

INCLUSIVE EDUCATION AND EPISTEMIC VALUE IN THE PRAXIS OF ETHICAL CHANGE

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“How did we learn this word (“good” for instance)?
From what sort of examples? In what language-games?
Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.”
(L. Wittgenstein, 1953, §77³²⁶)

12.1 Inclusive Education

12.1.1 Epistemic Value, Ethics and Online Learning

In many universities and related knowledge transmission organisations, professional focus on empirical data shows as in vocational education that preparation for real life technical work is important, as one would expect from “career education”. University is as the name shows on the contrary focusing on the universality of some sort of education, which is neither a technical one, nor much concerned by preparing oneself for a career. We see that knowledge comes also across disciplines,

³²⁶ Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/2010): *Philosophical Investigations*, Transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, 4th revised Ed. by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Wiley-Blackwell.

which can enrich academic education. Vocational and university education could agree on the fact that we all are lifelong learners, a concept that could be streamlined into institutional education models, where technical and pragmatic views would be assessed³²⁷. There is not much focus however on how everyday life could be made a fertile ground for education. The scope of this chapter is to propose an analysis of inclusion as the very essence of an ethics of reformation of education, which in our opinion cannot come from the institution of education as much as from a common basis between everyday learning capacities and curriculum based learning methods. Inclusive vision and values should be theoretically explained by philosophers in order to be refined and adapted into our current experience of values, pointing out issues about method and knowledge parameters. In particular a focus on epistemic values should bring good indications on how to empower others, and leave a more inclusive life, assuming the somehow paradoxical and surprising idea that knowledge is as important in real life outside the university as it is in the classroom, being the real universal value and currency across disciplines, times and contexts – and that university learns from being inclusive, i. e. by bringing not only a higher point of view on technical education but also a wider view on the human being.

“Epistemic values” simply mean that knowledge and truth should have a value. In order to fulfil the mission of an education institution, we should commit to the ideal of knowledge transmission *realiter*, not only as a consequence of our practice of teacher, editor or librarian. It is not enough to practically agree on the argument that human rights (SDGs) and communities are good solutions to unethical problems of exclusion and mismanagement (religious communities, academic communities are of course important elements). Academia and information science dif-

³²⁷ Lucas, Bill, Spencer, Ellen and Claxton, Guy (2012): *How to Teach Vocational Education: A Theory of Vocational Pedagogy*, Centre for Real-World Learning, University of Winchester, The City and Guilds of London Institute.

fers from various other professional fields in that knowledge and truth have a particular value for any person or group part of these environments or stakeholder in education. To move on the line of building communities is important, in particular for an online platforms based on internet (this is the case for institutions based on distance learning methods, for networks of teachers and students, for higher education administration distance learning and ToTs, and in open and distance learning in general). To build online open and distance communities gives a rather practical solution to an ethical need which is always as well a theoretical question³²⁸.

Ethics and inclusive education should not be reduced to the action level of practical possibilities, just because these notions serve to make ethics understandable to all. A balance between theory and practice should always be considered. In this chapter we shall express the view that theoretical levels of ethical understandings focusing on ethics, education and research help inclusion of others in education institutions, far from the view that theory is a field which should be left to the attention of some eccentrics living in ivory towers.

By the means of theoretical understanding of ethics as in *metaethics*, *epistemology*, *history of science and information science*, we are also accepting that ethics might entail a plurality of views, as well as the richness of a common sense understanding of some widely shared standards of ethics across cultures and historical times.

If we can ground ethics on some shared values it is also because any human being should be recognized some basic rights for education.

³²⁸ See the commented survey on ODL: Zawacki-Richter, Olaf and Qayyum, Adnan (2019): *Open and Distance Education in Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Springer-Briefs in Open and Distance Education, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-5787-9_1

12.1.2 Inclusive Education in Practice: An Introduction

12.1.2.1 Facts of Special Needs in Education

Inclusive education defined as special education has a specific aim and a set of means to adapt an education structure to the individual needs of some students with special needs³²⁹. The purpose of special education is providing specialized services to students with disabilities so that they can develop and overcome their difficulties, in some cases that they succeed academically³³⁰. Different roles in the education sector are concerned by delivering this service.

The assistance of a behaviour specialist for younger students as children with emotional disabilities and mental health disorders is part of inclusive education. Early intervention enables an educator to work with children from birth to kindergarten to support important skills development. Education institution employees do not actually diagnose behavioural or cognitive delays, medical professionals must do that, but they look at indicators that draw relations between cognitive deficits and educational concerns. Para educators are instructional assistant, integral part of the educational team because they provide the support a teacher, but are not responsible for learning that takes place. Special education administrators and coordinators, take leading roles in decision-making and in facilitating the right outcomes for students with special needs, by directing and overseeing the whole team of education related staff. Special education teachers serve both as a teacher and as an advocate for

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³³⁰ Special Education Guide, 2019, <https://www.specialeducationguide.com>

students with special needs, juggling with responsibilities related individualized education programs for those in special need³³¹.

