predicative interpretations of names are not echoic in this way, so this is a disanalogy. Again, variabilists owe us an explanation of why this should be. It doesn't seem as though, for example, the relative salience of the recovered properties will help here. Surely gender properties are typically more salient than name-bearing properties.

To sum up: both indexicalists and variabilists can recover predicative interpretations from the lexical meaning of names. In both cases, however, the projection functions required do not have the *formal* character that one might have initially expected - and some theorists have explicitly claimed - nor is there particularly clear linguistic precedent for the kind of projection functions that would be required. Again, what might have seemed like a smooth sailing for non-predicativist approaches has turned out to involve some choppy seas.

4   A GAP IN THE DISTRIBUTION

In this section I will introduce a complication that applies to predicativist and non-predicativist approaches alike. The paper so far neglects a crucial, though underdeveloped, aspect of Sloat's original discussion.[21] We have been canvassing ways that non-predicativists could account for the places in which the distribution of names and common nouns overlap. But Sloat's original observation concerned both the places that the distribution overlapped and the places where they diverged. Recall that they diverged in two places: names can appear in singular unmodified form without a determiner, common nouns cannot; common nouns can occur in singular unmodified form with a definite article, names cannot.

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[20]Thanks to a reviewer for suggesting a discussion of this case

[21]This aspect of the situation has rarely been discussed by referentialists. An exception to this is the insightful discussion in (*Jeshion*, 2015). I became aware of her discussion after the substance of this work was already completed. It will be clear that I am less optimistic about the referentialist story here than Jeshion is. We agree that referentialists should deny that the singular unmodified form is ungrammatical and try to give a pragmatic story about its default infelicity. I will leave more serious engagement with this work for the future, but I try to note a few important points of contact below. There is also the recent discussion in (*Fara*, 2015b) which touches on some of the issues here, though not explicitly. Space does not permit a full discussion of this either, but I will comment on it briefly in note (35) below.

The man stopped by	# The Smith stopped by
# Man stopped by	Smith stopped by

Suppose we take this claim at face-value (in a moment we will see that it involves a substantial oversimplification). Referentialists can easily explain the fact that proper names but not common nouns can appear bare. Names but not common nouns have the right lexical semantic type to be the argument to a predicate.[22] But why can they not appear in singular unmodified definite descriptions? We spent the last few sections canvassing ways that referentialists can generate the interpretation of names in predicative positions. But if a name can be interpreted as a predicate in other constructions, what stops it from being interpreted as a predicate in the context of a singular unmodified definite description (call these SUDS for short)? We need an explanation of how names can appear in *some* predicative positions which does not predict that they can appear in all predicative positions.

To see the force of this problem, we can return to a discarded suggestion. Recall Brute Ambiguity Deflationism - the attempt to explain predicative interpretations of names without trying to derive them via any interpretive mechanism. The view holds that **Alfred** is simply ambiguous between a referential and predicative meaning. Even if we hadn't already ruled out this approach, it would founder here. If predicative and bare occurrences are simply the articulation of unrelated lexical items, what could possibly explain the infelicity of SUDS? The existence of a homonym should not effect the distribution of a lexical item. If Brute Ambiguity Deflationism needs to posit an arbitrary restriction on the distribution of the predicate **Alfred**, this would be a substantial multiplication of theoretical complexity.

Are other deflationary approaches are in any better position? Can they offer any principled explanation of the absence of SUDS? Or must they posit one mechanism which generates the range of predicative interpretations we *do* find, and then posit an independent mechanism which restricts the interpretation of SUDS to specific contexts?

I'll assume that a principled account of the absence of the singular unmodified form would link that absence to the *presence* of the bare form. It is *because* the bare form is available that SUDS are unavailable. It's hard to see the promise in any other strategy. And at a broad level, we can distinguish two strategies of this kind. A *grammatical strategy* would attempt to explain the unacceptability of SUDS morphosyntactically. A *pragmatic* strategy would attempt to explain its unacceptability in terms of post-grammatical effects - principally invoking considerations about the rationality of communicative activity.

Predicativism invokes a grammatical strategy. There is a morphological rule which requires the definite determiner to go unpronounced in certain constructions. The reason that SUDS are unacceptable is that the syntactic structure which that form *would* be the articulation of must be pronounced as the bare form. Referentialism must posit some kind of broadly pragmatic mechanism. Referentialists hold that nothing morphosyntactically interesting is going on with bare names or with singular unmodified descriptions containing predicative interpretations of

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[22]What about the predicativist? Can she explain why names but not common nouns cannot appear bare? Yes and no. Predicativists posit a morphological rule which allows the definite determiner to appear bare only with names (under certain syntactic conditions). Why do no common nouns participate in this morphological rule? There doesn't seem to be, from the point of view of the predicativist, any deep answer to this question. This level of arbitrariness is an unavoidable part of the predicativist story, but see the discussion at the beginning of section (2) about whether it should be troubling.

names so there is no basis for a grammatical strategy.[23]

We need to decide whether the grammatical strategy posited by predicativists or a pragmatic strategy consistent with referentialism is more plausible. I'm going to suggest, in fact, that neither is particularly plausible. I will suggest that predicativists should fundamentally alter their view in response.

The predicativist claim that SUDS are ungrammatical has its source in the observation that an SUD cannot be used in ordinary reference to an individual who bears the relevant name. As an attempt to refer to an individual known as an Alfred to both speaker and listener and salient in a discourse, (44 b) is sharply infelicitous and (44 a) is completely normal.

(44)   (a) Alfred is an accomplished trombonist.

        (b) # The Alfred is an accomplished trombonist.

Predicativists have already noted that there are constructions in which SUDS are acceptable. In (45) the determiner is overt and stressed.

(45)   I met THE David Kaplan yesterday.

Examples of this sort are not particularly troubling to predicativism. It is not unreasonable to hold that stress can override the morphological rule which requires the determiner to go unpronounced in such constructions (Fara (2015a, pg. 95) notes: "one cannot stress a word without pronouncing it!"). But there are other contexts in which SUDS are available.

SUDS are perfectly acceptable in anaphoric contexts. In (47 a), **the Alfred** is an acceptable way of picking up the discourse referent introduced in (46).

(46)   Two Ralphs and an Alfred came to the party last night.

(47)   (a) The Alfred was a famous semanticist.

        (b) Alfred was a famous semanticist.

It is less obvious what predicativists ought to say about cases of like this. There is no special intonation required and this is a perfectly normal use of a definite description. Note that (47 b) would be a perfectly acceptable continuation as well. To my ears, there is a subtle difference in meaning between (47 a) and (47 b). Perhaps this is not immediately obvious, but see section (7) for an elucidation and explanation of this difference.

There are other constructions in which SUDS are felicitous. Speaking vaguely, we can say that contexts in which a name-bearer is salient *qua* name-bearer often license the use of an SUD. Suppose that for some reason we need to assemble a group containing exactly one Michael, one Helen and one Alfred. In this context (48) is perfectly felicitous (this is a variation on an example brought to my attention by Jessica Pepp.) Similar example are also discussed in (*Jeshion*, 2015)).

