

## SOLIDARITY - ENLIGHTENED LEADERSHIP

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### 12.1 Solidarity: as an End or as a Means?

#### *12.1.1 Solidarity as an End*

Solidarity could be defined in the broad sense either as a means or as an end. Considered as an end, solidarity is the motive of any virtuous action based on altruistic reasons, such as helping others to rescue someone in order to prevent a harmful situation. E. g. contributing to lift and rescue a heavy person, lying unconscious in the street on the floor, who is being handled by rescuers, but who might be needing an additional person, could express the value of solidarity as an end, since an answer to others request for help is given in the situation of emergency and risk, without having a particular obligation to help<sup>139</sup>.

#### *12.1.2 Solidarity as a Means*

As a means (to an end, not an end), solidarity could be understood as a property of dependency of a set of parts to a whole (*in solidum*), as when in a family or a professional group, individual and collective roles and responsibilities are melt together to some extent. This idea of benefiting others could be understood either as a way of sharing together

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<sup>139</sup> Haaz, I. (2012): *La solidarité*, Paris: L'Harmattan—see on the duty to help and the Harm Principle Part III, 275 ff. and 291.

moral sentiments as love, social virtues as friendship and shared commitments and common economic and educational interests, in a limited community circle, that of the family. Even if the division of labour is not simply based on patriarchal authority, mutual consent of family members to rules and to a commune circle of interests, those of the family, resemble to a egoism of the group, and not yet to truly social and altruistic values. Solidarity as cohesion of human beings, by the means of “interchangeability of ideas, services, goods, of workforce, virtues and vices”, is solidarity limited to the constitution of a process of exchange that is a means that could be used to different ends. Work in itself may be seen as an ideal means to integrate human beings in society and therefore is a powerful tool in order to achieve mutual benefice from a social and an economical order. As team work at the work place, that would complement a simple division of the labour is another manifestation of solidarity, when individuals are asked to work in groups, provided a transparent collaborative participation in a process of production of economic value. In many professional sectors there could be larger notions of solidarity, as a means of assigning direction lines, soft laws and creation of global norms, intended to counterbalance the strictly juridical, and economical notions of the work, entrepreneurship and economical organization (e. g. corporate governance and ethics<sup>140</sup>). In the sector of research, sharing research benefits is based on the awareness of the coincidence of individual and collective ends and strategies to accord individual potentials to constant evolutions, from the changes experimented in the society, technology and the continuous constructive production of science knowledge in a global world. In the military sector it is easy to represent solidarity as means, since soldiers’ actions express solidarity on daily basis, the victory of those on the front sign the victory of those

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<sup>140</sup> A very useful work on the aspect of solidarity as an *integrated* notion, related to both subjective and objective relative dimensions, see: Edison Paul Tabra Ochoa: *Solidarity y gobierno corporativo de la empresa*, Bosch Editor, 2015, 66ff.

resting behind the combat front: thus all soldiers accept a duty of loyalty and solidarity to the group, which might extend to self-sacrifice for victory.

### **12.1.3 Dependency, Transparency and Self-Empowerment**

Although a libertarian notion of freedom as essentially negative freedom would be strongly opposed to solidarity as dependency or heteronomy, we will see that it is far from clear that dependency and a certain level of authority or nudging should be seen as essentially negative. Solidarity as a means is a protective convention to preserve important subjective interests, in this sense it might be defined as *rule-from-another* or a *principle based on heteronomy* as opposed to *rule-from-oneself*, when a human being is searching for self-realization in “the authority of the family, the clan, State legislation, the morals, the Church or the divine will<sup>141</sup>”. A secular ethical point of view focusing on autonomy and negative freedom should be moderated by the possibility of fruitful and constructive relation between *theonomous* realism of values, - that is a point of view based on religious beliefs or self-transcendence -, and autonomous realist view of values. Thus we think that *theonomy* should not be seen as heteronomous *per se*, since it may not be considered as contrary to an increase *self-empowerment*. There is a difference saying that by a principle based in heteronomy, some dependency is accepted and that some principle is accepted from an external authority, without the *capacity* to be recognized as true principle by the person, if any other option of enlightened moral choice would be given, in the development of his autonomous ethical and moral consciousness. Family members might not need to build their choice only in reaction to the