12.1.2.2 Sociological Framework of Inclusion and the Ethical Principle of Inclusiveness

As special education it can be derived from a general will to give equal rights to all in terms of education, including handicapped persons who should also have the right for education. Inclusive education is also to do with the evolution of the role of parents, who are more closely involved with the education of their children or young adult relatives. Family life is not only impacted by the needs and limitations of young persons with disabilities, it is as well under pressure of assessing the precise utility and contextual progress of psychological care and continuing impact on education, while continuing to live a normal relationship with the person who should never be reduced to a patient or to the sociological facts of special needs³³².

In a more general sense, inclusiveness (as opposed to exclusion, segregation, or even integration) can be understood as adopting proactive measures that eliminate the barriers which hinder the learning and the full participation of students. Inclusion should transform the teacher's and institution's method of education and adapt to the individual needs of persons not only with disabilities (Gavira & Moriña, 2015). Inclusiveness should also be a way to ethically reform education institutions to be more truthful to their mission of delivering a decent education for all.

³³¹ Special Education Guide, Ibid.

³³² Éric Plaisance, « Débats, échanges autour de l'éducation inclusive dans le monde », *La nouvelle revue de l'adaptation et de la scolarisation* 2013/2 (N° 62), pp. 183-186. Rosario López Gavira & Anabel Moriña (2015) "Hidden voices in higher education: inclusive policies and practices in social science and law classrooms", *International Journal of Inclusive Education*, 19:4, 365-378

<i>Exclusion</i>	<i>Segregation</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>Inclusion</i>
Separation of those who have a capacity for education, or linguistic capacity, from those who don't have	Separation and concentration on the base of capacity and qualities	Incorporation of those previously separated but next to each other	To insert all together, the structure adapts to the individual needs
			



Figure: Source: Robert Aehnelt (2013): Historische Schritte auf dem Weg zur Inklusion auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene

Descriptive efforts should be made by anthropologists, linguists, digital media experts and philosophers to show the highly attractive nature of inclusive education, not because of some dogmatic arbitrary choice but because inclusiveness is in conflict with our subjective notion of values. Across disciplines all should explain and communicate how ethics is practised, but also be aware about how ethics is related to theory on a metaethical level.

In practice we all observe that there are involuntary habits which impact our lives but that are passively experienced, as first order short term desires, and beyond our long term conscious control (such as phobia, obsessions, compulsive disorders). Therapeutic care can be used to heal and revive capacities restricted by physiological mechanical or psychological causal constraints. If a child or a young adult is not given precise limits in the use of the internet, he or she may develop behavioural/mental health disorders, such as computer addiction and insomnia.

In order to promote health and education behavioural change and empowerment are needed, the first targeting individual or group behaviours through information incentives and manipulations, it is an easy way to change short term or first order desires, but is of no use for the development of personal autonomy and risks to induce other health and

education inequalities³³³. Empowerment on the contrary needs longer to realize because it is not a top-down but collaborative approach, but the change induced is respecting personal autonomy, and has long term effects. In order to be collaborative approaches, health and education measures should be primarily considered by decision related experiences, even though some changes in life are not chosen but nudged into some kind of behaviour. Changing behaviour as empowerment can be related semantically to the notion of inclusive and collaborative learning to change our attitudes in various types of interactions, interrelations, reciprocity based attitudes, religion related mutuality, in opposition to a “behaviour-change approach” which wants “to influence (other) people to change their health-related behaviour, be it to stop smoking, eat less, eat better, exercise more”, etc. (Tengland, *ibid.*). At best change as empowerment should be part of mutual attentions and care in collaboration but this is only the practice based common ground.

Ethical philosophy shed some light on how inclusion and inclusiveness in education could/should be seen as central focus of ethical reformation or change³³⁴. In particular we would like to address the question to what extent knowledge has a value that brings change in our life as

³³³ We think at social marketing techniques and sophisticated technics of nudging people into certain kinds of behaviour. See as example: Tengland, Per-Anders. (2012) Behavior Change or Empowerment: On the Ethics of Health-Promotion Strategies, *Public Health Ethics*, 5, 140-153, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/phe/phs022>

³³⁴ In *The Value of Critical Knowledge, Ethics and Education* (Ignace Haaz, 2019), I have attempted to show from a philosophical historical point of view how the values of good education are interrelated to generous and inclusive education, which has a long history. Introducing an ethics of generosity can help prevent unexpected catalysts for discrimination and oppression. This book invites the reader to rediscover the Cartesian system of virtues focused on the central virtue of generosity, as key paradigm of inclusive education. Download for free from: www.globethics.net/philosophy-series

such, without focusing here on the question about how self-knowledge and knowledge can be achieved at the same time.

The ethics of inclusive share of esteem across cultures and boundaries remain a powerful counter reaction to the movements of groups driven by polarizing sociological mechanisms, which generate division and reproduce factual inequalities. Education is revolutionary in the sense that educators tend to firmly believe that we can discipline ourselves to follow ethical guides, in order to dismantle barriers that are being formed by difference.

