Sociology’s missed opportunity: John Stuart-Glennie’s lost theory of the moral revolution, also known as the axial age

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Abstract
In 1873, 75 years before Karl Jaspers published his theory of the Axial Age in 1949, unknown to Jaspers and to contemporary scholars today, Scottish folklorist John Stuart Stuart-Glennie elaborated the first fully developed and nuanced theory of what he termed “the Moral Revolution” to characterize the historical shift emerging roughly around 600 BCE in a variety of civilizations, most notably ancient China, India, Judaism, and Greece, as part of a broader critical philosophy of history. He continued to write on the idea over decades in books and articles and also presented his ideas to the fledgling Sociological Society of London in 1905, which were published the following year in the volume Sociological Papers, Volume 2. This article discusses Stuart-Glennie’s ideas on the moral revolution in the context of his philosophy of history, including what he termed “panzooinism”; ideas with implications for contemporary debates in theory, comparative history, and sociology of religion. It shows why he should be acknowledged as the originator of the theory now known as the axial age, and also now be included as a significant sociologist in the movement toward the establishment of sociology.

Keywords
John Stuart-Glennie, moral revolution, axial age, Karl Jaspers, panzooinism

Introduction: À la recherche de la théorie Perdu
The sociological theory textbooks make it seem as though the early history of sociology is finished and formatted. But imagine coming across a prominent theory which was hiding in plain sight in early sociology discussions, by an author never credited with the

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theory, and who seemed to drop off the face of the earth after his death in 1910. The theory concerns phenomena of interest to a much broader range of scholars than sociologists. I have been lucky enough to discover just such a case and have now brought it to the light of day (Halton, 2014).

Here, I wish to build upon that work by presenting additional materials for the claims that this author, John Stuart-Glennie (1841–1910), was the first person to articulate a fully developed and nuanced theory of what 75 years later became known as the axial age. I will show why he should also now be included as a significant sociologist in the movement toward the establishment of sociology, articulating theories in an explicitly sociological context which retain contemporary significance for discussions in theory, comparative history, and sociology of religion. I will be drawing from Stuart-Glennie materials I uncovered only after publishing my recent book, From the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution (Halton, 2014), in addition to his primary book from 1873, and 1906 publication with the Sociological Society.

In 1949, Karl Jaspers published his book, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte (translated into English as The Origin and Goal of History) concerning what he called “the axial age.” He coined that term to characterize the historical shift emerging roughly around 600 BCE in a variety of civilizations, most notably ancient China, India, Israel, and Greece. He acknowledged Alfred Weber’s ideas and influence to some extent, but ultimately dismissed his sociological and material explanations of the phenomena in favor of a more speculative movement of the human spirit (Boy and Torpey, 2013).

Jaspers (1953) claimed that he was the first to develop a full theory of the phenomenon, despite some earlier scholars such as Ernst von Lasaulx in 1856 and Viktor von Strauss in 1870, who noted the facts, “but only marginally” (p. 9). And there were other earlier scholars who briefly noted the facts “marginally,” such as Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron in 1771.¹ Stuart-Glennie was not aware of these writings, just as Jaspers was not aware of Stuart-Glennie’s work. After a slow start, the idea reintroduced by Jaspers gradually took off over the next decades, with discussions by Lewis Mumford in 1956 and Eric Voegelin in 1957, a special edition of the journal Daedalus (1975), two anthologies edited by Shmuel Eisenstadt and others in 1986 and 2005, and recently, one edited by Robert Bellah and Hans Joas in 2012. Bellah also published his magnum opus Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age in 2011. Although an intrinsically interdisciplinary theory, the axial age idea found increasing sociological interest.

Despite these decades of interest spanning more than half a century, the scholarship said nothing about the man who had first articulated a comprehensive and nuanced theory of the phenomenon in 1873, some 75 years before Jaspers’ book first appeared. Unknown to Jaspers, and all subsequent scholars except Lewis Mumford, John Stuart Stuart-Glennie, who was most widely known then as a folklorist but was also a philosopher of history, elaborated a fully developed theory of what he termed the moral revolution to characterize the period, as part of a broader critical theory of history. His theory included gradations unexplored by Jaspers, such as a view of prehistory as panzooïniste in outlook, a worldview of revering “all life” as a religious basis for conceiving nature, as I will describe later. It is set in the context of a comparative theory of history that gave great attention to material conditions, as well as to pre-axial folk cultures and civilizations, both of which Jaspers undervalued or ignored.
Stuart-Glennie also presented these ideas in an explicitly sociological context in 1905, at the Sociological Society’s annual meeting in London. Stuart-Glennie’s contribution, “Sociological Studies,” was published in the new annual volume of the Sociological Society, Sociological Papers, Volume 2 (1906), whereas the drift to sociology of the concept of the axial age only began more than a half century later. Sociology, then still in the beginning stages of disciplinary formation, missed the opportunity to incorporate a major theory that would only begin to attract the attention of sociologists in the last decades of the twentieth century. Hence, I claim sociology today needs to acknowledge Stuart-Glennie’s original contribution on the moral revolution from back then as part of its history until now neglected, and also to evaluate the place of Stuart-Glennie’s ideas for contemporary sociological debates in theory, comparative history, and sociology of religion.

A longer analysis and discussion of Jaspers’ work is provided in my book on Stuart-Glennie (Halton, 2014). Given space limitations, I will here simply illustrate a brief comparison of some key statements from Jaspers on the axial age and Stuart-Glennie on the moral revolution, illustrated in Figure 1, where I have highlighted some of the similarities.

As is evident in Figure 1, Stuart-Glennie states the facts as well as the moral and intellectual significance of the moral revolution – Jaspers’ Axial Age – contradicting Jaspers’ claim to have been the first to grasp them as a whole in an articulated theory. In the 1906 quotation from “Sociological Studies,” he lists the breakout of the moral revolution in the same order as Jaspers would later do in The Origin and Goal of History: China, India, Persia, Syria (Palestine), and Greece, although Stuart-Glennie adds Egypt and Italy to the mix.

Stuart-Glennie’s characterization of the moral revolution explicitly drew attention to what he called its “prophetianism,” and presented a very different picture from Jaspers’ idealization of the period as the central pivot of all history. Some scholars, such as Robert Bellah (2011: 271), have tried to tease out whether Max Weber’s discussions of the rise of prophets were an influence on Jaspers, but Stuart-Glennie was already discussing the outbreak and meaning of “prophetianism” in 1873 as a manifestation of the moral revolution:

… we find the religions of this Age of a far more abstract character. They are also, though in one aspect certainly, great social growths, yet in such a way as we find no example of in the previous Age, founded by individual Moral Teachers, after whom these religions are called Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. And hence we distinguish the Religion generally of this Second Age as Prophetianism.