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<sup>141</sup> Similar secular libertarian point of view is expressed by not only E. v. Hartmann, but also many Neo-Kantian philosophers, influenced by Kant’s notion of autonomy. See: König, Hermann (1910): *Die Metaphysische Begründung der Ethik in Eduard von Hartmanns Philosophischem System*, Verlag von Quelle & Meyer in Leipzig, 15.

determining power of others, - as often small children do - they might in a second stage of development of ethical and social capacities ground a choice on a proper critical self-evaluation. When a person is reflecting on motivations for actions, or on the normative principles to act, found in some altruistic values, the value is not an exterior value. Autonomy is therefore understood in different other context than as founding true moral ethical principles. Not only *independence from coercive or manipulative influences* is essential for the autonomy and the flourishing of various capabilities of the self. As well the individual's *capacity for self-control* and *reflective authenticity* are key conditions to increase self-empowerment<sup>142</sup>. Interestingly this notion of self-mastering doesn't entail that a certain degree of its contrary would automatically be wrong. It is unclear if, in all cases, an *opaque non-coercive influence* may be seen as preferable to more *transparent but more coercive efforts*. The value of non-coerciveness hinges on the libertarian presupposition of founding the value of freedom on *negative conceptions of freedom* as the absence of any obstacle. As a result, it may not hold across all conceptions of freedom<sup>143</sup>. Solidarity as system of dependency may want to put a considerable weight on transparency, instead of institutional and individual autonomy. Two valuable contributions have been made in that direction: first the initiative of a Global Compact that entails a duty to report, and thus open to transparent activity self-interpretation, the second is the proposition to organize deliberative ideal communities, where solidarity would be given by a principle of universality of the morality of the discourse.

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<sup>142</sup> As expressed by Dworkin, G. (1988), *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-32. Also see: Raz, J. (1986): *The Morality of Freedom*: Oxford: Clarendon.

<sup>143</sup> See the brilliant analysis by Chris Mill, in: *Heteronomy of Choice Architecture*, 2015, preprint URL: <https://ucl.academia.edu/ChrisMills>

#### ***12.1.4 Some Considerations on the Value of Transparency***

The UN Global Compact (UNGC) is an important example of a great step forward towards more transparency in solidarity in the organization of an enterprise and in research institutions. Without necessarily asking for a clear evaluation of the intention of the promise, inherent to any shared consent toward a compact, or even specifying in defined terms the finality of solidarity as such, the model of the Global Compact (GC), initiated by the Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan in 1999, has widely been accepted as a model of soft law, in particular in the field of the social responsibility of enterprises. As governing tool this duty could be seen as a purely self-communicative and self-explanatory requirement to report on regular basis, on the activities of any type of organization (an NGO, an enterprise, an academic institution, etc.).<sup>144</sup> This compact of solidarity, based on a retrospective report of activities may be seen as lacking a prospective temporal aspect: in order to produce a meaningful description of activities, on the model of a promise, one would need to present objectives that are not yet realized (you cannot promise that you haven't broken a plate<sup>145</sup>). A purely discursive justification of ethical standards and valuable goals, where the object of the promise cannot be transcribed in a coherent and delimited description of facts, but to processes, that relate less to assignable responsibilities than a model of governance by the real, instead of the real. The repetitive character of the report is the contrary of a punctual analysis based on the recognition of value driven goals. Self-developing process may be transparent, because the rationale of the process would be clear. Simply by communicating, the organization might already justify the imperative to be responsible, if the promise is not motivated by the true or a false

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<sup>144</sup> Thomas Berns / Gaëlle Jeanmart, "Le rapport comme réponse de l'entreprise responsable : promesse ou aveu (à partir d'Austin et Foucault)", *Dissensus, Dossier : Droit et philosophie du langage ordinaire*, N° 3 (2010), URL : <http://popups.ulg.ac.be/2031-4981/index.php?id=701>.

