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Chapter One

John Stuart-Glennie's Lost Legacy

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THE CASE OF THE MISSING JOHN STUART-GLENNIE

John Stuart Stuart-Glennie (1841–1910) was a Scottish folklorist, historian, philosopher, and sociologist. He was educated at the University of Aberdeen and the University of Bonn. After having become a barrister, he left law to pursue folklore research, including a series of travels throughout Greece and Turkey. He wrote numerous books and articles throughout his life, and interacted with many of the most well-known scholars and intellectuals of his time. Yet when he died in 1910, he not only became quickly forgotten, but his most original ideas, many well in advance of their time, were never understood. He died at a time when sociology was still in formation, and many of his most important writings from the 1870s on were published before the discipline of sociology was established.

Stuart-Glennie's most significant idea in hindsight was his theory of what he termed in 1873, *the moral revolution*, delineating the revolutionary changes across different civilizations in the period 2,500 years ago, roughly centered around 500–600 BCE. This is the era currently known as "the axial age," after Karl Jaspers coined that term in 1949 and published his book, translated in 1953 as *The Origin and Goal of History*. Stuart-Glennie's theory of the moral revolution is framed within a three-stage view of history, the first of which involved an outlook he characterized as *panzooinism*, and sometimes as *naturianism*. This theory of aboriginal and early civilizational outlooks is also notable and worthy of consideration in contemporary context, as I will describe later.

Jaspers is widely known as the originator of the theory that there were shared affinities in new ideas erupting across different civilizations of this period, notably ancient Greece, China, Israel, and India. The accepted history

of the axial age, as spelled out by Jaspers, is that whereas the earliest civilizations showed "islands of light" of some spiritual significance, it was only the outbreak of the axial age that marked a radical transformation to a new kind of consciousness, a pivotal revolution and achievement of the human spirit. Some of the chief characteristics, as Jaspers put it, were that, "Rationality and rationally clarified experience launched a struggle against the myth (logos against mythos)," (Jaspers 1953: 5) philosophers appeared, religion was "rendered ethical."

There were a few other scholars cited by Jaspers who noted the phenomena before him, including Ernst von Lasaulx in 1856 and Viktor von Strauss in 1870. But Jaspers claimed their comments were "marginal," and that he was the first to give it full theoretical articulation. Jaspers was unaware of Stuart-Glennie. Interest in Jaspers' work gradually grew over decades and seeped into sociology through the work of Shmuel Eisenstadt and others, and more recently Robert Bellah. And there is increasing interest in the idea of the axial age across a variety of disciplinestoday.

Bellah's 2011 magnum opus, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*, draws heavily from Jaspers, yet Bellah had not even heard of Stuart-Glennie until I informed him in 2013. Similarly Bellah and Hans Joas edited a book in 2012, *The Axial Age and its Consequences*, with numerous contributors from a variety of disciplines. Yet there is no discussion of Stuart-Glennie, only a brief quotation from his work in a footnote to the bibliography. Joas had not previously heard of Stuart-Glennie until I informed him in November 2009 during a talk he gave on, "The Axial Age Debate as Religious Discourse," at my university, so that likely explains how the note he wrote down then made it into the quotation in the bibliography footnote. But still there was no discussion there, or by Shmuel Eisenstadt, who had written over decades on the axial age, or by Jaspers, who had no knowledge of Stuart-Glennie.

I rediscovered Stuart-Glennie through the books of one of the most well-known public intellectuals in America in mid-twentieth century, but today also strangely eclipsed, Lewis Mumford. Mumford had even served as editor of *The Sociological Review* in 1920, so could be considered a sociologist, among other professions. I was a student of Mumford's works, and corresponded and met with him a few times.

Mumford was the only writer to observe that Stuart-Glennie had preceded Jaspers by many decades, and was likely aware of Stuart-Glennie through his friend and Mumford's mentor during the period around his time editing *The Sociological Review*, sociologist Patrick Geddes. Yet even Mumford did not take the time to discuss Stuart-Glennie's work in any depth. So I was aware of Stuart-Glennie's name from way back, but it took me to about 2008–2009 to plunge into systematically reading his original works. As I began to realize how he had provided a fully fleshed out theoretical account in 1873, embed-

ded within a broad philosophy of history and consciousness, only to be forgotten after he died in 1910, I took it upon myself to resurrect his work. I published the results in my 2014 book, *From the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl Jaspers, and a New Understanding of the Idea* (Halton 2014).

