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LOVE IMPERILED

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we argue that hard incompatibilism imperils a typical component of loving relations—lovable behavior—if it imperils moral praiseworthiness. We propose that to be lovable behavior, the behavior must exemplify the property of being commendable (the property of being praiseworthy from the standpoint of love), in contrast to being morally praiseworthy (praiseworthy from the point of view of moral duty). But if hard incompatibilism undermines moral praiseworthiness, then it just as surely undermines commendability. Thus, hard incompatibilism imperils a crucial component of loving relationships.

Key words: hard incompatibilism, moral responsibility, moral praiseworthiness, love, lovable behavior, love's value, commendability.

1. Introduction

Derk Pereboom has recently advanced a powerful defense of a position in the free will debate that he dubs "hard incompatibilism." According to this position, with the exception of agent-causal accounts of free action or moral responsibility, no compatibilist or libertarian account is true. Pereboom further proposes that since there are no good reasons to believe that we are agent-causes, we are, in effect, without free will. A significant supplement to Pereboom's hard incompatibilism is that, contrary to what many have assumed, a life devoid of free action would not be as detrimental as it has often been made out to be and, in certain respects, such a life would even be beneficial (Pereboom 1995; 2001; 2002). Pereboom, for instance, argues that though lack of this freedom undermines appraisals of moral praise- and moral blameworthiness, its absence leaves intact other sorts of moral appraisal, such as appraisals of moral obligation, right, and wrong, is no bar to developing an acceptable position on managing criminal behavior and on

moral education and reform, and fails to affect significantly interpersonal relationships, including those of love, and "life-hopes."[1] Pereboom, in effect, theorizes that fully appreciating hard incompatibilism reveals that this position is not such an exacting one after all.

In this paper, we take issue with an element of the supplement. We argue that a typical component of loving relationships—lovable behavior—*is* imperiled by hard incompatibilism. We may tentatively identify such behavior with behavior that is motivated by love. Our discussion will be concerned not so much with hard incompatibilism's impact on *love*, as with its impact on *lovable behavior*, love being an essential constituent of loving relations and loving behavior being, characteristically, a part of loving relations. Accordingly, we will not give a definition of love, nor deal with the nature of the different varieties of love.

In roughly hewn strokes, our line of reasoning for the view that hard incompatibilism threatens lovable behavior may be summarized in this way: To be lovable behavior, the behavior must exemplify the property of *being commendable* (the property of *being praiseworthy* from the standpoint of love), in contradistinction to, for instance, *being morally praiseworthy*—praiseworthy from the point of view of moral duty. But hard incompatibilism undermines commendability just as it undermines moral praiseworthiness. Thus, hard incompatibilism imperils a crucial component of loving relationships.

2. Hard incompatibilism

It will be helpful to commence with a brief overview of some of the key elements of hard incompatibilism. Pereboom argues that moral responsibility for an action depends primarily on the action's actual causal history and not on whether its agent could have avoided performing it. So in Pereboom's estimation incompatibilism is not motivated by the thought that determinism expunges alternative possibilities without the having of which no action can be free. Rather, Pereboom proposes that it is considerations concerning an action's causal origin or source that undergirds incompatibilism.

Elaborating, Pereboom submits that we can describe cases in which a victim of manipulation, such as a subject whose decisions are the product of antecedent elements—values, desires, and beliefs, for example—which neuroscientists surreptitiously implanted in her, is not free and, hence, is not morally responsible for her behavior. A causal history involving apt manipulation, a "manipulated causal history," undermines freedom and responsibility. In such cases, owing to the agent's not being the ultimate source of her action (mental or otherwise), the agent is not morally responsible for the action.

[1] For a view similar to the view that some important "life-hopes" must be abandoned if determinism is true but that other life-hopes that matter to us can be retained, see Honderich 1988; 1993; 2002.

More specifically, the pertinent principle to which Pereboom appeals to support his verdict of unfreedom and non-responsibility in scenarios involving responsibility-subversive manipulation is this:

> *Principle O*: If an agent is morally responsible for her deciding to perform an action, then the production of this decision must be something over which the agent has control, and an agent is not morally responsible for the decision if it is produced by a source over which she has no control. (Pereboom 2001, pp. 4, 47)

A deterministic causal history, Pereboom contends, is pertinently like a manipulated one: an action that is causally determined issues from sources—the distant past and the natural laws—over which the agent lacks any control. Contrary to compatibilists, Pereboom proposes that there is no relevant and principled difference between an action that results from responsibility-undermining manipulation and an action that has a more ordinary deterministic causal history. It follows that compatibilism is not sustainable (Pereboom 2001, pp. 89-126; 2002, p. 478).