(48)   I'll find the Michael and the Helen, you find the Alfred.

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[23]The issue is somewhat more complicated. There are theories which basically *grammaticalize* the idea of blocking that is described below (as pragmatic competition), referentialists might try to appeal to theories of this kind to offer a grammatical explanation for infelicity of SUDS which does not require positing syntactic or morphological structure in bare occurrences. For example (*Poser*, 1992) holds that lexical forms can block phrasal forms which stand in the right relation to those forms. But accounts of this kind only apply when the two forms are synonymous, which is precisely what referentialists deny about the relation between the bare form and the SUD.

It doesn't look like the names are being used here in any way that is out of the ordinary for definite descriptions. Why are bare names not required?

The situation appears to be as follows: SUDS are not ungrammatical. They are strongly infelicitous in "run-of-the-mill" referential situations involving names. But they are perfectly felicitous in other sorts of discourse situation. The question we have to ask is whether referentialism or predicativism is in a better position to explain why SUDS are not available in normal referential uses of names, but are available in constructions like (48) and (47 a). Can referentialists offer a plausible pragmatic story? Can predicativists offer a principled modification of their grammatical story?

5 PRAGMATIC COMPETITION

The next step is to canvass the possibilities for referentialists. The discussion will have two stages. I will begin with a general discussion of pragmatic accounts of blocking, and then discuss pragmatic competition in the referential domain. The formula for a general referentialists strategy is clear: an SUD is infelicitous, when it is, because a speaker who uses it when she could just as easily, and to the same effect, used the bare name is forcing the audience to do needless extra interpretive work and is therefore being uncooperative. The question is whether this general strategy can be implemented in detail, and whether it can explain the interpretation SUDS receive when they are felicitous.

There is a long history - going back even before Grice (see the references in (*Horn*, 1984)) - of explaining the infelicity of certain complex forms in terms of pragmatic competition with lexical forms. McCawley (1979) argued in some cases, the use of a complex phrase which was synonymous with a lexical item would trigger - via Gricean manner considerations - a search for a communicative reason for the extra prolixity. If no explanation could be found, the utterance is judged infelicitous. And, the thought goes, if contexts of utterance in which there would be a point to the extra prolixity are non-standard, or rare, or difficult to imagine, the judgment of infelicity might apply to the forms themselves, rather than merely to utterances of them.This sort of reasoning can explain why the existence of lexical forms can block the availability of phrasal forms which would otherwise be expected

For example, McCawley claims that the lexicalized predicate **pink** makes the complex predicate **pale red** infelicitous. Whereas the predicate **pale green** is perfectly felicitous, owing to the absence of a (well-known?) lexical alternative.

(49) (a) John bought a pale green sweater.

     (b) ? John bought a pale red sweater.

     (c) John bought a pink sweater.

Note, importantly, that whatever we think of this kind of explanation it does not generate judgments of absolute unacceptability. There is no sense in which (49 b) is judged to be ungrammatical. At most, it feels odd (I'm not even sure that I agree with that, but leave this aside). This might not be such a bad precedent for the referentialist. Though Sloat, and predicativists following him, held that SUDS were ungrammatical, one should be suspicious about any attempt to finely parse the phenomenology of linguistic unacceptability. More than that, the data from the last section suggests that SUDS are clearly acceptable in some contexts. It might be enough to hold that SUDS are strongly infelicitous in many contexts.

So maybe some kind of pragmatic story will work for the deflationist. The trick is getting the details right. Note that McCawley's explanation involved competition between a lexical form and a phrasal form which *have the same meaning*. But deflationists precisely *deny* that a bare occurrence of **Alfred** and the singular unmodified description **the Alfred** have the same meaning. Both homonymists and contextualists had to posit content-adding projection functions to generate predicative interpretations of names. And if they don't have the same meaning, why should the bare form block the SUD?

To slow down: deflationists deny that **Alfred** and **the Alfred** have the same compositional semantic structure. But there might be some other sense in which they have the same meaning which explains why one blocks the other. But it is tricky to characterize this other sense in a way that makes the correct predictions. You might think, for example, that sameness of character would be enough to achieve blocking. Whether or not this is true, it won't help here. Referentialists deny that **Alfred** and **the Alfred** have the same character - referentialists hold that relative to every context **Alfred** expresses a constant function from worlds of evaluation to individuals. Definite descriptions do not have characters of that sort.

Perhaps it is enough that two expressions have the same diagonal content (that they have the same extension relative to every pair c and w_c).[24] First note it clearly would not help the homonymist deflationary strategy. According to that strategy, it is inappropriate to speak of *the* character of the bare form. According to it, the bare form is the articulation of one of the particular context-invariant lexical items (**Alfred**$_1$, **Alfred**$_2$, *etc*). Each of these has a different constant character - returning the same individual relative to all contexts. The definite description **the Alfred** does not have any of these diagonal contents (it has a non-constant character). So it is unclear how homonymism - the traditional philosophical view about names - is in a position to offer any kind of principled story about the default infelicity of SUDS.

The situation is somewhat more complicated for contextualist referentialism. I will take indexicalism as an example here (similar remarks apply to variabilism). To decide if **Alfred** and **the Alfred** have the same diagonal content we need a particular hypothesis about the meaning of definite descriptions, in particular the way they interact with context. Suppose, roughly, that relative to a context and the world of that context a description **the *F*** denotes the individual, if there is one, who is the unique member of the contextual restriction of the property expressed by ***F***. Our question then is: is there any reason to think that for every context c the individual who occupies the 'Alfred' parameter c_{Alfred} will be the unique member of the contextual restriction of the property characterized by applying the projection function (Character to property) to the meaning of **Alfred**? There is no reason to think this, and it is certainly not built into our characterization of (Character to property). The contextual parameter c_{Alfred} and whatever restricts the domain of predicates (suppose it is an an assignment to a covert variable, as in (*Stanley and Szabó*, 2000)) are independent features of a conversational situation. We haven't been given any reason to think that a systematic relationship exists between them. Consider an analogy. It is not the case that the agent parameter of a context, and the contextual restriction of the predicate **speaker** will always coincide. It is easy to imagine a context in which **I** and **the speaker** would be interpreted as referring to different things relative to the worlds of those context. Note, and we will return to this later, that an utterance of **the speaker** in a context c is normally interpreted as referring to the speaker of a context distinct from c which is itself salient in c. The normal

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[24]This would assume that descriptions are individual-denoting expressions rather than generalized quantifiers. But we could characterize an equivalent formal relationship in that case.

interpretation of (51) would involve disjoint reference between **me** and **the speaker**.

(50)   The speaker told me to be quiet during his remarks.

This is a fundamental problem for referentialism. There is no theory internal reason to for the referentialist to hold that the bare name and the SUD would even have the same reference relative to typical contexts. Why should they be in competition?

The proposal at hand also seems to overgenerate. It is not generally true that if a complex term and a simpler term have the same diagonal content, then the use of the complex term is deemed infelicitous (absent some communicative point in uttering it). Take **I** and **the speaker of this utterance**. Plausibly they have the same diagonal content. But they do not seem to be in any real competition. Consider (51).