In order to understand inclusion as related to the values of knowledge and truth, we need to present a concept of change, as a simple and not contradictory practice. With an appropriate notion of self-esteem and esteem of others, and with a strong concept of truth and what we call the ethical change or reformation, we can fulfil the main conditions for dialogue with others and inclusion of others, tolerating some disruptive attitudes, because our compass is fixed on solid ground. The right attitude is not complacency toward others, nor is it an unjustified desire to please others. I shall attempt to sketch out some basic ingredients of what an “ethical reformation of values” can mean, and we will argue that change is best assured when knowledge is granted.

12.2 Ethical Change Understood Philosophically

If we listen to media campaigns we are told on daily basis to embrace disruption in our behaviour, or collectively on the level of policies, and change early and at any price. In order to have some dialogical and second order desire based foundation of empowerment and change, let's try to unfold the complex process of how change enters our mental life, by reflecting on movements and practices and try to show how transformation is widely present in our life:

12.2.1 Potentiality in Action

Philosophical ethics is not only related to the arena of intentional reflection. It is not solely reflective, conscious deliberation that leads us to live our values but also that which brings what exists as human potentiality, which is virtual, into actuality as an active experimentation (Greek: *energeia* as opposed to *dynamis*)³³⁵. *Potentiality in action* means either a reflective conversations (e. g. between professionals) or as a smoothly incorporated collective practise in any type of social activity. Consciously transmitted values in a process of experimentation and actualisation are open to change and revision.

12.2.2 Humans are Relational Beings

Homo sapiens gained an advantage over more dopamine addicted cousins by having a low “neanderthal quotient³³⁶”. In other words, we as humans survived, even before inventing an elaborate language, religious gatherings and great economic collaborations, through simple social ability and willingness to live in groups. Humans are beings whose identity is formed in relationship to the beings around them. In the practice of good relationships, the care of one’s self can also be seen as a precondition for being able to care for others. Good relationships depend on collective expression in practice but also on a minimal security of our private sphere.

12.2.3 Esteem and Empowerment

Self-esteem and esteem-of others can afford some degree of ethical reformation and change: it is the price of a *humanistic* and *pluralistic* view on values, and a constructive dialectic between power oriented and

³³⁵ I leave open the metaphysical structure of our setting; I refer to a basic concept, that of *Energeia*, given by Aristotle and interpreted it in a personal way.

³³⁶ Geher, Glenn, Holler, Richard, Chapleau, David et alii, “Using Personal Genome Technology and Psychometrics to Study the Personality of the Neanderthals”, *Human Ethology Bulletin* 32 (2017)3: 34-46.

service oriented ethics of leadership³³⁷. As long as we acknowledge either a wide set of inherent values, or one core humanity grounded value, and we do so precisely and value refined values consequently among peers, adapting to given geographical contexts, we are dealing with strong values, quite on the opposite of complacency and resignation which are rooted in impotence, and cannot be embedded in shared esteem. Excessive limitations in potential/competence cannot afford any change or revision of values.

Complacency occurs if we depreciate our self-esteem (individually or collectively); by willing to please others at an unaffordable cost vis-à-vis some essential potential and shared values. Ethical change should go away from complacency toward initiative and empowerment.

12.2.4 Contempt for the Pain instead of Blaming

How should we answer to wrong actions in a fairly inclusive way? Answering by contempt instead of by blaming to a wrong differs from seeking to correct a wrong at any price, but seeking instead to empower by showing the right example. Blaming is related to the hope that the perpetrators of wrongful actions can see their guilt and recognize and experience it as wrong. “Praise and punishment can correct and effectively control behaviour when it affects people who are concerned not only with their reputation, but also with self-esteem. Moral censure produces a moral shock: feelings of guilt, failure and defiance. Blame generates displeasure and should therefore often be omitted, even if it might be appropriate. Some blame remains silent blame and should remain so.” (Wolf, Haaz, 2011). Blaming is a poor method of amelioration or facilitation of virtuous action, mainly based on a rights based retributive principle which evaluates the complex interrelations of various rights, it

³³⁷ See my definition of ethical pluralism, as opposed to ethical relativism, Haaz (2019), op. cit., in particular Ch. 2 “Leadership, Anti-realism and moral psychology”.

is as using “the power of Beelzebub to force out demons” (Matthew 12.24). Answering to wrongs by contempt (as *mépris* for Descartes) is very different, it takes the value of moral sentiments seriously but doesn’t cultivate the hope of changing behaviour by proactive moral shocks; *mépris* can and should remain as silent as possible in order to not add more pain and suffering in the world³³⁸. Contempt should not be understood in the popular sense of stigmatisation but on the contrary, it is writing off a wrong as negligible—“e.g. a hero could be said to have ‘contempt for the pain of his wounds’”³³⁹.

12.2.5 Digital Disruption

Economy, commerce, administration, communication, our work and even our presence —the beginning, the origin, or the active constitution of the self and values— are increasingly digital. It is indeed a chaotic change but also an invitation for creativity in the age of digital disruption. Increasingly, we are including technology in our interactions; therefore we should speak of techno-moral care and change. Indeed we allocate differently our time and energy since the emergence of a new phenomenon: the development of digital technologies, a paradigm shift as revolutionary as the Gutenberg’s printing press³⁴⁰.