(Stuart-Glennie, 1873: 224)

Note that Stuart-Glennie includes “Christianism” and “Mohammedanism” as manifestations of the second age of humanity inaugurated by the moral revolution, despite their later emergence.

Given Stuart-Glennie’s explicit attention to prophetianism as characteristic of the new religions decades before Weber wrote, the question of whether Weber’s discussion of the age of prophets was or was not a possible influence on Jaspers is rendered relatively unimportant in the broader history of the moral revolution/axial age. But the question
Karl Jaspers, 1949 (trans. 1953)
“It would seem that this axis of history is to be found in the period around 500 B.C., in the spiritual process that occurred between 800 and 200 B.C. It is there that we meet with the most deep cut dividing line in history. Man, as we know him today, came into being. For short we may style this the ‘Axial Period.’

The most extraordinary events are concentrated in this period. Confucius and Lao Tse were living in China, all the schools of Chinese philosophy came into being, including Mo-ti, Chuang-tse, Lieh-tsu, and a host of others; India produced Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, ran the whole gamut of philosophical possibilities down to skepticism, to materialism, sophism and nihilism; In Iran Zarathustra taught a challenging view of the world as a struggle between good and evil; in Palestine prophets made their appearance, from Elijah, by way of Isaiah and Jeremiah to Deutero-Isaiah; Greece witnessed the appearance of Homer, of the philosophers—Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato—of the tragedians, Thucydides and Archimedes. Everything implied by these names developed during these few centuries almost simultaneously in China, India, and the West, without any one of these regions knowing the others” (1953, 3-4).

“What is new about this age, in all three areas of the world, is that man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation and redemption. By consciously recognizing his limits he sets himself the highest goals. He experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence.

All this took place in reflection. Consciousness became once more conscious of itself. In this age were born the fundamental categories within which we still think today, and the beginnings of the world religions, by which humans still live, were created” (1953, 2).

John Stuart-Glennie, 1889
“As I was the first to point out, and as I have again and again shown during the last fifteen years, the sixth century B.C. -more accurately the sixth-fifth century B.C. (550-450 B.C.)- is the true epoch of division between the Ancient and Modern Civilisations. The sixth-fifth century before Christ was the century of Confucius in China; of Buddha in India; of Gomates and Zoroastrianism as a political power in Persia; of the Babylonian Captivity (588-536); the so-called second Isaiah and the triumph of Yahvehisn, in Judea; of Psammetichus, its last Pharaoh, and of the worship of Isis and Horus, the divine Mother and Child, rather than of ‘Our Father,’ Osiris, in Egypt; of Thales, the Father of Philosophy; of Pythagoras and Xenophanes, the fathers also of Religious and Ethical Reform; and of Sappho and Alkaios, the first of the new subjective and lyric school of Poetry in Greece; and finally, in this rapid indication of its greater synchronisms, it was the century of that Persian world-empire of Kyros which, followed as it was by the Greek world-empire of Alexander, and the Roman world-empire of Caesar, established henceforth Aryan domination; it was the century in which Europe and Asia first appear as clearly differentiated; and it was the century of those political changes from Monarchies to Republics which were but the outward sign and seal of far profounder economic changes both in Greece and at Rome” (1889, 309, fn.1).

Stuart-Glennie, 1906
“Assyriological and Egyptological researches are more and more adding to our knowledge of the development of the earlier religions through the conflict between the primitive magical, or panzooist, and the new supernaturalist conception of Nature. The successive stages in this development cannot be, as yet, clearly distinguished. But one great epoch can be signalised—that which I was, I believe, the first, thirty-two years ago ([In the Morningland:] “New Philosophy of History,” 1873), to point out as having occurred in the sixth (or fifth-sixth) century B.C. in all the countries of civilisation from the Hoangho to the Tiber. There arose then, as revolts against the old religions of outward observance or custom, new religions of inward purification or conscience—in China, Confucianism; in India, Buddhism; in Persia, Zoroastrianism; in Syria, Yahvehisn (as a religion of the people rather than merely of the prophets), and changes of a similar character in the religions also of Egypt, of Greece, and of Italy (1906, 262).
arises of what effects might Stuart-Glennie’s articulation of prophetianism and the moral revolution have had for Weber or Jaspers’ thinking had his ideas been incorporated into broader sociological consideration.

The first citation by Stuart-Glennie in Figure 1 is taken from a footnote in his 1889 article, “The Traditions of the Archaian White Races,” which I recently discovered and discuss for the first time here. In the article, he recapitulates his 1873 theory of the moral revolution in places, along with biblical exegeses, while attempting to justify a “scientific” racialist theory for the origins of civilization (an unfortunate preoccupation of Stuart-Glennie’s which I have described and criticized elsewhere and will return to). One notices in these brief quotations the explicit parallels between Jaspers’ and Stuart-Glennie’s depictions. Stuart-Glennie also delineated, from 1873 and on, the ways the moral revolution manifested in three domains: the intellectual, the religious, and the socio-political. In the quotations cited here, for example, he draws attention to socio-political domain in citing the Persian world empire started by Cyrus (Kyros) as well as Greek and Roman republics. He also notes the transformations from religions based on custom to new religions based on conscience.

Stuart-Glennie’s mentions of the Babylonian Captivity, of Pythagoras and Cyrus, also indirectly allude to a kind of seldom acknowledged focal point in the moral revolution: Babylon. The question of whether Neo-Babylonians (like aspects of Egyptian religious culture also cited by Stuart-Glennie) can be considered elements of the moral revolution/axial age has been debated with a general consensus that they should not (e.g. Machinist, 1986: 183–202). The Neo-Babylonians clearly had more sophisticated mathematics and astronomy reaching far earlier than the Greeks, but didn’t “theorize” on it. But a number of experimental scientists today are primarily observational rather than theoretical: is it second-order reflective thought that matters, or is the proof in the pudding, so to speak, in the first-order numbers and predictable systems described.