(51)   The speaker of this utterance is tired.

It would no doubt be a slightly odd way to make a point, but it isn't infelicitous in the way that an attempt to use an SUD for run-of-the-mill reference is.

Perhaps we have missed a crucial aspect of the situation. It is not just, from the referentialist's point of view, that **the Alfred** has the same diagonal content as **Alfred** (or near enough the same), but that the first involves an interpretation which is polysemically derived from the second (note that this explanation is only open to indexicalism/variabilism and not to homonymism - recall the homonymists must hold that predicative interpretations are derived from quotative expressions and not from names themselves). This distinguishes it from **the speaker of this utterance** and **I**. Perhaps it is the conjunction of these two facts that explains the observed blocking effects.

There is a kind of logic to this thought. There is, from the point of view of the contextualist referentialist, something dramatically indirect about the interpretive procedure required to interpret **the Alfred**. Consider a context in which some individual *o* is the uniquely salient bearer of the name 'Alfred'. In that context, an utterance of **Alfred** would refer to *o*. Instead of uttering **Alfred**, a speaker places **Alfred** in a type-mismatched semantic environment, which triggers application of (Character to Name) - resulting in the interpretation of **Alfred** as a predicate true of individuals named 'Alfred'. But given that predicate occurs in an SUD, the effect is to create a complex singular term which refers to the unique member of the contextual restriction of **Alfred** - that is, *o* (bracketing the above - very serious - worries about this assumption). This does seem to have a heroic amount of unnecessary cognitive effort to no real purpose. And this is going to be generally true of contexts which would license **the Alfred.** So perhaps it is enough to establish a kind of default infelicity.

Because of its level of specificity, it is difficult to test this claim in other cases. But we can return to other kinds of polysemic extension and check whether it is true that complex expressions which contain expressions which are polysemically derived from simpler ones - and which have more or less the same referential profile - generally are blocked. And this doesn't seem to be the case. Recall that the interpretation of **cherry** to pick out trees is supposed to be polysemically derived from the interpretation that picks out fruit. Suppose after dinner I utter (52 a) rather than (52 b).

(52)   (a) Please pass the fruits from the cherry tree.

       (b) Please pass the cherries.

This would be a round-about way to ask for the cherries, but it is perfectly felicitous. But **the fruits from the cherry tree** stands to **the cherries** as **the Alfred** stands to **Alfred**. So there doesn't seem to be strong independent support for this strategy.

Finally, the distributional gap - the default infelicity of SUDS - is morphologically precise. It appears to be simply that *form* that is ruled out. It is not clear that any plausible *pragmatic* principles will be able to capture a morphological gap of this kind. Note that very closely related meanings, expressed in different forms, are perfectly acceptable - see (53 a)-(53 c).

(53)   (a) That Alfred is tall.

    (b) The salient Alfred is tall.

    (c) The guy called Alfred is tall.

It is unclear what purely pragmatic story would rule **the Alfred** out, but let these three expressions in.

It looks as though general considerations of the infelicity associated with unnecessary prolixity seem unlikely to do the work that the referentialist requires. In general, there simply isn't a strong enough pragmatic punishment for unneeded prolixity to explain the status of SUDS.

Referentialists might look to more narrowly relevant precedent from the study of the interaction between competing referential devices. Linguists have offered a range of related accounts of the way that the choice between alternative referential devices depends on the grammatical possibilities and the discourse situation. They have held that the *choice* between alternative referential devices which are grammatically licensed in a given position can affect the interpretation of that device in context. This work has been within a number of different paradigms. Space does not permit a substantial discussion, but I'll briefly discuss considerations in binding theory, and the givenness hierarchy which are relevant.[25] I will try to draw out why they seem unlikely to offer much comfort to the referentialist.

Compare (54 a) and (54 b).

(54)   (a) He$_i$ likes Helen and he$_i$ gave her a valentine.

    (b) He$_i$ likes Helen and the man$_j$ gave her a valentine.

Levinson (1987, pg 411) notes that the second occurrence of **he** in (54 a) is is naturally understood as coreferential with the first in (54 a), while **the man** is naturally understood as non-coreferential with **he** in (54 b). His explanation is as follows: Gricean considerations cooperativity make coreference the default interpretation of the repeated pronoun. Though **he** and **the man** have a roughly similar semantic potential in this context, the non-coreferential interpretation of **the man** in (54 b) is supposed to follow from the fact that the speaker went out of her way to use a more prolix form than the one that would have generated the default coreferential interpretation.

From the point of view of referentialism, (55 a) and (55 b) should exhibit the same structure.

(55)   (a) John likes Steve and John gave him a valentine.

    (b) # John likes Steve and the John gave him a valentine.

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[25]Other relevant precedents would include the *given/new* distinction introduced in (*Prince*, 1981), and the rankings of *accessibility* introduced in (*Ariel*, 1988). Space doesn't permit a discussion of these paradigms here, but I have substantially similar things to say about them as I do with respect to the approaches below.

The second occurrence of **John** in (55 a) is not grammatically required to be coreferential with the first, but this is a natural interpretation. **John** and **the John** have, according to referentialists, roughly the same semantic potential in this context. So why isn't the occurrence of **the John** in (55 b) understood as simply indicating that a different John gave Steve a valentine? The SUD is not acceptable here, but the referentialist would seem to predict that it would be smoothly interpretable as non-coreferential.

A similar point can be made about the givenness hierarchy in (*Gundel et al.*, 1993).[26] That framework posits that a scale of (roughly) epistemic relations that a speaker might stand in to a potential discourse referent. At the bottom of the scale is *type identifiability* (roughly: knowing the meaning of some nominal expression which the object satisfies). At the top is *in focus* (roughly: the object is currently being attended to by the speaker) (pg 277). Intermediate levels involve intermediate degrees of identifying knowledge. They also posit that different kinds of determiner phrase conventionally signal that an intended referent has achieved a particular degree of *givenness*. Lower points on the scale are consistent with higher points on the scale, but employing a device associated with a lower point on the scale is supposed to implicate, via standard Gricean reasoning, that the speaker is not in a position to employ a device that is associated with a higher point. So for example, the natural interpretation of (56) is that the speaker cannot identify the dog which tore up the garden.

(56) A dog tore up my garden today.

This interpretation is supposed to be explained by the fact that the speaker did not use a determiner phrase associated with a higher level of activation (*e.g.*, **my dog**, **that dog**, **he**) ((*Gundel et al.*, 1993, pg 296), for a related discussion see (*Horn*, 1984)).

This is the kind of structure that referentialists would have to appeal to explain the possible interpretations of SUDS. But it is not clear how this would work. They would have to hold that names were higher on the givenness scale than definite descriptions (names do not actually appear on the hierarchy in (*Gundel et al.* (1993)), so this already involves some extension). This is because the theory is meant to explain how expressions higher on the scale tend to crowd out expressions lower on the scale, and referentialists are trying to explain how SUDS are crowded out by bare names. So referentialists would have to explain some sense in which using a bare name involves some higher degree of identifiability of a referent than does using an SUD. This, by itself, does not seem promising (the philosophical literature on names suggests that very little, or perhaps, no identifying knowledge or identificatory ability is required to use a bare name - see, for example, (*Soames*, 1989)).