³³⁸ Wolf, Jean-Claude, Haaz, Ignace, Strafe als Tadel? Argumente pro und contra in: Von Hirsch, A., Neumann, U. and Seelmann, K. (Hrsg.), *Strafe - Warum? Gegenwärtige Strafbegründungen im Lichte von Hegels Strafrecht*, 2011, 69-78.

³³⁹ Descartes, René (1649/2010): *Passions of the Soul*, Transl. and Glossary by Jonathan Bennett. See Glossary: “Contempt”.

³⁴⁰ I owe this § to Christian Grund Sørensen’s bright insights (“Church and Neighbour in an Age of Artificial Intelligence and Disruption”, Report, unpublished, May 2019), for convincing me on the relevance of *digital disruption* as not only as quantitative modality of *an augmented reality* or presence, but as a *paradigm shift* in the sense of T. Kuhn (*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962) a paradigm shift occurs when “the dominant paradigm under which normal science operates is rendered incompatible with new phenomena”.

12.2.5.1 Digital Disruption as a Democratisation Process

The use of internet to express the voice of the majority, relates to the participation opportunities in social life, whereby new digital platforms provide new opportunities for online activism. E-activism, e-petition, e-citizenship, e-government, e-voting are promising aspects of the internet, having more technical capacity to interact. Do we have more time and an augmented organisation capacity needed to make the best use out of it? Our capacity of communication has in reality been limited by censorship, our freedom is limited by more surveillance, propaganda and manipulation

12.2.5.2 Internet Epistemic Risks

In order to be inclusive in an efficient way, we need to get rid of the hyper-optimistic “technological solutionism” and focus on values adapted for internet literate persons, in particular when crisp clear knowledge transmission is a professional duty as for educators and information professionals³⁴¹. There are many deep social and economic inequalities that have not been solved, such as the generation and social gap. To address these issues more effectively with the help of information technology, I propose to focus on five important epistemic risks inherent of the use of internet, which may prevent a constructive change and the empowerment of others when we navigate on the internet. Using internet is complex to the point of labyrinthine once we do an advanced search, it is easy to be walking around and not finding what we are looking for.

(a) *Filter bubbles* are not only useful tools where search engines and their algorithms track information in our browser history to increase the usability of our environment on internet (including, for example, the place where we have been), but it can also produce a state of intellectual

³⁴¹ Hidalgo, Olivier (2019): Demokratie und Digitalisierung, *Information Philosophie*, März 2019, 52-58.

isolation built on our personalized searches. We can easily find ourselves “in a mirror chamber with a narrower and narrower experience of the world.” (Lanier, 2016). If both John and Paul search “virtue” they don’t come up with same results as Google has a database of one’s previously used search terms and visited web pages, resulting in a specific informational profile which is unique for each user (Heersmink, 2018).

(b) *Bias due to personalised ranking of search results* consist in an imprecise ranking, from knowledge value point of view, determined in relation to a network of other websites. Just because many hyperlinks point towards a website, it is no guarantee that it contains epistemically useful or accurate information.

(c) Studies showing students implicitly trust *Google’s ranking* of educational content in that they prefer to click on links in higher positions even when the abstracts are less relevant.

(d) *Autocompleted search* terms nudging towards a wrong path of enquiry (Google autocomplete based on search history with trending popular searches cannot be turned off, only ignored). A good case study of this bias is to search for “What happened to the dinosaurs?” which brings some epistemically wrong results at high Google ranking levels.

(e) Difficulty of verifying the validity of the source of information on blogs, social media and internet forums posted by anonymous non-experts³⁴².

With regard to inclusiveness, a person who has bad cognitive habits, because he/she does not develop much his/her ideas in complete arguments, relying more on a short-term memory than clear reasoning, or a person who has learning difficulties, or who does not speak a language well, will have additional cognitive difficulties to escape the technical daedal of how engines and navigators function.

³⁴² Heersmink, Richard (2018): A Virtue Epistemology of the Internet: Search Engines, Intellectual Virtues and Education, *Social Epistemology*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1–2.

An important part of the solution depends on the dispositions and attitudes of the person (his/her ethical character) vis-à-vis various methods of acquisition and transmission of knowledge (epistemology) and which can be defined by intellectual virtues: virtues a person of knowledge.

12.2.5.3 *Internet Virtues as Epistemic Virtues*

Intellectual virtues can be divided into two sets of virtues, and correlatively with what Heersmink calls internet epistemic vices³⁴³ (ibid. 2018, 3), or the absence of these positive dispositions:

- Intellectual responsibility related virtues (curiosity, open-mindedness, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness)

Curiosity: being motivated to extend the horizon of knowledge

Open-mindedness: willing to consider alternative views

Attentiveness: to have a sustained focus when performing some cognitive task

Intellectual carefulness: logical skills and critical thinking skills

- Intellectual reliability related virtues: (intellectual courage, humility, tenacity, intellectual thoroughness)

Intellectual courage: to be prepared to be embarrassed, eventually accept some risks related to founded knowledge