Greek mathematics and astronomy owed much to the Neo-Babylonians, and the philosopher and mathematician Pythagoras is described as having spent a few years in Babylon learning from the Magi. Earlier he had traveled to Egypt and spent a decade or so there learning mathematics and astronomy as well as religious ideas, which remained an influence. Although details about Pythagoras’ philosophy are scant, could he represent a kind of “surfacing” of Babylonian and Egyptian movements that contributed to the birth of the moral revolution/axial age, such that more allowance be given to Mesopotamian and Egyptian ingredients? That is a question it seems to me that remains open today, especially given the legacy of the Judeans coming out of the second Babylonian exile, armed with Babylonian learning, including debates concerning monotheism and the Babylonian God Marduk, and needing to delineate in writing the new outlook that marks them as bearers of the moral revolution/axial age (Grabbe, 2004).

Jan Assmann has proposed the very useful idea of “proto-axiality” to signify intermediate stages rather than either/or distinctions (see also the discussion of varying standards for qualifying as axial or not in Boy and Torpey [2013]). But perhaps another way to view it is to see those Greek philosophers, such as Pythagoras, and the Judeans as standing on the shoulders of Neo-Babylonian giants, so to speak, in ushering in the moral revolution.
The 1889 footnote cited in Figure 1 filled in details on the moral revolution from a sentence in the essay where Stuart-Glenne (1889) argued that the “Books of Moses … the Pentateuch, or rather Hexateuch” should be viewed as an expression of the moral revolution rather than an earlier epoch:

Finally, I would point out what is too often forgotten, that the ‘Books of Moses’ can, as to form, literary, moral, and theological, be justly compared, not with Sacred Books composed millenniums before the Hebrew Scriptures, but only with the literatures contemporary with the Pentateuch, or rather Hexateuch, when it first assumed its present shape – that is to say, with the other literatures bearing the impress of that great Moral Revolution under the influence of which the Hexateuch was finally redacted, that great Moral Revolution of the Sixth Century B.C. which extended throughout all the countries of civilisation from the Hoang-ho and the Ganges to the Nile and the Tiber.

(p. 309)

In dating the Books of Moses to the sixth Century BCE, Stuart-Glenne saw the importance of comparison not with a literal chronology, vertically so to speak, but on the basis of “form, literary, moral, and theological,” with the movement of which it was an expression, horizontally, that is, “with the other literatures bearing the impress of that great Moral Revolution of the Sixth Century B.C.” This was perhaps similar to his mention of “the new subjective and lyrical school of poetry in Greece,” which was also an example of a new differentiation of subjective and objective realms as another characteristic of the moral revolution.

In this sense, his theory of the moral revolution allowed a deduction for a comparative history. Although Stuart-Glenne was a philosopher of history, in that sense, like Jaspers, he was also a working folklorist, a practice that would be largely absorbed into anthropology in the twentieth century as disciplines formed. One must remember that there were no sharp lines between folklore, sociology, and anthropology in the late nineteenth century and turn into the twentieth, and as Bennett (1997) put it in a review of a history of folklore and anthropology by George Stocking, “Stocking, in fact, stresses that anthropologists with a ‘sociological’ bent ‘were more likely to be active within the Folk-Lore Society’ than the Anthropological Institute” (pp. 120–121). Consider too Stuart-Glenne’s (1906) own words from the 1906 Sociological Society publication:

I submit that, whether the law of historical intellectual development which I have suggested, or what Comte dogmatically presented as a “grande loi philosophique,” more nearly approximates to a true description of historical facts, is a question, judgment on which must be pronounced – not by those who are ignorant of, or ignore, the immense recent increase of our sociological knowledge; but by those who, like myself, have spent a life-time in sociological research.

(p. 300)

He stated concerning his three-paper contribution:

I shall thus, I trust, be excused for prefacing papers on what must be the core of sociology, a law of historical intellectual development, by a paper on the place of the social sciences in a
classification of knowledge, based on a fundamental theory of mind and matter. But a theory of mind and matter is, in other words, a theory of causation.

(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 291)

Stuart-Glennie’s philosophy of history and depiction of the moral revolution was based on a theory of causation. Unlike Jaspers’ downplaying of material causes, preferring to see the axial age as a movement of spirit, Stuart-Glennie saw in its rise “a slow and extraordinarily varied working out of the antagonisms latent in primitive conceptions.” That is, as I shall discuss later, he saw “primitive” intuitions of nature as subjectively true, but clothed in false conceptions, an outlook he termed panzoonism. The development of history was a dialectical process, perhaps in Hegel’s sense though not deriving from Hegel’s philosophy, of the working out of that antagonism toward a resolution of true intuitions of nature clothed in true conceptions, a resolution that he thought would be brought about through science. The moral revolution, far from Jaspers’ conception of the axial age as the pivot of all history, was a transitional phase in this process, one primarily concerned with the differentiation of the subjective and objective. That differentiation would bring forth a dialectical development, especially in the development of the West, between the naturalism of Greek science and the supernaturalism of the Abrahamic religions:

This conflict has been a slow and extraordinarily varied working out of the antagonisms latent in primitive conceptions; yet not a merely futile conflict, but one the long aeon of which constituted in all its ages – from that which began in the eighth or ninth millennium B.C. to that present age which may be dated from the sixth century B.C. – a vast and complex transition to a generally truer conception of causation, and hence to greater power over nature. Thus the transitional stage which Hume wisely forborne, and Comte rashly ventured to characterise, is now presented as an aeon of such conflicts as it would be as grotesque to qualify, like Comte, as “metaphysical,” as to date, as he does, from the quatorzieme siécle of the Christian era. And the appeal here against Comte is to all that recently accumulated mass of Ethnographical, Assyriological, and Egyptological discoveries of which he could not, and his disciples will not, take account. The third clause of the law presents the latest, if not ultimate, conception of causation as, with clear definiteness, connected with the primitive conception; and as, in the complexity of its integration of the differentiations of the Transitional Aeon, illustrating that general law of thought which Dr. Stirling has called “The Secret of Hegel.”

(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 300–301)

As a folklorist, philology was an essential tool for Stuart-Glennie, especially in some of his empirical work in the Balkans. He raised here and elsewhere the issue of inscription as indicative of the Jewish manifestation of the broader moral revolution, a point related to the questions of the influence of technological and intellectual innovations, as well as canonization of texts, as crucial for the spread of “axialization” raised by Jan Assmann.