Regarding libertarian accounts not wedded to agent-causation, Pereboom ventures that an indeterministic event-causal history, a history not including agent-causation and in which various antecedents of an action, such as the agent's having of reasons, indeterministically cause elements in the action's etiology or the action itself, is not relevantly different from a manipulated one: this sort of history, also, undermines responsibility. This is because in scenarios involving indeterminism, just as in those involving determinism, antecedents over which the agent lacks any control produce the action. Again, Pereboom's position is that no relevant and principled difference can distinguish an action that results from responsibility-undermining manipulation from an action that has a more ordinary indeterminsitic causal history (Pereboom 2002, p. 478). He concludes that such libertarian theories are doomed to go the way of compatibilist ones.

Only agent-causation, Pereboom believes, allows for free action and moral responsibility. Agent-causation is coherent, but given evidence from our best scientific theories, it is not credible that we are in fact agent-causes. We, therefore, do not have the freedom that moral responsibility demands (Pereboom 2001, pp. 69-88).

3. Love in hard incompatibilist worlds

Pereboom submits, as we have noted, that although hard incompatibilism undermines moral praise- and blameworthiness, it leaves intact love and loving relations. Pereboom has several interesting things to say about why hard incompatibilism does not endanger these things. The following passage is especially noteworthy:

> Is it plausible that loving another requires that she be free in the sense required for moral responsibility? One might note that parents love their children rarely, if ever, because these children possess this sort of freedom, or because they freely (in this sense) choose the good, or because they deserve to be loved. Moreover, when adults love each other, it is also seldom, if at all, for these kinds of reasons. Explaining love is a complex enterprise. Besides moral character and action, factors such as one's relation to the other, her appearance, manner, intelligence, and her affinities with persons or events in one's history all might have a part. But suppose we assume that moral character and action are of paramount importance in producing and maintaining love. Even if there is an important aspect of love that is essentially a deserved response to moral character and action, it is unlikely that one's love would be undermined if one were to believe that these moral qualities do not come about through free and responsible choice. For moral character and action are lovable whether or not they merit praise. Love of another involves, most fundamentally, wishing well for the other, taking on many of the aims and desires of the other as one's own, and a desire to be together with the other. Hard incompatibilism threatens none of this. (Pereboom 2001, p. 202)

One may, however, have preliminary suspicions about whether various elements of loving relations that are deemed important remain secure in a world that is a hard incompatibilist world. So, for one thing, just as there are moral obligations, so there are "obligations" or commitments from love's standpoint. We believe that it is intrinsically good when moral obligations are fulfilled and it is, fundamentally, in virtue of this fact that doing moral right for right's sake and shunning what is morally wrong is of intrinsic value and so valuable to us. But, surely, if it is good when moral right is so done, the *presumption* is that some particular moral obligation is *freely* fulfilled—one does not fulfill it as a result of, say, manipulation.

Turning to love, Roger Lamb proposes that as a lover, you are, among other things, obligated *from love's standpoint* to attend to requests of the beloved, help the beloved, be concerned with the welfare of the beloved, and to defend the trust that is partly constitutive of the love (Lamb 1997b, pp. 28-29). We propose that just as it is good when moral right is done, so it is good when love's obligations—obligations or commitments from love's standpoint—are fulfilled. But if fulfilling such obligations is good, again the background *presumption* is that these obligations are freely fulfilled. The pertinent sense of 'free' is the sense in which our decisions, for instance, are required to be free if we are to be morally responsible for them. But then the *free* fulfillment of love's obligations is something that hard incompatibilism undermines (or, for present concerns, so we are assuming).

