

Amber L. Griffioen • Marius Backmann  
Editors

# Pluralizing Philosophy's Past

New Reflections in the History of Philosophy

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*Editors*

Amber L. Griffioen  
Faculty of Arts and Humanities  
Duke Kunshan University  
Kunshan, China  
  
Department of Global Studies  
Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

Marius Backmann  
Department of Philosophy, Logic and  
Scientific Method  
London School of Economics and  
Political Science  
London, UK

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*To Eileen O'Neill. Her brilliant scholarship, advocacy,  
and generosity made all the difference to the kind of efforts  
that this volume is meant to represent.*

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# Introduction

*Amber L. Griffioen and Marius Backmann*

## 1.1 PLURALIZING PHILOSOPHY'S PAST: THREE APPROACHES

There is much talk in professional philosophical circles today about how “we” need to “expand” “the” historical philosophical canon. Yet while we (the editors) agree that the motivations behind this claim are largely admirable and that those who make it are generally in the business of trying to create more inclusive spaces within the discipline of philosophy, we have also come to see how this way of speaking is itself potentially problematic, insofar as it speaks of a *we* who assumes the existence of a *singular* philosophical canon that stands in need of *expansion*. This *we*, which is often left relatively unexamined, is usually assumed to mean something like “we philosophers” or “we in the discipline of academic philosophy,” yet in

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A. L. Griffioen (✉)

Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, China

Department of Global Studies, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA

M. Backmann

Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

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reality it tends to refer to members of Anglo-American-European philosophy departments (or of departments modeled after such) who have adopted or inherited one particular canon of figures and texts as an archetype for teaching the history of philosophical thought—a canon which is overwhelmingly white, male, and European and which tends to divide up the history of ideas into conventional eras and categories (e.g., ancient/classical–medieval–renaissance–modern) that largely apply to the political and cultural history of Western, Christian, Latin Europe. (The overarching title we gave to the conference that sparked this volume, “Expanding the Canon: Transitions and Transformations in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy,” was itself indicative of this Eurocentric tendency.) Now clearly this canon does need expanding, even from within its own self-imposed borders. And much of the work that has been done in this regard has therefore undertaken *figure-based projects* aimed at demonstrating the historical influence and/or philosophical relevance of, for example, women, persons of color, and members of other traditionally marginalized groups from within the confines of the Eurocentric canon and increasing inclusivity with respect to these figures when reshaping how the canon is taught and transmitted today.

However, the canon that dominates much of Anglo-American-European philosophy is not the only historical canon in the philosophical landscape. And one of the potential problems of centering the aforementioned “expansionist” model is that it continues to take the Eurocentric canon as primary (and anything from outside the limits of this canon as secondary or “other”) in ways that may serve to underscore, as opposed to undermine, some of the imperialist or colonizing tendencies already present in the Anglo-American-European history of thought. Some philosophers have thus adopted a more *global* approach to the history of philosophy that focuses attention on other regional, religious, or cultural philosophical traditions and the canonical thinkers within those traditions. Such approaches may be conducted from within the confines of these various non-Eurocentric canons themselves, but they may also be comparative, or seek to locate lines of influence between the thinkers of different global traditions.

Still other approaches seek to extend the boundaries of what can properly be called “philosophy” itself by exploring *genres* often overlooked or actively marginalized from within their own contemporary philosophical traditions. In some cases, this involves (re)claiming particular genres for the realm of “philosophy proper” or otherwise expanding the notion of “the philosophical” to include forms of thinking, writing, and performing

not generally considered under this category. In other cases, it involves an attempt to show how the output of near-lying disciplines or literary genres can be utilized fruitfully for more mainstream philosophical ends.

Importantly, these three approaches are by no means mutually exclusive, and we think they all appropriately belong to the overarching project of what we in this volume are calling *pluralizing philosophy's past*. Indeed, it is not uncommon to see overlaps in these approaches, as when one attempts to incorporate more women into the history of medieval European philosophy by looking at non-scholastic genres of religious writing typically subsumed under the (itself not unproblematic<sup>1</sup>) label of “mysticism” (Griffioen 2019), or when one tries to decolonize a particular construal of African thought by exploring the ways ideas may be transmitted by non-written means, for example, in oral traditions or in art (Wiredu 2009). At the same time, there is a significant lack of communication in the discipline between the various factions of scholars focusing on each of these particular strands of the pluralization project, sometimes resulting in unproductive competition as opposed to fruitful cooperation. This volume hopes to go some way toward rectifying this problem.