Assmann (2012a) has argued against what could be called literary determinism as a cause of the axial age, in favor of “implications of writing” of certain qualities as significant, especially the establishment of a “cultural literacy,” in which cultural memories and innovations, such as history displacing myth, and canonization become central. He views
the period between 200 BCE and 200 CE as when those texts became canonical in those expressions, those “literatures bearing the impress of that great Moral Revolution,” as Stuart-Glennie put it. In Assmann’s (2012b) words,

The decisive event is not the terrestrial existence of the great individuals but the canonization of their writings … Canonization … is not an individual but a social and collective process … If we insist on a first period of axialization, we could point to the years about 200 B.C.E. to 200 CE when the great canons were established: the Confucian, the Daoist, and the Buddhist canons in the East, and the Avesta, the Hebrew bible and the canon of Greek “classics” in the West. This is not the time when Homo sapiens axialis, “the human being with whom we are still living,” came into being, but when the texts were canonized that we are still reading.

(p. 399)

In this connection, it was not simply literacy per se or the later canonization but novel forms of writing to which Stuart-Glennie drew attention, an interesting perspective to add to Assmann’s “implications of writing.” In his original 1873 statement, Stuart-Glennie (1873) noted the influence of technological and intellectual literary invention in the spread of the moral revolution in the period around the Sixth century BCE:

Throughout the civilised world, in Japan (?), China, India, Persia, Judaea, Greece, and Egypt, we find a new intellectual activity in collecting, editing, and for the first time writing down in alphabetic characters the Literature of the preceding centuries. It is only in this century that a Profane, as distinguished from a Sacred Literature arises; only from this time forth that, speaking generally, we have independent and nameable individual authors; and only now that, in the speculations of Thales, philosophical, as distinguished from religious Speculation, begins. And further, it is to this century that is to be traced, in the down-writing of the Ormuzd- and-Ahriman Creed of the Persians and the new development of the Messiahism of the Jews, the first beginnings of general reflection on the Past, and speculation on the Future of Mankind; the first beginnings, therefore, of Universal, and Philosophical History; the first beginnings of such reflection and speculation as that with which we are ourselves now occupied.

(pp. 212–214)

Clearly, the rise of reflective mind is significant, a key point also from Jaspers on. And in a footnote to this statement,

This is clear with respect to China, India, Persia, and Greece … In Judaea, however, and in Egypt, we find partial exceptions to this generalisation. For though by far the greater part of the Hebrew Literature owes, if not its substance to writers, at least its form, to editors of the Sixth and later centuries; still, certain prophecies, those at least of Joel and of Amos, would appear not only in their present shape to belong to, but to have been written by nameable authors of the eighth or ninth century. See Davidson, Introduction to Old Testament (1862), and compare Ewald. As to Egypt the exception lies in this, that we have hieroglyphic and hieratic Papyri of an immensely earlier date. But the generalisation still holds in this, that it is only to the Sixth Century that the demotic or popular form of writing can be traced.

(Stuart-Glennie, 1873: 213)
Stuart-Glenennie noted ways in which Egypt contributed new cultural expressions indicative of the moral revolution, such as the development of popular writing, or earlier, the near outbreak of monotheism with Akhenaten. He also admitted that Egypt did not provide a clear example of a thorough transformation to the moral revolution, consistent with the consensus of later scholarship.

The mistaken origins of civilization

Stuart-Glenennie, though a socialist and advocate for worker rights, sought a racial understanding of the origins of civilization, which needs to be addressed. He attempted to understand the division of labor in early civilization as a result of lighter skinned races dominating darker ones, which allowed the dominators the leisure to develop the arts, crafts, and sciences that emerged with civilizations. He claimed biological support for the superiority of lighter skinned races, which, despite the widespread scientific racism, was already a matter of contention in biology and anthropology debates of the time, eventually to be rejected in the first decades of the twentieth century through works, for example, of Boas and others. As Stuart-Glenennie (1892) put it in an 1892 essay on the “Origins of Mythology,”

Innumerable Human Societies exist, and have always existed, which are no more distinguished by progress than are Animal Societies. Why? The answer I would suggest is, that these Human Societies are no more distinguished than are Animal Societies by that Conflict of Higher and Lower Races, which, through the subjection of the Lower Races, gives the Higher Races wealth, and hence leisure and opportunity for the development of those higher intellectual capacities which would otherwise lie dormant – gives leisure and opportunity, in a word, for that development of Thought which is the core and cause of progressive history.

(p. 218)

Although a socialist, Stuart-Glenennie was not persuaded by Marx and Engels’ claims for class differentiation rather than race in early civilized societies as a basis for domination, although he did admit it as a later development. He defined civilization in his 1905 papers for the Sociological Society as

Civilisation is such a relation between higher and lower races (or, at a later period, classes of the same race) as results in enforced organisation of food-production and -distribution, followed by such economic conditions as make possible the planning and execution of great public works, the invention and development of phonetic writing, and the initiation of intellectual development generally. But as civilised and progressive societies began, they maintained themselves, through the conflict not only of races (or classes), but of ideas. Assyriological and Egyptological researches are more and more adding to our knowledge of the development of the earlier religions through the conflict between the primitive magical, or panzoist, and the new supernaturalist conception of Nature.

(Stuart-Glenennie, 1906: 261–262)

Contrary to Stuart-Glenennie’s origins of civilization thesis, the establishment of bureaucratic elites and increases in inequality appear in the emergence of all agriculturally based
civilizations, including those established in the new world, regardless of racial differences or racial homogeneity. If Stuart-Glennie had not been so stubbornly fixated on the widespread “scientific” racism of his time, and had been able to see class differentiation rather than racial origins as key, and that the differentiation into dominating and subordinate classes was a product rather than producer of civilizing processes, resulting from systemic conditions of domestication, agriculture, and settlement, including rapidly expanding populations and increasing hierarchical organization, he would have been on much sounder ground.

Stuart-Glennie (1901: 454) thought that pre-civilized societies had less leisure, yet the actual archaeological and anthropological records that began to emerge in the late 1960s reveal clearly that foraging societies have more leisure and better nutrition than agriculturally based civilized ones on average, and that what agriculturally based civilization did was to siphon off leisure and higher quality nutrition for the tiny elite, while the mass of people worked much harder and ate less well. Average heights in civilized societies, old world as well as new, fall 4–6 inches from the reduction of a wide variety of food sources from foraging to dependence on limited grains, such as wheat, barley, or rice (see Eaton et al., 1988; Lee and DeVore, 1968; Mummert et al., 2011; Sahlins, 1973).