To give further biographical evidence of how Stuart-Glennie was actively involved in the intellectual life of his times, here are a few examples of Stuart-Glennie's social contacts in his lifetime. In 1885 he met and became a friend of Irish playwright, critic, and political activist George Bernard Shaw, with whom he shared an interest in socialism. Twenty years later in his preface to his play, *Major Barbara*, Shaw compared Stuart-Glennie favorably to Friedrich Nietzsche:

> Now it is true that Captain Wilson's moral criticism of Christianity was not a historical theory of it, like Nietzsche's; but this objection cannot be made to Mr. Stuart-Glennie, the successor of Buckle as a philosophic historian, who has devoted his life to the elaboration and propagation of his theory that Christianity is part of an epoch (or rather an aberration, since it began as recently as 6000 BC and is already collapsing) produced by the necessity in which the numerically inferior white races found themselves to impose their domination on the colored races by priestcraft, making a virtue and a popular religion of drudgery and submissiveness in this world not only as a means of achieving saintliness of character but of securing a reward in heaven. Here you have the slave-morality view formulated by a Scotch philosopher long before English writers began chattering about Nietzsche. (Shaw 1907)

Shaw was lamenting how English theater critics ignored English thinkers. He was describing Stuart-Glennie's writing on how religious legitimation could be used for social dominance, instilling fear and subordination in the underclass, and false hope in a just afterlife: the rise of the "Hell religions."

Shaw also noted how Stuart-Glennie's problematic race-based theory of the origins of civilization clashed with Marx's class-conflict theory: "As Mr. Stuart-Glennie traced the evolution of society to the conflict of races, his theory made some sensation among Socialists—that is, among the only people who were seriously thinking about historical evolution at all—by its collision with the class-conflict theory of Karl Marx"(Shaw 1907). Under the thrall of then reputable scientific racism, Stuart-Glennie mistakenly attempted to describe the origins of civilization as rooted in conflicts between dominant lighter races and darker races, as I have addressed elsewhere (Halton 2017). He failed to see how Marx's class conflict theory could better explain the phenomena. Stuart-Glennie also corresponded with Karl Marx's daughter Eleanor, and was well-aware of Marx's work, though I have not discovered any contacts or correspondence between them.

Earlier Stuart-Glennie traveled and corresponded with philosopher John Stuart Mill, whose middle name was given to Mill by his father James Mill in honor of Stuart-Glennie's grandfather, Sir John Stuart. Shortly after meeting the young twenty-one-year-old Stuart-Glennie, John Stuart Mill wrote to Henry Fawcett, on July 21, 1862: "(Henry) Buckle's untimely end grieved me deeply. I knew of it early, having met at Athens with his travelling companion Mr. Glennie, a young man of, I think, considerable promise, who occupies himself very earnestly with the higher philosophical problems on the basis of positive science" (Mill 1972). This is high praise from one of the most prominent philosophers of the time.

Stuart-Glennie was also a friend of early sociologist and fellow Scotsman Patrick Geddes and also Victor Branford. Geddes published an obituary for Stuart-Glennie in the new sociological journal, *The Sociological Review*, in 1910. Geddes' review begins: "Of the many historical, sociological, and philosophical writings of the late Mr. J. S. Stuart-Glennie three characteristic examples are to be found in *Sociological Papers*, Vol. II" (Geddes 1910: 317). *Sociological Papers* was an annual volume published between 1905 and 1907, which then turned into *The Sociological Review*. Stuart-Glennie's three papers appeared under the heading "Sociological Studies." In the first volume, Stuart-Glennie had commented on a chapter by Emile Durkheim. These are some serious sociological credentials.

From these brief examples from Stuart-Glennie's biography, one might expect that he came to be regarded as also one of the early contributors to the emergence of sociology. But history did not happen that way. Despite publishing a number of books and articles throughout his life, including important contributions in the late nineteenth century to the Folklore Society, an organization that preceded organized sociology and anthropology, Stuart-Glennie's works seemed to drop from the face of the earth after he died in 1910. And, whether through the complexity, or possibly the obscurity of his writing style (he invented a number of new terms and neologisms, including alternatives to the "barbaric mongrelism" of Comte's term "sociology"), or the obtuseness of readers to the originality of some of his key ideas, or the possibility that those ideas were simply ahead of their time, his most significant original ideas never were given the understanding they deserved in his lifetime.