Summing up: neither general pragmatic reasoning, nor pragmatic reasoning about the choice between competing referential devices, provides referentialism with any very obvious explanation of the interpretive possibilities for SUDS. This is a significant challenge. Perhaps it can be met, but until then it looks like referentialists must posit two independent interpretative mechanisms. They must generate predicative interpretations of names, and then must prohibit those interpretations from being accessed in the context of singular unmodified definite descriptions

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[26](*Jeshion*, 2015, pg 393) claims that SUDS violate "the various ''givenness'', ''accessibility'', and ''activation'' scales linguists have offered to explain norms on choices among referential expressions", but does not develop this idea in detail. So I am not entirely sure what she has in mind.

(used in the run-of-the-mill reference). It is not clear that they can relate these two features in any principled way. And this is a substantial element of added theoretical complexity.

6   ANAPHORIC AND NON-ANAPHORIC DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS

We can take two related lessons from the previous section: first, the gap in the distribution of predicative interpretations of names seems to be morphologically precise - the singular unmodified form is related to the bare form in some way that other forms with closely related meanings are not; second, the contrast in interpretive possibilities between bare names and SUDS does not appear to be predictable from general pragmatic principles. Extant forms of predicativism are in a good position to explain the first lesson - recall that for predicativists the bare form just is the way that the SUD is (typically) pronounced. But the second lesson is not explained by extant forms of predicativism. We saw in section (4), that there are contexts in which SUDS are perfectly acceptable and for which predicativists have no explanation to offer.

We will explore the prospects of modifying predicativism in a principled way to respond to this worry. To look ahead: extant forms of predicativism treat bare names as having the same discourse role as definite descriptions. This is a mistake. Bare names select their referent from context in a way that is more restricted than definite descriptions. Predicativists should hold that the determiner which goes unpronounced in bare names encodes this interpretive feature. I will thus be advocating that predicativist adopt a form of what, in the initial taxonomy, I called *idiosyncratic predicativism*.

To work our way towards seeing the more restricted discourse role that I will posit for the null determiner, we can note that it is not uncommon for natural languages to make finer grammatical distinctions within the space of definiteness than does English. Many languages morphologically distinguish between a definite description functioning anaphorically and one functioning non-anaphorically (in addition to the case discussed below, this contrast is found in, *e.g.*, Fering, Lakhota, Hausa, Haitian and Mauritian creoles (*Lyons*, 1999, pg 53ff), (*Wespel*, 2008)). Below I'll focus on a contrast found in standard German: a definite article following a preposition is sometimes contracted, and sometimes not. Schwarz (2009) labels the contracted form the *weak* definite article and the uncontracted form the *strong* article (all German examples below, with the exception of (**??**), are due to Schwarz). Note, as this will be important in relation to names, that use of the wrong form does not result in strong judgments of ungrammaticality but rather judgments of (for some speakers only minor) infelicity (*Schwarz*, 2009, pg. 60).

The distinction between the two forms can initially be characterized like this: the strong form is used when the intended discourse referent is introduced via an indefinite antecedent; the weak form is used when the intended referent is presupposed to be the unique satisfier of the descriptive condition associated with the description in some salient domain. In (57 a), the strong form (**von dem Politiker**) is used to pick up the discourse referent introduced by the indefinite (**einen Politiker**). In (57 b), the weak form (**vom Burgermeister**) is used to refer to individual who is known to be the unique mayor in the situation under discussion.

(57)   (a)   *Hans   hat   einen   Schriftsteller   und   einen   Politiker   interviewt.   Er   hat   #vom*
              Hans   has   a   writer   and   a   politician   interviewed   .   He   has
              /   von   dem   Politiker   keine   interessanten   Antworten   bekommen.
              from-the $_{weak}$ /   from   the$_{strong}$ politician   no   interesting

answers gotten

'Hans interviewed a writer and a politician. He didn't get any interesting answers from the politician.' (pg. 30)

(b) *Der Empfang wurde vom / #von dem Burgermeister eroffnet.*
The reception was by-the$_{weak}$ / by the$_{strong}$ mayor opened
'The reception was opened by the mayor' (pg. 40)

But the situation is not so straightforward. Though the strong form typically involves a linguistic antecedent, it need not. In the classic Partee-style example, the strong form is still available (and preferred by some to the weak form), despite the lack of an antecedent.

(58) *Wir haben 10 Eier versteckt, aber die Kinder haben erst 9 gefunden.*
We have 10 eggs hidden but the kids have only 9 found.
?Im / In dem fehlenden Ei ist eine a Uberraschung.
in-the$_{weak}$ / in the $_{strong}$ missing egg is surprise
'We hid 10 eggs, but the kids have only found 9 of them. There's a surprise in the missing egg.' (pg 277)

Note also that the strong form *must* be used if a description is modified with a restrictive relative clause, and can be used in that form even without any linguistic antecedent or other antecedent identifying knowledge (in what Hawkins calls 'establishing uses' of descriptions)

(59) *Sie ist #vom / von dem Mann, mit dem sie gestern ausgeganen*
She is by-the$_{weak}$ / by the $_{strong}$ man with whom she yesterday
ist, versetzt worden.
went out is stood up been
'She was stood up by the man that she went out with yesterday.' (pg 68)

Conversely, though the weak form is typically used in relation to background knowledge of situational uniqueness, it can also be licensed by preceding discourse.

(60) *Der Gaustadvatnet ist ein See in Norwegen. Am See liegt der Ort*
the Gaustadvatnet is a lake in Norway. On-the lake lies the town
Korsvegen...
Korsvegen
'The Gaustadvatnet is a lake in Norway. The town Korsvegen lies on the lake.' (pg. 44)

Here, the weak form (**am see**) is used to refer to the lake that was introduced in the first sentence, the strong form is also available here. What seems to be the case is that the initial sentence in (60) introduces a situation in which there is a unique lake under discussion, in this case by employing an indefinite. The subsequent utterance can pick up that discourse referent either by exploiting this uniqueness, or by exploiting the indefinite antecedent.

We can think of the situation as follows. We can distinguish *context-bound* from *non context-bound* discourse referents. A definite DP refers to a context-bound discourse referent when it is licensed by its relation to a feature of the local discourse, and is interpreted by semantically linking it to that feature (Schwarz treats strong DPs as introducing dynamic variables which can

persist cross-sententially but not cross-contextually). Often this is achieved with an indefinite antecedent, but this is not the only way. For example, strong definites have a quasi-demonstrative use as well, where they are used to refer to an object which is perceptually salient in a context (*Schwarz*, 2009, pg 39). A definite DP refers to a non context-bound discourse referent if it is licensed by common knowledge in a context of the unique satisfaction of the associated descriptive condition relative to a situation under discussion. The weak form is used to refer to discourse referents whose identification, and re-identification, does not depend on the local linguistic and perceptual context. Put this way, it is clear that the two forms would have overlapping distribution. Some discourse referents which are made available in a context, are done so in a way that makes them identifiable in ways that do not rely on local features of the context.