For another thing, one constituent of the complex relationship that is a relationship of love is the trust that characteristically exists between the lover and the beloved. Typically, when there is love, there is supreme or unquestioning trust. Laurence Thomas,

for example, claims that one of the distinguishing marks of friendship—and by extension, love—is the bond of mutual trust between friends. This he thinks "is cemented by equal self-disclosure and for that very reason, is a sign of the very special regard which each has for the other" (Thomas 1987, p. 217). Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett, take issue with Thomas's proposal that self-disclosure—the confiding of private or intimate information—between friends, cements bonds of mutual trust. But they agree that trust and intimacy are pivotal in friendship (Cocking & Kennett 1998). But again it *seems*, at least prima facie, that the trust, with its attendant emotional attitudes, must be *free* if it is to be deemed of value. And again, freely trusting each other is something that hard incompatibilism undermines.

For yet another thing, we value loving relations partly in virtue of the affective intensity or warmth that love requires.[2] Niko Kolodny tenders a recent incarnation of this view. Kolodny explains that

> To say that A is emotionally vulnerable to B…is to say, in part, that A is disposed to have a range of favorable emotions in response to A's beliefs that B…has fared or will fare well, and a range of unfavorable emotions in response to A's beliefs that B…has fared or will fare poorly. For example, A may feel content when B is well, elated when B meets with unexpected good luck, anxious when it seems that B may come to harm, grief-stricken when B does. (Notice that A is not simply emotionally vulnerable to how B *treats* A, although this is often what is meant by saying that one person is "emotionally vulnerable" to another). (Kolodny 2003, p. 152)

If, though, hard incompatibilism undermines the freedom of our decisions, it also undermines the freedom of our feeling states. This is because such feeling states, if free, are only indirectly so: they derive their freedom from the freedom of prior elements to which they are aptly causally related and that are directly free.[3] (These antecedent elements are directly free in that they do not derive their freedom from the freedom of anything else.) It is plausible that these temporally prior causal elements from which events that are indirectly free derive their freedom are (the having of) decisions. It would seem, consequently, that Pereboom's relevant views on freedom imply that there is no principled, relevant distinction between states of emotional vulnerability being causally determined and such states being the product of manipulation. If the emotional vulnerability that love implicates is to be of value to us, it cannot, it *appears*, be vulnerability of the sort that is engineered into us. Why would anyone value this sort of vulnerability?

[2] See, for example, Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Book IX, ch. 5, 1166b30-1167a12 (and also Book IV, ch. 6, 1126b20ff.) and Oakley 1992, pp. 58-59.

[3] See, for example, Mele 1995, p. 106 and Oakley 1992, pp. 122-159.

So we do think that there are initial, tentative reasons to be somewhat skeptical of the view that hard incompatibilism has no detrimental influence on central components of loving relationships. Even if love itself does not succumb to hard incompatibilism, there are reasons to believe that hard incompatibilism imperils *lovable behavior*. We said above that we may tentatively identify such behavior with behavior that is motivated by love. If hard incompatibilism endangers lovable behavior, then since such behavior is, typically, a pivotal ingredient of loving relationships, hard incompatibilism threatens such relationships even if it does not threaten love itself. In what follows, we develop one line of reasoning to kindle this skepticism, a line of reasoning that requires unearthing a connection between commendability and lovable behavior. It is to this connection that we now turn.

4. Commendability and lovable behavior

To understand the view that lovable behavior is behavior for which its agent is commendable, we need to clarify the notion of commendability and we need to address what species of behavior we have in mind when we speak of lovable behavior. Toward these ends, we start with a distinction. Along the lines Bernard Williams suggests, we may differentiate between a narrow conception of morality in which the morally deontic notions of obligation, right, and wrong are primary, and a broader conception in which morality's ambit extends beyond obligation to, roughly, concerns of how one should live.[4] Morality, broadly construed, includes, for example, concerns of love or an ethics of virtue or care. Henceforth, we shall reserve the use of "morality," or "moral," or related expressions for the narrow conception. Concerning this conception, we use "acting from duty" and "acting from moral obligation" interchangeably.

We previously registered that just as duty imposes requirements—there are obligations of duty or moral obligations—so love imposes requirements—there are obligations of love. One might, as a first approximation, identify lovable behavior with behavior in which one would engage if one were to discharge the duties of love. But as we shall argue, it is important to distinguish between lovable behavior proper and ersatz lovable behavior. Either variety of behavior is behavior in accordance with love's requirements; the former sort of behavior, though, is behavior for which its agent is *commendable*.