THE LOST LEGACY OF THE MORAL REVOLUTION

As mentioned, John Stuart-Glennie formulated the first systematic theory of "the moral revolution," in 1873 (later independently theorized by Karl Jaspers as "the axial age") to characterize the historical shift around roughly 600 BCE in a variety of civilizations, most notably ancient China, India, Judaism,

and Greece (Stuart-Glennie 1873). He returned to the theme many times over the succeeding decades, and explicitly in a sociological context later in his life. Here is his statement from his contribution to the Sociological Society meeting in London, published in 1906 in *Sociological Papers, Volume 2*:

> . . . one great epoch can be signalised—that which I was, I believe, the first, thirty-two years ago ([*In the Morningland*:] "New Philosophy of History," 1873), to point out as having occurred in the sixth (or fifth-sixth) century B.C. in all the countries of civilisation from the Hoangho to the Tiber. There arose then, as revolts against the old religions of outward observance or custom, new religions of inward purification or conscience—in China, Confucianism; in India, Buddhism; in Persia, Zoroastrianism; in Syria, Yahvehism (as a religion of the people rather than merely of the prophets), and changes of a similar character in the religions also of Egypt, of Greece, and of Italy. (Stuart-Glennie 1906: 262)

And as he put it in his original 1873 publication: "Anterior to the Sixth Century, and to the New Religions of the Second Age of Humanity, Religion had no specially moral character" (Stuart-Glennie 1873). Acknowledging that religion had no special moral character before this time may seem odd to us today who live in a time of those world religions which emerged from the legacy of the moral revolution, including Christianity and Islam.

Stuart-Glennie's theory of the moral revolution was part of a broader critical philosophy of history, which included gradations unexplored by Jaspers. Where Jaspers had viewed prehistory and non-civilizational aboriginal peoples as insignificant in the history of spirit, and even early polytheistic civilizations as but "islands of light" at most, Stuart-Glennie's comparative theory of history gave more weight to pre-axial folk cultures and civilizations, which Jaspers undervalued or ignored. A key term introduced by Stuart-Glennie for aboriginal and early folk cultures is *panzoonism*, a worldview of revering "all life" as a religious basis for conceiving nature. I will return to this later, after providing examples of Stuart-Glennie's theory of the moral revolution.

Speaking of the likely origins of civilizations about 8000 BCE in his 1901 paper, "The Law of Intellectual Development," Stuart-Glennie noted a period of gradual development until the time of the moral revolution:

> . . . such religions as those against which, in the sixth century B. C, broke out that great revolution which substituted, or attempted to substitute, for these religions of custom, Religions of Conscience. I was, I believe, the first, thirty years ago, to generalize the very remarkable synchronous facts of this great epoch as a moral revolution embracing all the countries of civilization from the Hoang-ho to the Tiber. (Stuart-Glennie 1901: 457)

Some of the characteristics that Stuart-Glennie drew attention to were religion transforming from custom to conscience, new ascetic outlooks marked also by the rise of prophets (which he termed "prophetianism"), and a greater level of self-reflection.

Five years earlier, in his 1896 paper, "The Survival of Paganism," Stuart-Glennie also restated his theory, claiming that the accepted history of the time which held that the origins of European philosophy and science were uniquely Greek was both superficial and myopic. As Stuart-Glennie saw it, the paganism of pre-civilizational "folk culture" as well as early civilizational polytheism, however falsely conceived, retained "intuitions" of the "Solidarity of Nature" he termed *panzoonism*, which provided a basis out of which reflective science could emerge as a manifestation of the moral revolution. Another aspect of the revolution of the sixth century BCE was the rise of Judaism, a new expression of divinity as transcendent rather than immanent, a new outlook of "anthropomorphic supernaturalism." The rise of the "New Moral Religions" in the Western lineage from Judaism through Christianity and Islam, the "religions of the book," set up an antagonism between science and religion, a dialectic that would mark the history of the West. It is:

> A very superficial view . . . which represents the origin of European Philosophy and Science . . . as due merely to the splendor of Greek genius. It was but part of the general Revolution of the Sixth Century B.C., and a publication and development of ideas far from unknown in Priestly Colleges, notwithstanding the mythological forms of their exoteric Cosmologies. But synchronously with this New Philosophy developed by nameable individual thinkers, and recorded, not in mythic, but in scientific language, and not in hieroglyphic, but in alphabetic writing, there arose those New Moral Religions which made of this great Revolution the true Epoch from which date the Modern as distinguished from the Ancient Civilisations. Among these New Religions of the Sixth Century B.C. was one in which the general revolt against Mythologic Polytheism took the form of a specially absolute and anthropomorphic Supernaturalism—the Yahvehism of the Jews after the Babylonian Captivity. And the Semitic conception of a Creator-God outside and independent of Nature, becoming 500 years later the intellectual core of Aryan Christianism, such an antagonism was set up between the fundamental conceptions of Religion and Science as to this day endures. (Stuart-Glennie 1896: 517–18)

Stuart-Glennie notes the revolt against "Mythologic Polytheism," not only through "scientific language," but also through the "New Moral Religions," a more general revolution whose legacy begat the origin of what he called elsewhere "the modern revolution." His observations on the rise of new critical outlooks in science and religion, a new reflectiveness, resonate with those of Jaspers. Yet Jaspers did not credit the earliest pre-civilizational outlooks with any spiritual significance, and only grudgingly admitted that pre-axial civilizations held some "islands of light," in contrast to Stuart-

Glennie. Though their theories of history are markedly different, there are also strong parallels between Stuart-Glennie and Jaspers in their understandings of the ideas, cultures, and representative figures marking the transformation effected by the moral revolution/axial age.

In trying to make Stuart-Glennie's original ideas known in my book about him, one of the facets of the project that stood out for me was how closely many of Stuart-Glennie and Jaspers' characterizations of the phenomena were, as almost providing a kind of "independent verification" of the idea. I wanted to show the nuances of their differences as best I could, but the fact that many of their observations closely overlap was interesting in itself for me. This is especially so given that Jaspers' own philosophic outlook involves a view of spirit as transcendence, and an uneasy tension between the poles of religion and secularism, neither of which by themselves are adequate to do justice to the openness of transcendence. Stuart-Glennie was a socialist, an empirical folklorist and philologist, and an Aberdeen philosopher who sought a naturalistic account of history and mind.

With those two very different starting points they yet had similar conclusions on many of the facts of the moral revolution/axial age. Of course they also had significant differences, perhaps most notably in Jaspers' insistence that the axial age remains the standard by which to understand all of human history: "the spiritual foundations of humanity were laid simultaneously and independently . . . And these are the foundations upon which humanity still subsists today" (Jaspers 1953: 98). And as he put it elsewhere:

> The conception of the Axial Period furnishes the questions and standards with which to approach all preceding and subsequent developments. The outlines of the preceding civilisations dissolve. The peoples that bore them vanish from sight as they join in the movement of the Axial Period. The prehistoric peoples remain prehistoric until they merge into the historical movement that proceeds from the Axial Period, or die out. The Axial Period assimilates everything that remains. From it world history receives the only structure and unity that has endured– at least until our own time. (Jaspers 1953: 8)

Jaspers sought to get at how the axial divide has distanced that which was outside of its mindset, so that the legacies of the religions of the book, for example, still dominate world religious outlooks, whereas ancient Egyptian and Babylonian polytheisms have dissolved. Still, the yet living "prehistoric peoples," or what is better termed indigenous peoples, would strongly differ with Jaspers' civilizational-centric depiction, despite the ways civilizations have brutally sought to eliminate them. The pre-axial civilized peoples might also beg to differ, given that the Neolithic diet they bequeathed us remains the staple of the world food system.

Stuart-Glennie, in contrast with Jaspers, saw the moral revolution/axial age as a transitional phase between the first and third stages of history. He

described the first stage, the panzoonist outlook of aboriginal and early civilizational mind, as true intuitions of nature, but as clothed in false conceptions. By true intuitions of nature Stuart-Glennie meant to draw attention to the ways in which natural phenomena are central to many non-civilizational peoples, from the close attention to wildlife to, for example, skilled practices of wayfinding and tracking. Stuart-Glennie's definition of religion showed perhaps the influence of socialism on him, given how he connected it to "Environments of Existence." In his 1892 essay on "The Origins of Mythology" he stated: "Religion is, subjectively, the Social Emotion excited by the Environments of Existence, conceived in the progressive forms determined by Economic and Intellectual Conditions; and is, objectively, the Ritual Observances in which that Emotion is expressed" (Stuart-Glennie 1891: 225). Stuart-Glennie's definition allows that life experience can enter into religious sensibility and human consciousness. It does not deny ideological or alienating elements, but also does not reduce religion to them. It allows that the social construction of religion may be informed by physical and social conditions of relations to environs. This gets particularly interesting when considering the two-sided practical and reverential attuning to the wild habitat as teacher and role model one sees in a wide variety of hunter-gatherer societies.