<sup>145</sup> Berns/Jeanmart, "1<sup>er</sup> problème le rapport au temps", *ibid.*

description of an inner experience, but not the simple act of speech (with J. L. Austin, 1962), and not without a sincere motivations of the self<sup>146</sup>. The moral principle of the *discourse ethics* could be a second way of conceiving communication and solidarity.

### ***12.1.5 Solidarity as Discourse Ethical Principle***

Jürgen Habermas has famously built his notion of solidarity on a universal principle that has a moral dimension, embedded in the idea of a discursive process, where parties would share a same arena of public deliberation and discursive will-formation, provided that morally responsible agents be present, who would have a recognizable capacity *to assert legal right claims*. The original solution of the philosopher is to present a creative tension: between the facts and the norms, between the descriptive level of solidarity, as concrete reality, and the normative solidarity that count as an *ought* statement. The concept of justice which would originate from an ideal community, linked into the practice of communication, entails an awareness of solidarity, as certainty of close union in a common life context. But it is precisely this foundation on the universality of morals that renders solidarity still not easy to use in the proposition of the moral principle of communication<sup>147</sup>. This view of communication in a given cultural community can help us to introduce the question whether self-development that is based in a communicative praxis, might not need to be transcribed in an agency-based process, so that we could introduce leadership in relation to solidarity, as what helps people to enable others.

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<sup>146</sup> Austin, J. L. (1962), *How to Do Things with Words*, 2nd edn., M. Sbisà and J. O. Urmson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

<sup>147</sup> Habermas, J. (1981): *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. English trans., 1984a, 1987. See : Pensky, M. (2008) *The Ends of Solidarity: Discourse Theory in Ethics and Politics*, New York: SUNY, Ch. 1. Derpmann, Simon (2013): *Gründe der Solidarität*, 223pp. Ethica Band 22, Münster: Mentis.

## 12.2 The Enlightened Leadership: Helping Others to Develop their Own Capacities

The aim of enabling others to transcend their horizon of action, in the possibility of an ongoing human flourishing, is a definition of leadership based on freedom and some shared basic preferences, in order to have a good life. The capability approach highlights that freedom to achieve well-being is a matter of what people are able to do, and thus the kind of life they are able to lead. We don't need here to go much in details on the nature of a compact, a scheme of communication, a social contract, or a supposed natural law based explanation on the reason for people to all have overall similar social interests. To act as enabler supposes to take a situation of just collaboration and focus on the *capacity of agency* in a given cultural community, instead of seeing an autonomous development only as a *capacity of autonomous evaluation*<sup>148</sup>. In order to shift from the essential properties of self-development, as an autonomous process as we just saw it above, to an agency-based development, and introduce leadership in relation to solidarity, as what helps people to enable others, following a view expressed by Sen, we just need to suppose some *basic capabilities* that external dependencies such as “exclusion, poverty, powerlessness, exploitation, and a lack of things such as education, health and food, which increase people's spiritual and material capability, can deprive people of such ability<sup>149</sup>”.

In consequence, we could transcribe solidarity as means in the form of any mediating and communicative activity, enabling others to spiritu-

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<sup>148</sup> As example we might mention that for Hugo Grotius (Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*) it is only by mastering language and rational understanding that an essential structure of ethical and juridical norms of solidarity and justice could be developed, from the simplest social instincts.