To secure a preliminary understanding of commendability, we call to mind that an agent can act from love in the absence of any thought to the morally deontic considerations of right, wrong, or obligation. Such moral factors may be entirely on the sidelines, playing no causal role at all in the generation of the agent's conduct that is consonant with the requirements of love, such as attending to the requests of the beloved. Love's requirements may conflict with morally deontic requirements. In cases of

[4] See Williams 1985, pp. 6, 174-196. For this distinction, see also Mackie 1977, pp. 106-107.

such conflict, the agent need not be *morally* praiseworthy for doing what love requires but may, nevertheless, be (as we have been saying) "commendable" from the standpoint of love, commendability being an analogue of moral praiseworthiness. Similarly, having acted in light of the belief that she has discharged her moral obligation, though not morally blameworthy, an agent may nevertheless be "censurable" from the perspective of love, censurability being an analogue of moral blameworthiness. Commendability or censurability is a genuine variety of responsibility distinct from the moral variety. Again, bear in mind the identification of the moral with the deontically moral. In our terminology, commendability (or censurability) from the point of view of love is a non-moral albeit *normative* variety of responsibility.[5] In the remainder of this paper, "commendability," "censurability" or cognates of the two are terms referring to appraisals of normative responsibility from the point of view of love.

To amplify further the notions of commendability and censurability, we expound the concept of normative responsibility. An agent is normatively responsible for something if she is either normatively blame- or praiseworthy for that thing. Starting with normative blameworthiness, there are different species or varieties of such blameworthiness.[6] A person can, for example, be morally, love-wise, or prudentially and so normatively blameworthy for intentionally doing or failing to do something or for the consequences of her intentional actions or omissions. Normative blameworthiness is concerned, preeminently, with a certain sort of appraisal of a person and only derivatively with the appraisal of the person's behavior. When a person is normatively blameworthy for an action, the blame in question is inward in that the person is *deserving* of blame, and not "outward." Outward blame includes the outward expression of blame by words, gestures, or actions, and if well substantiated, presupposes blameworthiness.

Normative blameworthiness is closely tied to what a person deeply cares about. Frequently (but not without exception) it is associated with normative standards a person thinks important and, hence, follows in guiding his life and conduct. Construe "normative standards" liberally. On this expansive interpretation, dictates of custom or tradition, or imperatives deriving from projects or ideals of *central importance* to one's life, count as such standards. Further, for a set of dictates, ideals, or rules to qualify as appropriate normative standards that "ground" normative responsibility, the standards must both guide and constrain behavior; they carry, in the person's life, a sort of authority. A person who accepts a set of standards as normative, is motivated to act in accordance with those standards, believes that they provide reasons for action, and is disposed to have (appropriate) pro or con feelings or attitudes under various conditions in which the standards are implicated in some fashion. Often (but again not always), when an agent is normatively blameworthy for a course of conduct, the agent does something

[5] On varieties of normative responsibility, see Haji 1998, pp. 177-196.

[6] Much of what we have to say on normative blameworthiness will also apply, with suitable amendments, to normative praiseworthiness.

she takes to be under par, or below the cared-for normative standards on which she typically relies to arrive at practical judgments about what to do. As an illustration, an agent may do something in violation of *prudential* standards to which she is committed and with which she identifies. She identifies with these standards insofar as she cares more for them than for others such as those of morality or love; it is to these standards she would like her behavior to conform. It is in virtue of the agent's having done something below par that it is frequently fitting, in instances of normative blameworthiness, for the agent to have negative feelings or attitudes (such as regret, or remorse) and for other parties to adopt appropriate negative attitudes toward her; but such feelings on the part of the agent or others are not essential to normative blameworthiness.

It is also worth reemphasizing that the guiding standards with which an agent identifies need not be (deontically) moral. An agent may deliberately evade what she recognizes to be a moral obligation, and intentionally execute some alternative she considers more significant, perhaps because it is the prudentially rational course of action, and because it is prudential standards to which she bears allegiance.[7] Deliberate deviation from such standards may leave the agent susceptible to blame, but the blame will not be moral. We make no presumption that people generally endorse a single set of ideals or standards that guide and constrain behavior across all "domains" of life. One may, with respect to certain concerns, act out of love, but with respect to others, act from moral duty, or from the imperatives of one's religion.