The best way to get a sense of the contours of the phenomenon is to see where each is unavailable. The strong definite is not available in (57 b) where the a speaker must interpret **dem Burgermeister** by employing knowledge that there is a unique mayor in the situation under discussion. Only the strong article is available for **the room** in (61).

(61) *Bei   der Gutshausbesichtigung hat   mich eines der Zimmer besonders*
     During the mansion   tour has me   one the$_{GEN}$ rooms
     beeindruckt. Angeblich hat   Goethe im   Jahr 1810 eine
     especially   impressed Ouppposedly has   Goethein-the$_{weak}$ year 1810 a
     Nacht # im   / in dem   Zimmer verbracht.
     night in-the$_{weak}$ / in the$_{strong}$ room   spent
     'One of the rooms especially impressed me during the mansion tour. Supposedly Goethe spent a night in the room in 1810'

The explanation of this asymmetry lies in the fact that the first sentence introduces a particular room in a way that makes it clear that the situation under discussion contains other rooms as well. Thus subsequent reference to the original room cannot employ the weak article, but requires the anaphoric article. Note that it is not obvious that there is no sense in which the room under discussion is unique - it is the unique room that impressed the speaker. It is somehow that this sort of uniqueness is not the right sort to license the weak determiner.

7   Bare names as non-anaphoric

Some languages grammatically distinguish between definite determiners functioning anaphorically and those functioning non-anaphorically, and this can have a morphological expression. Predicativists should take this as relevant precedent for their own approach and hold the unpronounced definite determiner in bare names is marked as non-anaphoric.

Note that there are constructions in German in which names occur with an overt definite determiner. In run-of-the-mill referential uses - uses which would involve a bare occurrence in English - if there is an overt article it takes the weak form.

(62) *Ich müsste mal   wieder beim   Hans vorbeischauen.*
     I   must   once again by-the$_{weak}$ Hans stop   by
     I should stop by Hans's place again some time. (pg 65)

But in constructions in which a name is followed by a restrictive relative clause the strong article is used.

(63) *#Vom /   Von dem Hans, der   in   New York wohnt, habe ich   schon*
     of   the-*weak* /   of the   *strong* Hans that in   New   York lives have
     lange nichts mehr gehört.
     I   PART lon   nothing more heard
     I haven't heard from the Hans that lives in New York in forever. (pg 69)

We noted earlier that the weak article cannot be used with a restrictive relative clause. The strong article also appears in contexts in which a proper name is used to pick up the reference of an indefinite antecedent (Schwarz, pc). Already, then, we see a suggestive connection between the weak determiner and the bare form.

So it is worth exploring the idea that the morphological rule which phonologically reduces the definite article to create the bare occurrence in English is an instance of a broader cross-linguistic phenomenon. Cross-linguistic evidence suggests that a morphological reduction in the definite article can be used to indicate that it is operating non-anaphorically. Like with bare names, this reduction is only available if the proper syntactic configuration is present, and like with bare names, restrictive modification generally blocks the reduction. I've been focusing on the weak/strong contrast in German here, but other languages exhibit similar patterns. We even see cases - for example in Haitian and Mauritian creoles - where the non-anaphoric article is morphologically null, as is the case with bare names (*Wespel*, 2008).

Predicativists should hold that in English the overt definite article is unspecified with respect to the anaphoric/non-anaphoric distinction, but that the morphological rule which generates the bare occurrence is specified as applying only to non-anaphoric descriptions. This would involve a slight modification of the morphological proposal at the heart of predicativism. It would constitute a form of idiosyncratic predicativism - it holds that the null determiner in English does not have the same significance as any overt determiner (in English). But it is only a very modest idiosyncrasy - the null form signals a restriction on the discourse role of the overt form.[27]

To begin to motivate the idea, we can note that it fits with what philosophers have long said about the discourse function of proper names. It is independently plausible that bare names are non-anaphoric. One does not interpret a bare name by linking it to some particular linguistic antecedent, or to some object in the perceptual field, but rather by linking it to some more permanent, cross-contextually enduring mental representation of an object. The canonical function of bare names is to refer to individuals when "there is an interest in the continuing identity of the particular from occasion to occasion of reference" (*Strawson*, 1974, pg 36) (see related ideas in (*Evans*, 1982, chap. 11)). Devices like pronouns and demonstratives are useful for referring to objects which make themselves known to speakers in virtue of the local features of a context, and which are such that there is no need to refer to them again in other contexts.[28] The discourse function of names is to provide a kind of cross-contextual tag: a device to use to refer to individuals in whom one has a cross-contextually enduring linguistic interest. Of course, if this is true

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[27] An important disanalogy with the linguistic precedent is that we would have to hold that in English the anaphoric/non-anaphoric distinction is *only* marked with proper names, not with other nouns. How serious a problem is this for idiosyncratic predicativism? First, note that it is not, in fact, only proper names which exhibit this structure. Bare occurrences of, for example, **mom** and **grandma** exhibit the same pattern (see note (9)). So there is some independent evidence that English deploys these resources in a restricted way. Second, this level of arbitrariness is built into the predicativist approach. Predicativism already posits a morphological rule which is restricted to names; idiosyncratic predicativism just alters the form of that hypothesis. So the restricted nature of the rule is not a strike against idiosyncratic predicativism in relation to other forms of predicativism.

[28] To be more careful, there is no need to refer to them again *as the same* in the sense of (*Fine*, 2009).

it can only be generically true, it is clearly possible to use a name in a one-off way. But something like this seems right (for an extended defense, see (*Jeshion*, 2009)). Definite descriptions in English *can* be used to refer to individuals that are known to speakers in a particular context in virtue of cross-contextual knowledge, but this is not their specialized function. Rather they have a range of normal uses, relying on perceptual, or anaphoric, or general knowledge (see (*Hawkins*, 1978, chap. 3) for a taxonomy).

What I'm suggesting is that predicativism take this idea seriously, and hold that the morphological reduction in the article associated with bare names signals that the name is functioning to refer to a cross-contextual discourse referent.[29]

Whatever the intuitive appeal of the idea, there is still the question of whether there is any linguistic evidence for it. To make the proposal more precise: suppose that definite determiner phrases are always marked with a specification of **[+anaphoric]** or **[-anaphoric]**, but that these features do not typically, in English, have any morphological effect. We can hold that the morphological rule in English that reduces the definite article when it is the sister of name requires that the determiner phrase is marked **[-anaphoric]**.

If a definite determiner is in the relevant syntactic configuration with a name and is not morphologically reduced, as is the case with SUDS, this is the expression of the fact that the DP is marked **[+anaphoric]**. If, in such a construction, no suitable context-bound discourse referent is to be found, the use of the SUD is infelicitous. This would explain the infelicity of attempted run-of-the-mill referential uses of SUDS. So we retain predicativism's grammatical explanation of the infelicity of run-of-the-mill referential SUDS.

The fact that it is possible to use a bare name to refer to a discourse referent which was initially introduced via an indefinite description, as in (64), is not inconsistent with this view.

(64)   I have a friend named Bruno. Bruno lives in Paris.

