Every Truth Must Be True

Rethinking the Principle of Identity

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(See “Logic Beyond Language”)
The principle of identity as originally formulated by Aristotle states that everything exists in its own way, which is its identity. However, if we take the word “existence” to mean precisely the way by which anything exists, which is its ultimate, concrete “being,” then we have that anything must be the same as (the way of) its being, hence that anything must be identical to itself. Meaning, say, a falsehood must be identical to itself: although we may render such an identity meaningless by taking falsehoods as nonexistent, we still cannot say “there is no falsehood” without making all that is false be rather true – if what is false is to be false, then falsehoods must be something. But what is the necessary identity between a falsehood and itself? What means the statement “a falsehood must be precisely that falsehood”? First of all, we have an ambiguity here, since a falsehood can be taken as meaning:

1. Something false.

2. The falsity of something.

If a falsehood is taken as meaning something false, then that something becomes the same as its own falsity, so:

1. If we take that falsehood as a being – hence both what is false and its falsity as having that same being – then being false is just a being, so everything is false, by which either there is no truth or truths are the same as falsehoods.

2. If we take that falsehood as a nonbeing – hence both what is false and its falsity as having that same nonbeing – then being false is just a nonbeing, so nothing is false, by which either there is no falsehood or falsehoods are the same as truths.

To escape such unsolvable contradictions, we must rather choose the meaning according to which a falsehood is the falsity of something, despite being that something as false. Which combines the two previous options in a third one, by identifying what is false and its own falsity to each other as respectively a nonbeing and a being:

1. If what is false were different from its own falsity, then it would be possibly true – or possibly false – rather than actually false – or impossibly true.

2. If what is false were a being, then it would be a true being, rather than a false one.
3. If the falsity of something were nothing, then that something would be true rather than false.

Thus, the being of a falsehood is the falsity of something, by which alone it is the nothingness of that something rather than absolute nothingness – which is the falsity of nothing. A falsehood is a being that, as any other being, must itself be true since, if it were false, then it would be the circumstance of whatever is false being true rather than false: the falsity of something must be true as the circumstance of that something being false to be false as whatever that circumstance falsifies – it is itself a truth by being a true falsehood, or it is no longer the falsity of something. Hence, the only way for us to maintain the principle of identity regarding falsehoods – without running into unsolvable contradictions – is by taking any falsehood as meaning its own truth – the true falsity of something – so self-identity regards only truths – of either true falsehoods or simple truths – to become “every truth must be identical to itself.” However, being faithful to the original meaning of such an identity, which is that anything exists in its own way, we must rather say that “every truth must be true,” since the proper way of a truth to exist – by which alone it is identical to itself – is to be true.