The positive correlate of normative blameworthiness is normative praiseworthiness. Ponder an example involving commendability, a judgment of commendability being a judgment of non-moral normative praiseworthiness. Imagine that a mother visits her sick child in hospital. She sees her child for no other reason than that she loves him and cares for his well-being. The belief, occurrent or dispositional, that it is morally right or morally obligatory for her to visit her child plays no role whatsoever in the etiology of her action or behavior—her visiting her child. Any such moral belief fails to enter into her deliberations (if she deliberates at all) about whether to visit her child; nor in any way does she entertain any moral belief in visiting her child. We submit that the mother is not *morally* deserving of praise for visiting her child. Or suppose that, without hesitation, the mother gives up one of her kidneys to her child who would not otherwise survive. Assume that she acts out of love and not moral duty or any sense of moral concern. Then, again, the loving mother is not morally praiseworthy for giving the kidney. But she is commendable. She gives up her kidney, roughly, on the basis of the belief that this is what she ought to do. "Ought" in this last sentence does not signal any moral duty or imperative. Rather, it denotes an obligation, or at least some prescriptive element *like* a duty or a deep commitment, associated with acting out of love that is somewhat analogous to what one takes to be one's moral obligation when

[7] Michael Slote develops an interesting example in which a father deliberately does something he believes to be morally wrong—he misleads the police about his son's whereabouts—taking the verdict of parental love to do whatever he can to save his offspring, to override the verdict of morality (Slote 1983, p. 86).

one acts in light of the belief that one morally ought to do something. The "obligation" here, then, signifies an imperative stemming from the appropriate normative standard from which the mother acts when she gives up her kidney. The standard, in this case of hers, is not a moral one.

As for the notion of lovable behavior—we use "lovable" and "loving" behavior interchangeably—we have the following in mind. Refer to intentional behavior that is in accordance with love's requirements but that is behavior (an intentional action, for example) for which its agent is not commendable as "loving* behavior" (or as "a loving* action") or, if one wants, as "ersatz loving behavior." Assessments of love's *requirements* or *prohibitions* are assessments of behavior that are "act-focused"; such assessments are first and foremost normative appraisals of the *behavior* and not appraisals or appraisals only derivatively of its agent. Assessments of commendability, in contrast, just like assessments of moral praiseworthiness, are primarily "agent-focused"; they are fundamentally normative appraisals of the agent and not, in the first instance, appraisals of the pertinent behavior. Our position is the following. To be behavior that is *loving behavior*, the behavior must be expressive of love. (Hence, the initial tentative gloss that lovable behavior is behavior that is motivated by love.) To be expressive of love, its agent must be commendable for the behavior; the behavior must be reflective of the loving attitude of the agent toward the beloved. Thus, loving behavior, as we understand it, is behavior that is in accordance with the requirements of love and for which its agent is commendable.

We now explain the view that lovable behavior is behavior for which its agent is commendable by elucidating the value lovable behavior has for us.

5. On lovable behavior's being valuable

We value several of the components that collectively are constitutive of relationships of love. We value love, for instance, whether love is an attitude, or a moral emotion, or a relationship, or yet something else. But we value lovable behavior as well. So far, we have used "valuable" and its cognates in a loose, intuitive sense. It is time to tighten up.

The notion of *being valuable* is broadly construed as an amalgam of a strict sense of "being valuable" and a derivative sense of this term: something is valuable to, or important for, an agent if it is good in relation to the agent in some sense of "good". That is, it is valuable or good, (i) first, if it is worthy of being valued—it is worthy of being something toward which the agent is favorably disposed. The agent has favorable attitudes, including emotional attitudes, toward it. (This is the strict sense of "valuable".) (ii) Second, it is worthy of being judged good; the agent values it in the sense of judging, finding, or believing it to be good.[8] (This is the derivative sense of "valuable".)

[8] See, for instance, Zimmerman 2001, pp. 2-3. Strictly, we should distinguish between something's being (strictly)

In this section, we motivate the thesis that *the value of lovable behavior for us is essentially a function of our being commendable for the behavior*. This thesis is to be understood as implying the following. First, as we have proposed, behavior is *lovable behavior* (or *genuinely lovable behavior*) only if its agent is commendable for the behavior. If an agent's actions are in accordance with the requirements of love but the agent is not commendable for those actions, then the prior implicate yields the result that the behavior will not be lovable behavior proper and, hence, it will be behavior that is devoid of the value we typically associate with loving behavior. Second, it is in virtue of possessing the feature of *being commendable* that lovable behavior is especially valuable. In brief, we judge lovable behavior to be good, partly but pivotally, in virtue of the fact that commendability is essential to a bit of behavior that is an instance of lovable behavior.