In his 1901 essay, “The Law of Historical Intellectual Development,” Stuart-Glennie (1901) also asked, “And how could individuals of a homogenous race have had the authority permanently to impose on others of the same race the sacrifices required by such labor and restraint?” (p. 454). He seemed to think that only difference could make the difference for the origins of civilization, neglecting how differentiation within a homogeneous group could accomplish the same purpose. The inventions of priestly class and of divine kinship, as Lewis Mumford (1967, 1970) pointed out, provided means of legitimating the harsher conditions required by agricultural civilization. The Babylonian myth of creation, the Atrahasis, illustrates how the portrayal of struggle among the gods, mythically mirroring the increased workload of civilized society, was solved by the creation of humans to do the work of the gods, thereby legitimating the harsh conditions as religious service.

It is odd that Stuart-Glennie failed to see how religious legitimation, backed by military muscle, could empower the emergent elite domination of laboring classes, especially since he was aware of how the process worked, only applying it to race. If one simply substitutes “class” for “race” in his work, he would have given a good explanation of how dominating power legitimimized itself through state religion:

… it can hardly, I think, be doubted that one very potent cause of the development of homely supernal, into stately supernatural, beings, worshipped in elaborate and grandly spectacular rites was the need, the very practical and pressing need of cultivating every germ of the emotions of reverence, awe, and fear, in order to the due subordination and discipline of the lower races.

(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 261)

The rise of supernatural beings and of what he called the rise of “Hell religions” is shown to be an aspect of dominating bureaucratic legitimation, religio-cultural components of the bureaucratic machine.
Jaspers, with the racism of National Socialism discredited in postwar Europe, was not subject to the same racist prejudices that marked Stuart-Glennie’s much earlier theory. But he held strong prejudices of his own. He completely discounted the spiritual views of non-civilizational peoples as insignificant, stating, “We see the vast territories of Northern Asia, Africa, and America, which were inhabited by men but saw the birth of nothing of importance to the history of the spirit” (Jaspers, 1953: 22). Jaspers drew from German anthropology, which was biologically based and at the time had little interest in ethnography. He seemed unaware of the vast body of ethnographies that had been done over many decades, from which, for example, Durkheim and Stuart-Glennie had drawn, and did not offer any convincing evidence for claiming “nothing of importance for the history of spirit.” And he denied much enduring significance to pre-axial civilizational beliefs, calling them “little islands of light” (Jaspers, 1954: 98) in comparison with the great breakthrough of reflective consciousness in axial age religions and philosophies (see Figure 2).

Stuart-Glennie, by contrast, provided a historical account that accorded great significance to non-civilizational beliefs, linking them with modern science while viewing the moral revolution as a transitional phase. Although Stuart-Glennie’s racist account of the origins of civilization was false, his broader philosophy of history allowed more to the spiritual outlook of indigenous peoples than Jaspers, as well as a more nuanced dialectical historical process stemming out of the moral revolution all the way to his present day.

Stuart-Glennie’s theory of panzooinism, in allowing religion as involving perceptive relations to nature, attributes reality to non-civilizational folk beliefs as true intuitions of nature, albeit clothed in false conceptions, which would find completion in verified

Figure 2. Enduring significance of religious ideas from different ages.
conceptions of modern science. This theory has much to contribute to contemporary debates in the social sciences and philosophy concerning the legitimacy of “the new animism” (Harvey, 2005; Halton, 2005, 2007).

And he viewed the moral revolution/axial age, by contrast with panzooinism and with Jaspers’ view of it as pivotal, as a transitional phase. Although significant, he argued that it had lost the true perceptive intuition of nature in the turn to the transcendent “supernaturalist” conceptions of divinity. In sum, although Stuart-Glennie’s racialist theory of the origins of civilization is false and must be rejected, it does not diminish the significance of his original theory of the moral revolution and its relevance today, or his understanding of the subjective validity of panzooinism.

**Panzooinism, the moral revolution, and the United States of Europe**

As a philosopher of history, socialist, and folklorist, Stuart-Glennie developed a philosophy of history in contrast not only to Jaspers but also to Comte’s three-stage view of history as originating in superstition and culminating in science. Comte (1988 [1830]) argued that the first, theological state represents phenomena “as being produced by the direct and continuous action of more or less numerous supernatural agents, whose arbitrary intervention explains all the apparent anomalies of the universe”. From there, human intelligence passed through the metaphysical state, arriving at the state of positive science, “its fixed and definitive state.” He included in the first state all religions up to and including monotheism. By contrast, Stuart-Glennie viewed aboriginal and earliest civilizational religions as a first stage of “panzooinism,” or what he sometimes called “naturianism,” and as based in true *intuitions* of nature, though clothed in false *conceptions*, rather than “arbitrary intervention” of supernatural beings. Panzooinism is a worldview centered in circumambient life, an outlook commonly called animism today, but as I will discuss below, distinguished for theoretical reasons by Stuart-Glennie from Tylor’s original definition of animism.

Stuart-Glennie distinguished between “supernal beings,” as the intuitive personifications of nature of the first stage, from supernatural beings and states, which represent religions of hierarchical civilization as well as the later movements from immanence toward transcendence characterizing the moral revolution, including, for example, monotheism and Greek logos. Despite his false racial presumptions, he did see clearly how civilization also introduced profound transformations of spiritual views, which corresponded to hierarchical organization. The moral revolution marks Stuart-Glennie’s second stage of humanity. He also drew attention to a greater degree of panzooinism and the significance of nature remaining in the Eastern manifestations of the moral revolution, such as Daoism, a nuance missing in Jaspers. One might take this perhaps as ethnocentric “orientalism,” although it does not seem to me to be Stuart-Glennie’s intent: far from it.

Stuart-Glennie saw clearly that China and India were major centers of the moral revolution, and it should be remembered that panzooinism has a closer connection, through subjective intuitions, to the truth than less panzooinist manifestations of the moral revolution, a still remaining greater place for the wild other and its informing properties in
worldview. The example of Daoism allows that panzooinist influence, although refracted through the reflective lens of the moral revolution. Discussing the anthology traditionally attributed to *Chuang-tzu*, Komjathy (2011) states,

Within the contours of the *Zhuangzi*, we find diverse views of animals, but there is a recurring engagement with and reverence for their innate connection with the Dao (the Way). This includes a critique of the human tendency to distort that connection through domestication and instrumentalism. The classical and foundational Daoist worldview is thus more theocentric (Dao-centered) and cosmocentric and less anthropocentric. One also occasionally finds expressed a quasi-ecological and conservationist perspective. Generally speaking, Daoist views and practices tend to be more body-affirming and world-affirming than other “world religions,” and this tendency includes a recognition of the cosmos, world, and all beings as manifestations of the Dao, at least in potentiality. Here one finds expressed a monistic, panenhenic and perhaps animistic theological view. That is, the Dao is simultaneously manifested as a single impersonal reality, as Nature itself, and as animating forces (“nature gods”) within Nature … one of the most radical Daoist perspectives is also one of the most authoritative and influential: it is the one found in the *Zhuangzi*, wherein animals are viewed as embodiments of the Dao and as potential teachers of humans.