## 1.2 PLURALIZING PHILOSOPHICAL PEDAGOGY

Of course, the question of pluralizing philosophy's past is not just historiographical or methodological. It is also fundamentally *pedagogical* and *didactic*: If we are really interested in promoting plurality in the history of ideas, we must also consider the challenges that arise for the way the history of philosophy is taught and publicly transmitted. Indeed, since many (if not most) philosophy students may not end up pursuing academic philosophical careers, we need to think very carefully about the ways our presentation of the history of philosophical thought might impact how our students come to see their own histories and the histories of those outside their immediate sphere of contact when they leave the university setting.

Therefore, in addition to how we view and conduct historical research, the way the history of philosophy is traditionally taught, especially in Anglo-American-European departments, needs to change. The very notion of, for instance, a historical “survey” course relies on the idea that it is possible to distill the history of philosophy into a manageable set of

<sup>1</sup> On a few of the problems with the term ‘mysticism,’ see, for example, Jantzen (1995) and Griffioen and Zahedi (2018).



readings that every philosophy student needs to be familiar with in order to be a full member of the profession. For example, in Germany (where the editors spent the bulk of their careers), the history of philosophy is often taught as a linear narrative that begins with a dusting of the Greek pre-Socratics followed by a heavy dose of Plato and Aristotle, a bit of late antiquity, some Neoplatonism (or at least Augustine), and a brief excursus into medieval philosophy, before embarking on a lengthy discussion of early modern white European men like Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, culminating in the thought of Kant, Hegel, and German idealism, and perhaps concluding with a brief foray into twentieth-century existentialist, postmodern, or early analytic thought. We think that such a way of teaching the history of philosophy as a neat, linear procession of dead, mostly European, mostly white men all building on each other's work (ignoring, as is customary, figures like Plotinus' and Augustine's heritage and global legacy) is not just overly simplistic but also intellectually irresponsible, potentially even dishonest. Indeed, we hope that the reader of this volume will have taken up a collection like this because they are already trying to broaden their own historical philosophical horizons and are already seeking to include voices, traditions, and genres that have been neglected in the canon they have been trained to perpetuate.

We thus think that the question should not necessarily be *why* we should extend, expand, or even rid ourselves of the historical canons we were raised with. If we really do value diversity, multiperspectivity, and inclusivity, we simply owe it to our students to present them the history of philosophy in all its vastness, complexity, and messiness.<sup>2</sup> The question then becomes not why, but *what* we teach, and *how*. How does one incorporate, say, global philosophy into specialized courses, which are often neatly compartmentalized according to traditional "western" categories? How does one even design a historical survey course? Even if it is clear that the history of philosophy is not a neat procession of roughly fifteen dead white men (or however many weeks one might have available in a term) and

<sup>2</sup>There is also some research to indicate that, for example, although philosophers tend to associate philosophy with maleness (Di Bella et al. 2016), when women feel similar to the kinds of people who become philosophers, they are more likely to continue on in philosophy (Demarest et al. 2017). Something similar is likely also true for members of other marginalized groups in particular philosophy cultures. Therefore, if we are also interested in raising the visibility or representation of women and minorities in the discipline, there seems to be an added incentive to pluralize the philosophical historical curriculum.

should not be taught as such, widening the scope of the thinkers, texts, and traditions presented in teaching the history of philosophy makes the selection of texts with which an instructor will confront their students a difficult task.

It is a task that the editors of this volume have themselves been faced with and have found challenging: Prior to the conference we organized, which would ultimately serve as the inspiration for this volume, we team-taught a semester-long seminar at the University of Konstanz titled *Forgotten Philosophers? Neglected Philosophies?* in which we abandoned traditional thinkers and texts for less commonly treated ones. Marius Backmann developed a half-year historical survey course at the LSE, and Amber Griffioen is currently developing new courses in the history of ethics and philosophy of religion. These endeavors have proved to require walking a particularly wobbly tightrope. On the one hand, one tries to treat the history of philosophy as the global and plural phenomenon that it is, and on the other one still needs to do justice to the fact that, for better or for worse, certain philosophers *have been* very influential in the Anglo-American-European sphere.