The stance toward which we are working is this: Given the notion of *being valuable* at issue, if loving behavior is good—it is behavior worthy of our having appropriate favorable attitudes toward it—and we take such behavior to be good, then such behavior is important to us; it is of value to us. There is little reason to believe that, generally, people are favorably disposed toward *loving* behavior*; such behavior is not typically behavior worthy of our having favorable attitudes toward it. People do not, for example, generally, take delight in engaging in loving* behavior. In addition, there is little reason to believe that people typically find loving* behavior to be good. There is, thus, little reason to believe that loving* behavior is good in one fundamental respect in which *loving behavior* is good: we take delight in the fact that we engage in the latter sort of behavior but, generally, we do not take pleasure in engaging in the former sort of behavior. In sum, there is little reason to sustain the view that loving* behavior is good and that people take loving* behavior to be good. It follows that loving* behavior is not (typically) of value to us. It is loving behavior proper, behavior that entails commendability, which is valuable to us. Roughly, it is the agent's "proper (loving) investment" in a bit of loving behavior that we cherish so deeply.

The thought, that loving* behavior, that is, again, behavior in accordance with the requirements of love but unaccompanied by commendability, is not the sort of behavior we have in mind when we think of loving behavior as valuable, may be developed, in a preliminary fashion, by reflecting on Pereboom's remarks on love that we cited previously: love of another involves, most fundamentally, wishing well for the other, taking on many of the aims and desires of the other as one's own, and a desire to be together with the other. One may wish well for the other because one believes that this is morally or prudentially required of one. Similarly, one can take on many of the aims of the other as one's own, or generate desires to be together with the other, or sustain such desires, because one believes that this is what morality requires. But what we would then value in such behavior, if we value it at all, would not be anything like what we value in loving

valuable, and something's being (strictly) valuable for a person. The distinction is of no consequence in the discussion to follow.

activity. What we find valuable in behavior of this sort, insofar as such behavior is genuinely loving behavior, is that the relevant agent—the lover, for instance—*is* commendable for the behavior. The behavior expresses the cares or nuances of *love*. To elaborate, we remarked that when one loves another, one is typically concerned for the other. The concern may express itself in sundry ways, many behavioral. Insofar as the concern is a concern of love—insofar as the behavior that expresses the concern is genuinely loving behavior—what is done to manifest the concern, it seems, causally stems appropriately from love and not, for example, from duty or prudence—the behavior must be behavior for which one is commendable. Adapting an example of Bernard Williams, the spouse, saved by the husband who declares that he rescued his wife partly in view of the fact that that is what love required of him, but who failed to act on the basis of the belief that love constrained him to act in the way in which he did and, so, who failed to act "out of" love, would be just as put off as she would have been had her husband informed her that he acted solely from moral duty in saving her. The husband acted in conformity with the requirements of love, but not being commendable for his behavior, we would be hard pressed to regard his behavior as loving.[9]

Cocking and Kennett propose that a close friend—a lover, for instance—is receptive to being directed and interpreted by the other. They explain that when one is directed in the characteristic way, "one's choices are shaped by the other and one's interests and activities become oriented toward those of the friend" (Cocking & Kennett 1998, p. 504). In an example that they develop, on the basis of one's receptivity to being directed by one's friend's interests, one accepts the friend's invitation to the ballet even though one has no interest and will never have any real interest in the ballet. In acting out of love or friendship, one does not go begrudgingly or out of any sense of moral obligation. Yet again, though, we would not find anything of value commensurable to what we find of value in loving behavior, if one were to go to the ballet but not be commendable for doing so.

Reflecting on receptivity to being interpreted by the other, Cocking and Kennett advance the following case.

> Consider how we often recognize and highlight aspects of our close friend's character. So, for example, Judy teasingly points out to John how he always likes to be right. John has never noticed this about himself; however, now that Judy has pointed it out to him he recognizes and accepts that this is indeed a feature of his character. Seeing himself through Judy's eyes changes his view of himself. But beyond making salient an existing trait of character, the close friend's interpretation of the character trait or foible can have an impact on how that

[9] Here is Williams' original example: "But this construction provides the agent with one thought too many: it might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one's wife" (Williams 1976, pp. 214-215).