In his 1873 work, *In the Morningland*, Stuart-Glennie criticized Tylor’s definition of animism, published only 2 years earlier in his book *Primitive Culture* (1871), and claimed Tylor should have termed his theory “spiritism,” because of its idea of an animating principle from without, a “phantom.” Stuart-Glennie’s panzooinism, by contrast, took the conception of immanence of power in Nature itself, of the livingness of things, themselves regarded as powers, as a more basic and accurate way to portray “primitive” folk or aboriginal beliefs as well as early civilizational polytheisms. As he put it in 1906, the fundamental implication of this conception is that of inherency of power in Nature itself. This implication there is also both in the panzoism of folk-religions and the pantheism of culture – religions. The fundamental conceptions, therefore, of science find no such antagonism in the Eastern pantheistic and atheistic religions as they have found, and of the most remorselessly persecuting character, in Western Christianity. Hence the triumph of scientific conceptions might appear to be the certain result of the present epoch of Asian-European conflict. But … we have no assurance that, as in the fall of the Roman Empire and the triumph of Christianism, there will not again be a victory of all lower elements.

This view allowed the possibility of a perceptive relation to the informing properties of the livingness of things as a basis of religious and social life, of religion and social life as rooted in habitat relations. And as the previous quotation makes clear, he viewed modern science as moving toward true intuitions of nature clothed in true conceptions. In that he was a progressivist, as was Comte. But he distinguished his philosophy of history from Comte’s, stating in his 1906 essay,
First, my standpoint is wholly different, not only philosophically, but historically from Comte’s: philosophically, it is a theory of causation very different (as indicated in my first paper) from Comte’s, the crudeness of which Mr. Mill himself was among the first to point out; and historically, it is a standpoint no less different in taking such a survey of intellectual development as only the results of research since Comte’s time have made possible. Secondly, I define and contrast, yet connect, the primitive and ultimate conceptions of causation – the panzoist and kosmianist stages, as I call them – in, as I submit, a more definite and more verifiable way than Comte – namely, as the former an unquantified intuition, and the latter a quantified conception of universal interaction. And thirdly, dating the commencement of the great Transitional Æon from the origin of civilisation instead of, as Comte did, from the fourteenth century, B.C., I define it by no such epithets as either “metaphysical” or “abstractional,” but as a succession of ages of Conflicts of Ideas developing the antagonisms latent in primitive or panzoist conceptions of sentient powers and supernal beings, and working up, through these conflicts of ideas, more and more definitely distinguishable as naturalist and supernaturalist, to those more verifiable conceptions which may be regarded as relatively ultimate, and designated kosmianist.

(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 301–302)

Stuart-Glennie notes here in 1906 how the earliest panzooinist and yet to fully emerge scientifically informed “kosmianist” stages are linked by conceptions of causality, in contrast to Comte’s claim for a movement from arbitrary ideas to positive science. The kosmianist stage is for Stuart-Glennie the third age of humankind only then beginning to show its outlines, wherein intellectual, religious, and socio-political domains are purified through the developments of science. As he already put it in 1873,

working up to such an integration as will, in the variously outwrought conception of mutual determination, mark that third age of humanity, towards the opening of which, in the establishment of new syntheses, philosophical, religious and social, we should seem to be approaching.

(Stuart-Glennie, 1873: 223)

Stuart-Glennie’s conception of the origins of science is also noteworthy. In contrast to a number of epistemological views which argue for scientific thinking as a conceptual practice, some even requiring the theoretically reflective advent of Greek science as a standard, Stuart-Glennie (1906) allows for a kind of “grass roots” origins in panzooinist intuitions, unquantified in contrast to modern scientific quantified conceptions:

The facts I have generalised in the first clause of the law I have stated appear to show that scientific thinking originated in a primitive intuition of universal interaction, and that the germ from which gods were developed were the supernals, the creation of primitive poetry … But again, how is the primitive panzoist conception to be distinguished from, yet connected with, the scientific conception of reciprocal action? And how are the panzoist to be distinguished from, yet connected with, the kosmianist creations of supernal beings? The inferences from the facts referred to in the third clause of the law stated distinguish panzoist from kosmian conceptions of reciprocal action as the former unquantified, the latter quantified; and distinguish the supernal beings created by panzoist from those created by kosmianist poetry, as the former
unrecognisedly and the latter recognisedly subjective merely; and the law of the passage from the former to the latter set of conceptions and creations is verified in the conflicts of the transitional aeon of civilization … in the development of the sciences, the result of the conflict between naturalism and supernaturalism, the necessary stage of the creation of hypotheses, less and less crude and unverifiable as knowledge has increased, would be more correctly termed the hypothetical, than the “metaphysical,” stage.

(p. 303)

Stuart-Glennie’s philosophy of history was a nuanced dialectic, from the first age of panzoooinism, to the second and transitional age of the conflict between naturalism and supernaturalism arising out of the moral revolution, marked especially in the West between the contradictions of naturalistic Greek science and Judeo-Christian supernaturalism, to the third age of kosmianism. This dialectic was marked by 500-year phases, culminating in the victory of the kosmian age by 2000. Here is another summary statement by Stuart-Glennie (1901), from his 1901 essay:

In an historical survey of intellectual development since the origin of civilization, stages are presented in the past, and a stage may be inferred in the future thus characterizable: a first stage, marked by the incipient development, in sub-stages, hereafter to be distinguished, of the antagonisms latent in primitive panzoist conceptions, and progressively manifest in the history of nature-religions or naturianism; a second stage, initiated by the new moral religions of the sixth century B.C., and their concomitant changes, and marked, in the West particularly, by the definite differentiation and determined conflict of the naturalist and supernaturalist conceptions incipient only in the first stage; and a third stage marked by the victory of a more adequate naturalism in a kosmianism distinguished by verified conceptions of a quantitatively determined (instead of, as primitively, quantitatively undetermined) universal interaction; and by at once nobler and more verifiable ideals than either the earlier supernal, or later supernatural, beings and their abodes.