Early civilizational polytheisms also give significant attention to patterns of nature, which are vital for agriculturally based societies, through fertility and weather deities. Such practices and beliefs, "naturianism," express true subjective intuitions about nature, but, as Stuart-Glennie saw it, lacked objective conceptualization. He saw in the developments of modern science of his time the rise of a potential "third age of humanity," which would involve true intuitions of nature, but now clothed in true scientific conceptions.

The second stage of humanity, the period and legacy of the moral revolution, is regarded by Stuart-Glennie as a transitional time whose main task was to develop subject-object differentiation. It is the age of "transcendence" and of a greater reflective outlook, as Jaspers characterized it, but rather than seeing that as the pivot of all history, Stuart-Glennie holds it as a 2500 year phase of development of subjective and objective dimensions of consciousness, much as a child develops a differentiation of self and other:

> . . . a Revolution should be discoverable in the general history of Mankind . . . the great historical period of Transition, or Middle Stage of Mental Development which it initiated . . . that of a Differentiation of Subjective and Objective. . . . If one conceives the distinction of Subjective and Objective as, generally, but a short way of indicating the distinction between consciousness of Oneself and consciousness of what is not Oneself; between the Internal World of our own thought and emotions, and the External World of those persons and Things that excite thought and emotion; between reflection on Ourselves—the sequences of inward want and satisfaction, of pain and pleas-

> ure that constitute our own solitary selves—and reflection on the coexisting phenomena of Outward Objects,—I think that no difficulty should be found in attaching a perfectly clear and definite meaning to the distinction of 'Subjective and Objective. (Stuart-Glennie 1878b: 208)

Whereas the earlier felt intuitions of the laws of nature characterizing panzooinism lacked objective conceptualization in Stuart-Glennie's view, the result of the legacy of the moral revolution, the 2500 year, as he put it, Modern Revolution, would be a stage that could, through science, *objectively conceptualize* the subjective *intuitions* of nature. That 2500 year period was marked by a dialectic of 500 year cycles in the West between the supernaturalism of the Judeo-Christian tradition and the naturalism of science, culminating in the triumph of science, a religion of humanism, and a polity of socialism by the year 2000. The actual history turned out to be far messier than Stuart-Glennie surmised: Global capitalism stretching new levels of inequality enabled by advanced science and technology, and a rise of religious fundamentalism.

I have dealt with Stuart-Glennie's idea of 500 year cycles in history and this historical dialectic in the West in my book, and cannot address it further in the space here. What is of interest, however, is that Stuart-Glennie was able to include nature as a key element in the development of human consciousness and religious sensibility, whereas Jaspers largely excluded it from "the history of the spirit." Despite abundant evidence for the attunement to wild nature in the whole range of aboriginal religions, Jaspers denied that nature can be a source of profound spiritual significance and even transcendence: "We see the vast territories of Northern Asia, Africa, and America, which were inhabited by men but saw the birth of nothing of importance to the history of spirit" (Jaspers 1953: 22). Stuart-Glennie's position is markedly opposed to that of Jaspers on this point.

In an 1876 work of Stuart-Glennie, *The Modern Revolution. Proemia 1: Pilgrim Memories*, there is a wonderfully succinct sentence that goes to the heart of the differences between Stuart-Glennie and Jaspers' accounts: ". . . the Civilisations prior to the Sixth Century B.C. were chiefly determined by the Powers and Aspects of Nature, and those posterior thereto by the Activities and Myths of Mind" (Stuart-Glennie 1876a: 479). Whether one accepts the powers of nature as elements of the history of spirit which continue as such, as Stuart-Glennie does, or whether one denies them spiritual significance, as Jaspers does, marks a major fissure in understanding the role of the moral revolution/axial age in history (See also Halton, Forthcoming). To give an example, both Stuart-Glennie and Jaspers noted parallels between the eastern Asian movements in ancient China and India and those of the West in ancient Greece and Israel, and the legacies of Christianity and Islam. But Stuart-Glennie noted how the Eastern outlooks retained a connection to the

panzooinism, or "the conception of immanence of power in nature itself," whereas the Western religious outlooks developed as supernatural and independent of nature:

> . . . Common as an exoteric Polytheism and esoteric Pantheism were to all the earlier religions, we find the new religions of, and subsequent to, the sixth century B. C, distinguishable into two antagonistically different classes. The new religions of Farther Asia, though, so far, like the new religions of Hither Asia and Europe, that they were religions of conscience rather than, like those of which they took the place, religions of custom, were yet clearly distinguishable from the western religions in retaining the fundamental conception of panzoism, the conception of immanence of power in nature itself, and were, therefore, still esoterically pantheistic and atheistic. But the new religions of Western Asia and of Europe,—Judaism, half a millennium later, Christianism, and, after another half millennium, Islamism,—were, on the contrary, for the first time supernatural religions, not in their popular forms only, but in their essential principle, the conception, not of a power immanent in, but of a creator independent of, nature. (Stuart-Glennie 1901: 457–58)

Another forgotten facet of Stuart-Glennie's outlook worth recalling is this idea of *panzooinism*, meaning "all life," the livingness of things, the intuition of a "Solidarity of Nature" as characterizing the first stage of humanity. He published his book articulating his theory of the moral revolution, *In the Morningland*, in 1873, two years after E. B. Tylor published *Primitive Culture* and introduced the term and theory of *animism*. There Stuart-Glennie gave a devastating critique of animism that scholars never picked up on, a critique that remains interesting.

Tylor claimed that animism involves an attitude toward an object imbued with a spirit from without. Stuart-Glennie claimed Tylor's theory would be more correctly titled "spiritism," not animism, because it was not about the life of the object per se. Stuart-Glennie's alternative, panzoonism, concerns the power inherent in the object and the relation to that power. I view it as involving a relational consciousness, a participation attitude, thoroughly involved in its living and signifying habitat. In this relational outlook things are not inanimate substances, but rather animate signs through which one finds clues and cues for living. In this sense Stuart-Glennie's panzooinism finds resonance in contemporary theorizing on "the new animism," among writers such as David Abram, Tim Ingold, Nurit Bird-David, Robin Wall Kimmerer, and myself.

IS THE MORAL REVOLUTION/ AXIAL AGE UNSUSTAINABLE?

Almost 4.5 billion people today are Christian or Muslim, more than half the people on earth. Their religious beliefs stem from the moral revolution, of post-exile Judaism and its "religions of the book" legacy in the development of Christianity and Islam. Contemporary global civilization is also heavily influenced by the legacies of developments from the moral revolution/axial age of Greek science and Athenian democracy, of political empire building from Cyrus on, of the reflective spirit that broke out back then to reshape things in ways still present. Though it is true that many leading figures of the philosophic and religious movements, the "renouncers," ultimately "failed" in having their ideas co-opted by the power systems they rose up against, many of their ideas lived on through those power structures, for example, in the Christian Roman Empire and in Islam. These are some of the reasons Jaspers could say "Man, as we know him today, came into being. For short we may style this the 'Axial Period'" (Jaspers 1953: 2).

Stuart-Glennie was incorrect in thinking that a new stage of humanity would come into being by the year 2000 in which religion would be purified through science. He also was naïve in seeing that the developments of science and technology would be solely benign. Jaspers, living through the Second World War and its atomic bomb finale, saw and wrote about how science and technology had become deeply problematic, even while he held to axial ideals. Stuart-Glennie did make some prescient predictions, such as that a "United States of Europe" would come into being around the year 2000, which it did, though it now shows signs of dissembling. But instead of arriving at a new age of humanism, humanity has proliferated a world "human-all-too-human," as Nietzsche put it, replete with dehumanization side-by-side with human rights and institutions.

Stuart-Glennie's philosophy of history and account of the moral revolution has its deficits, such as his racist ideas on the origins of civilization and his overly optimistic belief in a necessary historical progress. But there remain elements of his thinking related to the moral revolution relevant to contemporary issues.

The moral revolution/axial age introduced ideas of transcendence, such as in religions of the Abrahamic tradition, where, as Robert Bellah said of ancient Judaism in his recent book on the axial age, "A God who is finally outside of society and the world provides the point of reference from which all existing presuppositions can be questioned, a basic criterion for the axial transition" (Bellah 2011: 322). This new transcendent "point of reference," the greater reflectiveness, was celebrated by Jaspers and Bellah. Bellah saw it as the rise of "theoretic culture," and that it "certainly proclaimed the sacredness of the person" (Bellah 2013).