Intellectual humility: to be realistic on own limitation of reasoning skills, and mistakes to which one is prone

Intellectual tenacity and thoroughness: not to give up quickly when one doesn't understand something, to probe for deeper meaning,

³⁴³ “Epistemic virtue” comes from the Greek *epistēmē*, which can refer to knowledge, science or understanding, and virtue which stands for moral excellence. Epistemic virtue is a value committing to individual or collective greatness. As related to our understanding, virtues are also common good related or part of first principles of moral life.

draw connections instead of memorizing

- Intellectual vices (apathy, dependence, arrogance, neglect, carelessness, intellectual conformity, indecisiveness)

The opposite of curiosity is intellectual apathy

The opposite of autonomy is dependence

The opposite of humility is arrogance

The opposite of attentiveness is neglect or inattention

The opposite of carefulness is carelessness

The opposite of open-mindedness is being dogmatic

The opposite of intellectual courage is intellectual conformity

The opposite of intellectual tenacity is indecisiveness

12.2.5.4 Redefining Common Good Based Use of Internet

There are deontological ethical principles related to the use of internet focusing on intentions (also called Golden Rule, reciprocity rule), more than concrete consequences and risks. The most important deontological principle is the *categorical imperative*, which based use of internet would urge us to ask oneself a simple question: “Before a person does something with a technology, the person should reflect, whether it would be alright if everyone did it”. There is also a teleological ethical principle for internet focusing on aims and outcomes, rather than intentions. The most important is the *no harm principle* “to ask oneself whether this internet product is going to harm or dehumanise anyone”. The third family of common good based principles is a consent based principles of artificial intelligence related technology. *Informed consent* condition of using AI would invite us to ask “whether we have the informed consent of those who will be affected”. Privacy is part of a consent related use of technology; it is about the right limits in establishing good relationships with others (teacher/student/clients/patients). Privacy

depends on the subjective and lived experiences of the value of privacy across contexts, not only on norms, definitions, rights and laws - which should be adapted (but are unlikely to prevent all risk).

Common good based values and internet are all concerned by the ethical use of internet and artificial intelligence based on the principle of diversity for common good and benefit of humanity. It is part of the condition of diversity and of common sense understanding of humanity that inclusiveness is not left behind. For persons in need for inclusive education, the very condition of a principle of reciprocity, considered as a fundamental principle, might be problematic, justifying the need for external support to the teacher (or the librarian), but also information about how to handle similar situations in such a way to give individual attention and keep in mind that inclusion is most of the time about the spirit, not the space. Let's try to define the right spirit of inclusiveness with regard to common practices.

12.2.6 Inclusion and Practice

A non-contradictory definition of a value or norm should always be seen as possible and subject of tacit consent (implying, therefore, logical non-contradiction). Definitions can be communicated and agreed upon among persons entering in good practice in order to strictly distinguish the definition of the norm and any interpretation of these norms, rules and practices. Changing a value can be understood as *shifting, engineering, replacing, revising, improving, innovating, ameliorating or reforming*; they apply to the rule of practice (not to interpretations). In some cases, experimentation leads to active intervention which can be seen as transgression. Transgression is thus always norm relative; it is related to norms which have been previously established.

Amelioration and facilitating is a change done by practice, i.e. by use: a new meaning has been made explicit in action, in a community of users and practitioners.

12.2.6.1 A Philosophy of Contradictions

Inclusion and change can also be seen as a way of dealing with conflicts, a *philosophy of contradictions* or an affirmative and dynamical way of looking at the being and the reality as we read in Matthew 10:33: “Do not assume that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword.” The leader and pacifying mind across conflicts, by being inclusive is “The thunderbolt pilots all things.” “The god is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger [all opposites, he is the *nous*]” a Heraclitus inspired hidden unity that binds all opposites. Inclusivity is “Grasping: wholes and not wholes, convergent divergent, consonant dissonant, from all things one and from one thing all.” (D.K. 64, 67, 10³⁴⁴)

While including others, the fact of intervention can disrupt the normal functioning of a process of development of values, or a system serving certain functions or values, and ultimately be considered as transgression. Knowledge values, common good based values, and preferences don't align as easily as we can see in the thought experiment below.

12.2.6.2 The Reformer's Dilemma and Transgression and Rule of Practice Reformation

Suppose A is an ethical social reformer and thinks that value v should mean v where v is not the value determined by the value conventions of v 's community. If A uses w to mean v – i.e., speaks to and interprets others as if w means v – then A has done something wrong qua member of his value community (supposing common values). Either A can interpret others correctly (according to conventional values) or A can reform the values, but A can't do both.

In his *Philosophical Investigations*, L. Wittgenstein brings a way out of this dilemma by showing that the correctness or incorrectness of a use

³⁴⁴ Diels, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, K. Freeman (transl.), Cambridge: Harvard UP.

of language, which applies for other rule based practices, is determined by the rules of the language or of the given practice—“determined” in two senses which allow the transformation or inventive change of a practice:

(a) The rules form a complete system, in the sense that for every “move” within the language it is obvious that a rule does or does not apply.

(b) Where a rule does apply, it is obvious whether it has been followed or infringed.