(p. 459)

The advent of the moral revolution marked the rise of what he called the supernatural religions:

The new religions, on the other hand, of Western Asia and Europe, the Yahvehism of the sixth century B.C.; the Christianism of half a millennium later; and the Islamism after another half millennium, were, for the first time, supernatural religions, not in their popular forms only, but in their essential principle, the conception, not of a Power immanent in, but of a Creator independent of, Nature.

(Stuart-Glennie, 1873: 262–263)

Given the changes from state religions toward religions of the people, as in the religions of the book cited by Stuart-Glennie, it is notable that supernaturalism, manifest in monotheism, still retains in transposed form the hierarchy, or what Morris Berman (2000) has called “the sacred authority complex,” inherent in earlier polytheistic state
religions. Perhaps that could be a factor in why, although beginning as marginal counter-cultures to centralized power, religions such as Christianity could become fused to power complexes, as happened in the Roman Empire.

Stuart-Glennie believed the dialectic of 500-year phases between naturalism and supernaturalism would be resolved in favor of science, resulting in a religion of humanism by the twenty-first century (see Figure 3). Rather than dissolving religion, as in Comte, science would purify it, as he stated in the quotation above, in “a more adequate naturalism in a kosmianism.” He saw the possibilities of science as, in a sense, a completion of panzoooinism, correcting its one-sidedness, as he called it. What has happened is, of course, far more complicated than his optimism allowed. The birth of the atomic age, signaled in the atomic bomb, brought a darker power culture of science into being, as both Jaspers and Mumford were among the very first thinkers to point out, far removed from the enlightened humanistic age Stuart-Glennie envisioned. Yet, there are perhaps some similarities to Jaspers’ view of the future of religion as allowing for greater humanistic outlook, although Jaspers still held for the enduring place of the axial.

One of the earliest commentators on the axial theme, Lewis Mumford, was also oddly largely excluded from the scholarly debates on the axial age, despite being a well-known public intellectual. Mumford could also be considered a sociologist, having served as editor of The Sociological Review in 1920, but has also been sorely neglected by sociologists, despite his numerous writings on cities, technology, history, and human development. He

Figure 3. Stuart-Glennie’s history of religion.
devoted a chapter to “Axial Man” in his 1956 book *The Transformations of Man*, before sociologists expressed interest in the theme, and cites Stuart-Glennie as a forerunner. Mumford knew this because he had been brought to London by Patrick Geddes, who had been a friend of Stuart-Glennie and had written his obituary, to serve as editor of *The Sociological Review*. *The Sociological Review* was founded as a continuation of the annual volumes published as *Sociological Papers*, to which Stuart-Glennie had contributed his discussions of the moral revolution, “Sociological Studies,” in Volume 2 in 1906.

Mumford’s theory of the modern world, expressed, for example, in *The Myth of the Machine* (1967–1970), is independent of academic sociology’s Parsonian canon of the time, and can even be taken as an anti-Parsonian alternative. In its two volumes, he presents a more developed chronological account of human development than he did in *The Transformations of Man* (1956). It includes further critical discussions of the axial age, and again cites Stuart-Glennie (mistakenly as “Glennie”) as a forerunner, though again, without discussion of any details of Stuart-Glennie’s theory of the moral revolution. Mumford (1970) does note that despite Stuart-Glennie’s “overelaborated terminology, he was the first to invent such necessary terms as ‘mechanotechnic’ and ‘biotechnic’” (p. 448).

With his serious interest in proper terminology, Stuart-Glennie was also critical of the term sociology, coined by Comte, not only because of its “barbaric mongrelism” in combining Latin and Greek but also because he thought its use was already too vague to be valid as scientific terminology. Nevertheless, as he put it in “The Place of the Social Sciences in a Classification of Knowledges,” Part 1 of his contribution to the 1906 *Sociological Papers* volume, he allowed that “it may still desirably live, not only to serve, in Mr. Branford’s words, ‘the vague purposes of popular usage’, but that definitely twofold purpose of our Sociological Society which he has so admirably defined in the terms above cited” (Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 252).³

Stuart-Glennie (1879) discussed the legacy of the moral revolution as involved in “the modern revolution” developing through the conflicted dialectic between Greek science and Christian ideals, the dialectic framed in 500-year periods of history. Whether or not his 500-year cycle model is sound – Charles Peirce also proposed such a view, and Mumford suggested that 600-year cycles might be more accurate – it did lead Stuart-Glennie to make an uncanny prediction in 1906 that this dialectic would involve likely transformations for the twentieth century, such as a Russian revolution, and a war between Russia and Germany that would lead to a “United States of Europe” by the year 2000. Rather than socialism developing out of a heavily industrialized nation, Russian expansionism would lead the way:

And vaguely as has hitherto loomed on the political horizon a general European, and therefore world-wide, war, its fatality will assume very definite outlines if we consider the probable consequences of the already achieved results of this sixth European-Asian conflict. Defeated in Further Asia by Japan, and encountered on the British Indian Frontier not only by a re-organised Army, but by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the aims of Russian Foreign Policy will be redirected to the realization of Pan-Slavic dreams of unification. The Tsardom, however, will probably first be transformed or overthrown. For Russia will probably begin the new European Revolution as France began the last, more than a century ago. Sooner or later these Russian National aims will come into conflict with German Imperial ambitions. And the way will thus
be prepared for that general Nationalist and Socialist Revolution which will create the United States of Europe.

(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 275)

Stuart-Glennie’s extraordinary prediction got a lot right. Yet, “the new European Revolution” he outlined materialized far more darkly than Stuart-Glennie imagined, manifesting as the totalitarian Soviet Union and National Socialism of Nazi Germany, the massive deaths their conflict in World War II involved, and the divided Europe of the half century cold war which was its legacy.¹ A “United States of Europe” did come into being in the form of the European Union (EU), and within the time frame Stuart-Glennie imagined. Although, ironically perhaps, Russia remains outside the EU today, its “Pan-Slavic dreams of unification” are rearing up again. And questions concerning the continuation of the EU itself have begun to emerge with the vote by the United Kingdom to exit.

Conclusion

Stuart-Glennie, Mumford, and Jaspers each developed comparative theories of history of profound import for sociology, delineating themes ranging not only from pre-civilized “panzooinist” religious outlooks and the emergence of the moral revolution/axial age, but addressing the meaning of those historical shifts for the modern world. Yet, they remain marginal at best or absent from sociological discussions of “comparative history.” Jaspers, for example, is cited only once in the 2005 edited volume on comparative history, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology, in a footnote in Philip S. Gorski’s chapter, and there is no mention of Mumford in the book. Gorski (2005) suggested that Jaspers’ axial age theory provides a broader understanding of Max Weber’s discussions of “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions,” as indicating a collapse of the axial age synthesis. Throwing Mumford and Stuart-Glennie into the mix would broaden the perspective for comparative history much further again, perhaps even to the point where Weber becomes the footnote on this theme.