Recall that the same thing is possible with the weak article (cf. (60), above). What the use of the bare form here signals is that the speaker is treating Bruno as a cross-contextual discourse referent, and expects the hearer to do the same. That is, further occurrences of the name used to refer to the same individual in this context, and in other contexts, will be understood relative to the information *X's friend in Paris named Bruno*, will be felicitous to the extent that there is reason to think that this condition is commonly known to be uniquely instantiated relative to the situation under discussion, will not require a linguistic antecedent, *etc*. More on this in section (8).

Let's return to (46), (47 a) and (47 b), repeated here.

(46) Two Ralphs and an Alfred came to the party last night.

(47 a) The Alfred was a famous semanticist.

(47 b) Alfred was a famous semanticist.

Idiosyncratic predicativism can explain what extant versions of predicativism cannot - why the

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[29]We should admit that this general idea could be explored in the context of referentialist theories of names as well. A reviewer notes that variabilists might hold that names-qua-variables are marked as **[-anaphoric]**. I'm not in a position to evaluate the plausibility of that proposal here. It doesn't gain support from the weak/strong distinction in the same way idiosyncratic predicativism does. But there might be a principled way to develop it. It strikes me as a promising approach for the referentialist.

SUD is perfectly felicitous in (47 a).[30] The overt article signals that the description is functioning anaphorically, and the context supplies an obvious context-bound discourse referent in (46).[31] That is a good start. It can also explain the felt difference in the continuations in (47 a) and (47 b). In (47 a), the speaker is treating Alfred as a context-bound discourse referent. In (47 b), the speaker is treating Alfred as a cross-contextual discourse referent. She is indicating that going forward she has an interest in referring to Alfred - as an Alfred - in a way that relies on stable cross-contextual knowledge, rather than context-bound knowledge (we might say that she is indicating that she already possesses, or has opened, an encyclopedic mental file in the sense of (*Récanati*, 2012, chap 6)). Note that if we change the content of the indefinite antecedent to make it clear that the speaker must already be in a position to treat the referents as cross-contextual discourse referents - as in (65 a) - the bare form is completely natural and the SUD goes back to feeling slightly forced ((*Jeshion*, 2015, pg 397) also notes - but does not, in my view, explain - the relevance of how well the individual is known to the felicity of SUDS).

(65) (a) I was best friends with an Alfred and a Helen at college.

       (b) Alfred was in the glee club, and Helen was on the hockey team.

       (c) ? The Alfred was in the glee club, and the Helen was on the hockey team.

We can look to sharpen the contrast by trying to find constructions which force the overt article (recall (61)). In (66 a), the introduction of the indefinite antecedent explicitly introduces a situation in which more than one Alfred is salient.

(66) (a) John met three Alfreds and two Ralphs yesterday. One of the Alfreds and one of the Peters particularly impressed him.

       (b) Apparently the Alfred was a famous semanticist.

       (c) ?? Apparently Alfred was a famous semanticist.

The continuation with the overt article, in (66 b), is preferred.[32] The continuation with the bare name, in (66 c), is slightly odd. It is not ungrammatical, but this shouldn't be a surprise. As mentioned above, use of the wrong form in German does not result in strong judgments of ungrammaticality but rather judgments of minor infelicity. The continuation in (66 c) suggests, more than anything, a change of topic. One gets the sense that the speaker is trying to refer to an Alfred who he knows - that is - that he can identify independently of the linguistic antecedent in (66 a). So he is either changing the subject - no longer speaking about the Alfred described in (66 a) - or he is revealing that he can identify the Alfred who impressed John independently of the introduction in (66 a).

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[30]A reviewer points out that the interpretability of (47 a) is not definitive proof that SUDS are grammatical. Often ungrammatical strings are interpretable, and ungrammaticality comes in degrees. It's possible that SUDS are only mildly ungrammatical, and nonetheless interpretable. I grant this. The challenge for someone who wanted to push this line would be to develop an explanation of the interpretability of SUDS which predicted the range of interpretations described below in a principled way.

[31](*Jeshion*, 2015, pg 398) notes that the overt article is felicitous in a context in which speakers identify the reference of SUDS via perceptual cues (for example, a context in which individuals are wearing name-tags). This is also predicted by the present theory. Recall that the anaphoric article has a quasi-demonstrative use.

[32]A reviewer, along with their informants, find examples of this kind infelicitous. My own informal polling of informants has not found anyone who regards them as infelicitous. Clearly, experimental work on all of the examples presented in the paper would be of great value. I'm not in a position to provide that here.

We get an interesting confirmation of this pattern by considering cross-speaker continuations. In (67) *A* introduces an Alfred in an indefinite antecedent. In (68 a)-(68 b), *B* can ask a question about that discourse referent with either a bare name or an SUD.

(67)   A: I shook hands with two Ralphs and an Alfred last night.[33]

(68)   (a) B: Did the Alfred have a firm grip?

      (b) B: Did Alfred have a firm grip?

Compare this to a different kind of continuation. If *B* wants to call into question the claim that was made introducing the indefinite antecedent, she must use the bare form. (69 a) is distinctly more odd than (69 b) as a continuation of (67).

(69)   (a) B: ?? No you didn't. The Alfred didn't shake anyone's hand last night

      (b) B: No you didn't. Alfred didn't shake anyone's hand last night.

A speaker who wished to deny the claim made in introducing a discourse referent with **an Alfred** in (67) represents herself as having some independent knowledge of the individual in question. And thus she is not treating Alfred as a context-bound discourse referent. And thus the SUD is not felicitous.[34]

So there is some linguistic evidence for the hypothesis that the null article in bare names is marked as **[-anaphoric]**. An apparent counterexample is (48), repeated here (recall the context is one in which we need to find exactly one Michael, Helen and Alfred for our research).

(48) I'll find the Michael and the Helen, you find the Alfred.

Yet, I still think that the idiosyncratic hypothesis has the potential to shed some light here. It is clear that the context in which (48) is felicitous is one in which the speaker and audience have no means, independent of the context, to identify the individuals in question (after all - it hasn't yet been determined which Michael, Helen, and Alfred will be chosen). So this fits with the idea of these SUDS being interpreted, in some broad sense, anaphorically. Recall that the weak determiner in German does not require an overt linguistic antecedent (it is fine in the Partee-style marble example without an antecedent). It is enough that information introduced in the context entails there is a contextually unique satisfier of the descriptive material relative to the interests of the context. I will suggest then that the SUDS in (48) are interpreted relative to the implicit contextual instruction *find exactly one Alfred, Helen and Michael*.[35] Clearly in uttering (48), a

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[33] I owe this example to Mahrad Almotahari.

[34] In fact, it possible to accommodate the utterance in (69 a), but one must interpret the SUD not as anaphoric on the indefinite antecedent in (67) but as relating to discourse-bound knowledge of a unique Alfred of the sort identified in relation to (48).