Both Bellah and Jaspers were critical of the ways science and technology had become dominant and potentially out-of-control forces in modern life. As Jaspers put it, it was, "possible for technology, released from human meaning, to become a frenzy in the hands of monsters" (Jaspers 1953: 125). Both saw the ideals of the axial age as having continuing contemporary relevance in restoring humane values. Stuart-Glennie, by contrast, lived in the hopes of the Victorian era that science and technology were benign forces, and lacked the critical perspective that Jaspers and Bellah shared.

Yet Stuart-Glennie's philosophy of history offers an unexpected corrective to the axial-centrism of Jaspers and Bellah. Remember that the era of the moral revolution, his second stage of humanity, was a transitional phase, a developmental working out of subjective and objective perspectives, and that he saw a forthcoming third stage as completing the partial intuitions of the first panzooinist stage of true insights into nature. Science and humanism would return to true intuitions of nature and add true conceptualizations of nature. Despite the many lacunae in Stuart-Glennie's schematic account, I see an unappreciated insight in it, one that I have been working out from another perspective in my own work: how human insight into nature in the long-term deep past have informed, shaped, and tempered human nature in ways that may serve as resources for living today (Halton 2019).

What would some of the allegedly true insights into nature from panzooinism be? What could their possible relevance be for today? The most significant insight might be what I have called "sustainable wisdom," an outlook of accord with the earth and its limits instead of one set apart from it. As I put it in 2013:

> Though we may think ourselves modern, we retain Pleistocene bodies, as ecological philosopher Paul Shepard put it, and Pleistocene needs, bodied into being over our longer two million year evolution. What Shepard termed 'the sacred game,' the dramatic interplay of predator and prey, reminds us of that older evolutionary story, wherein [humans emerge] into being wide-eyed in wonder at circumambient life, a child of the earth foraging for edible, sensible, thinkable, and sustainable wisdom. (Halton 2013: 279–92)

The two million year trajectory into anatomically modern humans, embodied in our psyches and genomes, reveal practiced modes of wisdom available for use in contemporary society, including diet and parenting, and even potentials for economic life. The Paleolithic diet, for example, in its many varieties, represents an optimum diet, a far healthier alternative to the industrial diet, and one that can be selected for today. The Neolithic diet, basis for the global food system today, brought its eaters reduced nutrition over most of its history from the earlier Paleolithic model, actually causing people to become 4–6 inches shorter wherever it was introduced. It is only in the past 150 or so years in advanced industrial countries that heights began to return

to their pre-neolithic normalcy (Mummert et al. 2011). The Paleolithic model is less meat-dependent and grain dependent than the industrial diet, suggesting more sustainable practices for the earth.

Human nature involves a complex, nuanced innate sociality, bodying forth in the "communicative musicality" of banter between infants and their mothers, as neuroscientists Colwyn Trevarthen and Stephen Malloch have demonstrated (Malloch and Trevarthen 2009). This inborn social, musical capacity is dialogical and expressive, and is coming from the subcortical brain of the infant. The synaptic connections of our vaunted prefrontal cortex have not yet been made, but this expressive banter will help body them into being in the course of development. This is a truly social *and* biological interaction, one that, when adequately undergone, will result in a couple of years in a child capable of symbolic interaction. Human plasticity in early childhood operates within developmental patterns that can be optimized or pathologized.

As Jean Liedloff, who spent years studying Venezuelan Amazonian hunter-gatherers and their parenting argued:

> The assumption of innate sociality is at direct odds with the fairly universal civilized belief that a child's impulses need to be curbed in order to make him social. There are those who believe that reasoning and pleading for 'cooperativeness' with the child will accomplish this curbing better than threat, insult, or hickory sticks, but the assumption that every child has an antisocial nature, in need of manipulation to become socially acceptable, is germane to both these points of view as well as to all the more common ones between the two extremes. If there is anything fundamentally foreign to us in continuum societies like the Yequana, it is this assumption of innate sociality. It is by starting from this assumption and its implications that the seemingly unbridgeable gap between their strange behavior, with resultant high well-being, and our careful calculations, with an enormously lower degree of well-being, becomes intelligible. (Liedloff 1977: 84)

Liedloff calls this general outlook "the continuum concept," the two million years of evolution embodied in the genome. From this perspective it is our human birthright that a child is born with the expectation of being worthy and welcomed.