We will not try to present a universal solution to the question of how to design such a course here, nor even to provide the reader with sample syllabi, enough of which are now publicly accessible.<sup>3</sup> Not only because it would be inappropriate to attempt to do so, nonchalantly, in the introduction to such a collection as this, but because such a universal solution simply does not exist. While designing the survey course at LSE, Marius decided that he would abandon the idea of teaching the history of philosophy as a linear progression altogether, and rather decided to cover a certain range of philosophical areas, such as political philosophy, ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and so on, picking freely from the global cornucopia of texts from dead philosophers and choosing approaches he thought offered a particularly original or interesting position or argument, figures that were particularly influential, or texts that, across time and regional divide, manage to miraculously “bounce off” one another. The result is eclectic, and maybe it has to be. In this case it was a course that covered Aristotle as well as Master Kong, Plato as well as Zhuangzi, the Nyāya-sūtra, Elisabeth of Bohemia, Anton Wilhelm Amo,

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, the APA’s Diversity and Inclusiveness Syllabus Collection ([https://www.apaonline.org/members/group\\_content\\_view.asp?group=110430&cid=380970](https://www.apaonline.org/members/group_content_view.asp?group=110430&cid=380970)) or the Diversity Reading List (<https://diversityreadinglist.org>).

and others. The guiding idea was to sensitize students to the vast global nature of our discipline, while trying to reign in the chaos by focusing on a selection of topics that are especially relevant to the needs of a student at that institution. For her part, Amber is following the advice of another of the volume's authors, Kristopher G. Phillips (Phillips 2017a, 2017b), and abandoning the survey course in favor of a closer thematic approach involving bringing just a handful of figures and traditions into conversation with one another, rather than attempting to provide a purportedly "comprehensive" overview, on the one hand, and an overly eclectic philosophical "smorgasbord," on the other.

One might justifiably disagree with either approach. While the editors of this volume would ultimately prefer abandoning the idea of a canon altogether, however one approaches this discussion there is a clear need for *more material*. Even if one tries to cling to the ideal of a single, more inclusive canon when designing a more globalized and diversified historical course, one needs to decide what goes in said canon, just as one faces the question of what to include in a course that follows a more eclectic, let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom-approach or a narrower comparative approach. The present collection is thus also designed to help the reader with that decision, and perhaps even with its implementation. Not only do the various authors in this volume offer contributions on a wide range of thinkers, texts, and traditions, each chapter also offers some of the author's suggestions on how to integrate them into one's teaching. Their approaches are varied and are not always commensurate with one another, but by including authors' thoughts on pedagogical matters, we hope to make it easier for the reader to decide what they themselves might want to include in their courses, and how they might approach teaching it. Of course, the selection offered in this book cannot be exhaustive. But it is a start. And a start is what we can profit from when we set about designing our courses.

### 1.3 AIMS AND OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT VOLUME

While no single volume can bring all the numerous strands of the immense task of pluralizing philosophy's past into view, let alone into conversation with each other, this volume hopes to minimally create a starting point for such dialogue. It aims to showcase the research of scholars who are working on various topics related to the pluralization of the history of philosophy and to simultaneously introduce readers to diverse philosophical

figures, traditions, and genres with which they may be unfamiliar. As a project aimed at *pluralization*, not merely “expansion,” this means that the volume focuses more on the value of multiplicity over that of unity—and on diversity over singularity of perspective and even purpose. The history of philosophy (if one can even speak of a singular “history” in this respect) contains as many ruptures and caesuras as it does continuities and overlaps, and we do not want to shy away from this aspect of philosophy’s past. Moreover, although each of our authors views the project of pluralizing philosophy’s past as important and worthwhile, we do not impute to them the same motivations for sharing this common goal, nor do we expect that they share a unified vision of how that goal is best construed or achieved. Our authors come from various regional, cultural, linguistic, and academic backgrounds and find themselves at various stages in their scholarly careers. They do not all share a common philosophical approach or methodology, nor do they express their ideas in a unified stylistic manner. We take this to be a virtue, not a vice, of the present volume—one that can appeal to a wide range of readers and which displays the plurality of approaches to contemporary philosophical writing and scholarship, in addition to its emphasis on the plurality of philosophy’s past.