> trait continues to be realized. Within the friendship, John's liking to be right may become a running joke which structures how the friends relate to each other. John continues to insist that he is right; however, his insistences are now for the most part treated lightheartedly and take on a self-consciously ironic tone. And John may be led by Judy's recognition and interpretation of his foibles to more generally take himself less seriously. Thus, John's character and his self-conception are also, in part, drawn, or shaped, by his friend's interpretations of him. (Cocking & Kennett 1998, p. 505)

If Judy were not commendable for bringing the indicated foible to John's attention, we would suspect that she is not acting out of friendship or love. Her behavior, at best, would qualify as ersatz lovable behavior. Analogously, suppose John reacts to Judy's activities in the way in which Cocking and Kennett describe in the passage. Again, if John were not commendable for the pertinent behavior that comprises his reactions, we would have good grounds to believe that he did not act out of love or friendship. His behavior would be devoid of what we find valuable in loving behavior.

What, though, about cases in which one loves seemingly without exhibiting any overtly *behavioral* manifestations of love? *For* what, in such cases, is the agent commendable? David Velleman, for instance, brings attention to scenarios that suggest cases of the relevant sort:

> [S]urely, it is easy enough to love someone whom one cannot stand to be with. Think here of Murdoch's reference to a troublemaking relation. This meddlesome aunt, cranky grandfather, smothering parent, or overcompetitive sibling is dearly loved, loved freely and with feeling: one just has no desire for his or her company.… In the presence of such everyday examples, the notion that loving someone entails wanting to be with him seems fantastic indeed. (Velleman 1999, p. 353)

Similarly, Velleman suggests:

> I think that one can love a person without having the faintest notion of what that person's interests are, and without having any inclination to discover or promote them. One may feel unworthy to serve the beloved's interests, or powerless to serve them, or forbidden from serving them by social circumstances or ethical constraints. One may love a colleague or student in ways that one is not entitled to express in benevolent action. One may love a teacher or mentor without ever presuming to imagine that one might further his interests. There are even loving friendships, I think, in which respect for one's friend rules out any acts of unsolicited benevolence. (Velleman n.d., p. 18)

Cases such as these, though, do not present any substantial difficulty to the thesis at issue. Surely, a person may express loving feelings and may well be commendable for expressing such feelings. Or if, as Velleman believes, "love is essentially an attitude toward the beloved himself but not toward any result at all" (Velleman 1999, p. 354), there is nothing, in principle, to stand in the way of the person's being commendable for the attitude or appropriate constituents of it. Indeed, as Michael Zimmerman has forcefully argued, if we do not conflate the scope of moral responsibility—roughly, the things *for which* an agent is morally responsible—with degree of moral responsibility—roughly, the *extent to which* a person is morally responsible—then there is nothing untoward about a case in which the scope of, say moral praiseworthiness, diminishes to naught but in which the degree of such praiseworthiness remains the same as what it is in an otherwise similar case in which the scope of moral praiseworthiness is significant (Zimmerman 2002). There is no reason to think that commendability differs from moral praiseworthiness in this respect. Thus, a person can be commendable for her loving attitude although she does not in any way overtly manifest this attitude in loving behavior; and she can be commendable for it to the same extent as she would have been had her attitude found expression in loving behavior.

In summary, should we be taken to task to clarify the general line of reasoning to sustain the thesis that what we find valuable in loving behavior is essentially a function of our being commendable for the behavior, we oblige with the following. First we distinguish between behavior that is merely in accord with the requirements of love (ersatz lovable behavior) and genuinely loving behavior. We record the truism that we typically value the latter but not the former. The explanation of why we customarily value the latter is, again, the relatively straightforward one that it is *lovable* behavior that is characteristically valued. We then ask what it is about such behavior in virtue of which it qualifies as lovable behavior proper as opposed to qualifying merely as ersatz lovable behavior. We take our cue from suggestions such as the following. When an agent engages in ersatz lovable behavior, this behavior does not express the cares or concerns of love; the behavior need not causally stem from desires for the good of the other for the other's own sake;[10] or the behavior does not generally express the "investments" of love, such as taking on many of the aims and desires of the person who is loved as one's own. We propose that underlying these suggestive reflections is the unifying view that lovable behavior (however thoughtful or reckless) is behavior for which its agent is commendable. If an agent is commendable, for example, for an action, then she performs that action at least partly on the basis of the belief that that is what *love* requires that she do. Given that all other conditions of commendability, such as freedom-relevant conditions, are satisfied, the agent will be commendable for this action.