[35] One possibility here would be to appeal to the idea in (*Fara*, 2015b): that in uses of apparent SUDS there is an unpronounced nominal restriction which blocks the use of the null article. Perhaps in cases of this kind, there is a syntactically real but unpronounced restrictive material (*e.g.* **the Michael** *we need for or study*). The challenge for a view of this kind is to distinguish, in a principled way, the kind of contextual restriction which we see in run-of-the-mill referential uses of a name (which, according to this view, would not involve unpronounced syntactic material that blocks the null article), from the kind of contextual restriction which we see in the cases where we do see the SUDS. It would special pleading to insist that there is unpronounced syntax when and only when the overt article is felicitous. We need some independent grasp on different modes of contextual restriction. This is what the anaphoric/non-anaphoric distinction, and the morphological precedent from other languages, provides.

speaker is not committing herself to the being able to refer again to the same Michael in context with different local features.

This last explanation is not particularly satisfying on its own. It gains significant support from returning to the contrast between the strong and weak article in German. The strong article (i.e. anaphoric) article is required in structurally analogous situations. Suppose that we are planning a national political campaign. We want to collect some advisors for the campaign. We decide that we need to invite exactly one mayor, exactly one lawyer, and exactly one doctor. We haven't yet decided which mayor, which doctor or which lawyer. Explaining the rationale for the plan, I could utter (70) (thanks to Malte Willer for help with the German here).

(70) *#Vom / Von dem Burgermeister werden wir politische Beratung,*
From the mayor will we political advice, from the
#Vom / von dem Arzt medizinische Beratung, und #Vom /
doctor medical advice, and from the lawyer legal advice receive.
von dem Anwalt juristische Beratung erhalten.

We will get political advice from the mayor, medical advice from the doctor, and legal advice from the lawyer.

Here the anaphoric articles are preferred. So this is striking independent confirmation of the idea that the presence of the SUD is conditioned by discourse features which are grammatically encoded in the morphology of the definite determiner.[36]

To sum up the situation: Referentialists have no very obvious story about the default infelicity of the SUD, or about the interpretation that the SUD receives when it is felicitous. Extant forms of predicativism do no better with respect to the second question. A form of idiosyncratic predicativism which draws on the distinction between anaphoric and non-anaphoric definite descriptions is independently motivated and appears to predict subtle and diverse aspects of the data.

So there is some reason to think that the grammatical approach of predicativism is preferable to the pragmatic approach of referentialism. I am impressed enough by the explanatory work that the anaphoric/non-anaphoric distinction can do, and by the morphological similarities between weak definites and bare names, to treat predicativism as a serious contender. It is quite clear to me that idiosyncratic predicativism is substantial improvement over extant varieties of predicativism. The discourse role of bare names is not identical to that of definite descriptions. Aside from its ability to capture the intuitive canonical function of bare names - as devices of cross-contextual reference - idiosyncratic predicativism also is better suited to explaining the distribution of SUDS.

8 IDIOSYNCRATIC PREDICATIVISM

In the previous two sections I've argued that predicativists should hold that the morphological rule which reduces the definite determiner to create bare names signals a more restricted

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[36](*Jeshion*, 2015) contains a number of other examples in which SUDS are felicitous. Many of them are analogous to the kinds of cases discussed above, so would fit nicely with this theory. I'm not certain that all are, so it's possible that more work would need to be done. I describe in the next section independent reasons to think that the anaphoric/non-anaphoric distinction might not be enough to chracterize the discourse role of bare names.

discourse role than that of overt definite descriptions: bare names refer to non context-bound discourse referents. This kind of position - idiosyncratic predicativism - has not been explored by predicativists. This is surprising. Idiosyncratic predicativism holds that bare names have a discourse role that does not match that of other kinds of definite determiner phrase. On the face of it, shouldn't this be the null hypothesis for predicativists? Definite determiner phrases share a general discourse feature - they refer to discourse referents which are contextually unique, identifiable, familiar, *etc* (different theories offer different characterizations of definiteness) - but natural languages contain many different specifications of this general discourse role. Among demonstratives, many languages distinguish discourse referents which are proximal to a contextually established orienting location (**this**) from discourse referents which are distal to that location (**that**). As discussed above, many languages distinguish definite descriptions functioning anaphorically from those functioning non-anaphorically. Many languages distinguish discourse referents which stand in different relations of social authority and deference to speakers. Would it be a surprise if languages didn't treat names exactly as it treated other predicates? Names have a distinctive role in referential communication - they provide the means for referring to individuals in whom speakers have an enduring cross-contextual interest - would it not be odd if this were not, to some extent, grammatically encoded as distinct from definite descriptions in general?

A large part of the reason, I suspect, that a view of this kind has not been explored by predicativists is the worry that it would be *ad hoc*. If predicativists are allowed to simply invent a new determiner meaning, have they not lost the theoretical parsimony which was supposed to recommend the approach? Relatedly, the Sloat chart seems to reveal that the bare form must have the same interpretation as an SUD. But the Sloat chart has been misinterpreted; the proper interpretation of it reveals that bare names have a more restricted discourse role than do definite descriptions. And the proposal is not *ad hoc*. There is cross-linguistic evidence for the restricted discourse role that it posits, and it explains the patterns in interpretations of SUDS better than does extant versions of predicativism. If one finds the general predicativism approach convincing, idiosyncratic predicativism is the most viable candidate.

I'll mention four areas where further work would be required to pursue idiosyncratic predicativism.

First, I haven't offered a model of the semantics/pragmatics of the feature **[-anaphoric]**, which is at the heart of the idiosyncratic proposal. I have described the contours of the phenomenon as it appears in German, and gestured at the informal idea of the distinction between a context-bound discourse referent and a cross-contextual discourse referent. I don't have a firm view about how to develop the informal idea in the context of a theory that makes precise predictions. It might be possible to give a genuinely revealing interpretation of the distinction at the level of formal semantic architecture - (*Schwarz*, 2009) treats anaphoric DPs as introducing dynamic variables - but I am sceptical. It seems more likely that the distinction is a more broadly cognitive one. Compare the way that features like **[proximal]** and **[distal]** are typically represented in formal accounts of demonstratives (as a sample, see (*Wolter*, 2006, pg 109), (*Acton*, 2014, pg 159), (*Elbourne*, 2008, pg 432)). One typically finds that in the specification of the meaning of **this** some metalanguage predicate like 'proximal' or 'accessible', alongside some informal discussion of the intended interpretation of these metalanguage predicates which is supposed to loosely explain some facts about the interpretation of **this**. Ultimately, we must suppose, that this metalanguage predicate is a stand-in for an explanation of the cognitive representation of space which guides speakers' use of demonstratives. I am suggesting the same

thing about **[-anaphoric]**. I have given an informal discussion of its role, but ultimately what is required is an account of the way that speakers deploy cross-contextually stable information to identify and re-identify discourse referents. As I mentioned above, I suspect that the mental files approach - for example in (*Perry*, 1980), (*Evans*, 1985), (*Jeshion*, 2009), (*Récanati*, 2012) - would be a good place to start.

Second, a general characterization of the distinction between context-bound and non context-bound discourse referents will not fully explain the way that names pick up their referents from context.[37] We noted above (cf. (64)) that bare names can be used to refer to a discourse referent that was introduced by an indefinite antecedent. This isn't inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are marked **[-anaphoric]**, recall (60). But it looks like bare names more easily pick up indefinite antecedents than do other non-anaphoric descriptions. Recall (57 a), in which a weak determiner is infelicitous. If we construct an analogous example with names, a bare form *is* felicitous (as in (47 b)). Nothing we have said above explains this.