John Stuart-Glennie and Lewis Mumford each contributed major dimensions missing from Jaspers’ theory of the axial age.⁵ Although Jaspers has perhaps played an increasing role in sociological discussions concerning history, all of them, including Jaspers, deserve more attention than they have been given. Why these major thinkers remain occluded from the discipline of sociology (and the sub-discipline of historical sociology, a sub-discipline that is, after all, supposed to be actively concerned about history) suggests how important it is for sociologists to remain open to “unheard voices,” and closed to the canonizing text book mentality of accepted ideas.

Stuart-Glennie’s theory of the moral revolution and understanding of the panzooinist outlook as characterizing aboriginal worldviews have much to add to contemporary discussions of the axial age as well as key debates in theory, comparative history, and the sociology of religion. By grounding the moral revolution in a larger three-part philosophy of history, Stuart-Glennie opens the scope of the axial age debate. His idea that religion is rooted in perceptive relations to habitat “terrestrial conditions” provides an alternative to traditional understandings of animism as originally expressed by Tylor, but
also, for example, to Durkheim’s conceptualist idea of religion as human sociality projected onto nature rather than a transaction with nature.

Panzooinism as habitat relation is an insight that goes directly to contemporary debates on “the new animism” (Harvey, 2005: xi) as a relational ontology (Bird-David, 2000; Ingold, 2011) rather than animism as attributes ascribed to substances. Things can speak not simply as isolate substances, but as signs living in our relations to them, potential learning relationships worthy of our attention and respect. Stuart-Glennie’s scientific progressivism would seem to be at odds with some of the contemporary discussions, yet provides an interesting historical context on the movement away from perceptive panzooinism toward supernaturalism often missing from these debates.

Despite the “marginal” insights into the synchronicities by the earliest commentators, which should be given greater exposition, it is clear that the history of the theory known thus far as the axial age needs to be rewritten, and that John Stuart-Glennie needs to be credited as the originator. His theory of the moral revolution also has the advantage that it does not make the moral revolution the key pivot of all history, as Jaspers claimed for the “axial” age. It attempted to ground the outlook in the material conditions of social life, though not always successfully, as in his assertion of racial origins of civilization. Still, his ideas were far ahead of their time, and now, more than a hundred years later, it is time for sociology to acknowledge the opportunity it missed in 1906, when Stuart-Glennie’s last major discussion of the moral revolution appeared within the pages of Sociological Papers, providing a historically informed, sociologically grounded theory of the moral revolution decades before Jaspers’ theory of the axial age or Alfred Weber’s ideas on the phenomena. That neglect was to the detriment of sociology’s historical and global imagination, and it is time to fix it.

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Notes

1. Anquetil-Duperron did not develop a full theory of the phenomenon, but only a mention of the synchronicity as significant. As I noted elsewhere (Halton, 2014). Johann P. Arnason commented on this “prehistory” of the moral revolution/axial age theory, including Anquetil-Duperron: “Its history would thus be comparable to the notion of civilizations in the plural: both go back to marginal eighteenth-century intuitions that are later developed into fully-fledged concepts” Johann Arnason, “The Axial Age and Its Interpreters: Reopening a Debate.” In Axial Civilizations and World History. Edited by J. P. Arnason, S. N. Eisenstadt, and B. Wittrock, 19. (Leiden, NLD: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005), 21. Although such predecessors are important to the history of the theory, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Stuart-Glennie did not appear to know of these earlier writers, stating repeatedly that he was the first to provide a comprehensive historical theory of the phenomena.
2. Stuart-Glennie was aware of the work of fellow Aberdeen biblical scholar and philologist William Robertson Smith (1846–1894) and cited it in the essay from which this quotation is taken. It would be interesting to know whether they corresponded on Stuart-Glennie’s theory of the moral revolution, given that Smith also developed a comprehensive account for the origins of Semitic civilization, for example, in his book, *The Religion of the Semites*, also published in 1889.

3. Stuart-Glennie (1906) proposed instead the terms anthropology and *dikaiosynics*:

> there is in the undifferentiated popular conception of sociology, a notion, more or less clear, of such a utilization of knowledge as may ameliorate social conditions. But in a far more definite and systematic manner will this idea be realized when sociology, as popularly conceived, has differentiated into an evolutionary science, an anthropology, aiming at and discovering the laws of man’s history, and an ethical science, a *dikaiosynics*, as I have termed it, aiming at and discovering the conditions of just institutions.

(p. 253)

In the previous volume published a year earlier, Stuart-Glennie (1905) had raised a similar objection in responding to a paper by Durkheim, stating,

> Surely it would be desirable with less vagueness to define both Anthropology and Sociology (or, as I should rather say, *Politology*) by restricting the connotation of the former term to the Causal, and the other to the corresponding Applied, general science of Man.

(p. 234)

4. Stuart-Glennie’s statement from the 1905 Sociological Society meeting, published in 1906, reminds one of another original historian’s prophetic insight from 1905, Henry Adams (1938), who wrote in a letter to Henry Osborn Taylor:

> The assumption of unity which was the mark of human thoughts in the middle-ages has yielded very slowly to the proofs of complexity. The stupor of science before radium is a proof of it. Yet it is quite sure, according to my score of ratios and curves, that, at the accelerated rate of progression shown since 1600, it will not need another century or half century to tip thought upside down. Law, in that case, would disappear as theory or a priori principle, and give place to force. Morality would become police. Explosives would reach cosmic violence. Disintegration would overcome integration.

(pp. 391–392)

Adams’ method of quantifying the rise of physical power, like Stuart-Glennie’s 500-year cycles, may have been faulty, but, like Stuart-Glennie, it allowed his intuitive powers to make startling predictions. The first bomb of “cosmic violence,” the atomic bomb, exploded about 40 years after Adams’ prediction.

5. Another major yet unknown contributor, surprisingly, is D. H. Lawrence, whose contribution I have discovered and addressed elsewhere (Halton, 2014; 2016), and do not have the space to discuss here. Lawrence developed an original and critical perspective on the age in 1929, and did not share the optimistic sense of progressivism one finds in Stuart-Glennie and Jaspers.
References


**Author biography**