Consider by contrast the Christian idea of "innate depravity" so celebrated by the Puritans, that a baby is born evil, a viper, a child of the devil as Jonathan Edwards put it, an amped up version of St. Augustine's idea of original sin. Augustine: "A baby's limbs are feeble as it kicks and strikes out, but its mind is sinful." This is an alienated outlook which has falsely separated from human nature, then declared that separation to be human nature. One might call this outlook, which vilifies the newborn, the real "original sin."

Would a mother ever come up with such a depraved view of newborns? I don't believe so. Only a chauvinist patriarchal mindset, the same one which redefined the first appearance of woman as "born" from a man's rib, could fabricate such an absurdity to invert the innate goodness and sociality of the newborn into depravity. Here is an outright cost of the legacy of the moral revolution/axial age, with its idea of transcendence, that gulf between earth and the divine, and which was supposed to produce a "universal compassion" and a new valuation of "the sacredness of the person" as Bellah put it and Hans Joas has also written about. It is the loss of the touch of the earth and the forgetting of its lessons and limits as central.

This example illustrates the potential dangers represented in Bellah's idealization of axial cognitive mind and Bellah and Jaspers' undervaluing of passional mind, of the sustainable wisdom in parenting practices it can carry. This idealizing of reflective mind also prevented Bellah and Jaspers, in my opinion, from fully appreciating the place of perceptive relations to wild habitat in the evolutionary origins of religion. Stuart-Glennie's definition of religion cited earlier as involving "subjectively, the Social Emotion excited by the Environments of Existence" (Stuart-Glennie 1873: 220) provides an interesting contrast.

Here is an opening for the panzooinist outlook to inform contemporary life, the attunement to wild nature and modeling of its informing properties for human ways, in this case parenting. One sees repeated examples of such outlooks in extant hunter gatherers, over a range of parenting practices. To be sure, one can also find examples of infanticide, practiced of necessity in extreme cases when times are hard. Now infanticide is clearly morally objectionable to us, and is clearly not necessary in settled society today. But there remains much to learn of optimal parenting practices based on the long-term continuum that threads through a diversity of still extant hunter gatherers. A colleague, psychologist Darcia Narvaez, has been exploring these possibilities through a series of conferences and publications on child well-being (Narvaez 2014; Narvaez et al. 2014). In short, there is room for the original intuitions into nature, to paraphrase Stuart-Glennie, to inform contemporary life, not in a regressive sense, but in a progressive and selective re-incorporation.

More generally, the anthropological and archaeological record reveals that humans evolved as foragers, out of increasing modes of prosocial behavior, relatively equitable clan based societies, and sustainable relations to habitat through an outlook of few wants that could be easily met (Sahlins 1973; Suzman 2017). This not only was, but remains, our human nature. Neolithic civilization reversed that, creating "the economic problem" of unlimited desires and limited means to meet them, a development that the moral revolution attempted, in part, to offset, but overall failed to achieve. The idea

of "economic man" as having unlimited wants, of a Hobbesian "state of nature," is a civilizational construct, not human nature.

Agriculturally based civilization spawned wealth and poverty, great inequality, and unlimited wants as part of its mistaken idea that it could transcend nature. More recently, between 1970 and 2018 human population doubled. In that same time period there was a global average decline of 60 percent of vertebrate species populations, and regionally an 89 percent decline in Central and South America (WWF 2018). The various scenarios of unsustainability puncture the happy never-ending ascent of the myth of progress, as well as question the role of science and technology as manifestations of the myth of progress.

More than half the world are believers in the religions of the book, and one must assume, active contributors to the increasingly unsustainable world we live in. One would hope that the wisdom of the moral revolution/axial age could be turned to address and overcome these problems, as indeed, many of the writers, including Stuart-Glennie, Jaspers, Lewis Mumford, Robert Bellah and others, including another writer I discovered had written on the theme 20 years before Jaspers, D. H. Lawrence, have attempted to do. They share a hope that understanding the revolutionary past of the moral revolution/axial age, as Jaspers put it, might "assist in heightening our awareness of the present." And in this milieu Stuart-Glennie's idea of panzooinism, admittedly abstract, does suggest that a reimagining of our relations to nature in our scientific, economic, and religious beliefs might be necessary, not in the context of his optimistic progressivism, but rather in something like holism: a recovery of a more primal way of consciousness, already embedded but forgotten within us.

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