As the editors, we have therefore tried to resist, insofar as it is possible, attempting to tie these essays together with a neat and tidy bow, other than insisting that the contributions remain relatively short and reader-accessible. We have not attempted to organize the chapters by philosophical area, historical period, or geographical region, nor by gender, race, ethnicity, or religion, since any attempt to do so within the confines of this volume would be likely to erase relevant differences in favor of singularity or reduction. Instead, in order to keep the emphasis on plurality, we have decided to simply order the chapters by the last names of the authors. However, to aid the reader in locating chapters of especial interest for their purposes, in this final section of the introduction we provide a brief overview of each of the contributions in this volume and the broad contemporary philosophical areas of interest under which each might be said to fall—as well as possible cross-references and suggestions for fruitful cross-pollination with other essays in the volume as suggested by the authors themselves. This may assist readers looking for topics relevant to their own research and teaching interests in more easily locating the chapters that will be of most relevance for them.

*Andrew Arlig* (Chap. 2) focuses on seventeenth-century English philosopher Anne Conway’s metaphysical views on substance and individuals.

Although sometimes said to be a monist, Arlig argues that Conway is only such in a very restricted sense. Moreover, her version of type monism at the level of created substances results in the rather radical view that created things can be converted into one another as they progress or regress morally and, *contra* Descartes, that there is no substantial difference between minds and bodies. [cosmology, early modern philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, women in the history of ideas; see also Harvey (Chap. 6), Hernandez (Chap. 8), Hudspeth (Chap. 9)]

*Liam Kofi Bright* (Chap. 3) discusses W.E.B. Du Bois' approach to research allocation and planning during Du Bois' tenure as the head of the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory. Bright explores Du Bois' very deliberate and centralized approach to set the Laboratory's research agenda and task distribution between the individual researchers, which might serve as an alternative to our contemporary incentive-based approach of distributing research tasks, the latter of which fails to properly incentivize researchers to, for example, replicate past research, or to conduct long-term, large-scale research projects. Taking into account the drawbacks of such a centralized approach, Bright explores how we might nevertheless harness some of the benefits of Du Bois' approach in democratizing research allocation. [Africana philosophy, philosophy of science, social epistemology, nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy; see also Hernandez (Chap. 8), Jones & Phillips (Chap. 10), Táíwò (Chap. 13)]

*Elizabeth Cruz Petersen* (Chap. 4) brings the role that women actors played in early modern Spanish theater into conversation with discussions in feminist philosophy. She argues that reading Jusepe Antonio González de Salas' seventeenth-century manifesto on acting, *Nueva idea de la tragedia antigua*, through the lens of Shannon Sullivan's notion of "transactionally co-constituted bodies" can give us an enhanced understanding of gender roles in early modern Spanish theater, as well as a better sense of the importance of lived embodiment to both philosophy and theater. [early modern philosophy, literature and theater, feminist philosophy, philosophical pedagogy, women in the history of ideas; see also Hudspeth (Chap. 9), Jones & Phillips (Chap. 10), Kadish (Chap. 11), Van Dyke (Chap. 15)]

*Eirik Lang Harris* (Chap. 5) explores Shen Dao's political realism, in particular his view on the role of resentment—namely, that only by eradicating the sources of resentment it is possible to build a stable society or state. Harris notes that, on Shen Dao's view, resentment arises only out of the frustration of expectations that could possibly have been satisfied and

that the way to eliminate the sources of resentment is a political system based on the rule of law, where the laws are not seen as being implemented arbitrarily by individuals. When laws are perceived as inviolable, more like laws of nature than subjective or arbitrary decisions, resentment is unlikely to arise. The view thus stands in contrast both to modern ideas of the individual accountability of members of government and legislature, but also to the classical Confucian ideal of a wholly virtuous ruler. [**Chinese philosophy, moral and political philosophy; see also Schliesser** (Chap. 12), **Turner** (Chap. 14), **Viveros** (Chap. 16)]

*Ramon Harvey* (Chap. 6) looks in detail at the theory of properties put forward by Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī, a tenth-century Sunnī theologian from Samarqand (modern-day Uzbekistan). He concludes that al-Māturīdī is best understood as an early representative of trope nominalism and that he opposes the concept nominalism of some members of the Muʿtazilīte camp. Harvey also shows how al-Māturīdī thereby rejects divine simplicity as advanced by many Sunnī theologians and Muʿtazilīte thinkers, comparing him to Duns Scotus in the Christian medieval tradition. [**Islamic philosophy, metaphysics, ontology; see also Arlig** (Chap. 2), **Turner** (Chap. 14)]