(c) Where no existing rules apply, you can always adopt a new rule to cover the case, but then that obviously changes the game.

A constructive and sustainable change is thus a change that is embedded in such a way in a practice that it has been made possible in a reformed system of values, which is not simply interpreted by the community of practitioners as a form of transgression, and the game has changed around that overall praxis in a sense not affecting the application of existing rules. Trust and transgression are mutually exclusive concepts; it is not possible to build on trust in any trade related exchange, or simply any relationship on love if the fear of hate, of being cheated, is predominant over confidence and predictability. Three main reasons to change rules are (1) Rules can be incomplete, therefore subject to modifications (§68), (2) the rule doesn’t exhaust the correctness of its applications in term of right or wrong, and (3) some rules doesn’t explain what playing the game constitutes³⁴⁵. Changing a practice as reforming a practice by contrast to consolidate without significant change differs from revolutionizing a practice which always entails a removal and replacement of major components of the practice. Reforming a practice is based on the aim of bringing an amendment of what is defective or incomplete, without turning the whole system upside down.

³⁴⁵ Cavell, S. *Must We Mean what We Say? A Book of Essays*, Harvard: UP, 49.

12.2.6.3 Community of Practice as Institutional Form of Practice and Reformation of Practice

Ethical reformation has as main tool for inclusion the institutional form of a community of practice. An activity which can be attributed to individuals, collectives (families, churches, societies) and institutions (private, public, State related) has a political advantage to multiply horizontal interactions between communities of practice, in order to increase the outreach of each circle, provided overlapping interest and values. The more communities have an interest to promote progress and change, the more they are keen to be open.

Institutional communities of practice are interconnected as solidarity is increasing with the use of technology. Global understanding is needed to deal with the most imaginative scenario of connections and connectivity between sectors in our societies.

Ethical reformation is often part of an education (scientific), religion, and/or legal and political discipline oriented practice. Institutions of education, religious communities, legal and human rights NGOs and political drivers of change welcome reformation of values in their institutions. Instead of relying only on their professional network, embracing strategically an ideal progress in well-being, human rights or essential human capacity based values means to stay open to social and human progress in various ways. Power relations are seen increasingly as shared capacities instead of concentration and accumulation of power.

Various forms of work organisation (administration, management) are based on legal and proto-legal types of practice across many sectors of activities (professions, economic sectors). As such they should be based on the division of responsibilities in order to generate stronger impact; a form of organisation should never be merely “the rule of the anonymity”, which on the contrary is a risk, that of harming other capacities, professional potentials of innovation. Horizontal organisational structures relying less on legal codes and hierarchy may be more flexible and thus open to change. Many different forms of activities around the

living being coexist. By balancing globally these formal conditions of our life we can invest harmoniously our life and develop with joy and the sentiment of a free horizon in front of us our potentials in a dynamical way. When this dynamism is given, we have the sensation of being able to work and give our best; whether individual or collective. A collective brings innovation when there is an industrial impact of the technology developed by this enterprise/work organization. Innovation is not a value expressed on the originality of the scientific findings, which logically precedes, but which is often owned by multiple research stakeholders, across different continents, in a complex way.

By being actualized into an institutional form, a dynamic of change or reformation of values is not simply concerning an actual shape³⁴⁶, or the reproduction of a formal strategy of the organisation, or professional corporation interactions. Reforming an institution, or laying down a progressive dynamic at the core of the institution refers to a deep movement of transformation which brings some new values into action, based on the mission and values of the organisation³⁴⁷. In order to be inclusive, the change in value should be seen as a potential being, as philosophers after Aristotle would say which is something else, already, and therefore change dependant.

³⁴⁶ Chen, C. (1956): "Different Meanings of the Term *Energieia* in the Philosophy of Aristotle", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 17(1), 56-65. doi:10.2307/2104687

³⁴⁷ As inclusive activity value reformation is something that should become actual, passing from capacities and potentials as matter to be expressed and ultimately related to a given form, and thus be normative in the sense of application to a form (Greek: *energia* as application to a form *aidos*). As example: the bronze is actually bronze, but it is in action "not in so far as it is bronze, but in so far as it is movable". The community of practice constituted by institutions share this propriety of overcoming the matter and form antimomy by creating new potentials by the simple fact of the diversity and size of the institution.

12.2.6.4 Inclusion and Ecological Transition

Care for the environment as qualitative design principle refers to an ethics of change as transformability in social-ecological systems. The terms “transformability” is to be understood as an energy transition related and defined as a long-term structural change (“ecological transition”). Inclusion as an education oriented aim should not only bring an openness of the self to others, but also to a non-anthropological world, to nature and to our responsibility towards environmental impact. As we rely on an open society model of organisation and economy, ecological awareness is again showing the importance of having the right knowledge at the right time. Unfortunately the more a situation is understood as being urgent, the less theoretical and practical work is likely to complement harmoniously. When a majority of the population on earth is exposed to concrete risks of climate change, but without that some of the richest part of the world face the same risk, to the same extend, inclusiveness might be more difficult for rich countries because of the simple fact of their situation.