Note, first, that this issue is somewhat murky in the literature independently of names. Schwarz (2009, pg 44ff) doesn't offer a substantive characterization of the conditions under which weak definites can pick up indefinite antecedents. He cites Ebert's claim that this is possible when the antecedent becomes "central" in a "narrative", and gestures at the idea that it is related to the topicality of the referent. So without a precise characterization of how this works with non-anaphoric descriptions generally, it is difficult to know what idiosyncratic predicativism predicts.

But it remains the case that bare names more easily pick up referents introduced by indefinite antecedents than other weak definites. Developing idiosyncractic predicativism will involve more fully specifying the nature of the distinction between context-bound and non context-bound discourse referents *and* explaining how bare names interact differently with that distinction than do other weak definites. There are different options here. One would be to build more than non-anaphoricity into the meaning of the null determiner (if Schwarz is right about the relevance of topicality, perhaps that should be built in). Another, non-exclusive, option is to appeal to the particular meaning of name-predicates - that is, the nature of name-bearing properties (*being an Alfred*, *being a Helen*, etc). I suspect that the nature of name-bearing properties makes names particularly suited to reference to individuals when we have a continuing interest in them *qua* individuals. This might do some work in explaining why indefinite antecedents involving names are more easily interpreted as introducing non context-bound discourse referents. Space prevents a discussion of it in this paper, but see (*Gray*, 2012, chp. 4-5).

Third, it is not clear that merely pointing to the non-anaphoricity of bare names is going to be enough to characterize the special discourse role of bare names. Overt definite descriptions have interpretations in which they are interpreted as relativized to other operators. In (71 a)-(71 c), the description **the mayor** can be interpreted relative to the situations introduced by a quantificational determiner phrase, temporal operator, and counterfactual conditional respectively.

(71)　(a)　In every town we visited, the mayor gave us a key to the city.

　　　(b)　Next year, the mayor will be a labour unionist.

　　　(c)　If the election had gone differently, the mayor would have been a fascist.

In languages which distinguish anaphoric from non-anaphoric determiners, these constructions would employ the non-anaphoric determiner, so the proposal that treats bare names as *just like*

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[37]Thanks to two reviewers for pressing this issue

overt definite descriptions except in being marked **[-anaphoric]**, would predict that analogous readings should be possible with bare names. It is unclear whether bare names can ever receive readings of this kind. For example, is it possible, against a background assumption that there is a unique Alfred in every town we visited, to interpret the bare occurrence of **Alfred** in (72) as relativized to the quantifier (that is, as making claims about pairs of towns and unique Alfreds in those towns)?

(72)   In every town we visited, Alfred gave us a tour of the city.

Intuitions here are not uniform. The reading, if it exists, certainly feels more marked than in (71 a). Much more would need to be said to decide whether examples of this kind show that bare names are grammatically restricted from relativized readings - I discuss the issue extensively in (*Gray*, 2012), see also (*Bach*, 2002), (*Rothschild*, 2007), (*Elbourne*, 2005), (*Maier*, 2009), and (*Fara*, 2015a,b). Suffice it to say for now, that it is possible that the idiosyncratic determiner meaning encodes a feature which requires that bare names retrieve their discourse referents from the global context rather than from situations introduced by operators (Segal's version of predicativism already includes this feature, and Maier's version of discourse representation theory, which has a version of this stipulation, could easily be adapted into a predicativist framework).

Finally: developing predicativism along these lines would force us to re-evaluate some of the syntactic evidence that has been claimed for predicativism by some proponents. Part of what has motivated the hypothesis that the null determiner is the definite determiner is that fact that in some languages normal referential uses of names always, or sometimes, occur with an overt definite determiner (see, *e.g.*, (*Elbourne*, 2005, pg 74) (*Larson and Segal*, 1995, pg 355) (*Matushansky*, 2008)). But the current proposal says that bare names in English do not have the same discourse role as definite descriptions. So we are left with two possibilities. Either normal referential uses of names in those languages do not have the same discourse role as bare names in English. Or the overt definite determiners in those occurrences do not determine the kind of definiteness that those occurrences possess. The first option is not appealing. Happily, the second option has independent support. A serious defense lies beyond the scope of this paper. I'll just note that one standard approach to occurrences of this kind is to treat the overt definite article as expletive (that is, as making no semantic or pragmatic contribution, see (*Longobardi*, 1994)). For example, in their analysis of definiteness in modern Greek (one of the languages in which ordinary referential uses of names can occur with the overt determiner), (*Lekakou and Szendrői*, 2012, pg 115) conclude that "all instances of the Greek definite determiner are semantically expletive. What looks like the source of definiteness [that is, the overt determiner] is semantically empty, and what makes the semantic contribution is a phonologically null element." This proposal, developed independently of considerations involving names, is consistent with the view that there is a null non-anaphoric determiner in normal referential occurrences of names in modern Greek. What this means is that the presence of languages, like Greek, in which normal referential uses of names are accompanied by an overt definite determiner can no longer be taken for evidence *for* predicativism, but neither should it be taken as evidence *against* idiosyncratic predicativism.

Similar questions will arise about languages which have a preproprial article, and languages (like German) in which there is, in some constructions, a choice between bare forms and overt articles. Both predicativists and referentialists would do well to examine cases like these in detail to see what interpretive possibilities exist for morphological variations in different contexts. One

central lesson of the present work is that neither predicativists nor referentialists have offered a very plausible account of interactions of this kind.

9   CONCLUSION

I hope to have shown that there are unappreciated difficulties in referentialist responses to predicativism's master argument. The projection functions that referentialists must posit in order to generate predicative interpretations are not particularly straightforward, nor do they have very clear independent attestation. Homonymists must posit a two-layer process which starts with a quotation and is then further modified to generate a *name-bearing* interpretation. Contextualists, though they represent their view as holding that name-bearing properties are part of the meaning of bare names, must posit content-adding projection functions. This is inelegant, but is not a decisive problem. Pragmatics is unruly business, and so perhaps it should be no surprise that predicative interpretations of names are difficult to tame.

More troubling for referentialists is their failure to offer a plausible account of the interpretation of singular unmodified definite descriptions containing predicative interpretations of names. The interpretive procedure they offer for predicative interpretations of names generally predicts that SUDS should be perfectly felicitous. In fact, they are only felicitous in specific contexts. Without a plausible story about why this should be, referentialism is incomplete.

But the troubles of referentialism are weighed against the troubles of predicativism. And extant versions of predicativism fare no better than referentialism on this last score. So the second upshot of the paper is that if one wants to be a predicativist, one should plump for a form of idiosyncratic predicativism. I introduced a version above which 1) is closer to capturing the intuitive discourse role of bare names, 2) employs an independently motivated morphological proposal about the null determiner in bare occurrences, and 3) makes progress in predicting the actual range of possible interpretations for singular unmodified descriptions.

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