*Aminah Hasan-Birdwell* (Chap. 7) looks at a less commonly discussed aspect of Hannah Arendt’s thought, namely her remarks on the history of philosophy at large. In particular, she explores how Arendt uses the meditative tradition as a way to frame that history and relate it back to the concept of “thoughtlessness,” which is central to her own political thought. According to Hasan-Birdwell, Arendt saw a shift in the meaning of “thinking” between the aporetic model of meditation employed by Socrates, which was ultimately still outward-looking, and that of the medieval and modern adaptation of meditation in the Augustinian tradition, which she claimed resulted in a turn inward. [**historiography of philosophy, metaphilosophy, political philosophy, twentieth-century philosophy, women in the history of ideas; see also Jones & Phillips** (Chap. 10), **Kadish** (Chap. 11), **Schliesser** (Chap. 12)]

*Jill Hernandez* (Chap. 8) argues that the eighteenth-century African-American poet and former slave Phillis Wheatley can be read in the context of discussions of narrative theodicy in philosophy of religion, given the various ways her poems and letters grapple with the problem of evil. Hernandez shows that although Wheatley appears at first glance to offer a clear redemptive account of human suffering, the story might actually be somewhat more complicated. Looking more closely at figures like

Wheatley, then, can open up new spaces for philosophers of religion to fruitfully explore the questions and tensions surrounding the possibility that the suffering of oppressed persons and groups might be eschatologically redemptive. [**Africana philosophy, early modern philosophy, literature and theater, philosophy of religion, theodicy, women in the history of ideas; see also Kadish (Chap. 11), Schliesser (Chap. 12), Táiwò (Chap. 13), Turner (Chap. 14), Van Dyke (Chap. 15)**]

*Lacey Hudspeth* (Chap. 9) explores the various complicated metaphors that thirteenth-century French author Marguerite Porete employs in *The Mirror of Simple Souls*, the work for which she was ultimately condemned and executed, to illustrate how the human soul “returns to” and becomes “annihilated in” the Divine. Hudspeth takes the reader through the various alchemical metaphors of melting, burning, grinding, and dissolving that Porete employs in her play, noting that if we read her as a philosopher, not (merely) a mystic, we may end up with a complicated yet sophisticated substance metaphysics that has heretofore gone largely ignored in the history of philosophy. [**metaphysics, ontology, medieval literature, medieval philosophy, women in the history of ideas; see also Arlig (Chap. 2), Van Dyke (Chap. 15)**]

*Seth Jones and Kristopher G. Phillips* (Chap. 10) argue that the tendency of philosophical research and pedagogy surrounding the European Enlightenment to emphasize the tight association of philosophy with science gives rise to two “dogmas” of Enlightenment scholarship—namely, one which privileges a very narrow concept of reason with respect to early modern thinkers and another which privileges the restriction of Enlightenment scholarship to a very narrow range of (largely white male) figures who are (misleadingly) thought to embrace that concept of reason. Employing the work of Margaret Cavendish as a guiding example, Jones and Phillips show how addressing the second dogma by integrating traditionally marginalized thinkers into the canon of Enlightenment philosophy can help correct the first dogma and the correlated tendency of the academy to view the sciences and the humanities as wholly distinct enterprises. [**early modern philosophy, metaphilosophy, philosophy of the humanities, philosophical pedagogy, women in the history of ideas; see also Arlig (Chap. 2), Bright (Chap. 3), Kadish (Chap. 11), Schliesser (Chap. 12)**]

Although not a philosopher herself, novelist *Rachel Kadish* (Chap. 11) reflects on the ways fictional literature might be utilized in the philosophy classroom to awaken interest in philosophy and combat stereotypes that

philosophy is dry and inaccessible. The chapter includes excerpts from Kadish’s 2017 novel, *The Weight of Ink*, which tells the story of Ester Valasquez, a young woman from a Portuguese Jewish refugee family in seventeenth-century England, who establishes philosophical correspondences with various prominent thinkers of her day. The novel serves as a kind of literary thought experiment, asking what kinds of philosophical issues may have concerned someone like Ester, as well as what it might have taken for a woman of her background to be able to engage in philosophical discourse in early modern England. [**early modern philosophy, literature and theater, women in the history of ideas; see also Arlig** (Chap. 2), **Cruz Petersen** (Chap. 4), **Hernandez** (Chap. 8), **Jones & Phillips** (Chap. 10)]