12.2.6.5 The Problem of Drawing a Relation between Statements of Facts and Moral Judgements

Philosophers call *is-ought problem* the category confusion inherent to the attempts of empirical or pragmatic foundation of ethical values on brute facts. On a purely prudential level prevention of risks can be done by facts assessment, as when police is blocking a road after an accident. In order to present the moral duty of a subject in a convincing way, we need more than a harm or a risk, we need wrongdoings i.e. intentions and liable, or responsible subjects.

The Scottish philosopher D. Hume presented how the attempt of deriving moral belief and judgment from facts might occur, but should be handled with caution, showing how our use of the language can hide some ethical preconceptions. He shows a kind of allegoric shift between two levels of the discourse: first facts (natural phenomenon, tendencies,

first order desires) and second, the apparition of unexpected ethical notions:

“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought*, or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it³⁴⁸.”

The *is-ought* gap comes from possibly not seeing clearly the difference between facts as how people live and express values by looking at them, and the moral judgement which is grounded on a meta-ethical prescriptive ground. Hume would clearly derive values from passions, not reason, but T. Reid has denied the irrational or empirical ground proposed by the former, by affirming the need for *ethical reason based first principles*. Reid presents the utility of *deontic statements* and explains that there should be a logical difference between what *should* be done or not done, what *must* be done, or what *must be forbidden*, given some strong modalities of necessity or principles in the first place. This whole conversation remains valid when epistemic authority is not clear and communication about knowledge and values is not clear.

³⁴⁸ Hume, David (1739): *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, Part I, “Of virtue and vice in general”, Sect I.

In order to avoid the error of category between facts/norms, theory/practice based judgements, a clear ethical argumentation and reasoning needs to be prior available. There is stability across cultures and History on first (global ethical) principles of morals³⁴⁹. In order to designate actors as moral or non-moral, we need another type of reasoning than consequence based reasoning, argues Reid, who answers the sceptical temptation of reducing the good to what is desirable, - showing the incapacity of desires and wills to account for moral subjects as they are limited to the evaluation of actions.

In order to have an inclusive attitude towards others, one needs more than medical, ecological and socio-economic facts. Without reflecting morally on the subject, we are left with the desirability or undesirability of unequal circumstances of life, and lack the right attitude of including the other person, not because of moral sentiments, but because of the ground of a reason and moral principle.

Ethical progress in areas open to strong moral dilemmas as those related to ecology (climate change) show the limits of action based interpretation of human behaviour. In order to change the mind of those who remain sceptical we need the ground of a stable foundation, given by common sense practical morality; however, to be tempted to reducing all ethics to practical ethics is an abuse of language, it is forgetting the theoretical level of norms, where we easily tend to disagree, but knowledge authority is theoretical and disagreement is part of the theoretical development of knowledge³⁵⁰.

³⁴⁹ This common sense judgment is “necessary to all men for their being and preservation, and therefore it is unconditionally given to all men by the Author of Nature”, Reid, Thomas, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*, Derek Brookes (ed.), University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 6.4, 452.

³⁵⁰ Legal texts, aphoristic discourses, which are narrative but not argumentative or the preaching of values (as living practice in religious communities, as exemplarist virtue ethics in practice) fulfil some essential conditions to be value driven ethical change drivers, but without argumentative authority, without the logi-

In order to bring a large overlapping consensus over ecology related issues the academic professions need to be developing strong theoretical research and show the example by strong institutional presence in the civil society.

12.2.6.6 *Summum Bonum*

What ought to be should not simply be based on statements about what is, running the risk of missing the gap between facts and values. An argumentative discipline is required to sort out what behaviour is valuable (teleological), or even *ethically the best*, with regard to an ultimate standard or *summum bonum*. To claim for a precise notion of a highest good, an end in itself or intrinsic value; brings immense advantages in order to construct an explicit and argument-based system of values. To be able to reform a practice following the main chapters of the given type of highest value that has been chosen, introduces parameters of articulation of a system of values/principles. As the birth, the death, separation or illness are chapters of the human life, and are to some extent containing all the other goods or values of that life, any highest good (Greek *energia* as being perfect) supposes chapters/parameters of a given hierarchy of values (or axiology), or definable stages of evolution (and possible regress). In priority *summum bonum* should be concerned by truth related systems of values in order to gain epistemic authority or a value of knowledge, objectivity and predictability.

cal constructive skeleton of systematic thinking, the communication doesn't bring a fundamental narrative of what ought to be. We miss realistic theoretical analysis when we rely on practical projection into a possibly common but ultimately highly contingent configuration of the world.

12.3 Conclusion: The Value of the Epistemic Value

A radical faith in people is important if we take seriously the idea that we are neighbours, and that we should carry the same interest in our neighbour as we do in ourselves, according to Jesus Christ (Mark, 12, 31). To improve policies and professionalism in higher education are good first steps but not sufficient in order to achieve real change in quality as it is not sufficient to be using the ingenious path of the cyberspace to achieve real change in quality, which should always be related to conceptual clarity, truth and inventive argument based narratives. It is not enough either to be able to analyse the methods of knowledge; knowledge itself should remain the central scope of higher education development; otherwise communication would have a poor value, even if our intentions are praiseworthy.