<sup>149</sup> Symphorien Ntubagirirwa (2014): *Philosophical Premises for African Economic Development: Sen's Capability Approach*, Geneva: Globethics.net Theses No. 7, p. 290. See Sen, A. (1999) *Development as Freedom*, New York: Knopf, pp. 87ff & 137ff.

al and material capability, by the medium of protective systems and networks, where individuals or groups can expect to conserve collaborative activities, in a peaceful and sustainable way (e. g. cultural communities, professional corporations, professional associations, online tools developed to make joint research activities within a scientific community). The description of solidarity as an end, constitute a normative system that could help and motivates us, for behaviour that has its object the benefit of others, enable or empower others to act, and therefore conceive others as persons in action. An acceptable duty or will to “act in consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior motives<sup>150</sup>”, is essential in order to reject a purely prudential reason to follow social behaviours. Enabling others would require acting on someone else’s behalf [...], and whose achievements are to be assessed in the light of someone else’s goals<sup>151</sup>”. Secondly, agent refers to “someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives<sup>152</sup>”. In order to propose to others protection that would benefit them supposes to raise the issue of hard paternalism that is solidarity essentially as a means not an end. Leaders should not intend to promote the well-being of the subject because he or she is judged incapable of doing so themselves. The internal point of view on the value of altruism and solidarity vs. the external (naturalistic, prudential) point of view should be explained in order to clarify the teleological understanding of the norm of solidarity from a subjective realist point of view. The assurance of my proper integrity (that I respect myself and others) in helping others supposes that I know which value I put in action. We will see now that the realist view on values should not be historical, nor hermeneutical or a natural view.

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<sup>150</sup> Nagel, Thomas (1978): *The Possibility of Altruism*, Princeton New Jersey : Princeton UP, 79.

<sup>151</sup> Sen, A. (1999) *Development as Freedom*, op. cite, 18-19.

<sup>152</sup> Sen, ibid. Ntibagirirwa, 2014, p. 289.



## 12.3 Reconsidering the Importance of Solidarity as an End

The word “solidarity” doesn’t express a simple philosophical concept; therefore, solidarity should be analyzed and defined in more simple terms, by breaking down a straight forward explanation such as: solidarity is *a fundamental human drive “to move with others”* (Dilthey, 1965<sup>153</sup>). In order to understand what the philosopher means by such a basic anthropological capacity to move with others, and ask us the question of the moral dimensions of this anthropological basis of solidarity, that would be rooted in an internal point of view on values, as opposed to an external explanation. In order to describe this internal understanding of solidarity let’s first defined the composed characteristics of solidarity, by listing them as parts of the complete definition, that includes external points of views, and then, by taking a look at the relationships between the internal and external parts. A philosophical analysis should show us the beliefs and motivations surrounding the truth of moral statements and reasons to act in an altruistic way by reflecting on the notion of life as either a biological or anthropological substratum.

### 12.3.1 Biocentric and Vitalist Solidarities

The philosophical psychology of solidarity, has been developed by first stating a natural ground in some altruistic behaviours, as “physical altruism of the lowest kind”, which, “differentiating from physical egoism, may, in this case, be considered as not yet independent of it”, as when “whatever action, unconscious or conscious, involves expenditure of individual life to the end of increasing life in other individuals” (Spencer, 1879/1902, 232<sup>154</sup>). Secondly, defined as “automatically psy-

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<sup>153</sup> A basic anthropological ‘*Mitbewegung*’. Dilthey, W. (1965): *System der Ethik*, H. Nohl (ed.), *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. X, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 74-77.

<sup>154</sup> Spencer, Herbert (1879/1902): *Data of Ethics*, New York: P.F. Collier & Son.

chical” altruism, solidarity could be considered in situations where *almost conscious* altruism is present: as in birds and mammals, and in parental activities, guided by instinct, where such activities are accompanied by either no representations or by vague representations of the benefits which is received (284). Self-sacrifice, then could be recognized as “no less primordial than self-preservation. Being in its simple physical form absolutely necessary for the continuance of life from the beginning; and being extended under its automatic form” (ibid, 235).