*Eric Schliesser* (Chap. 12) focuses on the way we teach the history of political thought and explores how various contemporary textbooks in this domain (and the typical survey courses that might employ them) still tend to be extremely Euro-, Christian-, and male-centric. He argues that implementing a more global, comparative approach creates promising alternatives for teaching the history of political philosophy, and he proposes two strategies for decentering the dominant narratives in this area. The direct-voice approach involves giving voice to those “insiders” or “outsiders” who explicitly challenge, criticize, or oppose the universality of Eurocentric ideas, whereas the indirect-voice approach focuses on the inclusion of traditions of thought that stand outside and/or predate European modernity. Schliesser then goes on to explore both the benefits of each of these strategies and the challenges that arise in their implementation. [**metaphilosophy, philosophical pedagogy; see also Jones & Phillips** (Chap. 10), **Hasan-Birdwell** (Chap. 7)]

*Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò* (Chap. 13) examines how African contributions to the history of philosophy have been systematically excluded from many philosophical narratives. He discusses what he labels “problem moderns,” or those canonical European thinkers who violate their own claims of the equality and dignity of all human beings by excluding African-descended peoples from the realm of rational humanity. He then turns his attention to the “excluded moderns,” or those thinkers who both embraced and transformed the ideas of modernity put forward by the problem moderns, while at the same time challenging the latter on their inconsistencies—but who continue to be largely excluded from the scholarship on modern philosophy. Táíwò concludes by discussing the thought of nineteenth-century West African excluded moderns like Alexander Crummell and Edward



Wilmot Blyden, arguing that they should be included in the annals of the history of philosophy as active participants in and contributors to the discourses concerning modernity. [**Africana philosophy, early modern philosophy, metaphilosophy; see also Bright** (Chap. 3), **Hernandez** (Chap. 8), **Jones & Phillips** (Chap. 10), **Schliesser** (Chap. 12)]

*Jamie Turner* (Chap. 14) compares Alvin Plantinga’s “Reformed epistemology” in analytic philosophy of religion, which was strongly influenced by his reading of Thomas Reid’s “common-sense philosophy,” to the epistemological approach put forward 400 years earlier than Reid by the Islamic theologian Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya. He demonstrates how Ibn Taymiyya’s externalist and foundationalist approach—which is centered on the Muslim concept of *fiṭra*, or the “natural disposition that God instilled in [humankind]”—both anticipates Plantinga’s “proper function” argument concerning the so-called *sensus divinitatis* and opens up space for a contemporary Muslim version of “Reformed” epistemology in philosophy of religion. [**comparative philosophy, epistemology, Islamic philosophy, philosophy of religion; see also Harvey** (Chap. 6), **Hernandez** (Chap. 8)]

*Christina Van Dyke* (Chap. 15) explores how the popularity of the meditative genre allowed European Christian women to become accepted as authoritative “knowers” in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, despite their being associated more closely with sensation and the body, as opposed to with the intellect and the knowledge of “higher things.” Van Dyke argues that as love came to be viewed as the primary means of achieving union with God in both will and intellect, the focus on imagination and the “paradoxically receptive activity” of contemplation in late medieval meditations written by women allowed them a degree of epistemic and ecclesial authority *because* of, not *despite*, their association with embodiment and the senses. [**epistemology, medieval philosophy, philosophy of religion, women in the history of ideas; see also Hasan-Birdwell** (Chap. 7), **Hernandez** (Chap. 8), **Hudspeth** (Chap. 9)]

*Alejandro Viveros* (Chap. 16) seeks to show how Indigenous sources can contribute to political philosophy. In particular, he focuses on two Indigenous chronicles from New Spain as examples of *mestizaje cultural*, which employ genres and concepts familiar to European readers in order to demonstrate the moral and political legitimacy of pre-Hispanic Texcocan society. These chronicles, which center on the Texcocan worship of the

deity *Tloque Nahuaque* and the just governance of the philosopher-poet-warrior-king Nezahualcōyotl, were employed to demonstrate that pre-Hispanic Texcocan society represented a kind of “proto-Christian” monotheistic civilization made up not of subhuman “barbarians,” but rather of rational, sophisticated, and “civilized” human beings. Viveros argues that by including such texts in the way we approach and teach the history of philosophy, we can open up “alter-native” scholarly horizons regarding the role of Indigenous contributions to Latin American political philosophy in the history of ideas. [**indigenous philosophy, Latin American philosophy, Meso-American philosophy, moral and political philosophy, philosophy of religion; see also Harris (Chap. 5), Hernandez (Chap. 8), Schliesser (Chap. 14), Táíwò (Chap. 13)**]

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