[10] O. H. Green argues that love is not an emotion but a complex conative state, a set of desires. Regarding romantic love, he claims that *A* loves *B* if and only if *A* desires to share an association with *B* which typically includes a sexual dimension, *A* desires that *B* fare well for his or her own sake, and *A* desires that *B* reciprocate the desires for association and welfare (Green 1997, p. 216).

We conclude that there are good reasons to believe that the thesis that ties the value of lovable behavior to commendability merits serious consideration.

6. On hard incompatibilism's influence on lovable behavior

We may now revert to why hard incompatibilism imperils lovable behavior, behavior which it is agreed is habitually a vital component of loving relationships. We have seen that according to Pereboom, if a person is morally praise- or blameworthy for a mental action, such as a decision or a choice, the production of the decision must be something over which the agent has control, and the agent is not morally responsible for the decision if sources over which she has no control ultimately produce it (Pereboom 2001, pp. 4, 47; 2002, p. 478). On Pereboom's view, this principle—*Principle O*—captures a requirement of "ultimate sourcehood" for moral responsibility. Pereboom calls events for which factors beyond the agent's control determine their occurrence *alien-deterministic events* and those that are not produced by anything at all *truly random events*. He adds that the "range of events between these two extremes—for which factors beyond the agent's control contribute to their production but do not determine them, while there is nothing that supplements the contribution of these factors to produce the events—[may be referred to as] *partially random events*" (Pereboom 2001, p. 48). With respect to moral blameworthiness, Pereboom claims that to "be blameworthy is to deserve blame just because one has chosen to do wrong. Hard incompatibilism rules out one's ever deserving blame just for choosing to act wrongly, for such choices are always alien-deterministic events, or truly random events, or partially random events" (Pereboom 2001, p. 140). Hard incompatibilism undermines moral praiseworthiness for similar reasons. We may summarize the relevant view in this manner: according to Pereboom, hard incompatibilism undercuts moral praise- and blameworthiness because hard incompatibilism precludes our ever being ultimate originators of any of our actions.

But now consider the pertinent view concerning censurability—blameworthiness from the point of view of love—that Pereboom would presumably endorse: *To be censurable is to deserve blame from love's standpoint just because one has chosen to do what love forbids*. It would seem that if one accepts the view that hard incompatibilism rules out our ever deserving moral blame (or moral praise) just for choosing to act morally wrongly (or as we morally ought to) because we are never the ultimate originators of such choices, then one should equally accept the view that hard incompatibilism rules out our ever deserving blame (or praise) from love's standpoint just for choosing to act wrongly (or as we are obligated to), where these deontic assessments of wrong or obligation are assessments from the point of view of love. This is because, again, we are never the ultimate originators of such choices. More succinctly, if there is a requirement of ultimate origination for moral praise- and blameworthiness, then, in the absence of convincing reason to believe otherwise, there should be such a requirement for commendabil-

ity and censurability as well. So, if hard determinism undermines moral praise- and blameworthiness, then it undermines commendability and censurability as well.

7. Conclusion

Let us take it, then, that hard incompatibilism undermines the truth of judgments or ascriptions of normative responsibility from love's standpoint if it undermines the truth of such judgments or ascriptions from morality's standpoint. If what we value, though, in loving behavior is essentially a function of being commendable for such behavior, contrary to Pereboom, hard incompatibilism *will* also undermine relations of love. The "lovable behavior" that remains intact in hard incompatibilist worlds is ersatz lovable behavior and not lovable behavior proper. Given that lovable behavior is, typically, a key component of loving relationships, the "relations of love" that stay undamaged in such worlds are at most ersatz relations of love.

One may inquire into whether hard incompatibilism undermines loving relationships by inquiring into whether this brand of incompatibilism undermines love itself. If love is a moral emotion, or if it is to be analyzed in terms of a set of desires, then, on this strategy, one would explore whether hard incompatibilism has a detrimental effect on the pertinent emotion or desires. In this piece, we have by and large not enlisted this strategy. We have opted for an alternative that counsels looking closely at what comprises lovable behavior and then examining whether hard incompatibilism imperils such behavior. We have argued that hard incompatibilism does indeed threaten this component of loving relationships.

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