### **12.3.2 *The Inner Life as the Realistic View on Values***

Another perspective might be introduced at this point, we find it by E. v. Hartmann as an important part of his *Ethics of the Moral Sentiments*<sup>155</sup>, where we have the affirmation that the moral sentiment of solidarity should not be reduced to a vital value in a biocentric way such as being part of natural selection and evolution or in a conative principle (as life explained as a general principle of will to live). If solidarity is not only related to the theory of evolution with Spencer (see also Fouillée, Guyau), but as well from outside a vitalist principle in ethics, in order not to reduce some of the most important values as Love, Sympathy and the tendency for religious devotion to egoistical tendencies conditioned by life as growth, power and domination in the struggle to survive and self-preservation. Interestingly, even biocentered philosophers such as Spencer, recognized the importance to turn upside down the system based on evolution where the sentiment of altruism originated from egoism, when he affirmed that an “originated community building” constitute the current inclination of methodological individualism<sup>156</sup>. “If we define altruism as being all action which, in the normal course of things, benefits others instead of benefiting self, then, from the dawn of life, altruism has been no less essential than egoism. Though, primarily,

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<sup>155</sup> Von Hartmann, Eduard (1879/2006): *Die Gefühlsmoral*, 5. Das Moralprinzip des Geselligkeitstriebes, Hamburg : Meiner Verl., 80-85.

<sup>156</sup> Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, Altruism versus Egoism, Ch. XII, §76, 232.

it is dependent on egoism, yet, secondarily, egoism is dependent on it”). Scheler names the “Principle of Solidarity”, the essential experience of human community, in which an anthropologically centered understanding of life is founded, as essentially independent from this first organic drive to survive proposed by Spencer<sup>157</sup>. We have seen above that in order to grasp altruism and solidarity as inner perception of values, we don’t even need to draw a relation to organic, historical or hermeneutical aspects, only to true reason for being persuaded to act in a way to benefit others. Let’s suppose now that no such realist account exist, as though experiment.

### ***12.3.3 Solidarity and the Radical Contingency of the Notion of Justice***

Richard Rorty defines the radical contingency of any norm of justice, and of any social relation, that is understood as related to his denial of any universal solidarity, because Rorty takes for questionable the conditions of foundation of such a universal solidarity. Once we took the first step and acknowledged the contingency of any possible bridge built toward human differences, we tend to accept in a second step the ordinariness of *ordinary vices*: the supposed normal badness that seems acceptable. After that both steps, we may find ourselves not so distant from the moral monsters of human history, as Shklar rightly demonstrated, in her *Ordinary Vices* (1985<sup>158</sup>) full of wit, but not without letting us perplex on any common ground for solidarity. We agree on Derpmann criticism of Rorty, because he sees a lack entailed by this radical contingency: in that Rorty’s presupposition of the radical contingency of the

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<sup>157</sup> Scheler, Max (1916/2000): *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die material Wertethik*, *Materiale Wertethik un Eudaimonimus*, Bonn: Bouvier Verl. 284 note I.

<sup>158</sup> “Ordinary vices” distinct from the seven capital sins, are cruelty, hypocrisy, snobbery, betrayal, and misanthropy for Judith Shklar, they are merely forms of inhumanity. As Nietzsche reminds us, no great religion or art could be possible without cruelty, and even more: no new social order of moral rules is plausible without this constitutional and ordinary vice. Shklar, J. (1985): *Ordinary Vices*, Harvard UP: Belknap Press.

relations of the members of a given community fails to explain the possibility and condition of delimitation of true forms of solidarity from totalitarian prototypes of same. Normative solidarity is distinct from the simplifying ideologies in that, even if both could well be harmless, only a true solidarity has the value of sharing in the community, while an ideological solidarity could not be understood as a moral expectation, toward the possibility to empower others, beyond the relation of membership of the participants of a community.