As living beings, we are placed in the world of nature, not only with regard to the environment, animals and the biodiversity but with regard to the billions of living beings who work unceasingly to maintain our collective body and identity. We may be tempted to forget this natural fact because we are part of a project of human community which gives a unifying form to our interactions and brings changes into our life and the world. We aim endlessly at becoming self-organizing living wholes, with many other humans, claiming ethically to pay a special attention to mutual differences, to include them with respect and care. It is a matter of constant ingenuity and careful observation of nature and of the human mind (including our possible justifications of the existence and description of the presence of a Divine power or world order).

We are continuing to live in one world, but the world has different attributes, bodily and spiritually, thus bringing an epistemic (epistemic, method of knowledge related) focus. This theoretical view point is necessary in order to make progress and change the world, although changing the world is often seen as a matter of practice. In the footsteps of F. Bacon's writings on the nature of science and the scientific method,

where he shared his views of the unity of knowledge, both scientific and non-scientific (including philosophical/ethical), we find three important insights on the overall relation of ethics with research and education, which was understood as a great potential of change, not only for science but as an ideal inclusivity rooted education.

Building knowledge and thus *augmenting it*, grounding knowledge on a solid methodological ground, *developing an argument* in order to communicate knowledge: all the complicated aspects of truth and justified belief formation and communication are central aspects of an ethics of change for three reasons, that have been found in the parallel development of scientific research and good practice oriented education policy.

In order to avoid error and not to suspend the process of progress in knowledge and good practice: (1) the delivery of knowledge, which is often magisterial and peremptory, and not ingenuous and faithful in education institutions, should be perfected and amended. (2) An early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and methods, from which research and education receive small or no augmentation, should be limited. We need to keep the original creative activity of the researcher as *energia* in focus: “knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, it is in growth; but when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it may, perchance, be further polished, and illustrate and accommodated for use and practice, but it increases no more in bulk and substance³⁵¹.” (3) If science is not increased, it is unlikely that decent conditions of research and education can be further looked for, clearly established and reaffirmed when good practice is not respected. Lack of augmentation of knowledge, research and education output is a risk for the research and

³⁵¹ Bacon, Francis (1893) *The Advancement of Learning*, London: Cassell & Company, §V, 4, 9. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) is a leading figures in epistemological philosophy and scientific methodology just after in the Renaissance era; not to confound with the 20th Century Irish painter and homonym.

education profession: “the most constant and devoted kind of professors of any science ought to propound to them-selves to make some additions to their science”, they should not convert their labours “to aspire to certain second prizes: as to be a profound interpreter or commenters, to be a sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical compounder or abridger”. Quality of knowledge should be improved, but also the quantity augmented, because change in praxis depends not only on the consolidation of knowledge but on knowledge formation itself³⁵². Of course knowledge formation and augmentation should not be overall considered as mandatory or vital for a majority of the homo sapiens family, as life has many circumstances which don’t depend on it; it is enough to inspect the socio-economic tissue of society at many levels, and across many useful professions, to see that some are *indirectly* very dependent on the progress in knowledge, not to mention the deep but sophisticated gap between scientific progress and technical innovation.

Aiming at living with *epistemic concern for truth* is to philosophicaly question the value of prima facie knowledge, instead of denying knowledge in order to posit human practice dangerously close to *might is right*. Knowing what we eat, where we live, how we use common natural resources as water, food, how we take a medicine when we are ill, how aware we are of having a freedom of movement, how we manage to bring nature closer to our lives and to our relatives, all these simple aspects of life show the importance of having at hand the right knowledge, instead of relativizing the value of knowledge. The cultural framework of knowledge is important but should never be confounded with knowledge formation and the relevant criteria for truth and authentic scientific discovery. Inclusive education on the contrary can be directly related to knowledge formation as it concerns the right understanding of a good practice, which should not exclude on the ground of the identity or of a particular handicap.

³⁵² Bacon, §V, 10.

Inclusive education can be part of an ethical reformation of life, including a fine understanding on how digital technology may bring some answers on how we change the world, as the same ingenuity was needed at other periods of History, related to the impact of other major technologies and scientific paradigm shifts. In conclusion it is not enough “to call philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the earth” and to apply knowledge only to manners, good practices and research policies; both heaven and earth should “conspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man”, “to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful; [...] as a spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort”. Knowledge formation will always be the best ally of meaningful inclusion of weak parts of the human family, and of sustainable societal change, but the search for knowledge without self-knowledge is vain: “knowledge without conscience is but the ruin of the soul [Science sans conscience n'est que ruine de l'âme]³⁵³” (Gargantua and Pantagruel by F. Rabelais, 1653).

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³⁵³ Rabelais, François (1653): *Gargantua and Pantagruel. Complete. Five Books of the Lives, Heroic Deeds and Sayings of Gargantua and his Son Pantagruel*, Transl. by Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromarty and Peter Antony Motteux, Book II, Chapter 2.VIII, Derby: Moray Press.

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