citations of Averroes and Michael Scot’s translations of Aristotle, which circulated at Paris for the first time around 1225, as Gauthier established. There are ten of these, most of which also appear to be commonplaces, such as substantia dicitur tribus modis: materia, forma et compositum (35*, 39*); the only reference to Averroes that cannot be a commonplace is to Metaphysics Lambda, Actus est finis ad quem est (190), which hardly reflects great familiarity with Aristotelian metaphysics. On the whole, then, Pagus’s knowledge of Aristotle and Averroes seemingly does not present a strong case for a date after 1231, but rather 1225. Moreover, like other early masters active before 1235, Pagus pairs Averroes the “Commentator” with Aristotle (10), not with “the Philosopher,” a title that in this early period sometimes refers to Boethius. An earlier post quem date also fits better with the idea that Pagus was already important enough to be mentioned by Gregory IX along with William of Auxerre and Geoffrey of Poitiers.

Dating aside, the commentary is philosophically interesting, not the least for its contribution to the history of mental content theory, found in discussions of the subject of the Categories. It is a treatise on logic, which, however, seems to be about things in the external world. Following Aristotle, his medieval commentators fail to distinguish sharply between linguistic and ontological items. Thus Nicholas, for example, speaks of “predicating substance” (74*n62). Seemingly this practice is justified by the Boethian claim that the Categories is about significative terms as they signify things (65*). For Pagus and his contemporaries, the Categories is about sayables (dicibiles), insofar as their significates can be classified (ordinabiles sunt) in a genus. Pagus claims further that as such the sayable is univocal across categories (73*). Interestingly, Nicholas denies that ‘chimera’ is a sayable, on the grounds that its significate cannot be classified in a genus (72*). And, of course, the incomplex sayables of the Categories are combined in the complex enuntiables of On Interpretation. So it appears that early speculation on the immediate objects of knowledge takes place at least in part in a hermeneutical context as Aristotle’s commentators struggled with his texts.

Disappointingly, Pagus’s discussion is never comprehensive, but it also has the advantages of brevity. You find here terse, simple definitions and explanations that often elude us in more thorough discussions: thus an enunciable combines a noun and verb (9). In short: Pagus is a terrific resource.

Since we hope for more good editions from Hansen, it is appropriate to add some desiderata. It is great to read parallel texts in the introduction and see them noted in the index generalis, but it would be better to find them also in the notes to the text itself. The index generalis should be supplemented by a subject index. And though most of the translations are fine, Pagus is rendered in oddly wooden English. None of these cavils detracts, however, from the value of this fine edition whose editor transcribes and interprets manuscripts accurately. Checking columns at random, I found few mistakes; only two may matter for content: ‘differentia definitiva’ for ‘differentia definita’ (74, line 24); ‘contingit’ for ‘est’ (266, line 6). For other unrecorded variants consult the author.

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This book, a revision of the author’s doctoral dissertation, traces the history of several disputes concerning Aristotle’s De anima in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The stated aim of the work is to demonstrate that the philosophical study of soul “transformed” during this period, with Scholastic philosophers becoming increasingly pessimistic
of the possibility of establishing the nature of the human intellective soul by natural reason alone. This pessimism took hold despite a continuing consensus that the nature of non-human vegetative and sensitive souls could be understood by reason alone, thus resulting in a deep division between the study of human souls and that of non-human souls.

De Boer’s study is distinguished from much of the existing secondary literature in two ways. The work’s first distinctive feature is its focus on disputes concerning the Aristotelian conception of soul in general, rather than of the intellective soul in particular; consideration of vegetative and sensitive souls is featured more here than in some other studies. The disputes covered center on two sets of questions. In the lengthy third chapter, De Boer discusses a number of questions concerning the methodology of the science of the soul, including (i) whether this science belongs to metaphysics or natural philosophy, (ii) whether the subject of this science is the soul itself or the animated body, and (iii) how the apparent difficulty of this science impacts the epistemic status of its conclusions.

Then, in chapters 4 and 5, De Boer covers disputes about the adequacy of Aristotle’s definition of soul and about the distinction between souls and their powers. One of the issues scrutinized here is the question of how Aristotle’s definition of soul (“the first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially”) can be harmonized with the rejection of a plurality of substantial forms, a position that became increasingly common during this period. On a view such as Aquinas’s, for instance, the soul is the only substantial form of a living substance, and thus all of a living substance’s actuality derives from its soul. But given this, it is difficult to see how the soul can be the actuality of “a natural body which has life potentially.” A body that has life only potentially would be a body without a soul (for a body with a soul is one that has life actually, not merely potentially); but to hold that all a living substance’s actuality derives from its soul is to deny that there could be such a thing as an organic body without a soul.

The second distinctive feature of De Boer’s study is that he focuses solely on commentaries on the De anima, setting aside discussions of soul that take place in other texts (for example, in commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences). This results in a somewhat unorthodox assortment of figures being studied. Indeed, with only two or three exceptions, the philosophers studied here will be unfamiliar even to many specialists: Thomas Aquinas, Radulphus Brito, John of Jandun, John Buridan, Nicholas Oresme, and the authors of five anonymous De anima commentaries.

De Boer’s choice to focus on these commentaries is somewhat curious. He admits that his selection was guided by the availability of these particular works in either a renaissance or modern edition (10n22); overlooking the many De anima commentaries available only in manuscript is understandable though regrettable. Yet there are still a number of edited commentaries from the period that are largely or entirely ignored, including those of Siger of Brabant, Giles of Rome, John Duns Scotus, Walter Burley, and Albert of Saxony. Scotus’s short quaestio commentary is set aside for not discussing the methodological issues De Boer focuses on (11), but no reason is given for the exclusion of these other commentaries. (Burley is an especially curious case. In chapter 1, De Boer includes Burley’s commentary on the list of commentaries he will discuss; but apart from one paragraph in the main text on pages 105–106, Burley is only discussed in the footnotes, and there only rarely.)

That said, the material De Boer does survey is presented in a clear and illuminating manner. Given the gaps in coverage mentioned above, this book is not a comprehensive look at the commentary tradition from 1260 to 1360 (as both its subtitle and main thesis might imply), but it is nonetheless an insightful survey of a portion of the later medieval reception of Aristotle’s De anima, and a worthy addition to the growing body of scholarly literature on the period.

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